Author - ab_mnbr

Elizabeth Hagedorn

The diplomatic firestorm unfolding in Libya comes as the United States is pushing the North African country to hold long-awaited nationwide elections.

At first glance, war-ravaged and politically fractured Libya is an unlikely candidate for normalizing relations with Israel’s far-right government. For starters, it’s unclear whether the unelected, embattled Tripoli-based government even has the authority to enter into such an agreement with Israel. 

The public disclosure of Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen’s meeting in Rome last week with Najla el-Mangoush quickly set off protests across Libya, where public support for Israel normalization polls in the single digits and establishing relations with the Jewish state remains a criminal act under a 1957 law.  

The uproar threatens the relative calm Libya is now enjoying 12 years after a NATO-backed uprising toppled longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi. Two rival governments in the east and west, each supported by their own set of foreign backers and armed militias, are now jostling for control of the oil-rich country of 7 million people. Repeated UN-led attempts to hold elections have failed. 

On Monday, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, the appointed head of the UN-supported Government of National Unity in the Libyan capital, said he suspended Mangoush after Cohen spilled the beans on their meeting. The Libyan Foreign Ministry claimed the meeting was a chance encounter, and Mangoush has since fled to Turkey out of concern for her safety. 

“The political elites in Libya did scapegoat her, insofar as they were all aware that these meetings were happening,” said Alissa Pavia, the associate director of the Atlantic Council’s North Africa program. “These meetings have been happening for the past six to eight months.”

“All of a sudden now Dbeibah’s going public saying he knew nothing about this. … These are your typical two-faced Libyan elites, trying to play both cards,” Pavia said. 

Experts say many of the same Libyan politicians who threw Mangoush under the bus for the Cohen meeting have themselves had contact with Israelis. As Ben Caspit reports, “Mossad and other security entities have maintained discreet, sensitive contacts with various Libyan figures for many years.” 

In November 2021, Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Saddam Hifter, the son of eastern strongman Khalifa Hifter, landed in a private jet at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport to discuss establishing diplomatic ties in exchange for Israeli military assistance. 

In January 2022, Libyan and Saudi media outlets reported that Dbeibah met with Mossad chief David Barnea in Jordan to discuss normalization and security cooperation. Dbeibah’s office denied the reports. 

A number of other Libyan officials, including the former Hifter-aligned eastern Foreign Minister Abdul Hadi Al-Hweij, have been quoted as expressing some level of support for eventual relations with Israel. 

Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Libyan official told Al-Monitor the United States has long encouraged communication channels between the two countries on security and intelligence matters. 

The Associated Press reports that CIA Director Bill Burns discussed normalizing ties with Israel during a meeting with Dbeibah in January. The Libyan official also told Al-Monitor that Burns raised the issue with Dbeibah while in Tripoli. 

The Biden administration is eager to expand on its predecessor’s so-called Abraham Accords, which in 2020 established diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco.  

But bringing Libya into the Trump-era accords is not on the administration’s list of priorities for the war-torn country, where the more pressing US interests include expelling Russia’s Wagner mercenary group and containing the threat of Islamist militant groups.

Axios reports that US officials were nonetheless angered by Cohen’s public disclosure of the Mangoush meeting, concerned it could jeopardize normalization with other Arab countries who may fear they can no longer trust Israel to conduct diplomacy discreetly.   

The uproar comes as the United Nations is pushing for elections that would unify Libya under a single executive authority. Planned elections in December 2021 were called off at the last minute amid disputes over who was eligible to run. Candidates included Dbeibah, Hifter and Seif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of the ousted dictator who is wanted on war crimes charges. 

Many analysts say Dbeibah, who refused to step down after the elections were postponed, likely pursued Israel ties via Mangoush as a way of gaining legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. But Ben Fishman, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former National Security Council director for North Africa, said Dbeibah may have overestimated the value of such a meeting. 

The Israel debacle is “just another example of how this government, in the eyes of many, has overreached because it was initially just a technocratic or interim government to get to the point of elections,” Fishman added.  

This February, the UN’s special envoy for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, said he would be spearheading a new effort to hold long-awaited parliamentary and presidential elections by the end of 2023. But many Libyans were skeptical that the country’s entrenched political class would meaningfully cooperate on an election proposal that could see them removed from power. 

Libyan politicians, including Hifter, who backs the eastern-based government, and its parliament speaker Aguila Saleh, have since called for the creation of a new interim government to oversee the vote. The former chair of the rival High State Council, Khaled Mishri, also publicly endorsed the idea. But critics are concerned the formation of yet another interim government in Libya would remove the incentive for holding elections.

“Interim has become a word for de facto,” said Anas El Gomati, the founder of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute think tank.  

“As they claim that they want to stand for elections, they clamor at the opportunity to create a joint interim government appointment that on the surface looks like Libya has solved the problems,” El Gomati said. 

US Ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield told the UN Security Council this month that Washington is “open to supporting the formation of a technocratic caretaker government” before elections are held. 

A senior State Department official who spoke on the condition of anonymity told Al-Monitor the United States is not proposing “another kind of open-ended transitional structure,” but rather, a body that would “enable a political technocratic management of the elections process.”

The senior official declined to speculate on who would constitute such a caretaker government, but said it would not be “a recipe for stability in Libya to have a candidate in the election also exercising executive power and administering that elections process.” 

Six months after Bathily unveiled his year-end election plan, a nationwide vote looks as uncertain as ever. Many of the key issues that sunk the 2021 elections remain unresolved, including the eligibility criteria for candidates. Asked about prospects for elections in 2023, the senior official said “courageous decisions by key political factions” would be required to move forward.

***

Elizabeth Hagedorn is Al-Monitor’s State Department correspondent. She previously reported on the region as a freelance journalist in Turkey and Iraq for publications including Middle East Eye, The National and The Guardian.

_________________

David Wood and Mehdi Bchir

Libyans are divided by their experiences since 2011, but a new national reconciliation process provides an opportunity to foster a vision for the future.

“We are not writing the history of yesterday, but the history of tomorrow.”

In the al-Washishi district of Benghazi a burnt-out car stands in memorial to a slain Libyan National Army (LNA) special forces fighter, serving as a city-wide reflection of the country’s 2014-2017 civil war. The car belonged to Salem (Afareet) Al-Naili, whose father was brutally murdered, one of the many victims of terrorist violence in the city. Inspired by the personal loss of his father, Salem threw himself into the fighting in the city’s civil war and was ultimately also assassinated. Salem’s car and those of others killed during the fighting are placed at prominent road crossings as a testament to their personal sacrifice and as a symbol of the city’s resilience — allowing for mourning of loss, but also hope for the future.

For the families displaced from Benghazi and unable to return, often because their sons, brothers or fathers are accused of fighting against the LNA, the car holds a different meaning. It is viewed as a statement that Benghazi is unsafe for them to return to and is no longer their home.

Such examples of local commemoration with multiple meanings repeat throughout the country, reminding people of past suffering and maintaining its social and political divides, which presents a major challenge for national reconciliation efforts in Libya. But for a country that has been divided after decades of dictatorship followed by civil war, reconciliation is a prerequisite for a peace that gives Libyans hope for the future. Political commemoration is an important vehicle for furthering reconciliation — but it must be done right.

Commemoration Fosters New Divides

Libya wahad, or “Libya is united,” was a common phrase heard in social and political gatherings following the 2011 uprising against longtime dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi, providing a sense of optimism that the political transition would be short. History has proved otherwise, with Libyans experiencing over 12 years of political turmoil.

A key but often overlooked cause of this instability is different experiences and memories. The revolution was driven by a sense among some Libyans that they lost out in the Qaddafi period. This includes those in the East who felt they had been marginalized by the Tripoli government; Amazigh and other minority groups held to a lower status than Arabs; conservative Islamic groups, given the state’s political restrictions; and a range of tribes who were less well represented in Qaddafi’s political system.

The revolution prioritized the experiences of these groups. New monuments were created to valorize those that suffered from the Qaddafi regime. National symbols were changed. Some who had been part of the Qaddafi state were banned from participating in politics through the 2013 Political Isolation Law. There was wide communal punishment, including the displacement of whole communities. New values were articulated, moving away from the Qaddafi socialist model.

This process of commemoration through memorials, symbols, treatment and values, created a wave of new grievances that led to a rejection of the political transition, the formation of parallel governments in the East and West, and widespread armed violence as communities took responsibility for protecting their interests. Localized violence led to more suffering and more partisan commemoration.

In the pursuit of justice for past grievances, post-2011 commemoration has driven a wedge between social groups and created distrust in the new state to treat all equally. Instability in Libya will continue until all the country’s peoples feel that their different experiences and memories are reflected in the commemoration established or endorsed by its leaders.

A New Reconciliation Process

A new national reconciliation process provides an opportunity for Libyans to better understand each other and to forge a new future. It is ambitious, attempting to gain agreement to difficult political questions, such as governance arrangements (e.g., should Libya have a new federal arrangement?), distribution of the country’s national resources (e.g., who should control the country’s oil wealth?), and justice for those that has suffered (e.g., what does redress mean in practice?).

There seems to be an unprecedent space for such reconciliation, with significant progress in reintegrating the country’s institutions, divided since 2014. USIP has worked to support cooperation across the country’s police forces and supported a landmark agreement for a national audit body at the end of 2022. In perhaps the most substantial progress toward reunification, the country’s Central Bank announced just this week that it has reunified.

Political agreements are not however sufficient to build prosperous future for all Libyans. The many divisive local commemorations across the country demonstrate that national reconciliation is not just a question of reaching political agreements. It also requires a concerted effort to manage Libyan’s different experiences — their memories of what happened. The risk is that some past injustices are again prioritized as part of transitional justice, especially when some justice demands contradict each other, demonstrating that the new Libya does not value all its citizens equally. How can families displaced from Benghazi receive justice at the same time as the families of those killed by extremist violence?

The Ethics of Political Commemoration

Learning “the ethics of political commemoration” from other countries provides some guidance as to how national reconciliation in Libya can encompass different and competing histories. There are four critical elements to this type of political commemoration.

1. Individual experience

The national reconciliation process should emphasize the individual experiences and injustices faced by Libyans, no matter their political or ideological belief, or the part of the country, tribe, or ethnic group they represent. It should not lead to competition as to who has suffered most and hence has the most “just cause” that is worthy of commemoration.

It is important to focus on the individual experiences of post-Qaddafi Libya, as this is the best way of building Libyans’ empathy for each other — to help transcend the different collective identities that exist across the country. This means giving voice to those that have suffered, as every Libyan should be heard.

Rwanda is widely held as a powerful example of giving direct voice to victims, as a contribution to both justice and reconciliation. In places such as Lebanon, the absence of processes for victims — especially women — to tell their personal testimonies means that the scars of war heal slowly, if at all.

2. Positive stories

Commemoration can often focus on negative experiences of loss and trauma. Such stories, while essential for transitional justice, do not provide a positive vision for the country’s future. So, the process should identify individual stories of how Libyans have helped each other for the good of all.

There are many such examples, from a mother in Ubari who helped stopped inter-tribal violence when her son was killed, to the local government officials who work night and day to maintain their communities’ services. A key part of national reconciliation is to identify and promote these positive stories, so that Libyans are not shackled to destructive histories, and are helped to build optimism for a shared future.

In 2022, a Yemeni mediator, Hadi Jumaan, was recognized for his work in returning the bodies of the dead to their families. His international recognition has been a source of pride in Yemen across all sides of the political divide — a rare point of unity in a divided country.

3. Legitimate authority

It is important that there is legitimate authority to lead national reconciliation. This authority should place unity and the best interest of the public at the forefront. A crucial aspect of this is the capacity to uphold and implement the reached agreements. Libya has demonstrated that without the ability to deliver on agreements (for example, compensation payments), reconciliation efforts are likely to fail, fueling frustration and reigniting conflict.

Libya’s Presidential Council has exhibited strong leadership in establishing the national reconciliation process, but it needs buy-in from a broader set of national leaders to ensure its success. A critical challenge facing the Presidential Council will be to draw in a wider set of credible and representative leaders to provide the process with a sense of public legitimacy — to enhance trust it will not be manipulated for political gain — and to spread the responsibility for delivering on any agreements reached. Wider leadership is especially important when reconciliation processes endorse commemoration.

In Tunisia, a “quartet” of leaders was essential for its 2013-14 national dialogue — encompassing the country’s main labor and business unions, human rights defenders and lawyers. This group had the credibility to mediate a historic constitution for the country.

4. Local ownership

Responsibility should not be restricted to political leaders but should be spread among all Libyans at a local level. The more that national reconciliation happens locally, to deal with the country’s various local conflicts, the more likely that the national process will succeed. This means that the political leaders of national reconciliation, including the Presidential Council, provide guidance, but also space, for local reconciliation without dictating its outcomes.

Local leaders are best placed to understand how reconciliation will succeed locally and are the only ones who can take responsibility for the results. There is a proven history of local leaders in Libya making a difference whether the Tebu-Tuareg reconciliation efforts in Ubari, the Misrata-Tawergha dialogue that created the space for Tawerghans to return home, or between Bani Walid and the towns that led a 2012 military operation against it. Local leaders will also have a stronger sense of what local commemoration will best help with reconciliation.

These are big tasks — to focus on individual experiences, promote positive stories, ensure wide leadership and promote local responsibility — and mistakes will be made along the way. There is however reason to be optimistic, as those organizing national reconciliation are aware of these tasks. In a recent workshop on national reconciliation organized by USIP for the Presidential Council, one participant summed up their ambitions as “we are not writing the history of yesterday, but the history of tomorrow.” Benghazi will be a test case for how national dialogue can have a local impact, especially now, as the destruction of the city’s historic center, damaged by war, is contested. It is a difficult balance to build a new Libya while respecting the past.

***

David Wood is a professor of practice at Seton Hall University’s School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a senior researcher at The Geneva Graduate Institute.

____________________

Ivan Bocharov

The international community’s attention towards the Libyan crisis has diminished in recent times. The situation in Libya has lost its formative role in influencing the relations between the countries in the region. However, the conflict in Libya continues to be a key issue for North Africa.

The prospects of a political settlement in the Libyan conflict remains unclear and the root causes for the twelve-year-long crisis have not been eliminated. Particularly, the country maintains a high level of political and economic fragmentation within the Libyan society. The delayed effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the global food crisis, and the global recession further exacerbate these problems. An additional factor that negatively impacts the situation in Libya is the conflict in Sudan, which broke out in April 2023.

In the near future, Libya will continue to be hotbed for instability in North Africa. Terrorism proves to be one of the most consequential problems of such instability. Libya currently has no unified army or security forces, which cultivates the most appealing atmosphere for new terrorist activities. The occasional confrontations between Tripoli and Tobruk significantly complicates the fight against the terrorism.

Terrorist and extremist groups continue to plague Libya. Terrorists from ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia, and other organizations based in Libya pose a threat to the entire region. The terrorists who were in Libya took advantage of the internal instability in Mali and Burkina Faso, and carried out various destabilizing attacks in these countries.

Tunisia has also faced the problem of foreign militants infiltrating the county, bringing with them weapons into its territory. For example, in March 2016, ISIS fighters trained in Libya invaded Tunisia, and fought with Tunisian security forces for several days.

Additionally, over the past few years, Libya-based terrorists have repeatedly carried out terrorist attacks in Egypt. According to Presidential Spokesman Ambassador Bassam Radi, Egyptian security forces have recently destroyed thousands of cars with terrorists trying to cross the Egypt-Libya border.

Another problem concerns Libyan combatants in neighboring countries. Particularly, a conflict broke out in Mali in 2012, which would later influence the 2019 clashes that took place in Chad, which also involved Libyan militias.

Additionally, Sudanese mercenaries fought on the side of the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar. In 2021, there were 11 thousand mercenaries from Sudan in Libya. This means that there is a possibility that these Sudanese mercenaries will return to their country to take part in the hostilities.

Arms smuggling, cross-border drug trafficking and human trafficking have also negatively impacted the countries neighboring Libya. After the outbreak of the civil war in Libya in 2011, weapons from Libya spread to Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan and other African countries.

In 2023, there were reports of forces linked to Khalifa Haftar that were selling fuel, as well as weapons, ammunition and medicine to paramilitary units of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, who were then fighting against Sudan’s national army.

However, the impact of the situation in Libya on the subregion is not limited to just security issues. The Libyan conflict undermines the dynamics of the North African economies.

In 2021, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia issued a report noting that the Libyan crisis is triggering conflicts in other countries in the continent, affecting the overall development of their economies.

It also noted that the conflict was hampering sustainable development goals, in addition to negatively affecting regional economic integration. Economically speaking, the Libyan conflict has had the greatest impact on Tunisia, Egypt, and Sudan. This is particularly true, given that Libya had strong trade, economic and investment ties with those countries before the war. Algeria’s economy has also been negatively affected by the crisis.

Thus, the Libyan crisis as an important factor contributing to regional instability. Its impact on the sub-region is primarily rooted in the treat of terrorism, as well as the involvement of Libyan combatants in other conflicts in North Africa.

Additionally, illegal arms trade continues; its spread to Libya’s neighboring countries is a factor that affects the security of the entire continent. Furthermore, the Libyan conflict continues to negatively impact the development of the economies of Libya’s neighboring countries.

***
Ivan Bocharov – Program Assistant at the Russian International Affairs Council.

____________________

RIAC

Alex MacDonald

Suspicious death of Putin ally-turned-putschist leaves backing for warlords in Sudan and Libya in doubt.

The sudden and suspicious death of Wagner Group leader and Putin critic Yevgeny Prigozhin in a plane crash on Wednesday has people wondering what the fate of his fighters and networks in Russia, Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa will be.

None more so, perhaps, than Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, the Sudanese paramilitary leader known as Hemeti, or eastern Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, both of whom are high profile associates of the caterer-mercenary.

In Libya, Wagner Group fighters provided support to Haftar, backing him in his failed 2019-2020 assault on Tripoli and currently bedded into key sites like oil installations.

In neighbouring Sudan, Wagner operatives have worked alongside Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group currently engaged in anMEE armed conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Middle East Eye has also previously reported on massacres carried out by Wagner fighters around gold mines in the Central African Republic, while the United States has accused the group of pilfering billions of dollars worth of gold from Sudan – with much of it allegedly making its way to the United Arab Emirates and Russia.

Ashok Swain, head of the Peace and Conflict Research Department at Uppsala University in Sweden, told Middle East Eye that the death of Prigozhin would have a “profound impact” on the Wagner Group’s activities, as well as Russia’s links in North Africa.

“The ongoing civil war between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary group has considerably heightened the complexities surrounding the Wagner Group’s operations. Prigozhin not only represented the group externally, but also played a pivotal role as a negotiator and problem solver,” he said.

“We must now await the appointment of Prigozhin’s successor, who will steer the Wagner Group. The extent to which this new leader garners the support of Putin remains to be seen.”

Wagner and the RSF

The Wagner Group first appeared in Sudan during the rule of longtime autocrat Omar al-Bashir and was heavily involved in protecting important mineral resources, such as gold mines.

Its operatives were later accused of aiding Bashir’s government in trying to suppress pro-democracy demonstrations in 2019, though Bashir was ultimately forced from power.

Since the Sudanese war broke out in April 2023, numerous reports have emerged suggesting Wagner was throwing its weight behind its established ally the RSF, though the latter has repeatedly denied the group’s involvement.

“I think the biggest loser aside from Prigozhin is Hemeti in Sudan,” said Cameron Hudson, a former US diplomat and CIA analyst.

Wagner reportedly provides the RSF with surface-to-air missiles, which have enabled it to counter the aerial power of the SAF, as well as numerous other weapons.

Hudson told MEE that the RSF’s reliance on foreign supply lines to continue prosecuting the conflict in Sudan – which has seen more than 5,000 people killed and millions displaced – meant that a sudden loss of a key ally could prove disastrous.

“Will we see the RSF as aggressive as in the last few weeks? Will we see them even trying to hold their positions in Khartoum? They have constant fear that their supplies lines are going to get shut down,” he said.

Kremlin alternatives? 

The group’s operations in Libya have been much more public.

Wagner fighters played a key role in Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, initially giving it new impetus before the tide eventually turned against him. Their defensive fortifications in central Libya helped stave off the prospect of a counterattack when the offensive collapsed, and Wagner fighters are believed to remain in Libya in their hundreds, alongside Syrians they employed.

Just a day before the death of Prigozhin, Russian military officials, including the deputy defence minister, visited Haftar in Libya, in what they said was the first official visit of a military delegation to the country.

The groundwork for a post-Prigozhin future was likely already being laid by the Kremlin, argued Alia Brahimi, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

“Unfortunately, beyond the ‘charisma’ of the man himself, there’s a whole architecture that’s still in place and in play, and it’s unlikely that we’ll see a significant impact on the Wagner Group’s activities in Libya and Sudan,” she told MEE.

“Plus, the Kremlin has had weeks to lay the ground for Prighozin’s removal and obviously felt confident in the timing.”

She added that, particularly with the rise of coup-led governments in sub-Saharan Africa, there would still be plenty of “clients” for Russia, even without Wagner as the go-between.

“These militarised regimes didn’t call in the Wagner Group because they liked the cut of Prighozin’s jib. They had problems, and Wagner had solutions. It’s just that now the Russian state has been outed as the service-provider.”

MEE asked the RSF for a comment on the Wagner leader’s death, but received no reply by time of publication.

Uncertain future

Since he came to power in 2000, many high profile Russians have learned that crossing Putin comes at a very high risk.

While there has been no confirmation of what caused the crash that killed Prighozin, many – including US President Joe Biden – have been quick to point the finger at the Russian president.

But for Putin as well, the death of the Wagner Group leadership and the potential terminal harm it could cause the mercenary group, will have consequences.

For years the organisation was Russia’s primary source of brute force and influence in Africa, as well as a crucial go-between for military leaders. Without such a proxy, Russia will have to take a more direct role.

Hudson noted that, aside from Tuesday’s visit to Libya, Russia had been reaching out to African leaders since Prighozin led a fleeting mutiny in June, attempting to reassure them of continued Russian support.

The question now, he said, is what Putin will decide to do with Wagner’s assets, including its lucrative gold-smuggling business.

“Does he allow Wagner to continue with new leadership or does he try to absorb Wagner and all of its assets in these countries and operate them as subsidiaries of the Russian military?” asked Hudson.

Hudson added that there was still value in having an informal military company operating on the continent, self-financing itself through client relationships, adding that “that money makes its way back to Russia which benefits the economy”, which is currently being battered by western sanctions.

“My guess is that Putin will try to bring under more direct and reliable control Wagner entities under Russian leadership – but at the same time will find it helpful to have plausible deniability.”

___________________

Irene Fernández-Molina

A collapsing transition roadmap and yet another authority split (2020-22)

Some lessons from the previous decade’s international government recognition and peacemaking dilemmas seemed to have been learnt at the outset of the new transition stage upon the end of the 2019-20 civil war.

The page was definitely turned regarding coherence on the international recognition of an insufficiently effective GNA. Inclusivity was the name of the game in the LPDF launched by the UN in November 2020, whose 75 participants were supposed to represent ‘the full social and political spectrum of Libyan society’.

The first outcome of this dialogue was what UNSMIL described as a ‘roadmap to credible, inclusive and democratic national elections’. This comprised both parliamentary and presidential elections, which were supposed to be held jointly on the symbolic date of the 70th anniversary of Libyan independence, 24 December 2021.

In addition, the same LPDF appointed the GNU as a new interim, unified Libyan government for the pre-election period, electing Dabeiba as Prime Minister.

Dabeiba’s cabinet stood out as the country’ first single government since 2014. Unlike in the negotiation process leading to the establishment of the GNA in 2015, this time domestic recognition took precedence over international recognition. Furthermore, the former was fully accomplished in institutional terms, as the GNU won parliamentary confidence from the HoR with a sweeping majority in March 2021 –which also put an end to the existence of the eastern parallel government–.

A different question is whether the LPDF delegates, the HoR members and the Libyan political elite they represented could genuinely embody and provide domestic recognition in the sense of the broader social contract.

UN peacemaking continued to rely on an elite bargain, and internal ‘power dynamics which mirror those that followed the establishment of the GNA in 2016’ could be observed again soon after the inauguration of the GNU. Also, and putting legitimacy aside, the GNU’s effectiveness in terms of territorial control and monopoly over the use of force remained as partial and patchy as that of the GNA. Areas of limited statehood continued to characterise Libya’s governance.

Indeed, as predicted by several Libya analysts, the LPDF’s roadmap was doomed to crumble in less than a year’s time. Its weaknesses emerged in the first place in relation to the electoral process, for which the LPDF failed to establish a legal framework.

This, compounded with the more fundamental absence of a constitution, made longstanding disagreements resurface over the sequence of elections, ie, the order in which parliamentary and presidential elections should take place, and whether a constitutional referendum should necessarily precede them.

Seizing the opportunity provided by such a legal vacuum, the HoR speaker –and Haftar ally– Aguila Saleh issued a unilateral and skewed ‘presidential electoral law’ in September 2021. Besides not having been approved in a regular parliamentary vote, Saleh’s law was controversial for two main reasons:

(a) first, it reversed the LPDF’s agreement to hold presidential and parliamentary elections jointly by establishing that the former occur ahead of the latter; and

(b) second, it loosened eligibility criteria in a way that allowed both Haftar and Saleh himself to run for the presidency –while maintaining their existing official positions–.

Two additional problematic developments that concurred with Saleh’s manoeuvring were the announcements of the presidential candidacies of Prime Minister Dabeiba and the son of the former dictator, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.

The former thereby reneged on an earlier commitment not to do so, while the latter, wanted by the International Criminal Court, provoked an intense backlash in many circles inside and outside Libya. Political tensions were thus running high when, three weeks before the election date of 24 December 2021, the High National Election Commission suspended the whole process.

Just two months later, the GNU also lost its brief status as Libya’s unified government. With the electoral process frozen and the GNU’s interim mandate extended sine die under the leadership of a Dabeiba willing to perpetuate himself in power, in February 2022 the HoR took the initiative to replace this cabinet by a new one headed by Bashagha.

At the end of the 2019-20 war, the GNA’s former Interior Minister had struck a political deal with his hitherto rival Saleh –and thereby with Haftar– which resulted in both Bashagha and Saleh leading what looked like the favourite list for the GNU at the Conclusions

LPDF. The alienation of this duo/trio due to the LPDF’s unexpected election of Dabeiba would culminate with the swearing-in at the HoR of Bashagha’s so-called Government of National Stability (GNS) in March 2022.

Unsurprisingly, Dabeiba’s GNU refused to cede power to this competitor, resisting political pressure and stopping –with some Turkish support– a budding military offensive on Tripoli to dislodge it in the summer.

Clashes in the capital in the summer of 2022 heightened the international community’s fears that Libya’s new government split and legitimacy crisis further destabilise the country, provoking a return to civil war. The international and regional political conjuncture is not pushing in that direction at the moment, though.

The Turkish-Russian entente that greatly contributed to putting an end to the 2019-20 war has been matched by a wave of reconciliations between the regional supporters of Libya’s opposing conflict parties, including the end of the Qatar blockade by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the mending of ties between Egypt and Turkey. Yet, the present stability reflects ‘a stalemate rather than a settlement’.

In this fragile context, in September of 2022 the Senegalese Abdoulaye Bathily was appointed the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNSMIL.

Bathily called for the organisation of the postponed elections to be sped up so as to avoid putting the country ‘at risk of partition’. Then, following an extensive series of consultations in February 2023, he has proposed to set up a high-level steering panel in charge of agreeing the legal framework as well as a time-bound roadmap for presidential and legislative polls to be held in 2023.

While foreign players have certainly had a crucial role in freezing or unfreezing the Libyan conflict at various points in time, the key to solving it remains first and foremost domestic.

This is no proxy war, and both the Libyan political elite and armed non-state actors seem overall content with the status quo given the currently limited levels of violence and, not least, the rising global prices of energy since the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine. That explains the general lack of a genuine commitment to relaunch the transition and electoral roadmap.

Last summer’s protests by disgruntled Libyan youth in multiple cities from Tobruk to Tripoli were indeed directed against the entire national political elite, revealing more profound domestic recognition and social contract issues that will affect any future conflict settlement and Libyan government.

The international community has learnt only half of the lessons from the past decade of Libyan government splits and international recognition dilemmas (2014-15, 2016-21 and 2022-now).

Upon the end of the 2019-20 civil war, at the time of the establishment of the LPDF, it was already widely assumed that domestic recognition should always take precedence over international recognition, that governance legitimacy cannot thrive by itself without effectiveness, and that coherence around international government recognition positions may stand in the way of the inclusivity –and success– of conflict mediation and peacemaking.

However, the problem of the now-embraced inclusivity –common to both the LPDF and Bathily’s new high-level electoral steering panel– is that it remains partial and vulnerable to hijacking from members of the Libyan political elite who have little interest in a successful transition.

Overcoming this catch-22 situation is certainly not easy, but in any case, the only way ahead hangs on democratic elections. Attempts to form a viable, unified Libyan government by other means have repeatedly failed.

In order to actively support UNSMIL and Bathily’s plan of holding elections by the end of 2023, the EU’s efforts in the coming months should focus on ensuring intra-EU and broader international political unity to deter spoilers.

At the same time, if it materialises, the national reconciliation conference for Libya that the African Union has announced it is preparing to host should also receive strong EU backing.

Finally, complementary dialogue formats should be considered in order to give some international oxygen to an increasingly neglected Libyan youth and civil society.

_______________________

Stephanie T. Williams

As we look ahead to 2023, it is easy, indeed facile, to predict the worst in Libya. Political and societal divisions persist, human rights are flagrantly violated, weapons are aplenty, negative foreign interference continues, the list goes on.

Yet, the October 2020 ceasefire agreement remains intact, though not fully implemented, and the prospect of return to the kind of large-scale warfare witnessed in 2019-20, while not inconceivable, appears unlikely. This relative calm offers an opportunity for the United States and like-minded allies — in addition to working on the seemingly intractable political process — to build on pre-disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts launched last year to start tackling Libya’s hybrid armed group quandary.

This is a generational challenge that should take into account several factors which set Libya apart from other post-conflict contexts:

1) Libya is a rentier state in which the majority of the population on all sides of the conflict draws a salary from the state;

2) the hybrid armed groups are vertically-integrated enterprises that have fully infiltrated official bodies;

3) sustainable DDR and sector security reform (SSR) requires justice, accountability, and a decentralized approach;

4) direct incorporation of armed actors into the political process should be avoided; and,

5) Magnitsky-level sanctions should be on the table for those who abuse human rights and perpetrate the blatant theft of the Libyan people’s patrimony. Above all, DDR and SSR efforts must continue to honor the Libyan people’s demand for civilian control over the military.

THE HYBRIDITY SPECTRUM IN LIBYA

Nearly 12 years ago, Libyans rose up against Moammar Gadhafi, the man who had brutally ruled them for 42 years. Though the United States had learned much from the 2003 regime change debacle in Iraq, those lessons sadly were not translated on the ground in post-revolution Libya, much to the detriment of the Libyans and the international coalition that had brought Gadhafi to his knees.

Perhaps the greatest challenge since Gadhafi’s overthrow has been the inability of successive Libyan governments to exercise the monopoly over the use of force.

In his book “All Necessary Measures?”, Ian Martin, the first United Nations (U.N.) special representative, has comprehensively detailed the key decisions taken by international actors and Libyans during the critical window following Gadhafi’s downfall.

On the issue of what to do with the plethora of armed groups that had emerged, Martin comments on the “failure to understand the armed groups and tackle the full security sector. Here the greatest responsibility lay with the governments that had supported, armed, and directed the rebel battalions and who were needed to provide a strong coordinated ‘diplomatic quorum’; they made no effort to do so, and it was far beyond the capacity of the U.N. to create this.”

By the time I arrived in Libya as the deputy U.N. special representative-political in the summer of 2018, the number of hybrid armed group actors in western Libya had mushroomed by several orders of magnitude from the approximately 30,000 on the books following Gadhafi’s ouster. While the number of Tripoli-based armed groups had decreased, those that remained had consolidated their power in a vertically-integrated model running from senior government offices to the young men toting guns on the street.

Hybrid armed groups across the country exacted their pound of flesh from the state in the form of acquiring arrest, detention, surveillance, and intelligence-related authorities, all the while conducting mafia-style activities including the smuggling of people, fuel, drugs, and weapons.

In the east, a larger armed actor, General Khalifa Haftar, was busy with his own project, having by 2018 defeated most of the eastern extremist militias and absorbed into his forces various armed groups and many of the remnants of Gadhafi’s erstwhile army.

A Libyan caudillo, Haftar had long set his sights on ruling the country of his birth along the lines of the “army with a state” model favored by more than a few Arab autocracies. Haftar took his best shot in April 2019, in an ill-fated bid to capture Tripoli that ended in defeat after the decisive entry of the Turks on the side of the U.N.-recognized government in Tripoli.

MOVING TOWARD STABILIZATION AND MORE EFFECTIVE STATE-BUILDING

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the complex and inter-related DDR and SSR files in Libya, but such efforts must above all honor the Libyan people’s demand for civilian control of the military. The October 2020 U.N.-brokered ceasefire agreement offered an opportunity to tackle Libya’s hybrid-armed group dilemma.

Ground has already been laid with official Libyan actors, including the Joint Military Commission and civilian authorities in Tripoli, to advance pre-DDR efforts, notably during a meeting hosted by the Spanish government in May 2022. Those efforts should continue with the United Nations, the United States, and like-minded allies taking the following factors into account:

• Libya is a rentier economy with a weak, even practically non-existent, private sector and a “state” bursting with over-staffed and negligibly efficient institutions (in 2020, for instance, the prime minister’s office alone boasted over 900 employees). Over 80% of Libya’s working age population draws a salary from the public coffers. Therefore, any DDR effort should factor in the likelihood that armed group members will be integrated into existing “state” structures — in other words, into the very entities that many but not all of them have pillaged over the last decade.
• To the extent possible, the DDR/SSR process should be devolved from the center to local communities. With the national political process frozen, there should be a push for genuine decentralization which can open opportunities for armed group actors to fold more appropriately into the areas and communities from which they hail and which they purport to (and in some cases indeed do) provide protection. Local communities, including municipal councils, civil society organizations, elders’ councils, and women’s groups should be consulted on security arrangements, including the much-needed withdrawal of heavy and medium-sized weapons from urban areas. Local communities will know better than centralized authorities how to reintegrate armed group actors into their milieu, forsaking the gun for more peaceful occupations. 
• Caution should be exercised before proceeding with the proposal put forward by some actors, mostly in western Libya, to establish a separate “national guard” in which to absorb armed group actors. Libya does not need a national guard as much as it needs competent border guards and a well-trained and less predatory critical infrastructure protection force. A national guard, with a separate budget and weapons’ arsenal, could evolve into a competitor to rival the national armed forces. This could be a recipe for more, not less, conflict. 
• Sustainable peace requires justice. The DDR/SSR exercise should be guided and complemented by a focus on human rights training for those heading to the military, police, and security sectors. There should be individual vetting, rather than the absorption writ large of whole groups into these sectors. Anyone implicated in human rights abuses should be selected out, with a separate accountability process that is part and parcel of an overall national reconciliation package. Armed actors throughout the country have committed terrible abuses over the last decade, from the mass graves in Tarhouna, to the targeted assassinations and the forced disappearance of Libyan women activists and politicians, to everyday preying on their fellow citizens as well as the sickening treatment of African and Asian migrants — all with zero accountability for the perpetrators. Magnitsky-level sanctions should be on the table for all actors who abuse human rights and plunder the state. 
• How armed group actors are included in the political process requires careful deliberation — and a caveat emptor. The approach the U.N. took under the Berlin process, with its three inter-related Libyan tracks, was to use the military track — the Joint Military Commission — as the format in which armed actors would be formally represented. General Haftar selected five officers from his forces, while the then-U.N.-recognized government in Tripoli appointed five officers representing the major urban areas in western Libya: Tripoli, Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan, as well as an officer from the city of Gharyan. In the political track, and in keeping with the Libyan demand that there be civilian oversight of the military, armed actors were permitted to dispatch civilian representatives. Since then, however, armed groups have pushed their way more directly into the political process, with the help of foreign actors who have hosted “secret” meetings between the western Libyan armed groups and Haftar’s military and civilian representatives. When in January 2022 I met in Libya with the armed group representatives who had attended such a meeting in Morocco at the end of 2021, it was clear to me that they were enjoying their elevated status inside the political tent, openly boasting that the civilians would do as they were instructed — hardly a good omen for civil-military relations, let alone a process free from threats and intimidation.

__________________

Irene Fernández-Molina

International government recognition dilemmas and pitfalls (2011-19)

One further aspect of the international involvement in post-2011 Libya that deserves closer attention is the broad range of practices of international recognition of governments that have been pursued during the course of this conflict, ranging from the macro to the micro level, and from highly formalised procedures with legal implications to purposefully unofficial modes of interaction.

The repertoire includes declaratory, diplomatic, informal engagement, intergovernmental cooperation and support practices.

Furthermore, in a context of recurring domestic authority splits and areas of limited statehood, these practices have confronted three dilemmas stemming from the gaps or tensions between international vs domestic recognition, legitimacy vs effectiveness and coherence vs inclusivity.

First, the mismatch between international and internal recognition has been prominent in situations where the former has preceded the latter, yet the externally-backed government has proved eventually unable to achieve a viable social contract with all the key societal groups and political stakeholders inside the country. This domestic recognition deficit has affected, to a greater or lesser extent, all the successive internationally-recognised governments in post-2011 Libya.

It was already a concern for the National Transitional Council (NTC) established in Benghazi upon the anti-Gaddafi uprising in February 2011. Originally conceived as a tool of rebel diplomacy vis-à-vis the international community, the NTC, in parallel, had to provide governance in areas under rebel control during the 2011 civil war, and eventually became the country’s government for nearly 10 months after the civil war came to an end. Tensions between the two roles were inevitable.

Still, the NTC mitigated them thanks to a mix of revolutionary legitimacy and the legal effects of its increasingly formal international recognition, which enabled it to secure access to some of Libya’s frozen assets abroad and thereby continue to pay state salaries at home.

The gap between international and domestic recognition was greater in the case of the GNA established in late 2015. The reason for this was the rush that pushed a powerful range of international actors –including multilateral organisations such as the UN, the EU, the Arab League and the African Union– to ‘pledge [their] support’ for this would-be unified central government even prior to the actual signature by Libyan actors of the Libyan Political Agreement (Skhirat agreement) that founded it.

The urge mostly came from the Western crisis approach to both the capture of the Sirte region by the Islamic State (IS) group and the increase in migrant sea crossings from the Libyan coast to Italy. A regular Libyan government was needed as a partner for international anti-terrorism and anti-migration cooperation efforts to be effectively, and legally, boosted.

Yet, the initial strong international and EU endorsement of the GNA was not met with a similar level of domestic sanctioning. The power-sharing elite deal was spoiled as the HoR –the country’s (transitional) legislative authority in accordance with the Libyan Political Agreement– denied consent to the GNA.

Besides a new West-East government split, the GNA’s domestic recognition shortage was reflected in its very struggle to physically set foot in and operate from Tripoli, exerting effective rule over the armed non-state actors that controlled the capital’s security.

In my interviews with Libya-focused diplomats and international practitioners based in Tunis in early 2019, there was a widespread, ex-post acknowledgment that the GNA had been one of those ‘fictions the international community has to get into’.

Secondly, the relationship between the legitimacy and effectiveness of the various aspiring Libyan governments is a complex one, and foreign actors have had to balance between these two types of criteria.

In the case of the GNA, after being originally externally enabled, legitimacy became taken for granted and prioritised by the international community, who expected a virtuous circle whereby effectiveness would progressively come to match it. However, from 2016 onwards, the GNA did not become more effective in its rule over Libyan territory and population.

Quite the opposite: its rival Haftar’s LAAF consolidated and expanded its control in the east and the south of the country. This led international interaction with this anti-GNA rebel to gradually shift from informal engagement to increasingly official diplomatic practices, deflating the exclusiveness of the recognition of the GNA in several respects.

Diplomatic practices towards Haftar grew in significance from bilateral visits from regional allies such as Egypt and the UAE to official invitations from Russia in 2016, and to participation on an equal footing with the GNA’s head Fayez al-Sarraj in the Libya-focused multilateral summits organised by France and Italy in 2017 and 2018.

Chief among the justifications for such an evolution provided in my fieldwork was that Haftar could ‘not be ignored’ as an effective ‘party on the ground’ and that it was ‘one of the stakeholders’ with most ‘influence on the peace process’. The non-governmental nature of this actor was helpful because it allowed to claim that dealings with him were not in breach of the international recognition consensus.

In any case, Haftar’s effectiveness-based international recognition worked as a self-fulfilling prophecy in consolidating a diplomatic fait accompli at least until the 2019-20 civil war.

Thirdly, the de facto veto-player role of Haftar’s LAAF and other Libyan armed non-state actors raised the dilemma between coherence and inclusivity in conflict mediation and peacemaking processes. This applied most notably to the mediation efforts undertaken by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) after the establishment of the GNA, when the UN had thrown all its weight behind this government and was thus considered one-sided by other Libyan players.

From mid-2017 onwards, though, concerns about the counterproductive side-effects of this approach led UNSMIL to reconsider and reframe its mandate putting a greater emphasis on engagement with ‘all Libyan political actors’ and ‘bridging the inter-Libyan divide’.

This change of method was influenced by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ghassan Salamé’s preference for bottom-up mediation and grassroots dialogue initiatives involving non-state actors, as part of his roadmap for the Libyan national conference that was supposed to be held in the spring of 2019.

The aim of such a wide-ranging preparatory consultation process was that the national conference endorsed a pre-negotiated transition plan that enjoyed the wide domestic consensus and domestic recognition that the Libyan Political Agreement and the GNA had lacked three years earlier.

____________________

By Guy Burton

Viewed from above, the Libyan conflict has looked like a battle between two main groups, the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and General Khaled Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) based in the east of the country. Read More

Irene Fernández-Molina

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

Theme

In Libya, domestic authority fractures have become a constant in the midst of a fluid conflict. The practices of international recognition of governments pursued since 2011 have faced dilemmas stemming from three dichotomies: international vs domestic recognition; legitimacy vs effectiveness; and coherence vs inclusivity in conflict mediation and peacemaking.

Summary

Twelve years after the spark of the revolution and the international military intervention that overthrew the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya is yet to see the light at the end of the tunnel of protracted turmoil and intermittent civil war. Parliamentary and presidential elections were planned to take place on 24 December 2021; however, three days earlier, the High National Election Commission suspended the entire process.

Agreed by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), this electoral roadmap provided some hope for Libyans to overcome conflict and fragmentation. Since its failure, the country has seen a new government split along the lines of the authority fractures in 2014-15 and 2016-21. Two parallel cabinets are operating again in Tripolitania (West) and Cyrenaica/Barqa (East) since February-March 2022, with the ensuing increased risk of return to violent conflict.

Analysis

Background and analytical reconsiderations of the Libyan conflict

Over the past 12 years, Libya has gone through the overlapping upheavals of revolution, international military intervention and civil war in three episodes (February-October 2011, May 2014-December 2015 and April 2019-October 2020), as well as relatively quieter interludes devoted to stabilisation, political transition, security sector reform (SSR) and state-building attempts (October 2011-May 2014, December 2015-April 2019 and October 2020-now).

Yet, at no time have the latter efforts resulted in a sustainable conflict settlement. Against a backdrop of deepening political fragmentation and hybridisation of security governance in the country –due to the blurred boundaries between state and non-state actors–, the failure of conflict resolution has been conspicuously associated, at the institutional level, with recurring authority splits and international recognition contests.

The 2014 fracture stemmed from a controversy over the extension of the mandate as a legislature of the 2012-elected General National Congress (GNC), as well as the validity of the results of the elections that were held to replace it by a new House of Representatives (HoR). The two rival parliaments ended up operating in parallel from Tripoli and Tobruk, respectively, with each of them sustaining its corresponding appointed government.

Furthermore, as Libya’s second civil war (May 2014-December 2015) broke out, each of them received armed support from armed non-state actors remobilised around the coalitions Libyan Dawn (pro-GNC) and Operation Dignity (pro-HoR), the latter led by the military strongman Khalifa Haftar and what the HoR would designate as the ‘Libyan National Army’, also known as the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF).

A second government recognition controversy emerged just as this one drew to a close. In late 2015 a Government of National Accord (GNA) was established in Tripoli under the terms of the UN-led Libyan Political Agreement. Yet, while backed –and arguably created– by a strong international recognition consensus, the GNA’s domestic recognition was never complete, impaired by the denial of consent from the HoR and its armed allies.

As a result, an eastern parallel government and administration remained in place operating from Bayda, though with a decreasing political salience compared with Haftar, his LARelapsing into deadlock:AF and the HoR itself. The third and last government split is the one that has signalled the deadlock of the transition roadmap following the end of the third civil war (April 2019-October 2020). The unification and exclusivity achieved by the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) designated in March 2021 by the LPDF, under the leadership of Abdelhamid Dabeiba, were short-lived.

A new eastern competitor came up just one year later amid disagreements over the irregular prolongation of the GNU’s mandate in the absence of parliamentary elections, as the HoR appointed former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha to form yet another government.

This pattern of divisions and polarisation at the executive and legislative levels has become a constant in the midst of a fluid conflict whose core cleavages and framing have significantly changed since 2011. While the collective identity and purpose of most armed non-state actors  was primarily local in origin and reliant on their ‘social embeddedness’, their larger-scale positioning within the broader game of the conflict owed much to the external recognition and support they received at different points in time.

This applies to the revolution vs the Gaddafi regime framing of the 2011 civil war, which translated into a revolutionaries vs counterrevolutionaries dichotomy in the post-war transitional politics, as well as to the overlapping West vs East and Islamists vs secularists oppositions that have prevailed since the 2014-15 civil war.

The latter discursive framework, in particular, was always in fact less reflective of the actual makeup of the two sides and armed alliances –both of which have comprised an assorted range of non-Islamist and Islamist forces– than the ideological leanings of the regional backers of each side, ie, Turkey and Qatar for the GNC/Libyan Dawn and later the GNA, and Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia in the case of the HoD/Operation Dignity and Haftar’s LAAF.

In fact, the most fundamental and longstanding political cleavage shaping the post-2011 confrontation in Libya has been one between horizontal and vertical modes of authoritarian governance. Tripolitania has been dominated by a form of authoritarianism ‘populist in character and often portraying itself as revolutionary’ that ‘allows space for horizontal arrangements between rivals and a small degree of tolerance for political initiative on the part of citizens and local leaders’.

On the other hand, in contrast to this relatively more pluralistic and unpredictable governance, the alternative model consolidated by Haftar and his supporters in Cyrenaica is a ‘more vertical’ one, ‘which tolerates almost no contestation, even moderate’.

When it comes to the violent conflict dynamics, it is similarly useful to reconsider the analytical lenses through which the international community has approached Libya over these years in at least two ways.

First, while this is certainly an internationalised civil war, and one that has become more conspicuously so in its 2019-20 iteration due to the overt foreign (para)military intervention of Russia –through the Wagner Group– and Turkey, describing it as a proxy war is inaccurate and misleading inasmuch as it underrates domestic agency.

In fact, rather than acting at the initiative or on behalf of regional or global powers, Libya’s ‘local actors played a key role in internationalising the conflict by soliciting and manipulating foreign support for their own interests and agendas’.

From a political economy perspective, the autonomy of such local actors, including armed non-state actors, has been preserved and reinforced thanks to the persisting rentier nature of the Libyan state and its institutional bits and pieces. Oil and oil revenues managed by the Central Bank of Libya have kept flowing even in the shakiest conditions to all sorts of (para)state and double-hatted local actors.

Secondly, rather than pigeonholing the country into the problematic category of failed states, the outcome of Libya’s deepening fragmentation may be better understood as the consolidation of multiple areas of limited statehood.

Defined as ‘parts of the territory or policy areas in which the central government lacks the capacity to implement decisions and/or its monopoly over the means of violence is challenged’, the point about areas of limited statehood is that they are ‘neither ungoverned nor ungovernable’, and not always necessarily associated with violent conflict.

___________________

Fighting between the influential 444 Brigade and the Special Deterrence Force has raged this week after months of relative peace.

The worst armed clashes in a year have killed 55 people in Libya’s capital, Tripoli, authorities have said.

The death toll from the fighting was announced on Wednesday by Tripoli’s health authorities, which also said 146 people had been injured.

Major warfare in Libya has been paused since a 2020 truce between the main eastern and western sides.

But rival factions still hold the most territory and a lasting solution to the conflict that has raged since a 2011 NATO-backed uprising looks distant.

Here is what you need to know about the latest unrest:

Who is fighting?

Fighting raged from Monday night into Tuesday between the influential 444 Brigade and the Special Deterrence Force, or al-Radaa Force.

The 444 Brigade is affiliated with Libya’s defence ministry and is reputed to be the North African country’s most disciplined armed group.

The Special Deterrence Force is a powerful ultraconservative militia that acts as the capital’s police force.

They are two of myriad militias vying for power since the 2011 overthrow of longtime dictator Muammar Gaddafi, growing in wealth and power, particularly in Tripoli and the west of the country.

The 444 Brigade and the Special Deterrence Force are among the largest militias in Tripoli and have been backed by the Tripoli-based government in the west of the country, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Since 2014, Libya has been divided between rival administrations in the east and the west, each supported by an array of well-armed militias and different foreign governments.

What triggered the fighting?

The clashes with rocket launchers and machine guns followed the detention of the 444 Brigade head, Colonel Mahmoud Hamza, on Monday as he tried to travel from Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, which the Special Deterrence Force controls.

A total of 234 families were evacuated from front-line areas in the capital’s southern suburbs, along with dozens of doctors and paramedics trapped by the fighting while caring for the wounded, the Emergency Medical Centre said.

Late Tuesday, the social council in the southeastern suburb of Souq el-Jumaa, a stronghold of the Special Deterrence Force, announced that an agreement had been reached with Dbeibah for Hamza to be handed over to a “neutral party”.

In a televised announcement, the council said a ceasefire would follow the transfer of the commander and, late on Tuesday, the fighting abated.

Hamza was returned to his unit on Wednesday, officials in the commander’s organisation said.

Anas el-Gomati, director of the Sadeq Institute, a think tank focusing on Libya, said clashes have re-emerged because Hamza has “enormous standing amongst his brigade, the 444”.

“Also, I think he blurs the lines between the political factions that have been largely at peace for the last year in Tripoli and their allegiances towards the [Tripoli] government of national unity as it stands … And those that favour a unity government with renegade General Khalifa Haftar,” el-Gomati told Al Jazeera, referring to the ruler of Libya’s east.

“Those that are on the ground and know Hamza quite well would suggest that he is in the anti-Haftar faction,” el-Gomati said.

Have there been previous clashes?

The escalation follows months of relative peace.

In May, the same armed groups had clashed for hours in Tripoli, also after the arrest of a 444 Brigade member. Minor injuries resulted.

Tripoli has seen similar episodes of violence in recent years, although most have only lasted a couple of hours.

Last August, clashes between two other militias active in the capital killed at least 23 people.

What has the world reaction been?

The African Union expressed its concers and calls for an end to hostilities and a start to reconciliation on Thursday. Moussa Faki Mahamat, AU Commission head, “is following with great concern the developments of the security situation in Tripoli” the statement said.

The embassies of the United Kingdom and the United States in Libya both issued statements expressing their concerns about the escalating violence.

The US urged “immediate de-escalation in order to sustain recent Libyan gains toward stability and elections”.

_____________

Libya capital Tripoli rocked by militia clashes

Tensions flared between two of the Libyan capital’s most powerful armed factions. The oil-rich nation has been in a state of turmoil for over a decade.

Clashes between rival militia factions have rocked Tripoli, shattering months of relative calm in the Libyan capital. 

The violence broke out overnight and continued into Tuesday morning. It took place in different parts of Tripoli, residents and local media reported. It appears to be the worst flare-up of fighting in the city this year.

The exact death toll from the clashes remains unclear, but one estimate said 27 people were killed and another 100 were wounded in the fighting.

What is the latest?

A medical unit linked to the Defense Ministry said it had recovered three bodies from the Furnaj, Ain Zara and Tarik Shok districts.

Ambulance services spokesperson Usama Ali said 19 people had been injured and 26 families evacuated from a district hit by fighting.

The Health Ministry said many of Tripoli’s residents have been trapped in their homes.

In a statement, it called on the warring parties to allow ambulance and emergency teams to enter the affected areas and for blood to be sent to nearby hospitals.

The clashes seemed to have calmed later on Tuesday after the Special Deterrence Force released 444 Brigade commander Mahmoud Hamza.

Reuters news agency cited unnamed sources from each of the factions as saying that Hamza was handed over to a third group that was not involved in the fighting.

What triggered the violence?

According to local media, fighting broke out between the 444 brigade and the Special Deterrence Force late Monday evening.

The groups are viewed as the Libyan capital’s most powerful armed factions.

The 444 brigade is backed by the Interior Ministry in Tripoli. The Special Deterrence Force controls the capital’s Mitiga airport.

Tensions flared on Monday after the Special Deterrence Force allegedly detained 444 Brigade commander Mahmoud Hamza as he attempted to travel, media reported.

Dark smoke hung over parts of the city early on Tuesday, and the sound of heavy weapons rattled through the streets, a Reuters journalist said.

Flights to and from Mitiga airport have been diverted due to the fighting. The University of Tripoli has canceled classes.

A divided nation

Libya, an oil-rich nation located in the Maghreb region of northern Africa, has been in turmoil since the overthrow of dictator Moammar Gadhafi in 2011.

The country has been split into two since 2014, with opposing governments located in the eastern and western parts of the nation, respectively.

A United Nations-backed administration known as the Government of National Unity is based in Tripoli in the west, and its rival, known as the House of Representatives, is based in the east, in Tobruk.

Each is supported by a number of local militias and foreign powers, and each has tried to wrest control from the other.

However, after several years of fighting and instability, the violence has largely subsided. 

Still, in Tripoli, longstanding divisions have sparked several incidents of bloodshed in recent years.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya released a statement on Tuesday saying it was following with concern “the security incidents and developments” that began Monday.

It called for an immediate end to the ongoing armed clashes.

_________________

Cathrin Schaer

Fierce clashes between rival militias in the Libyan capital Tripoli have raised fears about what the increasingly powerful paramilitaries operating there want.

In Libya this week, clashes between two rival militias left an estimated 27 people dead and over 100 more injured.

The fighting has been described as some of the worst violence in the Libyan capital for months and saw civilians trapped in their homes after shooting broke out. It is unclear as yet whether those killed and injured were combatants or civilians.

The fighting, which started late on Monday and had mostly subsided by Tuesday morning, apparently began when one militia detained a senior leader from another.

Mahmoud Hamza, a leader in what is known as the 444th brigade, was on his way out of town when another group known as the Special Deterrence Force detained him. Reports say the fighting ended when Hamza was released.

Although the situation in Libya has been comparatively calm over the last two years, long-time observers of the country’s turmoil continue to warn about the dangers posed by Libya’s militias. In fact, the incident this week is only the latest in a series of such clashes.

Where did militias come from?

Libya’s militias are the distant relatives of informal fighting groups that arose after the country’s long-standing dictator Moammar Gadhafi was toppled from power during the country’s 2011 revolution. In the fighting that followed, locals banded together to protect their own communities and fight forces loyal to Gadhafi.

Since 2014, Libya has been split into two, with opposing governments located in the east and west of the country. A United Nations-backed administration known as the Government of National Unity is based in Tripoli in the west, and its rival, known as the House of Representatives, is based in the east, in Tobruk.

Each is supported by a number of local militias and foreign powers, and each has tried to wrest control from the other. Attempts to hold an election that would unite the country have failed up until now.

During this time, Libya’s armed groups have evolved, proliferating, getting funding from the government and also gradually becoming part of Libya’s nascent state security institutions.

But the lack of a unified civilian government meant there was no real control over their growing number. 

Libyan militias often fought others, competing for influence and wealth. They also openly harassed politicians, civilians and rights groups. As Roberta Maggi, a project officer at the Geneva Center for Security Sector Governance, wrote in a 2022 policy briefing, “Libya’s first parliament was regularly raided by militias that obstructed sessions and intimidated lawmakers, hoping to protect their [the militias’] benefits and extract further concessions.”

Political factions have also enlisted the militias to “bully their rivals and strengthen themselves,” Maggi adds.

In the east of Libya, former warlord-turned-politician Khalifa Haftar, has managed to consolidate control over various armed militias under his command. In the west, different militias have been competing and now there are fewer groups, albeit more powerful ones. 

Who was fighting in Tripoli?

The two militias who were shooting at one another this week were the 444th brigade and the Special Deterrence Force. They are just two of many Libyan militias who have been vying for power in the country’s capital. As both are based in Tripoli, their conflict is more likely to have been about rivalry and influence, rather than the country’s political east-west divide. 

Most of these armed groups have some kind of link to an official body like the ministries of defense or interior and operate “under the cover of state legitimacy,” Wolfram Lacher, a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, explained in a July 2023 commentary. “In reality, however, they primarily defended the interests of their leaders, members or social base, while largely evading state control.”

The 444th is loosely affiliated with the country’s defense ministry and has a comparatively good reputation, a local journalist in Tripoli told DW. Many ordinary people in the city preferred the 444th to other militias because of the more professional way it behaved, the journalist said. He did not want to give his name for fear of repercussions.

“In Tripoli, which was dominated by particularly unruly militias only a few years ago, the 444th Brigade is now the new model,” Lacher writes. “It is a unit that is seen as disciplined, reliable and uncompromising in dealing with crime in the areas it controls south of Tripoli.”

Meanwhile the Special Deterrence Force, or SDF, are a hardline religious militia which works as a kind of police force in Tripoli. The group, also known as Al Radaa, controls many public amenities, including the city’s civilian airport, Mitiga, from where the 444th brigade commander was detained this week as he was trying to leave for an event.

The SDF was loosely linked with the government’s Ministry of Interior but, in effect, acts independently. The conservative group is notorious for randomly detaining locals, including a Libyan politician and civil society activists, and has been criticized by rights groups like Amnesty International as well as the United Nation’s Human Rights Council.

This is not the first time that the 444th and the SDF have clashed in Tripoli. Local media reported a similar incident in May this year when the SDF briefly kidnapped another 444th leader. In 2017 and 2018, the SDF fought other Tripoli militias and both times, the airport was also closed.

Will there be a new civil war in Libya?

This week’s militia-versus-militia clashes, like others before them, seem to have calmed for now. Both of Libya’s governments in the east and the west condemned the fighting.

But, according to experts on the country, there’s no doubt that militias like those fighting this week will continue to play an unfortunate and outsized role in Libya’s future. 

“The armed groups that have formed in Libya since 2011 have progressively taken over the state,” Lacher of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, argued last month.

“They are undergoing a process of institutionalization, and their representatives are reaching the top levels of the army, the security apparatus and the civilian government,” he said. “At the same time, they are exerting massive influence over who gets key appointments and how state resources are distributed.”

The militias “adeptly play on politicians’ insecurity, illegitimacy, and general ineptitude to enrich themselves and entrench their positions within Libya’s institutions,” Tarek Megerisi, a senior policy fellow and Libya expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in a commentary late last year. “The country is divided between two governments that have no interest in governing or public support, and that are beholden to militias that feed on their myopic, unwinnable struggle for absolute power.”

________________

Hafed Al-Ghwell

After more than a decade of political morass, Libya’s future hangs precariously in the balance between two less than optimal outcomes. One is an enduring status quo that is a playground for self-interested political elites, hybrid actors and serial agitators, atop the disaffected masses. The other is the formation of a so-called “unity government” headed by the very ruling elite that has repeatedly thwarted the country’s post-2011 aspirations.

The status quo is as unwieldy as it is untenable. The revolving door of power facilitates the rise and fall of chimeric influencers, some of them politically aspirant, others militaristically potent, all of them cloaked in a veneer of national interest while working only to further their own parochial agendas.
Meanwhile, most of the views from abroad merely offer guided tours of this maze of malignancy and its debilitating toll on a society adrift in a volatile situation that has left Libya suffocating on the threshold of chaos, with instability the only constant.

Just this week, the surprising departure of Khalid Al-Mishri as head of the High Council of State underscored the shifting sands in the balance of power. The council is recognized by most of the international community as part of Libya’s official governing structure, serving as an advisory body to the House of Representatives. Its primary role is to help guide the nation through a turbulent transition process, while addressing security issues and attempting to reconcile deep-rooted internal divisions in the country.

The council’s leadership therefore directly influences the prospects for Libya’s stabilization, since effective leaders can facilitate dialogue and foster unity among competing factions, potentially creating an environment conducive to political reconciliation and stability. Conversely, inconsistent or self-interested leadership can inflame tensions and disrupt an already fragile process of transition.
Al-Mishri’s departure is yet another illustration of the country’s unpredictable political climate and the fragility of its key institutions. The unforeseen ouster of a five-year incumbent serves only to introduce additional uncertainty at a critical juncture when Libya is striving for a lasting political settlement and stable policy frameworks, to legitimize future elections that might produce the country’s first-ever democratically elected government.

Such leadership changes also affect the council’s ability to effectively advise the House of Representatives, contribute to critical policy decisions, including the implementation of electoral laws, and help facilitate the drafting of a constitution.

At the same time, opportunists continue to pursue their own personal ambitions and petty rivalries, even if it means manipulating or subverting ongoing political processes. This constant state of flux is a significant contributing factor to disaffection among the Libyan public, raising the risk of even more turbulence in the years ahead, which is not helped by an enduring distrust of state institutions.

Divisive politics and the presence of regional and external actors who have stakes in the Libyan conflict also play a part in exacerbating the difficulties in achieving consensus or a unified national vision.
If the status quo is therefore undesirable, the alternative of a lurch toward a unity government remains, at best, a mixed blessing. While the concept might appear to be an antidote to the protracted crisis in Libya, the overall process to achieve it has been marred by cynicism and wariness — and justifiably so.

Several attempts to forge a unity government have crumbled as a result of infighting, deeply entrenched factionalism, and ever-challenging local dynamics. The current ongoing attempt has yet to bear fruit and is unlikely to fare much better than previous efforts, given that it is similarly afflicted with the maladies that mean such pursuits are granted only some measure of symbolic importance while practical effectiveness remains questionable.

The revolving door of power facilitates the rise and fall of chimeric influencers. 

After all, even the most well-intentioned consensus-building endeavors are not immune to the influence of a ruling elite who are loath to relinquish their monopoly on power. They therefore continually interfere and use their resources and influence to steer outcomes in service to their own interests.

This ongoing meddling has merely intensified lines of conflict, further eroding trust among the polity and undermining the firm principles of an egalitarian society that underpin any nascent democratization process. Instead of fostering unity, these elite-driven efforts have deepened the chasms of division and perpetuated the status quo.

The continued involvement of those same political incumbents who have done little to bridge the divides so far creates an understandable skepticism about this proposed pathway. A unity government populated by those who have no qualms about undermining democracy in Libya just adds to the national strife about this faux harmony among elites, leaving Libyan spirits just as embattled as before.
Obviously, the implications of entrusting the country’s future to this ruling cabal are grave, and thus indefensible. Theoretically, such a government could help to stabilize the situation in Libya. Realistically, however, its only “success” would be to bring an element of predictability to the nation’s woes — a sort of “managed chaos,” so to speak.

However, it also runs the risk of hardening the divisions between the various factions vying for their place in the sun, while offering a veneer of legitimacy to vested interests, thereby perpetuating the very structures of power that are responsible for Libya’s present quagmire.

Meanwhile, other paths that sought to realize Libya’s post-Qaddafi aspirations for democratization raised plenty of hope, only to wither under the weight of the country’s ever-changing dynamics. Disruptive influences — internal and external — continue to shape and reshape the course and the discourse, rendering obvious solutions ineffective and erstwhile feasible transitions, infeasible.

The global community, fatigued by the enduring Libyan quagmire, now finds itself in the testing position of having to choose the lesser of two evils. The unfortunate inevitability of this, due to the external support for stabilization oscillating between the halfhearted and the blithely half-baked, leaves much to be desired.

However, few alternatives exist outside of engagement by an international community that finds itself backed into a corner and forced to choose between facilitating a unity government, with all its inherent flaws, or resigning itself to a protracted and volatile status quo.

While neither option is particularly appealing, shying away from proactive involvement would only risk exacerbating the instability. The challenge now is to strike a delicate balance between securing stability without entrenching a political landscape that is unresponsive to democratic reform.

By reassessing priorities, aligning regional interests and focusing on long-term solutions rather than short-term gains, the international community can still contribute in a meaningful way to Libya’s stability, help prevent further devastation and avert direct threats to regional, and global, security.
One can only hope, for Libya’s sake and that of its people, the final choice pays more than just lip service to the principles of unity and democracy. It is incumbent on the international community to select the lesser of two unpalatable options, and in doing so work diligently to shape a future in which Libya’s impossible choices can become, at last, a little less impossible.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and the former adviser to the dean of the board of executive directors of the World Bank Group.

_______________

Tira Trichur, Stephanie Chambers, and David Milstead

Billions of dollars belonging to former Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi are sitting in Canadian bank accounts almost 12 years after his death, says a former diplomat.

Fathi Baja, who served as Libya’s ambassador to Canada from 2013 to 2017, said he kept confidential documents containing financial details about the cash stockpile after he was fired from his envoy job in Ottawa. Citing the risk of corruption, Mr. Baja said he plans to safeguard those financial records in Libya until the North African country has a democratically elected government.

Mr. Baja’s disclosure that Mr. Gadhafi secretly stashed “billions” in Canadian financial institutions during his 42-year rule in Libya – made in an exclusive interview with The Globe and Mail – comes at a critical time for both countries.

Libya is renewing its efforts to recover billions of dollars’ worth of missing assets that were looted by Mr. Gadhafi and his inner circle. That global hunt is resuming as political deadlock threatens to thwart plans to hold long-promised elections in Libya this year, fuelling fears of additional delays in repatriating state assets.

Canada, which has seen its internal affairs rocked by Libya-related scandals in recent years, is facing international criticism for its failure to find and freeze dirty money, and for its lax enforcement of global sanctions.

Given Libya’s shaky security situation, Mr. Baja says it’s his responsibility to prevent the financial assets uncovered in Canada from falling into the wrong hands, including Libyan militias. In the years following the overthrow of Mr. Gadhafi, rival factions attempted to abscond with some of his recovered assets. That’s why Mr. Baja chose to hide the cache of Canadian financial records until his country has a democratic government.

“I cannot give it to anybody else except an elected government – a legal one,” Mr. Baja said in a telephone interview from Benghazi, Libya. He declined to provide the documents to The Globe.

“There is money in these [documents], the account numbers, in fact,” he later added.

When asked to be more precise about the amount of money traced to Mr. Gadhafi at unnamed Canadian banks, Mr. Baja declined to provide specifics. “We are talking about a billionaire,” he said.

Mr. Gadhafi used front men, including Canadian proxies, to open bank accounts and shell corporations on his behalf to hide part of his fortune outside of Libya, according to two other people familiar with the matter. Additionally, Mr. Gadhafi intermingled his personal wealth with Libyan state funds in bank accounts in Canada and other countries, they said.

The Globe is not identifying the sources, who are not authorized to speak publicly, because their personal safety is at risk.

Mr. Gadhafi, who was killed by rebel fighters after being pulled from a drainpipe in his hometown of Sirte on Oct. 20, 2011, reportedly died the world’s richest man.

He, along with his relatives and agents, stole as much as US$200-billion from the Libyan people between 1969 and 2011 and potentially hid more than US$40-billion worth of those assets outside of Libya, according to estimates cited in documents filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

That asset-recovery case, which is being pursued by the Libyan Asset Recovery and Management Office, is an effort to trace misappropriated funds that were transferred abroad through U.S. banks.

“LARMO will use that information to commence lawsuits in the relevant jurisdictions to freeze and recover the identified assets,” reads its court filing.

Tripoli-based LARMO, which reports to the Libyan cabinet and has the backing of the UN, has also asked the U.S. State Department for more help in recovering assets pilfered by Mr. Gadhafi, The Wall Street Journal reported in April.

Mr. Gadhafi, despite being deceased, remains on the UN Security Council’s sanctions list and on Interpol’s website. (There is no single way to translate an Arabic name into English, which is why spellings can vary.)

The Canadian government, however, won’t specify the total amount of Libyan assets frozen in Canada as a result of sanctions. Nor will it comment on whether any of those frozen assets include the billions that Mr. Gadhafi accumulated in Canadian bank accounts.

“Global Affairs Canada cannot comment on frozen assets belonging to specific listed persons,” spokesperson James Emmanuel Wanki said in an e-mailed statement.

UN officials, meanwhile, didn’t respond to requests for comment about the money Mr. Gadhafi hoarded in Canadian bank accounts.

Canada has a foreign-policy interest in helping Libya recover state assets stolen by Mr. Gadhafi and his officials.

Not only did Canada play a central role in the NATO-led military intervention that ousted him in 2011, Ottawa has since contributed tens of millions of dollars to help stabilize Libya and to provide humanitarian assistance.

In June, Canada amended its Libyan sanctions regulations, signalling it is preparing to provide additional aid to the country by releasing sequestered financial assets.

Canada’s Ambassador to Libya, Isabelle Savard, then met Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah in July to discuss bilateral commercial relations and the likelihood of elections. Ms. Savard also met with other high-ranking officials, including Libya’s Minister of Justice, Halima Ibrahim Abdel-Rahman, whose mandate includes asset recovery.

Back in 2011, as Arab Spring protests in Egypt and Tunisia inspired an uprising in Libya, Mr. Gadhafi sold off part of Libya’s gold reserves and moved large sums of money outside his country, according to media reports. He also vowed to crush the revolt against his regime, calling protestors “rats and mercenaries.”

On Feb. 26 of that year, the Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya in response to violence against civilians.

Canada implemented those measures the following day, freezing assets belonging to Mr. Gadhafi and his children. Ottawa also imposed additional sanctions, including a prohibition on financial transactions with the government of Libya.

As a result of the UN sanctions, Canada also commenced an asset-tracing investigation to find Mr. Gadhafi’s assets, according to a public database maintained by the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, a joint project of the World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

At the time, Canada froze an estimated $2.3-billion in assets belonging to Mr. Gadhafi, his family and the Libyan government, according to a research publication from the Library of Parliament.

But on Sept. 13, 2011, then foreign affairs minister John Baird announced that Canada was unfreezing roughly $2.2-billion to provide humanitarian help to the people of Libya. (It is unclear why there is a discrepancy between the two figures.)

Sandra McCardell, who was Canada’s ambassador to Libya at the time, told a parliamentary committee days later that Mr. Baird’s announcement involved “the unfreezing of all Libyan assets held in Canada.”

It was a critical moment for Libya, which still wasn’t fully liberated despite NATO air strikes that had commenced months earlier.

Mr. Gadhafi had been chased out of Tripoli by rebels and gone into hiding, but still maintained strongholds in parts of the country, including his hometown of Sirte. That meant he and his loyalists still had access to some state assets.

It is unknown whether the money belonging to Mr. Gadhafi located in the Canadian bank accounts that Mr. Baja is safeguarding was part of Canada’s initial asset freezes or if those funds were detected after Mr. Baird announced the release of the $2.2-billion.

If Global Affairs Canada knows, it won’t say. Mr. Baird and Ms. McCardell didn’t respond to separate requests seeking comment. Bob Rae, Canada’s ambassador to the UN, said he was unable to help.

There was also another freezing order involving Libyan funds in Canada. On Aug. 9, just weeks prior to Mr. Baird’s announcement that he was removing restrictions on the $2.2-billion, Canada expelled all remaining Libyan diplomats and froze the Libyan embassy’s bank accounts.

The Globe has obtained financial records for five of the Libyan embassy’s accounts at Royal Bank of Canada. The documents, compiled by RBC’s compliance department, detail more than 8,700 transactions across the five accounts between 2004 and 2011 – the final years of Mr. Gadhafi’s regime.

RBC’s compliance officers compiled the data set because there was concern the flow of funds in and out of those accounts was abnormal for a diplomatic mission, according to a third confidential source. (The Globe is not identifying this person because the individual was not authorized to disclose this information to the media.)

Certainly, the bank records show multiple large transactions.

There were 58 transactions of $1-million or more, including eight that exceeded $11-million. An additional 173 transactions exceeded $100,000.

On Nov. 12, 2010, the records for one account show an incoming wire payment of $68.3-million. Three days later, on Nov. 15, the records show a debit of $50-million from the same account.

Then on July 2, 2010, one account showed an incoming wire payment of $14-million and a debit in the same amount on that same day.

On average, the five accounts show about 100 transactions a month, not counting monthly maintenance fees and interest paid on the balance.

The activity in the accounts picked up toward the end of Mr. Gadhafi’s rule. The embassy made 150 transactions or more in seven of the 85 months captured in the bank records. All seven months occurred in 2010 and 2011, leading up to Canada’s August, 2011, freeze on the embassy’s accounts.

It is unclear how many of those transactions RBC later flagged to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

“RBC adheres to all applicable laws and regulatory requirements in the jurisdictions where we operate,” bank spokesperson Gillian McArdle wrote in an e-mailed statement.

“We also comply with all applicable government sanctions, including those issued by Canada, as well as by the U.K., U.S.-OFAC and the EU. This includes blocking or freezing of payments or accounts as required under each of the relevant sanction regimes.”

(OFAC is the acronym for the Office of Foreign Assets Control, an enforcement agency of the U.S. Treasury Department.)

The Libyan embassy in Ottawa did not respond to requests for comment.

The full scope of Mr. Gadhafi’s ill-gotten fortune in Canada remains unknown.

What is known, however, is that Mr. Gadhafi profited from Libya’s vast oil wealth, enriching himself, his children and loyalists by looting funds from state institutions.

His iron-fisted control of the state’s machinery, funds and even commercial contracts is highlighted by an American diplomatic cable referenced in LARMO’s asset-recovery case.

“Libya is a kleptocracy in which the regime – either the [Gadhafi] family itself or its close political allies – has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning,” stated the 2009 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Libya, also stressing the entire system is based on “an unholy alliance of corruption and cult-of-personality politics.”

When it comes to the billions of dollars traced to Canadian bank accounts, Mr. Baja said: “It has to do with Gadhafi himself, not his sons.”

In June, The Globe reported that his third-born son, Saadi Gadhafi, tried to orchestrate a sale of his luxury Toronto penthouse apartment, which remains subject to an asset freeze by the UN Security Council.

“Unfortunately, most of the records that would have detailed the theft of Libyan State funds by Gaddafi and his family have been destroyed or lost since the collapse of his regime,” LARMO states in its U.S. court filings.

“Despite the vast scale of the theft, LARMO has very few records indicating where Gaddafi, his family, and associates hid and continue to hide what they stole.”

__________________

John A. Lechner & Marat Gabidullin

In Africa, Wagner morphed from a state-backed entity into a state-like entity.

Utkin personally flew to CAR to oversee the defense. Upon arrival he told instructors, previously working under a separate entity, to sign a new contract with the PMC. Valery Zakharov, leader of CAR operations, decided to leave the country. The number of contractors in CAR jumped from a few hundred to roughly 2,000, and the mission shifted completely to counterinsurgency. As a result, most major towns returned to government control and armed groups were greatly weakened. The counteroffensive deepened Wagner’s ties to the CAR state, creating new economic opportunities for both.

Wagner was no longer a “deniable” force of the Russian state in CAR; it was the Russian state in CAR. This doesn’t equate to Wagner “controlling” the Central African Republic, however.

Instead, Wagner in CAR is a network of individuals that has subsumed state and corporate functions—diplomacy, military, business—and has grafted onto local powerful networks in the pursuit of mutually beneficial and profitable projects. With time, these networks become interdependent. Wagner has tipped the power balance in Bangui’s favor, but historical modes of governance—the relationship between armed groups and the state and between the center and periphery—have changed little in CAR.

If Wagner’s beginnings were a unique reflection of Putin’s Russia, its success abroad was only possible thanks to specific global circumstances.

Wagner chanced upon a global trend in the privatization of warfare, an existential crisis in U.N. peacekeeping, and failed Western interventions in Africa. Wagner is not an aberration within African politics but what the scholar Graham Harrison calls a “part of the repertoire of techniques of governance” African leaders use to manage constant instability.

Indeed, Africans have significant leverage in dealing with Wagner. Each conflict in which Wagner intervenes provides a unique set of obstacles and opportunities, which explains why operations differ radically in each country.

In contrast to CAR, in Mali, Wagner faces a more dangerous enemy, and local networks have proved keen to retain ownership over assets. Wagner’s “military” mission in Sudan never graduated from instruction to counterinsurgency. In Libya, the PMC began employing pilots flying MiG-29 and Su-24 jets in May 2020 to back Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli.

The scale and sophistication of the equipment Wagner sourced reflected both the Russian state’s keen interest in the oil-producing nation on NATO’s southern flank and the context of the conflict. Militias in the oil-rich country are well-funded, and Turkey’s intervention in the conflict saw a level of technology Wagner would not witness in an enemy until 2022.

Wagner does not have a permanent structure; it morphs, adapting rapidly depending on the situation and circumstances.

In Africa, Wagner morphed from a state-backed entity into a state-like entity. But in Ukraine, following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Prigozhin had to deal with the same rivals and institutions that had challenged him in the past.

When Prigozhin’s enemies cut off his access to Putin, delivering victory in Bakhmut became a question of political survival. Putin’s approval of subordinating Wagner units in Ukraine to the MoD was no less existential. The resulting mutiny was a violent attempt to gain Putin’s ear and oust Shoigu and Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian military. Prigozhin got the meeting with Putin; Shoigu and Gerasimov remain.

The surprise beneficiary was Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who allegedly mediated the conflict and agreed to host Wagner’s new headquarters. The move may change Wagner’s structure, but the more important network remains intact.

In Russia, the MoD terminated contracts for food supply with Prigozhin’s Concord Holding. But an actual shift in suppliers will take time. “Given the convoluted mechanism of state procurement, the Concord scheme was likely quite intricate, involving external beneficiaries other than Prigozhin,” Eledinov told FP. Even if changes appear on paper, they may not reflect actual financial flows.

In Ukraine, the MoD may try to create a new PMC under the leadership of a former high-ranking member of Wagner like Andrei Troshev. The combat effectiveness of such a formation will be significantly lower and serve more to maintain morale. Troshev would still be within the Wagner network. In a critical situation on the front, Putin can deploy Prigozhin’s men from Belarus without explanation.

There are certainly some Wagner fighters who went home or signed up with MoD-affiliated volunteer battalions after the mutiny. It is also unclear how the recruitment of thousands of convicts will affect the composition of Wagner after Ukraine. But more important are the commanders, men such as Utkin and Aleksandr “Ratibor” Kuznetsov. They represent the military talent of the PMC and remain with Prigozhin.

In Syria, Wagner’s main task is to provide security for the base camp at Hayyan, essentially a fortified Russian military outpost. Given the experience of Wagner commanders, any attempts by the MoD to transform or replace Wagner units with a different formation will decrease combat effectiveness. Iranian forces, for the most part, also lack the technical expertise to pick up the slack. Like in 2016, an Islamic State resurgence would result in Wagner’s redeployment.

Wagner will likewise work to retain its assets in eastern Libya as a key logistics hub. Wagner units and units of the Libyan National Army, particularly in the south, have integrated over time. There is little appetite or capacity from the MoD to intervene.

In Africa, the Russian state needs Wagner more than Wagner needs the state.

Wagner’s assets have taken a considerable hit amid civil war in Sudan. Wagner was seen as particularly close to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces through mining interests, and the organization provided some logistics supplies to the RSF through local trade networks at the beginning of the conflict. But Wagner has economic links with the Sudanese Army as well and it’s likely the organization will make an effort to stay on the civil war’s sidelines, revisiting its position when the outcome is clearer.

The MoD’s presence in Africa is limited to individual representatives—part of the standard staffing of any embassy—who neither control nor determine what Prigozhin does. In Africa, the Russian state needs Wagner more than Wagner needs the state, which renders Lavrov’s statement—that Wagner’s operations in Mali and CAR will continue—expected. Prigozhin’s appearance at the Russia-Africa summit was similarly unsurprising.

Wagner does not have a permanent structure; it morphs, adapting rapidly depending on the situation and circumstances. For African operations, Belarus can provide equipment and state backing. In return, Minsk will get a cut of some projects in Africa and shore up its military with training. And Wagner will continue to pursue its projects, framing its efforts as furthering Russia’s, and now Belarus’s, national interests.

***

John A. Lechner, an analyst concentrating on the politics of Russia, Turkey, and African nations.

Marat Gabidullin, a former Wagner Group commander in Syria.

___________

Dr Wolfram Lacher

Dimensions and consequences of a consolidation process

Politicisation

Libya’s armed groups long played only a limited political role. While they acted as veto powers in individual political decisions, they often had diffuse leadership structures and no clear political agendas. They were only indirectly involved in the negotiations to end the civil wars of 2014/15 and 2019/20.

The unity governments that emerged from these negotiations subsequently had to come to terms with the armed groups by granting them posts and affording them budgets. The only coherent politico-military actor was Haftar, who declared his forces to be the Libyan army from the outset and pursued the goal of seizing power. He was always included as a key stakeholder in negotiations by international mediators.

However, since the power struggle between the Dabeiba and Bashagha governments, western Libyan militia leaders have taken on a more explicit political role. They have been able to do so not least because they consolidated military power over the years, and thus also gained more and more political weight.

Since spring 2022, a small group of Western Libyan militia leaders has been meeting regularly with Haftar’s sons and other representatives. These talks are about the distribution of posts and funds, but also more fundamental questions concerning the political process and the conditions for possible elections.

One participant in these negotiations told the author that this group of commanders had come to the realisation that they had to take the political initiative themselves – they could not just let Libya’s politicians “keep playing their games”, and then bear the brunt of fighting if things escalated.

One consequence of these negotiations is the appointment of the warlords’ representatives to high positions. These include the chairman of the NOC, the board of directors of the General Electricity Company of Libya, the interior minister and many others. In addition, western Libyan commanders are exerting increasing pressure on parliamentarians, as Haftar has done for years, in order to influence political negotiations.

Consequences

The evolution of armed groups calls for a re-evaluation of the way in which Libya’s security sector is being conceived. Until now, these forces have been rightly understood as militias, or in other words, groups that, despite their official status, are not really state entities because they represent particular interests.

However, the institutionalisation of these groups and the massive influence of their leaders at the highest levels show that the militias have become the state. The broad contours of the security sector are likely to remain for years to come: a military landscape characterised by competing centres of power, whose leaders use military clout for political and financial gain.

The end of DDR/SSR

For Western governments and the UN, the reunification of the Libyan army remains an important political goal. It is supposed to go hand in hand with processes of security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of militias.

This ideal assumes that it is possible to overcome the current politicisation of armed units, build professional security forces and dismantle the more problematic groups. However, establishing state control over the private armies is no longer realistic. Reuniting them on paper under a single command structure would achieve little, as their effective subordination is out of the question.

The competition between their leaders would continue unabated and it would only be the losers that get branded as militias needing to be disarmed and demobilised. All key actors need to retain their firepower to secure and, if possible, expand their political influence.

Conflict dynamics

Since mid-2020, the deployment of the Turkish military and Russia’s Wagner Group has perpetuated the stalemate. The more recent rapprochement between Turkey on the one hand, and Egypt and the UAE on the other, has further diminished the prospect of renewed military escalation.

These conditions have been central to the development of increasingly collegial ties between militia leaders in eastern and western Libya. Still, the current amalgamation of military power with political and financial interests holds the potential for future escalation.

Who gets what depends on their respective military weight. Distributive conflicts that see competitors engage in games of chicken always involve the possibility of miscalculation.

If the leading military actors strike more far-reaching arrangements in the short term, this could still provoke armed conflict in the medium term. By enjoying privileged access to state resources, individual armed groups could become increasingly powerful and thus pose a growing threat to their rivals. The current balance of power should therefore not be taken for granted.

Meanwhile, ongoing consolidation is also likely to provoke further conflicts, particularly west of Tripoli, where the process is still in its early stages. Moreover, some of the most powerful units could disintegrate if they lose their leaders. This could have particularly significant consequences in the event of Haftar’s demise, as it is uncertain whether his sons will be able to keep his forces together.

Militarisation of politics

With the rise of militia leaders, military force is set to dominate Libya’s political landscape for years to come. This has implications for the UN and Western governments’ goal of ending the crisis of legitimacy of state institutions through elections.

Given the combined military and financial power that violent actors now wield, they are in a position to exert enormous influence over any electoral process – and their now overt political ambitions suggest that they would do just that.

This was already clear in the run-up to elections that were scheduled for December 2021 but failed to take place. A key reason for their failure was the fact that Haftar wanted to run for president while also being able to manipulate the results given that he controlled around two-thirds of the country’s territory.

If elections are held at some point, it is therefore likely that militia leaders will either run themselves or field their own candidates – and then use intimidation and manipulation to ensure that they prevail.

Armed factions could also conceivably form political parties, and their competition could then also play out in a newly elected parliament. In fact, this has already begun with the formation of the al-Karama party, which is aligned with Haftar.

In such an environment, civil political forces face difficult conditions. The repression through which Haftar controls the east is now also growing in the west, and will prevent the political mobilisation of many who do not have weapons to protect themselves.

International engagement

Western diplomats and the UN have long dealt with militia leaders in eastern and western Libya in very different ways. Haftar gained international respect when French President Emmanuel Macron received him in 2017.

By way of the countless meetings that followed thereafter, Western officials conferred international legitimacy upon Haftar without asking for any concessions in return. Militia leaders in western Libya, on the other hand, very rarely enjoyed public meetings with Western diplomats.

This began to change in 2022, when Western representatives encountered the militia leader Emad al-Trabelsi as interior minister. In the spring of 2023, UN Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily brought key commanders from eastern and western Libya to meetings of the Joint Military Committee, which is supposed to oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

Bathily’s stated aim is to ensure that these commanders allow elections to take place. Although he has received only vague assurances to this effect, he has publicly praised the militia leaders for their “patriotic spirit” – praise that the political class can only dream of.

While the international legitimisation of western Libyan militia leaders has begun, the treatment they receive still differs qualitatively from that of Haftar. Europeans have courted Haftar even more since his inner circle has begun to exert pressure on Europe by developing the migration route from eastern Libya to Italy.

The criminal activities of his clan seem to be just as little an obstacle to Haftar’s relations with European states as his alleged responsibility for major war crimes and his alliance with the Wagner Group.

The consolidation of militia power structures requires a change in approach towards their leaders. International mediators have rightly, if belatedly, begun to directly engage with them. However, an opportunity is missed when international actors bestow legitimacy upon militia leaders by way of public meetings without extracting concessions, for example, in the field of human rights.

Western governments should seek to impose limits on the almost total impunity enjoyed by the warlords. The UN sanctions regime is ineffective in this regard due to polarisation in the Security Council. The investigations of the International Criminal Court are important but remain limited to a few suspects.

The EU and US, by contrast, could make much more extensive use of sanctions. At the EU level, this would require Germany and like-minded governments to use their political weight to convince skeptical member states, especially Italy and Malta, but with regard to sanctions against the Haftar clan, also France. European authorities could also investigate whether foreign assets of individuals linked to Libyan militias are derived from criminal activities.

Above all, European governments and the US should use the militia leaders’ pursuit of respectability and legitimacy as leverage to influence their behaviour. The naming and shaming of those individuals responsible for excessive violence, repression or large-scale embezzlement of public funds would send a signal to their colleagues.

***

Dr Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.

_____________

Wissenschaft und Politik

German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Claudia Gazzini

Potential Obstacles

Whatever the plan’s merits, the two assemblies have a record of striking deals and then backtracking, and there are other potential hurdles besides.

The first is that Dabaiba and his supporters could reject his being unseated as prime minister without elections. They could mobilise their armed allies in Tripoli to keep him in power. If they do, clashes could break out between Dabaiba backers and opponents, or individuals tied to efforts to replace Dabaiba could be kidnapped, a tactic commonly used in Libya to silence political opponents. Any of these events could halt the selection process and have destabilising effects.

The second possible obstacle is that, thus far, the main international actors in Libya appear not to support a move by the House and Council toward selecting a unity government. As noted, the UN has opposed the idea outright, saying it runs counter to UN-backed efforts to pave the way for elections.

In a 26 July statement, the UN Support Mission in Libya called it a “unilateral initiative” that flies in the face of popular demand for elections, warning it could have “serious consequences for Libya and trigger further instability and violence”.

But in a strongly worded response, the House Foreign Affairs Committee accused the UN of misleading the Libyan public in describing the plan as “unilateral”, contending that the proposed selection process is consistent with the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, which requires both assemblies’ imprimatur for major political decisions.

The Committee is technically right, but the UN appears to believe that the two assemblies’ agreement is insufficient, and that legitimacy requires greater buy in, including from pro-election and possibly pro-Dabaiba factions – however far-fetched that may be.

As for other outside actors, their views fall along a spectrum. Like the UN, Western capitals have distanced themselves from the interim government plan. In a 27 July joint statement, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the U.S. underscored the need to “address all contested elements of the electoral framework”, arguing that the focus of Libya’s leaders must be on responding to the “Libyan people’s continuous demands for national presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible”.

In neglecting to mention the notion of a unity interim government, the statement suggested these capitals would not support one. This posture is no surprise: officials from these countries have been adamant that the next step should be presidential and legislative elections, followed by formation of a government by the new president based on the existing legal framework.

They see no benefit to appointing a unity government, contending (not entirely plausibly) that the country can embark on elections just as easily with the two rival governments still in place. Some Libyans interpret such positions as a tacit endorsement of the Dabaiba government, which enjoys close relations with many of these countries.

Middle Eastern actors have a range of perspectives. The Egyptian foreign ministry called for “respecting the role of Libyan institutions” and avoiding “any diktats or external interference from any party”.

In doing so, it seemed to suggest that Cairo stands behind the plan to form an interim government – consistent with its repeated calls for appointing one before general elections and its longstanding support for negotiations between the two assemblies. By contrast, the United Arab Emirates has not expressed a view but is unlikely to throw its weight behind the 6+6 Committee’s plan. 

It probably leans toward a deal between Dabaiba and Haftar as the best way forward. Abu Dhabi has tried to forge an arrangement between the two power brokers over the past year, and Emirati officials have indicated to Crisis Group that they prefer that path.

Officials in Qatar are less enthusiastic about a Dabaiba-Haftar deal as such, but they consider it more realistic than any other option that would require ousting Dabaiba. Many Libyans, however, contend that although Haftar and Dabaiba appear to cooperate on a host of matters, especially related to the oil sector, there is little chance that they will strike a political bargain that could lead to the appointment of a unity government.

An Opportunity to Break the Deadlock?

With the prospect of elections more remote than ever, it is possible that the UN and foreign governments are being too hard-nosed in opposing the idea of forming a unity government as the necessary first step.

Of course, if the main Libyan parties could agree on elections, the ballot box would be the best way forward. But they remain divided over the same issues that torpedoed the 2021 elections, namely identifying the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates and the sequencing of presidential and legislative elections.

The chance of overcoming these disputes right now is very low, despite the 6+6 Committee’s ideas about how to do so. Libyan politicians tend to profess publicly their support for elections but to temper or withdraw it when they suspect polls would threaten their own political aspirations.

For its part, the UN is in no position to impose a different solution on the Libyan parties. In late February, Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN special representative, proposed that the UN appoint a High-Level Steering Panel for Elections to complete the electoral roadmap. But after the two assemblies objected, and Egypt lobbied the UN Security Council against the idea, Bathily reversed himself.

The UN’s role has since shrunk, reflecting the desire of Libya’s political leaders to make their own decisions about the country’s future.

With the UN thus constrained, and no viable alternative on offer, external actors concerned with Libya’s path to stability and good governance should soften their opposition to forming an interim unity government prior to elections.

Instead, they should make clear that they can get behind the idea if the two assemblies agree on clear, transparent procedures for selecting a prime minister and if the mandate of the new executive is clearly defined to support electoral preparations.

Both bodies should thus make refinements to the approved plan, offering further commitments and details concerning how they will organise internal voting. The House and the Council should also invite the UN to oversee the selection process to ensure that it is free and fair; the UN’s involvement would reduce the chances that other Libyans, including Dabaiba supporters, will contest the outcome, as occurred with the Bashagha government in 2022.

Once a unity government is in place, the prospects for getting to new polls become much greater, although still fraught with challenges.

Outside actors are right to see risks in following this path, but if the two assemblies make the changes and commitments suggested above, those risks will be worth taking. 

The plan approved by the House on 25 July might not be the ideal way out of Libya’s political crisis, but for now it is the only realistic path to reunifying the country.

***

Claudia Gazzini is the International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Libya. She has covered this role since 2012. Between October 2017 and March 2018 she also served as policy advisor to Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). She researches and produces reports on security, politics and economic governance of Libya, including its oil sector. She travels regularly throughout Libya. 

________________

John A. Lechner & Marat Gabidullin

The mercenary group is a product of the system Putin built, and he can’t dismantle it without undermining Moscow’s global influence.

Much ink has been spilled on what the Wagner Group’s June 23 mutiny means for the mercenary outfit.

One of us is a former Wagner Group commander, and based on experience and a look at Wagner’s past, it’s clear that it’s here to stay.

Wagner is a reflection of the system Russian President Vladimir Putin has built. The same opportunities and challenges that created Wagner will constrain the Russian state’s willingness and capacity to replace it. The organization’s relocation to Belarus is simply its latest iteration.

To predict Wagner’s future, we need to understand what Wagner was. Analysts have scoured history to find precedents: from Frederick the Great’s Freikorps to the ronin of feudal Japan. The best answer, however, is that Wagner is something new. As Sergey Eledinov, an Africa expert, told Foreign Policy, “Wagner is a sociological phenomenon, one that could only manifest within the context of Russia at a certain time in an increasingly interconnected world.”

The Russian system is an amalgamation of competing institutions and individuals framing their projects within the “interests” of the state. Guidance from the center—the Kremlin—is rare, so political entrepreneurs pursue what they believe to be good for Russia and their bank accounts. But there’s the risk of misinterpreting the center, or that the center will reinterpret its interests.

Wagner began during the war in Ukraine. While the 2014 seizure and annexation of Crimea was directed from the Kremlin, the initial phase of the war in the Donbas was not. Rather, hawkish elements within the Russian government worked, successfully, to draw the Kremlin further into the conflict.

Once in, the Kremlin could not appear weak on its preferred talking point: protecting Russian minorities outside Russia’s borders. But Putin wasn’t interested in annexation, either, and so the Kremlin turned to a mix of soldiers without uniform, volunteers, and mercenaries to shore up local militias.

At its core, Wagner arose from a government need—to shore up, in a deniable fashion, weak local militias facing an increasingly confident Ukrainian military.

In 2013, Dmitry Utkin, a former special forces officer in Russia’s military intelligence, still known today by its old acronym, the GRU, was part of a mercenary group, Slavonic Corps, that fell afoul of the FSB, Russia’s internal security service, over its actions in Syria. A few months later, he was in Ukraine commanding a military detachment primarily composed of former Slavonic Corps mercenaries. That detachment would form the basis for Prigozhin and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to develop a private military company (PMC), the future Wagner Group.

The FSB worked to organize the government of the unrecognized Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR). The GRU—subordinate to the MoD—organized, prepared, and managed militia units, as well as coordinated joint actions between mercenaries and militias. The LNR—where Utkin’s detachment was most active—required more mercenaries than the DNR given its lower industrial base.

Prigozhin was also active in Luhansk, where he recognized the potential for a Western-style PMC in Russia. He brought on high-ranking GRU officials as informal advisors to the project, but not as authorized representatives of the Russian government.

At its core, Wagner arose from a government need—to shore up, in a deniable fashion, weak local militias facing an increasingly confident Ukrainian military—but it was Prigozhin, and informal networks from state institutions, who took the initiative for its future development. The relationship between Wagner and the state was always dependent on the political context.

For example, in 2016, Wagner Group was in Syria, part of the Russian military’s intervention. After Wagner’s involvement in capturing Palmyra from the Islamic State, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu insisted on pulling the PMC out of the country. Wagner turned over its weapons to the Russian military.

Prigozhin formed a new company, Evro Polis, and signed a contract with the Syrian government to liberate oil fields in exchange for 25 percent of the profits. In December 2016, the Islamic State drove the Russian military out of Palmyra. The MoD once again issued weapons to Wagner to retake the city. When Russian Gen. Aleksandr Dvornikov denigrated Wagner’s role in the fighting, an infuriated Prigozhin sent his men back to camp. It was only under great pressure that Wagner rejoined the conflict.

The incident in Syria revealed a peculiarity of the Russian system. The Wagner network worked to embed itself within Russia’s national security infrastructure, itself a web of powerful interest groups. The U.S. PMC Blackwater also marketed itself as an indispensable pillar of the U.S. military’s “Total Force,” but Blackwater’s mandates were very different. Blackwater, unlike Wagner, was never tasked with offensive operations parallel to or in place of the U.S. military.

At the same time, the freedom of Russia’s elite to pursue foreign policy allowed Prigozhin to sign contracts with foreign governments—even when separate defense agreements existed between national governments. In this sense, Wagner resembled the South African PMC Executive Outcomes (EO) in the 1990s, which signed contracts with Angola and Sierra Leone. EO provided training and engaged in combat, yet unlike Wagner or Blackwater, it could not leverage ties to a “host” government.

Prigozhin still needed a narrative to frame outside contracts as furthering Russia’s “national interests.” Enter the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In 2017, Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir lobbied the Russian government to protect his country from U.S. influence. “It was impossible, however,” Eledinov told us, “for the Russian military to send troops.” The only viable option for Russia’s top diplomat, Sergey Lavrov, was to send contractors.

Of course, the use of contractors in Africa is widespread; the U.S., for example, hired an American PMC, DynCorp, to rebuild Liberia’s army. But the U.S. military could have fielded troops if it were a priority. Syria, half the distance between Sudan and Russia, already presented challenges to the MoD.

That same year, following a disagreement at the United Nations Security Council over an arms embargo in the Central African Republic (CAR), French diplomats told CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to reach out to Russia directly. Lavrov, eager for another foreign-policy win, took advantage. He flew CAR officials to Russia and struck a deal to send weapons and instructors to the beleaguered government in Bangui.

It was in CAR that Wagner broke from all previous PMC models. Not because of mineral concessions linked to security provisions—this is common—but because of diplomacy. In 2019, according to those involved, Wagner and Prigozhin personally delivered Lavrov another foreign-policy win. They brought the CAR government and 14 armed groups together to sign a peace accord, the 2019 Khartoum Accord. Despite it’s failure to hold, it’s a peace deal the international community still supports.

In Syria, Wagner found itself constantly checked by Russia’s MoD, which, as the 2016 incident showed, had direct leverage over the PMC through the distribution of military equipment within Syria. But CAR’s lack of importance to the Kremlin’s security institutions allowed Prigozhin to pursue business ventures and projects as he saw fit.

Until late 2020, Wagner’s military operation focused on training. But a presidential election—pushed by the entire international community—upset the fragile Khartoum Accord. Six armed group signatories formed a new alliance, the CPC, and pushed toward Bangui. The rebels thought they were about to kick Wagner out. Instead, they supercharged it.

***

John A. Lechner, an analyst concentrating on the politics of Russia, Turkey, and African nations.

Marat Gabidullin, a former Wagner Group commander in Syria.

________________

Dr. Ali Al-Din Hilal

The term “ceasefire agreements” or “truces” refers to agreements that are concluded to halt ongoing military operations between two or more parties, for humanitarian reasons. These reasons include providing care for the wounded, protecting civilians or reducing tensions and seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

The following are examples of such ceasefire agreements: 

A ceasefire agreement known as the Armistice of 11 November 1918 was signed between the Allies, on the one hand, and Germany and its ally the Ottoman Empire, on the other, to end World War I including in the Middle Eastern theatre. A similar agreement between the Allies and Germany regarding the Western Front in Europe led to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919.

After World War II, Israel signed agreements with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in 1949. Other examples include the agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953, the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the agreements that ended the U.S. intervention in Vietnam in 1973 are also noteworthy. Furthermore, the ceasefire agreement signed between Georgia and Abkhazia in 1994 and the agreement between Israel and Lebanon in 2006 are further examples of ceasefires. 

It should be noted that all the above-mentioned examples of ceasefires have to do with conflicts and wars between countries. However, it is crucial to broaden our understanding of ceasefire agreements to encompass other scenarios. This includes analyzing agreements reached following the dissolution of existing states or during civil conflicts occurring within a state, where government forces engage with opposition armed organizations and militias commonly known as “non-state actors.”

Prominent examples of such agreements include the Washington Agreement, which brought about a ceasefire between Croatia, Serbia, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1994 following the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Another notable instance is the Dayton Agreement, which ended the war between Serbia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1995. These agreements serve as significant illustrations of ceasefire efforts in complex political contexts involving non-state actors.

Another notable example is the Good Friday Agreement, which was signed by the British and Irish governments and several parties in Northern Ireland in 1998. The agreement established power-sharing arrangements between unionist and nationalist parties. 

In South America, numerous ceasefire agreements were put in place following conflicts between government forces and rebel armed organizations. Most recently, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the Colombian government and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, in June 2023.

In the Arab region, Sudan’s government has signed several ceasefire agreements to end internal wars. These include an agreement with rebel groups in 2006, as well as agreements with rebels in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile in 2016. Another one is an agreement with rebel groups in South Sudan that was signed in 2018.

The question now is why some ceasefire agreements between conflicting parties have succeeded in halting military operations and initiating peace talks, while other efforts to resolve the ongoing conflicts in Sudan, Libya, and Yemen, have failed?

Five Determinants

Because of varying political circumstances and causes of armed conflicts, as well as the balance of power between government forces and armed organizations, one can’t generalize and use a single reason or explanation to apply in all cases. However, the following five factors can be pointed out:

1. Lack of mutual trust between warring parties:

In this case, each party to the conflict believes that the other party has ill intentions, is unwilling to adhere to commitments resulting from an agreed ceasefire, and/or will seize the first opportunity to violate them. As a result, a back-and-forth exchange of accusations between the parties regarding violation of the ceasefire. This is currently happening between the army commanders and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan. Moreover, this feeling is amplified by a history of reneging on commitments between the parties, the affiliation of conflicting parties to conflicting tribes and ethnicities, as well as continued provocative statements and actions from one or both parties, which exacerbates doubt in the intentions of other parties.

2. Resorting to military means:

Parties to the conflict believe in their ability to resolve the conflict through military means and defeat opponents on the battlefield. In such a case, leaders of this party do not have the desire to cease fire because they believe it would deprive them of the opportunity to achieve a decisive military victory and impose their conditions on the defeated party. In that case as well, a party might publicly declare acceptance of mediation efforts but it is often viewed as a political maneuver to buy time, replenish weapons and ammunition supplies, and regroup.

3. Multiplicity of warring parties, their diversified objectives, and the absence of unified leadership:

In some cases, a large number of parties are involved. These include militias, tribal and sectarian-driven organizations, local groups, and armed factions that seek to defend specific interests or regional agendas. This was the case in Libya, Syria, Sudan, South Sudan, and at various stages of internal conflicts in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. In these cases, the outbreak of fighting and civil war reveals the extent of social divisions and exposes the existence of a “fragile” or “failed state” that has failed to fulfill the primary task of any state, which is to maintain the security and cohesion of its territory.

4. The role of external powers that have no interest in reaching a ceasefire or ending the war:

That is because they have their own interests and they get involved and intervene in the conflict accordingly. In some cases, they directly intervene through individuals, experts, and trainers. Most often, they provide their local allies with financial support, weapons, and ammunition, and encourage them not to engage in ceasefire negotiations or mediation or respect such efforts. This amounts to “proxy wars”, where civil wars become the battleground and an arena for competition between regional and international powers. Here, it becomes difficult to uphold ceasefire agreements without the consent of the “sponsoring state(s)” behind the warring parties. This is evident, for example, in Libya and Yemen. In light of this, the decision of the United Nations Security Council to impose an arms embargo on Libya in 2016, which is renewed annually but often disregarded by many countries, can be understood.

5. Significance of the material and moral weight of mediating countries:

The more sufficient leverage and influence by these countries on the behavior of warring parties (utilizing a combination of “carrots and sticks”), the greater the chance of their mediation being successful. However, this viewpoint should not be accepted without reservation. For example, the ongoing mediation in Sudan is led by the United States and Saudi Arabia, both of which hold significant influence over the conflicting parties. Nevertheless, their mediation has not succeeded so far in achieving a ceasefire. This point is tied to the ability of sponsoring countries to establish systems of monitoring and surveillance to determine which party is violating the ceasefire and to impose appropriate consequences.

Failure of State-building

Multiple reasons contribute to failure of ceasefire agreements with armed organizations. Their role and significance vary from one situation to another. However, they are all connected to a central core, which is the fragility of the state and the magnitude of social and ethnic divisions, as well as a sense of exclusion, marginalization, and injustice felt by certain groups. As a result of these conditions, the state structure begins to crumble, and its political and security institutions disintegrate. Here, the priority shifts from the “state” to the “group,” “organization,” or “sect,” and the main determining factors in the political choices of the conflicting parties become factional, regional, and sectarian interests. Thus, the outbreak of fighting between the conflicting parties is evidence of the failure of the state-building process. Failure of mediation attempts to achieve a ceasefire further confirms the state failure.

In Libya, for example, armed groups and militias have taken control of state territories, and politicians resort to them to seek protection. Despite the signing of a ceasefire agreement on October 23, 2020, there continued to be multiple governments each claiming to be legitimate. The prime minister appointed by the parliament failed to enter the capital to assume his duties. Moreover, the presidential and parliamentary elections were delayed, and there was ongoing disagreement between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State about the constitutional foundations for holding elections. Furthermore, military clashes have periodically resurged in various areas.

In this context, the dominance of armed groups over state institutions and the fragmentation of political power highlight the failure of state-building efforts in Libya. The inability to establish a unified and stable government, conduct elections, and maintain a lasting ceasefire has hindered the country’s progress towards peace and stability.

In Yemen, the Houthi militia expanded their influence and managed to seize control of the capital Sana’a. Their expansion was supported by the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh. As a result, the legitimate government relocated to the southern region of the country, and more specifically to Aden. The agreement brokered by the United Nations between the Yemeni government and the Houthi rebels in April 2022 helped reduce the intensity of the armed conflict. However, the Houthi militia violated the ceasefire, refusing to extend it in October last year. They continued their military escalation in several fronts in Yemen and laid a siege on the province of Taiz in the southwest of the country.

In Sudan, the fighting broke out on April 15, 2023, between the army forces led by General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan, Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council and the Rapid Support Forces led by the Deputy Chairman of the Council Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti. This means that the fight erupted between forces all affiliated with the official military institution. The numerous mediations and initiatives by Arab, African, and international parties to achieve a ceasefire, failed to achieve any success. This includes the Saudi-American mediation that took place based on indirect talks with representatives of the conflicting parties in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. However, up to date, this mediation has not resulted in reaching a stable ceasefire.

In summary, failures to achieve ceasefires indicate varying degrees of state institutional breakdown and division, dominance of ethnic, sectarian, and regional interests and agendas, presence of non-state armed actors, and increased interventions by regional and international powers. Nevertheless, ceasefire agreements remain the primary pathway to build trust between warring parties, reduce escalation, ease tensions, and create a conducive environment for conflict resolution.

____________

Claudia Gazzini

Libyan politicians have floated a plan to put together an interim government. The UN and other external actors should support this step toward breaking the country’s political deadlock.

Libya’s political crisis took a new turn after its House of Representatives, based in the eastern city of Tobruk, approved a plan to appoint an interim government that would reunify the country’s two parallel executives as part of a roadmap to general elections. House members made this decision with backing from representatives of the rival Tripoli-based assembly, the High State Council, and from east-based military strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

If it garners sufficient support, the plan could be an important step toward healing the rift that has placed Libya under the split administration of two separate authorities for much of the past decade. But it still faces significant obstacles, with influential critics both inside and outside Libya.

Opponents say the plan undermines already faltering efforts to hold elections and risks shattering a peace that has lasted for a year despite the deep divisions in the country.

Western governments and some Libyans want Libya to hold general elections first, before forming a government, and so does the UN. But they find themselves at odds with the so-called 6+6 Committee, which was established by and comprises members of both the House and Council, and is tasked with drafting a roadmap to fresh polls as well as a set of laws to govern them.

The UN has supported the Committee in helping prepare for fresh polls. But despite the UN’s insistence on holding elections before putting together a government – which would leave the two parallel administrations in place for the time being – the 6+6 Committee concluded in its deliberations that an interim unity government is a necessary first step. It drafted a plan to that effect, which the House and Council then adopted.

Proponents of the plan make a solid case that their effort is the most promising way to bring the country back together, given the challenges (some would say impossibility) of holding elections while governance is divided between two competing entities. But it remains to be seen whether their plan is viable – something that will depend in part on external support.

If the process of selecting a prime minister to form this government is clear and transparent, international actors, including the UN, should endorse this course of action, which presents a concrete path for moving Libya beyond the political stalemate that has plagued it for so long.

Toward a New Unity Government?

At the heart of debates about the new plan stands the unresolved matter of Libya’s reunification. Since an international coalition ousted the Muammar Qadhafi regime in 2011, Libya has lurched from one predicament to another.

In 2014, contested parliamentary elections in effect split the country in two, with one power centre forming in the capital, Tripoli, and the other in Tobruk. Fighting broke out intermittently between the two camps, with forces under Haftar’s command laying siege to Tripoli in April 2019.

A ceasefire the following October ushered in the formation of a unified interim government. But the unity did not last. In February 2022, following botched elections two months earlier, a deal between the House and Council to replace the Tripoli-based government of Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba collapsed, and the House asked Fathi Bashagha to form a parallel government.

The country has been split between two rival administrations since then, with precious little agreement either inside or outside the country about how to knit them back together.

In Tripoli sits the Dabaiba government, which enjoys international recognition despite its failure to hold scheduled elections in December 2021, controlling most of western Libya. The parallel authority (which Russia has welcomed but no government has recognised) administers eastern Libya from Sirte, backed by the House in Tobruk as well as Haftar. In March, the House removed Bashagha, replacing him with his finance minister, Osama Hamad, in an acting capacity.

Local and international actors continue to disagree about the best way to bring the country back under a single government – whether through fresh elections, a power-sharing deal or a new constitution.

The elections-first approach is enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2656 (2022), which “recognises the desire of the Libyan people to have their say in who governs them through elections” – language that partly explains the UN’s present opposition to creating a unity government.

Likewise, there are persistent divergences over who should lead reunification efforts: the rival assemblies, the principal political actors on the ground or a new UN-led forum.

The 2015 UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement states that the country’s rival assemblies must agree on any major decision about the country’s political future. But in 2021 it was a UN-led body, which included members of the two assemblies and other representatives of Libya’s factions, that selected Dabaiba as interim prime minister.

Moves toward the present juncture began in late May, prompted by the deliberations of the 6+6 Committee.

The Committee was formed in early March and comprises six members of the House of Representatives (Libya’s parliament elected in 2014) and six from the Tripoli-based High State Council (an advisory body created in 2016 by members of Libya’s first post-Qadhafi assembly elected in 2012). Two months later, it stated that it had reached agreement on an electoral roadmap and supporting legislation. To the surprise of those who believed the 6+6 Committee’s charge was to pave a straight road to elections, it conditioned the two assemblies’ endorsement of the election laws upon the prior appointment of a unity government.

Calls for forming an interim unity government were not new. House Speaker Aghila Saleh and Council Chair Khaled Mishri had publicly endorsed the idea in preceding months. The two men, once adversaries, and their allies in the rival assemblies agreed on the need for a new prime minister to replace Dabaiba.

Yet it is unclear if what drove them was real enthusiasm for a unified government to organise elections or simply animosity toward Dabaiba, who by late 2021 had lost the support of members of the House and by early 2023 also of the Council. 

On 16 June, Haftar added his voice to the mix, saying the country needed an interim government of technocrats to oversee elections and unify the country.

The 6+6 Committee says the time is right to form the interim unified government because it has resolved key disputes such as those over the sequencing of presidential and parliamentary elections and eligibility requirements for presidential candidates. This claim is only partly true.

The Committee’s members are in agreement on these matters, but neither the House nor the Council has accepted the proposed election laws that the committee drafted. The Committee scheduled a signing ceremony for the electoral laws on 6 June in Morocco, where its members had been negotiating behind closed doors; the speakers of both assemblies travelled to Morocco but stayed away from the ceremony, which was cancelled at the last minute.

House Speaker Saleh subsequently explained to Crisis Group that he opposed the Committee’s provision for a mandatory second round in the presidential election even if a candidate wins more than 50 per cent of the vote in the first round.

According to other politicians, another point of contention is whether and when a presidential candidate should have to renounce a second nationality (a potential issue because of Haftar’s reported U.S. citizenship).

With these matters still outstanding, neither assembly has yet officially endorsed the electoral laws the Committee submitted, but the latter appears undeterred. Apparently bypassing these setbacks, the 6+6 Committee nevertheless went ahead and drafted a separate document laying out the terms of reference and selection process for a new interim government, as part of its electoral roadmap. It is this new text to which House members gave their preliminary approval on 25 July (the Council had already endorsed it earlier in the month).

This approved proposal for forming a unity government envisages full cooperation between the two rival assemblies in selecting an interim prime minister. Candidates would need to secure formal endorsements (tazkiyat) from at least fifteen House and ten Council members.

Next, the House and Council memberships would each vote for candidates from the list. The winner would need to secure the combined highest number of votes.

The plan might well still change. Several House members have said the Council should not be part of this arrangement, on the grounds that it is merely a consultative body. Some have also argued that selecting a government should happen only after the House has formally approved the election laws, with Council backing. They accordingly questioned the plan’s legal validity.

In response, and to reassure House members, the House speaker argued that while the Council will share responsibility for selecting the candidate for the interim prime minister’s post, only the House will have the power to ratify or reject the selected candidate; he is right, because Libyan law provides that only parliament can give confidence to a government.

At this point, in light of House members’ remarks and possible amendments to the plan relating to voting procedures, it is unclear if both the House and the Council will need to approve an updated version of the plan another time.

The two assemblies also still need to clarify the voting procedures and quorum numbers by which the selection process is to occur; and to make clear that part of the new prime minister’s mandate will be to prepare for fresh elections.

As a practical matter, for the Committee’s plan to bring an interim unified government into being, three sets of conditions are required.

First, the two assemblies will need to continue good-faith cooperation on the selection procedure for the prime minister, the details of which remain unspecified. Secondly, the move needs popular support.

Many Libyans embrace the idea of a unity government before elections – including political personalities who have been staunch advocates of polls and were themselves candidates in the presidential race.

But their blessing for this particular plan depends on the perceived validity of the selection procedure and the interim prime minister’s credibility. Thirdly, the plan needs international recognition and UN backing, without which prospects for Dabaiba leaving his post are dim.

***

Claudia Gazzini is the International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for Libya. She has covered this role since 2012. Between October 2017 and March 2018 she also served as policy advisor to Ghassan Salamé, Special Representative and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). She researches and produces reports on security, politics and economic governance of Libya, including its oil sector. She travels regularly throughout Libya. 

_____________

Dr Wolfram Lacher

Dimensions and consequences of a consolidation process

The armed groups that have formed in Libya since 2011 have progressively taken over the state. They are undergoing a process of institutionalisation, and their representatives are reaching the top levels of the army, the security apparatus and the civilian government.

At the same time, they are exerting massive influence over who gets key appointments and how state resources are distributed. The resulting amalgamation of private interests mixed with military units is likely to shape Libya’s political and security landscapes for years to come.

Since mid-2022, relations between leading military actors have been characterised by pragmatic arrangements. But they continue to harbour considerable potential for conflict as distributive conflicts can quickly lead to armed confrontation.

The consolidation of private armies also diminishes the prospect of security sector reform. European governments should reconsider how they engage with Libya’s increasingly powerful and repressive militia leaders.

Since the Libyan state’s monopoly on violance collapsed with Muammar al-Qadhafi’s demise in 2011, numerous armed groups have competed to fill the vacuum. In addition to the forces that mobilised in order to fight the Qadhafi regime, countless new units also formed after its defeat.

Almost all armed groups operated under the cover of state legitimacy, whether within newly created institutions or simply as units of the interior or defence ministries. In reality, however, they primarily defended the interests of their leaders, members or social base, while largely evading state control.

Their competition over access to state funding played a major role in the escalation of the second civil war in 2014 that put an end to the post-Qadhafi transition and led to the formation of two competing governments.

Even after the second civil war subsided, confrontations continued between groups that nominally reported to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Meanwhile, Khalifa Haftar, who had formed his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in 2014, gradually expanded his control in eastern, central and eventually southern Libya. In 2019, Haftar’s attempt to capture Tripoli provoked a third civil war that ended in 2020 with the LAAF’s withdrawal from western Libya and the establishment of a foreign military presence on both sides.

Since then, foreign forces have maintained a precarious balance of power: the Turkish military backs the government in Tripoli, while Russia’s Wagner Group supports the LAAF. There have been several unsuccessful attempts under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) to break this stalemate by holding elections and reuniting the country. Nonetheless, the so-called Government of National Unity (GNU) under Abdelhamid Dabeiba, formed in 2021, has held on to power in Tripoli. Even though Haftar does not recognise the Dabeiba government and instead supports a parallel government in the east, he has a growing set of informal arrangements that link him to the GNU.

He receives sizeable monthly payments from Tripoli, and has placed his representatives in key positions, including as chief of the National Oil Corporation (NOC).

Consolidation

The military landscape has seen a process of consolidation that began in 2016 and has accelerated ever since, including during the political stalemate since 2021. From a multitude of small armed groups, ever larger formations with more extensive territories have emerged.

The pioneer in this respect was Haftar, who mobilised a loose alliance of armed groups in 2014 but increasingly centralised control over his coalition throughout the years. Haftar’s defeat in Tripoli in 2020 temporarily weakened his position in eastern Libya, but since then his sons have continued to amass military, political and economic power. Many LAAF militias have been integrated into units under the command of Haftar’s sons and relatives.

Commanders with loyal followings who had become liabilities for Haftar due to their particular notoriety for war crimes fell victim to assassinations. This centralisation of power within the Haftar clan also allowed it to increasingly monopolise control over criminal activities.

These include the violent seizure of land, the takeover of state companies and banks, and the smuggling of fuel, drugs, and people. At the same time, Haftar’s sons have strengthened loyal commanders – as opposed to opportunistic allies – in southern Libya, thereby consolidating their direct control over the region.

In western Libya, the consolidation is less advanced, but nevertheless unmistakable. After Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj took office in 2016, a cartel of four militias gradually pushed smaller groups out of downtown Tripoli, allowing them to establish a stranglehold over state institutions.

During the war for Tripoli in 2019/20, some western Libyan militias proved particularly effective. After the war, they received training and equipment from Turkey in addition to privileged access to state funds, thereby strengthening their position.

The Tripoli militia landscape consolidated further when several armed groups were driven out of the capital by their rivals in 2022.

This occurred in the context of a power struggle between the GNU and the rival government of Fathi Bashagha – a dynamic that polarised armed groups in the greater Tripoli area. The camp supporting Dabeiba prevailed in a brief armed confrontation in August 2022.

Since then, large parts of Tripoli have been controlled by only two armed groups: the “Deterrence Apparatus” of Abderrauf Kara and the “Stabilisation Support Apparatus” of Abdelghani “Ghnewa” al-Kikli.

Institutionalisation

The groups that have prevailed in these struggles are in the process of institutionalising themselves in several respects. Many of them had emerged by 2011, and nearly all by 2014; they have since gained permanence.

Over the years, their leaders have acquired considerable expertise in war, politics and finance. They have also tightened what were initially often diffuse command structures. In their established territories, their patronage networks are now deeply entrenched in the economy and administration.

Institutionalisation is also evident in the links between the militias and the state. From the outset, armed groups entered state institutions, thereby claiming to represent the state.

This included adopting official-sounding names such as “116th Brigade”. Another common practice was to appoint career officers as pro forma commanders of such units in order to conceal the role of the actual militia leaders, who were civilians.

Now, these same militia leaders have not only emerged as official commanders of these units but also as top government officials. Examples include: GNU interior minister Emad al-Trabelsi; his counterpart in the rival east-based government, Essam Buzriba – a brother of Stability Support Apparatus deputy commander Hassan Buzriba – and his deputy, Faraj al-Gaim.

In addition, an increasing number of senior officials owe their positions to militia leaders, who now collect the lion’s share of embezzled state funds. In this sense, armed groups’ quest for official status is no longer a matter of camouflage: they now indeed represent the Libyan state as it exists today.

Finally, the process of institutionalisation is evident in the growing professionalisation of armed groups. Militias are increasingly trying to appear as providers of security, just as they work to counter civilian perceptions that they are primarily a threat.

In this regard, militias in Tripoli have benefited from the fact that armed clashes, which were previously common in the capital, have almost completely ceased since August 2022.

In interviews with the author, commanders argued that disorderly factions had been gradually eliminated, thus prompting other militias to conclude that they needed to work together to provide security in order to survive.

In Tripoli, which was dominated by particularly unruly militias only a few years ago, the 444th Brigade is now the new model. It is a unit that is seen as disciplined, reliable and uncompromising in dealing with crime in the areas it controls south of Tripoli.

Part of this model, which more and more groups are imitating, is that units recruit beyond the areas of origin of their leaders, rather than remaining associated with a particular social constituency.

Still, this definitely does not mean that these units are under state control as the govern­ment would not be able to change their commanders. Like Haftar’s LAAF, they are therefore private armies.

Professionalisation further means that militias place greater emphasis on the skills of their personnel. They acquire these skills, for example, through the military training that western Libyan units have received from Turkey and Haftar’s forces received from Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Professionalisation also encompasses an increasing reliance on members of the Qadhafi regime’s security forces. Here too, Haftar has been a pioneer, recruiting the former regime’s military and intelligence officers and using them to engage in fierce repression. In western Libya, the recruitment of such personnel had long been considered taboo, but this has gradually been overcome since 2016.

The first group to recruit former intelligence officers in large numbers was the “Deterrence Apparatus”. Later, militia leaders in Tripoli began to revive the domestic and foreign intelligence services along with their old staff.

The network around Abdelghani al-Kikli controls the Internal Security Agency, while several militias compete for influence in the foreign intelligence service. Under the helm of the militia leaders, the institutional culture of these agencies is experiencing a renaissance in the form of hostility towards civil society, which is suspected of being an instrument of foreign subversion.

The intelligence services and their new masters try to portray themselves as the guardians of Libyan sovereignty by arresting civil society activists and then releasing videos of confessions extracted under pressure. In this way, the political culture of the old regime and the personal interests of militia leaders intertwine to create a new western Libyan security apparatus.

***

Dr Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.

_____________

Wissenschaft und Politik

German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Fuat Emir

On the night of 26 July in Niger, on the television broadcast where Colonel Maj Amadou Abdramane and the soldiers with him were present, the administration was seized, and in this context, President Mohammed Bazum was dismissed and detained, the borders were closed and a temporary curfew was declared. After the developments, many regional and international actors reacted to the military coup. Countries in the region neighboring Niger, especially regional and international organizations, condemned the military figures who attempted a coup in the democratic process.

Niger is in a strategic position in terms of its rich uranium resources and hosting the bases of countries that have an active military presence in the Sahel region, such as the USA and France. In this sense, it can be stated that in addition to the USA and France, Russia, China and Turkey also have certain economic, social and military engagements. 

In addition, Niger is a country where France has deployed approximately 1500 soldiers after entering Mali in 2014 as part of the Barkhane Operations and is at the center of its military planning in the Sahel. Similar statements came from Libya, a North African country bordering Niger, and Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dibeybe and Chairman of the Presidential Council Muhammed Menfi reacted to the developments.

Reactions from Libya to the Coup Attempt

President of the Presidential Council Menfi condemned the effort to change the government in Niger in an unconstitutional way and stated that unlawful military steps were not based on any legitimate ground. 

Menfi added that similarly, the African Union (AfB) charter also rejects unconstitutional interventions and noted that the army units involved in the coup in Niger should return to their barracks. However, the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity (MBH) in Libya, Abdulhamid Dibeybe, stated that he was concerned about the developments in Niger, and in his post on his Twitter account, he emphasized that the military moves that undermine the security and stability of the region are alarming for the countries in the region. Dibeybe,

The developments in Niger are very closely related to Libya, which is in a political deadlock due to the elections. The slow progress of the negotiations carried out by the 6+6 Joint Committee formed by the representatives of the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives and the Supreme Council of State (DYK) and the increased pressure of the UN Libya Support Mission (UNSMIL) on the committee reduces the possibility of reaching an agreement aiming at a comprehensive solution. In addition, the prolongation of the process paves the way for Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the militia forces in eastern Libya, to turn his rhetoric into a more aggressive tone.

Possible Scenarios

In this context, it seems likely that the stability and peace that Libya is trying to establish within itself will be affected by extra-regional factors. Just like Mali, the country that was affected by the coup in Niger entering a period of chaos may cause the conflicts in Niger to spread to Libya over broad common borders. 

In such a scenario, it may become possible for armed groups active in the south of the country to engage in some illegal activities by taking advantage of the chaos environment. 

At this point, one of the main points to be emphasized is that smuggling activities and terrorist groups have transformed the Fezzan region of Libya into a transit zone. This situation includes the possibility of adding a new one to the existing security vulnerabilities. 

So much so that the Fezzan region under the approach of unmanageable areas, It is defined as areas where basic public services cannot be provided and where security concerns reach a serious level in the eyes of the public. 

At this point, the fact that the atmosphere in Niger, as a country with a relatively stable and strong state authority in the Sahel region, reached an uncontrollable dimension, provided the non-state armed actors (DDSA) in the country with the environment they were looking for, turning these points into “ports of refuge” (safe haven ).

On the other hand, the success of the military coup in Niger and the takeover of military figures in the country may cause the leader of the militia in eastern Libya and former soldier Khalifa Haftar to store motivation. 

This scenario, which can be read as a domino effect, has examples specific to the region in the past. As it is known, the coup attempts launched by Haftar against the UN-backed governments in the west in 2014 and 2019 failed. 

However, at this point, his statements and his efforts to undermine the reconciliation/dialogue process in Libya through the political and military elites, especially the Tobruk-based parliament, show that Haftar still has similar goals for the future. 

Therefore, the internal turmoil in Niger and the spread of the chaos here to Libya may offer Haftar the environment he is looking for. For Haftar, who is in silent competition with the forces affiliated with the current government in the south of Libya, the atmosphere of insecurity that will arise due to the events in Niger in this region may pave the way for a military intervention in the province of Fezzan. Because in the literature, these regions have an important symbolic value in terms of power variables in Libyan politics.

The third topic is the potential of the young population holding a gun to turn into a “mercenary”, as in the case of Sudan and Chad, as the events in Niger take a further stage. Considering the Sudanese Janjavits who have fought alongside Haftar in the recent past, who have now turned into Rapid Support Forces (HDG) from the parties of the civil war in Sudan, and the Front for Change and Integration (FACT) militia groups in Chad, such a situation creates wider problems in Libya.

It may become possible. Similarly, FACT mercenaries, who participated in the 2019 coup attempt in the ranks of Haftar, made a coup attempt by moving to Chad with the cut off of the financial allowance, and as a result of the conflicts, the then President of Chad, Idris Debi, lost his life.

Finally, it can be said that DAESH, which has adopted the strategy of being buried in the public as a “sleeper cell” in the Fezzan region of Libya, closely follows the developments in Niger and will begin preparations for operational activities again depending on the developments there. ISIS last committed suicide at a police checkpoint in Sebha in 2021.

Conclusion

Considering the statements and approach of Menfi and Dibeybe, it can be stated that all these factors were evaluated by the military bureaucracy in Libya. The coup in Niger may facilitate the transition of armed groups and militias to Libya due to weak border controls and security gaps in the south, and it is possible to say that this situation is seen as a national security issue. 

In addition, the events may undermine the ongoing political transition process in Libya and pave the way for the anti-stability steps of actors like Haftar whose role in the political arena has been reduced to a minimum. 

In conclusion, it can be said that the developments in Niger are closely followed by the decision makers in Libya and serious border measures will be taken in this direction in the short term.

***

Fuat Emir – He works as a North African Studies Researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM).His work in Libya. His areas of special interest include terrorist movements in the Sahel region, the geopolitics of the Red Sea, soft power and public diplomacy.

__________________

There has been renewed talk in recent days about the possibility of forming a new government in Libya, especially after the so-called Joint 6+6 Committee between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State (or 6+6 HoR-HCS) reached an agreement on some electoral laws, including provisions for forming a new government before holding elections. Additionally, the announcement made by the Haftar, voicing support for the efforts, adds to this discussion.

A New Government in the Making

Local reports have revealed that intense consultations are underway between Libyan parties to form a new government that would replace the outgoing Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. This can be summarized as follows:

1- Haftar’s support for the new government:

Khalifa Haftar, has voiced its support for the outcome of the Joint 6+6 Committee, including a proposal to form a new government to be tasked with preparing for the upcoming elections. The proposal was rejected by Dbeibah.

This announcement came following a meeting between Haftar and Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, at the headquarters of the Libyan National Army in al-Rajma City, east of Benghazi. The meeting was held to settle the current disputes between the two figures, especially after Egypt stepped in to mediate a solution to their disagreements.

The consultations in al-Rajma also witnessed an attempt to reach understandings between Haftar and Saleh regarding the draft laws that emerged from the “6+6” committee’s work.

The parties discussed whether the parliament would move towards approving these laws, thus following suit of the High Council of State, or whether new consultations would have to be made to amend some provisions, especially those related to the eligibility criteria for the upcoming presidential elections.

2- Naming candidates for Prime Minister:

Over the past few days, several figures were nominated for the position of head of the new government. On June 18, 2023, some members of the Libyan State Council announced their support for the candidacy of former presidential candidate Mohamed al-Mazoughi for the new post.

Additionally, Abdulhakim Baiou, a former presidential candidate from the city of Misrata, received support for his bid for premiership from some members of the House of Representatives, the High Council of State as well as parties from the eastern and western regions of Libya.

3- Movements of the Parliament and the High Council of State: 

Both bodies are already engaged in efforts to form a new government. This was evidenced by the inclusion of a provision in the electoral law drafted by the “6+6” Committee.

The new provision mandates the formation of this government before holding the elections, thereby giving the step legislative power. Members of the High Council of State have already proposed candidates for the post of prime minister.

Despite the parliament’s reservations about some provisions of the laws drafted by the “6+6 Committee” in Bouznika, Morocco, Saleh confirmed that consultations were underway with the High Council of State to form a new interim government in the coming period.

Re-forming Alliances

The current movement reflects a shift in the alliances previously established between Debaiba and Haftar. This can be presented as follows:

1- Haftar turning against the alliance with Debaiba:

After understandings were reached between Haftar and Debaiba, the commander of the LNA, in a recent statement, expressed support for the proposal of the “6+6” Committee to form a new government. Haftar’s statement revealed a failure of his agreement with Debaiba. Moreover, it may indicate Haftar’s attempt to pressure Debaiba into making further concessions in the event of a cabinet reshuffle. Although that seems to be a more plausible explanation, 

 Haftar’s statement could also indicate an attempt by Libyan parties to deliberately create obstacles that would lead to the election being postponed.

2- Dbeibah threatening to hold parliamentary elections:

On June 17, 2023, Dbeibah announced that holding parliamentary elections is currently a priority and should pave the way for presidential elections. Dbeibah’s statements came after Haftar welcomed calls for forming a new government, which is another indication that previous understandings and agreements between the prime minister and the military commander have crumbled.  

Moreover, Dbeibah sought to hinder efforts to form a new government. He held a meeting on June 18, 2023 with the head of the High Council of State, Khalid al-Mishri، to sway him into supporting his bid and undermine understandings between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State over the formation of a new government.  

3- Looking for a replacement to Debeibah:

Over the past weeks, several figures were proposed in the cities of Misrata and Zawiya as successors to Debaibah.

Khalifa al-Ghweil, former head of the National Salvation Government, seeks to garner support from Misrata to form a new government in the country.

Another figure working towards the same goal is Ali Sassi, the former CEO of the General Electricity Company of Libya who has close ties with businessmen in Misrata, especially Mohammed Tahir Issa, who has a strong network of connections in both eastern and western Libya, including Saddek Omar el-Kaber, Governor of the Central Bank of Libya, and Saddam Haftar, son of the the commander of the LNA.

Additionally, similar moves were made within Misrata by Mohammed Abdul Latif al-Muntasir, a cousin of Omar al-Muntasir, former Prime Minister during the Gaddafi era to form a coalition to support his bid for prime minister.

Similarly in Zawiya, prominent figures presented themselves as potential successors to Dbeibah.

Ali Bouzriba, who enjoys significant financial influence and a wide network of connections in western Libya. He is the brother of Asim Bouzriba, Minister of Interior in the Tobruk-based government appointed by the Parliament.

It should be noted that drone airstrikes conducted by the Debeibah government forces against Zawiya have fueled growing resentment, which Bouzriba seeks to leverage in support of his efforts to find a replacement to Dbeibah.

4- Securing support from western Libya factions: 

Forming a new government requires the support of armed groups which are operating in western Libya and are still loyal to Dbeibah.

Al-Mishri held meetings with leaders of the armed groups to rally their support for forming a new government. In doing so, he aimed to exploit divisions within this bloc that were triggered by Dbeiba’s establishment of a new security apparatus called the “The National Agency of Backup Forces.” The move sparked anger among some armed groups in western Libya.

5- Unwavering western and international support for Dbeibadh: 

United Nations envoy to Libya Abdoulaye Bathily seems to be holding on to the Dbeibah government. This was evidenced in Bathily’s briefing to the United Nations Security Council on June 19, 2023, in which he emphasized that the outcomes of the “6+6” committee regarding electoral laws seem insufficient to complete the electoral process. He acknowledged that they represent an additional step that can be built upon, but then pointed out four main challenges regarding the committee’s outcomes.

These challenges include ongoing disputes over the conditions for presidential candidacy, the provision that insists on holding the presidential elections in two rounds even if a candidate secures a majority in the first round, the clause stipulating the cancellation of parliamentary election results in case of a failure in the presidential elections, as well as insistence on forming a new government ahead of the elections.

Based on that, Bathily believes that it is difficult to conduct the elections based on the laws enacted by the “6+6” committee.

He called on the international community to exert pressure on Libyan factions to hold elections. His call can be seen as an invitation to the world powers to pressure the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, and to reject the idea of forming a new government. This prompted Saleh to criticize Bathily and even accuse him of attempting to impose his will on the Libyan people.

Similarly, European powers and the United States appear to be more inclined to support the continuation of the Dbeibah government in power while also working on integrating the eastern-based government, appointed by the parliament, into the Dbeibah government to form a unified government that would prepare for the upcoming elections.

However, the Western stance is perhaps showing openness to the idea of forming a new government if the forces in eastern and western Libya succeed in reaching an agreement on naming a successor to Dbeibah.

Paths of the Libyan Crisis

The overall actions reveal potential implications on the Libyan scene, which can be summarized as follows:

1- Freezing Bathily’s initiative:  

Bathily’s June 19, 2023 briefing before the United Nations Security Council was preceded only by an earlier one in mid-April. Back then, he announced the outlines of a new initiative to resolve the Libyan crisis and prepare for elections. He asked the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to finalize the electoral laws by mid-June 2023. He further warned that if both councils fail to accomplish this, he would form a high-level steering committee.

Bathily’s most recent briefing before the Security Council did not include an announcement regarding the formation of such a committee, which may be related to the support of some regional powers for the efforts of the House of Representatives and the State Council in finalizing the electoral laws. Additionally, Haftar’s unexpected announcement of support for the formation of a new government has disrupted Bathily’s calculations.

2- Postponement of the elections:

The chances of holding parliamentary and presidential elections within this year are diminishing, which may push influential Libyan factions to focus on forming a unified government. The dynamic contributing to this is the reduced ability of the United States to exert pressure on Libyan parties to expedite the elections.

3- Reaching comprehensive agreements:

The Dbeibah government may succeed in restoring its previous understandings with Haftar, involving the heads of the House of Representatives and the State Council in these understandings, and subsequently forming a new government to be led Dbeibah, based on consensus among the former parties in a way that ensures their active participation.

Although such a scenario is likely to be hard to happen, it cannot be entirely ruled out given the rapid changes in alliances among Libyan factions.

Conclusion

Since 2011, Libya has been witnessing a continuous process of dismantling and reassembling alliances and existing balances, as well as working towards periodic replacement of competing governments.

Therefore, despite the external and, to a lesser extent, internal support for the Dbeibah government, there are still chances of the current Libyan parties succeeding in forming an alternative government to replace the Dbeibah government, despite the obstacles that may be encountered.

__________________

Source: FUTURE For Advanced Research & Studies

Matt Herbert | Rupert Horsely | Emadeddin Badi

Cronyism and armed groups’ penetration of executive portfolios and state institutions are effectively normalized and no longer viewed as the taboo it once was. At the same time, revolutionary ideals have gradually waned, removing another restraint on criminal penetration of the state.

The impact of these dynamics on the UN’s political mandate in Libya is critical for policymakers to consider. The multiplicity of compromised actors with often diverging interests within government is not just a challenge to governance and law and order but also to the political process.

The limited political progress seen through the UN track since 2020, coupled with growing state penetration, has diverted political momentum towards building systems that resemble a kleptocracy, with key power players’ personal interests at odds with democratic processes that pose a risk to the gains they have accrued.

The entrenchment of these figures and their networks within political, economic and security institutions complicate future potential reform efforts.

Anti-crime as a political tool With the rise of an intricate political–criminal nexus in Libya, the mantle of ‘anti-crime’ has been developed into a political tool. ‘Anti-crime’ positioning has evolved from approaches and communications around responses to security challenges, becoming instead a useful platform for gaining political clout and legitimacy.

Various factions and actors, from political entrepreneurs to armed groups, are playing both sides of the fence. They portray themselves as champions of law and order to secure foreign funding and garner support.

Anti-crime platforms have been used to attract international aid, gain popular support and legitimize political ambitions. However, these efforts often fall short of comprehensive solutions, as they tend to prioritize short-term gains and personal interests over long-term stability and institutional reform.

Using anti-crime approaches as a political tool can take several forms, including profiteering from the funds and immunity conferred by police status, reputation washing and as cover for political action. Profiteering and immunity The most common use of anti-crime approaches, particularly by armed groups, involves gleaning direct benefits, either financial profits or legitimacy as state actors.

The latter rarely involves foregoing involvement in criminal activity, reflecting that even as they seek legitimacy, armed group leaders need to carefully balance intra-organizational and local interests around involvement in illicit markets with international desires for its cessation.

Perhaps the most powerful recent force to emerge in this fashion has been the west coast branch of the Stabilization Support Apparatus (SSA). This branch emerged from a coalition of the Awlad Buhmeira network in Zawiya and the 55 Brigade, led by Muammar al-Dhawi in Warshefana.

The west coast branch is one half of the SSA, with the other located in Tripoli and led by Abd al-Ghani al-Kikli, the head of the Abu Salim Central Security Force. The broader SSA was established in January 2021 by Fayez al-Sarraj, president under the then Government of National Accord.

As the GI-TOC has previously argued, despite this legal basis, it operated in practice as a decentralized and largely unaccountable armed group coalition rather than a hierarchic, unitary entity. For the armed groups involved, the establishment of the SSA allowed for increased influence, a veneer of legitimacy and access to state resources that bypassed the Ministry of Interior.

Between 2021 and 2023, the west coast branch of the organization became one of the most dominant security and law enforcement actors in the coastal area between Zawiya and Tripoli, including in combatting human smuggling through maritime search and rescue of migrants and subsequent detention.

In this, it was closely allied with the Zawiya Refinery Branch of the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG), commanded by Abd al-Rahman Milad, who was sanctioned by the UN in 2018 for alleged profiteering from human smuggling. Milad is himself a member of the Awlad Buhmeira network.

For the armed groups forming the West Coast SSA, the evolution of the organization shaped the nature of their involvement in illicit economies rather than leading to a complete cessation. The network remains deeply involved in fuel smuggling, even if it is not directly involved in human smuggling per se.

Some network members reportedly ‘collude with smugglers’ as per UN reporting, while others remain involved in the protection or taxation of lower-level smugglers. Further, interviews and public reports suggest that migrants continue to face abuse and extortion at facilities linked to the West Coast SSA and allies of the Zawiya LCG.

The West Coast SSA has not only played a central role in security and law enforcement in the region but was also a key ally of the government of Fathi Bashagha and deeply involved in his efforts to gain a foothold in western Libya.

The footprint it built using the justification of combatting human smuggling was, in this way, inseparable from its political aspirations. This led al-Kikli, the overall head of the SSA and a Dabaiba supporter, to withdraw official sanction from the anti-smuggling activities of the west coast branch in February 2023.

The Awlad Buhmeira network and al-Dhawi reacted by having their maritime forces incorporated into the General Administration for Coastal Security, a component of the GNU’s interior ministry, while the detention centre was placed under the interior ministry of the rival GNS.

Reputation Laundering

Involvement in law enforcement action is widely used to launder the reputation of those accused of criminality in the past. Perhaps the best example is Milad, who continues to command the Zawiya Refinery Branch of the LCG.

After being sanctioned in 2018, Milad was arrested in 2020 under orders of Bashagha when he was Interior Minister. Milad has aggressively and successful changed his reputation since his release from detention. In part, this involved doubling down on a long-time strategy: counter-migration activities by the Zawiya LCG, an approach that led to a substantial rise in interceptions in 2021.

The refurbishment of the Naval Academy in Janzur is another centrepiece to his rebranding, one which has been highly effective in expanding his influence within the Libyan Navy, including among senior officers. More recently, in Zawiya, a series of small ground operations targeted fuel smugglers. These were overseen by a member of the Awlad Saqr tribe, who is alleged by interviewees to be involved in fuel smuggling himself and appeared to be a PR effort at a time of heightened tensions.

This sort of practice remains ubiquitous in Libya. Cover for political action ‘Anti-crime’ campaigns may also involve actors using state authority to arrest political opponents or rivals. For example, in April 2023, the leader of the Awlad Saqr tribe in Zawiya was named as an arrest target in an official letter issued by the Zawiya Security Directorate, with pressure then put on the Attorney General to pursue him. Interviewees reported that this nominal law enforcement procedure was driven by local rivalries in Zawiya.

In late May and early June 2023, the use of anti-criminal narratives as a political tool took a more violent turn when a series of drone strikes reportedly authorized by Dabaiba targeted facilities in Zuwara, Zawiya and Warshefana, including buildings linked to the West Coast SSA and fuel smuggling depots.

The GNU Ministry of Defence claimed that the strikes targeted criminals in these areas. Although airstrikes had a considerable impact on local fuel supplies, their initial focus within Libya was seen as political, with the targeting interpreted as messaging to the West Coast SSA on the risks it was running in its continued opposition to the GNU. There is some evidence that, following the strikes, rival groups are allowing men under their protection who are wanted by the Attorney General to be arrested, but only as part of wider efforts that are negotiated to ensure the perception of political balance.

***

Matt Herbert is a senior expert at the GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in North Africa and the Sahel. He writes on transnational organized crime and state fragility, and policy responses to these issues, including targeted financial sanctions, security sector reform and governance, and state–community engagement.

Rupert Horsley is a senior analyst at the GI-TOC. He is an expert on Libya, focusing on migration, organized crime, security and conflict trends in the country. He specializes in complex analysis and research in difficultto-access communities.

Emadeddin Badi is a senior analyst at the GI-TOC, a senior advisor for Libya at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He specializes in governance, organized crime, hybrid security structures, security sector reform and development.

______________

Federica Saini Fasanotti and Anas El Gomati

The recent turmoil in Sudan, involving Haftar, further complicates the situation and the potential for increased migration to Europe through Libya, could position Haftar to play a role in ending the conflict, or reduce potential migration from Eastern Libya of Sudanese refugees.

However, Haftar’s influence over the conflict remains limited, and he is overshadowed by the role and power of his foreign allies whom he remains dependent on at home and is thus unable to coerce an end to the conflict.

The key players in Sudan’s war, the UAE and Russia’s Wagner Group, supply weapons and training to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from military bases they control in Haftar’s Eastern Libyan territory, whilst Haftar has delivered intelligence and fuel supplies to the RSF.

Despite Haftar’s involvement in the Sudanese war, his heavy reliance on the UAE and Russia’s Wagner Group to secure territory in Libya against his rivals, which they in turn use to intervene in Sudan, significantly undermines his ability to play a role in ending a conflict that could result in a rise in migration, as it remains a key transit and source of migration travelling across the Mediterranean.

Haftar’s role in the Sudanese civil war is primarily focused on facilitating Russia and the UAE through his territory in Libya.

One might expect that this position would provide him with leverage over his foreign backers, yet his lack of political legitimacy when compared with that of the Tripoli-based internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) prevents him from ever formally requesting his backers’ to withdrawal from Libya as it would choke a critical supply line for the war in Sudan. Moreover, Haftar lacks the necessary military strength to coerce his foreign allies into leaving Libya and prevent them from utilizing their military bases in the country to exert influence in Sudan.

Haftar depends on his powerful backers for military support, diplomatic protection, and financing in order to reach his ultimate goal: the seizure of political power in Libya, which he often seeks to obtain through coup’s and power grabs.

He may exploit his strongman image to suggest he can stop migration flows from the source and leverage Italy’s impending migration crisis to obtain diplomatic rehabilitation and political support from high level meetings in Rome. However, due to his limited political power and military control, he lacks the ability to stop his backers’ involvement in the civil war in Sudan.

As a result, the root causes of the conflict, which have led to a significant increase in displacement numbers exceeding one million people and the potential migration from Sudan, including through his smuggling network in Libya, remain unresolved.

Recent developments have revealed that Haftar’s forces were involved in clashes with smugglers and staged a mass deportation of Egyptian workers and migrants. In a highly orchestrated display of power, approximately 4.000 migrants were left to cross on foot to Egypt on the Eastern border, demonstrating Haftar’s purported commitment toward reducing migration from Eastern Libya to Europe.

However, this spectacle serves as a mere show, since Haftar has not actually left the smuggling business. On the contrary, the LNA has consolidated its control over the smuggling network by requesting smugglers to operate in Benghazi under their control, eliminating any rivals and redirecting migrants who had paid rivals to get them to the Egyptian border.

Meanwhile, migrants and refugees who pay the LNA continue to arrive from Damascus, to Benghazi and on to Europe.

Today, even if the LNA were to cease their involvement in the network of human trafficking in Cyrenaica, unlikely given the financial returns, and new political leverage, departures at best would merely shift to the network of smugglers in Western Libya responsible for the other 40% of arrivals to Italy, leaving Italy grappling with an ongoing migration crisis from a different portion of the shoreline.

Consequently, the meeting with Haftar primarily grants him leverage to extract political concessions, but it does not provide a reliable or long-term guarantee for resolving Italy’s migration objectives.

How should Italy navigate Libya’s complexities

Considering these predicaments, it becomes evident that Italy’s engagement of Haftar offers little tangible reward and opens significant strategic risks. To effectively address these risks, Prime Minister Meloni should reassess Italy’s approach in navigating the complexities of Libya and their implications across crucial policy objectives.

While Italy’s inclusive engagement with all parties in Libya is commendable, it is vital to acknowledge that Haftar’s LNA are not a regular military, nor a single entity within the Libyan conflict, but rather an informal network of armed groups.

This distinction is significant because the LNA operates under the influence and control of external backers, which hinders their ability to engage productively in bilateral security discussions with the international community or gain legitimacy among the Libyan public.

The LNA requires urgent structural reform to turn it from an informal network of militias, mercenaries and migrant traffickers that serve the highest bidder, into a neutral institutionalised military that serves the state and works with its partners.

The well-publicised United Nations 5+5 military track, that includes the rival network of militias in Western Libya also requiring urgent reform, remains the option to do this; but requires Italian and international assistance to ensure its objective is to create a functioning security institution that can serve Libya and work effectively with its partners, rather than unify two rival informal networks who are largely responsible for destabilising the country.

Haftar and his political rivals across the board should be incentivised to conduct such structural reforms in order to be eligible to stand for elections or hold future political office. Only by seeking an institutional structure and settlement in Libya, Italy can hope to promote stability, combat human trafficking, and safeguard its long-term energy interests.

Italy’s multifaceted interests in Libya demand a careful and nuanced approach that balances immediate concerns with long-term strategic goals. While Haftar may appear as Italy’s saviour in the short-term, he has been the catalyst of its long-term troubles, burdened by his alliance with external powers that limits his strength.

Haftar’s alignment with Russia, control over illicit trafficking networks, and influence on Libya’s oil supplies all pose risks to Italy’s standing within NATO and Europe, intensify the migration crisis, and threaten its energy security. Italy should remain vigilant, ensuring that immediate pressures do not overshadow its broader strategic objectives.

Moreover, it is essential to see beyond and unpack the reality of Haftar’s strongman façade, which conceals the reality of his weakness; that he is a cog in the intricate machinery of a foreign mercenary network.

Operating outside of any legitimate government structure, Haftar and his band of mercenaries are incapable of fulfilling the role of a dependable security provider for Libya or serving as a credible interlocutor for Italy in the long run. Instead of unilaterally engaging Haftar, Italy should prioritize the transformation of the LNA into a fully functioning security institution.

This can be achieved through a revised UN 5+5 military track that places greater emphasis on structural reforms to establish a viable security and military institutions as per the initial Berlin Agreement rather than immediate political unification of rival networks that have exacerbated the political and security problems in Libya.

Italy can also leverage its relationships within the European Union and NATO to shape the UN’s state-building and political processes in Libya. By adopting a collective approach, Italy can minimize its exposure to unilateral leverage by opportunistic Libyan factions.

It is crucial to prioritize structural reform and establish a solid foundation for security in Libya and bilateral engagement rather than engaging with non-state actors like Haftar outside of such a process. This approach will contribute to long-term stability and ensure that Italy’s engagement in Libya aligns with its own needs and broader international efforts.

Italy must navigate Libya’s complexities while safeguarding its strategic objectives, counteracting Russian influence, effectively managing migration, and securing its long-term energy interests.

This can only be achieved through a comprehensive political and institutional settlement that promotes stability, combats human trafficking, and safeguards Italy’s interests in the region.

____________

Matt Herbert | Rupert Horsely | Emadeddin Badi

THE INTERSECTION OF CRIME, CONFLICT AND POLITICS

Illicit markets have become more deeply entrenched in Libya since 2011 than they were at any point before the revolution. Proceeds from crime – particularly smuggling and the embezzlement of state funds – have been critical to the emergence and consolidation of armed groups that have gone on to play a dominant role in politics at the local and national levels.

Competition over these resources has also been a repeated source of conflict between groups. Finally, the politics and practice of law enforcement have drawn in armed groups previously complicit in organized crime, seeking legitimacy and alternative sources of patronage and funding.

This has created an ambiguous and compromised law enforcement ecosystem in which it is not possible to disentangle legitimate from illegitimate actors as a basis of reform or external engagement.

Organized crime and armed-group dynamics Organized crime as a funder and enabler of armed groups dates to the revolution, when many groups gained control over nodes key to illicit economies – such as trafficking routes, ports and migrant detention facilities.

The nature of different armed groups’ involvement in illicit economies has often been heavily influenced by the local political economy of an illicit market, the power of the armed group and the risks faced for involvement in a given activity.

Such involvement has also shifted over time, particularly as the chaotic and highly fragmented security situation in the mid-2010s slowly consolidated, with a narrower set of larger and more sophisticated armed groups assimilating or destroying their smaller rivals.

This process was punctuated by conflicts that often shaped the landscape, killing off certain players while others emerged stronger. The latest major purge through conflict occurred with the war for Tripoli.

The victors and survivors from this period now constitute the elite groups who control illicit economies across the country. Since 2020, the biggest expansion of profiteering from illicit economies has reportedly been driven by the LAAF in Cyrenaica and the Fezzan. This can be traced to its defeat in the war for Tripoli.

Types of armed group involvement in illicit economies:

■ Direct organizational participation.

■ Individual involvement by low-ranking members.

■ Provision of protection to criminal enterprises.

■ Extortion or taxation of illicit economies.

Although the group survived, maintaining territorial control in Libya’s east and south, the loss eroded its ideological and financial foundations. This drove a pronounced shift towards the systematization and centralization of economic predation, which had previously operated more organically.

Profiteering off illicit economies by elements of the LAAF has increased across nearly all illicit markets.

Since 2020, industrial-scale fuel smuggling has evolved in Cyrenaica, according to interviewees, allegedly involving high-level officials within the LAAF able to secure fuel directly from state facilities, protect such shipments and arrange cross-border smuggling with foreign counterparts.

Less visibly, elements of the LAAF and affiliated businessmen allegedly control drug trafficking routes, both trans-Saharan and Mediterranean. Profit sharing from these initiatives is a significant source of funding and support to subordinate armed groups affiliated with the LAAF in peripheral areas.

Finally, over the last three years, there has been an uptick in the activity termed by the UN Panel of Experts as piracy, involving an LAAF maritime unit in Cyrenaica impounding commercial vessels and demanding payments from their insurers.

Some profiteering occurs at the level of senior commanders, who reportedly leverage their positions to organize illicit economic activity, mainly in fuel smuggling, and through the extraction of payments from criminal actors.

However, involvement in criminal markets is also devolved, especially in remote areas of southern Cyrenaica and the Fezzan.

There, the LAAF largely rules with a light touch, having negotiated agreements with local armed groups to join it in a loose hierarchy. These agreements leave local groups highly autonomous, able to police themselves and pursue their economic interests, including in illicit economies.

This has resulted in a highly ambiguous relationship between local armed groups and criminal actors. In some cases, exploitation of the illicit economies in these areas has taken on a quasi-legitimate veneer, with ‘taxes’ levied by armed groups and municipal authorities, and papers given to criminal actors to allow their movement.

In one case, in Kufra in southern Cyrenaica, such a taxation scheme was reported by an interviewee to generate around US$200 000 (€181 290) per month from smuggled fuel alone.

It is important to note that there are elements of a political strategy in the LAAF’s activities. In addition to securing the loyalty of component groups by providing access to a livelihood, there are indications that the LAAF no longer wants to rely exclusively on repression and is instead funnelling some illicit profits into the local economy both to launder the money and to secure social support.

This is the closest parallel to the governance of illicit economies exercised by the Gaddafi regime before the revolution, particularly in borderlands. Examples of this also exist in western Libya, where armed groups continue to derive funding from criminal activity. However, this is more fragmented and anarchic – reflecting the heterogeneous political landscape in this part of Libya.

For example, multiple groups of varying size and politico-military significance engage in cannabis resin and cocaine trafficking on the west coast, with al-Ajelat being a centre of this trade.

Fuel smuggling also remains widespread and is an essential source of funding for groups in Zawiya, a crucial illicit economic node west of Tripoli.

Violent competition over illicit economies has diminished since the mid-2010s, as groups have established quasi-stable monopolies in various criminal sectors. Nonetheless, such violence continues and represents the main type of conflict at present. Elite factions in Zawiya – comprising tribal leaders and militiamen, some of whom have attained highly sensitive security and intelligence posts – frequently skirmish over control of illicit economies.

These turf wars have contributed to Zawiya remaining one of the most unstable towns in Libya.

Infiltration of criminally linked actors into politics Protracted conflict in Libya has increasingly fused political and criminal power, creating a political– criminal nexus that has thrived on the weakness of state institutions.

A number of armed group leaders known to be complicit in organized crime have advanced within the GNU and its rival, the Government of National Stability (GNS).

One key example is the deputy head of counterterrorism in Libya’s intelligence service, who previously was a high-profile militiaman.

The GNU’s Interior Minister is also a former armed group commander whose units were accused of involvement in fuel smuggling by the UN in 2018. The Interior Minister of the GNS, in turn, is a brother of the leaders of Zawiya’s Awlad Buhmeira network.

As the above examples demonstrate, figures with past involvement in organized crime are no longer simply seeking the patronage of politicians – as was largely the case in the early post-revolution years– but are obtaining sensitive and senior posts, which come with access to intelligence as well as decision-making authority.

The advancement of such compromised figures through the state hierarchy is double-edged.

On the one hand, it entrenches corrupt and criminal networks in positions of power, corroding the quality of law enforcement and expanding the realm of criminal enterprise.

On the other hand, there is a dampening effect on crime and insecurity, as those who have gained status through illicit means need stability to build legitimacy and to make their advantage permanent.

Their involvement can also augment the state’s coercive capacity, as they bring with them their own power bases and armed fighters. However, this comes at the cost of hierarchic control and accountability.

As they have become embedded in the state, many of these actors have reduced or sought to camouflage better their direct exposure to organized crime.

Rather than profit off overt forms of organized crime, such as fuel smuggling, they profit off their ability to govern criminal markets using official instruments and state institutions, as well as to shape or control state budgets, payrolls and procurement contracts.

Ultimately, appointing corrupt figures for political expediency has led to stagnation in substantive governance. Support for reforming law enforcement and dismantling militias and armed groups as a route to legitimacy has declined since 2020.

***

Matt Herbert is a senior expert at the GI-TOC’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in North Africa and the Sahel. He writes on transnational organized crime and state fragility, and policy responses to these issues, including targeted financial sanctions, security sector reform and governance, and state–community engagement.

Rupert Horsley is a senior analyst at the GI-TOC. He is an expert on Libya, focusing on migration, organized crime, security and conflict trends in the country. He specializes in complex analysis and research in difficultto-access communities.

Emadeddin Badi is a senior analyst at the GI-TOC, a senior advisor for Libya at the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He specializes in governance, organized crime, hybrid security structures, security sector reform and development.

______________

Federica Saini Fasanotti and Anas El Gomati

The ongoing instability in Libya directly impacts Italy’s politics and decision-making, requiring a meticulous diplomatic strategy.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni‘s recent meeting with Khalifa Haftar on Libya has raised important questions about Italy’s broader strategic goals in the country.

On Friday, May 5, Prime Minister Meloni held talks with the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s leader, Field Marshal Haftar, at Palazzo Chigi.

Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, and Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi also partook in the meeting. According to media reports, discussions centred around Libya’s forthcoming elections, as well as the escalating migratory flows from Africa to Italy.

According to UNHCR statistics, the number of arrivals since the start of 2023 has already reached 71.342 as of June 11, placing immense pressure on Italy’s government. These figures are particularly alarming considering that the peak migration season has yet to begin.

While the meeting may seem routine and necessary to address election promises and the migration crisis, it carries significant risks for Italy’s long-term interests in energy security, migration policy, and its role within NATO. To mitigate these risks, Italy should adopt a meticulous diplomatic strategy and fully understand the implications of working with Haftar.

Since 2017, Italy has played an active role in reconciling Libya’s rival factions, most notably by hosting the Palermo conference in 2018 to mediate a plethora of Libyan factions with non-state actors like Haftar, in the same forum as officially recognised actors such as the former UN backed Government of National Accord (GNA).

Haftar made discrete visits to Italy prior to the Palermo peace talks to meet the former minister of Defence and Interior, who insisted he adopt a peaceful political approach. The official one-on-one meeting between Meloni and Haftar, who holds no official position within the Libyan state, signals a break with this norm in Italy’s diplomatic approach.

Dealing with Haftar jeopardizes Italy’s international standing, energy security and the management of migration flows

Under Meloni’s leadership, as well as under the previous government led by Mario Draghi, Italy adopted a firm stance against Russian aggression in Ukraine, both globally and domestically. Italy shifted its energy security focus away from Russia towards North Africa, with Algeria offering a steady supply of gas but also Libya, securing major gas concessions for the future. Additionally, the new government prioritizes migration policies, as a domestic electoral promise. However, the recent meeting with Haftar threatens to undermine these objectives.

Haftar is not an ordinary political figure, as he operates outside the Libyan state. His forces are an informal inter-dependent network that draws its strength from Haftar’s backers, such as Russia and the United Arab Emirates. Through the Wagner Group, the Kremlin jointly operated an extensive logistical, military, and smuggling network that spans from Syria to Sub-Saharan Africa. Haftar’s alliance with the Wagner Group has allowed Russia to expand its influence into Libya, posing significant strategic implications for Italy in its role as the guardian of NATO’s southern neighbourhood. The Russian Wagner group controls significant territory in Libya where they have positioned mercenaries, air defence systems and fighter jets in NATO’s soft underbelly, giving Moscow strategic influence over a territory that has been a source of anxiety for energy and insecurity for the alliance. Italy’s critical position within NATO must not be undermined, as its firm stance against Russian aggression in Ukraine has positioned it as a key player on both flanks. However, an official reception for Haftar, who since 2019 has enabled the Kremlin to carve a foothold in Libya, risks eroding Italy’s standing within the Atlantic alliance and compromising its role in countering the increasing Russian aggression in its own portion of NATO’s southern flank.

Italy’s energy security is of utmost importance, as demonstrated by the recent deal signed last January by ENI which seeks to grow Italy’s long-term energy security in Libya. However, Haftar’s politically motivated oil and gas blockades have historically disrupted European energy supplies, including those to Italy, with Libya historically being its second highest supplier after Russia in 2022, prior to the war on Ukraine.

Italy is reliant on gas from the Mellitah complex and pipeline in Western Libya, and during Haftar’s 2020 blockade of oil production, the country suffered substantial losses, having the Mellitah complex lost a total of 155.000 barrels per day of oil and 145 million cubic feet per day of gas (for an overall daily loss of revenues of 9.4 million USD)”.

After the blockade ended in 2022, Italy lifted the first condensate gas from Brega, a port where the Wagner Group have a presence, underscoring Italy’s strategic energy needs in Libya and associated risks. Critically, Haftar’s repeated oil blockades required talks in Moscow and Abu Dhabi to end, indicating that his backers have had the final say over Libya’s energy supplies.

The Wagner Group’s disruptive actions and access to Libya’s oil facilities and ports gave them a chokehold over Libya’s energy resources which has existed since 2020 and should raise concerns with regard to European energy security.

If the Wagner Group gains control over Libya’s future onshore gas facilities, positioned in Sirte where the Wagner group has a key military base, Italy’s energy supplies could be held captive by a Russian mercenary force, ultimately jeopardizing Italy’s energy security, leaving Rome in a state of uncertainty regarding who to negotiate with for their energy future.

The migration crisis compels Italy to act promptly in Libya, given the approaching summer months and emerging conflicts, like in Sudan, for example, which risks spillovers in terms of the increasing displacement of people. Haftar’s control over a vast smuggling empire contributes to over  60% of illicit human trafficking from Libya to Italy since the beginning of the year, intensifying Italy’s migration challenge.

The LNA have established a police state in Eastern Libya, led by Haftar’s sons whose tribal and Salafi militias have monopolised security, but also the formal and informal economy. Haftar’s son Saddam has been actively involved in facilitating the trafficking of migrants to Italy, many though existing networks across the country the LNA is tapping into as a source of revenue.

The surge in arrivals from Cyrenaica, under Haftar’s sway, further exacerbates the situation, compromising Italy’s migration management and emphasizing the need for engagement in Libya.

_______________________

Islam Alatrash

There are around 700,000 foreigners living in Libya, many of them migrants who’d like to make their way to Europe. Some of those who were turned back want to try again. By

Despite the recent loss of hundreds of lives when an overloaded fishing boat packed with migrants heading from Libya to Europe capsized off the Greek coast, Ali Majdi still wants to try and get to Europe.

The 28-year-old Syrian refugee has already tried to leave Libya for Europe once. He paid people smugglers in the coastal town of Zawiya $1,960 (€1,800) and was eventually able to board a boat crossing the Mediterranean. Majdi’s final goal is Germany, where his family now lives. He hasn’t seen them for eight years.

But the boat was intercepted by the Libyan coastguard and forced to return to Libya. “My hopes were shattered,” he told DW. “They forced me to come back here. I was devastated. But I’m determined to try again.”

“I know the risks,” he continued, “but I still want to sail across the Mediterranean. I need to reach Germany.”

Libya, a hotspot for people smugglers

Majdi is just one of hundreds of thousands of foreigners in Libya. Some are happy to remain there, others are still trying to find a way out. And while Majdi was able to find a job in Libya, many migrants are in Libyan detention where they may be abused. According to United Nations numbers, there are just over 700,000 migrants in Libya at the moment, making up just over 10% of the country’s total population.

Refugee Ali Majdi is 28 and determined to get to Europe to his family. He has already made one attempt, but the boat was intercepted by the Libyan coastguard and forced to return to Libya. “My hopes were shattered,” he says. “They forced me to come back here. I was devastated. But I’m determined to try again.” He now works in a kebab shop in Zawiya

Still politically divided a decade after the revolution that toppled the country’s dictator, Muammar al-Gaddafi, the North African nation has become a popular waypoint for migrants – whether they’re crossing borders for economic reasons or they’re seeking asylum – because of the Libyan coastline’s relative proximity to Greek and Italian shores. More than 56,000 people made the trip across the sea to Italy in the first three months of this year. Around half of them started their journey in Libya. 

Majdi told DW that he is of course worried about the risk that another crossing entails and he admits that he’s also frightened of the Greek coastguard. “I’m worried they’ll stop me from reuniting with my family. Their actions towards migrants seeking safety and a better life are a terrible mistake,” he added, referring to the recent tragedy with the fishing trawler Adriana and the possibility that the Greek coastguard was somehow culpable in the deaths of hundreds of people who drowned when the overloaded boat capsized.

A new home for some migrants

Not everybody feels this way though. Rida Solan is originally from Pakistan and he too had initially wanted to come to Europe to work. Experts say that Syrians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are often able to fly into Libya from Syria on civilian flights before trying to make their way to Europe. People coming from elsewhere, including from Africa, often cross into Libya at land borders.

On his first attempt to get to Europe, Solan paid €2,000 ($2,175) to people smugglers in Zawiya, which is known as a hotbed of smuggling activity. But the 31-year-old was also apprehended and returned to Libya, this time by the Italian authorities.

Solan has now decided to stay put. He has managed to get a job at a juice shop in Misrata, a city around 220 kilometres (136 miles) further along the coast from Zawiya and is happy to be saving money.

“I vow not to consider migration again or risk my life,” he said. “And I decided to stay here and work in Misrata because it’s one of the safest cities in the country.” 

He went on to say that “Libya is good because everything here is free, like electricity and water. So I can save more money than I could in Europe.” He is referring to the fact that the lack of a functioning state means that while electricity and water are provided, the payment of power or water bills is barely enforced, if at all.

“Committing to a rights-based and collaborative response to migration flows is the best way to protect migrants and refugees from grave crimes and serious human rights violations along the central Mediterranean route,” says Marwa Mohamed, head of outreach at the advocacy organisation Lawyers for Justice in Libya

The ‘safest’ way to Europe

By mid-June, 7,292 people had been returned to Libya during 2023, as they were trying to cross to Europe on what is known as the central Mediterranean route, the UN’s International Organization for Migration, or IOM, reports. The organisation also said that in the same period, 662 had died and 368 people were still missing.

The latter deaths and disappearances are a reason why Libya-based people smugglers promote themselves as providing a “safe journey” across the Mediterranean.

DW contacted one people smuggler advertising his services on the social media platform TikTok who boasted that he could offer “the safest trips to Europe.” In an interview conducted via the social media platform, the people smuggler, who would not give his real name, repeatedly emphasised that travelling with him was “extremely secure” and that he could organise travel between Tobruk in Libya and the Italian coastline for $2,500 per person.

Another people smuggler repeated this offer during an interview on WhatsApp. He also went on to claim his trips to Europe were the safest one could find in Libya.

Ismail, a former security guard for the Libyan government turned smuggler, further explains these kinds of promises. Ismail, who won’t give his full name or age because of the business he’s in, left his job to become a people smuggler because he earns much more money this way. After all, sometimes his government salary was not paid for months, he explained.

Ismail also uses TikTok to attract customers and he spoke to DW via the platform’s direct messaging feature. He admits that his promotional videos on TikTok depict an unrealistic scenario of what life would be like for migrants once they reach their destination.

Migrants pay Ismail and his colleagues between $500 and $2,000 for the trip, depending on the kind of risks they’re willing to take. The lower prices get them a ride on a rubber inflatable, which might take between 50 and 200 people aboard, and which is clearly more perilous. The highest prices include a bribe for Libyan border guards who help hide the migrants on commercial shipping. 

“The work is hard and tiring,” he wrote to DW. “But it’s very profitable and I make an average of about two trips a week.”

Migrants pay smugglers between $500 and $2,000 for the trip across the Mediterranean, depending on the kind of risks they’re willing to take. “The lower prices get them a ride on a rubber inflatable, which might take between 50 and 200 people aboard, and which is clearly more perilous,” writes Islam Altarash. Pictured here: men inpsect a boat that was used to carry migrants

A legal path to migration?

A coastguard staffer in Zawiya told DW that as long as assisting the migrants to leave Libya is so profitable, nothing will stop this business. He spoke off the record because he was not supposed to talk to journalists.

Experts and advocates in the field say that current policies to police the central Mediterranean route are not working and are leading to more deaths at sea and more abuses by people-smuggling networks in Libya. An April 2023 investigation by the United Nations reported that there were “grave and widespread human rights violations” and “reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity were committed” against migrants in Libya.

The European Union should be doing far more to help the would-be migrants stuck in Libya as well as those who still want to leave for EU countries, Marwa Mohamed, head of outreach at the advocacy organisation, Lawyers for Justice in Libya, argued in a 2022 op-ed for the ECRE Weekly Bulletin of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. Offering migrants in Libya a legal pathway to migration would not only help them and prevent deaths and abuses, it would also help European countries solve their looming labour crises, she wrote.

“Committing to a rights-based and collaborative response to migration flows is the best way to protect migrants and refugees from grave crimes and serious human rights violations along the central Mediterranean route,” Mohamed concluded. “Doing so would contribute to the fight against the transnational crime of human trafficking by eradicating the demand and ultimately disempowering smuggling and trafficking networks.”

____________________

Since 2011, foreign interference in Libya’s domestic affairs has been a feature, rather than an anomaly, of this protracted conflict.

STEPHANIE WILLIAMS

Since the outbreak of the 2011 popular uprising that toppled longtime Libyan dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, foreign interference has been the norm rather than the exception in the North African country’s longstanding crisis.

In some cases, foreign actors have exploited Libya’s fractures and taken advantage of the fragility of the (non) state but blame also lies with Libya’s ruling elite for being overly eager to cheaply barter their country’s sovereignty.

Despite shifting regional alliances, the international community should continue to use the Berlin architecture to support UN mediation and meet the aspirations of the Libyan people for an end to the country’s long transition.

A land of paradoxes

Libya is a land of paradoxes. A nation that was founded by the United Nations in 1951 and for 18 years, thereafter, basked in the warm embrace of international alliances was, in 1969, plunged into four decades of quixotic and brutal one-man rule.

During this period, Libya became an international pariah, under multiple sanctions, with its people increasingly isolated in the world.

That began to change in the early 2000s when Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi changed course, renouncing his WMD programme and the campaign of state-sponsored terrorism he had doggedly pursued for many years.

Libya began to interact with the outside world, but this was not enough to save Gaddafi from the internal uprising that overthrew him in 2011.

The rebellion that brought him down could not have succeeded without the direct military assistance provided by Nato and its Arab allies and the political support and cover provided by the UN Security Council.

Libya’s quarrelling leaders seek legitimacy abroad

Since 2011, foreign interference in Libya’s domestic affairs has been a feature, rather than an anomaly, of this protracted conflict.

Gaddafi’s political and military successors — most of them parvenus on the world stage — have awkwardly straddled between the domestic and the international, revelling in political tourism. Unable to attain legitimacy at home among their compatriots, these men have sought it abroad.

The post-2011 Libyan ruling elite complains about foreign interference, especially if it threatens their personal standing, but the truth is that the interfering countries have, for the most part, been pushing on an open door, invited in by the quarrelling Libyan parties.

This pattern was partially established during the 2011 uprising when Nato members and their Arab allies established discrete relationships with various armed groups that had formed to battle Gaddafi’s forces. 

Russia, Turkey and Egypt step up involvement

In the last half-dozen years, several countries that were less involved in the Libya conflict in 2011 – namely Russia, Turkey, and Egypt – have more forcefully come to the fore.

In most cases, the initial ties, especially between the Libyan armed groups and foreign elements were brokered through special forces and intelligence channels — elements who were more present on the ground during the rebellion and in the maelstrom that beset Libya in the years following Gaddafi’s violent demise than their diplomatic counterparts. 

It was — and to some extent still is — the intel types that have filled the space in which too much of the international community’s business has been conducted.  

The most recent chapter in this murky “mukhabarat (spy) story” witnessed the successive visits earlier this year of US CIA Director Bill Burns, then-Turkish Intel Chief Hakan Fidan and Egyptian Intel Chief Abbas Kamel. 

Countries with interests in Libya have used their armed proxies on the ground to advance the full range of their national (and competing) priorities:  counter-terrorism, counter-migration, oil, counter-Islamism, counter-democracy, exploitation of Libya’s riches or to secure bases on the country’s geostrategically valuable terrain. 

The transactionalism that defines this type of opportunistic “diplomacy” is directly at odds with the mandate of the United Nations, tasked with brokering peace and helping the Libyan people to build a state with a representative government and accountable institutions. 

At no moment were the disconnect, dysfunction, moral bankruptcy, and transactionalism in the international community’s approach to Libya plainer to see than in the spring of 2019 when the Security Council — spurning its own resolutions and ignoring the UN arms embargo — failed to condemn strongman Khalifa Haftar’s assault on Tripoli. 

As the UN was putting the final touches on a meticulously planned National Conference, a significant number of its member states were offering political, material, and tactical support for Haftar’s brazen attempt to seize power by force.

But actions can have unintended consequences and Haftar’s attempted putsch awakened a latent Turkish interest in Libya.  

The Turks had watched with alarm, while the Russians, with funding provided by Arab country, dispatched thousands of Wagner mercenaries to the frontlines in Tripoli where they coordinated tactically with Arab-operated Chinese drones to inflict heavy losses on the Tripoli forces. 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision in late 2019 to come to the assistance of the UN-recognised government in Tripoli changed the course of the war. 

In exchange for offering to assist the internationally-recognised government, the Turks wrangled out of the Tripoli government several controversial maritime and military agreements. When Ankara finalised its arrangements with the Tripoli government, the Turks inserted their own advanced weaponry and thousands of Syrian mercenaries.

Ankara-Moscow rivalry 

Brushing aside the Arab countries backing Haftar, Erdogan instead focused his Libya diplomacy on Turkey’s traditional rival — the Russians. 

Ankara and Moscow used a series of bilateral meetings in late 2019 and early 2020 to strike a modus vivendi and, more importantly, to try to steal a march on the international conclave being organised by Germany and the United Nations. 

The Turkish-Russian compact encountered a hiccup when a 13 January 2020 meeting with the Libyan parties in Moscow failed to produce a ceasefire agreement, thanks to Haftar’s legendary stubbornness (he still believed that his forces could prevail militarily). 

Instead, a larger international meeting took place on 19 January 2020 in Berlin in the presence of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Erdogan, producing the Berlin process and a broad umbrella under which to harness and coordinate international efforts. 

The Berlin process and resulting international working groups remain the international architecture for Libya to this day, albeit circumscribed at the highest levels by the diplomatic fissures caused by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine.

Within eight months of the Turkish entry on the side of the UN-recognised government, Haftar’s forces — which had been at the gates of Tripoli — were pushed back to central Libya. 

Fighting wound down in June of 2020 and a formal ceasefire — which continues to hold — was signed by Libyan parties under UN auspices in October of that year. 

Libya carved up

On their part, the Turks and Russians carved up the country and created their own realities on the ground, occupying Libyan bases and maintaining their mercenary forces (despite a formal Libyan request, enshrined in the October 2020 ceasefire agreement, for the departure of all mercenaries and foreign forces). 

Russia has since used its mercenaries in eastern and southern Libya, along with their local allies, to assist the Rapid Support Forces in their battle against the Sudanese military across the border in Sudan. 

Meanwhile, the Turks have firmly entrenched themselves in western Libya, with a sprawling military, intelligence, political, and commercial presence.  They are also making significant inroads in eastern Libya where a Turkish business forum is taking place and plans are afoot to open a Turkish consulate in Benghazi. 

There is little doubt that amongst all the foreign powers, it is the Turks who wield the most influence on the ground in Libya today. 

Other players in Libya’s arena

The three years following Haftar’s defeat have witnessed major realignments in the Middle East/North Africa region with the UAE and Turkey mending fences and a significant warming of ties in the last six months between Cairo and Ankara.  

Previously an ardent foe of the Tripoli government, Egypt has of late taken receipt of a $700 million loan from Libya’s central bank. 

While Moscow keeps an eye on Libya and there is no indication that its mercenaries will be recalled, it is otherwise occupied with its own blundering invasion of Ukraine. 

On its part, the US has deprioritised the Arab world, returning to America’s 20th-century myopic support for “stability”. Seldom before has one seen so little overlap between America’s so-called strategic interests and its democratic values. 

Meanwhile, the Germans and French are occupied with Ukraine while the Italians continue their own transactional approach in Libya, prioritising counter-migration efforts.

Libyan people’s voice lost

Unfortunately, what gets lost in these international and regional machinations are the voices of the Libyan people, particularly the 2.8 million who continue to call for ending Libya’s 12-year-long transition through presidential and parliamentary elections on a consensually-agreed constitutional basis.  

At the very minimum, the international community needs to honour their wishes and support the rule of law, respect for human rights and accountability in Libya. There is no need to reinvent the wheel with regard to international architecture, specifically, the Berlin Process and its associated working groups. 

The factors that formed the basis upon which the process was designed still pertain: a mostly dysfunctional and quarrelsome Security Council and transactionalism in bilateral approaches to the country.  

This international umbrella is also needed to support UN mediation and to put pressure on the Libyan protagonists. 

__________________

Gregory Aftandilian

The bizarre episode of the late June failed mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin against the Russian military establishment has put the fate of his Wagner Group of Russian mercenaries in doubt, not only in Ukraine but in several Arab states as well, notably in Syria, Libya, and Sudan.

Wagner’s military actions in these strife-ridden Arab countries have played an important role in strengthening certain factions and governments over the past several years, but at the cost of prolonging these conflicts, contributing to human rights abuses, and exploiting mineral resources. Russian officials have indicated that they want such involvement in these Arab countries to continue, suggesting that Wagner fighters could come under direct Russian military command; but whether this nationalization of the mercenary group will succeed remains an open question.

Continuing Uncertainty in Russia

Recent developments in Russia show that the future of the Wagner Group remains shrouded in uncertainty and secrecy. After he called off the mutiny during his march to Moscow on June 24, Prigozhin and his Wagner fighters were supposed to go to Belarus in a deal that would provide them a safe-haven there. But Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko told reporters on July 6 that Prigozhin was no longer in his country and was instead in Russia of his own volition.

Moreover, it is unclear how many Wagner fighters are currently in Belarus and for what purpose they are there (one report has said that some of them are being used to train the Belarusian Army).

Prigozhin and his Wagner commanders met with Putin on June 29 so he could hear directly from the group.

It subsequently came to light that Prigozhin and his Wagner commanders met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 29 so the Russian leader could hear directly from the group. At this meeting, according to a Russian government spokesperson, the commanders “emphasized that they were staunch supporters and soldiers of the leader and supreme commander in chief and said they were ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

It was also revealed that Prigozhin has remained in Russia to supposedly clean up his business affairs. Soon after the failed mutiny, the Russian police seized assets in his mansion, including stacks of foreign currency, gold, and numerous passports—a raid that was aired on Russian state television in an effort to discredit Prigozhin and to paint him as a corrupt traitor. However, the fact that he is still in Russia means that he remains there with Putin’s blessing.

What all these contradictory developments ultimately mean is difficult to say. Given Russia’s troop shortages in its war in Ukraine, Putin may have wanted to test the “patriotism” of the Wagner commanders and to remind them of his pledge of amnesty as long as they remain committed to the war effort in Ukraine and agree to act under Russian military command. Putin may have also wanted to get a detailed assessment from Prigozhin about Wagner’s operations abroad, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, where the group has played a large role.

Arrests in Syria but No Rebellion

The Wagner Group has been active in the Syrian Civil War since Russia intervened on the side of the Assad regime in 2015. Several thousand Wagner Group mercenaries, including Syrian national recruits, have been involved in operations in the country. The recent attempted mutiny in Russia, however, made Russian military officials in Syria nervous.

Russian military police and Syrian intelligence officers launched an arrest campaign against Wagner commanders in Syria and raided Wagner offices in Damascus, Hama, and Deir Ezzor as the mutiny was unfolding in Russia. Reportedly, two or three Wagner officers were arrested at Russia’s air base in Humaymim in Latakia Province, and another was arrested in Sweida, south of Damascus.

These arrests were reportedly confirmed by US and German defense officials. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin reportedly flew to Damascus to urge Syrian authorities not to allow any Wagner fighters to leave the country.

However, one Syrian analyst based in Turkey told the international media that these Russian actions were merely “precautionary” measures and that no Wagner members had rebelled against Russian military forces in Syria.

Whether those detained in Syria have since been released is unknown. For its part, the Wagner Group in Syria has denied that any of its members had been arrested. But Syria may be a special case because of the presence of both Wagner fighters and the regular Russian military, which clearly has the upper hand in this situation. In Libya and Sudan, Wagner forces do not have the Russian military watching over or competing with them, which allows them more freedom to operate.

Allowing Wagner to Continue Operations in Africa?

Preliminary indications coming out of Russia seem to suggest that Russian officials see value in the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa but want these fighters and their activities to come under formal Russian command. Indeed, even before the failed mutiny, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke favorably about the Wagner Group.

In a February 9, 2023 press conference in Khartoum, he stated that Wagner was “working on fighting terrorism in [African] countries” and that such private militaries companies are “coming to these countries according to agreements with the governments that have sovereignty over their countries.”

Russian officials see value in the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa but want these fighters to come under formal Russian command.

Since the failed mutiny, Lavrov said in an interview that the “instructors” and “private military contractors,” as he called them, would remain in the Central African Republic and Mali. Although Lavrov did not mention Libya and Sudan, some analysts have suggested that the Wagner forces will remain there too.

Atlantic Council expert Alia Brahimi said that there may now be an effort by the Russian government to nationalize the Wagner Group, and that the close cooperation in Libya and elsewhere between the Wagner Group and the Kremlin would make such a process easier.

The Ukrainian media, citing a UK Defense Intelligence assessment, stated that the Russian state “is likely prepared to accept Wagner’s aspirations to maintain its extensive presence on the [African] continent.” It is worth noting that in the wake of the failed munity, Putin publicly acknowledged that the Russian government had funded the Wagner Group, finally laying aside years of denials on the part of the Kremlin.

Strategic and Economic Benefits

The Wagner Group’s activities in Libya, Sudan, and other parts of Africa have given Russia a foothold in these countries that it does not want to relinquish. For example, in Sudan, Wagner has been involved in mercenary military activities on behalf of Khartoum before the current rift between the Sudanese Army and the rapid Support Forces, such as helping to put down pro-democracy demonstrations, and also in lucrative gold mining operations.

Some of this gold, reportedly transferred through the UAE, has made its way to the Kremlin or has been sold for hard currency, helping Putin circumvent the sanctions that have been imposed on Russia since the beginning of the Ukraine war.

In addition, Wagner’s operations in Libya—chiefly its military support to the self-anointed Field Marshal of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, who is connected to the eastern Libyan government—has given Wagner a “bridgehead” in Libya.

This allows it to maintain links with the head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces under the command of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, more popularly known as Hemedti, who is embroiled in a civil war against the forces of Sudanese General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Complicating Factors

It is far from clear that Wagner and the Russian government were always operating from the same playbook. For example, after Haftar failed to take the Libyan capital of Tripoli by force in 2019-2020, the Russian government began to hedge its bets on this Libyan strongman and started to reach out to the Tripoli government even though Wagner remained in Haftar’s corner (and in his employ). And in Sudan’s ongoing civil war, Wagner and the Russian government may be on different sides.

At the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Hemedti was in Russia, where he spoke favorably about the establishment of a Russian naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast; but Burhan, who at the time was in charge of the Sudanese government, was reportedly opposed to the idea.

Lavrov attempted to finesse the issue by saying the naval base proposal was first approved by a previous Sudanese government (a reference to deposed dictator Omar al-Bashir), but that has not diminished the controversy. The Kremlin wants to keep its links to Burhan in case he comes out on top in the war, even though it may privately favor Hemedti. Meanwhile, the Wagner Group, because of the Haftar-Hemedti relationship, is reportedly supporting the latter in the civil war.

The Wagner Group is reportedly supporting Hemedti in Sudan’s civil war.

On June 30, a Wagner military base in Libya was hit by a drone strike, though no one was killed or injured in the attack. The government in Tripoli, which has long opposed the Haftar-Wagner alliance, denied that it was involved in the strike; but one possibility is that it undertook this attack to weaken the abovementioned ties.

Another possibility is that Turkish forces in Libya may have launched the drone strike at the behest of the Russian government as a warning to Wagner against taking part in any rebellion against the Kremlin. However, until more information is revealed, it remains uncertain as to who actually launched the strike and for what purpose, since there are multiple conflicts within conflicts in Libya.

The UAE Connection

There have long been reports suggesting that the UAE has not only helped to fund Wagner operations in Libya and Sudan (though it may have ended its funding for Wagner in Libya when Haftar’s offensive to take Tripoli faltered in 2020), but has also facilitated the transfer of Wagner funds across its own borders.

One prominent security analyst, Andreas Krieg, has even suggested that Wagner “would not be able to operate if they no longer had access to the infrastructure, financial logistics, gold trade infrastructure that the UAE has provided.”

Wagner reportedly operates the Dubai-based company, Kratol Aviation, which is used to move supplies around Africa, as well as another company, Industrial Resources General Trading, which is allegedly involved in moving gold from Wagner operations. These two companies have been sanctioned by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

US Moves Against Wagner Operations

Even before Prigozhin’s failed mutiny, the US had highly negative views of the Wagner Group, and in one encounter in Syria in 2018 even killed about 200 of their mercenaries in an air strike after they attacked a US military base. In January 2023, CIA Director William Burns traveled to Libya where he had discussions with a number of Libyan leaders, including Haftar, and reportedly pressured him to expel Wagner amid concerns that the group could exploit Libya’s oil resources.

That same month, OFAC designated Wagner as a “significant transnational criminal organization.” Whether Haftar decides to move against Wagner to enter the good graces of the United States remains an open question.

It is noteworthy that Haftar also has good relations with the Russian government, which he wants to maintain; but unlike in Syria, Wagner is the only Russian entity of significance in Libya. Haftar may not want to run the risk of getting into a military conflict with Wagner forces, especially because he knows their capabilities.

In the wake of the failed mutiny in late June, it appears that the US Treasury has stepped up its pressure on Wagner, sanctioning four companies connected with it, including the two mentioned earlier.

Although these sanctions, along with pressure on the UAE to clamp down on companies doing business with Wagner, may hinder some of its operations, Wagner may find other means to maintain its influence in Arab and African countries.

While the Russian government may have the muscle to place Wagner under its control in Syria, the same cannot be said for Libya and Sudan. Thus, Moscow may prefer to use cooptation and other non-military means to try to bring Wagner under its orbit in these countries.

From the perspective of certain warring factions in Libya and Sudan, such a policy may not be to their disadvantage since what counts for them is retaining a mercenary presence in their countries that would aid them against their opponents.

However, from the perspective of the peoples of these countries, a continuing mercenary presence, either from a private company or a nationalized one, merely adds to their woes, as it contributes to the ongoing violence and constitutes a drain on their countries’ mineral wealth, which should be used instead for the welfare of the people.

***

Gregory Aftandilian is a Nonresident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a Senior Professorial Lecturer at American University where he teaches courses on US foreign policy. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and George Mason University, teaching courses on Middle East politics.

___________