Author - ab_mnbr

Bilal Abdullah

Key Takeaways

• While UN envoy Abdullah Bataille’s initiative has not yet come to fruition, alternative paths to a settlement in Libya are emerging, including national reconciliation and dialogue under the umbrella of monarchical legitimacy.
• The existence of multiple avenues to address the Libyan crisis raises questions about their alignment or divergence with the primary approach led by the UN mission, particularly given indications of setbacks in this primary approach. 
• The UN is anticipated to retain dominance in the settlement process, potentially diminishing gains from the national reconciliation approach, although it may not be entirely incompatible with its efforts. 
• The monarchical legitimacy track remains a likely option, as it could favor the preservation of existing power dynamics.

The dawn of the year 2024 has marked the rise of various initiatives in Libya, some hinting at departures from conventional approaches to resolving the nearly decade-long conflict. Alongside maintaining the initiative of the UN Secretary-General’s envoy to Libya, Abdullah Bataille, albeit with waning momentum, two other courses of action have emerged. 

Firstly, there is a focus on expediting steps related to the national reconciliation process, seen as the overarching framework for reintegrating supporters of the former Gaddafi regime into the political process. Secondly, there has been a notable surge in the activities and political engagement of Crown Prince Mohammed al-Hassan al-Rida al-Senussi within Libya during the closing months of the previous year and the initial weeks of the new one, with reports suggesting the preparation of an initiative.

Besides these two avenues, traditional attempts to rival the UN initiative persist, notably through the House of Representatives and State Council maneuvers to influence the settlement agenda. These efforts address long-standing contentious issues, such as a consensus on the occupants of sovereign positions and forming a new government through an agreement between the House of Representatives and the State Council.

As a general principle, it is often believed that the multitude of approaches to conflict resolution can hinder peace efforts, reshuffle the cards, and reflect divergent views among external actors involved in the conflict. Conversely, setting aside all other peace initiatives and prioritizing only the UN’s role in the reconciliation process can signal international consensus on settlement or a desire for calm and conflict de-escalation.

This paper monitors and analyses these trajectories, evaluating the degree of coherence or contradiction among current initiatives and their intended outcomes. It also assesses the prospects of maintaining these parallel approaches to conflict resolution.

The National Reconciliation Process

Despite the intricate nature of the National Reconciliation Process in Libya, the focal point of discussions revolves around integrating supporters of the former regime, mainly led by Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, into the political process. This movement holds significant sway, given its widespread presence across various regions of Libya, particularly in critical strongholds such as Bani Walid, Warshefana, Tarhuna, Sirte, Mazda, Ragdalin, Jamil, and Asaba.

Even though this political current has suffered from marginalization and organizational fragmentation since Gaddafi’s ouster, Saif al-Gaddafi’s frequent public appearances in recent years and his candidacy for the presidential elections (which did not materialize) toward the end of 2021 marked a pivotal development. This presented a symbolic leadership capable of mobilizing and guiding this movement, particularly during critical electoral junctures. Consequently, consolidating the fluid nature of this movement into a semi-cohesive voting bloc could significantly impact the legitimacy or trajectory of any forthcoming elections organized as part of the settlement process.

In terms of political alliances, the most significant weakness for Gaddafi’s supporters lies in the scarcity of these alliances, with the movement primarily focusing on ties with Russia. Another Moscow ally, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, wields considerable power in the eastern and, to a lesser extent, southern regions, diminishing Moscow’s inclination to prioritize Gaddafi’s supporters over Haftar during the current phase. Regarding the national reconciliation track, several developments have recently unfolded notably:

• The primary activity in this track revolves around preparatory conferences conducted over six months in anticipation of an all-inclusive conference scheduled for April 2024 in Sirte. The inaugural preparatory conference took place in July 2023 in Brazzaville, Congo, followed by the fourth conference in mid-January 2024 in Zuwara, located in the country’s far northeast. Another round of preparatory conferences is slated to be held in Congo this February.
• Although Gaddafi’s supporters were the primary focus of this process, Saif al-Islam’s team at the Sebha conference in mid-December announced its withdrawal from participating in the preparatory committee for the all-inclusive conference. This decision was prompted by their perception of the Presidential Council’s lack of seriousness in achieving national reconciliation, particularly concerning the absence of progress in addressing the issue of detainees from the pro-Gaddafi regime.
• Amid the ongoing momentum for reconciliation, marked by monthly preparatory conferences, the House of Representatives (HoR) discussed the National Reconciliation Law on January 8, referring it to the House Committee on Justice and National Reconciliation for review. This move reflects the parliament’s effort to exert legal control over the reconciliation process. Conversely, Tripoli Government President Abdelhamid Dbeiba’s stance is notable, as he has a vested interest in thwarting any process that could jeopardize his grip on power.
• During a meeting with local mukhtars (village chiefs) in mid-January, Dbeiba declared his opposition to the African Union’s involvement in facilitating reconciliation, insisting that it should be managed solely by local mukhtars without external intervention. Notably, apart from the African Union, led by Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso, no other international entities openly intervened in the reconciliation process. The African Union’s involvement in reconciliation efforts, in collaboration with the Presidential Council, is endorsed by the UN Security Council.

Hence, in theory, the national reconciliation process in Libya is not entirely separate from the UN-led process. Instead, it can be viewed as a complementary path to settlement. The outcomes of the reconciliation process are expected to align closely with the final arrangements of the settlement, particularly concerning the electoral process, which is a crucial focus of the UN’s efforts. This alignment is underscored by Saif al-Islam’s previous intention to participate in the presidential elections slated for late 2021.

In practice, the dynamics of national reconciliation diverge from those of the primary settlement track, which is currently concentrated on establishing the necessary legislative and political conditions for elections. The two main factions controlling power in the east and west of the country are pivotal players in this track. Thus, while the national reconciliation track operates independently in terms of dynamics, its outcomes are intertwined with the main settlement track led by UN envoy Abdallah Bataille. Some parties, seeking to disrupt or derail the settlement process, are creating parallel tracks to the reconciliation process. 

Dbeiba’s proposal, articulated during his meeting with Libyan mukhtars, does not present a viable alternative but instead serves as an attempt to obstruct the ongoing reconciliation efforts and evade potential commitments. On the contrary, Saif al-Islam’s position should not be interpreted as rejecting the reconciliation process, as it remains the sole avenue where supporters of this movement officially engage in various UN-backed sub-tracks. This confrontational stance likely pressures the entities responsible for facilitating the reconciliation process, such as the UN mission, the Presidential Council, and the African Union. Continued boycott by Gaddafi supporters would undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the entire process.

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Bilal Abdullah is a Researcher focusing on Libyan affairs. He has published and cooperated with several think tanks in and outside the Arab region. Abdullah is preparing for a Master’s degree from the College of African Postgraduate Studies at Cairo University, specializing in Tribalism and the Future of the State in Libya after 2011. Some of Abdullah’s published studies include “The Amazigh Movement and Dynamics of Libyan Political Life”, “The Amazigh Spring in Libya: Between Revolution Gains and Challenge of Division”, “The Democratic Transition of Power in Tunisia after the Revolution: A Study about the Role of the Tunisian General Labor Union”, and “The Political Role of A-Azhar after the Revolution: Constants and Variables”. He has a BA in Political Science from the College of Commerce at Helwan University and a Diploma in African Studies from Cairo University.

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Ghazi Ben Ahmed, Andrea Cellino

While Rome is attempting to position itself to serve as a gateway into European markets for natural gas from Africa, the “Mattei Plan” is opaque about what Africa would gain from this plan.

The optimism on display at the Italy-Africa Summit hosted in Rome on January 28-29 by the Italian government, gathering representatives from over 25 countries along with EU leadership, struggled to mask underlying contradictions of the event. Italy, under the leadership of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, proclaimed its ambition to “work for the development of Africa in a new partnership of equals.” However, this statement appears to oscillate between naive hopes and political cunning, suggesting to some observers that this promise of a “partnership of equals” is deception rather than sincere.

While Rome has ambitions to serve as a gateway into European markets for natural gas from Africa, the “Mattei Plan” is opaque about what Africa’s gains would be in this in terms of development. In such an atmosphere of high-flying promises and the reality of short-term European political and electoral interests, the Italy-Africa Summit could well turn out to be a new chapter in the long story a Europe-Africa relationship where speeches promising equality and partnership often mask imbalanced power dynamics and divergent interests.

On the one side, Italy as led by Meloni and her populist far-right coalition is asserting its desire to contribute to Africa’s progress under the guise of renewed and balanced cooperation. The Italian government’s flagship initiative aims to mobilize 5.5 billion euros for their proposed plan for African development over the next five to seven years by combining Italian cooperation envelopes and the country’s climate change fund—something vehemently contested by Italy’s opposition parties.

Yet these promises are met with skepticism, and a number of African countries are voicing their discontent with what they perceive as European interference or imposition, even as they seek essential financial and economic support. In the eyes of many African leaders, Meloni’s promises ring hollow. For one, Italy developed its plan for Africa without input from African leadership. Furthermore, the funds pledged are not sufficient for providing sustainable, long-term solutions for the many issues facing the continent. Although the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have shown their support through significant financial commitments, the added value of this summit and the fulfillment of its promises remain uncertain.

The expressed intention to find synergies (and additional funding) with other programs, such as the EU’s Global Gateway, raises questions about the viability and sincerity of the commitments made in a context where intentions and tangible results appear more than uncertain. Also, energy needs are ostentatiously at the center of the initiative as the prominent role of Italy’s energy giant ENI in the plan clearly demonstrates.

Combating the root causes of migration remains central

Another European actor—Germany—had previously explored a similar approach and ultimately rejected it due to its failure to achieve the expected results. Berlin sought to develop a new policy towards Africa independent of the EU or France–given France’s poor reputation as a former colonial power. In this bid to renew ties with Africa, Germany assured African partners that it had observed the mistakes made by the French, and that Berlin would apply a rational, methodological approach to its policy while avoiding paternalistic interference.

Germany’s ambition at the time was just as “commendable” in form as that carried by Meloni today in that it advocated the end of the era of conventional development aid and favored the orientation of private investments towards the support of renewable energies and environmental preservation. Nevertheless, the migration crisis constitutes the persistent backdrop of these approaches, and Germany aspired to establish a new type of cooperation capable of retaining young potential emigrants in their home countries. Thus, to a large extent, to stem the migration flow, the German government articulated its new African strategy, primarily encouraging German companies to invest in Africa. But as is the case with Italy, stemming the flow of migrants to Europe was the ultimate driver behind Germany’s cooperation with Africa. And like the proposed Mattei Plan, this single-minded focus of the migration crisis prevented a comprehensive, multi-dimensional approach that could address the underlying issues driving emigration from Africa.

It appears that Meloni’s government has failed to understand this lesson, continuing to prioritize migration over other issues. A controversial migration agreement between Italy and Libya has been automatically renewed for three years amid warnings by humanitarian organizations that this might make Rome and the European Union complicit in crimes against humanity.

The Memorandum of Understanding on Migration – signed on February 2, 2017, to provide Libyan authorities with financial and technical support to “combat illegal immigration” – was automatically renewed for a second time in 2022.

Geopolitical context conducive to renewal

Times are changing, and the international context is no longer conducive to unproductive quarrels and symbolic gestures. The current German government seems to have now understood that a paradigm shift is needed in Europe-African relations. In a recent statement, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Svenja Schulze (SPD), presented a revised German strategy for the African continent, saying that  “Africa is growing and changing enormously. Its evolution will shape the 21st century – and thus also the future of Germany and Europe.” This new strategic direction signals Germany’s intent to ingratiate itself into broader EU initiatives vis-à-vis Africa rather than pursue an independent path. This shift also marks a willingness to radically transform the relations between Europe and Africa by transcending the colonial legacy and addressing the historical imbalance of power between the continents.

In fact, if EU leaders who attended Meloni’s summit in Rome are sincere in their interest in Africa—and not just seeking visibility and publicity ahead of the European election—they should emulate Germany’s strategic readjustment and focus on adjusting power imbalances between the two continents.

Europeans must recognize that over-reliance on historical and geographical ties, supposed to confer an advantage against competitors such as China, India, or Turkey, represents a strategic misinterpretation of the current state of Europe-Africa relations. Indeed, several African countries have established significant ties not only with China and Turkey but also, surprisingly after the war in Ukraine, in the field of military cooperation with Russia. The hesitation of many African countries to clearly position themselves in a conflict with such evident moral stakes has shocked the common sense of many in the West, but it should be a wakeup call that African countries do not feel like they must automatically support Europe.

And if Europe’s objective is to really favor Africa’s sustainable and long-term development, it needs to move beyond the rhetoric of hydrocarbons, which even the “Mattei Plan” name—in honor of the founder of Italy’s major oil company Eni—embodies. To become a real strategic partner to the African continent, as expert Lorella Stella Martini of Ecco think tank indicated, Europe needs to focus on the opportunities presented by the green development and the energy transition, which in addition would be more in line with its own European Green Deal.

Africa needs to find its own alliances

Today, many African countries seek to break free from their traditional role in the global politics and adopt a proactive stance. States now wish to choose their partners autonomously without being drawn into alliances dictated by others. The criticisms from the Tunisian Foreign Ministry, which accuses the European Community of suffering “from a feeling of superiority and thinks that it is a model to follow while in reality, it is a minority” should be understood in this context. Although this sentiment might be shared by many in the region, it is time to move beyond such unproductive statements and see Europe for what it is, a chance and an opportunity for the development of the continent and to face global challenges together. As the Malian writer Amadou Hampâté Bâ so aptly said, “Partnerships between nations should not be mirrors reflecting the asymmetries of the past but windows open to the possibilities of a shared future.”

And there is much room for envisioning this shared future—the destinies of Europe and Africa are inextricably intertwined. Currently, the European Union positions itself as Africa’s main commercial partner, concentrating more than 30 percent of the continent’s external trade exchanges. Meanwhile Europe, in its quest for energy diversification, needs Africa for its natural gas supply. With the announcement of the imminent exploitation of vast gas fields off the west coast of Africa, including reserves estimated at 2.83 trillion cubic meters between Senegal and Mauritania, Africa is emerging as a key player in this sector. Algeria, ranked the tenth largest gas producer in the world, along with Nigeria, Angola, Egypt, and Libya, could become essential pivots to reduce European dependence on Russian gas.

However, the success of this strategy requires reciprocal collaboration. Africa must tackle corruption and poor governance that persist on the continent—scourges long neglected, and in some cases even exploited, by Western countries. For its part, Europe must recognize and support Africa’s rising influence on the world stage by aligning its actions with African priorities without compromising on the values that underpin it: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including those of minorities.

This dynamic can only flourish through the harmonious commitment of EU member states, a sine qua non condition for synergy with the overall visions of the European Commission. Any unilateral strategy of a member state, primarily focused on managing immigration in its African policy, is inherently doomed to failure. This was notably manifested with the Memorandum of Understanding on Migration, spearheaded by the Italian Prime Minister. When they started negotiating the details for the implementation of an anti-migration policy, Tunisia backtracked, saying that it cannot serve as the EU’s coastguard.

There is reason to fear that the Mattei Plan is merely an extension of this memorandum, turning African leaders gathered in Rome into mere coast guards for the EU in exchange for a few micro-projects in renewable energies, or even gas. Such an orientation not only risks undermining the depth and richness of Euro-African relations but also reduces African heads of state to peripheral roles, far from the balanced and mutually beneficial cooperation that should characterize the ties between the two continents. Moreover, such a deal raises grave concerns for human rights violations, as Italian authorities are fully aware that the tools they are potentially providing will be instrumental to more human rights violations in Libya and in Tunisia. The Memorandum of Understanding on Migration – signed on February 2, 2017, to provide Libyan authorities with financial and technical support to “combat illegal immigration” – was automatically renewed for a second time in 2022. This renewal occurred amid warnings by humanitarian organizations that this might make Rome and the European Union complicit in crimes against humanity.

Implementation of the Mattei Plan legitimizes Meloni’s racist anti-immigration policy and whitewashes the thousands of migrants deported to the Libyan desert, where they are vulnerable to extortion, abuse, and murder.

Africa must not be reduced to a role of detention zone for Italy. For many African observers, right now the Mattei plan looks increasingly like a proposal with fascist undertones where Giorgia Meloni would recklessly pump African gas and carelessly deport migrants.

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Ghazi Ben Ahmed is the President of the Mediterranean Development Initiative.

Andrea Cellino is a Senior Fellow and head of North Africa at Middle East Institute Switzerland.

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K. Oanh Ha

Benghazi, the eastern Libyan city where the Queen Majeda took on its cargo, is controlled by Khalifa Haftar, an 80-year-old warlord who helped Qaddafi come to power in 1969 and later allegedly attempted to overthrow him with the blessing of the CIA while in exile in Virginia.

Libyan maritime and security officials, along with Western diplomats, said not much happens in the eastern part of the country without the approval and knowledge of Haftar, who returned to Libya in 2011, and his sons. His military group, known as the Libyan National Army, attempted to topple the transitional government in Tripoli and seize the city in 2019 with the help of Russian mercenaries working for the Wagner Group. That resulted in a ceasefire the following year, leaving Haftar in control of eastern Libya.

Western diplomats and Libyan officials told Bloomberg it’s commonly believed that, in exchange for peace and the resumption of crude production, Dbeibah’s government and the national oil company agreed to look the other way on fuel smuggling. The officials said the Haftars are benefiting from the illicit traffic at the Benghazi port and they suspect the proceeds have been used in part to fund the Wagner Group, the Russian mercenary army that continues to operate after the death last year of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Bengdara, the national oil company chairman, said in this statement to Bloomberg that the allegations are “definitely not true.” Neither Haftar nor his son Saddam responded to requests for comment sent through a spokesman.

Fuel smuggling from Benghazi has risen significantly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to Shekshek’s audit bureau and a report published in September by the UN’s Panel of Experts on Libya. The report called the illegal traffic “rampant” and said it contributes to destabilizing the country.

The invasion led to a cataclysmic shift in the world’s oil and refined fuel markets. Oil prices soared to a 14-year high of $140 a barrel in March 2022. Western countries responded by imposing sanctions on Russian oil and fuel products to curb Moscow’s ability to raise funds for the conflict. The European Union also blocked the purchase and import of seaborne Russian crude as of December 2022. Albania, which isn’t in the EU, has said it supports the sanctions.

As Europe, which was the main market for Russian hydrocarbons, began closing its doors, it turned to Asia and the Middle East for supply. Russia looked for new buyers. It found one some 6,000 miles away — in Libya.

Russian fuel exports to Libya have surged more than tenfold since the invasion, to 2.5 million tons in 2023 from 260,000 thousand tons the previous year, according to an analysis of AXSMarine shipping data done for Bloomberg by the Energy Security and Transition (EST) Lab @energycenter at Italy’s Politecnico di Torino. Russia is now the top exporter of all refined petroleum products to Libya, edging out Greece and accounting for 28% of Libya’s total supply, the analysis showed. That’s up from 4% in 2021. “Russia suddenly became the main Libyan supplier in 2023,” says Ettore Bompard, the center’s scientific director.

Russia has exported 2.4 billion euros ($2.6 billion) worth of fuel to Libya since January 2023, according to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, which has been tracking energy flows from Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war. About half of that is diesel, gas oil and gasoline — products that are typically smuggled. Using the Libyan audit bureau estimate that 40% is being diverted, that means about half a billion dollars of Russian fuel products that came into the country over the past year were spirited out to Europe and elsewhere.

Since 2022, Libya has exported diesel, gasoline and gas oil to European countries including Italy, Spain, Malta and France, according to shipping data. “Exports of diesel and gasoline from Libya make no legitimate economic sense, given the country’s enormous imports and insufficient domestic refineries,“ said the Sentry’s Cater.

As many as four ships a week were leaving Benghazi last year loaded with smuggled fuel, according to an official familiar with the port’s operations who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the matter. In September and October, at least six vessels made stops in Russia before discharging at Benghazi and other Libyan ports, according to Brega and ship-tracking data.

“It’s suspicious and sketchy,” said Alan Gelder, head of oil research at Wood Mackenzie. “There’s no structural reason why we would see this huge increase of imports from Russia to Libya.”

The Queen Majeda had engaged in two illegal shipments, loading up in Benghazi and unloading in Turkey, according to the memo. “The NOC has been unable to prevent such illegitimate practices that are taking place openly at Benghazi Sea Port from occurring while these practices go totally unnoticed despite being committed openly and for all to see in daylight outside the control and authority of the NOC and Brega Oil Marketing Company,” the memo said.

Shipping location data show that the Queen Majeda stopped mostly in Greek ports prior to 2022. It was in Greece in March 2022 before proceeding to Benghazi, arriving there on April 11.

Twelve days later, still in the Libyan port, the tanker turned off its automatic identification system, or AIS, and went dark, according to data from MarineTraffic, a company that tracks ship movements. International maritime law requires ships to have their AIS turned on, except for certain safety purposes. Going dark is a telltale sign a vessel is likely engaging in illicit activity, according to the US sanctions office.

On April 25, the Queen Majeda began broadcasting its location again and headed northwest to Malta. Then it went dark again for three more days, giving it ample time to travel the roughly 100 nautical miles to Hurd Bank, part of Malta’s territory and a well-known spot for vessels to conduct ship-to-ship transfers at sea without official scrutiny. By April 29, the tanker returned to Benghazi and, within a couple of days, turned off its AIS again.

A month later, on May 24, the Queen Majeda asked for permission to enter Italian waters. The request was denied. When it entered anyway, coast guard officials inspected the ship and discovered 3 million liters of marine gas oil for which there was no documentation. They detained the vessel at the port of Taranto in southern Italy, according to court documents. After the ship’s owner provided paperwork saying the Queen Majeda would be unloading in Albania, it was allowed to leave on July 8.

Two days later the vessel again went dark as it neared Sicily. The UN panel, which also examined the Queen Majeda’s movements, reported it received documentation showing the ship supplied two other vessels via ship-to-ship transfers on July 11 and July 13. Shipping data also show that the Queen Majeda stopped at Albania’s Porto Romano on July 26 and discharged.

Cargo documents obtained by the panel showed the fuel was loaded in Benghazi on May 8, with a certificate of origin from the Ras El Mungar Terminal, which was set up only to receive fuel, not supply it to ships. The panel didn’t say where the fuel had come from.

Bilrahim, Brega’s chairman, said the cargo documents the Queen Majeda presented to Albanian authorities two months later were fake. Brega wouldn’t use the National Oil Corp. logo and seals on any of its documents, he said, and most of them are in Arabic. The ones the captain had were in English.

It wasn’t until November that a crucial piece of the puzzle emerged. That’s when two people helped answer the question of where some of the money was going. The two, who asked not to be identified to protect their safety, said that in recent months they had been in the vicinity of the Al Jufra Airbase about 300 miles southwest of Benghazi. Haftar’s militia captured the base in 2017, and since then Russian aircraft and several hundred Russian mercenaries have been operating there.

Russia has been expanding its military presence in Libya, as well as in other African countries such as Mali, Sudan and the Central African Republic. Wagner, a private military company controlled by longtime Vladimir Putin ally Prigozhin before his death in August in a plane crash in Russia, had been spearheading the effort. Since then, the Russian defense ministry has moved to take over Wagner’s lucrative security, gold mining and oil services contracts, as well as its relationships with African leaders such as Haftar.

Haftar met with Putin in Moscow in September, underscoring Russia’s influence. The US special envoy to Libya, Richard Norland, has called the Russian military’s role in Libya “destabilizing,” and US officials have pressed Haftar to remove foreign forces.

The threat is being taken “very seriously” by the US administration, Jonathan Winer, a former US special envoy to Libya, told Bloomberg in November. He was especially concerned about reports that Putin and Haftar were hammering out a defense accord that could lead to a Russian naval base in eastern Libya. “Keeping Russia out of the Mediterranean has been a key strategic objective,” Winer said. “If Russia gets ports there, that gives it the ability to spy on all of the European Union.”

The two people familiar with activities at Al Jufra said they wanted to speak out against fuel smuggling and Wagner’s presence in Libya. They described an airbase still so tightly controlled by Russian militia that Libyan National Army troops cannot enter on their own. They said they overheard conversations in Russian, saw deliveries of Russian alcohol and observed Russian soldiers barbecuing meat in a desert city where few locals can afford it. They also said they spotted Haftar’s son Saddam, who commands a brigade, entering the base, sometimes several times a month.

Since mid-2022, trucks full of fuel that was supposed to go to nearby gas stations for use by Libyans were sent instead to Al Jufra, according to one of the people.

The deliveries, each comprising dozens of trucks, brought in far more fuel than the base needed for its operations. Some of it was put on planes and sent to Russian-controlled air bases in Mali, the person said military leaders at the base told him. He said he also saw fuel trucks headed for Sudan.

“All of this smuggling activity, including the Russian activities, is made possible by the absence of rule of law and accountability in Libya,” said Stephanie Williams, who served as head of the UN Support Mission in Libya until 2021. “Smuggling is an endemic problem that’s corrosive to society. It’s part of the underground network that feeds into the kleptocratic network that keeps the ruling class afloat. The lion’s share of the blame is on the Libyan ruling elite who allow this to happen and line their own pockets.”

In January, Dbeibah said his government would work to revise the fuel-subsidy program and would poll Libyans on a proposal similar to Shekshek’s that would give citizens a lump-sum payment or a coupon.

Meanwhile, in Durres, the Queen Majeda remains tied to Quay 2, loaded with fuel, 17 months after it was brought into port. Another crew member left the ship in November, according to prosecutors. On Monday, prosecutors charged Shaalah with trading and transporting smuggled goods and asked for a five-year prison sentence. Shaalah is scheduled to appear again in court later this month.

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— With Henry Meyer, Vernon Silver, Leonidha Musaj and Gjergji Thanasi

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Prof. Miral Sabry AlAshry

Turkey has renewed its relations with the Middle East, with a focus on achieving political stability in Libya and resolving issues through dialogue among all parties. This commitment was demonstrated through discussions held between Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba in Tripoli.

The talks covered various important topics related to bilateral relations and cooperation on regional issues. The discussions also addressed current areas of cooperation and potential collaboration on regional conflicts, security issues, and instability in certain parts of Africa. Turkey and Libya emphasized their joint efforts in combating terrorism, human smuggling, and illegal immigration. They also discussed the resumption of Turkish Airlines flights to Libya, highlighting the need to restore these flights as soon as possible.

Fidan emphasized Turkey’s support for Libya and its commitment to preventing further conflict in the country. Turkey rejects the division between East and West and believes that dialogue is essential for resolving issues with the approval of all parties. As a result of the improving relations with eastern Libya, Turkey has decided to reopen its consulate in Benghazi.

Since the beginning of 2022, Turkey has been gradually moving towards reconciliation with eastern Libya. This has included the announcement of plans to reopen the Turkish consulate in Benghazi. Turkey is also actively engaging with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates to play a constructive role in resolving the Libyan crisis.

In 2023, the Turkish ambassador visited Benghazi and the Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, visited Turkey twice. During the meetings, President Erdogan expressed Turkey’s support for expediting a consensual solution to the Libyan crisis and holding presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible.

The decision by the Turkish Parliament to extend the army’s mission in Libya reflects Turkey’s significant involvement in supporting the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj. Turkey has sent thousands of forces and mercenaries from armed factions in Syria to western Libya, demonstrating its commitment to strengthening the GNA’s position in the ongoing conflict.

The memorandum of understanding for military and security cooperation, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fayez al-Sarraj in Istanbul on November 27, 2019, marked a significant milestone in Turkey’s engagement in Libya. This agreement paved the way for increased Turkish military support, including the deployment of troops and provision of military equipment to the GNA.

The extension of the army’s mission in Libya for two years, starting on January 2 of last year, demonstrates Turkey’s long-term commitment to its military intervention in the country. This decision has implications for the conflict dynamics and the broader geopolitical landscape in the region, solidifying Turkey’s role as a key player in the Libyan crisis.

According to a memorandum between Al-Sarraj and Erdogan, Turkey has taken control of the Al-Watiya air base and the Misrata naval base, and has established a center for the Turkish-Libyan joint command in Tripoli. Despite the ceasefire agreement implemented on October 24, 2020, and conferences held in Berlin, France, and Moscow, which called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya within 90 days, Turkey has continued to train Libyan forces inside the country and build camps in Turkey. This goes against the agreement and conferences, and it appears that Turkey is using this as a way to boost its economy. They have been providing military training, aid, cooperation, and advisory activities to the Libyans, with over 15,000 Libyan personnel trained and health support given to about 37,000 people.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to visit Egypt next week, marking his first visit in 10 years. Relations between Cairo and Ankara have been tense since the overthrow of former President Mohamed Morsi in 2013. Erdogan had previously supported The Brotherhood in the Middle East region but has since changed his stance. The interests of Turkey and Egypt require good relations between the two countries, and Erdogan is seeking reconciliation with the administration of Field Marshal Haftar in Benghazi, Libya. The Libyan file will be discussed during his upcoming visit.

On August 3, 2023, Egypt’s Minister of Trade and Industry, Ahmed Samir, and Turkish Minister of Industry and Technology, Mehmet Fatih Kacır, discussed opportunities for strengthening bilateral industrial cooperation during Samir’s visit to Ankara. They explored potential joint ventures, technical cooperation, and investment opportunities in industries such as automotive, furniture, and renewable energy. Both ministers emphasized the importance of developing a joint industrial cooperation plan and agreed to establish a working group to enhance coordination. They also discussed the possibility of reopening the Ro-Ro line between Egypt and Turkey to facilitate trade. Kacır expressed Turkey’s keen interest in enhancing cooperation with Egypt and welcomed the proposal for collaboration.

In conclusion, Egypt and Libya are expected to experience developments shortly with Turkey, including the reopening of files and cooperation that did not exist before.

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Prof. Miral Sabry AlAshry is Co-lead for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the Centre for Freedom of the Media, the Department of Journalism Studies at the University of Sheffield.

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K. Oanh Ha

Over the years, the office has investigated drug and human trafficking. In 2022, officers began seeing another trend: Albanian fishing vessels engaged in ship-to-ship transfers at sea with boats getting deliveries of fuel smuggled out of Libya.

Libya, which has the largest oil reserves in Africa, has little refining capacity. So the national oil company imports fuel at market prices and sells it to citizens at a steep discount, practically giving it away as a social benefit, creating opportunities for smugglers to sell it at higher prices.

In January 2023, the Guardia di Finanza helped catch two fishing vessels, the Albanian-flagged Geni and a Libyan-flagged boat, transferring fuel using rubber tubes. All told, they have busted five fuel-smuggling operations since Russia invaded Ukraine, according to Lt. Col. Davide D’Aponte, who was in charge of the outpost in Durres until last month.

“The problem has become a very pronounced one since the Russian war,” D’Aponte said in an interview at his office overlooking the port. “In the past, it was a small-time crime, fishing boats, fishermen who profited directly. Now we are seeing an increase and internationalization of this phenomenon, with organized crime involved too.”

Ilir Malindi, a lawyer representing the owner of the Geni, said it’s a common practice for Albanian fishing vessels to go to Libya to buy subsidized fuel for about 25 cents a liter. He said almost every Albanian fishing vessel is retrofitted with extra storage capacity to bring aboard fuel. The owner of the Geni, who is Malindi’s son, has made several trips to Tripoli to sell fish and buy fuel to operate his boat, he said. He has pleaded not guilty to smuggling excise-paying goods. A trial date hasn’t been set.

The case of the Queen Majeda suggested something bigger. Albanian prosecutors didn’t say where the fuel had come from, but they allege it was illegally traded. The captain and three crew members face prison sentences of as much as 10 years. Six others were allowed to go home.

Shaalah and the crew members still on the ship were free to come and go as they pleased — an unusual arrangement given the severity of the charges. They used a bicycle to shop for groceries. But mostly they tended to the ship’s generators and other equipment. The Queen Majeda was still loaded with the fuel it never delivered, and they needed to make sure there were no leaks or fire hazards, as they were living with a potentially explosive cargo.

Alkuafi, the captain, had complained via WhatsApp that he and the crew were pawns caught in the middle of a power struggle between competing arms of Libya’s National Oil Corp. “They made me out like I am a mafia guy,” he said. “I could have heaved up anchor and run. If I had something to hide, I would have tried to escape.”

But Alkuafi did heave up anchor, according to prosecutors. He had left the ship one morning in late June and never came back. He hasn’t returned messages since then. “The fuel-subsidy policy as it’s currently applied is a waste of public money and depletion of state resources.”

Khaled Shekshek, head of Libya’s audit bureau, the government’s financial watchdog, was one of the few officials willing to talk about fuel smuggling. He agreed to meet in September at a hotel in Tunis, the seaside capital of neighboring Tunisia, about an hour by air from Tripoli. Clean-shaven and wearing a gray suit, he arrived like a man on a mission, with three aides and a binder of documents he referenced during the interview.

Shekshek, who has headed the audit bureau for the past decade, has been on a campaign to stem the scourge of fuel smuggling. It has been an entrenched problem that has gotten worse since the collapse of Moammar Al Qaddafi’s regime in 2011, which led to an ongoing struggle among rival military factions, warlords and criminal networks.

In 2017, prosecutors in Italy and Malta uncovered an international crime network that smuggled diesel fuel to ships in Malta and eventually on to the European market. The case involved a former Maltese soccer star, an armed Libyan militia, an Italian shipping firm and the mafia, according to Italian prosecutors.

By May 2022, national oil company officials were noticing a pattern of contraband fuel trading from Libya to Turkey but were unable to stop it, according to documents seen by Bloomberg. In a May 10 memo to Libya’s attorney general, then-Chairman Sanalla singled out three vessels, including the Queen Majeda, for illegal fuel shipments and urged the prosecutor to take action.

Libya’s subsidized fuel program, which began under Qaddafi in the late 1970s, has metastasized in the past few years, according to Shekshek’s accounting. It jumped by more than 70% to 62 billion dinars ($12.8 billion) in fiscal 2022 from 36 billion dinars in 2021, he said. That was almost half the national budget, and was on track to be larger in 2023. As much as 40% of that — about $5 billion in 2022 — is being smuggled, according to audit bureau estimates Shekshek shared with Bloomberg.
A Libyan central bank estimate was even higher: It said that the leakage cost the country 30 billion dinars in 2022, or more than $6 billion.

Farhat Bengdara, chairman of the national oil company since July 2022, said in an emailed statement that fuel smuggling is a “huge problem” but that he couldn’t provide an estimate for the scale or value of the theft. He said the company has instructed Brega to install GPS tracking systems to help authorities investigate and has recommended the government reconsider its subsidy program.

Shekshek has called for replacing the subsidies with a lump-sum payment of $1,000 for families to meet their energy needs. “The fuel-subsidy policy as it’s currently applied is a waste of public money and depletion of state resources,” he said. “It spreads crime, inequity in the distribution of resources and undermines democracy.”

In a country with few strong institutions and dominated by militia and tribal allegiances, Shekshek has sought to hold those in power accountable. His audits have led to the suspension or ouster of dozens of officials for corruption, misuse of public funds and governance issues. And he has repeatedly criticized the central bank and the state oil company for their lack of transparency — allegations the bank and the oil company have publicly refuted.

He survived an effort to dismiss him in 2014. In 2017, he called for digitizing the subsidy program as a way of capping expenses. Libyan families would be given a preloaded charge card they could use to purchase fuel at subsidized prices at points of sale throughout the country. Once families used up their monthly allocations, they would be required to buy fuel at market rates. The proposal didn’t go anywhere.

Shekshek said the national oil company has a weak accounting system that’s not in accordance with international standards and doesn’t have a full view of what its subsidiaries are doing. He said Libya continues to import more refined fuel that never reaches the citizens the program was intended to help. And the country has done so even though the economy contracted by 1.2% in 2022, according to the World Bank.

So much fuel is being smuggled, he said, that in some southern and border areas, Libyans stand for hours in long lines to gas up their cars or buy fuel on the black market — at inflated prices. “A large number of citizens and families do not benefit, especially low-income people, which leads to the subsidy program losing its purpose,” Shekshek said. “The real beneficiaries of this subsidy are the owners of companies, factories and luxury cars, which results in an injustice in the distribution of state resources.”

The only activity that accounts for the rise in imports, he said, is the rise in smuggling.

The smuggling can jolt global markets. In January, protests at the Sharara oil field sparked in part by fuel shortages forced the national oil company to shut the facility for three weeks. The closure of the country’s largest oil field, which can produce about 300,000 barrels a day, helped push up crude prices more than 3% that week.

The siphoning of Libyan fuel cost the country about $750 million in 2018, according to then-chairman of the national oil company, Mustafa Sanalla, who didn’t respond to requests for comment. In 2021, when the government refused to allocate more money for subsidized fuel, he implemented a program in which unprocessed Libyan crude could be exchanged for fuel from foreign energy companies. The buyer of the crude would cover any price difference.

The crude-for-fuel swap, which has been used by other countries, made it simpler to procure products without the use of hard currency and the scrutiny of the central bank or other government institutions. It also made it easier for money to go missing. Shekshek found a $9 billion discrepancy between what the government said it spent on the import of hydrocarbons, including fuel for the subsidy program, and the actual expenditure.

“This crucial change in how Libya procures its fuel has facilitated the vast increase in imports,” said the Sentry’s Cater. “This surplus is diverted by illicit Libyan actors who sell the fuel in the black economy inside and outside of Libya.”

Suspicions of Fuel Smuggling

Shipping location data shows that the Queen Majeda stopped mostly in Greek ports prior to 2022. It was in Greece in March and April 2022 before proceeding to Benghazi, arriving there on April 11

The ship broadcast briefly on April 25 and headed to Malta, when it went dark for another three days. That’s enough time to travel to Hurd Bank, a well-known spot for ship-to-ship transfers, according to a UN probe. It returned to Benghazi on April 29
On May 24, the Queen Majeda was detained in Taranto, Italy, where officials discovered 3 million liters of fuel for which there was no documentation. It was allowed to leave on July 8 and went dark again two days later near Sicily

Smugglers capitalize on the price difference between the subsidized fuel and what it fetches on the black market. Though Libya isn’t the only country in the region that offers subsidies, its fuel is so discounted that it makes it a ripe target. Russia’s war with Ukraine has led to an even greater price differential. While Libyans pay just pennies for a liter of gasoline — about 1% of market price — consumers in Europe pay about $2.

The smuggling is costing European countries billions of euros in lost tax revenue, according to Sicpa, a Swiss company that runs a fuel-marking program to identify illicit trading. Italian officials estimate that as much as 20% of fuel used for transport in 2021 came from the black market, mainly through illegal imports that evade about $3 billion a year in taxes.

“This has now become a major corruption issue,” Shekshek said. “It has turned from small-scale smuggling by individuals to organized crime carried out by groups with power and influence using large tankers and trucks.”

In August, an officer at the Zawiya refinery, about 35 miles west of Tripoli, was detained for alleged fuel smuggling. Other administrative and security officials at the plant, which refines oil for domestic consumption, were also being prosecuted at the time, according to Libya’s attorney general. The national oil company didn’t respond to requests for comment about the case.

“It’s clear that the beneficiaries of fuel smuggling have been moving higher and higher up the food chain,” said Tim Eaton, an analyst at Chatham House, a London-based nonprofit that published a 2019 report on fuel diversions at refineries. “Now you have armed groups selling it, and it’s become more and more a transnational crime involving authorities in Libya.”

At a televised meeting in November, Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah accused Brega, which receives imported fuel and delivers it to transport companies for distribution, of contributing to the rise in fuel smuggling by placing big orders for petroleum products. That’s the same company whose name was on the Queen Majeda’s shipping documents. “Brega is to blame,” he said.

Brega Chairman Fouad Ali Bilrahim called the allegation “unfounded.” In an interview with Bloomberg in January, he said Brega gathers, but doesn’t scrutinize, the fuel demands of key government agencies and passes that on for budget approval. Brega also isn’t responsible for transporting fuel once it hands it off to distribution companies. He said there isn’t enough oversight.
“There is no follow-up from any party,“ Bilrahim said. “We are very concerned about fuel smuggling. The situation will get worse in the future unless something is done, but Brega lacks jurisdiction and authority.”

Dbeibah’s office didn’t respond to questions about Brega or the alleged $9 billion accounting discrepancy. Nor did the finance ministry. “It’s clear that the beneficiaries of fuel smuggling have been moving higher and higher up the food chain.”

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K. Oanh Ha

The Queen Majeda, a tanker seized by Albanian authorities in September 2022, in the port of Durres, Albania, on July 14, 2023. The capture of a Libyan tanker in Albanian waters opened a window on a $5 billion trade in smuggled fuel — much of it coming from Russia.

On a clear morning in September 2022, the Queen Majeda, a faded blue and white tanker loaded with marine gas oil worth more than $2 million, left the Libyan port of Benghazi and set off for Porto Romano in Albania, 600 nautical miles to the north.

Zuhair Alkuafi, the 55-year-old Libyan captain, treated the trip like previous ones he had made: He had a signed certificate showing that the fuel originated in Libya from Brega Petroleum Marketing Co., an arm of the country’s state-owned National Oil Corp.

Four days later, as the Queen Majeda entered Albanian waters, Alkuafi saw a small boat come into view, he later recounted. It was a coast guard vessel, and when an officer came aboard, Alkuafi offered him tea while he looked at the cargo documents. “He said there was no problem,” Alkuafi said. Then, a larger coast guard vessel came alongside. “That’s when I knew something was wrong.”

Getting Busted

The Queen Majeda, carrying $2 million of marine diesel oil, set sail from Benghazi, Libya, on Sept. 8, 2022. Four days later, it was intercepted when it entered Albanian waters

Albanian inspectors found that even the water tanks had been pumped full with thousands of gallons of gas oil. They also suspected that the documents showing the fuel originated in Libya were forged. One red flag: Brega handles fuel inside Libya, while the national oil company is the only entity authorized to import and export petroleum products in the conflict-ridden African nation.

Alkuafi was instructed to take the Queen Majeda to the port in Durres, where a line of police vehicles awaited. He and some of his 10 crew members were driven to a police station and charged with smuggling.

The intended recipient, Albanian prosecutors and crew members said, was Kastrati Group SH.A., an energy company that operates a network of gas stations across the country. It wasn’t charged. Nor was the ship’s owner, Nuri Eldawadi, a Libyan businessman whose Facebook profile shows him posing with foreign cars and yachts. His company, Eldawadi Shipping Ltd., operated the Queen Majeda out of Turkey until early 2022. It is now registered in the Marshall Islands, according to the International Maritime Organization database. In June 2022, he changed the ship’s flag from Libya to Cameroon, deemed a blacklisted registry by the maritime industry for its lack of oversight.

Kastrati confirmed in an email that it had received deliveries of marine gas oil from the Queen Majeda in July and August, contracted through a company in Dubai. But Kastrati said it didn’t have a purchase contract for the cargo the Queen Majeda was carrying at the time of its detainment. “Kastrati Group has conducted every business transaction with the utmost integrity and transparency,” a spokeswoman for the company said. Eldawadi didn’t respond to requests for comment.

The ship’s detention raised more questions about the alleged fuel smuggling than it answered: Who was behind it? How widespread was the theft? Why was it able to happen? Where did the fuel come from? And where was the money going?

It would take almost a year to answer those questions. But a Bloomberg News investigation based on shipping records and interviews with Libyan officials, people familiar with Libya’s oil business and members of the crew found that as much as 40% of the fuel being imported into the country under a government subsidy program — or about $5 billion a year — is leaking out through illicit trade. Much of that imported fuel is coming from Russia. And it’s being diverted to countries in Europe that have banned imports of those same products.

“The closure of European markets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions drove a sharp uptick in exports for Russian refined petroleum to North Africa, a region with a scarcity of refineries,” said Charles Cater, director of investigations at the Sentry, a Washington-based nonprofit that recently reported on a surge in corruption and illicit activities in Libya and provided research assistance for this story. “This flood of petroleum imports is directly linked to Libya’s thriving fuel-smuggling operations.”

The port in Durres, Albania’s largest, was eerily quiet on a scorching hot Tuesday afternoon in July. The yellow and blue cranes that move containers were idle, and few workers could be seen in the heat radiating from the docks. At the eastern end of the port, the Queen Majeda was tied to Quay 2.

Ten months had passed since the ship was forced into port, and telltale streaks of rust marred its hull. A lone metal chair with a frayed nylon back sat on the foredeck. Closer to the bridge, where the ship’s officers would normally be found, a few t-shirts and towels hung from a jerry-rigged clothesline.

Alkuafi, the captain, had responded to questions over WhatsApp. He denied wrongdoing, saying it wasn’t his job to verify the paperwork. He said he had been hired in April 2022 on a five-month contract for $3,500 a month. “We are workers under a contract between us and the company,” Alkuafi said. “We are not the owners of the ship or the shipment. I don’t know why they are holding us.”

The captain had indicated he would be willing to talk more in person, but he had stopped returning messages in June and was nowhere to be found that afternoon in Durres. Instead, the ship’s chief officer, Emad Shaalah, emerged from a doorway at the top of a rusty gangway. He was reluctant to speak at first, saying he didn’t want to upset the ship’s owner, who he said was paying for a lawyer representing the crew.

But over the next few days he shared his despair. After six months in prison, he said, he and other crew members were allowed to return to the ship under house arrest. He missed his daughter, who was born just before he set sail from Benghazi and was approaching her first birthday.

An experienced seaman from Tripoli, Shaalah started working on the Queen Majeda in July 2022. He said the ship had made deliveries to Albania that July and August without incident and that he was surprised when it was detained in September. “It was all the same, same paperwork, same buyer,” he said. “We didn’t do anything wrong.”

Albanian investigators tell a different story. By the time of the Queen Majeda’s last voyage, they had intelligence suggesting that it was sailing with forged documents. They suspected that the fuel, had it entered Albania, would have been sold locally at gas stations and possibly re-exported to other countries, according to a law enforcement official who asked not to be identified because the case is ongoing.

Not far from where the Queen Majeda was docked is a two-story building with an Italian flag at the entrance. It’s an outpost of the Guardia di Finanza, a police force that investigates economic and financial crimes. Italian military personnel there work closely with Albania’s coast guard to monitor suspicious activity on the Adriatic Sea, which separates the two countries.

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Dr Mustafa Fetouri

The United Nations Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established in 2011 as Libya descended into chaos and lawlessness, starting in February 2011 when hundreds of young Libyans took to the streets demanding reform, jobs, housing and better living conditions.

Before the end of the first week of protests, what could have been ordinary small legitimate demonstrations were, deliberately, turned into an armed rebellion. By 20 February, 2011, the entire country went up in flames and, eight months later, Muammer Gaddafi was murdered, ushering in more chaos and lawlessness.

Throughout the past 13 years, Libya’s reconciliation maze – the top UN goal in the country – has eluded nine envoys, and counting. The list of envoys include some of the wisest and most experienced diplomats, like Ghassan Salame, who resigned from the job due to bad health to the current mediator, Abdoulaye Bathily, who lacks thorough understanding of the country compared to his predecessor. Mr. Bathily is a former Senegalese minister with a significant Francophone background and an aristocratic streak. He has, however, beaten Salame in one measure: to manage and prolong the crisis, instead of solving it—something the UN is very good at.

Last 18 December, just days before Libya’s 72 Independence anniversary, Mr. Bathily told the UNSC that he had been working day and night since taking over – in September 2022 – to get Libyan protagonists to come together and “be nice to each other”, as he once remarked when he first arrived in Tripoli in March 2022, supposedly to save Libya.

However, since he took over the UN mission, the gap between the disagreeable Libyan parties has widened, while they have grown less nice to each other. Mr. Bathily found consolation in telling his audience, the UNSC, that there is a little dim light at the end of the tunnel. He said that Libya, for the first time, “has” the necessary laws for “elections” – a highly contentious issue among different parties vying for power.

He told the Gaza-preoccupied Council that the country’s election commission finds the newly passed election laws “technically implementable” and technically, also, the commission is ready to organise both presidential and legislative ballots. However, the UN envoy did not say when the elusive elections could take place because, deep down, he knows it is unlikely to happen in 2024.

A few sentences down his sombre speech, Mr. Bathily appeared unsure if the dim flicker of light he saw earlier was still blinking at the end of tunnel or had completely gone out. He reiterated that his new idea, which he proposed last November as a plan to fix Libya, is the way to go.

This idea calls for the meeting of the five “institutional stake holders”, as he called them, to agree on the way forward. The five “institutions” which the UN envoy believes are capable of sorting out the mess are: the Parliament and the Libyan National Army, led by Khalifa Haftar from Eastern Libya and, sitting opposite them, from Western region are: the overly corrupt, yet UN recognised Government of National Unity, the Higher Council of State and the paralysed Presidential Council.

While Mr. Bathily refrained from admitting that his idea is unlikely to see the light of day, he seemed to be telling the UNSC that the plan could work, where everything else has failed to deliver elections in a country where everyone wants voting, except his “five institutional stakeholders”. He said that he has already invited the “key” stakeholders and that none of them have rejected the proposed meeting, but all of them made their participation conditional on issues that make the entire initiative dead, even if he did not yet pronounce it.

The man appears to be confused, to say the least. In early March, when he first arrived at UNSMIL headquarter in Palm City west of Tripoli, he was clearer and appeared a little more decisive. He told all Libyan power-hungry and corrupt “key institutions” – the Parliament and its rival Higher Council of State, in this particular instance, that if they did not agree on elections laws by June 2023, he would convene a parallel dialogue group that includes all Libyan players to draft and enact elections laws.

He called the proposed group as the High Level Steering Committee. Come October, both houses failed to produce the required documents. The final documents of the two elections laws – for presidential and another for legislative elections, respectively – were full of shortcomings, according to Mr. Bathily himself. In November, he commented that both laws, drafted jointly by both houses, were “[un]implementable” at which moment, his High Level Steering Committee should have taken over the process of law drafting, but that never happened.

By late summer of 2023, the entire idea of the Committee lost momentum and Mr. Bathily himself allowed it, discreetly, to join other shelved UN envoys’ initiatives. A while later, he came back with another more disagreeable idea – the initiative of the “key institutional” stakeholders – to quote his own description.

By the time he briefed the UNSC last December, many were already convinced that he had moved to the stage of “managing” the Libyan mess, instead of ending it.Mr. Bathily has already been at the helm of UNSMIL for more than 13 months; the average time each former envoy has spent on the job. Many Libya observers believe that, at this stage, Mr. Bathily is dabbling with the extra time, during which no new initiatives will get drafted, let alone debated. And the outcome? Nothing of substance is likely to happen about important issues like elections, unification of state institutions and reconciliation.

The experience of the UN in Libya confirms one thing: the world body’s old reputation of being a clumsy manager of crises but definitely not a problem solver in any way – examples of the UN’s historical deficiencies are littering the world political stage, from Somali to Bosnia-Herzegovina all the way to North Korea and Ukraine, in between.

However the UN’s return to Libya, this time to pull it out of the UN-helped mess, is no surprise to many, including some Libyan politicians who usually agree with what the organisation proposes, only to reject it, once they get into the details. The repeated failures of the UN offer politicians enough ammunition to shoot at the UN, blaming it for almost everything, after they finish blaming each other. But, overall, this kind of status quo serves them better and they love to see it prolonged for ever, since it preserves their privileges, including high pay and a comfortable life compared to the average Libyan.

For the UN to be back trying to fix Libya, 72 years later, might be a good thing, if only the organisation is prepared to effectively lead – which is not the case, unfortunately.

______________

Dr Mabruk Derbesh

The next section of this paper will discuss the role of financial planning in managing these challenges and fostering sustainable economic development in rentier state economies.

Financial planning as a tool for managing rentier state economies:

A. Importance of financial planning in rentier state economies:

Rentier state economies face unique challenges, such as revenue volatility, limited economic diversification, and macroeconomic discrepancies. Effective financial planning can help to mitigate these challenges and attain sustainability.

Financial planning involves setting objectives, developing strategies, and implementing policies to allocate resources efficiently and effectively.

In rentier state economies, financial planning has the possibility to play an integral role in qualifying economic risks, fostering diversification, and ensuring economic stability based on strategic views.

B. Financial planning tools and techniques:

Several financial planning tools and techniques can be used to manage rentier state economies effectively. These include:

a. Budgeting and forecasting: Rentier state governments should develop realistic and comprehensive budgets that account for the volatility of commodity prices and the potential for unexpected shocks. Regular forecasting can help to anticipate future revenue streams and expenditure needs and ensure that resources are allocated efficiently.

b. Revenue and expenditure management: Effective management of government revenues and expenditures is critical to ensuring fiscal sustainability. Rentier state governments should develop policies and procedures for managing revenues and expenditures, including strict controls on public spending, transparent procurement processes, and effective tax collection.

c. Debt management: Given the volatility of commodity prices, rentier state governments should develop prudent debt management strategies to avoid excessive borrowing and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability.

This includes developing policies for managing external and domestic debt, monitoring debt levels, and establishing debt sustainability frameworks.

A. Application of financial planning in Libya:

Despite the significant economic challenges facing Libya, financial planning can play a critical role in managing these challenges and furthering sustainable economic development.

The Libyan government has taken some steps to improve financial planning, including the establishment of a Ministry of Finance and the adoption of a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) . However, these efforts have been hampered by political turmoil and security vulnerabilities, which in turn have created sizable obstacles to effective planning.

Stated that, the application of financial planning tools and techniques should assist in addressing some of the key challenges facing the Libyan economy. For example, developing realistic budgets and forecasting revenue streams can help to mitigate the impact of oil price volatility, while effective revenue and expenditure management can ensure that resources are allocated efficiently.

Additionally, prudent debt management strategies can ensure long-term fiscal sustainability and elude excessive borrowing, which would most likely restrain economic prosperity and social programs.

Case study: Using financial planning to manage the Libyan rentier state economy: Overview of the Libyan economy:

Libya is a rentier state that relies heavily on oil and gas exports for its revenue. The country has the largest oil reserves in Africa and is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Oil and gas exports account for over 90% of Libya’s export earnings and around 75% of government revenue.

Despite its significant oil wealth, Libya faces numerous economic challenges, including high real unemployment, a lack of economic diversification, and a weak, lazy and deformed private sector that needs much business and logistical maturity.

The so-called private sector in Libya has developed to become an additional burden. Additionally, the country has been plagued by political instability and insecurity since the overthrow of former president Muammar Gaddafi in 201114 .

Financial planning challenges in Libya:

The Libyan government faces several challenges in implementing effective financial planning strategies, including:

1. Revenue volatility: Libya’s economy is worryingly reliant on oil and gas exports, which are subject to significant global pricing and volatility in international markets and consumption. This makes it hard to accurately forecast government revenue and plan expenditures, hence the need for cohesive planning.

2. Lack of economic diversification: The aforementioned reliance on the oil and gas sectors causes limited potential for long-term growth and job creation. Again, this makes it challenging to develop sustainable economic development strategies.

3. Weak public financial management: The Libyan government has a weak public financial management system that has, for a. long time now, hampered its ability to effectively allocate resources and manage expenditures.

Financial planning initiatives in Libya: Despite these challenges and obstacles, the Libyan government, in the past 20 years, has implemented several financial planning initiatives to manage the country’s economy, such as:

1. Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF): The Libyan government has adopted an MTEF, which is a planning and budgeting tool that helps to align government resources with strategic priorities. The MTEF covers a three-year period and provides a framework for developing realistic budgets and allocating resources efficiently.

2. Public financial management reforms: The Libyan government has implemented a number of public financial reforms, including the establishment of a Ministry of Finance, a Ministry of Administrative Supervision, Entities of fiscal financial policies, and, on top of all that, the adoption of international accounting standards helped by known financial institutions.These reforms are intended to improve financial management, enhance transparency, and promote accountability.

3. Economic diversification: The Libyan government has initiated several measures to promote economic diversification, including the development of non-oil sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing.

Additionally, the government has encouraged foreign investment and privatization of state-owned enterprises. However, most of these reforms were met with resistance either by the political elite or by the political struggles over power and overseas legitimacy.

Impact of financial planning initiatives in Libya:

While the impact of financial planning initiatives in Libya is difficult to assess given the ongoing political instability, these initiatives have the potential to stimulate sustainable economic development and alleviate the challenges faced by the Libyan economy. The MTEF, for example, can help to ensure that government resources are allocated efficiently and effectively, while public financial management reforms can improve transparency and accountability.

Furthermore, economic diversification can help to reduce the reliance on oil and gas and promote further job creation in non-oil sectors. Eventually, these initiatives are essential for creating a more stable and sustainable economic environment in Libya .

This paper argues that financial planning is a critical tool for managing rentier state economies, particularly in the context of significant economic challenges such as those faced by Libya.

Effective financial planning should, with everything else being equal, diminish risks, adopt economic diversification, and ensure macroeconomic permanence or steadiness. Financial planning tools and techniques, such as budgeting and forecasting, revenue and expenditure management, and debt management, can be applied to manage the challenges faced by rentier state economies.

While the Libyan government has taken some steps to improve financial planning, political instability and security concerns have created significant obstacles to effective implementation. Nevertheless, the application of financial planning tools and techniques can help to address some of the key challenges facing the Libyan state.

Recommendations:

Based on the analysis of financial planning in rentier states, including the case study of Libya, the following recommendations are made for improving financial planning in rentier state economies:

1. Develop a long-term economic diversification strategy: Rentier state economies are heavily reliant on a single commodity or sector, which makes them vulnerable to economic shocks. Therefore, it is fundamental, at this stage, to develop a long-term

economic diversification strategy to reduce reliance on oil and gas exports and promote growth in non-oil sectors.

2. Establish a stable and predictable fiscal framework: Rentier states face significant revenue volatility, which makes it challenging to plan and manage government expenditures. A stable and predictable fiscal framework, such as a medium-term expenditure framework, can help to align government resources with strategic priorities and promote fiscal discipline.

3. Strengthen public financial management: Weak public financial management systems can hamper effective financial planning and budgeting. It is essential to strengthen public financial management systems, including budget preparation, execution, and monitoring, to ensure efficient and effective allocation of resources.

4. Enhance transparency and accountability: Transparency and accountability are critical for effective financial planning and management. Rentier states should adopt international accounting standards and develop mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability in government operations.

5. Promote private sector development: Rentier states often have weak private sectors, which limits economic growth and diversification. It is important, again, to promote private sector development through measures such as careful privatization, local investment, and the creation of a conducive and relaxed business environment.

6. Develop a modern tax system that is elastic and far reaching to ensure another layer of governmental supervision over public wealth to try to eliminate corruption and promote accountability.

7. Cut the overly populated public institutions with useless functions and inefficient methods of handling funds from and to the producer, which is the Oil Company, NOC and the Central Bank of Libya, CBL. For instance, the NOC transfers its revenue to the CBL through an added channel called the Foreign Bank of Libya.

This procedure seems redundant and creates further red tape and unnecessary costs for no apparent reason or added value.

8. Secure better property rights with extraction companies. This may turn out to be difficult during the current political state of Libya as the bargaining chips are mostly in the hands of those foreign companies with their over-valuation of risk. This, however, is not impossible.

9. The Libyan state can enhance its revenue by using model contracts and transparent exemplary bidding practices such as what the Asian state of Timor-Leste did, with success, in recent years. To improve financial planning in rentier state economies, developing a long-term economic diversification strategy, establishing a stable and predictable fiscal framework, strengthening public financial management, enhancing transparency and accountability, and promoting private sector development are recommended.

Implementing these recommendations will require political will and commitment, as well as technical expertise and capacity-building efforts to evade what we learned from the rentier experience in Latin America, for instance. Nonetheless, effective financial planning can contribute to sustainable economic development and help to address the challenges faced by rentier state economies.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, this thesis has examined the use of financial planning to strategically manage rentier state economies, using Libya as a case study. The research found that financial planning is a critical tool for managing the economic challenges facing rentier state economies, such as revenue volatility, overreliance on a single commodity or sector, and macroeconomic instability.

Through effective financial planning, rentier states can moderate these challenges to a degree and build a sustainable economy for their citizens. These efforts have been somewhat fruitful in some Gulf states, although the verdict is still out in the case of Iran.

The case study of Libya highlighted the unique challenges faced by a rentier state, including a history of political instability, civil conflict, and economic sanctions.

Despite these impediments, Libya has taken steps to improve its financial planning, including the implementation of a medium-term budget framework and efforts to diversify the economy.

Those efforts are still in the early stages to fully credit them. Based on the analysis of financial planning in rentier states, including the case study of Libya and some of the Gulf states, several recommendations have been made for improving financial planning in rentier state economies.

These include developing a long-term economic diversification strategy, establishing a stable and predictable fiscal framework, strengthening public financial management, enhancing transparency and accountability, and promoting private sector development.

Implementing these recommendations will require political will and commitment, as well as technical expertise and capacity-building efforts. Nonetheless, effective financial planning can contribute to sustainable economic development and help to address the challenges faced by rentier state economies.

This thesis has demonstrated the importance of financial planning in managing rentier state economies, and the potential benefits of adopting a strategic approach to financial planning.

By addressing the unique challenges faced by rentier states and implementing effective financial planning measures, these economies can move towards sustainable economic development and reduce their vulnerability to economic shocks. However, its important to note here that Libya’s initial problems are based on its political and governance widespread and unashamed corruption.

***

L’université Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne, Sorbonne University, Paris, France. Tripoli University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science.

___________________

Tom Kington

A visit by Russia’s deputy defense minister to Libya on Sunday — his fourth in six months — represents how keen Moscow is on making the African nation another stepping stone to influence the region, according to an analysts.

Russia wants gold, diamonds and to be a guide for the global south,” said Chiara Lovotti, a Middle East and North Africa expert with the Italian think tank ISPI, using a term for developing countries and their Eastern allies.

The Russian official, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, was in Benghazi to meet the warlord of eastern Libya Gen. Khalifa Hifter and improve ties forged in 2020 when Russian mercenary organization Wagner Group helped Hifter in his unsuccessful bid to oust the U.N.-backed government running western Libya.

Four years on, and following the death of Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin last year, Yevkurov is now bringing Wagner mercenaries under Moscow’s control and rebranding them as Russia’s Africa Corps.

“The Africa Corps will not consist solely of Russian regulars; a mercenary logic will persist, meaning some services will be provided for a fee and some of the operations will remain covert,” said Jalel Harchaoui, a North Africa analyst at the London-based Royal United Services Institute think tank.

In eastern Libya, where analysts put the Russian head count at between 800 and 1,000, there are air bases like al-Jufra that provide Russian military flights with a stopover before heading south to other countries, including the Central African Republic, where Moscow has helped the government fight rebels.

As French influence fades on the continent, Russia has courted recent military coup leaders in Niger and Mali, both of which Yevkurov visited last month, and Burkina Faso, which recently said it received 25,000 tons of free wheat from Russia.

As well as eyeing eastern Libya as a stepping stone into Africa, Russia is also reportedly discussing the use of its coastal city Tobruk as a base for naval vessels. That access would give Russia another Mediterranean naval base to add to its two berths in Syria — Tartus and Latakia.

“A potential naval base facility in Libya could help Russia increase its foothold and influence in North Africa,” said Nick Childs, a naval analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank in London. “In naval terms in the Mediterranean, much will depend on what facilities are actually available and whether Russia will have the option to develop them to support a wider range of assets, including submarines.”

“If so, that could significantly enhance its ability to sustain a credible naval capability in the region,” he added.

But if facilities in Libya proved limited, this would mirror Russia’s predicament in Syria, where its Navy cannot carry out “deep repair and maintenance,” he noted.

Umberto Profazio, a North Africa specialist at IISS, explained that “Tobruk is a deep-water port, and it would offer Russia a triangulation between it, its Syrian ports and Port Sudan.”

Russia has been negotiating a Red Sea naval base in Sudan.

In exchange for allowing Moscow to use air bases and ports, Hifter will expect Russian personnel to continue operating air defense systems in the country as protection against Turkey’s military presence in western Libya.

“In 2022 Hifter blocked oil production in eastern Libya, and he does not want to be worried about Turkish drones if he tries that again,” Harchaoui said. “The Russians also shot down a U.S. Reaper [drone] over Benghazi in 2022.”

The U.S. has recently tried to woo Hifter away from Russia’s influence, but that has not gone smoothly. Gen. Michael Langley, the head of U.S. Africa Command, visited Libya in September, only for Hifter to pay a visit to Moscow the same month.

Four days after Yuvkerev’s trip to Libya in December, a Russian Ilyushin Il-76 cargo plane was destroyed at the al-Jufra air base — the second such incident in a year.

“If the U.S. is doing this, it may be a way to hurt Russia without harming Hifter,” Harchaoui said. “The problem is the Russians may have decided that losing two cargo planes in a year is a price worth paying for being in Libya.”

***

Tom Kington is the Italy correspondent for Defense News.

________________

Dr Mabruk Derbesh

Abstract:

Rentier state economies present unique challenges to managers, particularly in terms of market volatility and reliance on a single revenue source. This thesis argues that effective financial planning is critical to managing these challenges and achieving sustainable economic development.

Using Libya as a case study, this thesis will examine the role of financial planning in managing rentier state economies and assess its effectiveness in achieving macroeconomic stability, diversification, and sustainable growth.

The research will analyze financial planning tools and techniques through discussing the term “Rent economy” within the Libyan context, effective financial planning tools and their potential impact and present practical and suitable recommendations.

The findings of this research will provide policymakers with actionable insights into how financial planning can be used to strategically manage rentier state economies, mitigate economic risks, and foster sustainable development.

Introduction:

The infamous economies of rentier1 states are characterized by the reliance on the exports of natural resources, such as oil, gas, or minerals, which ultimately provide most of the states’ revenues. Although rentier economies extend in definition beyond those commodities, the term has become associated with them.

While this economic model has been successful in generating significant income for some countries, it has also been linked to monetary volatility and state structural fragilities that can hinder sustainable policy or the thought of it. Therefore, effective financial planning is important to dealing with such challenges and achieving sustainable economic development.

Financial planning involves setting various things, including objectives, developing strategies, and implementing policies to allocate resources efficiently and effectively. In the context of rentier economies, financial planning can play a critical role in managing and mitigating economic risks, fostering diversification, and ensuring macroeconomic reliability.

For the sake of this paper, Libya, an Arab state, is an optimal example of a rentier state that has been exponentially reliant on oil exports for state revenue.

The country has experienced significant economic challenges in recent years, which were the result of political instability, security concerns, and a decline in a lone source of revenue which is ever volatile and elastic oil prices.

Consequently, the Libyan economy, in recent decades, has gone through severe macroeconomic imbalances, including a widening budget deficit, increasing debt, and an alarming declining GDP, which may cause further economic challenges in the short and long run alike .

Methodology:

This paper, using the methodology of an expository format, argues that financial planning is a critical tool for managing the challenges faced by rentier state economies and that effective financial planning can help to achieve sustainable economic development.

Using Libya as a case study, within the format of expository tools, this paper examines the role of financial planning in managing rentier state economies. It assesses its effectiveness in achieving economic stability, diversification, and sustainable growth. The research will analyze financial planning tools and techniques, such as budgeting and forecasting, revenue and expenditure management, and debt management, and evaluate their application in the Libyan context.

The findings of this research, in the form of recommendations, will provide policymakers with actionable insights into how financial planning can be used to strategically manage rentier state economies, mitigate economic risks, and nurture sustainable development.

Ultimately, this paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on financial planning within the context of rentier economies or states and provide those with interest the practical guidance on how to effectively manage these unique economies. This paper aims at practicality as a key element of the research sequence.

Overview of Libyan economy as a rentier state:

The Libyan economy can be defined by looking into a few parameters starting with whether Libya resembles the characteristics of the rentier states and the challenges that face any economy.

A. Definition and characteristics of rentier states:

A rentier state is a country that derives a significant portion of its revenue from the export of natural resources, particularly, but not restricted to, oil, gas, and minerals. Such countries are usually referred to as those with a lack of economic diversification and heavy reliance on one or two commodities.

Rentier states typically have high levels of government spending and limited private sector activity, which can create economic imbalances and fiscal vulnerabilities. Moreover, the volatility of commodity prices can lead to unpredictable revenue streams and economic instability.

B. Overview of the Libyan economy as a rentier state:

Libya is a classic example of a rentier state, as it relies heavily on oil exports for government revenue. The country is estimated to have the largest oil reserves in Africa, and the oil sector accounts for over 90% of government revenue6 . This counts for more than half of its GDP.

The Libyan economy has been heavily dependent on oil exports since the discovery of oil in the 1960s, and efforts to diversify the economy have been talked about but continued to lack the political will to accomplish and are therefore limited. After its independence from the British occupation and the soldiers’ revolution in 1969, the government has played a governing function in the overall economy, with state-owned enterprises and entities controlling key sectors such as energy, telecommunications, healthcare, and transportation.

C. Key challenges and constraints:

Despite its abundant natural resources, the Libyan economy has faced significant challenges in recent years, especially since the many civil wars that erupted since the debacle of the Gaddafi government, which many saw as a stable eastern government9 . Since then, political instability and security concerns have created a challenging business environment, which has deterred investment, local and foreign, and hampered potential growth.

Moreover, the decline in oil prices since 2014 has also led to a sharp reduction in government revenue, which has put pressure on public finances and led to a significant increase in public debt. The continuing closure of many of the oil fields due to political conflicts also reduced oil output.

Also, the cultural reliance on the state as a source of income is one of the challenges10 . Overall, the lack of economic diversification and heavy reliance on the oil sector has continued to make the Libyan economy vulnerable to external shocks and economic volatility.

The Libyan economy is a classic example of a poorly run rentier state, nevertheless a typical one. It is heavily reliant on oil exports and faces significant challenges related to political instability, security concerns, management of wealth, nepotism, and socially tolerated corruption.

***

Dr Mabruk Derbesh – L’université Paris Panthéon-Sorbonne, Sorbonne University, Paris, France. Tripoli University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science.

_________________

Youssef Mohammad Sawani

In the seemingly endless political turbulence and unrest of post-Gadhafi Libya, elections are both a beacon of hope and a quagmire.

After plans to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2021 collapsed at the last minute, 2023 looked like it might be the year when voting would finally take place, as prioritized by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the U.N.’s special envoy, Abdoulaye Bathily. Once again, those plans fell short.

But the U.N. mission is still leading the charge for long-hoped-for elections, pushing first for an accord on electoral laws. In November, Bathily asked Libya’s rival factions, split between the capital Tripoli in the west and Benghazi in the east, to designate representatives for talks aimed at reaching an agreement on a national vote. Since a cease-fire in 2020 brought most fighting in Libya to a halt, international diplomacy has focused primarily on arranging elections, but it has little to show for it.

And now, entering 2024, the prospects still look bleak for any agreement on electoral laws and holding elections this year. In the seemingly endless political turbulence and unrest of post-Gadhafi Libya, elections are both a beacon of hope and a quagmire.

The much-hailed elections of 2012 for Libya’s new General National Congress, the first elections in Libya in more than 40 years, were touted as a historic stride toward democratic rebirth after Moammar Gadhafi’s dictatorship, bringing to Libya the promise of free and fair electoral politics. But they were flawed from the start.

The elections occurred amid escalating tensions right after the Gadhafi regime’s fall but before the war to oust Gadhafi had fully ended. Large segments of the populace were excluded from voting, which only deepened the country’s divisions. The transitional authorities’ inability to facilitate a comprehensive national dialogue and establish a solid framework for reconciliation only worsened the situation.

Moreover, the adoption of a mixed electoral system—with some seats designated for individuals and elected by simple plurality in winner-take-all votes, and others set aside for political parties and elected through proportional representation by party list—confused many voters. The outcome birthed the GNC, a body wielding both legislative and executive powers, yet sowing the seeds of division and discord.

Despite the National Forces Alliance, led by the late Mahmoud Jibril, winning the majority of votes, the implementation of a sweeping “Political Isolation Law” that barred Gadhafi-era officials from holding public office prevented many winners from actually taking their seats in the GNC. That fueled more political discord that eventually erupted in civil war. Instead of being a cornerstone for political continuity and legitimacy, the 2012 elections were a setback for Libya’s democratic transition.

The GNC lost its legitimacy as a neutral mediator and came to represent, for many Libyans, the interests of a select few political parties. Calls for new elections rose, leading to a protest movement against extending the GNC’s mandate, which Khalifa Haftar capitalized on. The growing popular discontent eventually compelled the GNC to agree to parliamentary elections in 2014 for a new House of Representatives to replace it.

The House of Representatives elections saw only 18 percent voter turnout, against a backdrop of fear and civil strife. The power structure that had previously prevailed in the GNC changed as Islamist forces and their allies lost control in the new House of Representatives. However, this change did not find a response on the ground, as the forces controlling Tripoli and the other armed militias of western Libya rejected the results of the elections. This macabre performance forced the House of Representatives to relocate eastward to Tobruk, while the GNC clung to power and resurrected itself as the High Council of State in 2015. 

Earlier in 2014, the GNC had organized a separate election for a constituent assembly to draft a permanent constitution, but controversy and disagreement surrounded both the assembly and its draft constitution. The crescendo of conflict precipitating civil war reached its zenith when Libya’s Supreme Court, based in Tripoli, ruled that the parliamentary elections themselves were unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives should be dissolved.

Since 2014, rival military forces in Libya’s east and west, with their own competing claims of legitimacy, have resisted any reforms and refused any political compromise. Their ongoing clashes are rooted in disputes and grievances formed during this crucial period between the 2012 and 2014 elections. The failure to prioritize dialogue over competition in Libya’s initial political transition, culminating in those two ill-fated elections, not only laid the ground for civil war, but led to the current crisis and deadlock over holding another vote.

Elections, despite their democratic allure, have over the past 12 years in Libya unwittingly fueled violence, division and further conflict because of their flaws.

After the fall of the Gadhafi regime, Libyan politics have been a tableau of conflict, violence and corruption. Electoral laws drafted late last year by a committee of the House of Representatives and the advisory High Council of State are part of a turbulent dance of politicians agreeing to terms for a vote and then reneging on them—a vivid testament to the potential perils elections might unleash.

Elections, despite their democratic allure, have over the past 12 years in Libya unwittingly fueled violence, division and further conflict because of their flaws. Yet they are still viewed by the U.N. and Western powers as the solution to Libya’s interminable political crisis. Uncertainties loom over the feasibility of genuinely free and fair elections in the country, given doubts about the political and democratic commitments of key figures—on one side, Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, the prime minister under the U.N.-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, and his allies in the High Council of State, and on the other, the military forces led by Khalifa Haftar and his allies in the House of Representatives in the east. The specter of Seif al-Islam Gadhafi, who sees himself as a symbol able to reunite Libya, also hangs over any election; he had registered to run for president before the 2021 vote was canceled.

Rather than a panacea, elections may stoke further instability, deepen existing schisms and fall prey to spoilers, hindering the elusive path to national reconciliation. Conducting elections with competing (and armed) forces vying for any advantages before the polls will intensify factional divisions and only add to Libya’s turmoil.

Obstructionist parties stand ready to hinder and undermine any electoral process, while facing limited international pressure. The ongoing divisions internationally over Libya, among global and regional powers, further reduce the likelihood of the international community imposing an agreement for a unified and accepted executive authority in the country to oversee any elections.

But there is an alternative, a better path still rooted in democracy. Expanding local elections and nurturing grassroots governance would dilute the hegemony of central authorities, in both the GNU and around Haftar.

Empowering local communities could minimize conflicts over centrally managed resources, reduce the negative effects of Libya’s rentier economy, chip away at ever-expanding corruption, and lay the foundation for peace and reconciliation. There are still many in Libya yearning to build an inclusive, modern and democratic state, and this would resonate with the aspirations they have held onto through civil war and conflict.

Only then could a vision take shape for a comprehensive settlement, born of consensus and reconciliation—a national dialogue led by Libyans with the support of the international community but devoid of direct external interference. Libya’s political landscape could finally reflect the hopes of a people yearning for a country in tune with the true spirit of democracy.

***

Youssef Mohammad Sawani is Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Tripoli in Libya.

________________

Dr Mustafa Fetouri

The United Nations Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established in 2011 as Libya descended into chaos and lawlessness, starting in February 2011 when hundreds of young Libyans took to the streets demanding reform, jobs, housing and better living conditions.

Before the end of the first week of protests, what could have been ordinary small legitimate demonstrations were, deliberately, turned into an armed rebellion. By 20 February, 2011, the entire country went up in flames and, eight months later, Muammer Gaddafi was murdered, ushering in more chaos and lawlessness.

Throughout the past 13 years, Libya’s reconciliation maze – the top UN goal in the country – has eluded nine envoys, and counting. The list of envoys include some of the wisest and most experienced diplomats, like Ghassan Salame, who resigned from the job due to bad health to the current mediator, Abdoulaye Bathily, who lacks thorough understanding of the country compared to his predecessor. Mr. Bathily is a former Senegalese minister with a significant Francophone background and an aristocratic streak. He has, however, beaten Salame in one measure: to manage and prolong the crisis, instead of solving it—something the UN is very good at.

Last 18 December, just days before Libya’s 72 Independence anniversary, Mr. Bathily told the UNSC that he had been working day and night since taking over – in September 2022 – to get Libyan protagonists to come together and “be nice to each other”, as he once remarked when he first arrived in Tripoli in March 2022, supposedly to save Libya.

However, since he took over the UN mission, the gap between the disagreeable Libyan parties has widened, while they have grown less nice to each other. Mr. Bathily found consolation in telling his audience, the UNSC, that there is a little dim light at the end of the tunnel. He said that Libya, for the first time, “has” the necessary laws for “elections” – a highly contentious issue among different parties vying for power. He told the Gaza-preoccupied Council that the country’s election commission finds the newly passed election laws “technically implementable” and technically, also, the commission is ready to organise both presidential and legislative ballots. However, the UN envoy did not say when the elusive elections could take place because, deep down, he knows it is unlikely to happen in 2024.

A few sentences down his sombre speech, Mr. Bathily appeared unsure if the dim flicker of light he saw earlier was still blinking at the end of tunnel or had completely gone out. He reiterated that his new idea, which he proposed last November as a plan to fix Libya, is the way to go. This idea calls for the meeting of the five “institutional stake holders”, as he called them, to agree on the way forward. The five “institutions” which the UN envoy believes are capable of sorting out the mess are: the Parliament and the Libyan National Army, led by Khalifa Haftar from Eastern Libya and, sitting opposite them, from Western region are: the overly corrupt, yet UN recognised Government of National Unity, the Higher Council of State and the paralysed Presidential Council.

While Mr. Bathily refrained from admitting that his idea is unlikely to see the light of day, he seemed to be telling the UNSC that the plan could work, where everything else has failed to deliver elections in a country where everyone wants voting, except his “five institutional stakeholders”. He said that he has already invited the “key” stakeholders and that none of them have rejected the proposed meeting, but all of them made their participation conditional on issues that make the entire initiative dead, even if he did not yet pronounce it.

The man appears to be confused, to say the least. In early March, when he first arrived at UNSMIL headquarter in Palm City west of Tripoli, he was clearer and appeared a little more decisive. He told all Libyan power-hungry and corrupt “key institutions” – the Parliament and its rival Higher Council of State, in this particular instance, that if they did not agree on elections laws by June 2023, he would convene a parallel dialogue group that includes all Libyan players to draft and enact elections laws. He called the proposed group as the High Level Steering Committee.

Come October, both houses failed to produce the required documents. The final documents of the two elections laws – for presidential and another for legislative elections, respectively – were full of shortcomings, according to Mr. Bathily himself. In November, he commented that both laws, drafted jointly by both houses, were “[un]implementable” at which moment, his High Level Steering Committee should have taken over the process of law drafting, but that never happened.

By late summer of 2023, the entire idea of the Committee lost momentum and Mr. Bathily himself allowed it, discreetly, to join other shelved UN envoys’ initiatives. A while later, he came back with another more disagreeable idea – the initiative of the “key institutional” stakeholders – to quote his own description.

By the time he briefed the UNSC last December, many were already convinced that he had moved to the stage of “managing” the Libyan mess, instead of ending it.Mr. Bathily has already been at the helm of UNSMIL for more than 13 months; the average time each former envoy has spent on the job. Many Libya observers believe that, at this stage, Mr. Bathily is dabbling with the extra time, during which no new initiatives will get drafted, let alone debated. And the outcome? Nothing of substance is likely to happen about important issues like elections, unification of state institutions and reconciliation.

The experience of the UN in Libya confirms one thing: the world body’s old reputation of being a clumsy manager of crises but definitely not a problem solver in any way – examples of the UN’s historical deficiencies are littering the world political stage, from Somali to Bosnia-Herzegovina all the way to North Korea and Ukraine, in between.

However the UN’s return to Libya, this time to pull it out of the UN-helped mess, is no surprise to many, including some Libyan politicians who usually agree with what the organisation proposes, only to reject it, once they get into the details.

The repeated failures of the UN offer politicians enough ammunition to shoot at the UN, blaming it for almost everything, after they finish blaming each other. But, overall, this kind of status quo serves them better and they love to see it prolonged for ever, since it preserves their privileges, including high pay and a comfortable life compared to the average Libyan.

For the UN to be back trying to fix Libya, 72 years later, might be a good thing, if only the organisation is prepared to effectively lead – which is not the case, unfortunately.

______________

Mary Fitzgerald

Trabelsi, the son of a prominent Derna family, loved his hometown so much he told friends he could never leave it. Derna occupies a singular place in the Libyan imagination. Several families there trace their lineage to Muslims who fled Spain during the Inquisition. Locals often cite this Andalusian heritage to explain the city’s historical reputation as a hub of cultural diversity. Several Libyan writers, poets and artists have Dernawi roots.

Some refer to it as “the city of poets.” During the Italian colonial period, Derna and the nearby Green Mountains proved a key locus of resistance. Derna was long renowned for its lush gardens and waterfalls, and for producing the best fruits in Libya. Trabelsi grew up steeped in this history because his own family, which included religious scholars, theater pioneers, intellectuals and writers, was entwined in it. He was named after his grandfather, known in Derna as Sheikh Mustafa al-Trabelsi, who wrote a seminal book about the founding of the city.

Born in the late 1970s, Trabelsi’s life was to coincide with some of the most turbulent chapters in Derna’s modern history. From the early years of his rule, Gadhafi made clear his dislike of the eastern city. The more he neglected Derna, the more dissent grew in its narrow streets. As the years went by, opposition to the regime became religiously tinged. Islamist groups gained a firm foothold. By the time Trabelsi was in his teens, everyone in Derna knew that scores of locals had gone to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Many returned to challenge the Gadhafi regime, joining jihadist outfits formed by other Afghanistan veterans, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG).

One prominent member of the now-defunct LIFG from Derna, who is four years older than Trabelsi, recalls joining the group at the age of 18. “I dreamt of getting rid of the regime. At the beginning of the 1990s some of the mujahideen started coming back from Afghanistan and spreading jihadi ideology in Derna. I believed that Gadhafi could not be toppled unless by force. This ideology made sense to young men like me.”

When Gadhafi brutally quashed an LIFG insurgency in eastern Libya in the mid-to-late 1990s, Derna and its hinterland bore the brunt of his retaliation. The city became even more run-down and forlorn. Unemployment soared. Life there grew more difficult. Its vibrant cultural past was now little more than a memory invoked by its poets, including, later on, Trabelsi. In one of his best-known poems, written in 2006, Derna is portrayed as a beautiful child fated to suffer great injustices and misfortunes. “You could understand Derna through Mustafa and his writing,” recalls Boubida.

As the young Trabelsi sought solace in poetry, many of his peers sought escape and meaning by joining the insurgency in post-invasion Iraq. The scale of this became apparent in 2007, when U.S. forces seized a stash of recruitment files from an al Qaeda safe house in the Iraqi city of Sinjar.

The documents indicated that a proportionally higher percentage of Libyans fought in Iraq than nationals from other countries in the region. They also showed that more than 60% of the Libyan recruits had listed their home city as Derna. One was a distant relative of Trabelsi. “He was in his 20s, just like us,” recalls a friend of Trabelsi. “We tried to persuade him against it. We told him that Iraq was a serious war involving major powers and that he would not be able to change anything there.”

In 2008, Chris Stevens, an American diplomat posted in Tripoli, wrote a memo analyzing Derna’s jihadist subculture following a rare visit to the city. “Frustration at the inability of eastern Libyans to effectively challenge [Gadhafi’s] regime, together with a concerted ideological campaign by returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts, have played important roles in Derna’s development as a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq,” he wrote. “Other factors include a dearth of social outlets for young people, local pride in Derna’s history as a locus of fierce opposition to occupation, economic disenfranchisement among the town’s young men.”

Four years later, Stevens, then U.S. ambassador to Libya, was killed when the U.S. diplomatic compound in which he was staying in Benghazi was attacked by militants, among them jihadists from Derna.

Like many Libyans, Trabelsi was deeply religious but had no truck with Islamists. “He was skeptical of anyone who raised Islam as a political slogan,” explains one friend, adding that his faith was informed by the traditional variants of Sufism long popular in eastern Libya. Trabelsi not only abhorred the extremist militias that grew powerful in Derna after 2011, but he also despised the Muslim Brotherhood and frequently posted criticisms of the group on Facebook, blaming it for many of Libya’s post-Gadhafi travails.

In 2013, Trabelsi and Boubida worked together at a radio station in Derna. They loved introducing listeners to new music and often wrote songs together for local performers. One day, Sufian bin Qumu, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee who founded the Derna chapter of Ansar al-Sharia, designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. in 2014, visited the station. “He came with several men who were all heavily armed,” recalls Boubida. “He told us we could not play music on the radio or discuss anything that was against Islam.” Days later, an explosion at the station caused significant damage.

That was not Trabelsi’s only brush with the militants who then dominated his hometown. In May 2014, his father Abdulaziz al-Trabelsi, well known as the head of Derna’s court of appeal, was wounded when gunmen attempted to assassinate him as he walked to the mosque for evening prayer. Two years earlier, he had announced local courts were suspending their work due to poor security. Many judges, lawyers and other legal personnel in eastern Libya were targeted in what many believed was a deliberate campaign to bring the judicial system to its knees.

The intimacy of Derna meant that Trabelsi knew several men who fell into extremism, aside from his relative who fought in Iraq. Several of his neighbors had spent time in Afghanistan. Friends recall that he openly challenged younger neighbors who joined the Islamic State and other extremist militias. “‘This is not Islam,’ he would tell them,” one says. “They threatened him in response.”

In August 2016, after the Islamic State had been driven from Derna, Trabelsi was abducted by masked gunmen. They tortured him (“They beat him so hard with plastic pipes that his back was striped when we saw him later,” recalls a friend) and subjected him to mock executions. They ordered him to stop posting on Facebook. “Kidnapped and tortured for speaking the truth,” wrote Salem Owkaly, another prominent writer from Derna, on Facebook. “This is the first time that a writer, artist or poet has been kidnapped from the city of Derna despite four decades of tyrannical dictatorial rule, despite the hatred of this city by the previous regime.”

In a Facebook post in October 2018, Trabelsi recounted that a friend’s child had asked him if there was a public library in Derna (he said he was embarrassed to tell the youngster there was not), and they followed up with another question asking why the city was associated with terrorism. Trabelsi went on to bemoan the loss of what he calls Derna’s “tolerant past” when its places of worship included a church and synagogue as well as mosques, and there were libraries and theaters. He called for the provision of job opportunities, leisure and cultural facilities, and “moderate” religious discourse to immunize the younger generation against militancy.

Four months earlier, Haftar had declared victory in his battle to take Derna, even though fighting would continue in pockets of the old medina until early 2019.

Trabelsi’s animus toward Islamists of all hues meant that, unlike others in Derna, he was not staunchly opposed to Haftar’s operations. But, like many in eastern Libya, he became dismayed with the version of military rule Haftar and his sons sought to impose, even if the routing of extremists from Derna allowed artists and writers like Trabelsi to reclaim their place in the city.

He became deputy manager at the reopened House of Culture, housed in an Italian-built former church, and was happy when it drew crowds for summer readings in the handsomely restored courtyard. He spent hours holding court with friends at Najma, a humble cafe where local intellectuals sipped Turkish coffee alongside Egyptian laborers. Next to it was Derna’s landmark Sahaba mosque, where Trabelsi liked to pray. He became involved in local sporting clubs and began writing a postgraduate thesis on a famous Dernawi poet.

Life was easier compared to the years when extremists held sway in Derna, but Trabelsi had fresh worries. Wishing to see reconciliation after years of civil conflict, he signed open letters encouraging dialogue. “The price was very high — the loss of lives and buildings, and thousands of families displaced,” he observed in one Facebook post. “There is no hope in revenge, no benefit in displacement or throwing accusations.” He wrote about his concerns regarding the Madkhalis, ultraconservative Salafists who form a key component of Haftar’s forces and now control most mosques in eastern Libya.

He also fretted over another byproduct of the new dispensation in Derna: the emergence of a tribalist mindset that rekindled old animosities between city residents of diverse origins and tribes that consider themselves Indigenous to the city’s hinterland. He grumbled on Facebook about being told “to go back to where you come from” — a reference to his surname, which relates to the Libyan capital, Tripoli — and retorted that his family had lived in Derna for centuries.

Trabelsi’s biggest frustration, however, was one he shared with millions of other Libyans: corruption. “He had two enemies, extremism and corruption,” recalls a friend. Whether at the local level — before the floods, Derna’s municipal council was accused of embezzling millions of dinars allocated for postwar reconstruction — or nationally, he saw endemic graft as the main obstacle holding Libya back. He frequently voiced his exasperation on Facebook. “Who will save the Libyan people from themselves?!” he wondered in late 2020.

In February 2023, on the anniversary of the 2011 uprising, he struck a bitter note: “No one thanks the revolution except those who won from it.” In early September, little over a week before Storm Daniel, he wrote: “Come and walk in the streets of [Derna] to see corruption walking cheerfully, with all pride and arrogance, striking … in the eyes of those who open their lips with a word.” Days later, he posted a photograph of a collapsed mountain road outside Derna and a report on the emergency meeting at the House of Culture.

“To whom do we cry out about the catastrophe that engineers and specialists are sure will happen? The disaster that will befall the valley and end everything … after which our cries will be of no use.”

Today the Derna Trabelsi knew and loved is no more. Floodwaters leveled the House of Culture and destroyed the Najma cafe. The Sahaba mosque still stands, however, and no one was surprised that it was there that hundreds of furious Dernawis gathered within days of Storm Daniel demanding answers and accountability. Several protesters were detained — a clear message that no further demonstrations would be tolerated.

Trabelsi’s poem about the rain, as translated by the Libyan poet Khaled Mattawa, traveled across the world after it was picked up by international media. Outside Libya, many saw in his lines a climate emergency parable. For Libyans, the poem — and the story of Trabelsi’s life and death — was a damning indictment of their political elite. Several Libyan organizations have called for an independent, international investigation into the floods, questioning the failure of authorities to maintain aging infrastructure, including the two dams that burst.

In December, Human Rights Watch urged the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to initiate an inquiry. Libyans continue to share Trabelsi’s writing, marveling at how he appeared to foretell the tragedy that would befall his hometown. “We have lost Mustafa,” says his friend Habil, once one of the regulars at the Najma cafe. “But he lives on in his poetry.”

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Mary Fitzgerald has reported on and researched Libya since February 2011 and lived there in 2014

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Mustafa Fetouri

Last February marked 13 years since Libya was, literally, handed back to the United Nations by the U.N. itself. Many in Libya, particularly the younger generations, see the U.N.’s role to have evolved to that of a manager who has little to offer in terms of solutions, focusing, instead, on maintaining the status quo.

The U.N.’s relationship to Libya goes back to the establishment of the country as we know it today. The winners of World War II divided the colonies of the defeated countries among themselves, one of which was Libya. To settle their disagreements about the fate of this former Italian colony, the big powers decided to hand it over to the recently established U.N., which in turn led Libya to independence. 

Decades later, the U.N. once again assumed a key role in Libya’s fate. In February 2011 young Libyans took to the streets, demanding reform, better living conditions and jobs. Expectations were sky high that once the Qaddafi regime was overthrown, Libya would become paradise on the southern bank of the Mediterranean or the Dubai of North Africa. Actually, “we want Libya to be like Dubai” was the secret catch phrase spreading like wild fire across social media platforms as a call to join what was called “the 17 February Revolution”—the Libyan version of the Arab Spring. 

The role of the U.N. was intended to be limited in scope. However, it has mushroomed to touch almost every aspect of life.

By October 2011 and with helping “humanitarian” hands from NATO and others, including the United Arab Emirates (which many Libyans simply call Dubai), Col. Muammar Qaddafi was toppled and brutally murdered, and a new Libya, or so it was hoped, slowly emerged. Jubilant Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, one of the top humanitarian “helping” hands, laughingly commented after hearing the news of Qaddafi’s death: “we came, we saw, he died.”

WHERE IS THE LIBYA PARADISE TODAY?

Salem, a recent university graduate who is jobless, told the Washington Report that what Libyans did not realize in 2011 was that “indeed Qaddafi was gone but apparently he took the country with him.”

Today hundreds of thousands of young people, like Salem, are unemployed despite the success of The Revolution, which held promise of a leadership role for young people. 

According to the U.N., Libya has a population of around 7 million people; 1.1 million of them are between the ages of 15 and 24 years, and around 51.4 percent of individuals in that age group are unemployed.The median age in Libya is 26.8 years.

The official overall unemployment rate in the country is 19.6 percent—other sources claim it is higher than 21 percent—and it is expected to increase in the next two years.

Job creation in the country is on the increase but it is misleading because 85 percent of those who work are in the public sector. According to Libya’s finance ministry, some 2.1 million people work for the government, and their annual salaries are estimated to be 53.8 percent of the country’s budget. In neighboring Tunisia, for example, only 347,000 work in the public sector serving over 12 million people. 

Oil provides 97 percent of Libya’s revenue, but it is neither a stable commodity nor secure; it is vulnerable to closures by armed militias and tribesmen with grievances. Earlier this year, angry tribesmen blockaded the Sharara oil field in the south, one of the biggest with production capacity of 300,000 barrels/day. The standoff lasted for weeks. 

RECRUITING POOL FOR MILITIAS

Many young people faced with the prospect of unemployment join the armed militias. Three reasons drove Hussein into one such militia: having a job, top pay and social prestige that come with having a gun and being feared by peers. Hussein (who does not want his family name published for security reasons) said he decided to leave the militia because “I found myself fighting for unworthy causes.” Instead he chose to sell carpets in his uncle’s shop south of Tripoli. He left his militia during a fight between two rival militias which erupted in Tripoli in August 2023. Since 2011 successive governments have also, indirectly, encouraged people like Hussein to join armed groups by designating some groups as legitimate governmental law enforcement bodies.     

POLITICAL BLIND SPOT

Young Libyans have minimal participation in their country’s affairs because youth, in general, are looked upon as lacking leadership qualities and experience. Although civil organizations have mushroomed over the last decade, they are still relatively young, lack coherent strategies and are starved for funding; this forces them to accept foreign donations, risking contravening national laws that prohibit foreign funding. This, and more, make most civil organizations claiming to represent certain youth sections irrelevant, and they generally do not have a say in the country’s major issues like the transition to democracy and gender equality. Apart from the occasional events organized by the U.N. mission, young Libyans hardly appear on the national screen. Huge numbers of them find solace in venting their anger and frustration through social media; young people make up 58 percent of all users and most have more than one Facebook account. 

Most political parties fail to present any new national manifestos beyond the prevailing political polarization that tends to classify people as either “for or against the February 17 revolution,” says a social science researcher who wished to remain anonymous. This kind of “over polarized political atmosphere” denies young people the right to think freely and be creative in expressing their vision for the future. 

BRAIN DRAIN

Libya is experiencing its worst brain drain in the last 30 years. Migration out of the country is rising among highly qualified young people, including entrepreneurs, physicians and engineers. Many had already been living abroad before the revolution because of “the oppressive nature” of the Qaddafi regime. Thirteen years after his death, they still do not want to return simply because “the country now is more oppressive and risky than it used to be,” commented a Dubai-based Libyan surgeon. 

Some studies say that 8.9 percent  of all Libyan physicians are working in the U.S., UK, Canada and the Gulf states. This amounts to a “brain drain at the time when the country needs everyone” said Tripoli-based human resources expert Ali Zeinaddin.

FUTURE OUTLOOK

The country is still politically divided with two competing governments. Hopes are slim for elections this year, the reunification of government institutions and tackling youth issues. The U.N.’s mission in Libya of “stabilizing the country” seems aspirational after 13 years of work. At the same time the country’s younger generation is lost and has little hope for a better future anytime soon.

It appears the world body was more successful in helping Libya gain independence 72 years ago than it has been in trying to help it find stability since 2011.

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Mustafa Fetouri is a Libyan academic and freelance journalist. He received the EU’s Freedom of the Press prize. He has written extensively for various media outlets on Libyan and MENA issues. He has published three books in Arabic.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

In the ever-shifting sands of Libyan politics, the mirage of stability remains just that: a mirage. The country’s political and security maladies, deeply ingrained and perpetuated by a confluence of internal power struggles and external interventions, have fostered an environment in which a permanent deadlock seems the most likely outcome.

The promise of the Arab Spring has wilted under the scorching sun of reality and Libya, once hopeful for a democratic bloom, now appears resigned to a barren status quo, even as oil continues to flow and open warfare has subsided.

The current political landscape and security dynamics in the country are a far cry from the aspirations that toppled a decades-old regime. Since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has oscillated between periods of tentative peace and outright conflict, with the hoped-for democratic transformation remaining elusive.

It is therefore unsurprising that Libya’s post-2011 legacy is a museum for the ruins of grand ambitions and shattered dreams, as the North African country seems to be slowly settling into a permanent stalemate that will only accelerate its total collapse, with ordinary citizens standing to lose the most.
The response of the international community, characterized by inconsistent policies and competing interests among foreign powers, has done little to help resolve the stalemate.

External actors have consistently resisted the coordination of UN-led stabilization efforts, in favor of prioritizing their own geopolitical and economic interests over Libyan sovereignty and democratic aspirations.

Persisting with such zero-sum games while Libyan factions become further entrenched within their respective domains allows them to continue operating with a level of autonomy that undermines any national authority, thereby cementing a corrosive deadlock.

This interplay of diametrically opposed interests and groups, coupled with the relative inaction of the global community, has led to the rise and proliferation of more-sophisticated “hybrid actors.” These entities, which blend the characteristics of non-state armed groups with those of conventional state institutions, now enjoy a near-permanent entrenchment within the sociopolitical fabric of Libya, often exerting considerable influence over resource-rich territories and key infrastructure.

The nation’s vast oil reserves have become a primary target for these groups as they seek to leverage economic power in pursuit of their self-interested objectives. The battle for control over oil has not only fueled conflict but also allowed armed groups to operate as quasi-state entities, collecting revenues and providing governance in the absence of a unifying national authority.

In the absence of a significant recalibration of national and international priorities toward a process of reconciliation and rebuilding, the rise of local strongmen has accelerated the fragmentation of governance in Libya, establishing the contours of a state frozen in transition.

Worryingly, a new political economy is slowly developing under a new ruling elite and growing political caste that is not motivated in any way whatsoever to relinquish control, given the wealth and prestige that comes with their positions. This dynamic is perpetuated by the lack of a robust international mechanism to incentivize political transition and enforce accountability.

Naturally, this situation places a burden on a traumatized populace that is weary of promises of change and skeptical of the intentions of the ascending political elite. The failure to hold credible elections, and the opaque management of the country’s wealth, have eroded public trust. Repeated delays and the continuing absence of a democratic mandate have left Libyans questioning the legitimacy of their leaders and the likelihood of any meaningful reform.

Beyond this enduring deadlock enforced by a disinterested and distracted global community, ordinary Libyans face daily hardships, including infrastructure decay, service shortages and a lack of economic opportunities, which exacerbate public discontent.

The protracted stalemate has not only stunted the country’s economic growth but turned Libya into a breeding ground for instability that threatens to spill over its borders, potentially destabilizing the entire North African and Mediterranean region.

For instance, Libya’s political woes and security failures have had near-immediate effects on neighboring countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, both of which have experienced fluctuating security concerns directly tied to the deteriorating situation in Libya.

Socially, the sense of fragmentation is palpable as tribal and factional tensions are exacerbated. Such divisions deepen existing cleavages in society, with the result that the task of building a cohesive national identity is ever-more elusive.

The psychological toll is heavy as well, with the specter of violence and instability casting a long shadow over the population. Mental health issues, including trauma and a pervasive sense of despair, are on the rise, with few resources available for support or healing.

The effects of the deadlock are perhaps most tragically felt by Libya’s youth, who face a future in which education and employment opportunities are scarce. This lack of prospects will create successive “lost generations” that are vulnerable to radicalization or the perils of illegal migration, as evidenced by the harrowing tales of young Libyans who embark on treacherous journeys across the Mediterranean in search of a better life.

Furthermore, Libya’s international standing is at risk. The longer the stalemate persists, the more isolated the country becomes diplomatically, which complicates the process of accessing international aid and support. This isolation only serves to compound the country’s troubles.

Amid the political and social turmoil, environmental concerns have fallen by the wayside, with the most immediate casualty of this being the tragedies in Derna last September, where nearly 5,000 people perished in floods and thousands were displaced.

With attention fixated on survival and conflict, pressing issues connected to an intensifying climate crisis, ranging from desertification to water management issues, are neglected, leading to long-term environmental degradation with consequences that might endure far beyond the resolution of any political troubles.

Collectively, these effects paint a grim picture of a nation in which the status quo is one of systemic dysfunction and despair. The consequences of a permanent deadlock in Libya carry the potential to reverberate through generations, necessitating urgent and focused efforts to break the cycle and pave the way to a more hopeful future.

While external influences have intermittently affected the conflict in Libya, the resolution will be fundamentally rooted in domestic action. Protests last year by the youth of the country underscored the kind of deep-seated domestic grievances and erosion of the social contract that will be critical to the rise of any movement to find lasting peace and restore governance.

Although the global community acknowledges that domestic recognition is vital for the legitimacy of governance, and that lack of coherence in international positions can hinder inclusive conflict mediation, inclusivity remains incomplete and susceptible to manipulation by Libyan elites resistant to change.

To escape the entrenchment of stalemate and public disillusionment, a robust international strategy that offers incentives and imposes sanctions is essential, alongside the establishment of legitimate state institutions through a government elected by, and accountable to, the Libyan people.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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Stephanie T. Williams

There have been few shifts in the landscape of Libya’s numerous hybrid armed groups in the past year. In the aftermath of the devastation wreaked by Storm Daniel, which in September 2023 took the lives of more than 5,000 with over 8,000 still missing, mostly in Derna, there was a glimmer of hope, since extinguished, that Libya’s armed factions would come together for the sake of the country.

Although the October 2020 cease-fire continues to hold broadly, and its authors — the members of the Joint Military Commission — continue to meet, some of the agreement’s demands have yet to be fulfilled, notably the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries. A large-scale return to violence, such as witnessed between 2019-2020, is probably not in the cards, due in part to an assumed tacit arrangement between Russia and Turkey.

The Haftars and Libya’s east

As we survey the Libyan armed group terrain from east to west, there has been increasing focus on eastern Libya and the future of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) — an amalgamation of militias sometimes also referred to as the Libyan National Army — as the group’s founder and current leader, the octogenarian General Khalifa Haftar, moves inexorably toward the exit. Haftar’s sons are jockeying for positions to succeed him, while their father continues to be courted by an astonishing array of senior international civilian, military, and intelligence officials.

In the succession sweepstakes, the consensus view is that Haftar’s military heir apparent, Saddam Haftar, who was recently promoted to the rank of two-star general along with his brother Khaled, will assume control of the LAAF.

According to the United Nations Panel of Experts Report published in September 2023, which covered the period from April 2022 to July 2023: “The effective control exercised by the Haftars, in particular Haftar’s youngest son, brigadier Saddam Haftar, over key LAAF units, financial institutions and political bodies reached unprecedented levels during the reporting period. The Haftar family took control of most social and economic life in eastern Libya.” There are also indications that Saddam is increasingly involved in human smuggling activities.

While Haftar père’s departure may cause some perturbations in eastern Libya, it is equally the case that the passing of the torch to the next generation could be relatively smooth. The Haftars have been efficient in suppressing and even preempting dissent, as witnessed most recently in the apparent violent dispatch of Mahdi Al-Barghathi, a one-time LAAF senior officer who, over Haftar’s objections, served as the defense minister in the U.N.-recognized government in Tripoli from 2016-2018.

After an absence of some years, Barghathi returned to his hometown of Benghazi in October 2023 and, according to the U.N. mission, appears to have perished along with many other partisans after, as reported in the press, being captured by the LAAF’s Tariq Bin Zayid Brigade (controlled by Saddam Haftar). Moreover, Egypt has a vested interest in ensuring LAAF continuity and control in eastern Libya, an area which it views as its strategic depth.

Militias and sporadic violence in Libya’s west

By contrast, the hybrid armed group environment in western Libya remains highly fragmented. In Tripoli, three major groups dominate: the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DACOT, also known as the Special Deterrence Force or Rada), the so-called Stability Support Authority (SSA), and the 444 Brigade.

In an all-too-familiar scene in the country’s capital over the last decade, some 55 people were killed and nearly 150 wounded in clashes between DACOT and the 444 Brigade in August of last year, following DACOT’s detention of 444’s powerful commander, Mahmoud Hamza. The conflict was settled relatively quickly, Hamza was released, and the groups went about business as usual. Such turf wars were also unfortunately common during my tenure with the United Nations in Libya between 2018-2022.

Those who have paid the ultimate price in terms of lives and damage to infrastructure are Tripoli’s civilian residents. The Tripoli armed groups continue to distinguish themselves through their predation on what remains of the country’s institutions. Through ill-considered presidential decrees, they have acquired arrest, surveillance, and detention authorities which they routinely employ to coerce and imprison their compatriots and prevent accountability.

Elsewhere in western Libya, the armed group portrait remains highly varied and dependent on local conditions. In many cases, these groups draw salaries from the (non-)state while also extracting rent through any number of illicit activities, including the migrant smuggling business, with all of its attendant horrors.

Civil society and accountability under further threat

Of special concern throughout Libya is the crackdown on freedoms by elements of the LAAF and western hybrid armed groups. The U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, in its March 2023 report, sounded the tocsin over “[t]he rapid, deep and ongoing absorption of armed groups and their leadership into State-affiliated structures and institutions, including the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, and the spread of Salafist-leaning conservative ideologies … Persons were detained for … criticism of the State and affiliated actors, and expression of divergent political, religious and social views and norms, including their opposition to patriarchy and sexism.

Moreover, in the view of the Mission, the practice of conservative Salafist-leaning ideologies compounded the shrinking of civic space.” This regression harkens back to the days of Muammar Gaddafi when the regime exercised almost complete control over the population to the extent that there was no freedom of association and the practice of informing on others had become deeply entrenched in the society.

In this otherwise bleak outlook, one can take some solace from the fact that Libya, since the signing of the U.N.-brokered ceasefire in October 2020, has not witnessed the resumption of the type of large-scale violence that occurred in the country’s second civil war between April 2019 and June 2020 following Haftar’s attack on the U.N.-recognized government in Tripoli.

Much credit goes to the Libyan parties to the cease-fire and the U.N. mission for tending to the agreement. But the fragile peace has also been preserved through understandings reached between Russia and Turkey, who in mid-2020 achieved a modus vivendi that allowed for LAAF troops to withdraw to the center of the country and Wagner mercenaries to pull out unharmed from areas in western Libya they had occupied in support of Haftar’s offensive.

In exchange for keeping the peace, both countries have been able to use their Libyan proxies to deepen and extend their footprints through privileged access to Libyan bases and the maintenance of official forces and mercenaries.

The Turks have been more transparent about their arrangements with the Libyan authorities; they have returned to a set of military and maritime agreements signed with the previous U.N.-recognized government in the fall of 2019.

The Turkish parliament recently approved a memorandum of cooperation that would extend the Turkish presence in western Libya for another two years. During a mid-December 2023 press conference, Turkish Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler stated that Ankara had trained 15,000 Libyan military personnel since 2020.

Güler neither revealed the details of the training nor indicated what if any vetting had been conducted. The Turks have been most closely associated with the 444 Brigade, the Tripoli militia involved in last summer’s violence in the capital. Ankara also maintains a permanent presence in western Libya at al-Watiya airbase near Zintan and the naval base in Misrata.

For their part, the Russians have stepped up engagement with the LAAF, having dispatched Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov to eastern Libya several times since August 2023. Haftar was accorded head of state treatment during a September 2023 visit to Moscow where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. There is much speculation but few details on Russia’s goals.

Following Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s sudden demise in August 2023, they could be as limited as rebranding the Libya-based former Wagner mercenaries under more formal Russian Ministry of Defense control to far more expansive ambitions, such as seeking official basing arrangements at the eastern ports of Tobruk or Ras Lanuf. Such deals would allow Moscow to augment its naval presence in the Mediterranean and further threaten Europe’s security.

Thus, amid the tension among the major Libyan parties and despite the country’s occasional violent eruptions, a degree of harmony has ironically been reached between Russia and Turkey, the two major external parties to Libya’s tragedy. Such external concord suggests that in the short term, little will change on the ground, including the disposition of the country’s hybrid armed groups and the continued absence of the state’s monopoly over the use of force.

That the status quo conveniently leaves the predatory ruling class and its associated armed groups in place does not bode well for cultivating a few green shoots of democracy in Libya, especially given the frailty of the public sphere, the absence of accountable institutions, the splintering of personal freedoms, and the suffocation of civil society.

The United States can help address this stasis by pursuing the soft power tools provided in the Global Fragility Act’s Libya program, including its important focus on the marginalized south, and by employing Global Magnitsky Sanctions against those who abuse human rights and are implicated in corruption.

Recognizing that full-scale Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) awaits a comprehensive political settlement, the United States should nevertheless continue to support the modest pre-DDR measures outlined by the United Nations and the Joint Military Commission, including protection of the vital principle of civilian control over the military.

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Stephanie T. Williams – Nonresident Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy.

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