Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni
Recent Developments: Planes, Trains
and UAVs
For years, analysts have argued that, from Beijing’s perspective, it mattered little who ultimately “won” in Libya. China’s priority, the argument went, was to keep open channels to all plausible power centers, ensuring a seat at the table when postwar reconstruction began.
China’s hedge, however, may no longer be evenly balanced. A growing body of reporting suggests that China’s interest in Libya may be drifting eastward, away from the GNU and toward Haftar. Where Chinese firms once avoided acknowledging interest in the east, now the picture looks markedly different.
Reports of Chinese interest in the Haftar-controlled Benghazi airport, the ports of Tobruk and Sirte, and long-discussed railway links connecting Cyrenaica to the Sahel now circulate with increasing frequency, often framed within the BRI.
However, these projects’ feasibility and the depth of Chinese financial commitment remain an open question. Much of the apparent uptick may simply reflect improving operating conditions in the east, particularly following the establishment of the Energy and Mining Bank, intended to provide eastern authorities greater financial autonomy and contracting capacity.
Even if the headline projects remain aspirational, Chinese firms appear sufficiently active in the east to have provoked a reaction from Tripoli: the GNU has suspended Huawei’s operations in western Libya, citing the company’s role in developing telecommunications infrastructure in LNA-controlled areas.
Economic engagement with multiple sides is hardly unusual for China, and, on its own, would not signal a strategic realignment. What has truly fueled speculation are several high-profile, security-related episodes that hint, however ambiguously, at a more direct role.
In June 2024, Italian customs authorities intercepted two Chinese-made military drones at the port of Gioia Tauro. Shipped from Yantian and bound for Haftar-controlled Benghazi, the cargo was concealed as wind turbine components, an apparent attempt to circumvent the UN arms embargo on Libya.
More troubling still was an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which alleged that China-linked firms had plotted to supply the LNA with up to US$1 billion worth of drones, disguised as COVID-19 humanitarian assistance. Shell companies were allegedly used to mask state involvement, with the investigation suggesting the possible deliberate involvement of Chinese state-owned defense firms and even elements of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Investigators went further, suggesting that Beijing’s underlying logic may have been “using war to end war quickly” by tipping the balance in Haftar’s favor. That conclusion, however, remains contested. Ghiselli, for example, has cautioned against reading the episode as evidence of a centrally directed Chinese strategy, noting that even large Chinese state-owned enterprises have at times acted with considerable autonomy, often to Beijing’s irritation.
Moreover, Chinese-made drones have been present in Libya for more than a decade, most prominently the Wing Loong systems deployed by the LNA as early as 2016. Those drones were procured and operated by the UAE, not China, with Beijing insisting that such sales were purely commercial transactions unrelated to its political stance on Libya. Even Western officials have largely concurred.
In 2020, Wolfgang Pusztai, former Austrian defense attaché to Libya and chairman of the advisory board of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations, noted that there was no evidence China had directly supplied weapons to either side. Chinese drones, after all, are ubiquitous across the region and can just as easily be found trained on one another in the arsenals of rival states such as Algeria and Morocco.
More recent developments, however, have further muddied the waters. Last month, Pakistan reportedly finalized a US$4 billion deal to supply the LNA with military equipment over the next two and a half years, including sixteen JF-17 “Thunder” fighter jets.
The fourth-generation fighter is jointly developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, a fact that has drawn attention to Beijing’s possible role. However, the driving force behind this deal appears to be Pakistani, not Chinese.
Islamabad has aggressively marketed the JF-17 as a cost-effective, combat-tested alternative to Western aircraft following its reportedly successful deployment during recent clashes with India.
This push is both recent and potentially overextended, and may amount more to marketing than sustainable export capacity. Libya remains subject to a UN arms embargo – frequently violated, but still consequential – and analysts have questioned if Pakistan has the industrial and logistical capacity to honor a growing slate of large, long-term, and in some cases unconfirmed defense agreements, most notably an alleged deal with Saudi Arabia.
These uncertainties cast doubt on whether fulfilling a contract with the non-UN-recognized authorities in eastern Libya would rank as a strategic priority for Pakistan, let alone for China.
Amid this landscape of ambiguous commercial ties and third-party arms transfers, Beijing’s clearest move has come not on the battlefield or in the boardroom, but in the diplomatic sphere.
After much delay, China has relocated its embassy staff from Tunis back to Tripoli. Far from signaling support for the LNA, a rival authority that has repeatedly sought to seize the Libyan capital by force, this move points to a measure of confidence in the GNU and a desire to further strengthen ties with the UN-recognized government.
More plausibly still, it reflects a pragmatic need to monitor developments more closely on the ground, as Libya, and the wider region, enter a period of recalibration shaped by the end of the war in Syria and an emerging rift pitting the UAE and Israel against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye.
Has Libya Become the New Syria?
In the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse in Syria to rebel forces, a wave of reporting suggested that Russia was rapidly redeploying military and naval assets from the Syrian port of Latakia to LNA-controlled territory in Libya. Since then, Tobruk and the base in Maaten al-Sarra have been cast by analysts as the new logistical gateways for the Africa Corps – the rebranded successor to the Wagner Group – supporting Russian operations across sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Sahel.
Beyond Russian maneuvers, another decisive dynamic reshaping Libya is the widening rift between the once close partners of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and its continued engagement with Tel Aviv amid the Gaza war, has increasingly set it apart from Riyadh and other Gulf capitals, particularly after Israel’s escalatory military actions against Syria’s new regime, Iran and Qatar.
Simmering tensions over Sudan, Somalia and Yemen finally boiled over in December 2025. In Yemen, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council launched an offensive against the Saudi-backed internationally-recognized government. Riyadh responded with a direct military intervention, decisively routing the southern forces and laying bare the depth of the Gulf rupture.
Libya is deeply enmeshed in this broader fracture. The UAE remains one of the LNA’s main external backers, with Haftar serving as a critical nexus in a wider Emirati-backed network that includes Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, now locked in a brutal civil war against the Sudanese Armed Forces, who in turn, are backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
As Emirati assertiveness grows, Cairo, Riyadh and Ankara have increasingly coordinated their stances on regional files. Should this alignment deepen, the once-cohesive external coalition supporting the LNA could begin to unravel if Egypt and Saudi Arabia draw closer to Türkiye, Tripoli’s most influential military patron.
Recent developments in Syria and Yemen have also delivered a hard lesson for Haftar: his key backers, Russia and the UAE, are far from infallible guarantors. Still, this does not necessarily spell the end of the LNA.
While Haftar is now eighty-two, he has already cultivated a successor in his son Saddam Haftar, who has embarked on an international tour stopping in Paris and Cairo. Moreover, the LNA’s firm grip over eastern Libya, both territorially and militarily, sharply contrasts with the west, where the GNU remains hollowed out by corruption and fragmented authority, hostage to militias and local power brokers.
Adding further complexity is the Mediterranean dimension. Amid concerns over migration flows and volatile energy prices, Libya retains strategic importance for Italy, France, and Greece. However, European involvement has been anything but straightforward. The rival ambitions of Rome and Paris, each backing opposing factions or trying to outmaneuver the other as peace broker, have undermined any hope of a unified EU strategy on Libya.
China and Russia’s entrenched presence in the country has only heightened Italian and European unease. Though the Syrian case cautions against assuming seamless Sino-Russian alignment in Libya, the revival of power-politics thinking in Europe has fueled skepticism toward China’s role.
This skepticism is especially pronounced in Italy, where commentators, policymakers and military voices view the former Italian colony as within Rome’s “natural” sphere of influence, vital to energy security, migration management, and national security. This is despite Chinese diplomats having in the past indicated openness to cooperate with Italy on Libya, likely motivated by a shared preference for Tripoli over Benghazi.
In such a crowded and complex environment, which recently saw the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) extend its mandate in hopes of advancing the UN roadmap, it is unsurprising that Chinese officials have sought a more visible on-the-ground presence by reopening their embassy – a move which, however, should not be mistaken for deep commitment.
As Libya and the wider region enter a period of recalibration shaped by the end of the war in Syria and the emerging rift between the UAE and Israel against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye, the return of Chinese diplomats to Tripoli reflects Beijing’s pragmatic need to monitor developments more closely on the ground while maintaining a position of cautious and calculated neutrality between the Libyan factions.
While Chinese defense companies have seemingly participated in Libya’s security landscape through third parties, it remains highly unlikely that China would seek a direct role in the conflict.
The most plausible explanation is that Beijing tolerated some security-related engagement with the LNA as a way to maintain relations with the most significant stakeholder in eastern Libya. The LNA’s relative cohesion, compared to the fractured and internally weak GNU, might also position Haftar as a key player should a long-anticipated power-sharing agreement materialize.
The Syrian experience likely informs this cautious approach. China’s steadfast support for the UN-recognized government of Bashar al-Assad ultimately left it exposed when his regime collapsed, temporarily locking Beijing out of engagement with the new Syrian authorities and undermining Chinese interests, particularly regarding Uyghur fighters operating in the country.
Any Chinese engagement with the LNA, then, is best understood not as a pivot but as insurance: a way to remain relevant without becoming entangled. As Libya remains only more crowded with external actors as Syria ever was, Beijing’s most rational course is to remain present, visible, and determined above all to keep its options open.
_______________________
China Global South Project
