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Ali Bin Musa

Illicit trade at a key border crossing has become the focus of competition and a source of instability in Western Libya.

Nearly four months after it closed due to armed clashes between rival Libyan groups, the Ras Ajdir crossing with Tunisia finally reopened on July 1. Located 170 kilometers (105 miles) west of war-torn Libya’s capital, Tripoli, the main land crossing into its western neighbor is a vital lifeline for trade—both official and illicit. 

But it is precisely the crossing’s economic value that has made it the focus of repeated clashes among the armed groups struggling for power since the 2011 uprising that toppled Libya’s long-time ruler Muammar Gaddafi.   

The latest fighting reveals the fragility of the power alliances in western Libya, as political and militia figures driven by a desire to control lucrative resources maneuver between political, military, and religious forces to strengthen their own influence. The struggle for Ras Ajdir also underscores Tripoli’s ongoing struggle to control militia factions that continue to co-opt strategic state assets, including border crossings, for their own gain.  

Military and political factions in western Libya covet the Ras Ajdir crossing due to the major profits to be made from trade with Tunisia. In 2023, official trade between Libya and Tunisia totaled about $850 million, while some 3.4 million Libyans and Tunisians crossed for tourism, medical treatment in Tunisia, and trade. 

Yet official commerce across the border runs in parallel with a thriving illicit trade in goods and fuel, as well as human smuggling. These serve as a vital economic lifeline for traffickers and small merchants in southeastern Tunisia and several cities on the Libyan side of the border.

Authorities in both countries have historically turned a blind eye to this trade as it provides an alternative to much-needed regional development, while a clamp-down on the smuggling of goods would risk sparking social unrest. Indeed, repeated closures of the crossing in the past of severely affected the economically challenged areas around it.  

Informal trade between Libya and Tunisia has existed for many decades due to their geographic and historical connections. But the border economy is sensitive to changing political, economic, and security conditions.

The 2011 uprisings in both Tunisia and Libya disrupted trade, especially due to the deteriorating security on the Libyan side following Gaddafi’s ouster. One notable repercussion was a jihadist attack on the Tunisian border city of Ben Guerdane in March 2016, reportedly launched from Libya. Increased security measures to address the instability on the Libyan side have led to repeated bouts of unrest, protests, and violence in the border areas. 

The overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime and the fragmentation of Libya’s central authority prompted many local factions to compete for control of strategic sites and installations in order to secure larger shares of Libya’s economic resources.

The frontier city of Zuwara, inhabited by an Amazigh majority and excluded from the border economy during Gaddafi’s era, emerged as a key player. Its militias seized the Ras Ajdir crossing and annexed it to the Zuwara municipality, transforming the city into a significant power center. Although nominally under the control of Tripoli’s successive governments, Zuwara has since enjoyed considerable autonomy. 

Politics, Religion and Ethnicity 

More than a decade on, the latest clashes in Ras Ajdir have largely been fueled by the personal ambitions of Libyan Interior Minister Imad Trabelsi, who’s efforts to expand his influence have upset the balance of power in western Libya.  

Originally from the city of Zintan and former commander of the Al-Sawaiq militia, Trabelsi sided with eastern Libyan military chief Khalifa Haftar during the 2014-2015 Libyan civil war, but later switched allegiances. In 2018, Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj of the Government of National Accord (GNA) appointed him Director of the General Security Service, and in 2022 he assumed the role of Minister of Interior in Abdul Hamid Dbeibah’s Government of National Unity (GNU), which controls Tripoli today.

Trabelsi was accused in a 2018 U.S. State Department report of accepting illegal payments on trucks smuggling petroleum products to Tunisia in areas under his control, and was reportedly briefly detained at a Paris airport in 2023 for “carrying a large sum of cash” of unknown origin, before being released. 

Trabelsi, backed by Dbeibah, pledged in March to return Ras Ajdir to state control, “even by force,” ostensibly to halt smuggling and restore security. His repeated statements about controlling the crossing have sparked opposition from political forces allied with the Zuwara militias, especially the Supreme Council of the Amazigh of Libya.

Its leader, Abdel Hadi Barqiq, has accused Trabelsi of undermining social cohesion and eroding the government’s credibility, saying this could potentially lead to its downfall. Barqiq also said that any military attempt to control Ras Ajdir would mean declaring war on the Amazigh of Libya. This prompted a state of emergency and sparked a mobilization of militias in other Amazigh-majority cities along smuggling routes linked with Zuwara. 

To legitimize their military operations to control the crossing, both parties exploited political discourse inciting ethnic and religious division. The GNU’s authority for Islamic endowments (awqaf), dominated by Madkhali Salafists, issued a fatwa calling for the excommunication of the Ibadi sect of Islam, to which most Libyan Amazigh belong.

This prompted the Supreme Ibadi Council to condemn the fatwa as a criminal act, threaten a boycott, and propose creating an independent Ibadi endowments body. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, Dbeibah condemned the authority for “provoking strife” and urged it not to exceed its jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, Libya’s Dar Al-Iftaa, another religious institution affiliated with the GNU and led by Sheikh Al-Sadiq Al-Gharyani—a political rival of the Madkhali Salafist movement—accused the authority of following orders from international intelligence agencies aimed at disrupting Libyan religious and societal harmony. 

For its part, the Supreme Council of the Amazigh in Libya, which is allied with the Zuwara militias, is using ethnic minority discourse, portraying efforts by Trabelsi’s forces and allies to take control of the crossing as an attack on the Amazigh as an ethnic group. This is despite the fact that the two sides previously fought together in a large military coalition against Khalifa Haftar during his attempt to seize Tripoli by force, from April 2019 to June 2020. 

The situation at Ras Ajdir therefore exemplifies the complex and delicate nature of the balance of power in Libya, pitting among forces with multiple affiliations and goals against each other. Such dynamics have prolonged Libya’s political, economic, and security crisis since 2011.

Moreover, they consistently provide opportunities for ambitious actors to exploit sectarian and ethnic divisions, further deepening societal rifts—all to serve the political ambitions and pocketbooks of competing leaders. 

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Ali Bin Musa is a junior visiting fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs. He has recently graduated from the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in Qatar, with a master’s degree in political science and international relations.

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Camille Tawil

Libya has undergone significant changes since the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The Libyans have struggled to establish a stable government, leading to the country being split into two main factions: One in the west backed by Türkiye and another in the east supported by Russia. However, the reality is more complex than just two competing governments.

This report highlights the main players in the power struggle in Libya today, focusing on the Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli and the eastern government backed by parliament and Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

The report also explains why the UN-led political process has stalled and explores the influence of five key figures in Libya’s political landscape, the armed groups in Tripoli, and the rise of powerful families in both the east and west.

In 2011, Libyan rebels closed in on Tripoli, Gaddafi’s stronghold, and stormed his heavily fortified complex at Bab al-Aziziya. Armed groups, including some with ties to extremist movements, took over the complex, signaling the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule, though he continued to resist until he was killed near Sirte in October of that year. Thirteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya remains divided between two rival governments.

The Libyan army, which fell with Gaddafi’s regime, has largely been rebuilt in the east under Haftar’s command. In the west, the situation is more chaotic, with various armed groups operating under Dbeibeh’s government, each controlling different areas.

The conflict is further complicated by foreign involvement: Türkiye supports the western forces with troops and allied Syrian mercenaries, while Russia backs Haftar in the east and south, first through the Wagner Group and now with a direct military presence, raising concerns about a new Russian foothold on the Mediterranean.

The political process to reach a settlement in Libya has been stalled for years. International envoys come and go, but none have succeeded, and there is no solution in sight. Since Gaddafi’s fall, Libya has changed a lot, but the new system remains unclear. To help explain the current situation, we spoke with Tim Eaton, a top Libya analyst at Chatham House in London.

Political Process… Dead in the Water

When asked about the status of the UN-led political process in Libya, Eaton started by clarifying that it is currently in the hands of Stephanie Khouri, the acting head of the UN mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

She was initially appointed as the deputy to UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, but after his resignation, she ended up leading the mission. However, since Khouri wasn’t appointed by the UN Security Council, she’s not an official special envoy, and her role is less defined, coming directly from the UN Secretary-General.

There’s ongoing discussion about who will be the next special envoy to Libya, but given the challenges within the Security Council, appointing someone has been difficult and remains a tough task. In short, it’s increasingly hard to get a new envoy through a Security Council vote.

As for the political stalemate that Libya is suffering from nowadays, Eaton stressed that the reason behind this is that the political process is dead and hasn’t moved at all.

In 2021, under the then deputy head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for political affairs Stephanie Williams, the Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed.

It was the first government since 2014 to be recognized by both eastern and western Libya, and it was supposed to hold elections by the end of that year. But that didn’t happen.

Critics accused the GNU of blocking the elections, and there were disputes over who could run, with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s return causing particular controversy.

After the elections failed to happen in 2022, the eastern House of Representatives formed a new government, but it wasn’t accepted by the broader political scene. So, Libyans were back to having two rival governments.

Jan Kubis, who succeeded Williams, couldn’t move the election process forward. When he left, it was clear elections wouldn’t happen. Williams briefly returned, but was then replaced by Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN special envoy.

Instead of pushing the process forward, Bathily decided to take time to assess the situation and engage in shuttle diplomacy. He focused on trying to get agreement among the five key players but hasn’t made much progress.

The Big Five

According to Eaton, Libya’s “Big Five” are Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity; Mohamed Takala, President of the High Council of State (recently replaced by Khaled al-Mishri); Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Mohamed al-Menfi, Head of the Presidential Council; and military leader Khalifa Haftar.

Bathily’s plan focused on getting these five leaders to sit down and agree on the future, but he couldn’t make it happen. Each of them set conditions that blocked progress.

For example, Dbeibeh refused to participate if the talks were about forming a new government, as it would mean replacing him. Haftar demanded that if the western government was involved, the eastern one must be too. These obstacles led Bathily to resign, as there was nothing solid to build on.

This is where things stand now.

Despite seeming like rivals, the Big Five do cooperate in certain areas. For example, Haftar and Dbeibeh have an understanding on dividing oil revenues.

Family Rule

Eaton doesn’t think that the ongoing division between eastern and western Libya could lead to a real split of the country. The connection between east and west Libya is stronger than many realize, the analyst affirmed.

What’s happening now is more about powerful families and their networks competing for control, rather than just an east-versus-west divide. In the east, those in power are closely linked to Haftar, while in the west, Dbeibeh’s family has strengthened its control and appointed people with ties to them.

Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters and mercenaries have been involved in Libya since 2011. Initially, they came from places like Darfur and Chad. Recently, the situation has changed significantly.

During Haftar’s attempts to take Tripoli, he relied on Wagner Group mercenaries, which led Tripoli authorities to seek Turkish support. Türkiye established a permanent presence in the west and brought in Syrian mercenaries. Meanwhile, Wagner expanded its presence in Haftar’s areas.

Wagner’s involvement now seems more like a state relationship with Russia rather than just a mercenary group. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov has visited eastern Libya frequently, and there is significant Russian military equipment flowing into the region. This growing Russian presence is a major concern for the US.

In the west, the situation is more chaotic. No single family controls all security forces, and Türkiye supports specific groups, such as the 444 Brigade in Tripoli. Türkiye also took control of the Al-Watiya airbase.

Both Türkiye and Russia are firmly established in Libya now. Their presence makes a large-scale war less likely, as the costs would be high. Haftar cannot advance on Tripoli due to Turkish opposition, and when Misrata forces considered moving east, they were deterred by Russian aircraft and Egypt’s declared “red line.”

Foreign fighters have become a permanent part of the Libyan landscape and are likely to stay.

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Cathrin Schaer

With two rival governments at either end of the country, ongoing political ruptures and, now, fresh military mobilization, there are fears Libya could be heading toward more violence and fighting.

Over the past week, various international bodies have sent out the alarm.

In a statement, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya said it was monitoring “with concern the recent mobilization of forces in various parts of Libya.”

The organization, known as UNSMIL, urged “all parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any provocative military actions that could be perceived as offensive.”

On Thursday, the Delegation of the European Union to Libya expressed similar concerns. “The use of force would harm stability in Libya and lead to human suffering. It should be avoided at all cost,” it said in a statement. 

Longtime Libya watchers were more direct, suggesting that, after around four years of relative calm in the country, civil war might be about to break out once again.

The warnings came in response to last week’s large mobilization of militias affiliated with one of Libya’s two rival administrations.

Since 2014, Libya has been split in two, with opposing governments located in the east and west of the country. A UN-backed administration known as the Government of National Unity, or GNU, is based in Tripoli in the west, and its rival, known as the House of Representatives, is based in the east, in Tobruk.

At various times over the last decade, each government has tried — and failed — to wrest control from the other.

The government in eastern Libya is supported by former warlord-turned-politician Khalifa Haftar, who controls various armed groups in his area. It was Haftar’s forces that appeared to be moving toward Tripoli late last week. In 2019, Haftar attacked the city but was eventually forced to sign a cease-fire in 2020.

Haftar said troops under the command of his son, Saddam, were marching in order to secure Libyan borders, to fight drug and human trafficking and to combat terrorism. However, military analysts suspected other plans.

Haftar’s forces have wanted control of Ghadames airport and its surroundings for some time, Jalel Harchaoui, a North Africa expert with UK-based think tank the Royal United Services Institute, told French newspaper Le Monde. Controlling Ghadames “would significantly enhance his territorial stature in relation to Algeria, Tunisia and Niger,” said Harchaoui, and would also block access for the rival GNU.

If Haftar’s troops seize Ghadames, it “would officially mark the collapse of the 2020 cease-fire,” Tarek Megerisi, a Libya expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in a post on social media platform X (formerly Twitter).

In response to the troop movements, a range of other militias that support the Tripoli government in the west were told to increase their combat readiness.

Will there be another Libyan civil war?

The day after Haftar’s mobilization was sighted, a clash between two militias in Tajoura, on the coastal outskirts of Tripoli, left at least nine dead. However, local media later reported this had been motivated by an assassination attempt on one of the militia leaders. And this week, the situation in Libya seems to have calmed again. But the danger remains, experts told DW.

Emadeddin Badi, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council who focuses on Libya, sees Haftar’s latest moves as a kind of ongoing “brinkmanship.”

“Many of the actors [in Libya] are engaging in this, to see how far they could go in kind of taunting, or sidelining, or undermining their opponents,” he said. “A zero-sum mentality still prevails,” he added, referring to the fact that opposing factions in Libya believe that one of them must eventually run the country, as opposed to working together for unity.

“Libya continues to unravel quietly, with indications mounting that rival governments are regrouping for something big,” Hafed al-Ghwell, executive director of the North Africa Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s Foreign Policy Institute in Washington, wrote in an op-ed for the website Euronews last week. With all of the different militias, Libya is in danger of becoming a “mafia state,” he said.

Foreign interference keeping Libya

from the brink?

Both Libyan governments are also supported by an array of foreign powers. The government in the west is backed by Turkey; the administration to the east by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Russia. Previously, the UN and others have pushed for various international backers of the two sides in Libya and their soldiers to leave the country.

However, as Badi explained, their presence is probably preventing further violence in Libya right now. “Ironically, the only thing that has really prevented a relapse into all-out war is foreign influence in the country,” Badi told DW. “A balance of forces exists between the Turks and the Russians and others, and there’s a loose geopolitical understanding about not engaging in full-scale conflict again.”

Attempts to unite the two halves of the country by, for example, holding a national election, unifying security forces, administrative functions or a national budget, or setting up an interim unity government, have come to nothing. In fact, the international community has become accustomed to dealing with two administrations when working with Libya on oil supply or migration issues. 

But analysts like Badi, al-Ghwell and Megerisi have all argued that simply accepting the status quo in Libya — where there are two separate governments supported by increasingly mafia-like militias — no longer works.

“Actors [in Libya] have been emboldened through the impunity that they have been afforded by the international community,” said Badi.

“Libya has largely been neglected by the international community since 2021 and many have deluded themselves into thinking that Libya could remain stable in the long run, either with this status quo or through facilitating deals between the factions that have carved the country up for themselves. But this policy of pretending that conflict can be contained, is not working,” he said.

“And that mirage — that Libya is fine, it’s stable — is slowly collapsing right now.”

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Cathrin Schaer – A freelance journalist based in Berlin, Cathrin Schaer’s work has been published in a variety of media, including the New York Times, The Atlantic, Al Jazeera and The Guardian, among others. She has previously worked at Spiegel Online and Handelsblatt. At DW, she works as an editor and also as an author for the Middle East desk.

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Jonathan Fenton-Harvey

Ongoing political divisions and new military mobilisations have raised fears that Libya is heading towards another civil war. Libya’s shaky status quo is beginning to show cracks, with the looming threat of violence beginning to rupture its fragile cold peace.

Earlier this year, the United Nations special envoy to Libya at the time, Abdoulaye Bathily, sounded the alarm to the Security Council, warning that the country is teetering on the brink of “disintegration”.

Those gloomy predictions now appear to be drawing closer. On 9 August, at least nine people were killed and 17 injured in clashes in Tajoura, an eastern suburb of Tripoli, Libya’s capital city. Local media suggested that these clashes may have been sparked by an assassination attempt on a militia leader.

The next day, militia clashes briefly occurred in the Qali Bulla area, east of Tajoura. It comes after clashes also occurred in Tajoura in July, reportedly resulting in three deaths.

These incidents mark an alarming escalation in a country that has experienced relative calm since a UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020, following a war the previous year for control of Tripoli.

Following those clashes, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) expressed its concern over the unfolding events, stating that it is closely monitoring the “recent mobilisation of forces in various parts of Libya”.

UNSMIL also urged “all parties to exercise maximum restraint and avoid any provocative military actions that could be perceived as offensive”. Analysts are increasingly wary that the risk of further violence is growing.

Libya’s worsening tensions

Tensions have continued around the south of Libya. In the past week, forces loyal to eastern warlord Khalifa Haftar, who leads the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), deployed to the Ghadames region near the Algerian border, reportedly aiming to seize control of the region’s strategic airport.

Given these areas are under the control of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Haftar’s attempts to expand his influence in western Libya have effectively violated the UN-brokered ceasefire.

Although that excursion didn’t lead to major gains for Haftar, and further violence has thus far been avoided, analysts have warned that the risk of conflict still lingers.

“This recent outbreak of violence and divisions shows that the instability in Libya is reaching a dangerous phase. And this is a similar scenario to what we faced in 2019 before the war in Tripoli began,” Tarek Megerisi, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told The New Arab.

He further noted that “different factions believe they have an opportunity to gain more power. We are witnessing a breakdown at every level now, especially politically and militarily”.

Amid the risk of escalation, there have been repeated quarrels and disputes between the governments in the west and east, further highlighting that the prospect of unifying Libya is more distant than it has been in years.

Corruption within the system

Following the 2011 ousting of Muammar Gaddafi after the Arab Spring uprising and the NATO intervention, Libya has been in turmoil. Efforts by the UN and NATO countries to unify Libya, promote elections, and bridge internal divides that emerged after 2011 have failed.

Since 2014, the country has been divided between rival governments in the west and east. Tripoli, in the west, is home to the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), while the eastern region is largely controlled by the House of Representatives (HoR), based in Tobruk, which supports the Government of National Stability (GNS) under Khalifa Haftar’s influence and formed in March 2022.

Steps to implement a political solution since the 2020 ceasefire have achieved limited success. Elections that were originally due in December 2021 were delayed over various factors, such as logistics, disputes over election laws, and security concerns.

Due to weak domestic institutions and a fragile security system, entrenched corruption and infighting among the country’s political and military factions have also silenced the voices of ordinary Libyans.

“The post-Gaddafi ruling class – military, political and economic actors – continue to prioritise their monopoly on power over the demands of the Libyan people to end the long transitional period,” Stephanie Williams, former special adviser on Libya to the United Nations secretary-general, told The New Arab.

“There is not a single institution that enjoys a shred of popular legitimacy; all have long exceeded their shelf life.”

Even amid the relative calm, infighting has impacted mainstream institutions. For instance, the CEO of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), Farhat Bengdara, is a Haftar ally who was appointed controversially in 2022 after his forces blockaded or threatened to blockade oil fields.

Haftar’s forces, particularly led by his son Saddam, have pressured oil fields such as Al-Sharara on multiple occasions, aiming to ensure more oil revenues are diverted from Tripoli to the Sirte-based government.

However, that also risks the recovery of Libya’s oil sector, which constitutes around 98 percent of government revenues and 60 percent of its GDP. Further violence will therefore have profound risks for Libya’s post-war economic recovery, too.

Militias, whether aligned with Haftar or independent, have often targeted key institutions. On 18 August, the Central Bank of Libya said it was “suspending all operations” after a bank official was abducted in the capital Tripoli, showing the implications for other vital sectors.

“This fragile peace that everyone was content with, based on both sides sharing oil revenues and making deals around the oil sector, is showing signs of cracking,” Claudia Gazzini, a Libya analyst at the International Crisis Group, told TNA.

The role of foreign powers

Ultimately, the role of foreign powers will be key in determining the country’s direction, even if external intervention played a notable part in exacerbating the country’s divisions during the last civil conflict.

While the UAE, Russia, France, and Egypt initially aligned with Haftar’s forces in 2019, to varying degrees, Turkey’s intervention in support of the Tripoli-based government in 2020 helped crush Haftar’s ambitions and paved the way to brokering a ceasefire.

Paradoxically, while foreign powers fuelled Libya’s violence following Gaddafi’s demise, they are arguably now keeping the country from descending into chaos.

“As long as foreign powers do not support war, which is unlikely due to the volatility of the region, then things could just continue as they are,” Claudia Gazzini noted. Even if a war doesn’t break out, “we might be entering a new phase of political chaos in Libya,” she added. The prospect of renewed violence has certainly alarmed some neighbours.

Algeria has expressed concern over the potential outbreak of violence on its own border. Per its traditional approach of not picking sides in Libya, Algeria has aligned itself with the UN’s position and called for “the opposing brothers” to stop any further clashes.

In trying to spearhead the European Union’s engagement with Libya, Italy has pursued its Mattei Plan to gain more influence and oil and gas deals in Africa. The architect of this, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, has tried to court both major camps in Libya.

Yet, despite Italy’s consistent diplomatic engagements and gas deals within Libya, including an $8bn deal in January 2023 and subsequent cooperation agreements, Rome has had limited success in bridging Libya’s divide.   

While Egypt could have leveraged its influence in the east to help broker a political solution, this possibility may have been undermined when Egypt extended an invitation to Usama Hammad on 11 August, the Benghazi-based prime minister of the GNS, who accepted the invitation and visited Cairo.

That caused a rift with the GNU’s Presidential Council, which subsequently expelled Egypt’s diplomatic mission. It has hindered what analysts previously considered as an opportunity for Egypt and Turkey to broker a lasting agreement, given Ankara’s own influence in the West and ties with the Tripoli government.

In the absence of a political deal between western and eastern Libya, Moscow’s mercenaries have been able to retain a presence in the east, aligning with Sirte’s GNS.

While further violence may occur, it may not necessarily lead to a full-scale war of the same magnitude as previous conflicts. Indeed, the international powers that once backed Haftar are now more hesitant given his failures and their own lack of appetite for renewed conflict.

However, the situation remains fluid, and the risk of increased clashes is growing. Even if a hot war is averted, the latest violence and tensions show that the current state of affairs is untenable, with a need for more direct diplomacy to avoid escalating instability.

***

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a journalist and researcher who focuses on conflict, geopolitics, and humanitarian issues in the Middle East and North Africa.

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Yasmina Abouzzohour and Tarik M. Yousef

Trust in political institutions—measured by views on governments or parliaments—also positively impacts trust in the military. Overall, those who trust political institutions are more likely to trust the armed forces. However, when we take regime type into account, we see a change. Specifically, individuals in civilian-led regimes who trust political institutions less are more likely to trust the military.

This could be because, in settings where citizens perceive political institutions in a negative light, they view the military as a symbol of effective performance by comparison. This explains the strikingly high levels of trust in the military in countries like Jordan, Tunisia, and Lebanon and the significant difference in levels of trust in the military and in the various political institutions in these countries. On the other hand, in countries with a history of military intervention or rule, trust in political institutions goes hand-in-hand with trust in the military. This could be because the military interferes in the political sphere and is perceived as close to or in control of political institutions.

Interestingly, individuals in higher income brackets are less likely to trust the military. The well-to-do may fear the encroachment of the military on the economy, as in countries like Algeria and Egypt, where military elites dominate certain sectors or take advantage of ties to the ruling party to receive preferential treatment at the expense of the private sector.

Contrastingly, trust among the lower economic classes may stem from the role of the armed forces as large employers, especially in military-led countries, and the high representation of these classes in their ranks.

Finally, an Islamist orientation—measured by people’s views on the role of clerics in politics or the role of Sharia in legal systems—predicts less trust in the military. This finding aligns with the expectation that Islamist supporters would harbor mistrust toward the military due to its role in repressing Islamists in many MENA countries, for example, from Egypt in 2013 to Algeria in 1992 and Syria in 1982.

Overall, our findings paint a general picture of the drivers of heightened trust in MENA’s armed forces. The military draws support from conservative, non-Islamist, and lower economic segments of the public, who have lost confidence in parliaments and governments and believe the institution is a bulwark against insecurity and instability. Combined with declining confidence in democracy as the best system of rule and readiness to empower a strong executive, the high trust in the military highlights broader governance fatigue and disillusionment with the political system.

The Future of Military-Society Relations

Decades of political interference, economic mismanagement, blocked transitions, and coups by the military have profoundly affected MENA countries. Yet, even in the throes of political turmoil and social discord, the military retains its favorable standing among the public in most countries, especially with citizens who care about safety, are politically conservative, and, interestingly, support democracy. What does this tell us about the region’s broader social and political landscapes?

High trust in the military has palpable societal implications and serves as a litmus test for public sentiment. It reflects public disillusionment with political actors and institutions, signaling a form of governance fatigue. Simultaneously, the military is envisioned sentiment that seeks an anchor in times of socio-economic and political upheaval. Therefore, high trust in the military is both an indicator of institutional failure and a testament to the enduring need for stability.

This phenomenon is thus symptomatic of broader trends—disenchantment with political processes, the fraying of social contracts, and a yearning for stability. These trends shape policy directions, influence political outcomes, and contribute to defining national identities. In essence, the question of military trust is intertwined with the future trajectory of democratic norms and institutions, both within the MENA region and beyond.

Crucially, high trust in the military is not unique to the MENA region but reflects a global trend. Across democracies and dictatorships, in both affluent and struggling economies, armed forces outrank other national institutions. This trend holds even in nations with historically violent armies.

In Africa, home to the highest number of coup d’états in modern history, six successful coups have taken place since 2020, and fighting is ongoing between armed factions in Sudan and Mali.  Approximately 62% of Africans, on average, expressed significant trust in their armed forces in 2022.  Latin American and Caribbean militaries historically led repressive regimes and interfered in political processes. Now, the military is wading back into politics, often at the behest of civilian leaders. There, the armed forces inspired trust in 54% of surveyed citizens in 2023, more trust than any other national institution.

How can we leverage insights from the Middle East and North Africa to inform strategies for strengthening democratic norms and improving military-society relations in other regions? The trust that many place in the military raises questions about what citizens seek from state institutions.

Unlike political institutions, the military is a resilient entity in the public’s perception, seemingly entrusted with the formidable task of delivering security and defending stability. What does this mean for the future of military-society relations in these regions? Persistently high trust may signal a shift in political culture, where the military’s role in society goes beyond security provision.

While armies in these regions have been active agents in upending or sustaining political orders, the trust they enjoy from citizens points to broader social dynamics. Despite the military’s complex and often troubling role in governance, it commands a level of public trust that challenges conventional wisdom and compels us to reassess our understanding of contemporary military-society relations.

This could be a bellwether for future governance models and societal expectations and may point to a need for political actors to consider the military’s place in democratic governance more seriously, perhaps increasing civilian oversight mechanisms.

For now, as the crisis in Sudan unfolds, and the juntas that recently seized power in Sahel countries continue to rule, all eyes are on the military—a vivid reminder of its enduring influence and its role as both a stabilizing force and a potential catalyst for change.

***

Yasmina Abouzzohour is a nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) and a fellow and lecturer at Princeton University. Abouzzohour’s research focuses on public trust in the military, public opinion, and regime behavior in the Middle East and North Africa.

Tarik M. Yousef is a senior fellow and director of the ME Council. His career has spanned the academic and think tank world, including at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His involvement with public policy includes working in the Middle East Department at the International Monetary Fund, the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank, and the UN Millennium Project.

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Wolfram Lacher

By describing debt-fueled eastern spending as “parallel expenditure of unknown origin,” Kabir ostensibly denied any connection to it. In fact, central bank officials were well aware of how the funds granted to east-based banks were being used, but publicly they maintained silence. “Marei Barassi is operating with a gun to his head. We have to be easy on him,” an adviser to Kabir told me this June, referring to Kabir’s Benghazi-based deputy.

Kabir also adopted a permissive attitude to counterfeit currency, apparently printed under the Haftars’ aegis in eastern Libya. The Benghazi central bank had previously printed its own dinar notes in Russia from 2016 to 2021, and the central bank in Tripoli had grudgingly allowed them to circulate. But in early 2024, large amounts of 50 dinar notes began circulating that the central bank identified as fake, and of a quality inferior to the Russian notes.

Central bank and other financial officials said they believed the Haftar family had brought in a printing machine and was producing the notes in eastern Libya. Their estimates of the face value of the counterfeit notes varied widely, from $400 million to $1.4 billion. The central bank notified the attorney general about the notes in February but waited until April to go public. Even after announcing that it would withdraw all 50-dinar notes (worth about $10) from circulation, it gave banks until the end of August to use them. In the meantime, the counterfeit notes have continued to circulate in eastern Libya.

The Haftars now receive hundreds of millions of dinars from the Tripoli government each month even as they maintain their own rival government. Their sway extends to the highest levels of the NOC while they smuggle imported fuel on a large scale.

Their control over both commercial banks and the Benghazi central bank has enabled them to wipe out old debts and start spending on credit all over again. Dinars created out of thin air turn into hard currency. The center of gravity in Libya’s state of plunder has moved decisively to the east. And following years of wreaking destruction, Khalifa Haftar and his sons are now cultivating an image as builders.

To the Haftars’ credit, their reconstruction efforts are progressing swiftly and are already yielding visible results. But they also make clear that the Haftar family views those parts of Libya it controls as its private domain.

In addition to Belgasem’s fund, another body has recently started major construction work in Sirte and other cities: the National Agency for Development. This is a new name for an entity set up by Saddam Haftar, the Tareq ben Ziyad Agency for Services and Production. The head of both agencies, Jibril al-Badri, reportedly oversees fuel smuggling from Benghazi, according to an associate of his.

The Tareq ben Ziyad Agency served to channel profits from embezzlement and predation to Saddam’s military units. It also forced residents of Benghazi’s destroyed city center to sign over their properties with little or no compensation and subsequently cleared the area. Now, the National Agency is developing the prime real estate Saddam Haftar appropriated in Benghazi.

“Jibril al-Badri has closed off the seafront. People can’t access it, and they don’t even know what is being done there,” a Benghazi resident told me in June.

In Sirte, the National Agency’s projects are managed by Mahmoud al-Firjani, who has also run two TV channels supporting Haftar with propaganda. Municipal officials say they haven’t even been told — let alone consulted — about the agency’s plans.

“Egyptian companies have shown up and started working without anyone knowing what they are building,” one said.

“Some projects are Saddam’s, some are Belgasem’s, others are Khaled’s [another son] — all projects are divided between them,” a Benghazi contact with close ties to Haftar’s inner circle told me. An entrepreneur from western Libya who does business in the east confirmed this: “Turkish and Egyptian companies have to subcontract to either of two companies — one belonging to Saddam, the other to Belgasem. All Libyan companies working in construction have to contract with these two companies.”

Businesspeople and militia leaders from western Libya have flocked to the east and courted Haftar’s sons. So have Western diplomats. Before the reconstruction bonanza, there had been no public meetings between Western representatives and Haftar’s sons. Diplomats had met with Haftar himself for years but steered clear of the parallel eastern government, and were reluctant to be associated with the Haftar family’s blatant nepotism.

From April onward, however, meetings with Belgasem, Saddam and Khaled Haftar became part of the routine schedule of Western diplomats visiting the east. The French ambassador also led a delegation of businesspeople to meet with Belgasem, and others are likely to follow suit. “Internationals are now completely resigned to normalizing relations with a mafia state,” one frustrated diplomat in Tripoli said.

In their public communication on Libya, Western governments had long emphasized the need for a transparent management of public funds. But they have yet to raise the questions of where the reconstruction funds are coming from and how they are being used. When I suggested to a European ambassador that meetings bestowed legitimacy on the Haftar sons’ apparent ambitions to consolidate their family’s rule, he defensively argued that he had merely met Belgasem in his official capacity, not as Haftar’s son.

There are significant differences between Libya’s competing power structures — between Haftar’s brutal despotism and Dabeiba’s shrewd juggling of competing factions. When it comes to the pillage of state resources, the Haftars’ operations stand out for their far greater scale and brazenness. But there are also striking parallels.

One is nepotism. It is no coincidence that the eminence grise in Tripoli is Ibrahim Dabeiba. The Dabeiba family owes its influence to the rise of Ibrahim’s father, Ali, under Gadhafi. Ali Dabeiba — the prime minister’s cousin and brother-in-law — became spectacularly rich as a civil servant, at the head of a state agency in charge of infrastructure projects. He, his sons and relatives came to own an empire of offshore accounts, companies and real estate abroad.

Today, Ibrahim is the family’s key political player, and he has spoken derisively to foreign diplomats about Abdelhamid Dabeiba’s political acumen. But other relatives and in-laws also hold official positions and wield influence. Entrepreneurs in Tripoli complain that doing business with state institutions requires backing from Ibrahim Dabeiba, other members of the prime minister’s inner circle, or one of the handful of militia leaders that prop up the Dabeiba power structure.

The brazen looting of state wealth by a select few requires repression, though this takes very different forms in east and west. In Tripoli, security services controlled by militia leaders harass and arrest journalists, civil society activists, and even ordinary people who vent their anger on social media. In areas controlled by Haftar, speaking out can get you not only arrested but also tortured and killed. Society has been cowed into silence. “It feels like Libya in the darkest days of the 80s and 90s,” a western Libyan entrepreneur who does business in the east told me.

Can the two systems coexist indefinitely? The rift between Siddiq Kabir and the Dabeibas has fuelled tensions among rival coalitions of militias in western Libya — including competing groups deployed at the Tripoli central bank. In mid-August, Kabir and the U.S. embassy denounced an attempt to take over the central bank by force, pointing to threats made by militias aligned with Dabeiba that had prompted a countermobilization by opposing forces.

More importantly, the arrangements bridging east and west appear to be nearing a breaking point. The voracity of the leading protagonists shows no signs of abating. The NOC recently accorded a share of production in several oil fields to a newly formed Libyan company of unknown ownership but rumored to function as a front for Saddam, which has already begun selling its own oil.

Moreover, senior financial officials allege that a multibillion-dollar gap has accumulated over the past two years between the value of the crude oil lifted from Libyan ports and the transfers of revenue into the NOC’s account at Libyan Foreign Bank, a central bank subsidiary. Ever bolder schemes may come light — but every new scheme could be a step too far and unravel the tenuous relations among the Dabeibas, the Haftars and Kabir.

In the meantime, the Haftars’ greatly improved access to funds threatens to destabilize the balance of power. Saddam has told close associates that he is seeking to turn western Libyan factions against each other and buy the support of selected militia leaders — a task made easier by the money he now has at his disposal. His father has informed Western diplomats that he intends to make another attempt to seize Tripoli. The Haftars’ continuous acquisitions of military hardware leave little doubt that he means it. Recently, the Italian authorities intercepted a shipment of Chinese combat drones on their way to Benghazi — part of a transaction that allegedly involved crude oil sales.

For the time being, Turkey’s military presence in western Libya poses a formidable obstacle to such ambitions. So does the self-interest of militia leaders, regardless of whether they thrive or languish under the Dabeibas — all know that a Haftar takeover would immediately make them dispensable. But with the sudden accession to wealth and power, as well as the courtship by foreign emissaries, may come illusions of omnipotence that carry the risk of disastrous miscalculation.

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Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the author of “Libya’s Fragmentation”

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Yasmina Abouzzohour and Tarik M. Yousef

Why Trust in the Military is Surprising

High trust in the military is especially surprising, considering that armies in the MENA region have a history of turning on governments, blocking transitions, repressing citizens, and encroaching on the economy. Dark, repressive episodes have marred the military’s reputation in the region, with soldiers frequently deployed to quell protests. For instance, during the 2011 uprisings and subsequent civil war in Syria, military forces committed human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and torture. In Sudan, following President Omar al-Bashir’s removal in 2019, soldiers were deployed to disperse pro-democracy demonstrators, resulting in violence, injuries, and fatalities. In Iraq, soldiers brutally suppressed protesters during the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in 1991, which led to widespread casualties and displacement.

It is not just citizens who are at risk but governments as well. Military factions in nearly every MENA country have staged at least one coup since 1945. 

These events destabilized governments and undermined efforts to establish democratic governance in the region. Some coups occurred shortly after countries gained independence, leading to the establishment of military regimes that ruled for decades. Notable examples include the 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy by the Free Officers Movement, the 1963 coup by the Ba’ath party in Syria, and the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution led by Muammar Gadhafi in Libya.

Other coups reversed democratic rule, as seen in Sudan in 1969 and 1989. These events halted democratic progress and perpetuated a cycle of authoritarianism and instability in the country, which persists to this day. Even failed coups in the MENA region have had significant repercussions. For instance, two failed coups in Morocco in the early 1970s precipitated the most repressive decades of King Hassan II’s rule, while several attempted coups against Gadhafi in 1975 led to a decades-long strategy to marginalize the army.leaders have also frequently intervened in politics by obstructing political processes and supporting contested regimes. In Sudan, military leaders blocked a political transition in 2021, which led to civil war and continual armed conflict.

Similarly, the Algerian army leadership stopped a years-long revolution in its tracks in 2019 and backed Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s presidency. Decades earlier, the military annulled free elections that were poised to bring an Islamist party to power, sparking a decade-long civil war. In Egypt, army leaders took over in 2013 after ousting the country’s first democratically-elected president and remain in power today.

Outside the realm of politics, military elites have reportedly enabled and benefited from corruption and cronyism in various countries. In Egypt, for example, the military has established a significant economic empire spanning sectors such as construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and consumer goods. This economic influence is facilitated through an extensive network of companies and enterprises that enjoy preferential treatment and government contracts, granting them a competitive advantage over private businesses. Algerian military elites benefit from the country’s rentier economy by negotiating with political and administrative figures. As a result, they receive preferential treatment in real estate ventures, tax liability, and bureaucratic procedures. Additionally, military actors are reported to profit from smuggling operations in border areas, particularly where law enforcement agencies lack access.

Economic interference by military actors can have catastrophic repercussions. In post-2014 Libya, powerful militias, armed groups, and military factions have competed over control of state resources, including oil infrastructure, border crossings, and smuggling routes. This militarization of the economy has resulted in intensified resource competition, rent-seeking behavior, and the exploitation of Libya’s natural resources for financial gain. Consequently, economic instability has been exacerbated, efforts to revive the economy have been hindered, and the country has been plunged into political turmoil.

How High is Trust in the Military in

the Middle East and North Africa?

Despite the tumultuous history of military involvement in the MENA region, recent survey data conducted by the Arab Barometer in 2021–2022 reveal that the military commands significant trust among citizens. Indeed, more than 70% of surveyed citizens express significant trust in the armed forces. This has remained consistent over the years. Between 2011 and 2022, levels of moderate and high public trust in the military in MENA varied on average between 71% and 81%.

Levels of trust in the armed forces do vary across countries. On average, between 2011 and 2022, they ranged from 92% in Tunisia to 47% in Libya (see Figure 3). Yet, even in Libya, a significant portion of the population expressed high trust in the armed forces. For example, in the eastern part of the country, 87% of surveyed citizens indicated the army could be trusted a great deal or quite a lot in 2019 (versus 60% in the south and close to 57% in the west). Furthermore, in all surveyed MENA countries, including Libya, the armed forces are accorded significantly more trust than most national institutions like government, parliament, and civil society (see Figure 4). In fact, when comparing trust in the armed forces to trust in the next most trusted institution—in this case, it is civil society in most countries, except for Egypt—the difference in favor of the armed forces ranges from 61 percentage points in Lebanon to 19 percentage points in Sudan.

The Public Equation:

Who Trusts the Military and Why?

What explains the high levels of trust that MENA citizens place in the armed forces?  Our research has identified several factors that should influence MENA citizens likelihood of trusting their armed forces based on studies of civil-military relations and institutional trust and the growing political economy literature on the role of militaries in the MENA region.  These include personal safety, economic class, political conservatism, Islamist orientation, trust in institutions, and attitudes toward democracy.

We empirically examined these factors using data from the Arab Barometer Wave V survey, collected between 2018 and 2019, at a time when protests took place across the region, and consequently, armies were deployed to varying degrees across countries.  The data comprises some 10,000 responses from nationally representative samples across nine countries. Four of these countries have civilian-led governments (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia), and five have an extended history of military intervention or rule (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen).  This allows us to examine whether the drivers of trust in the armed forces vary under military versus civilian rule.

What makes people more likely to trust the military? Personal safety emerges as a key driver. Individuals who feel their personal and family’s safety is ensured are much more likely to trust the military. This suggests that the public may perceive the military as a bastion of stability and order that can be called upon in times of upheaval. In countries like Jordan or Morocco, where robust safety measures are in place, people may attribute this success to the military’s role in maintaining security. In less stable countries like Libya or Sudan, where military actions have contributed to chaos, the institution is viewed nonetheless as a safeguard against insecurity and a defender of a fragile state.

Ideology also plays a role. Conservatives—those who defer to the state regardless of their own political views—tend to trust the military more than others, perhaps because they view the military as a symbol of traditionalism. Similarly, despite its controversial history, the military garners trust among proponents of democracy, challenging conventional assumptions about its compatibility with democratic governance.

Dividing the data by regime type introduces an interesting caveat: data from countries with civilian-led regimes is driving the positive relationship between support for democracy and trust in the military. In countries with a history of military intervention or rule, we find some evidence of the opposite result: proponents of democracy tend to trust the military less, reflecting perhaps the erosion of democratic practices under extended military rule.

***

Yasmina Abouzzohour is a nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) and a fellow and lecturer at Princeton University. Abouzzohour’s research focuses on public trust in the military, public opinion, and regime behavior in the Middle East and North Africa.

Tarik M. Yousef is a senior fellow and director of the ME Council. His career has spanned the academic and think tank world, including at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His involvement with public policy includes working in the Middle East Department at the International Monetary Fund, the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank, and the UN Millennium Project.

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Ben Fishman

A political and literal fight over Libya’s top financial institution could enable Russia to enjoy the spoils of war without having to fight one.

Since Libya’s longtime dictator Col. Muammar Gaddafi was killed by rebel forces in 2011, the country he departed so brutally at the hands of his enemies has endured a cyclical civil war punctured by periods of fragile stability. Warlord Khalifa Haftar, whose power base is in the country’s east, launched a war in 2014-15 against the capital Tripoli in the country’s west, which ended with the Libya Political Agreement.

When that broke down in 2019-20, Haftar—armed with weapons and money from Russia, Egypt, and some Gulf states—attacked Libya’s west again, this time halted by a Turkish military intervention on the side of Tripoli. The Libya Political Dialogue Forum (LDPF) sought a general election in December 2021. This is approaching three years’ delay. In the meantime, the country has been ‘managed’ by a conglomerate of elites with no incentive to yield power.

Central Bank Siege

The struggle over the fate of Libya is currently being played out in Tripoli, with the country’s central bank at the centre. On Sunday, the bank suspended operations after its head of information technology (IT) was kidnapped from his house, while other senior executives were threatened. This followed a week in which armed men laid siege to the central bank’s headquarters.

The kidnappers, backed by Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Debeiba, want the resignation of the bank’s powerful governor, Sadiq al-Kabir, who has been in the role since 2012. Since then, he has used Libya’s oil receipts to build up a sizeable surplus that plenty would like to get their hands on.

Obtaining his coveted position has long been the goal of Libya’s illegitimate institutions. Libya’s House of Representatives still consists of members last elected in 2014. It is now fighting for control with the Western-based GNU, created in 2021 for a one-year term.

Aguilla Saleh, the powerful House speaker, was elected with fewer than 1,000 votes, while GNU prime minister Abdel-Hamid Debeiba, elected by 39 members in questionable circumstances, should have stood down two years ago. Even more institutions claim degrees of authority, including the Presidential Council (created as part of the LPDF) and the High State Council.

The Threat of Haftar

In the plethora of fora and initiatives—some of which are sponsored by the UN—nothing gives credence to the idea that Libya is being governed. Underpinning this political stasis is the perennial threat of war from the Russian-backed Haftar

His 2019-20 assault was conducted with Russian mercenaries and weaponry, including snipers, drones, and anti-aircraft systems. Since then, Russia has only deepened its relationship with Haftar, who has hosted Russia’s deputy defense minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and even been granted an audience with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

For Putin, this is a chance for Russia to build up yet more infrastructure in a Mediterranean country (beyond its current Syrian naval base in Latakia), advance its ambitions in the Sahel, and threaten NATO. Haftar and his powerful son Saddam now have the confidence to challenge the October 2020 ceasefire line, which has mostly held for four years.

Oil, Dollars, and Militias

Libya’s oil production exceeds one million barrels per day (bpd), which has given it a solid foundation in dollar reserves, with no appreciable debt. Billions more are still frozen in the Gaddafi-era Libya Investment Authority.

Given that, Libya should be more than able to provide for its citizens, but endemic corruption, a complete lack of accountability, and a woeful record of mismanaging the economy mean that Libyans have not benefited. There has been virtually no development of public infrastructure, and ministry budgets are almost entirely spent on salaries for the vast number of people on the public sector payroll, or else on government fuel and energy which incentivises cross-border gas smuggling.

While Tripoli has controlled the money, Haftar controls most of the oil fields. Periodically, when Haftar needs more money, he closes oil fields until Tripoli recapitalises the banks and releases money for him to pay his troops’ salaries. Such is the uneasy peace.

Most recently, Saddam Haftar shut in the Sharara field, depriving Libya of the sale receipts from 300,000 bpd since early August. The Haftar clan seem unmoved that this tactic deprives all of Libya of income, not just the west. Throughout, militias have grown rich through extortion, smuggling, trafficking, and schemes in which they use letters of credit from the central bank allowing them access to foreign currency, then add a significant surcharge to imports.

Taking Care of Kabir

Kabir has enormous leeway to fund political programmes or withhold funds from them. When Debaiba first became prime minister, the two men were on the same page, but as Debaiba began to take advantage and spend profligately, Kabir turned off the taps. There is now an unsightly fight involving Aguila, Debaiba, the Presidential Council, and others over Kabir’s fate, with questionably legal reasoning held aloft by both sides.

Haftar would like to see Kabir gone. The warlord successfully ousted the long-time chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation in 2022 and attacked Tripoli in 2019 principally to get his hands on the central bank.

Troops loyal to Saddam Haftar have now been deployed to south-west Libya, nominally to enforce border security. In reality, it is to pressure Debaiba. Turkey’s security offer to protect the GNU will prove key.

Turkey is an ally of Kabir’s, with Kabir having deposited funds in Turkey’s own struggling central bank. Turkey’s President Erdogan is therefore Kabir’s most powerful backer, and the reason he remains in-post.

International Responsibility

The US and UK have officially supported Kabir in recent days. They see him as a reliable steward of Libya’s complicated economic portfolio.

But nominal Western support may not be enough, especially since the UN Support Mission, led by Acting Envoy Stephanie Koury, has not articulated a new effort to help stabilise Libya, and its mandate expires later this year. Russia could veto any renewal.

If Kabir is forced out under pressure from Haftar, that could turn some of Libya’s considerable reserves over to Moscow. That can be avoided if Libya’s state political and economic institutions come together to participate and make the process equitable.

The Berlin Process, chaired by Germany’s former Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2020, established political, economic, and security tracks. The economic track got less attention.

A genuine audit of the central bank and state budget is needed, while the IMF’s 2023 Article IV should follow up with a more detailed report for 2024 to help make Libyan data more transparent. An oversight body comprised of representatives of states with experience in successfully fighting corruption (such as Georgia or Moldova) would increase confidence, as would a World Bank mission issuing quarterly progress reports. If key international actors ignore this crisis, they leave Libya at the mercy of Russia, who could soon enjoy the spoils of war without having had to fight one.

***

Ben Fishman is the Levy Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former director for North Africa on the National Security Council.

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Wolfram Lacher

“Ibrahim’s commitments to Haftar, Saddam, Ghnewa [a powerful Tripoli militia leader] go far beyond what Siddiq [Kabir] agreed on,” a senior financial official close to Kabir told me last December.

But there is another narrative of how Kabir and the Dabeibas fell out, one of political intrigue between power brokers who install and eject senior officeholders to pursue their private ends through Libya’s state institutions. Ibrahim Dabeiba’s power politics, this narrative goes, had begun to directly threaten Kabir months before he rang the alarm bells on expansionary spending. In July 2023, two militia leaders closely allied with Ibrahim had enabled a new appointee to take over at the Administrative Control Authority — a position that offered its holder veto power over public sector appointments and contracts.

“When that happened, Siddiq [Kabir] started worrying about his own post,” a senior financial official said. The previous incumbent, Tripoli militia leaders and senior officials agree, had been beholden to Mohamed Taher Issa, a prominent businessperson with close ties to Kabir. Previously, Issa had staunchly backed Prime Minister Dabeiba in his bid to retain the loyalties of armed groups in Tripoli. But following the change, Issa assembled a coalition aimed at ousting Dabeiba.

In the same month, a former finance minister was arrested on arrival in Tripoli, where he sought to rally the support of parliamentarians for his bid to replace Kabir at the central bank — apparently backed by both Ibrahim Dabeiba and Saddam Haftar. To protect himself against Ibrahim’s scheming, Kabir built his own alliances with eastern factions. He solicited the support of Agila Saleh, the head of Libya’s east-based Parliament, which had previously considered Kabir an impostor whose term as governor had expired long ago. Only weeks after the incident involving the former finance minister, Kabir obtained a decree from the Parliament’s presidency confirming his position as well as that of his east-based deputy Marei Barassi — another key official who owed his appointment to Haftar’s sons. The decree handed Kabir and Barassi the competencies nominally held by the central bank’s board of governors, requiring them to work closely together.

In the autumn, Kabir began blocking first the transactions of Ibrahim’s political clients and then capital and operating expenditure more broadly, saying that the money for 2023 had run out. Eventually, two militia leaders close to Ibrahim threatened Kabir directly, according to two senior officials close to him. “This crossed the line for him,” one of them said. Shortly afterward, in early November, Kabir left for Turkey, where he was involved in a car accident. Rumors quickly swirled that it had been an attempt on his life. Whatever the truth, Kabir stayed in Turkey for over a month, ostensibly for medical treatment.

All the while, he blocked payment authorizations for Dabeiba’s administration. Politicians and militia leaders in Tripoli believed that Kabir was trying to bring Dabeiba down. Tensions were building up between two emerging militia alliances in Tripoli, one of them backing Dabeiba, the other now looking to Kabir as Dabeiba’s leading opponent. Kabir’s ally Mohamed Taher Issa was holding meetings to rally support for a change in government. The dinar’s rate against foreign currencies was sliding on the black market.

In the early months of 2024, Dabeiba’s financial travails kept worsening, while the Haftar family and its east-based government suddenly became awash with money. “The Haftars used to negotiate with us over a billion here, a few hundred million there. Now they no longer ask for anything, they have more than they need,” a senior financial official told me this June.

The most important reason for the dinar’s slide was that the Haftar clan was printing money both figuratively and literally, as well as converting that money into hard currency on the black market, boosting the demand for dollars. In public, both Kabir and Dabeiba referred to this as “the parallel expenditure of unknown origin.” Kabir argued that the threat to Libya’s economy from parallel spending made it necessary to negotiate a unified budget between both administrations. In fact, Kabir himself was facilitating the eastern authorities’ financing mechanisms.

In the final months of 2023, rivalry between the two governments obstructed the response to the catastrophic flooding in the city of Darna. In September, the collapse of two dams after torrential rains devastated large parts of the city’s center. More than 4,000 people died; another 8,000 are still considered missing.

Libya’s factions characteristically seized on the disaster as an opportunity to get ahead of their competitors. On paper, Dabeiba decreed 2 billion dinars (then around $400m at the official exchange rate) for the emergency response and reconstruction; the east-based Parliament allocated five times that sum to the parallel government.

But Dabeiba’s government had no presence in Darna, while the parallel administration had no regular access to funding from the central bank. Meanwhile, Kabir insisted that reconstruction had to be overseen jointly and with the involvement of the World Bank to ensure transparency. For months, the impasse kept reconstruction on hold, even as more than 40,000 people remained displaced from their homes.

Saddam Haftar had overseen the initial response to the crisis, while his brother Belgasem became head of the eastern government’s Darna reconstruction committee in December 2023. Initially, Belgasem had little to show for it. Two months later, however, the east-based Parliament transformed the committee into a reconstruction and development fund for the whole of Libya, and exempted it from all administrative and financial oversight.

Shortly afterward, the sluggish work of clearing damaged or illegally built structures in Darna gave way to frantic construction activity. And it was no longer just Darna. Egyptian and Turkish companies began building roads, bridges and buildings in Benghazi and other cities.

It is unclear where the money for this sudden boom came from. Belgasem Haftar has told journalists that the funding for the projects he oversees comes from the central bank. Western diplomats also believe the central bank in Tripoli has financed the eastern government, though they lack specifics. Several senior financial officials in Tripoli equally claimed that the central bank had made direct transfers, including to Belgasem’s fund. But the central bank itself, which publishes detailed data on the disbursements it authorizes, did not declare any such payments.

In August, the Tripoli central bank for the first time acknowledged that the Benghazi central bank had used $950m for construction projects in the east, but it did not say where the dinar equivalent of that amount had come from. A close adviser to Kabir repeatedly denied to me that the central bank had made transfers to Belgasem’s fund or other arms of the eastern government. This could change after the east-based Parliament in July 2024 adopted a unified budget shared between the two parallel governments, as Kabir had proposed. But at the time of writing, Kabir and the Parliament are still at odds over the budget, which apparently does not correspond to Kabir’s expectations.

Three senior financial officials offered an alternative explanation for the bonanza — one that suggested a less direct flow of funds from the central bank, but nevertheless one ultimately overseen by Kabir. In the decree Kabir obtained from the Parliament’s presidency to protect his position, he committed to transferring assets held by commercial banks in the parallel central bank’s accounts in Benghazi to those of the central bank in Tripoli, and allowing the banks to use them. These assets, worth a total of around 51 billion dinars (or around $10bn at the official exchange rate), represented the bulk of the debt previously accumulated by the eastern authorities.

Since 2015, banks headquartered in the east, under pressure from Haftar’s forces, had disbursed money at the behest of the eastern authorities, in exchange for treasury bonds. The eastern central bank then nominally purchased these bonds, and in return credited banks with assets in its accounts. These assets were purely hypothetical, because the eastern central bank had no access to revenue. By the time Haftar launched his offensive on Tripoli, in 2019, this financial wizardry had brought the east-based banks to the brink of bankruptcy, and the eastern central bank ended it. The assets, which banks were unable to draw on, remained an unresolved problem.

Kabir had already begun crediting east-based banks for part of these assets in early 2023, while he was still on good terms with Dabeiba. In June of that year, central bank officials told me that around $3.7 billion had been “transferred.” But after Kabir fell out with Dabeiba and reached out to the east, that operation accelerated, and by the end of the year, it was complete. In addition, the central bank extended billions in long-term, interest-free loans to banks. Board reshuffles brought east-based banks under the Haftars’ de facto control — banks that now had dozens of billions of dinars in assets in the account of the central bank in Tripoli.

This meant that the eastern government — and Belgasem Haftar’s fund — could once more take out debt from solvent commercial banks, with the help of the Benghazi central bank. Indeed, the law creating Belgasem’s fund explicitly authorized it to do so. Control over banks also allowed associates of the Haftar sons to officially buy hard currency on credit, then pay back the dinar equivalent after converting the hard currency on the black market, pocketing the differential.

***

Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the author of “Libya’s Fragmentation”

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Vivian Yee and Islam Al-Atrash

The country has settled into a tense east-west divide, but turmoil around the central bank, which handles Libya’s oil riches, has worsened a fraying, fragile political setup.

Libya has scarcely known peace or stability since rebels overthrew its longtime dictator during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. After a civil war that ended in 2020, Libya remains split between rival, mutually hostile governments, one in the west and one in the east.

That uneasy stalemate appears headed for a destabilizing shake-up after a series of moves by political players, including a fight for control of the central bank, the conduit for Libya’s vast oil wealth and therefore a key prize in political factions’ infighting.

On Monday, the country’s presidential council tried to fire the bank head, Sadik al-Kabir, by decree. He refused to go, and analysts said the decree was legally toothless, but the leader of Libya’s western government endorsed the move and the presidential council announced that it would install a new central bank board of directors, beginning Wednesday.

Here’s what to know about how the country’s shaky peace and power-sharing might be unraveling.

What is the state of affairs in Libya?

The U.N.-recognized government headed by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeiba controls only western Libya. The eastern part of the country houses the country’s Parliament and has its own prime minister, but it is ruled by Gen. Khalifa Hifter, a warlord.

Since Mr. Hifter’s attempt to seize the capital, Tripoli, ended in a cease-fire in 2020, conflict has not erupted again because powerful players on both sides have struck deals to benefit themselves, analysts say, splitting up Libya’s oil revenues. Though the arrangement tamped down outbreaks of violence between rival militias, it did little to help regular Libyans.

The United Nations brokered a deal that put Mr. Dbeiba in office and created the three-member presidential council, which ensured Libya’s various regions were represented in leadership. They were supposed to step down after nationwide elections and unification of the country, but the elections never took place.

Political authority is now scattered among a jumble of political institutions, including the presidential council, led by officials who were either never elected or whose terms expired years ago.

The central bank is one of the few institutions that has bridged east and west, making its chief, Mr. al-Kabir, a key player. Though the bank is based in Tripoli, along with Mr. Dbeiba’s government, both administrations have worked with Mr. al-Kabir to keep oil funds flowing and government salaries paid.

What happened at the central bank?

Mr. Dbeiba and Mr. al-Kabir, once allies, had a falling out last year, as the central bank governor began accusing the prime minister of corruption and overspending.

Analysts say Mr. al-Kabir may have also worried for his own political survival as it became clearer that Mr. Dbeiba wished to replace him. The banker, needing new allies, now appears to be aligned with factions in eastern Libya.

In recent weeks, armed groups associated with rival political factions deployed around the central bank’s headquarters, generating suspicions that Mr. Dbeiba and his allies would attempt to seize it by force.

On Sunday, the central bank announced it was shutting down its operations, paralyzing the country’s banking system, to protest the kidnapping of its information technology director, Musab Muslam. It was unclear who had taken him.

On Monday, the presidential council, which usually wields little power, issued its decree dismissing Mr. al-Kabir, apparently exceeding its authority.

Hours later, the bank announced that Mr. Muslam had been freed and the bank had resumed operations. Its statement ignored the presidential council’s decree.

On Tuesday, the presidential council sent a delegation of officials, including a militia member, to the bank to tell Mr. al-Kabir to step aside. He replied in a statement that he was answerable not to his old allies in western Libya, but to the Parliament in eastern Libya.

Mr. Deiba, endorsing the firing, instructed Libyan embassies worldwide to inform foreign officials that Mr. al-Kabir’s term had expired.

What does it mean for instability in Libya?

The central bank is not the only arena where tensions between east and west have spiked again. Last week, Mr. Hifter, the eastern ruler, blockaded Libya’s largest oil field and moved some of his forces westward. The eastern Parliament declared Mr. Dbeiba’s government illegitimate.

Libya could be headed for more violence, analysts say, as political factions and militias compete for power and oil riches. They say it is unlikely that eastern and western Libyan forces will soon return to all-out war, but the fragile political setup that has prevented conflict is eroding.

Jeopardizing that system could send Libya careening toward more upheaval and conflict, putting political and economic progress even further out of reach.

Driving the central bank governor from his post, would put Libya in uncharted territory. International financial institutions would not be likely to recognize a new governor installed by force. All Libyan oil revenue goes through the central bank, which also pays the government employee salaries that many Libyans, under both rival governments, depend on.

The militia deployments outside the central bank prompted the United States special envoy to Libya, Richard Norland, to issue a statement calling threats to the bank’s staff and operations “unacceptable.” He warned that trying to topple the bank’s leadership could cut off Libya’s access to international financial markets.

Mr. al-Kabir, the central banker, has blocked spending by Mr. Dbeiba’s western government, plunging it into financial trouble.

Will it change the status quo?

The lack of large-scale fighting over the last few years did not mean Libya was doing well. The failure to hold elections left power in the hands of people who are widely viewed as corrupt and have little incentive to change things. Armed groups and foreign fighters, including from Russia, are deeply entrenched. Libya’s infrastructure and economy have rotted or stagnated.

There is little consensus among the international players involved in Libya — including Turkey, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt — about how to extract Libya from its quagmire.

“The arrangements have been fraying, they’re increasingly dysfunctional,” said Wolfram Lacher, a Libya expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. “Because some are getting too greedy, the arrangements are breaking down. But I think this is more like a process of renegotiating arrangements in a very tense manner, and not a prelude to renewed war.”

***

Vivian Yee is a Times reporter covering North Africa and the broader Middle East. She is based in Cairo.

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Yasmina Abouzzohour and Tarik M. Yousef

Key Takeaways

Trust in the military is surprisingly high in the Middle East and North Africa: Despite military involvement in coups, conflicts, political interference, and economic encroachment in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the majority of surveyed citizens express high trust in the armed forces, significantly more than other national institutions.

Trust in the military reflects disillusionment with politics and the need for stability: Combined with people’s lack of confidence in parliaments and governments, the military’s high ratings signal a form of governance fatigue. At the same time, significant trust in the armed forces amongst those who feel safe indicates that the institution is envisioned as a stabilizing force.

Safety, ideological, and economic factors explain public trust in the military: In addition to personal safety, ideology plays an important role, with conservatives displaying high levels of trust and Islamists showing lower levels. Additionally, trusting political institutions and being part of lower economic classes positively impact trust in the military, though this varies depending on the regime type.

The military engenders trust among proponents of democracy: This surprising finding in civilian-led countries suggests that many do not see a contradiction between trusting the military and supporting democracy. This is consistent with growing support for a strong executive amongst citizens in the region in the face of deteriorating government effectiveness and socio-economic outcomes.

Introduction

The institution of the military is experiencing a resurgence around the globe. Citizens are placing higher levels of trust in the armed forces—even in regions with a history of military interference or domination.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where military elites hold a great deal of political and economic power, around 70% of surveyed citizens in 2021-2022 expressed significant trust in the armed forces. This surpasses the levels of trust accorded to elected officials, civil society, and the news media.

The military’s centrality to the politics and stability of this region was reaffirmed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and subsequent developments. Indeed, the military’s support for transition or the status quo dictated the trajectory of events in many countries. 

In Tunisia, the army leadership’s decision not to support President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali led to his ousting.

At the same time, its adherence to civilian authority after 2011 facilitated a relatively smooth transition. In contrast, the Syrian army’s loyalty to President Bashar Assad’s regime fueled a brutal civil war that has lasted for over a decade, resulting in widespread devastation and humanitarian crises.

As a result, MENA armies have been at the heart of policy debates and media scrutiny. This discourse has predominantly centered around the role of military elites in politics, and little attention has been paid to the public and the paradoxical high trust it places in this opaque institution.

This issue brief analyzes public opinion data to explore military-society relations in the MENA region. It begins by examining the military’s role during modern times, focusing on patterns of political and economic interference.

It then explores data on trust in the armed forces in nine countries across the MENA region and identifies the characteristics that make citizens more or less likely to trust them. Building on these findings, it provides insights into the broader dynamics of governance, stability, and public sentiment in the region.

***

Yasmina Abouzzohour is a nonresident fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council) and a fellow and lecturer at Princeton University. Abouzzohour’s research focuses on public trust in the military, public opinion, and regime behavior in the Middle East and North Africa.

Tarik M. Yousef is a senior fellow and director of the ME Council. His career has spanned the academic and think tank world, including at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His involvement with public policy includes working in the Middle East Department at the International Monetary Fund, the Middle East and North Africa region at the World Bank, and the UN Millennium Project.

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Tarek Megerisi 

After weeks of rising tensions between Libya’s political elites, the country is nearing collapse. Europeans must act fast to avoid another conflict on their doorstep.

@Tmegrisi on X In recent weeks, Libya has been collapsing at every level. Increasing tensions between the ruling families, the Dabaibas and the Haftars, led Saddam Haftar to blockade Libya’s largest oilfield last week and later march his forces west, violating the 2020 ceasefire agreement. A few days later,  the parliament, under the Haftars’ influence, officially unrecognised prime minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba’s government and Libya’s Presidency Council. Then, on 18 August, the Presidency Council dismissed the long-standing central bank governor turned Haftar-ally Sadiq al-Kabir. This could be the final shock that sends Libya’s post-2020 status quo tumbling down into a civil war.

Towards stabilisation

Focusing on any of Libya’s mini crises would be like trying to stop a collapsing cliff face by pinning individual rocks. Rather, the stabilising intervention that Libya needs is a holistic one: the policy equivalent of a net across the entire cliff face. This means jump-starting Libya’s political process with enough political capital to redirect the interests of Libya’s myopic ruling class from their petty feuding. To achieve this, the most active European states in Libya, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom should come together to:

• Build a geopolitical alliance to support a new political process. Most importantly, with the United States, which often works with Europeans on such processes and remains anxious over Russia’s deepening entrenchment in Libya. Then, influential regional powers like Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey, alongside other Europeans like Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland who have their own stakes in Libya.
• Empower the interim head of the UN mission to Libya, Stephanie Khoury, to present an emergency plan for a new political process – including an election and negotiations with Libyan political heavyweights to frame their involvement in it. While Russia will undoubtedly seek to undermine Khoury, the weight of three permanent members (especially as the UK is a pen holder), and support from others in this broader group like Algeria and Switzerland (who are currently on the council) would provide enough weight. After the plan is officially announced, Europeans could then second staff to bolster the mission’s capacity.
• The alliance should then collectively pressure Libya’s political elite, namely, the leadership of its political institutions and powerful military figures, like Haftar, to de-escalate and join the stabilisation process. This involves keeping military forces within the boundaries of the 2020 ceasefire agreement and re-opening oil fields, while restricting central bank spending and halting new energy projects until after elections. This pressure should be delivered privately through bilateral meetings which blend potential punishments like sanctions with incentives like involvement in the process. A joint statement should also be issued, stating that the past week demonstrates that all Libyan political institutions have outlived their mandates, and must move towards a new, legitimate, political system. This would limit any Libyan actor’s room for manoeuvre and generate expectation from the Libyan street.

Alarm bells ringing

Haftar’s spectre of a machination to replace Dabaiba has put Algeria on high alert, all while Turkey and Russia have been increasing weapon deliveries and deepening their control over Dabaiba’s western and Haftar’s eastern armed forces respectively. If this meltdown isn’t averted, it will not only hit European migration and energy interests, but help the entrenchment of rivals near European shores, exacerbate regional crises, and create a fleet of unforeseen consequences ready to traverse the mediterranean just like Libya’s previous civil wars did in 2019 and 2014.

***

Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations. His work mainly addresses how European policymaking towards the Maghreb and Mediterranean regions can become more strategic, harmonious, and incisive – with a long-term focus on Libya.

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Lisa Schlein

The U.N.’s chief human rights official accuses Libya’s political leaders of crushing political dissent to cling to power, leaving the country divided and its people mired in crisis, poverty, and misery.

In a report submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council Tuesday, Volker Türk, the U.N. high commissioner for human rights, presented a stinging rebuke of the methods employed by Libya’s governing elite to eviscerate its political opponents and remain in charge.

“A stalled political process, hijacked by actors whose interests align in preserving the status quo, is decimating the hope of Libyans for a more stable, open and thriving society. Hopes they have had to carry for far too long, with little in return,” he said.

The high commissioner’s report covers the human rights situation in Libya in the 12 months since April 2023. The report outlines “some disturbing developments,” among them an escalation in arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances and detention-related violations.

“Targeting of political opponents and dissenting voices across the country has accelerated,” he said.

While the figure of those arrested is likely to be higher, he noted that his office has verified at least 60 cases of arbitrary detention of people who were “peacefully exercising their right to express political views.”

“In some cases, detention was followed by extrajudicial killing,” he said.

“All of this is corrosive to the prospects for healing Libya’s fractured social and political environment, especially as grievances around detentions were at the heart of the 2011 uprising,” he said.

He warned that lack of accountability for the violations and abuses committed 13 years ago “remains a serious obstacle to reconciliation today and serves as a driver of conflict.”

Libyan society is still divided 13 years after the country’s former dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, was overthrown. The country is ruled by two rival administrations: the internationally recognized Tripoli-based Government of National Unity and the Government of National Stability, which holds power in the east.

Libya has not had presidential or parliamentary elections since 2014.

At the council, the high commissioner denounced the widespread violations and abuses “perpetrated at scale with impunity” against migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers by both “state and non-state actors, often working in collusion.”

His report documents a litany of horrors to which these vulnerable, desperate people are subjected, including “trafficking, torture, forced labor, extortion, starvation in intolerable conditions of detention,” as well as mass expulsions and the sale of human beings, including children.

“And in March this year a mass grave was discovered in southwestern Libya, containing at least 65 bodies presumed to be migrants,” Türk said.

Following the discovery of the mass grave in March, the International Organization for Migration said, “The circumstances of their death and nationalities remain unknown, but it is believed that they died in the process of being smuggled through the desert.”

The high commissioner said, “As if this were not horrific enough, we are following up on reports of another mass grave recently discovered in the desert area at the Libyan-Tunisian border.”

Calling for investigations into these crimes, Türk said that “The responsibility for investigating these crimes falls squarely with the Libyan authorities. Reparations must be made, justice served and nothing like this must ever happen again.”

Halima Ibrahim Abdel Rahman, Libya’s minister of justice, did not respond to the high commissioner’s mass graves accusations, nor about his allegations regarding the abhorrent treatment of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers.

The minister said that some of the comments “are not in line with reality,” noting that “Libya gives special importance to the rights of refugees, although many of the refugees present in the territory of our country are there clandestinely.”

She also took umbrage at the high commissioner’s charges that human rights violations and abuses against political dissidents are committed with impunity.

“What we see in the report does not fully reflect the efforts taken by the judiciary because we have prosecuted a high number of individuals accused of violating human rights while providing all legal guarantees” to people in “all places of detention, which are under the control of the Ministry of Justice,” she said.

Human rights chief Türk urged Libya to restore the rule of law, including accountability for human rights violations, and to protect the peoples’ right to freedom of assembly and association.

“The stifling of civil society organizations, political activists, journalists and many others is fostering a climate of fear,” he said.

“It is also undermining the very foundations necessary for Libya’s democratic transition, emboldening the spoilers, and enabling security actors to perpetrate human rights violations with impunity,” he said.

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Wolfram Lacher

Collusion among former enemies in Tripoli has opened up unprecedented access to funds for the east-based Haftar family, threatening a fragile equilibrium

Tripoli feels like a backwater these days — rather unusually so for a city on which Libya’s struggles over power and wealth have focused for the past 14 years. Now, all the action is elsewhere. Libyan businesspeople and foreign diplomats come back stunned from eastern Libya, describing with wide eyes how brand new roads, bridges, public buildings and housing projects are rising out of the ground at dizzying speed.

Their amazement at this sudden turn of events is all the greater as it comes after more than a decade during which large-scale infrastructure projects had been mostly on hold. But the reconstruction now underway in areas controlled by Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar’s family is “unprecedented” even when compared with the late Gadhafi era, a Benghazi resident told me over the phone. (When you have written about the repression and corruption of the Haftars’ family-based power structure, as I have, it’s inadvisable to go and see for yourself.)

In Tripoli, by comparison, lethargy prevails. The only construction activity of any note is a motorway being built by an Egyptian consortium that cuts through Tripoli’s southern districts — an attempt by the Tripoli-based prime minister, Abdelhamid Dabeiba, to curry favor with the Egyptian government. Contractors working on other projects in western Libya complain that they’re having trouble getting paid unless they have allies in Dabeiba’s inner circle. And even if they do, business is slow: The government now has little access to funds for development.

This is a paradoxical state of affairs. Libya’s oil money, after all, is channeled through the National Oil Corp. (NOC) and the central bank. Both are headquartered in Tripoli and formally cooperate with Dabeiba’s government, rather than the rival administration led by Usama Hammad, which is based in Benghazi and provides a civilian facade to the rule of the Haftar clan. Officially, the central bank in Tripoli had not disbursed any funds to the Hammad government as of the time of writing. Opacity surrounds the financing of the large-scale projects in areas under the Haftars’ control — projects managed by an entity headed by one of Haftar’s sons, Belgasem, and a body that effectively reports to another, Saddam.

At the heart of the puzzle is a power struggle in Tripoli that has reshaped Libya’s political alliances and helped the Haftar family to unparalleled funds to dispense patronage. The Haftars have proven adept at exploiting that rift, between the seemingly immovable central bank governor, Siddiq Kabir, and Dabeiba — or more precisely, Dabeiba’s nephew Ibrahim, who is widely seen as the real power broker behind the Tripoli government. As a result of that struggle, the hemorrhage of state funds is worsening, Haftar’s sons are consolidating their power — and ultimately, the shaky balance that has maintained the calm in Libya over the past decade might come undone.

If Libyan politics has rarely made international headlines in recent years, this isn’t necessarily a good sign. Whereas the first decade after Gadhafi’s demise in 2011 was marked by turbulence and repeated civil wars, the period since 2022 has been one of deadlock and backroom deals. Politics is no longer a public affair but now plays out in the hidden machinations of a select few.

The basic contours are deceptively simple: two competing governments and military blocs, backed by two foreign powers — Turkey and Russia. Those two states’ military presence has prevented a relapse into civil war since western Libyan forces, supported by Turkey, defeated Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli in mid-2020. In the wake of that conflict, U.N. mediation led to the formation of a unity government under Dabeiba in early 2021. But the U.N.’s plan to hold elections later that year failed. Dabeiba’s western Libyan discontents allied with Haftar to form a new government, but Dabeiba prevailed in the bidding contest for the loyalties of armed groups in Tripoli, leaving the rival administration nominally in charge of the Haftar-controlled east and south of the country.

But the formal divides have concealed increasing collusion between Libya’s leading antagonists. In July 2022, Ibrahim Dabeiba and Saddam Haftar struck a deal to appoint Haftar’s candidate, Farhat Bengdara, as head of the NOC. In exchange, Haftar lifted a partial blockade on oil production with which he had sought to pressure Prime Minister Dabeiba to stand down. From then on, oil exports once again washed revenues into the central bank, and thence on to the Tripoli government, which paid salaries across the country. Dabeiba and Kabir cooperated closely, each relying on the other to ensure their political survival.

For a while, it appeared that the stalemate offered a comfortable setup to all key players. Both the Haftars and their nominal adversaries — the core group of militia leaders who had ensured Dabeiba’s survival — captured ever greater sums of money and influence over the distribution of posts. Ibrahim Dabeiba and the commanders allied with him now dealt routinely with Haftar’s sons. The Dabeibas’ western Libyan opponents were marginalized, and clashes in Tripoli — previously common — became extremely rare. The pillage of state funds, which had provoked so many confrontations and sudden reversals, now proceeded in silence. Meanwhile, the two ruling families and their allied militia leaders accumulated ever more wealth and power.

There are competing narratives about what prompted Kabir’s falling-out with the prime minister, which ended this tranquil state of affairs in the summer of 2023. Kabir and his advisers emphasize that the Dabeiba government’s expenditure proved unsustainably high, requiring the central bank to suspend payment authorizations for everything other than salaries in October 2023. A particular point of discord, an adviser to Kabir told me in late 2023, was implausibly high spending in public sector bodies headed by close allies of Ibrahim Dabeiba, such as the administration handling payments for hospital treatment abroad. In public, Kabir voiced particular alarm at a dramatic increase in the bill for fuel imports and the corresponding decline in the proportion of oil export revenues that the NOC transfers to the central bank.

With fuel imports, Kabir pointed the finger at a key source of the Haftar clan’s finances. Libya has limited refining capacity and imports most of its fuel. The NOC buys the fuel at world market prices, but its subsidiaries then sell it to Libyan consumers at some of the lowest prices worldwide: a liter of gasoline costs about three cents at the official exchange rate. The price differential offers huge opportunities for illicit profit. Fuel smuggling to neighboring countries was common even in the Gadhafi era, but since 2011 industrial-scale networks have replaced small-time smugglers.

Haftar’s forces have been leading players in the fuel-smuggling market since they extended their control over much of Libya’s land and sea borders. Leadership became domination after Haftar’s nominee Bengdara took over at the NOC in mid-2022 and subsequently appointed a Saddam loyalist as the head of its subsidiary Brega, which handles fuel sales. Since then, the quantities of imported fuel have continued to grow, as has the scale of smuggling operations in areas under the Haftars’ control. The opaque system under which the NOC barters the fuel it imports for crude oil exports has also attracted accusations of irregularities — “a black box,” one senior financial official called it.

In the months preceding Bengdara’s appointment, tankers had occasionally loaded fuel at Benghazi’s port to smuggle it abroad. But thereafter, such shipments became routine, according to an expert panel that monitors violations of U.N. sanctions on Libya. Trucks load fuel at depots controlled by Haftar’s forces and pass through checkpoints manned by these forces on their way to Sudan and Chad, reaching as far as the Central African Republic. Businesspeople I spoke to who are involved in these networks, and sources close to the operations at Benghazi port, all name Saddam Haftar as the actor ultimately overseeing fuel smuggling. The profits, they allege, are reinvested in military units reporting directly to Saddam, his brother Khaled and other close relatives.

Kabir understandably charged that the growing cost of fuel imports underpinning these activities was unsustainable. From 2021 to 2023, the annual fuel import bill more than doubled, to $8.5 billion — equivalent to a third of the oil revenue transferred to Libya’s central bank that year. But by singling out fuel imports, Kabir also denounced financial arrangements over which he, as central bank governor, had lost control. Since Libya’s government institutions split in two in 2014, Kabir had been the central arbiter of both monetary and fiscal policy in Libya. Now, bartering by Bengdara’s NOC prevented any central bank oversight over fuel imports. More importantly, the reckless expansion of fuel smuggling enabled by these imports had to be seen as part of the tacit arrangements linking Prime Minister Dabeiba and Haftar. Whether Dabeiba liked it or not, they were a part of the price he had to pay to keep the oil flowing. These arrangements were at the heart of Libya’s politics, but they bypassed Kabir and thereby undermined his centrality.

Kabir and his entourage point the finger at the Dabeiba government’s corruption as the reason for the rift.

***

Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and the author of “Libya’s Fragmentation”

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Frederic Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss

Help Democracies—and Let Moscow’s

Appeal Fade in Autocracies

The Kremlin is on a roll in large parts of Africa. In April, the Pentagon announced withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Chad and Niger, two key U.S. partners in counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel that are now turning to Russia for security assistance.

In the case of Niger, a military junta that seized power in a coup last year ordered U.S. personnel to leave a $100 million drone base. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has been pouring mercenaries, proxies, and materiel into Libya for the past six months, adding to its already sizable presence in that country.

Libya is now an important access point for Russia in the Mediterranean and a launching pad for operations elsewhere in Africa.

A string of coups across Africa since 2020 has allowed Moscow to strengthen its position on the continent, even as it funnels vast military and economic resources into the war in Ukraine.

Russia’s increased military, political, and economic presence in a diverse array of countries that now includes Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan also flies in the face of expectations expressed by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who said in June 2023 that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine had “diminished Russian influence on every continent.”

More than two years into that war, Russia clearly remains capable of seizing opportunities to expand its reach in Africa and other parts of the world.

With so many other crises calling for the Biden administration’s attention, rolling back Russia’s advances in Africa will not be easy, not least because the Kremlin has ingratiated itself with many unsavory regimes there.

Moreover, Russia’s recent successes capitalize on a combination of worsening regional security dynamics and the continent’s postcolonial history. In the Sahel, for example, Russia touts its ability to help governments respond to rising violence and jihadist threats while scorning France, the former colonial power, for its long record of heavy-handedness and failed policies.

The key question for the United States is how to identify realistic policy goals that play to Washington’s strengths, align with U.S. values, and harness Africa’s enormous potential while recognizing that many countries want to hedge their bets when it comes to foreign partners.

Democratic and Republican administrations alike have often treated countering Russia as an end in itself, citing the demands of great-power competition as justification for action in every country where Moscow gains a foothold. U.S. policymakers should take a more selective approach.

Instead of simply trying to compete for the affections of African leaders who are sometimes more of a liability than an asset to the United States, Washington should continue helping its current partners deliver good governance, economic opportunities, and security for their citizens.

Such aid can both improve the lives of ordinary Africans and diminish the likelihood that their governments will look to Russia in the future. As for those countries that have already turned to Russia for assistance, Washington needs to acknowledge that in many cases the most fruitful policy—difficult as inaction may be—is to step back and allow Russia’s appeal to fade on its own.

RIPE FOR RUSSIA

Russia is benefiting from a wave of democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation across the continent. Coups have ousted several Western-friendly governments in former French colonies such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger. These recent trends have deep roots.

As European colonial rule ended, from the 1950s through the 1970s, many African countries, such as Senegal and Tanzania, embraced multiparty elections, but others, including Burundi and the Central African Republic, devolved into coup-prone dictatorships.

Former French colonies were especially predisposed to authoritarianism, given the highly centralized political structures bequeathed by the colonialists and Paris’s support for strongmen rulers.

In the fight against violent extremists in the decades after 9/11, Washington and Paris trained military officers in the Sahel who often committed serious human rights abuses. Years later, some of these officers launched or supported military coups—including those in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

The United States and France also frequently overlooked the fact that militant organizations in the Sahel drew strength from the domestic misgovernance that their own security and counterterrorism assistance had enabled. The Western response to the uprising in Libya in 2011 made matters worse.

After NATO intervened in support of a revolution that toppled the longtime dictator Muammar Qaddafi, the country plunged into chaos.

Libya’s fragmentation created an opening for Russian intervention and destabilized the countries to its south. Security conditions in Libya deteriorated after the United States disengaged in 2012 and when a civil war broke out in 2014, and Moscow took advantage of the resulting power vacuum. Russia began establishing in Libya a bridgehead for its activities in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018.

The Kremlin dispatched thousands of fighters from the Wagner paramilitary group, an ostensibly private mercenary outfit controlled by the Russian government, along with regular Russian soldiers, advanced weaponry, and disinformation specialists to aid a warlord based in eastern Libya in his bid to defeat the internationally recognized government in the capital.

Although that effort failed, Russian forces gained access over time to many of Libya’s air bases and, later, key ports, which they now use to ferry arms and fighters to Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Sudan. Russia’s presence in Libya also allows the Kremlin to profit from the smuggling of fuel, gold, drugs, and migrants.

Russia learned lessons in Libya that now inform its meddling across the continent. Limited, flexible, and nominally deniable interventions—often on behalf of distasteful partners that the West is unwilling to countenance—can establish Russian influence on the cheap and secure lucrative revenue streams, such as from gold mining.

For relatively little effort, Russia has successfully marketed itself as a partner that can provide military assistance and regime protection without demanding concessions on human rights or democracy.

Moscow understands, of course, that it cannot outperform Western governments when it comes to providing economic prosperity or human security. But as many in the region remain resentful of Paris’s paternalism—and, to a lesser extent, skeptical about Washington’s intentions—Russian policymakers have discovered that their biggest advantage is that Russia is neither France nor the United States.

Although the United States remains more popular than Russia throughout Africa, the gap in approval ratings between the two countries among Africans has narrowed over the past decade, according to a 2024 Gallup poll. Western officials should not assume that Russia’s reputation is as toxic in much of Africa as it is in Western countries.

LESS IS MORE

U.S. policymakers must learn that they cannot always outbid Moscow in places such as Mali or Niger. The United States has often failed in its efforts to bend ambivalent foreign governments to its will, and leaders in such places are adept at playing great powers off each other to get what they want.

A better use of Washington’s attention and resources would be to support existing partners in Africa who share American values and are committed to helping their citizens, not just shoring up their regimes.

Washington should strengthen ties with African countries while holding its partners to a high standard. It was a step in the right direction for the Biden administration to designate Kenya as a major non-NATO ally. Of course, the Kenyan government’s violent suppression of protesters just weeks after Kenyan President William Ruto visited Washington underscores the need for the United States to continually scrutinize its partners.

It should not give any government—even a democratically elected one—a free pass simply because it aligns with Washington instead of Moscow. The United States should continue to include policy conditions to its aid packages to help African leaders govern more effectively, reduce corruption, expand trade, improve competitiveness, and reduce high debt.

It would be short-sighted to jettison these stipulations simply to win over countries that have been wooed by Russia.

In parallel, the United States should continue to put a spotlight on Russian misdeeds, predatory behavior, human rights abuses, and support for large-scale corruption by publicizing damning information collected by activists, independent journalists, and Western governments.

In some cases, as when its vital interests are at stake, the United States should push back against Russia through sanctions, diplomacy, pressure campaigns, or intelligence operations.

For the most part, however, Washington should take advantage of the fact that Moscow is often its own worst enemy.

The bargain the Kremlin typically strikes with Africa’s autocrats is that it will protect their regimes, provide hired guns, and organize flashy disinformation campaigns in exchange for a lucrative stake in extractive industries.

Russian help often backfires.

In Burkina Faso and Mali, for example, military-led governments have killed scores of civilians and engaged in horrific human rights abuses, sometimes with the help of Russian mercenaries.

Such brutal tactics will only exacerbate the security problems that are engulfing parts of the Sahel. In Sudan, Russia is supporting both sides of a bloody civil war, thus inflaming the violence, in a bid to get permission to build a base on the Red Sea.

In time, the most self-serving of African leaders will probably realize that Russian patronage leaves them worse off in the long run.

Of course, it would be naive to expect that African countries exploited by Russia will simply fall back into the arms of the United States.

Across the continent, citizens and governments alike are increasingly keen to chart their own course and diversify their external relations, and Washington must accept this reality. But by offering its partnership to countries that want it and leaving the door open to future cooperation with those that, for now, do not, the United States can craft more effective policies without pressuring leaders across the continent to take sides in a Cold War–style battle for influence.

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Álvaro de Argüelles

The two main armed conflicts of the last two years—in Gaza and Ukraine—have led to the belief that international politics are ruled again by sheer force and that the United Nations is no longer a relevant actor. Libya, where international rules have been violated periodically in the last decade, represents one of the first examples of the ongoing dismantling of the global order. At the same time, the Libyan case is unique in that the UN has played a key role in shaping the political configuration of the North African country, not always necessarily in a positive way.

From the authorization of the 2011 military intervention to the creation of the Governments of National Accord and Unity, the UN has had successes but also relevant failures in Libya. The recent resignation of UN Special Representative Abdullah Bathily points to the need for the UN to move beyond interim agreements between elites and to take a bolder stance. The volatile state of global affairs makes progress in Libya uncertain. Still, it is clear that the iteration of past mistakes in the transition process will not lead to a different outcome.

From the 2011 revolution to the

arms embargo

The current situation in Libya can be traced back to the 2011 NATO-led military intervention, sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 (2011), and that led to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Under the premise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the UN mandated the international community to establish a no-fly zone to protect civilians against war crimes carried out by Gaddafi’s army. However, as the situation deteriorated, the mission turned into a full-fledged regime-change operation, and Russia and China criticized what they saw as a breach of the scope of the resolution. Ever since, consensus within the Security Council on Libya has been elusive, and at the global level, the concept of R2P will likely remain on the shelf for a long time.

The UN’s role in Libya is described mainly in UNSCRs 1970 (2011), 1973 (2011), and 2009 (2011) and can be summarized as follows: the establishment of an arms embargo, an assets freeze, and a travel ban; the creation of a Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts (PoE) to monitor the situation on the ground; a referral to the International Criminal Court for crimes committed during and after the civil war; and, most importantly, the creation of a body to promote political dialogue and the reestablishment of state authority. UNSCR 2146 (2014) also calls for UN member states to inspect high-sea vessels to prevent the illicit export of crude oil from Libya, a decision adopted days after the oil tanker MV Morning Glory departed from Cyrenaica without the consent of the authorities in Tripoli.

When it comes to the arms embargo, its lack of an enforcement mechanism is responsible for the current situation in Libya, much more than the looting of arsenals following the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime. Divisions among Security Council members and at the European Union, competition between Turkey and the United Arab Emirates in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and the growing US disinterest in the Middle East and North Africa region are all factors that explain why the continuous flow of weapons has not been halted.

The nine reports of the UN PoE detail persistent violations that have not been followed by specific actions and point directly at, among others, the responsibility of Russia, a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council. Interestingly, the embargo was the first to include a specific clause banning “the provision of armed mercenary personnel.” Despite this stipulation, today, Libya has become one of the main bases of operations for the Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary group now operating under the banner of Africa Corps.

Guiding the peace process:

The role of the United Nations Support

Mission in Libya

Unlike with the embargo, the UN has taken a leading role in the transition process by creating a support mission, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and appointing six consecutive special representatives to the secretary-general. In its current form [UNSCR 2542 (2020)], the tasks of UNSMIL are to further political dialogue and guide the transition process, help maintain the ongoing cease-fire, and support key Libyan institutions, including securing uncontrolled arms. The latter state-building element of the mission has been watered down through the years, with an initial mandate to “restore public security and promote the rule of law” that never met its expectations. In practice, UNSMIL offers a setting for Libyan elites to bargain for political and economic influence.

The drafting of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, and the subsequent creation of the Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2015 were UNSMIL’s first major achievements, which nevertheless had little success beyond signaling to the international community who was Libya’s legitimate authority. This failure can be attributed to the weak institutional legacy of Gaddafi’s hyper-personalist regime and, most importantly, to foreign meddling. UN special representatives have constantly complained about the role of third actors in funneling arms and money into the conflict. For instance, Ghassan Salamé, who served as UN special representative from 2017 to 2020, described Libya as “a textbook example of foreign interference.” However, some inherent flaws in the design of the LPA can also be blamed on the UN.

The main weakness of the UN-inspired political agreement is that it prioritized political reunification at the expense of legal, economic, and security sector reform. This made the GNA dependent on the goodwill of militias, while counterfeit banknotes continue to this day to flow into the Libyan market. Neither did UNSMIL push for the drafting of a definitive constitutional text, and in its absence, the LPA now appears to act as the top of the Libyan normative hierarchy.

Another caveat of the UNSMIL strategy was to include all major political factions within the framework of the LPA, ossifying institutions with little popular legitimacy, including the House of Representatives (HoR), which was elected a decade ago with a voter turnout of 18 percent. In addition, the emphasis on local and regional representation (for instance, within the Presidential Council, whose three members represent Libya’s three historical regions) has turned into local parochialism and clientelist competition.

The fact that all actors on the ground have international support has forced UN special representatives to be pragmatically dovish. But at times, it appears they have become victims of their narrative, ignoring bellicose behaviors and focusing on “reconciling” rivals that already have tacit understandings of how to share Libya’s riches. This is most evident in the case of Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), whose 2014 power grab was decisive in the collapse of Libya’s transition.

UN personnel have periodically traveled to Haftar’s headquarters in Rajma, east of Benghazi, despite the irregular nature of the LAAF and its links with war crimes and human rights violations. In 2015, the HoR appointed Haftar as supreme commander of the Libyan army. Still, the LPA is clear that this process should have been done through a joint committee also comprising the executive and the upper chamber, the High Council of State. The fact that Haftar launched his 2019 offensive on Tripoli the same day UN Secretary-General António Guterres was on a visit to eastern Libya is evidence of his disdain for the organization.

By 2018, conferences in Paris and Palermo had shifted the international debate, emphasizing the need for organizing elections in Libya. This was a desire equally shared by the population, as confirmed in consultations organized by UNSMIL in the context of a new Libyan National Conference. Following the collapse of Haftar’s campaign on Tripoli, however, the UN mission organized a voting process with seventy-five electors instead of pushing ahead with the plebiscite.

This Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) was to choose a new Government of National Unity (GNU) to organize presidential and parliamentary elections by December 24, 2021. In this sense, while the forum was another significant UN-led turning point, it seemed to replicate previous mistakes, extending an endless interim period and bringing to the table those most interested in maintaining the status quo. Some even described the LPDF as a rendezvous between “dinosaurs” and “kleptocrats.”

In addition to the questions of representativity, including the underrepresentation of women, the UN was not able to effectively address the allegations that the chosen and current Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba had bribed his way to power. If this was not enough, the HoR soon withdrew its recognition of the GNU, returning Libya to the previous stalemate and rendering the whole process pointless.

As time passed, it became evident that neither Dabaiba nor the HoR felt particularly pressed to hold the election by December 2021. Surprisingly, before his resignation in April 2024, Bathily, who served as UN special representative from 2022 to April 2024, was working on yet another transitional government, ignoring the aspirations of the population and the already-expired UN-proposed election timeline.

The UN must break the Libyan impasse

International norms and institutions are being challenged worldwide. However, this does not make the UN a mere bystander, and it is certainly not the case in Libya. Willingly or not, all Security Council members made Gaddafi’s downfall possible and failed to agree on embargo measures to stop the flow of weapons into Libya. Regarding the transition process, UNSMIL has inadvertently trapped Libya in a far-too-complex institutional web.

Bathily’s farewell declaration describes Libya as a “mafia state” dominated by political and military elites that follow their narrow interests. It points to the need for a new UNSMIL strategy, moving beyond the emphasis on reconciliation and pact-making and instead pushing for elections and accountability. The UN should not push for the creation of a third transitional executive, giving its seal of approval to yet another clique of elites. At the very least, this principled stand would raise awareness of the situation on the ground, and it could serve as revulsive in the otherwise endless political impasse.

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Álvaro de Argüelles is a PhD candidate at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM), Spain. He holds a double major in international studies and law from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and a master’s degree in Arab and Middle Eastern studies from UAM. Argüelles is a board member of the Foro de Investigación sobre el Mundo Árabe y Musulmán.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

Is Western myopia in Libya creating a

far worse version of Gaddafi?

If we do not prevent Libya from becoming a mafia state, the trend will not stop at Libya’s borders but become a norm in the region, and especially the Sahel. Today, a gridlocked Libya ambles along in an unsettling calm as Russia increases its presence in the region.

Libya continues to unravel quietly, with indications mounting that rival governments are regrouping for something big. Recently, Italian authorities intercepted a cargo ship suspected of bringing Russian weapons to General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya.

The reason being that Russia is arming Haftar in return for allowing Moscow to build a port on the Mediterranean coast, which would give it a base with Italy directly in its sites.

The country remains compromised, not least by its self-assured ruling elites, but also by the unhelpful policy decisions and changing rules of engagement in Western capitals. I fear the consequences will likely birth the country’s next and likely Muammar Gaddafi.

Flip-flopping Western policies

Briefly looking back, we can see that Western approaches toward Libya have undergone noteworthy changes, shifting from narrow security-oriented strategies to facilitating inclusive political settlements.

And, when that failed to secure meaningful progress in restoring the Libyan state, the West subsequently devolved toward a messy strategy of pursuing agreements among Libya’s differing factions.

This new strategy erroneously viewed bargains between the fractious and unelected Libyan elites as a makeshift bridge toward the ultimate goal—peace and stability. This is a grave miscalculation and a deliberate misreading of fairly obvious dynamics at play in Libya.

By prioritising exclusive bargains, the West inadvertently sponsored the entrenchment of Libya’s kleptocratic governance model that has successfully sidelined the building of key institutions and security sector reform.

At the core of this ill-informed shift in strategy was a severe underestimation of the underlying causes of Libya’s endemic instability and scapegoating of its political deadlock for a stalled state-building process. It also enabled the meteoric rise of “Clan Haftar”.

Small-time CIA asset turned Libya’s

biggest strongman

Khalifa Haftar rose to prominence in Libya as a result of his military background and fortuitous alliances. An ex-officer in Gaddafi’s army and commander of Gaddafi’s armies who tried and failed miserably to invade Chad, Haftar later turned into an opponent, participating in a failed coup before spending years in exile in the United States as a small-time CIA asset.

His return in 2011, followed by a series of events and foreign sponsorships, eventually catapulted Haftar into the larger-than-life figure he has become in Eastern Libya today.

After a failed and humiliating attempt to capture Tripoli with direct support from the UAE, Haftar’s stronghold remained in the east, where he established control through his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), a network of alliances with tribal leaders, radical Islamists and other local armed factions with foreign backing, consolidating influence through both military and political manoeuvring.

A combination of strong anti-Islamist rhetoric, pure brutality, control over significant oil resources, and portraying himself as a bulwark of stability in a chaotic region further solidified his dominance in the eastern part of Libya — much to the delight of an international community exasperated by mounting policy failures in the country.

Despite a controversial background, problematic records of human rights violations, and deepening kleptocracy, Haftar continues to receive clandestine and overt support from various Western countries, including a recent visit with US officials.

France, for instance, valued Haftar’s promise of combating terrorism, stemming migrant flows, and possibly, being an insurance for Paris’ waning control over the Sahel.

Additionally, countries like Italy have been keen on gaining uninterrupted access to Libyan oil by trying to position Rome favourably in a post-conflict scenario and bolster its ambitions to become a Mediterranean energy hub, and Libya plays a prominent role in UAE’s ongoing agenda of gaining influence across North Africa and the Sahel.

Meanwhile, in Brussels, lavish economic incentives for Libya’s strongmen to control migration have altered the balance of power within the country.

By offering financial incentives to curb migrant flows, the EU is inadvertently subsidising the higher operational costs associated with keeping trafficking routes open, bankrolling Clan Hafar’s management of detention facilities and security operations essential for trafficking, and increasing its control over these illicit markets.

‘Haftar & Sons, Inc’

Beyond Libya’s borders, Clan Haftar turns a hefty profit from more lucrative criminal activities like fuel and drug smuggling, while maintaining a facade of cooperation with Europe to ensure uninterrupted financial flows. To date, there is no credible accountability mechanism or other means for tracking where profits from illicit activities go, as well as who or what they end up funding.

Meanwhile, the more resources Haftar and his sons accumulate from its capture of Libya’s state expenditures, the greater its accumulation of power and influence, fostering a deepening personality cult around Clan Haftar. In a sense, Europe’s and the US’ strategy of reinforcing the very instability and criminality it claims to mitigate is not just an own goal for its policy objectives.

It also perfectly encapsulates the paradox of supposed defenders of democracy, human rights and the rule of law openly crowding behind the antithesis of protection of human rights, political pluralism and consensus government at the expense of Libya’s democratisation prospects.

This trend readily reinforces Clan Haftar’s authoritarian rule. Before its downfall in 2011, the Gaddafi regime was characterised by unrestrained power concentrated in the hands of one individual, with the systematic suppression of dissent and political pluralism while at least maintaining a level of a normal state with public services and security for its people.

Clan Haftar has already replicated this model in its control of the East. Unchecked, Libya faces the real possibility of becoming a far worse form of an earlier era of personalistic rule, suppressed civil liberties, disappearing political opposition, and a monolithic and mafia-like power structure with no regard to anything else other than the Haftar & Sons Inc while pretending it’s a national army.

The implications are grave

Politically, while some level of order might be achieved in territories under Haftar’s control, the undermining of an inclusive and legitimate central government could perpetuate instability and unrestrained violence, particularly in contested areas.

Socioeconomically, while resource control might bring short-term gains for certain factions, the lack of a unified national vision could hamper long-term development and equitable economic growth. Citizens, especially in contested or “forgotten” regions, may continue to face issues related to access to basic services, employment opportunities, and investment in infrastructure.

Beyond Libya, the empowerment of figures like Haftar, with documented ties to criminal networks and a history of human rights abuses, is very concerning. It signals a worrisome precedence for short-termism. In sum, Western policy towards Libya, characterised by a preference for deal-making with controversial actors like the Haftar clan, is a myopic approach fraught with peril.

A recalibration of this strategy is imperative, one that prioritises the establishment of legitimate political institutions and respect for human rights. If we do not prevent Libya from becoming a mafia state, the trend will not stop at Libya’s borders but become a norm in its region, and especially the Sahel.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is the Executive Director of the North Africa Initiative (NAI) and Senior Fellow at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute (FPI), Johns Hopkins University.

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Fuat Emir Şefkatli

Turkey, which has been approaching the two separate power centers and social bases of the country at an equal distance since the beginning of the Libya crisis, has recently attached great importance to diplomatic opening with the east of the country, with which it has strong relations.

Fuat Emir Şefkatli from the National Defense University wrote for AA Analysis about the benefits that Turkey’s steps towards normalization with eastern Libya will bring to both parties.

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Libya entered a new era in political, social and military terms when the uprising against then-President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 turned into the February Revolution. The country is still referred to as a frozen conflict zone today. The power struggle in Libya, which largely began as rival political factions attempting to claim ownership of the revolution after the revolution, eventually gave way to military polarization as armed groups became active actors.

The unilateral policies of international powers and the inadequacy of supra-state mechanisms such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and NATO, which sought to find a solution to the crisis in Libya, were also effective in bringing this picture to life.

Turkey, on the other hand, is looking for solutions to restore peace and stability to the country within the framework of international law and foreign policy principles within this complex equation that has emerged over time.

In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan noted in an interview with an international media organization on July 24 that relations with eastern Libya are progressing quite well. Minister Fidan, who announced that the Turkish Consulate General in Benghazi has reopened, added that they are in contact with Tobruk-based Parliament Speaker Akile Salih, as well as Khalifa Haftar and his sons.

Normalization with the East is gaining momentum

As is known, Turkey’s steps towards normalization with eastern Libya were taken in the last quarter of 2021. In this sense, the period when Turkey put the opening towards Cyrenaica, the eastern region of Libya, on the agenda corresponded to a period of political deadlock following the cancellation of the presidential elections planned to be held in December 2021.

During these dates, official visits by a delegation from the Libyan Parliament to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) were followed by the visit of the then Libyan Ambassador to Turkey Kenan Yılmaz to Akile Salih. However, the turning point in relations in a positive direction was the reception of Akile Salih by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in July 2022.

Since the beginning of the Libyan crisis, Turkey has approached the two separate power centers and social bases of the country at an equal distance and has recently attached great importance to diplomatic openings with the east of the country, with which it has strong historical and cultural relations. However, in addition to its increasing contacts with the east of Libya, Turkey also aims to maintain its relations with the National Unity Government (NMU) led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dibeybe and institutions in the west.

Unifying and solution-oriented rhetoric

Turkey’s recent integrative rhetoric and policy preferences developed through statements and visits can be interpreted as a serious effort to shift the tense atmosphere in Libya to diplomatic grounds. Because the legitimacy crisis between the East and the West, the fragmented security bureaucracy and governance crises constitute a strong obstacle to putting comprehensive solutions on the agenda.

On the other hand, the negotiation channels that Turkey is trying to establish contain certain gains in the medium and long term for both Libya and Turkey under three subheadings. The first of these, as emphasized by Minister Fidan in his interview, is Turkey’s motivation and intention to use the relations it has developed with the East for East-West integration.

In terms of organizing elections and ensuring democratic transition in Libya, Turkey is holding talks not only with local elements but also with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar. Increasing its diplomatic efforts to establish stability and peace will prevent a new conflict environment in Libya and may strengthen the unity of the country in the long term. It should be said that this situation is an effective policy choice for Turkey in terms of both preserving current gains and reaching potential future benefits.

Based on this, the second issue is that Turkey, which has deep historical, cultural and economic relations with both parts of Libya, will secure its interests and commercial gains in the Eastern Mediterranean, namely the Blue Homeland, by transferring its influence from the West to the East. In such a scenario, the political climate in the East, which was relatively against Turkey’s Maritime Delegation Agreement in 2020 and Hydrocarbon Agreement in 2022, may be completely changed.

Although the relevant agreements are based on solid ground in terms of international law and legitimacy, obtaining the indirect consent of the Parliament and the Haftar wing for these agreements may strengthen the Turkey-Libya alliance relationship in the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics.

On the other hand, when Turkey’s normalization with eastern Libya is more broad-based and institutional, it is quite possible that the agreements made with Turkish companies through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund affiliated with the Parliament will increase significantly. The commercial benefits that this possible picture will provide to Turkey are of critical importance.

Finally, Turkey’s military presence in the west of the country has served as a deterrent in preventing small-scale conflicts from turning into large-scale civil wars after 2020. Turkey’s military mission, based on training and consultancy, has not only kept the military polarization between the east and the west in balance, but also the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west.

At this point, high-level diplomatic contacts with eastern Libya may also pave the way for breaking the negative narrative developed by the eastern-centered public and media organizations regarding Turkey’s military presence in the past. At the same time, the ongoing process may buy Turkey significant time in planning military structuring and engagements until a democratic structure is established.

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Fuat Emir Şefkatli is a PhD candidate at the National Defense University.

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Chiara Lovotti, Alissa Pavia

Over the past decade, Russia’s involvement in Libya is evidence of its realization that it could transition from a marginal power to a significant competitor in the country, and thus in the broader Middle East and North Africa. As Russia became disillusioned by its perception of the West’s actions in Libya as aimed at regime change, it shifted its stance from cooperative to antagonistic. This disillusionment strengthened Russia’s determination to establish a strong presence in the country, exemplified by its deployment of mercenaries to Libya to secure greater power and influence.

Russia’s withdrawal from the Middle East

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent end to the Cold War, Russia maintained a strong foothold in the Middle East, recognizing the region’s potential importance to global power dynamics. During the Cold War in particular, Russia maintained its presence by creating allies among those Arab nations that would help it achieve its goal of creating an anti-Western camp, most notably Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, along with Algeria, Yemen, and Sudan.

Its relations expanded from diplomatic ties to arms shipments to support for liberation movements such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The Soviet influence in the region was most obvious in its support for the Arab states during the Suez Canal Crisis (1956), the Six-Day War (1967), and the Yom Kippur War (1973), conflicts that saw a strong involvement by the United States on the side of Israel.

The 1990s, however, saw a major shift in Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The subsequent economic crisis forced Russia to dramatically scale back its involvement in the region, reducing both military engagement and economic support in order to focus on domestic issues.

Additionally, Boris Yeltsin, the then president, saw a window to improve relations with the West. Scaling back Russia’s presence in what had been confrontational states represented one way to resolve tensions at a time when the country was reeling from internal economic turmoil. As a result, Russia played a marginal role in major confrontations such as the First Gulf War (1990–91), the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001), and the Iraq War (2003–11).

The 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi represented the beginning of the end of Russia’s disengagement from the region. Due to the ongoing rapprochement with the West, Russia’s then president, Dmitry Medvedev, abstained from adopting the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.

This allowed Western intervention in Libya to overthrow the longtime dictator, who had by then turned on his own people. To many experts, Medvedev’s decision not to veto the resolution signaled an important change in Russia’s support of its Arab allies and allowed for a regime change to happen. Among the most notable critics of this action was Vladimir Putin, the then prime minister, who described the West’s subsequent intervention as akin to “medieval calls for crusades.”

The intervention in Libya left an indelible mark on Russian elites, many of whom saw it as emblematic of Western attempts to meddle in foreign countries and impose Western-like values. This threat left Russia feeling disillusioned with the West, which it accused of hypocrisy because of its violations of international law by interfering in Libya.

It also left Russia feeling isolated at a time when the United States had promised that a regime change in Libya would not occur, and when Russia-US relations were strong and based on the pursuit of mutual trust. It cemented Russia’s persistent belief in the principle of nonintervention as a means to maintain stability and the status quo in the rules-based order, a belief that it accused the West of not sharing, with the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq and subsequent deposition of Saddam Hussein as an example.

Russian reengagement

Russia’s distrust of the West and recognition of the importance of the Middle East and North Africa region help explain its intervention in Syria in 2015 and in Libya in 2017. Following two decades of relative disengagement from the region, Russia saw a window of opportunity to reassert itself with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and the request by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for help.

Additionally, the United States’ lack of intervention, underscored by the failure of Barack Obama, the then president, to adhere to his “red line” commitment, cemented Russia’s belief that the United States would not interfere in its quest for increased influence in the area.

The end of two decades of Russian disengagement came with the recapturing of Aleppo from rebel forces in December 2016, thanks to Russian involvement, and Libyan General Khalifa Haftar’s request for help a month earlier. Libya, engulfed in a civil war, saw the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and France aiding Haftar, with Russia emerging as a prominent ally at a time when its presence in the region was becoming more entrenched.

Emboldened by its victories in Syria and the potential to exert influence in the region by supporting another Arab country, Russia began deploying mercenaries to Libya as early as 2018, marking a definitive turning point from the previous two decades of disengagement. From its marginalized position, Russia saw Libya not only as another window of opportunity to reemerge as a great power competing for influence in North Africa but also as a gateway to other regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa. With the deployment of troops under the Kremlin’s authority, the days of being second to Western regime change in neighboring regions were over, and the potential for the resurgence of Russian primacy once again became a real prospect.

Russia reemerged as a regional power in the Middle East when Haftar attempted a takeover of Tripoli in 2019, with Russian forces fighting alongside Haftar’s. Egypt and the UAE were also involved, while Qatar and Turkey supported the Government of National Accord forces of Libya’s then prime minister, Fayez al-Sarraj.

Libya became a military quagmire for foreign power interferences, with Russia refusing to be the marginal player it had been during the First Gulf War and the US invasion of Iraq. While Haftar’s objective of gaining control of Libya was thwarted by Turkish troops, Russian involvement in the country remained consistent, with around 2,000 mercenary troops permanently stationed in eastern Libya, evidence of Russia’s unabated goal to establish a continued presence.

Ongoing influence

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is keeping the Kremlin largely occupied with redefining its borders to the west. Yet, “Southern missions” have not been downgraded to lesser-scale priorities. On the contrary, some 800 – 1200 mercenaries from Wagner (now called Africa Corps) remain present in Libya, many controlling key oil production facilities and thus positioning the Kremlin to control output from Libya and affect world oil prices.

Their continued presence illustrates the Kremlin’s conviction that North Africa and the Middle East is a region of vital importance, with enormous untapped resources that could help Russia’s economy in the long term. It also underscores that Russia is making a strategic bet during a time when the American presence is diminishing and the Chinese presence is growing, asserting itself alongside China as a main power by buying local support through influence and mercenary deployment.

This strategy of Russian reassertion is further exemplified by the ongoing activities of the Africa Corps in the wider Sahel region, where the mercenary group’s control has been well documented and is set to increase. In recent years, the area has been destabilized by numerous coups, creating power vacuums in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

Russia and China have moved to fill these voids, seeking to expand their influence as French and American troops have withdrawn. While Western countries focus on short-term diplomatic solutions, Russia appears to be ahead in its strategy, providing military and financial support to nations it considers strategically important.

Indeed, it would be a mistake to frame Russia’s presence in Libya exclusively under its competition with the West. Its presence is driven primarily by national interests, many of which are linked to the continent of Africa. Libya serves as the crucial hub for Moscow’s mission in Africa due to its geographical location and political instability, which favors Russia’s actions.

Strategically positioned at the crossroads of Africa and Europe, it provides Russia with a gateway to its operations in Sudan, Chad, Niger, and other Sahel and Central Africa countries, eventually projecting power and influence across these regions. Libya’s ongoing political chaos creates opportunities for Russia to establish footholds through alliances with both local factions and official authorities.

This is exemplified by Russia’s support of General Haftar over the past few years and its more recent relations with the government of Tripoli. Not least, the country’s fragmented governance has guaranteed Russia much-needed access to air and naval military bases, especially across Cyrenaica, allowing it to coordinate its military expeditions.

By maintaining a strong presence in Libya, Russia is able to pursue its broader geopolitical goals, including defying the West, expanding its military reach, and securing critical resources that are essential to sustain its economy and long-term strategic aspirations.

***

Chiara Lovotti is an Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) research fellow and scientific coordinator of the Rome MED-Mediterranean Dialogues, the annual flagship event of ISPI and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She is a specialist in Middle Eastern and North African international relations, with a focus on Russia’s foreign policy in the area and associated political and security issues. 

Alissa Pavia is associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa Program. She is responsible for providing research and analysis on North Africa while also expanding the program’s reach with like-minded centers, foundations, and government agencies.

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Karim Mezran, Aldo Liga

It has been more than thirteen years since the outbreak of the 2011 Libyan revolution and the moment when Italy reluctantly supported the NATO-led intervention that imposed a no-fly zone over Libya purportedly to protect the population from Muammar Gaddafi’s retaliation.

The overthrow of Gaddafi’s regime led to more of a decade of intermittent civil war and conflict, dismantling of state institutions, and rampant kleptocracy, turning Libya into a battleground for competition between external powers. Meanwhile, Italy has seen nine governments since the Libyan revolution. These governments have come to power against a backdrop of political instability and economic uncertainty, the rise in populism and “sovranismo” (sovereignism), and geopolitical tensions in Italy’s eastern and southern neighborhoods.

Irrespective of Rome’s different ruling coalitions, the crisis in Libya resulted in a rethink of Italy’s geopolitical posture and strategic orientation toward the North African country, questioning Rome’s approach to international intervention and national priorities, the resources and tools of its foreign policy, and its projection of power over the wider Mediterranean region. The conclusion of the debate has been that a stable Libya is strategically crucial for Italy, for political, security, and economic reasons.

However, the last decade has seen the gradual fading of Rome’s influence over Libya and the downsizing of its ambitions. The political leverage Italy historically possessed in Libya dwindled over the years. How did Italy squander its political capital and credibility in Libya? How could a country with prominent interests and a strong economic interest fail in Libya? The focus on short-term gains over long-term strategy played a pivotal role. Understanding the root causes of this marginalization is crucial for reshaping Italy’s approach to Libya and revitalizing its role in the region.

Migration policies have undermined Rome’s credibility in Libya

Between 2014 and 2017, over six hundred thousand migrants arrived in Italy, most departing from Libyan shores after enduring extensive journeys across Africa. Many suffered violence, forced labor, and sexual exploitation in both formal and informal Libyan detention centers. The migration issue became a focal point in Italian politics for several reasons: from challenges in managing the reception and integration of migrants once they arrived, to political exploitation of unfounded fears about terrorist infiltration and cultural clashes, to concerns about the country’s democratic stability during a period of economic uncertainty.

In 2017, amidst peak concerns about a surge in migrant arrivals and with Italy gearing up for elections, Interior Minister Marco Minniti introduced a new strategy for addressing the Libyan crisis. Stabilizing Libya became not just a priority in itself, but a means to control migration flows and counter transnational threats.

Rome engaged extensively: it worked closely with the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj, signing agreements, providing financial aid and technical support, and becoming the first Western nation to reopen its embassy in Tripoli. Italy also established connections with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in the east; engaged with southern tribes, cities, and municipalities; and even interacted with less-transparent groups like militias and armed factions, despite their involvement in smuggling and trafficking, which Italian authorities publicly denied but independent investigations corroborated. This approach proved effective as migrant arrivals dropped dramatically from July 2017, as evidenced by arrival data.

Despite changes in leadership and shifting political coalitions in Rome, the core strategy remained consistent even after the Government of National Unity, led by Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, took office in Tripoli in 2021. Italy saw different governments come and go: Giuseppe Conte’s “yellow-green” government (2018–19), Conte’s “yellow-red” government (2019–21), followed by Mario Draghi’s national unity government (2021–22), and now Giorgia Meloni’s leadership since October 2022.

However, new dynamics emerged as migrant departures shifted from the west to the east of Libya in recent years. Rome responded by increasing engagement with eastern Libyan authorities both politically and economically. This shift was highlighted by Haftar’s visit to Rome in May 2023 and a subsequent meeting held by Meloni in Benghazi on May 7.

So far, Italy, along with EU funds, has allocated almost €479 million to the “externalization” of its border to Libya, i.e. the act of empowering foreign actors to stop migrants from reaching Italy. However, this strategy of externalizing migration management—funding patrols and technology, and investing significant political attention and resources—has had significant unintended consequences.

By treating militias as interlocutors, even indirectly through recognized institutions or actors with national ambitions, Italy inadvertently empowered and legitimized ambiguous players. This has altered local power balances and undermined prospects for peace in Libya. Since the implementation of this policy, evidence has emerged of its destabilizing effects and distortions of local equilibria, influenced by Italy’s perception of threats and insecurity stemming from migration policies.

Italy’s leverage of foreign actors was not aimed at stabilizing Libya but rather at addressing Italian perceptions of insecurity

Despite its interactions with local actors, Italy has not been among the most influential players shaping Libya’s dynamics. Other countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Russia, France, and Qatar have exploited Libya’s internal divisions to advance their own domestic and international agendas. This interference has spoiled prospects for the establishment of stable Libyan institutions, state reconstruction, and durable peace. 

In this complex scenario, Rome has struggled to effectively stabilize Libya or facilitate consensus among Libyan factions based on international law and the desires of the Libyan people. Instead, Italy has mainly offered symbolic support for UN efforts without substantial mediation efforts or concrete peace proposals following the underwhelming results of the Palermo conference, a two-day conference in November 2018 intended to advance the UN-sponsored stabilization process for Libya.  

In the complex web of Libyan, regional, and international agendas, Rome has primarily used foreign relationships to advance its migratory policies and address minor issues. For instance, with the UAE, one of the most involved foreign players shaping Libyan internal dynamics through its strong support to Haftar, Italy leveraged its influence to secure the release of fishermen arbitrarily detained by Haftar’s forces.

Last year, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani visited the UAE twice, with migration from Libya featuring prominently in his discussions. The UAE’s president, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, then took part in the International Conference on Development and Migration in Rome, marking the start of the “Rome Process.”

Even with Ankara, Rome sought to align on its priorities in Libya. In 2020, Turkey emerged as a decisive actor in countering Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, supporting western Libyan authorities, under both the Sarraj and Dabaiba governments. Despite initial concerns about Ankara’s growing influence exerted over Tripolitania, and despite political competition and overlapping economic interests, Rome sought Turkey’s “solidarity” on the migration issue, which emerged as a central point of recent Italy-Turkey bilateral meetings.

Interestingly, Turkey’s recent imposition of visas for Bangladesh citizens entering the country was cited as an example of cooperation between Rome and Ankara. In 2022, more than 15,200 Bangladeshis arrived in Italy, with many transiting through Libya, about a third of whom travelled through Turkey. To avoid tensions with Ankara, Rome refrained from taking a more assertive stance on other contentious strategic issues, such as energy resource exploitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and maritime borders.

Another significant aspect of the Rome-Ankara entente involves Egypt, another key player in Libya. Rome leveraged recent regional diplomatic efforts to establish a triangular dialogue with Egypt and Turkey on Libyan issues, aiming to bridge differences and engage major supporters of the two rival power centers in Libya’s west and east.

Ambiguity between western and eastern authorities marginalized Rome’s ambitions in Libya

To control migration flows, Rome has blurred the lines between Libya’s western and eastern authorities. Initially a staunch supporter of the Skhirat Agreement, which led to the establishment of the GNA at the beginning of 2016, Italy found itself dealing with a divided country as Libya remained split between competing centres of power. This situation prompted then Italian minister of interior Marco Minniti to establish connections with Haftar during his tenure, integrating him into Italy’s new approach to the Libyan crisis.

This trend was further strengthened under the following two governments led by Conte (2018–21). Haftar’s presence at the Palermo conference in 2018, originally aimed at reconciling Libya’s factions, was seen more as a personal gesture to Conte than a genuine effort to forge an agreement with Tripoli.

Italy’s ambiguity peaked in April 2019 when Haftar attacked Tripoli. Conte declared that “Italy is neither in favor of Sarraj nor of Haftar, but of the Libyan people.” When Sarraj requested Italy to send troops and support, Rome did not officially respond, prompting Tripoli to seek and ultimately received crucial support from Ankara. Turkey’s military backing of the GNA gave Ankara significant political and economic influence over Tripolitania, sidelining Italy and diminishing its presence, role, and ambitions in Libya.

As another sign of Italy’s waning influence, the Bilateral Assistance and Support Mission in Libya (MIASIT), which includes the “Hippocrates” Task Force and the military field hospital in Misrata, has been downsized. 

Rethinking a new Libya policy for Italy

Over the past decade, Italy’s influence over the Libyan crisis has steadily declined. This decline can be attributed to two main factors: first, Italy prioritized managing migration over consistent efforts to stabilize Libya. Second, Rome played an ambiguous role by engaging with both western and eastern Libyan authorities, which complicated its diplomatic and  strategic approach.

Today, Italy seems willing to revitalize its role in North Africa (as well as in the Sahel and the rest of the continent) with the “Piano Mattei” (Mattei Plan), named after the founder of Italy’s ENI energy group. The late Enrico Mattei was known for advocating fairer relations across the Mediterranean. A steering committee has been formed, and initial pilot projects in nine African countries are set to begin soon.

Notably, Libya is not among these countries, although during Meloni’s visit to Tripoli in May 2024, memoranda of understanding on health, education, and sport were signed under the Mattei Plan’s framework. However, merely enhancing development cooperation is insufficient to reestablish Italy’s influence in Libya.

To achieve this, the Italian government needs to fundamentally rethink its approach to migration. This involves moving away from polarizing political debates and shifting focus from securitizing migration to recognizing its political, demographic, and economic potential for Italy’s future. Instead of solely emphasizing police and border controls, Italy should centralize discussions on these broader impacts.

In Libya, this shift would diminish the economic power and political legitimacy that Italy unintentionally bolstered among various local and regional “spoilers of peace.”  Moreover, Italy’s reduced dependence on Libyan energy resources—marked by the lowest natural gas exports in thirteen years in 2023—should embolden Italian leadership. This could open up opportunities to propose innovative pathways to peace and national reconciliation with its southern neighbor.

Italy and Libya share deep historic ties. Rome played a crucial role in Libya’s international rehabilitation in the 1990s and has a longstanding tradition of political, economic, social, and cultural connections with Libyan counterparts. This relationship reached a symbolic peak when Italy decided to reopen its embassy in Tripoli in 2017, despite the exodus of many other international actors. Today, it’s time for Italy to make up for lost opportunities and strengthen its ties with Libya.

***

Karim Mezran is director of the North Africa Initiative and resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. Mezran holds a PhD in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, a JD in comparative law from the University of Rome (La Sapienza), an LLM in comparative law from the George Washington University, an MA in Arab studies from Georgetown University, and a BA in management from Hiram College.

Aldo Liga is a research fellow for the Middle East and North Africa Centre at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. He is also a PhD candidate at the Institut Français de Géopolitique (University of Paris 8). He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science from the “Cesare Alfieri” (University of Florence) and a master’s degree in international security from Sciences Po Paris.

Abdullah Alkabir

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has fired the coup de grace on the outcomes of a group of members of the House of Representatives with about 25 members of the High Council of State in Cairo on July 18. 

UNSMIL said in its statement that it “takes note of the meeting” and encourages members to “build on what has been agreed upon, by seeking an approach that includes other relevant Libyan stakeholders, to ensure that the outcomes lead to a politically implementable solution.”

However, the Cairo meeting’s outcome is not expected to bring about any change to the political scene. It was essentially a gathering of two political parties with their own vision and interests, and it was not between the House of Representatives and the High State Council, even if those meetings were members of both chambers.

The two chambers have no genuine existence or effectiveness, except in the light of adherence to the Constitutional Declaration, the Political Accord, and the Rules of Procedure, without which, they turn into a mere two or several political parties that are rather closer to parties or blocs, driven by their own interests and goals.

These are different and contradictory to the interests and goals of other parties, that have influence or representation in the legislative authority. It perhaps does not have any influence or representation in the two chambers, but it does have power, authority, and money. This fact may not have been realized by members of the two chambers despite their many meetings on different tracks and issues.

Therefore, it is not an exaggeration, if the Cairo meeting is described as a meeting of political parties or even civil society organizations. Perhaps UNSMIL’s statement regarding an approach that includes other concerned Libyan parties confirms our conclusion, and even says without ambiguity that there are other concerned Libyan parties that must be involved, otherwise the outcomes of their meeting will not find their way to implementation.

What it meant by the other parties is the active forces on the ground, east and west, because of their power, influence, and ability to undermine any political agreement, as well as the Government of National Unity, which has become a political party that cannot be transcended except after the two houses returning to the normal path, that is, working through the texts of the Constitutional Declaration and the Political Accord. Only in such cases, the government may return to its status as an executive body that can be changed by mechanisms spelled out in the Constitutional Declaration and the Political Accord.

The Cairo meeting and the welcome by Agila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives, of its outcomes, and his announcement of the start of accepting applications to run for prime minister position, indicate the failure of his recent decision to pass the budget. For what is the rationale behind resorting to forming a unified government if the budget will be disbursed and the parallel government will get its share?

The issue of building on what has been agreed, which UNSMIL called for in its statement about the meeting, requires the involvement of a broad political spectrum that cannot be transcended to ensure the success of any agreement on change.

The other condition is that the path to elections be clear, but the parties to the meeting are members of parliament and High Council of state do not seek to solve the crisis, but rather they are obstructing the means of solution in order to continue obtaining their high salaries and other privileges they enjoy, which they will lose if genuine elections are held.

All these meetings and dialogues between the presidency of the two houses, the members, or their joint committees, are merely rotations in the same circle. The starting point is the same as the endpoint, and no progress will be made towards a political solution.

This solution will not be achieved in the light of the current international circumstances except with the national will that goes directly towards only parliamentary elections, as unifying legislative authority is the beginning of the path, and any other path will be just a new formulation that is different only in form of the current political scene.

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In Libya, Everything Comes Down To

Military Muscle

Peter Fabricius

The arrest of Libyans who allegedly received military training in South Africa hints at the nature of power in the north African country.

Were 95 Libyans really undergoing military training at the Milites Dei Academy in South Africa’s eastern Mpumalanga province, and if so, for what purpose? Or were they just learning to be commercial security guards?

This remains something of a mystery. Which should not be surprising, given the complexity of their home country. The men were arrested by police on 26 July and appeared in court three days later, charged with misrepresenting the purpose of their visit to South Africa in their visa applications.

Police told local media the men claimed they came to South Africa for training as private security guards, whereas they were really receiving military training. In an interview with a local TV network, one of the men said they had been hired and sent to South Africa for training by a Libyan business tycoon so they could protect his many businesses.

But most analysts aren’t buying that, and believe that the men were sent to receive military training. And there is a broad consensus they were sent by Libyan strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar who heads the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA). He is the de facto leader and enforcer of the government based in Benghazi in eastern Libya – which is vying for control of Libya with the United Nations-backed government in the west, based in Tripoli.

Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute, told ISS Today that the evidence pointed to the men being employed by the Haftars. It would be no surprise if they used the cover that the men were being trained as private security guards, he said.

There has also been speculation that if Haftar is training soldiers, probably as special forces, he must be preparing for another military assault on the western government like the one he launched in April 2019. His forces were stopped in the suburbs of Tripoli in June 2020 mainly by the intervention of Turkish forces.

Harchaoui doesn’t rule out that possibility, though he says it’s not an inevitable conclusion. ‘The entire economy, the entire political system, territorial management, administration, influence over the budget and expenditure, influence over day-to-day safety of citizens, police matters, all of those basic components of social life … in Libya are highly determined by the power of armed groups,’ he says.

In other words, since the open warfare of 2019-20, armed groups have continued to build up their military might to deter rival armed groups. They use force to exert influence over anything from defending territory to getting state jobs for their relatives, to stopping jihadists crossing the border from Niger. ‘Everything is predicated on – potential – physical violence. But it doesn’t mean that that violence is going to be used,’ Harchaoui says.

This helps explain why, four years after the all-out war ended, and 13 years after Muammar Gaddafi’s ousting, Libyans still haven’t negotiated an end to the political dispute between the western and eastern government. In April, United Nations Special Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily resigned in disgust, rebuking Libya’s political leaders for being unwilling to place the collective interest above their own personal interests.

On the face of it, the disagreement between east and west boils down to the sequencing of elections. The east wants to go straight into presidential elections now, while the west says there should be a more solid institutional foundation first. For example, the Constitution must be changed to include, among others, a proper definition of the president’s powers. The result of these incompatible positions has been a long impasse.

Yet when Bathily remarked on personal interests trumping the national interest, he was reflecting a general sense among observers that for the country’s political elite, the status quo is working just fine, so why change it?

Some talk about the Big Five spanning both east and west. These are: Mohamed Takala, High Council of State President; Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Government of National Unity Prime Minister; Aguila Saleh, Speaker of the House of Representatives; Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, LNA Commander; and Mohamed al-Menfi, Presidential Council President. They are all milking the country’s resources and living off the chaos.

One gets the impression that those in power are continually looking for some new pretext to avoid elections to choose a single, unified government. And Harchaoui says often politicians of the east and west are complicit with each other in corruption.

So the sharp lines between the two sides have become more blurred. This is also apparent in international involvement. Four years ago, it was clearer. Turkey supported Tripoli while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia were supporting Benghazi. Now, Harchaoui says, Turkey is still supporting Tripoli, while at the same time trying to win over the Haftar family in the east. The UAE is preserving its historical closeness to Haftar, but also backs Prime Minister Dbeibeh in Tripoli.

Turkey and the UAE are the two main foreign powers involved – though Russia is expanding its military presence in the east, thanks to its long alliance with Haftar, says Harchaoui.

‘So you see how entrenched the status quo is.’ He is dismayed that the international community seems resigned to this because it hasn’t led to open warfare for four years and Islamic State isn’t flourishing. Yet Libya suffers because the corruption and lack of unified purpose are hindering development.

There isn’t an obvious solution. But Harchaoui believes it is up to the US to use its power and influence to leverage one.

***

Peter Fabricius, Consultant, ISS Pretoria

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Mohamed Abaid

Libya, a North African nation endowed with vast natural resources, faces significant challenges and opportunities in its quest for economic stability and growth. This report delves into the country’s current economic status, the controversial 179 billion dinar budget, and potential sectors for diversification.

The Economic Landscape of Libya

Libya’s economy is primarily driven by its oil sector, which contributes approximately 97% of government revenue. Despite its wealth, the country struggles with political instability, corruption, and an over-reliance on oil.

Annual Revenue:

Total Annual Income: Libya’s total annual income is approximately $50 billion (307 billion Libyan dinars post-tax).

Revenue Breakdown:

• Oil and Oil Derivatives:
  • Oil revenue: $37 billion
  • Gas revenue: $4 billion
  • Petrochemicals: $3 billion
• Other Revenues:
  • Iron and steel: $260 million
  • Tourism and other sectors: $300 million
• Private Sector:
  • Non-oil exports: $3.1 billion

GDP and Growth:

• Current GDP: $50 billion annually.
• Growth Rate: Primarily influenced by the recovery and stability of the oil sector.

Oil Production:

• Proven Reserves: Africa’s largest, ninth globally.
• Current Production: 1.25 million barrels per day (bpd) as of July 2024.

Challenges:

• Transparency Issues: The National Oil Corporation (NOC) lacks transparency and competitive bidding, which hinders production growth.
• Production Targets: The original target of 2 million bpd by 2025 seems unlikely due to these issues.

Foreign Reserve Assets and Gold:

• Foreign Reserves: Over $80 billion.
• Gold Reserves: Libya holds approximately 146.65 tons of gold as of 2024.
• Frozen Assets: Approximately $72 billion, including those managed by the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA).
• Missing Gold: An estimated 50-55 tons of gold, worth around $3 billion, have been smuggled abroad.

External Investments:

• Libya has around $70 billion in external investments, plagued by poor management.

Analysis of the 179 Billion Dinar Budget

• The newly approved budget has sparked considerable debate among economists and policymakers. Here’s an in-depth analysis of why this budget might be problematic for Libya in the long term:

Overview:

• Total Budget: 179 billion dinars.
• Inflation Risk: The large budget could significantly drive up inflation, reducing the purchasing power of ordinary Libyans and potentially leading to economic instability.
• Lack of Transparency: Concerns about how funds will be managed and allocated are prevalent, given Libya’s history of corruption and mismanagement.
• Corruption: Historical mismanagement and potential misuse of funds are major concerns. A significant portion of the budget could be siphoned off by elites, rather than being used for public benefit.
• Fuel Subsidies: Contributing to smuggling due to Libya having the world’s cheapest fuel. This not only drains the budget but also benefits smugglers and corrupt officials rather than the general populace.

Impact on the Economy:

• Inflation: Injecting such a large amount into the economy without proper oversight and strategic planning will likely cause hyperinflation. This devalues the currency and erodes savings, disproportionately affecting the poor and middle class.
• Misallocation of Resources: Without transparent and accountable management, funds may not reach critical sectors that need investment for sustainable growth.
• Economic Inequality: A poorly managed budget will exacerbate economic inequality, as wealth will likely concentrate in the hands of the elite, furthering social and economic divides.

Diversification Potential

• To reduce dependency on oil, Libya must explore and invest in other sectors:
• Fishing Industry:
  • Potential: Libya’s Mediterranean coastline offers rich fishing grounds, especially for high-value species like tuna.
  • Challenges: Illegal fishing, particularly by foreign vessels, and lack of infrastructure and regulation.
• Solutions:
  • Coastal Surveillance: Invest in advanced surveillance technologies such as satellite imaging and drones to monitor and protect marine resources.
  • International Cooperation: Form alliances with neighboring countries and international bodies to combat illegal fishing and share best practices.
  • Community Engagement: Empower local fishing communities through training and resources to promote sustainable practices and involve them in surveillance efforts.
• Economic Impact: A robust fishing industry could provide significant employment opportunities and contribute to foreign exchange earnings by increasing exports.
• Agriculture:
  • Olive Tree Cultivation: Libya’s climate is ideal for olive cultivation. With proper investment, this sector could become a major export commodity.
  • Current Status: Limited production due to outdated farming techniques and inadequate infrastructure.
  • Potential: Modernizing agricultural practices and investing in irrigation systems could significantly boost yields and quality.
• Solutions:
  • Modern Farming Techniques: Introduce advanced farming techniques and provide training to farmers.
  • Irrigation Systems: Develop efficient irrigation systems to optimize water usage in agriculture.
  • Market Access: Create cooperatives to help farmers access international markets and negotiate better prices.
  • Economic Impact: Increased production and export of olives and olive oil could generate substantial revenue and reduce unemployment.
• Tourism:
  • Potential: Libya’s historical sites, including ancient Roman and Greek ruins, and its Mediterranean coastline offer significant tourism potential.
  • Current Status: Underdeveloped due to security concerns and lack of infrastructure.
  • Potential: Developing tourism infrastructure and promoting Libya’s cultural heritage could attract international tourists and generate revenue.
• Solutions:
  • Infrastructure Development: Invest in roads, airports, hotels, and other tourism-related infrastructure.
  • Security Improvements: Enhance security measures to ensure the safety of tourists.
  • Cultural Promotion: Promote Libya’s rich history and cultural heritage through international marketing campaigns.
  • Economic Impact: A thriving tourism sector could diversify the economy, create jobs, and boost foreign exchange earnings.
• Renewable Energy:
  • Potential: Libya has abundant solar and wind resources that remain largely untapped.
  • Current Status: Limited development of renewable energy infrastructure.
  • Potential: Investing in solar and wind energy could reduce reliance on oil and contribute to sustainable development.
• Solutions:
  • Investment in Infrastructure: Develop large-scale solar and wind farms.
  • Policy Framework: Establish policies and incentives to attract investment in renewable energy.
  • Research and Development: Support research in renewable energy technologies.
  • Economic Impact: Diversifying the energy sector could ensure long-term energy security and create green jobs.
• Reforestation and Wildlife Reintroduction:
  • Potential: Reforesting Libya and reintroducing wildlife can enhance biodiversity and offer eco-tourism opportunities.
  • Current Status: Libya has experienced significant deforestation and loss of wildlife.
  • Potential: Reforestation and wildlife conservation can create sustainable environments for future hunting and eco-tourism.
• Solutions:
  • Reforestation Programs: Implement large-scale tree planting initiatives.
  • Wildlife Conservation: Establish protected areas and reintroduce native species.
  • Sustainable Hunting: Gradually introduce regulated hunting to attract niche tourism markets.
  • Economic Impact: Environmental conservation can boost eco-tourism and provide long-term ecological and economic benefits.
• Recommendations
  • Governance and Transparency
    • Establish a unified government to ensure effective management.
    • Implement anti-corruption measures and ensure transparency in budget allocations and expenditures.
  • Economic Reforms
    • Diversify the economy by investing in non-oil sectors.
    • Reform fuel subsidies to reduce smuggling.
  • International Cooperation
    • Engage with international bodies to recover frozen assets.
    • Foster partnerships for technology transfer and investment in key sectors.
  • Political Stability
    • Conduct free and fair elections to establish a legitimate government.
    • Focus on unifying the country for coherent economic policies.

Conclusion

Libya has the resources and potential to transform its economy. By addressing political instability, enhancing transparency, and diversifying its economic base, Libya can achieve sustainable growth and improve living standards. Effective budget management and governance reforms are crucial for realizing Libya’s economic potential and ensuring a prosperous future for its citizens.

Libya’s economic future depends on prudent management of its vast resources, fostering a diversified economy, and ensuring political stability. The journey may be challenging, but the rewards of a prosperous and stable Libya are well worth the effort.

***

Mohamed Abaid, Independent Libyan Analyst

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Oliver Windridge

On April 16, 2024, UN Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily announced he would resign, citing a “lack of political will and good faith” among Libyan leaders. Few would disagree with his diagnosis that the vested interests of Libyan leaders have created a roadblock for progress. Bathily conducted eighteen months of shuttle diplomacy before concluding that the leaders he was seeking to negotiate a better future for Libya with were acting in their own interests instead of those of the country. These events are sadly reflective of how recent years have represented a boon for Libyan kleptocrats who have found ways to prosper amid the Libyan state’s governance crisis. Moreover, they do so with the active support and complicity of external state actors. This trajectory bodes ill for Libya’s future.

The rise of Libya’s kleptocrats

By predicating political progress on agreement between the “five major actors” in Libya in order to reach elections, Bathily ensured a situation whereby those currently in power would have a monopoly over what comes next. In truth, however, only two of the five major actors he identified—Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces and Abdulhamid al-Dabaiba, the head of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU)—have a meaningful influence on what happens on the ground. The other three—the heads of the Presidency Council and the High State Council and the speaker of the House of Representatives—draw their influence from their formal mandates, as well as political support from Turkey and Egypt, respectively.

Even if Bathily had created a more inclusive and representative process, there is a strong chance that vested interests would have ensured its failure. Indeed, it has become increasingly apparent that any political strategy will be doomed unless efforts are made to tackle the growth of kleptocracy that is sustaining the status quo.

For proof of this, it is necessary to look at the leaders and interests at the heart of the discussions. The Dabaiba family’s vast wealth has been generated through the management of Libyan state funds that remain subject to investigation, and the expansion of spending under Dabaiba’s GNU has been connected to widespread corruption. Meanwhile, Haftar’s dominion over eastern and southern Libya has translated into direct control over parallel institutions and their publicly funded budgets, which are subject to no oversight. When a fund for reconstruction was established in eastern Libya in recent months under the leadership of Khalifa’s son Belqacem (who appears to have no qualifications for the role), it was declared that there would be no financial oversight from the Libyan state’s anti-corruption agencies. The two sets of kleptocrats, the Haftars and the Dabaibas, also appear to have an under-the-table understanding on the management of the National Oil Corporation, through which state spending is skyrocketing, with little to show for it.

Libya’s list of kleptocrats is not limited to the Haftars and the Dabaibas. Armed group leaders and corrupt businessmen continue to build wealth and influence at the populace’s expense. Taken together, the vast majority of what acts as Libya’s formal state is controlled by kleptocratic forces. A recent report by The Sentry found that an array of illicit industries results in enormous wealth and power not only with the tacit but often active support of public institutions. The resources of the state are being plundered through widespread contract fraud and several forms of trafficking, including large-scale abuse of fuel subsidies for smuggling purposes.

This ubiquitous barrage of corruption is hurting the population. Prices continue to rise, leaving ordinary Libyans in a position where they need to spend more for less. Tragedies such as the September 2023 floods in Derna and surrounding areas, where over four thousand five hundred deaths have been recorded and thousands more are missing and presumed dead, show the extent to which the state has become hollowed out, as vested rather than public interests prevail.

International complicity and partnership

with the kleptocrats

While Bathily’s criticisms in his recorded remarks to the UN Security Council focused on Libyan leaders, much of his comments to the press afterward also took aim at the regional and wider international picture. “Libya today is a battleground,” Bathily noted. “We needed all of the support of all the international and regional players to achieve meaningful results. Unfortunately, we have seen… parallel tracks taken by different foreign actors which undermine efforts of the UN. As long as this exists, there is no room for a solution in the future,” he bleakly concluded before later stating that “Libya is the prey to foreign economic interferences.” 

This conclusion is accurate. Of course, there will continue to be a focus on security dynamics, particularly as a result of Russia’s growing presence in Libya and international concerns over the Sahel’s “arc of instability.” However, the economic plunder of the state continues at pace. In the oil sector, the 2022 deal to appoint a new chairman of the National Oil Corporation was brokered by the United Arab Emirates, while a Turkish-led and UAE-based energy merchant has grown increasingly involved in Libya’s fuel imports and crude exports.

At the time of writing, recriminations over the contracting of oil concessions in Libya to international companies are rising, with widespread allegations that some newly formed companies are in fact fronts for Libyan kleptocrats and their international partners. These dynamics raise serious concerns over who is profiting from Libya’s oil sector and highlight a significant reduction in transparency at a time when expenditures on fuel subsidies have reached unprecedented levels. Meanwhile, the Belqacem Haftar-led reconstruction fund is busy signing contracts, primarily with companies from Egypt, which openly eschew any form of oversight.

These dynamics illustrate that the accumulation of wealth by Libyan kleptocrats comes with the full knowledge and, indeed, support of regional interests, making it harder for the United Nations to adopt firm positions or marginalize Libyan leaders who enjoy continuing support from regional actors. 

How to tackle these dynamics

Successive UN special representatives have found this fusion of Libyan and regional interests impossible to untangle. Ghassan Salamé sought to bring the international players with interests in Libya together through the Berlin process—which held one meeting in 2020 and another in 2021—with the support of the German government, but any consensus built remained short-lived. Today, it appears that the UAE and Turkey have found accommodation with one another through the alignment of economic interests. And, while Egypt has continued to interfere in the political process to achieve its goal of displacing the GNU, it has also pursued its economic interests through its partnership with Haftar’s dominant alliance in Libya’s east.

While the status quo, which keeps deteriorating and might collapse any day, seems comfortable for Libyan kleptocrats and their international partners, the Libyan population increasingly suffers the consequences, runaway inflation by way of a depressed dinar being only one of them. The situation is also harmful to the interests of the United States and like-minded states. Mounting corruption in the oil sector imperils the status of Libya as a key oil producer, and Haftar’s engagement with Russia has led to a growing influx of weaponry and men through eastern Libya in recent weeks.

The question then becomes how this kleptocratic boom can be addressed. In reality, it will fall to the United States and like-minded governments such as in the United Kingdom and Germany to impose greater pressure in a concerted and targeted way on the kleptocracy to address the cause of Libya’s governance crisis rather than its symptoms. This will require support for Libyan institutions that are trying to push back against these dynamics in highly challenging and dangerous circumstances. It will also require the use of targeted network sanctions on the kleptocratic elite and calling out their enablers in external states through clear diplomatic messaging.

The UAE, recently removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s “gray list” for anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, should be a particular point of emphasis. An ongoing Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project-led investigation has identified that the Gulf state remains a prime location for those seeking to invest despite being subject to allegations of criminality and corruption. The United States and its like-minded allies should seek enhanced engagement between the private and public sectors through the use of business advisories and intelligence-sharing mechanisms to ensure Libyan kleptocrats can no longer launder and then stash their ill-gotten gains in financial centers and wealthy states across the globe.

A forceful focus on the kleptocracy is not a silver bullet by any means, but it is an attempt to attack the underlying cause behind most of the country’s problems in a way that has, to date, been lacking. The challenge of delivering on promises of democratic change for the Libyan people seems as far away now as ever. However, with a change of focus, international stakeholders can start to help Libyans begin to right the wrong of decades of kleptocracy and start to exact some accountability for the ongoing plunder of the country’s public resources. Only in such an environment will the next special representative have a more meaningful chance of success.

***

Oliver Windridge is the Director of Illicit Finance Policy at The Sentry.

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Ben Fishman

In the previous volume on foreign actors in Libya, I divided U.S. involvement into five stages, including the intervention itself, the immediate post-conflict period, and the aftermath of the tragic death of Ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi. As is well documented, Ambassador Stevens’ death created a long-lasting political firestorm starting in the 2012 election year and was revived by targeting Hillary Clinton in 2016 for her alleged responsibility as secretary of state at the time, even though she was exonerated in a Republican-led Congressional select committee report.

This disincentivize investing political capital or risk in Libya’s stability. Just as President Obama saw the post-intervention period as primarily a European problem, the United States continued to be risk averse when it came to investing in Libya, demonstrated most clearly by the withdrawal of the U.S. embassy during the early stages of 2014-2015 civil war. The embassy became the Libya External Office based in Tunis after a brief stint in Malta. Ten years later, the Biden administration is working with Congress to restore an initial presence in Tripoli, whereas most countries returned their embassies over the last several years.

When reflecting over the last decade of the U.S. policy, especially in the Trump and Biden administrations, three consistent trends emerge (though to different degrees): insufficient support for the UN political process to restore legitimacy to Libya’s political; leadership, repeated appeals to eastern warlord and head of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar to participate in a political process; and most consequentially for the United States, a seeming lack of attention to Russia’s increased presence in Libya.

Libya will never be at the top of the agenda for the United States in the Middle East, let alone for the rest of Washington’s foreign policy agenda. However, through a higher degree of attention and engagement, the United States can make significant inroads toward stability in a country that has the potential to benefit its neighbors and the region through proper management of its oil wealth, investing billions of dollars still frozen from the Qaddafi era, and preventing Russian expansion in the wider area.

Insufficient Political Engagement

The Skhirat Agreement or the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) tried to end the 2014-2015 civil war between Haftar’s Dignity operation and the Dawn Coalition consisting mainly of militia groups around Misrata and Tripoli. Instead, the overall split of Libya remains mostly between Haftar (addressed below) and political survivor Aguila Salah in the east and the UN-recognized pseudo governments and armed groups in the West.  

The LPA created two chambers: the legislature, the House of Representatives (responsible for making laws) based in Tobruk, and the High State Council (HCS) based in Tripoli. The HSC has a consultative role, but its legal role was never completely spelled out. The UN appointed Fayez Sarraj as prime minister.  Among other factors, Haftar’s refusal to accept that the military would be under civilian control, as stipulated in the LPA, effectively nullified one of its most important elements.

For the following years, the international community tried to forge a consensus by holding summits in Europe: including in France in first in 2017, 2018, then in Italy in 2018. These conferences elevated Haftar from a renegade general to an international statesman on par with Sarraj. Despite the presence of foreign heads of state, none of these summits resulted in an agreement to implement the LPA or to adopt a process for elections.

After another civil war broke out in 2019, German Chancellor Angela Merkel hosted an international conference on Libya in Berlin in January 2020 intended to halt the violence. When a ceasefire finally occurred in October 2020, the UN created the Libya Political Dialogue Forum, whose members chose a President and prime minister, Mohamed Menfi and Abdel-hamid Dbaibah. The Dbaibah government was supposed to implement elections at the end of 2021. The elections were delayed for a number of reasons yet Dbaibah remains prime minister of the Government of National Unity three years after his initial appointment and Haftar still controls of the East.

In this context, the U.S. stood mostly on sidelines, attempting to establish some progress between Sarraj and Haftar through direct meetings and attending the European meetings at a ministerial level or below. What the U.S. can always do, however, is pressure foreign actors, or “spoilers,” who support competing sides on the Libyan political spectrum to reach consensus.  At different times, the U.S. could have pressed Egypt, the UAE, France and Turkey, Qatar, and Italy to weigh in with their own Libyan allies to accept political compromise.

The problem with organizing a coordinated and effective diplomatic effort is that Libya is routinely far down on the “call sheet” for senior level engagements and there’s usually more pressing issues in the bilateral relationships with the above states than Libya. Without the necessary backing from the White House or Secretary of State a  special envoy can be easily ignored.

The one positive thing the United States did in was to develop a new set of sanctions in 2016 targeting individuals that “threaten the peace, security, or stability of Libya, including through the supply of arms or related materiel.” Agulia Salah was named as the first target as well as western militia leader Salah Badi. However, because Salah had no U.S. bank accounts to be frozen and had not ambitions to travel to Washington, the sanctions on him were symbolic and European partners allowed him to travel and participate in conferences. Applying the sanctions to Haftar would have been a different story.

Overestimation of Haftar’s Influence

and Value

General Khalifa Haftar emerged not during but after the 2011 revolution. Positioning himself as an anti-Islamist, he appeared as an alternative force to the growing influence of Islamist militias, who were killing individuals, whether they were members of the brutal security establishment or nonideological judges. Eventually he defeated the extremists in Benghazi and turned his sights on Derna, which hosted a strong Ansar alSharia presence. With the support of anti-Muslim Brotherhood countries such as Egypt, the UAE, and, to a certain extent, France, his domination over the so-called Libyan National Army grew.

But the Obama administration who distinguished between political Islamists, like Tunisia’s Rachid Ghannuchi, and militant Islam, bristled at statements calling all Islamists terrorists. The war ended in a standstill and UN Special Representative Bernadino Leon forged the LPA, leaving the international community pressing Haftar to accept a temporary government and placing the army under civilian control, effectively giving him a veto over any political compromise.

As Haftar became implacable, he had the temerity to attack Tripoli the day Secretary-General Guterres was visiting to help launch his Special Representative Ghassan Salame’s national dialogue. If there ever were a reason for sanctioning someone for threating the “peace and stability” of Libya, this was clearly it.

But the United States chose not to, and Haftar benefited from the support of Syrian, African, and most importantly, Russian Wagner Group mercenaries who almost succeed in capturing Tripoli. There continues to be a debate about what former National Security Advisor John Bolton told Haftar during the run-up to the war and whether he gave Haftar a “green or yellow light” to attack if he could take Tripoli quickly. Regardless, the war dragged on, and the United States ignored the consequences.

Shortly after the October 2020 ceasefire, the UN created the Libya Political Dialogue Forum. Seventy-Five members of Libyan society discussed future political issues and selected a temporary prime minister who would govern until national elections at the end of 2021. Abdul-hamid Dbaibah won a surprising if not controversial victory over Aguila Salah. Haftar once again played spoiler by taking various positions on the legality of a military presidential candidacy – one of the key issue blocking elections.

As elections moved into an indefinite delay, the United States (along with its allies) tried to engage with Haftar in an effort to get him to cooperate on the possibility of holding national elections and to expel Russian forces from the east. As movement restrictions in Libya ease for American officials, U.S. representatives have met Haftar at least six times during the Biden administration. One such visit was delayed after Haftar (or Russia) shot down a reconnaissance drone preparing for the visit of the U.S. special envoy. Haftar has made no moves toward accepting elections and he has only grown closer to the Russians.

The Russian Are Coming

The Wagner Group’s mercenaries have been in Libya since at least 2018 according to public estimates. Since then, their presence has only grown. The U.S. Africa Command documented Russian fighter jets and cargo carriers traveling from Syria to Jufra Airbase in central Libya in July 2020 as well as to the al-Khadim airbase close to Benghazi.

Haftar also uses Wagner to secure control of key oil facilities. This relationship expanded toward the end of the 2019-2020 civil war when Russian snipers, and the combination of Chinese-origin drones and mobile air defense units almost changed the tide of the war until Turkey intervened with superior drones and operators. At the same, the UN Panel of Experts estimated there were between 1200-2000 Wagner personnel in Libya by the summer of 2020.

Initially, Russia denied its presence in Libya just as it denied Wagner deployments in Syria and eastern Europe. After Yevgeny Prigozhin died almost a year ago, Haftar was co-opted by the emerging “Africa Corps” of the Russian ministry of defense and received almost monthly visits from Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. In fact, just one day after hosting the commander of U.S. Africa Command, Haftar headed to Moscow for a meeting with Vladimir Putin.

Russian interests in Libya are clear: it seeks access to a port in Libya, airbases to monitor NATO across the Mediterranean, and transit to its emerging allies in the Sahel. It is on track to fulfill all these ambitions unless the United States and its NATO partners make a concerted effort to counter Russian ambitions.

To date that has not transpired as the United States is focused on more pressing issues. But it will be a huge detriment to U.S. interests if Russia is allowed to deepen its presence in Libya and Africa. Part of a strategy to counter Russia in Libya requires investing more in Libya’s frozen domestic scene. Only a more legitimate government can challenge Haftar and assert its own nationalist instincts that Libyans displayed during the initial phase of the post-2011 transition.

***

Ben Fishman is the Steven D. Levy Senior Fellow in the Linda and Tony Rubin Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute, where he focuses on North Africa. He served from 2009 to 2013 on the National Security Council where he held several posts, including director for North Africa and Jordan.

_____________________

Jalel Harchaoui 

THE MAN OF CYRENAICA

Apart from the prime minister-designate, another noteworthy aspect of February 5th’s outcome is the personality of the president-designate, Mohammed Yunus al-Menfi, aged 44, who will now represent Cyrenaica at the very top of the state. The former member of parliament and diplomat, who carried out a symbolically meaningful visit in Benghazi by meeting Haftar there on February 11th, is known for little other than his failure to cheer the field marshal’s various offensives since 2014. That means that the sole official in the presidential council dedicated to representing Cyrenaica turns out to be a relatively neutral bureaucrat with no political or social anchoring among Cyrenaica’s most powerful factions. Thus, a sense of disenchantment and alienation is almost certain to stoke secessionist rhetoric in eastern Libya. Menfi is not an Islamist. The absence of a polarising past lets the newcomer engage in politics almost independently of the antagonisms and fealties that have torn the country apart in recent years, and he could see his influence grow in Cyrenaica. Reinvigorated by Saleh’s weakening, Haftar counts on placing his men in high positions in the new government, but Menfi may be able to slowly erode this claim to monopoly as far as the east is concerned. Not by interfering in Haftar’s armed coalition, but simply by embodying a political alternative in Cyrenaica while being able to spend time in Tripoli.

AN ISLAMIST TAKEOVER?

Mere moments after the UN process’s outcome hit the tapes on February 5th, an Egyptian member of parliament by the name of Mustafa Bakry portrayed the Dbeibah victory as a successful conspiracy by the Muslim Brotherhood. The interpretation peddled by Bakry and others is predicated on the fallacy that the Bashagha-Saleh list would have been a tougher bulwark against the Muslim Brotherhood.

To be sure, subsets of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood manoeuvred behind the scenes to undercut the Dbeibah list’s main rival: the roster that featured Saleh. But several other forces, including enemies of political Islam, lobbied and engaged in horse trading, too.

One such character is a wealthy businessman by the name of Abd al-Majeed Mleqta, residing in Jordan. Born in Tripoli, Mleqta has roots in Zintan, a small but militarised town up in the Nefusa mountains, to the southwest of Tripoli. In the aftermath of the revolution, Mleqta supported the late Mahmud Jibril, a charismatic anti-Gaddafi leader firmly opposed to political Islam. Within that circle was a former banker by the name of Abdullah al-Lafi from the coastal city of Zawiyah, to the west of Tripoli. The self-effacing Lafi, who belongs to the tribe of Awlad al-Saqr, is known to have no sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Thanks to weapons and equipment provided by Abu Dhabi, Mleqta’s brother Uthman led one of the most consequential militias in the Tripoli area until a Misrata-led coalition expelled it in 2014. The debacle caused the Mleqta brothers to distance themselves from the Libya scene but their close links with the UAE were never severed.

When the UN’s peace efforts began last summer, Abd al-Majeed Mleqta took it upon himself to promote Saleh’s candidacy for the presidency, tacitly endorsing the Bashagha-Saleh play. In late October, Uthman Mleqta attended a series of meetings in Istanbul, according to a Libyan insider who helped organize them. Those sit-downs involved Sallabi and Bashagha, among others.

From there, many felt the Bashagha-Saleh combo was now secure and poised to win. Bashagha even went to Cairo in November. But at the eleventh hour before the final Geneva round, the Mleqtas switched sides—jettisoning Saleh in the process. As for Bashagha, not being part of the interim government allows him to run in the general elections. Even before the UN-organized vote, Zintan’s pro-Haftar military council and Gaddafist-leaning communities nearby, such as Meshashiya and al-Seaan, notified Zawiyah’s elders of their support for Lafi as Tripolitania’s representative.

These clues, added to reports that other Haftar-aligned delegates, too, went for the Dbeibah list, demolish the notion that the forum’s outcome was a winner-takes-all master stroke by any specific faction, let alone a triumph for the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology. Some Islamist leaders in the Zawiyah area could have been emboldened by a new government perceived as biased in their favour. But, by going with Lafi, the new government signalled an inclination to avoid partisanship.

Dbeibah, Menfi and Lafi all share an ability to depart from Libya’s old fault lines somewhat. The same can be said of their running mate, Musa al-Koni, a Tuareg and former Gaddafist diplomat who will represent Libya’s southwestern province in the new presidential council, a function he fulfilled in 2016 under Serraj before resigning in protest. In sum, although Dbeibah is close to some militias, each of the four laureates is better described as a civilian prone to striking quid-pro-quo arrangements, than to a warlord. What seems to be surfacing in Libya this year is a novel thrust, a different way of navigating the North African nation’s fractured politics. This will come with its own pitfalls and potential upside.

TOWARDS A DIFFERENT POLITICAL

ECONOMY

Abd al-Hamid Dbeibah “will try to get as much as he can,” an unnamed UN official told The Economist. Alleged corruption in the upcoming government, a long-standing problem among successive administrations both in Tripoli and in the east over the years, should be rightly scrutinised. But in the coming months, these officials’ interactions with foreign states will be a more relevant bellwether for Libya’s ability to find a sustainable mode of governance.

A few days before February 5th’s vote, the U.S. ambassador to the UN called on Russia, Turkey, and the UAE, to cease all military interference in Libya. However, none of these three top meddlers is about to stop and walk away. Russia and Turkey—unlike the UAE, whose main motivation is ideological—are preparing to leverage off their military presence in Libya to reap economic benefits in the form of big-ticket contracts in energy and construction. Such pressure from external parties could make it difficult for the new government to avoid a dramatic and dangerous spike in Libya’s public spending.

On February 5th in Geneva, 74 delegates previously picked by the UN as part of its Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), elected four figures to lead a new interim government. The prime ministership went to Abd al-Hamid Dbeibah, a candidate whom commentators deemed controversial but never thought would win. The 62-year-old mogul from the western port city of Misrata now has until February 26th to form a cabinet, which, if confirmed, is expected to sweep into power next month and remain in place until general elections take place on December 24 or, more realistically, later.

The mechanism used to designate the prime minister and a triumvirate—called the presidential council, featuring a figure from each of Libya’s three provinces—was proposed by the UN as a means of easing Libya out of internationalised civil war. The goal is also to demonstrate that one unified government could hold despite the division that persists on the ground.

For months, until last spring, the eastern-Libyan-based commander Khalifa Haftar’s military offensive—with the combat assistance of Russian and other foreign mercenaries as well as Emirati air strikes—raged against armed groups aligned with the UN-recognized government in Tripoli. And in June, the Turkish state and its Syrian mercenaries helped the Tripoli government expel Haftar’s main brigades and allies from north-western Libya, a province called Tripolitania.

Now, Turkey’s military mission in the northwest and the Russian force in the centre, are not controlled by Libyans, but they help achieve a balance of power. The relative calm resulting from this approximate equilibrium, enabled the UN to promote ceasefire declarations and kickstart the LPDF last autumn.

The man widely expected to become prime minister was the current Tripoli government’s interior minister, Fathi Bashagha, aged 58, also from Misrata. Last year, when Turkey’s military intervention began looking like a game changer, a self-confident Bashagha embraced the Muslim Brotherhood’s idea of reaching out to a preeminent member of the opposite camp, whose main turf is Cyrenaica, the eastern half of Libya.

Bashagha partnered with Aguilah Saleh Issa, the chairman of the country’s eastern-based Parliament. Although the Egyptian-backed Saleh has never diverged in a fundamental manner from Haftar, he has often been a convenient civilian alternative to the stubborn Emirati-backed commander for actors outside Cyrenaica.

The pursuit of an entente with Saleh traces back to the spring of 2018, when the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated political party’s Khaled al-Meshri, upon acceding to the helm of the High Council of State in Tripoli, began conversing with his counterpart in the eastern parliament. The bet, revived amid Haftar’s defeat last year, was that a conciliatory stance by Bashagha, Meshri’s tactical ally, would give the interior minister an opportunity to rise to a higher office thanks to a UN peace process.

Things didn’t pan out, however. The list featuring Bashagha as prime minister and Saleh as president lost to the roster featuring Dbeibah and his running mates. In lieu of a list dominated by familiar faces, including Bashagha, known for his anti-corruption rhetoric, a combination of relatively obscure names prevailed. A brief look at their past itineraries helps avoid oversimplifications.

***

Jalel Harchaoui – Senior fellow researcher specialising in Libya within the Geneva-based Global network Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

In an era marked by enduring turmoil, the political elite in North Africa have found the crises that plague the world and strain domestic resilience to be surprisingly beneficial for their governments.
As security threats escalate and irregular migration intensifies amid the spillovers from widening geopolitical rifts, the governments in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco are increasingly leveraging the new opportunities arising from a tide of convergent challenges to entrench themselves and the power and influence they wield.

Algeria’s strategic significance has soared in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The ensuing energy crisis in Europe transformed Algeria from a regional player into a crucial supplier, with Italian and German delegations rushing to Algiers to secure gas deals as an alternative to Russian energy supplies. In 2022 alone, exports of natural gas from Algeria to Italy surged by 20 percent, demonstrating the country’s newfound prominence.

These agreements not only mitigated some of Europe’s energy woes, they also bolstered Abdelmadjid Tebboune’s precarious presidency of the country, providing him with substantial geopolitical leverage. While Algeria’s government faced criticism for clamping down on journalists and activists, the indispensable role it has played in European energy security has resulted in increased Western favor.

Capitalizing on this geopolitical shift Algiers has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, proactively engaging in its long-standing rivalry with Morocco. Beyond the energy exports, Algeria is also channeling its windfall revenues into domestic initiatives to create jobs, improve water security, and lay the foundations for overdue economic diversification.

For instance, the Algerian government has implemented new policies designed to stimulate private sector growth in an attempt to tackle unemployment, which stands at more than 20 percent for women and just under 10 percent for men.

Additionally, recent amendments allowing the deployment of its military forces in other countries signal a broader intention and strategy to play a more pivotal role in regional stability, particularly as part of Arab League and African Union peacekeeping missions.

This balanced approach between a strengthening of domestic policies and assertion of influence abroad reveals Algeria’s strategic use of crises to redefine its role both regionally and globally.
In Tunisia, President Kais Saied continues to exploit an escalating migration crisis to increase his political leverage.

It is an extension of a similar gambit Saied employed to capitalize on European fears of a heavily indebted Tunisia spiraling into economic collapse, which allowed his regime to extract concessional funding while pushing back against International Monetary Fund demands for austerity and stringent reforms.

The EU, in its desperation to curb migrant flows, has offered substantial financial aid to Tunisia, with little oversight. This transactional relationship gives Saied additional financial support, with few or no strings attached, that temporarily eases the acute economic distress in his country, characterized by soaring unemployment rates and severe shortages of fuel and other basic staples.

Beyond this financial aid, Saied is also exploiting widening geopolitical rifts in an attempt to assert his control and gain legitimacy. By pivoting toward Russia, China and Iran, he anticipates the receipt of additional funding and diplomatic cover that is not conditional on striving for or preserving the democratization of Tunisia and the institutions that would safeguard it. These alliances are especially pertinent as the country edges closer to a pivotal presidential election in October.

In Libya, the fragmented landscape of governance is receiving renewed attention amid the global distractions as a result of the self-interests of external actors, most notably Turkiye and Russia. The administration of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh has strategically leveraged the EU’s need for alternative sources of energy post-Ukraine by promising increased oil production to help shore up European energy security as imports from Russia dwindle. However, this engagement is fraught with allegations of corruption and mismanagement that compromise its credibility.

Meanwhile, the rival government in the east of the country is serving as a gateway for Russia to deeply embed itself in Libya, purportedly aiding Kremlin-backed initiatives such as the circumvention of international sanctions and the facilitation of fuel-smuggling operations.

Furthermore, Libya’s borders have become a conduit for sprawling illicit economies, which are magnifying the ramifications of the migrant crisis. As European border policies focus more on deterrence than resolution, Libyan elites are taking advantage of the country’s porous borders to sustain and expand these underground economies.

Morocco’s adept navigation of global crises exemplifies the ways in which nations can capitalize on turbulent times to further their own strategic objectives. For instance the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations with Israel, enabled Rabat to enhance its international security and intelligence ties, especially with the US. Such alliances have brought with them access to advanced technology and enhanced defense capabilities, tilting regional power dynamics in Morocco’s favor.

While normalization with Israel risked alienating a populace among which pro-Palestinian sentiment is strong, Rabat simply opted to recalibrate its foreign policy in anticipation that the strategic gains would eventually outweigh any domestic disapproval.

Simultaneously, Morocco’s pursuit of an independent migration strategy is helping the country shake up traditional EU-North African dependency dynamics. Its national strategies related to migration contrast heavily with more heavy-handed EU approaches elsewhere in the region, by striking a balance between deterrence of irregular migration and the protection of migrants’ rights. In return, Morocco gains a soft-power boost on the African continent and avoids the stigma of being seen to do the EU’s “dirty work.”

In summary, the turbulent global environment is providing North African countries with substantial geopolitical currency. Whether through energy deals, strategic alliances or migration agreements, governments in the region are fully committed to leveraging the effects of global instability to entrench themselves domestically and project influence abroad.

_____________________

Mary Fitzgerald

In May 2014 Libyan General Khalifa Haftar launched a then-unauthorized military operation from Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city. The operation, which Haftar named Karama, or Dignity, was centered on but not limited to Benghazi; its declared aim was to eradicate what Haftar and his associates described as terrorism. However, it prompted a swell of armed opposition from those who suspected it was a pretext for the septuagenarian general’s ambition to rule Libya.

On July 5, 2017, Haftar announced the complete “liberation” of Benghazi, although fighting in the downtown area of Sidi Khreibish only ended in January 2018. Between 2014 and 2018, Benghazi underwent the most significant transformation in its modern history, with displacement, dispossession, and the killing of thousands overturning generations-old social and economic dynamics. The consequences shaped not only the city’s current trajectory but also political and social developments in Libya more generally.

The four-year conflict resulted in the destruction of large areas of Benghazi; in 2021, its municipality said it had documented more than 6,000 properties that had been partially or wholly damaged during the fighting. Moreover, it divided families and neighbors, prompted the most extensive displacement in postcolonial Libya, and created new forms of identity rooted in grievance and partisan narratives of what had sparked the conflict. In a country where the legacy of Muammar Gaddafi–era property redistribution remained an obstacle to reconciliation, widespread seizures of property and land both during and after the fighting drove further antagonism in Benghazi.

Soon after its launch, Operation Dignity gained significant public support among the residents of Benghazi, who were becoming increasingly frustrated with deteriorating security. A series of assassinations had roiled the city. Former regime security personnel were targeted, along with civil society activists, judges, and journalists. The killings—mostly drive-by shootings and car bombings—generated both fear and widespread anger. Many commentators blamed groups, including Ansar al-Sharia, designated an al-Qaeda affiliate by the United States in January 2014 after it was linked to the 2012 diplomatic mission attack in which US ambassador Chris Stevens and several of his colleagues were killed.

Apart from its suspected role in the assassinations and bombings that shook Benghazi, Ansar al-Sharia had long unnerved many. The debate over how to address the problem of the group and its associates’ growing presence and influence in the city had divided residents before the launch of Dignity, and subsequently proved one of the main drivers of the ensuing conflict.

Operation Dignity began with attacks—including air strikes—on Ansar al-Sharia, as well as several armed groups that identified as “revolutionary” rather than Islamist. Faced with a common threat, a number of these militias united with Ansar al-Sharia under an umbrella group they named the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC).

Some groups that did not join BRSC continued to fight alongside it. The prominence of Ansar al-Sharia within the BRSC alliance benefited Haftar and his allies, serving to buttress their claim that their opponents were terrorists. When an Islamic State group affiliate emerged in Benghazi in late 2014, it recruited scores of Ansar al-Sharia members, who joined returnees from Syria and foreign fighters. Beheadings and other brutal tactics associated with the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq became a feature of the fighting in Benghazi, and helped consolidate popular support for Dignity.

These developments reinforced the views of those who had warned that a “force only” approach to Benghazi’s extremism challenge, together with Haftar’s scattershot targeting of a wide range of factions he considered a threat to his personal ambitions, risked not only radicalizing a far larger cohort but also pushing Benghazi into a long internecine war.

After the war, it was clear several new societal dynamics had emerged in the city. These dynamics were often shaped by perceptions of who had lost and who had gained from the conflict. Among those who had fought for or staunchly supported Dignity, there was a triumphalist mood.

Several appeared to benefit materially, taking over abandoned properties or participating in Benghazi’s war economy. There was a reshuffling of key posts in the city, with existing personnel replaced with individuals from eastern tribes now considered “victors” due to their support of Haftar and his operation.

Benghazi residents who had not participated in the conflict but who adopted the Dignity narrative of how and why it had started were relieved to see Ansar al-Sharia and its associates gone. Many bonded through a collective memory of the conflict as solely a battle against terrorism, and in the process created new social milieus and civil society organizations.

Other social dynamics brought about by the war caused concern among the city’s population. The influence wielded by the Madkhali Salafists prompted much trepidation. As Haftar advanced through Benghazi during the war, the armed Madkhalis he had recruited took over mosques and religious institutions in the city.

Later fully entrenched, the Madkhalis issued rulings against women traveling without a male guardian; called for all gatherings to be gender segregated; denounced any celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, traditionally a popular holiday in Libya; prohibited demonstrations as sinful; and intimidated civil society actors and cultural institutions. 

Another dynamic was the emergence of a stronger regional identity. This was particularly evident among a younger generation that had little adult experience of pre- Dignity Benghazi. The black flag of the short-lived Emirate of Cyrenaica (1949–51)—more recently associated with federalists seeking greater autonomy for eastern Libya and hard-line separatists—became an increasingly common sight in the city.

Benghazi also began to look different. While the reconstruction of neighborhoods damaged during the war was piecemeal, other parts experienced a building boom. In many cases, the increased construction was related to economic predation by Haftar’s inner circle—particularly his sons, a number of whom were given military ranks without any background or training—and their Libyan Arab Armed Forces units. In 2021, Osama al-Kizza, head of municipal planning in Benghazi, warned that a surge in unregulated construction was resulting in districts that lacked roads, water, sanitation systems, and other infrastructure.

A decade after Operation Dignity tipped Benghazi into four years of fighting, the people of the city—whether residents, internally displaced, or displaced overseas—continue to disagree about what caused the war and why it lasted so long. The trajectory of the conflict has been the subject of much revisionism, but there is consensus that Benghazi experienced an unprecedented transformation as a result.

The social and economic dynamics that emerged from the 2014–18 war not only upended what had been a generations-old status quo. They also gave rise to new identities, both among the majority of Benghazi residents who were broadly favorable toward Dignity and among those who opposed the operation and were exiled. Partisan narratives of the war have created powerful communal bonds in its aftermath.

The disappearance, detention, or killing since 2018 of prominent figures who were erstwhile allies or supporters of Haftar, among them a female parliamentarian, a female lawyer, and a former Dignity commander, has in some cases prompted disquiet and the questioning of both the current Haftar-dominated status quo and the operation that led to it. 

While many of the displaced have resettled in Benghazi, others who were displaced due to their opposition to Dignity or wider political views believe it remains unsafe for them to return. The city presents a particularly difficult challenge for greater reconciliation in Libya. In the absence of any comprehensive reconciliation efforts, it is unlikely that the decade-old divisions among extended families, neighbors, and communities that once called Benghazi home can be resolved.

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Mary Fitzgerald is a writer, researcher, and consultant specializing in the Mediterranean region, with a focus on Libya. She has worked on Libya for more than a decade. She spent several months on the ground during Libya’s 2011 uprising, lived in Tripoli in 2014, and continues to make regular trips to the country.

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