Author - ab_mnbr

 Salma El Wardany and Hatem Mohareb

Takeaways 

• Chevron Corp., Eni SpA, QatarEnergy and Repsol SA were among major energy companies that won rights to explore for oil and gas in Libya.
• The country’s state-owned National Oil Corp. announced the results of the auction for blocks both on land and out in water in the first tender of licenses since 2007.
• Libya energy officials said they aim to boost the country’s crude output to 2 million barrels a day by 2030, from 1.4 million currently, offering new production-sharing agreements with enhanced fiscal terms.

Chevron Corp., Eni SpA, QatarEnergy and Repsol SA were among major energy companies that won rights to explore for oil and gas in Libya, the latest sign that the nation that holds Africa’s largest crude reserves is opening up for investments following years of civil war.

The country’s state-owned National Oil Corp. announced the results of the auction for blocks both on land and out in water in the first tender of licenses since 2007. Of the 20 exploration blocks that were offered, only five received valid bids, and officials pledged to make improvements for the next bidding round.

The interest in the OPEC nation, still divided between rival eastern and western governments, comes as energy majors seek to boost reserves following forecasts that demand for crude will remain strong for longer because of a slower energy transition. President Donald Trump’s assertive foreign policy is also giving US oil companies confidence to strike deals and expand in politically sensitive countries like Iraq and Libya.

While some major producers such as Eni and France’s TotalEnergies SE continued to invest in Libya through the war, many were spooked by the instability that had energy facilities at the heart of the conflict.

Chevron secured an exploration license in the Sirte basin, marking a significant return to Libya’s most prolific onshore area, while Italy’s Eni, QatarEnergy and a consortium of Spain’s Repsol, Turkiye Petrolleri AO and Hungary’s Mol Nyrt. also won offshore licenses.

The 20 exploration blocks, which were put for auction about a year ago, hold an estimated 10 billion barrels of available resources and 18 billion barrels yet to be discovered.

The NOC said in a live-streamed awarding ceremony that it will review invalid bids received in other blocks to continue talks with the interested investors, and will study areas that haven’t received any bids to review and enhance the terms so that they can be offered anew in the next bidding round.

“There will be a new bidding round soon, expected to be this year after completing some arrangements and obtaining necessary approvals,” NOC Chairman Masoud Suleiman said in a phone interview. “Negotiations will take place to improve terms and reach an understanding between the tender committee and international investors.”

Libya energy officials said they aim to boost the country’s crude output to 2 million barrels a day by 2030, from 1.4 million currently, offering new production-sharing agreements with enhanced fiscal terms, simplified cost recovery and clearer profit sharing.

There’s already been some success with TotalEnergies and ConocoPhillips last month signing deals to more than double production capacity of their Waha Oil venture, with investments likely to reach $20 billion over 25 years.

The NOC’s chairman said in a conference in Qatar last week his country also aims to increase piped gas exports to Europe, which had largely stopped in recent years, by the end of the decade.

Libya’s last previous exploration tender was held four years before an uprising against Moammar Al Qaddafi sparked over a decade of upheaval. Before 2011, Libya was producing 1.6 million to 1.8 million barrels a day, before it was hit by political divisions that saw periodic oil and gas infrastructure shutdowns by various groups pressing for political or economic demands.

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Massimiliano Boccolini

Italy is rebuilding a structural presence in Libya by combining parallel security engagement with Tripoli and Benghazi and a renewed energy push. The strategy links migration control and offshore investment, betting on Libya’s recovery while navigating its persistent political fragmentation

Why it matters: Rome is moving to re-establish a structural presence in Libya — linking migration control, security cooperation and a renewed energy push in the Sirte basin. The strategy combines parallel engagement with both Western and Eastern power centres, as well as a major offshore license for Eni and QatarEnergy.

Security diplomacy on both sides of Libya. Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi visited Tripoli and Benghazi within days — his sixth mission to the Libyan capital since taking office — closing the trip with a meeting with Khalifa Haftar.

The big picture: Rome is formalising a strategy of “parallel engagement” with Libya’s dual power structures:

• The Government of National Unity in Tripoli, led by Abdulhamid Dabaiba.
• The Eastern Bloc aligned with Khalifa Haftar, his family network and the Tobruk-based parliament.
• The move follows a rocky phase in relations with eastern Libya. In July 2025, an EU delegation, including Piantedosi, was turned away upon arrival in Benghazi — widely seen as a political signal by Haftar to assert leverage.
• Returning now on a bilateral mission, including high-level intelligence components, amounts to recognising Haftar as a key interlocutor on migration and security — without formally acknowledging the parallel government in the east.

Rome’s calculation: Migration management cannot run solely through Tripoli if Haftar-linked forces effectively control key militias and transit nodes.

For Italy, operational channels must cover the full Libyan arc — especially areas intersecting the Central Mediterranean route and the southern borders with Egypt, Sudan and Chad.

Migrant arrivals drop — but Libya remains central. The visit comes as Italy prepares to implement the rules of the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will enter into force in June.

• The numbers:
  • 1,813 arrivals in Italy between Jan. 1 and Feb. 9, 2026.
  • Down 56.38% from 4,156 in the same period in 2025.
  • 1,386 migrants — more than three-quarters — departed from Libya.
  • Libyan departures down 64.1% year-on-year.
• Despite the decline, Libya remains the backbone of the Central Mediterranean corridor. Alternative routes via Tunisia and Algeria are growing in percentage terms but remain marginal in absolute numbers.

Reality check: While political attention often shifted toward Tunisia in recent years, data from NGOs and EU institutions show Libya has steadily regained its role as the primary departure point toward Italy. That explains Rome’s urgency to “cover” both Tripoli and Benghazi with operational cooperation and intelligence-sharing mechanisms.

Beyond the “naval blockade” slogan. Piantedosi has distanced himself from campaign-era rhetoric about a “naval blockade,” calling it a journalistic simplification.

• What’s actually on the table:
  • Possible temporary entry restrictions within Italy’s 12-mile territorial waters in exceptional security cases.
  • Externalisation of parts of asylum procedures to “safe third countries,” in line with EU Pact provisions.
  • Strengthened cooperation with Libyan authorities on voluntary returns and land and maritime border control.
• Symbolism matters — showing the route is “under control.” But the Interior Ministry acknowledges that current conditions do not justify extraordinary measures, given relative stability in 2025 and the early 2026 decline.

The controversial part: According to IOM data, 537 people were intercepted and returned to Libya between early January and late January 2026 — raising persistent concerns about conditions incompatible with European protection standards.

Libyan political analyst Ahmed Zaher argues the visit complements recent economic and energy developments. “Tripoli represents the maritime front and ports, while Benghazi effectively controls the entire southern border,” he says. “To influence the migration file, you need to work on both fronts in parallel.”

Zaher also notes that Eni has consolidated its reputation as a reliable partner, improving dialogue with Benghazi and facilitating minimal understandings on migration containment. But he warns these are “stopgap solutions” in the absence of a cohesive Libyan state governed by constitutional rule of law.

The energy pivot: Eni and QatarEnergy secure offshore O1. Parallel to migration diplomacy, Italy is deepening its energy footprint. Libya’s National Oil Corporation awarded the offshore O1 license to a consortium led by Eni, with QatarEnergy as a partner.

• Key details:
  • Offshore block in the Sirte basin.
  • Around 29,000 square kilometres.
  • Water depths up to 2,000 meters.
  • Considered highly prospective, including undeveloped discoveries and unexplored 3D seismic areas.
  • Eni holds 60% and acts as operator; QatarEnergy holds 40%.
  • Initial five-year exploration phase with 2D/3D seismic campaigns and at least one drilling cycle.
• The deal is part of Libya’s “Bid Round 2025,” the first international exploration round in over 17 years, offering 22 blocks (11 onshore, 11 offshore) across Sirte, Murzuq, Ghadames, Sabratha and offshore Sirte.
• To attract investors after a decade of instability, NOC introduced new fiscal terms: a Production Sharing Agreement with a state take of around 66% and modelled internal rates of return up to 20–35%, more competitive than previous contracts.
• Production context:
  • 2025 average output: 1.374 million barrels per day — a 10-year record.
  • 501 million barrels produced annually.
  • $21.9 billion in oil revenues, up 15% year-on-year.
  • Target: 2 million barrels per day by 2030.

Why is pushing: Eni has operated in Libya since 1959 and remains the leading international operator, with equity production around 160,000–170,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2025. Gas flows through the Greenstream pipeline to Italy.

• Strengthening upstream offshore exposure serves multiple goals:
  • Securing geographically proximate supplies.
  • Reinforcing Italy’s ambition to act as a southern gas gateway to Europe.
  • Balancing other external actors active in Libya, including Turkey in the west and Russia and the UAE in the east.
• QatarEnergy’s involvement adds geopolitical weight. Doha is already an LNG supplier to Italy and the EU. Its participation ties Gulf interests more closely to the Italy–Libya energy axis and provides Rome with additional political insulation in the event of local shocks.

Security and energy, intertwined. Put together, Piantedosi’s Benghazi visit and the O1 license award tell the same story: Italy is treating Libya again as an integrated strategic space.

Security cooperation on migration, counter-trafficking and border control is the political-military counterpart to deeper energy exposure during Libya’s production revival.

The upside:

• Concrete leverage in bilateral negotiations.
• Stronger standing in EU forums, where operational capacity counts.
• Alignment with Gulf partners invested in Libyan stability.

The risk: Libya remains fragmented and vulnerable to regional rivalries and external interference. Actors considered partners today — including Haftar — have previously used migration and institutional access as bargaining tools.

Italy’s bet is coherent with geography and post-Russia diversification needs. It is backed by tangible production recovery and a competitive new licensing round. But it remains a bet on a country where power balances are fluid — and where security, migration and energy are inseparable from politics.

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Anas El Gomati

His name offered an alternative line of succession that Libya’s rival elites could neither control nor neutralise.

Saif al-Gaddafi was shot 19 times inside his compound in Zintan, a mountain town in western Libya, where he had lived since his capture in 2011. Four masked men entered the compound after disabling the security cameras. Roughly 90 minutes earlier, his guards had withdrawn from the area for reasons that remain unexplained.

When the shooting ended, the assailants did not flee. They left. No gunfight. No pursuit. No claim of responsibility. The perpetrators vanished into the kind of silence that, in Libya, usually means the killers have nothing to fear from an investigation.

Saif was the son of Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled Libya for more than four decades before being overthrown and killed in the 2011 revolution. Since 2014, the country has been divided between two rival power centres. In the west, successive governments in Tripoli, the latest led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, derive their authority from United Nations recognition. In the east, renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar controls territory through military force, backed by the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Egypt, while a paper government in Benghazi provides civilian cover for what is effectively military rule. Neither side has faced a national election, nor intends to.

The mechanics of the killing tell their own story.

This was not violence born of chaos. It was an operation, executed within a narrow window by actors who understood Saif’s movements, his protection, and the informal rules governing both. Members of his inner circle have described it as an inside job. Reaching him required more than weapons.

It required access to his routines, to his guards, and to the layered arrangements that had kept him alive in secret. For years, Saif had lived in varying degrees of concealment, protected by local understandings and, at times, by Russian-linked security support.

By the night of the attack, all that protection had been withdrawn. Whoever planned the operation knew it would be.

Motive alone is not evidence. But method and capability narrow the field.

When Abdelghani al-Kikli, the commander of Tripoli’s largest militia, Stabilisation Support Apparatus (SSA), was assassinated last year by a rival brigade, the result was immediate chaos. Armed clashes shut down large parts of the capital – factional and noisy, and instantly legible.

The Zintan operation bears no resemblance. Its precision and the silence that followed point to a different kind of actor. Critics, liabilities, and inconvenient figures within Haftar’s orbit have often been removed quietly.

Mahmoud al-Werfalli, a senior officer in Haftar’s forces and a man wanted by the International Criminal Court, was shot dead in broad daylight in Benghazi in 2021. No serious investigation followed. Others have disappeared in a similar fashion. These operations do not require total territorial control. They rely on networks, intimidation and the expectation of impunity.

None of these constitutes proof. Libya rarely offers proof. Only patterns. But patterns have infrastructure.

The political order Muammar Gaddafi built did not disappear in 2011. It was disassembled and repurposed. Haftar took its fragments, tribal patronage networks, security hierarchies, and the militia economy, and reassembled them around his own family, anchored by a praetorian guard, the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade, commanded by his son Saddam, the recently appointed deputy general commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army and the most likely successor to his father.

Former loyalists of the old regime were not excluded from this system, but they were never trusted within it. Pro-Gaddafi political figures and commanders were encouraged to return under Haftar and absorbed after 2014 only on strictly conditional terms. Figures such as Hassan Zadma, once aligned with Saif’s brother Khamis’s infamous 32nd Brigade, were coopted for their utility, not integrated as partners. When their presence threatened Haftar’s control, they were marginalised or dismantled.

Saif himself was never offered even that conditional inclusion. He remained outside the system, tolerated, contained, and watched, a reminder of an alternative line of inheritance that could never be fully neutralised. He had lived under the persistent threat of assassination since 2017.

Saif did not represent change. He represented an alternative. The danger he posed was structural. Haftar’s coalition is held together not by ideology but by patronage, and patronage is distributed unevenly. Some tribes and armed groups receive more than others. Loyalty is transactional, calibrated to what each faction can extract. In the event of Haftar’s death, those who feel short-changed would see succession as an opportunity to renegotiate their terms, or defect to whoever offers a better deal.

The only figure with a history and surname symbolic enough to draw them in was Saif, heir to the very system Haftar had repurposed. He would not have dismantled it. He would have ruled through it, with the same patronage logic and the same authoritarian reflexes. Same system, different family.

That made him extraordinarily difficult to accommodate. Forty-eight hours before the killing, Saddam Haftar met Ibrahim Dbeibah, the prime minister’s nephew and head of Libya’s national security apparatus, secretly at the Elysee Palace in Paris. There was no official readout. Leaks suggest a single agenda: whether Libya’s rival camps could form yet another interim unity government, one that would bring the LAAF formally under the state, divide ministries and institutions between the Haftar and Dbeibah families, and postpone elections for what would now be over a decade. Libyans have not voted since 2014.

That grievance has deepened with every failed transition, every broken promise of elections, every new interim arrangement designed to keep the same people in power. A family carve-up negotiated in Paris would have made it volcanic. Saif did not need a programme to exploit that. He only needed to be on the ballot. In the aborted 2021 presidential election, he polled significantly ahead of Haftar. If the only viable candidates are authoritarians, the anti-establishment authoritarian wins. He could not be absorbed into such an arrangement without destabilising both sides, and he could not be left outside it without becoming the vehicle for every Libyan’s rage against it.

Five days after his killing, Saif’s tribe buried him in Bani Walid, a town long associated with loyalists of his father. They had wanted Sirte, his father’s tribal seat. Haftar’s forces denied them. Condolence receptions were blocked. Public mourning was prevented.

Saif spent a decade being told where he could live, who he could see, and when he could speak. His killers decided where he could die. His rivals decided where he could be buried. No one has been arrested. No one will be. In Libya, silence after a killing is never the absence of an answer. It is the answer.

***

Anas El Gomati is the Founder and Director General of the Sadeq Institute, Libya’s first public policy think tank based in Tripoli.

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Serag El Hegazi

Last week’s visit to Libya by Massad Boulos, Senior Advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump for Arab and African affairs — centred around the Libya Energy and Economic Summit (LEES 2026) in Tripoli — has been portrayed in Libyan and international press as a milestone in U.S.–Libyan relations.

According to news reports, Boulos emphasised that the United States sees “high value in the Libyan-American partnership” and is ready to deepen cooperation across economic and security sectors. He underscored efforts to expand Libya’s energy production and development ties with U.S. firms, signalling a renewed U.S. strategic focus on the country’s vast energy potential.

Yet this moment is about more than new deals and diplomatic optics. It exposes a central dilemma that has long shaped Libya’s trajectory since the 2011 revolution: will international engagement reinforce narrow economic gains and short-term stability, or will it support sustainable development that addresses the country’s deeper structural challenges?

The Context: A Fragile Political

Landscape

Libya’s political landscape remains deeply fragmented more than a decade after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. Rival administrations, institutional divisions, and competing security actors continue to complicate governance and policy coherence. The United Kingdom’s Parliament notes that rival governments in the west and east remain a central fault line, with repeated postponements of national elections underscoring a broader political impasse.

Internal clashes and unrest also persist: even in 2025, Tripoli saw renewed armed confrontations that required ceasefires to protect civilians and stabilise institutions. These conditions shape Libya’s economic decision-making, often privileging short-term revenue generation — especially oil — over long-term planning and institutional reform.

Economic Re-Engagement:

A Double-Edged Sword

At the LEES 2026 Summit, Boulos and Libyan counterparts celebrated significant agreements with international oil majors, including U.S. and European firms, aimed at boosting Libya’s hydrocarbon output and foreign investment. Meanwhile, Reuters reports that Libya has signed a 25-year oil and gas development deal worth over $20 billion with TotalEnergies and ConocoPhillips, reinforcing its role as a major energy supplier.

From a conventional policy standpoint, such deals are framed as economic growth and stability anchors. However, for Libya — a nation heavily reliant on oil revenues that constitute the bulk of fiscal income — this model risks reinforcing resource dependency and overlooking the need for economic diversification and resilience. According to the World Bank, Libya’s dependency on hydrocarbons, coupled with instability, has constrained productivity and undermined broader development prospects.

This is not just a Libyan problem, but a broader issue across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where hydrocarbon-dependent economies face similar pressures to transition toward diversified, knowledge-driven, and resilient economic models.

Sustainability Beyond Oil: The Case

for a Broader Agenda

To be meaningful, sustainable engagement must go beyond headline-grabbing energy deals and include three interconnected dimensions:

1. Economic Diversification

Libya’s oil wealth has historically crowded out investment in other sectors. This structural imbalance is a key reason why unemployment, poverty, and public service gaps persist despite abundant natural resources. The World Bank emphasises that without diversification, Libya’s economy remains vulnerable to global price shocks and conflict-driven disruptions.

2. Institutional Governance

Many analyses highlight the fragility of Libyan institutions, which lack the capacity to manage revenues transparently, enforce environmental protections, or coordinate long-term development planning. Political fragmentation and corruption — including within the national oil sector — have eroded public trust and impeded reform efforts.

This points to a broader dilemma: international actors can invest capital without strengthening domestic systems, but true sustainability requires empowering local governance frameworks that can oversee and regulate development, rather than bypassing them.

3. Environmental and Social Resilience

Libya sits at the intersection of climatic vulnerability and resource scarcity. The country faces acute water stress, desertification, and environmental degradation, as well as increasing climate extremes linked to global warming.

These challenges compound socio-economic vulnerabilities, as climate shocks disproportionately affect rural livelihoods and urban services. Without planning and investment in renewable energy, water resource management, and climate adaptation, Libya’s development gains will remain fragile.

Indeed, recent UNDP-led initiatives in Libya focus on advancing a just and sustainable energy transition, explicitly linking environmental sustainability with economic diversification and climate resilience.

Libya in the MENA and Global

Sustainability Landscape

Libya’s situation mirrors broader regional transitions. Countries across the MENA region — from North Africa to the Gulf — are grappling with the imperative to decouple growth from fossil fuels, strengthen institutional capacity, and introduce sustainable governance. International frameworks such as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate initiatives reiterate that sustainability is not an add-on but central to long-term peace, prosperity, and human well-being.

In this context, foreign policy must adapt. As commentators on sustainable peace-building have noted, aligning diplomatic engagement with human rights, governance, and SDGs — rather than narrow transactional interests — can help conflict-affected states like Libya break the cycle of instability that has plagued them for decades.

A Strategic Pivot or a Missed

Opportunity?

The U.S. engagement under Boulos can still be constructive. A U.S. strategy that integrates economic cooperation with support for institutional reform, environmental resilience, and inclusive governance would resonate with broader MENA sustainability efforts. But there is a risk: focusing narrowly on energy production and security risks replicating the old paradigm of resource-centric engagement that has underpinned cycles of instability.

As Libya expands its production targets and attracts foreign firms, policymakers in Tripoli and abroad must ask tough questions:

• Are international deals tied to requirements for environmental protection, local capacity building, and revenue transparency?
• Do investment frameworks support job creation and diversification beyond hydrocarbons?
• Can partnerships help Libya strengthen its water, energy, and food nexus to build resilience against climate shocks and political fluctuations?

Conclusion: Sustainability as Strategy

Libya stands at a genuine crossroads. The recent visit by a senior U.S. adviser reflects growing geopolitical and economic interest. But without anchoring this engagement in sustainability — encompassing diversified development, institutional reform, and environmental resilience — Libya risks repeating cycles of instability under a different banner.

The nation’s future will not be secured solely by oil deals or temporary stabilisation. It will be cemented by policies and partnerships that embed sustainability into the fabric of governance and by international engagement that sees Libya not just as a supplier of resources but as a partner in long-term development.

In the broader MENA context, this approach aligns with regional imperatives to transition toward resilience and equity. For Libya, making sustainability a central pillar of foreign cooperation could be the difference between enduring stagnation and a genuine transformation.

***

Dr Serag El Hegazi is a Lecturer and a Program Leader in Sustainable Development and Project Planning at the University of Bradford, and a member of the board and specialist in North African Studies at John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies (JEFCAS). His research focuses on sustainable urban development, post-conflict reconstruction, and environmental governance in the MENA region. 

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Barry Malone

Bloody chapter in Libya’s history closes with the fatal shooting of Saif al-Gaddafi. What prompted the killing of the playboy turned would-be leader?

A remote town on a mountainous plateau in north-western Libya is a long way from a box at the opera in Vienna alongside US model and actor Carmen Electra. But it was in Zintan where Saif al-Gaddafi, the playboy-turned-politician who had once been seen as Libya’s future, was assassinated last week.

The son of the late Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi, once believed to be a potential heir, was killed by four gunmen in the garden of his home, his lawyer said, describing the attackers as commandos who the 53-year-old “directly confronted”.

According to local reports, the assassination was unusually slick. “This wasn’t militia clashing. It was timed, coordinated, professional. They knew when he’d be there, disabled surveillance, executed the operation and vanished. That level of planning rules out standard militia operations,” Anas El Gomati, director of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute thinktank, told The Observer.

In the murky and fractious world of Libyan politics, though, while rumour abounds, there have been no credible reports of who was behind the killing. “Motive is everywhere. Evidence is nowhere,” El Gomati said. “We’re reading smoke signals in a country where the fire never stops.”

It was a tawdry full stop to a life that saw Saif al-Gaddafi become the second most powerful man in Libya after his father, trusted to lead important diplomatic initiatives. He was the acceptable face of the country in the west, rubbing shoulders with political elites across Europe, most notably in London, where he paid millions for a mansion in the wealthy Hampstead Garden Suburb.

The visit to the opera in 2006 came at a time when Saif’s charm offensive and efforts to bring Libya in from the cold had been under way for years. Though considered a more sober version of the elder Gaddafi, he wasn’t averse to a little flamboyance, owning two tigers, wearing only the sharpest suits, and enjoying opulent parties and the company of models.

He positioned himself as a genuine reformer who wanted to gently push his autocratic family towards a more democratic future. It wasn’t all talk. Relations with western nations improved considerably when Gaddafi agreed to give up his nuclear ambitions in 2003, a massive concession believed to have been brokered by his son, which eventually led to the lifting of longstanding sanctions.

Saif al-Gaddafi dangled access to Libya’s oil, hindered by increasingly dilapidated infrastructure, believing he could leverage it to strike favourable trade deals. He often called for the drawing-up of a constitution that would guarantee human rights. And in the most controversial move among his father’s loyalists and the state security apparatus, he extended an olive branch to sworn enemies in Libyan Islamist groups, leading to the release of many from the country’s dungeons.

In Britain he numbered among his circle Peter Mandelson, who faced a tirade of criticism in 2009 when the Spectator revealed he had joined Saif al- Gaddafi in a shooting party at Lord Rothschild’s Waddesdon Manor in Buckinghamshire. Mandelson’s office said in a statement at the time that it was not in the habit of commenting on his social engagements, but that he would never kill a pheasant.

Saif’s penetration of British high society was deep and reportedly included two meetings with Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor, but after Libya’s civil war broke out in 2011, his friends frantically distanced themselves. Howard Davies, then director of the London School of Economics, was forced to resign after admitting “errors of judgment” in accepting a £1.5m research donation from Gaddafi junior and in travelling to Libya to advise the government.

The university was also forced to investigate allegations that a PhD it awarded Saif al- Gaddafi – titled “The Role of Civil Society in the Democratization of Global Governance Institutions: From ‘Soft Power’ to Collective Decision-Making?” – had been plagiarised or that he had paid consultants to write it on his behalf.

It could have been very different, and indeed his western friends may have been forgiven for thinking they were about to be rewarded for their patronage and foresight when, with the nascent rebellion against his father under way, Saif al- Gaddafi appeared on television to address the Libyan people.

Many expected that he would announce concessions, perhaps even that Muammar Gaddafi was about to step down in favour of the reformist heir. Instead the Libyan people and the world watched as Saif al- Gaddafi jabbed his finger at the screen and warned that the country would end up awash in “rivers of blood” if the protests did not stop. “The language he used sounded just like his dad,” a western diplomat told me at the time. “A mask dropped and an instinct to protect the dynasty kicked in.”

In a speech that would go down in infamy, protesters were described as “rats” and the government, he said, would fight “to the last man, woman and bullet”. The soft face of Libya had made a choice. And that choice was to join with his father and Mutassim Gaddafi – his hardline younger brother who observers in Tripoli said was in close competition with him to succeed their father – and fight.

What happened next is well documented. The revolution, with the help of Nato, succeeded and Muammar Gaddafi was captured and summarily executed. Saif, who after making a dramatic appearance on the streets of Tripoli to rally the troops as rebels closed in on the capital, went on the run before he was caught on his way to neighbouring Niger disguised as a Bedouin tribesman.

It began a long period of imprisonment during which he was held by a militia in the revolutionary hotbed city of Zintan. Though there was an international criminal court warrant out for his arrest and he was sentenced to death by firing squad in a Tripoli court in 2015, the fighters of Zintan refused to give up their valuable negotiating chip.

The Gaddafi family’s warnings of a splintered Libya should the western-backed revolt succeed came to pass and the country quickly fell into chaos post-2011 with power brokers, militias, and tribes running fiefdoms and competing for influence.

There are now, in effect, two administrations, one based in Tripoli in the west and the other in the eastern city of Tobruk, each supported by a dizzying assortment of armed groups and foreign governments. A sense of frustration among the people of Libya with both governments, and with perceived corruption, is what led Saif al- Gaddafi to make his one and only audacious move since he was unexpectedly freed in an amnesty in 2017.

In 2021, as a UN-led initiative to hold a presidential election bore fruit, he made the journey from his safe haven in Zintan to the southern city of Sabha to formally register his candidacy, grabbing attention because of how rarely he was seen. It was a bid that most saw as rooted in nostalgia for the relative stability of his father’s time and a desire among some remnants of the Green Movement, Muammar’s loyalists, to have a figurehead they could rally round.

“Saif wielded entirely symbolic power – no territory, no militia, no political organisation,” El Gomati told The Observer. “He’d been invisible since 2021, living under Russian protection in southern Libya and Zintan, where he relied on local groups.”

According to Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute thinktank, the journey to Sabha was facilitated by troops from Russia’s Wagner mercenary group, who guarded him on the ground and flew jets above. “His appearance in Sabha at the electoral commission wouldn’t have been possible without the protection of Russia,” he told The Observer.

Russia, Libyan analysts said, nominally supported the administration of Gen Khalifa Haftar but saw Saif al-Gaddafi as an insurance policy. Harchaoui said that the appearance was very brief, the prospective candidate didn’t say much and it was a security feat more than anything else. “He showed up, declared himself as a candidate, and just disappeared into the wilderness within 20 minutes,” he said.

For Harchaoui, Saif al- Gaddafi was an asset to those who backed him simply because “he was biologically alive, and that was enough to use him as a symbol”. But, he said, reliable polling showed he could achieve as much as 40% of the vote.

The election didn’t go ahead, partly due to the possibility of what some were calling the “third option” disrupting power-sharing between east and west. Saif al- Gaddafi is now out of the way, and with the four surviving Gaddafi children abroad and lacking heft or influence, Muammar’s dynasty is dead.

In the end, it appears that a man who had survived a war, international arrest warrants and a death sentence could not, or would not, articulate to the Libyan people or the country’s many powerful factions what he stood for.

“I don’t think he knew who he was beneath the costumes. He wasn’t a democrat or reformer – he was a would-be heir who outlived his ­inheritance, method acting through personas until someone decided the performance had run too long,” El Gomati said.

Countdown to a killing

February 2011 Violent protests break out in Benghazi against the government of Muammar Gaddafi as the Arab Spring takes hold across north Africa. They spread to other cities.

March 2011 In response to Gaddafi’s violent crackdown, the UN Security Council imposes a no-fly zone over Libya, which NATO enforces with airstrikes across the country.

October 2011 Rebel fighters capture and kill Gaddafi, who had ruled for more than four decades. The main opposition group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), says that Libya is “liberated” and promises elections.

November 2011 Saif al-Gaddafi, is captured in the Sahara while attempting to flee to Niger. He is disguised as a tribesman.

August 2012 The NTC hands power to the General National Congress (GNC), but this is not a time of peace. The following month, Islamic militants kill the US ambassador in Benghazi.

February 2014 Protests erupt after the GNC refuses to disband in accordance with its mandate. The east and west become host to warring sides.

July 2015 A Tripoli court sentences Saif al-Islam to death for crimes committed during the 2011 uprising. He is freed in 2017 as part of an amnesty deal.

March 2016 The presidential council of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) arrives in Tripoli by boat. Over the next two years, Islamic State is rooted out of Libya.

September 2020 The eastern government, led by the warlord Khalifa Haftar, resigns after protests in Benghazi. A ceasefire follows between the GNA and his Libyan National Army.

November 2021 Four years after he is released, Saif al-Gaddafi says he is running for president. He is disqualified, the election falls apart and the impasse remains to this day.

February 2026 Saif al-Gaddafi is shot dead at his home in the city of Zintan.

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Enes Berna Kilic

The Trump administration has launched its most ambitious Libya initiative in years, centered on the belief that economic engagement can unlock political progress.

Rather than prioritizing formal mediation frameworks, Washington is placing commercial partnerships with both sides of the North African country at the heart of its approach. Energy investments, high-level access, and sustained contact with rival factions now define U.S. policy.

For more than a decade, the United States remained largely absent from Libya’s political and security landscape. After the 2011 NATO intervention that led to the collapse of the Gadhafi regime, Washington steadily reduced its footprint, opting for limited diplomatic engagement and deferring largely to U.N.-led processes.

The vacuum did not remain empty. Competing regional actors stepped in, and Russian-linked Wagner mercenaries gradually entrenched themselves across eastern and southern Libya.

Meanwhile, Libya’s political process has repeatedly stalled despite U.N.-backed roadmaps, ceasefire agreements, and election plans. Against that backdrop, the administration appears to be testing whether economic leverage can succeed where traditional diplomacy fell short.

At the core of this approach is the assumption that Libya’s elites, deeply dependent on oil revenues, can be nudged toward compromise if their economic interests are aligned. The question is whether engagement alone can translate into influence over entrenched political and military structures.

US return in Libya

The Trump administration’s recent Libya initiative is best understood as a deliberate return rather than a routine diplomatic push. After years of minimal involvement, Washington is re-entering the Libyan arena with sustained senior-level engagement, economic commitments, and direct outreach to rival power centers.

The long absence Libya’s instability also spilled beyond its borders, affecting migration routes, energy security, and regional military dynamics.

The roots of this disorder trace back to the Obama administration’s decision to intervene militarily without a viable postwar plan. The removal of Gaddafi dismantled the state’s coercive core, but no durable political or security framework replaced it. What followed was fragmentation, militia rule, and prolonged international disengagement.

The long absence

Libya’s instability also spilled beyond its borders, affecting migration routes, energy security, and regional military dynamics.

The roots of this disorder trace back to the Obama administration’s decision to intervene militarily without a viable postwar plan. The removal of Gadhafi dismantled the state’s coercive core, but no durable political or security framework replaced it. What followed was fragmentation, militia rule, and prolonged international disengagement.

Energy deals as a tool of influence

Energy agreements are both the strong point and the centerpiece of Washington’s renewed engagement. Recent deals involving major U.S. and European firms aim to significantly expand Libya’s oil production capacity over the coming years. These commitments also represent the largest wave of Western corporate investment in Libya’s energy sector in more than a decade.

Libya has already increased production to levels not seen since before the 2011 uprising, and officials on all sides view further expansion as essential to stabilizing state finances. For Washington, large-scale investment is intended to signal seriousness while creating shared incentives for cooperation between eastern and western power centers.

Yet, without clear safeguards, new income streams risk reinforcing existing divisions instead of bridging them. Oil revenues have often intensified competition rather than fostering compromise, fueling disputes over budget authority, institutional control, and revenue distribution.

Massad Boulos and logic of commercial

statecraft

At the center of this renewed doctrine is Massad Boulos, the administration’s senior advisor on Arab and African affairs. His repeated visits to Libya at the last couple of days of January and the following engagement with leaders on both sides of the divide, and his role in convening international meetings show an increase in the belief that economic access can unlock political space.

By maintaining open channels with rival factions and anchoring U.S. engagement in tangible economic projects, the administration is attempting to rebuild trust and relevance simultaneously. Ambassador Boulos’s strategy, in that aspect, prioritizes energy deals, not treated as rewards for political progress but as instruments to generate it.

Instead of past U.S. efforts that relied on external pressure, Trump’s approach assumes that sustained interaction, combined with shared commercial interests, can gradually lower barriers to dialogue, though whether this logic holds in Libya’s fractured environment is yet to be seen.

Access without leverage and working

collectively

Last week’s talks facilitated by Boulous in Paris brought representatives from Libya’s rival camps together for the first time in months, demonstrating Washington’s renewed convening power and that American engagement still carries weight.

Meetings have taken place with leaders and power brokers from both western Libya, centered in Tripoli, and eastern Libya, based in Benghazi. Discussions have ranged from energy cooperation to military coordination and the functioning of national financial institutions.

Practically, however, the meetings stopped short of concrete commitments. Over the last few years, Libya’s leaders have proven adept at engaging externally while preserving the status quo at home. That also shows that the access gained by Washington has to be coupled with working with allies like Türkiye to be turned into leverage.

As can be seen from the effects of the Trump doctrine in Syria, however, burden-sharing and working with allies are essential components of the renewed American foreign policy. In this regard, working with Ankara, which has communication and influence with both sides, may be the first option in the near future.

Absent such conditions, U.S. policy risks projecting activity without impact. The current approach has opened doors and created opportunities, and it is clear that new investments will also provide hope for the Libyan people and contribute to stability in the region.

Until then, Libya’s long-standing institutional fractures remain intact. Whether Washington can turn economic presence into political leverage will determine if this strategy will yield solutions and the extent of American interests.

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Abdalla Najjar

As European clubs fly into Benghazi for friendly matches, Khalifa Haftar is leveraging spectacle and soft power to reframe his rule

Benghazi, a city that gained notoriety in 2012 after an attack on the U.S. consulate that led to the death of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, recently hosted two major soccer clubs from the European Union.

The city, run by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who rules much of eastern Libya in opposition to the U.N.-backed government based in Tripoli, has long been devoid of any appeal to Westerners. More recently, however, the Haftar regime has sought to legitimize its rule through soft power and attempts at sportswashing its legacy.

The major soccer event brought together former Spanish champions Atletico Madrid and Italian champions and European Champions League finalists Inter Milan to play a friendly match on the evening of Oct. 10. The game was held in Benghazi’s newly reconstructed stadium, and financed by the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund under the leadership of Haftar’s son, Belqasim.

The friendly match saw the crowning of Atletico Madrid as champions of the “Reconstruction Cup” after securing a penalty shootout victory against Inter. The event will reportedly be held annually in Benghazi, bringing together two major EU clubs to compete against each other.

La Gazzetta dello Sport, Italy’s prominent sports paper, reported on the match, calling the experience “intense and surreal.” The report contained no mention of the Haftar regime’s record, and instead focused on the ostentatious spectacle. La Gazzetta declared the event an indication of Libya’s, and particularly the city of Benghazi’s, ability to open up to the West and host international events.

The Spanish paper, Mundo Deportivo, on the other hand, reported that legendary club Barcelona was planning to participate, but pulled out at the last minute due to security concerns, returning the 5 million euro participation fee, with Atletico Madrid replacing it. These security concerns might explain why Inter Milan and Atletico Madrid chose to arrive on the day of their match and depart immediately afterward, avoiding a hotel stay and a tour around Benghazi.

The match and the spectacle it generated exemplify the tools of soft power that the Haftars have been resorting to in recent years. It highlights the field marshal’s ability to adapt his rule to new challenges while diverting attention from a poor human rights record, which is being “sportswashed” by the grandiosity of events.

The memory of Haftar’s failed 2019 military campaign against the government in Tripoli, a Russian-backed effort that was fraught with numerous incidents of human rights violations, lingers. So, too, does the impact of mines left behind by Haftar-allied Wagner Group mercenaries, who planted the devices as they retreated from areas they had occupied, a possible war crime that has maimed and killed civilians, along with at least three deminers.

Members of Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), whether or not they took part in the 2019 campaign, are banned from entering Tripoli. Many of the individuals I spoke with in Benghazi have expressed their discontent at not being able to visit the capital of their own country. Now Haftar’s campaign to portray Benghazi as a vibrant and attractive destination has further deepened the division.

Sportswashing isn’t new to Libya. Moammar Gadhafi, who ruled the country for more than 40 years, previously hosted the Italian clubs Parma and Juventus, which battled for the Italian Super Cup in 2002. Other countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have also elicited accusations of sportswashing for hosting major sporting events like the World Cup.

“The event does not merely represent [soccer], but also the personification of Libya’s revived spirit that’s opening up to the world and unifying the masses through sports,” said Agila al-Abbar, who heads the international collaboration office of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, a body including both governments that is meant to lay the groundwork for a peace process.

Haftar’s pivot to sports gained steam as a major tool of influence with Mike Tyson’s first visit to Benghazi in March 2024. In Libya, soccer is the main sport, especially since boxing was banned under Gadhafi’s rule. Haftar’s approach has sought to revive boxing while simultaneously providing Benghazi with access to high-profile European soccer, rebranding his own image with the West and providing entertainment to his constituents. In a place where entertainment outside of sports is limited, investing in soccer or boxing is a win-win situation for both Haftar and his people.

At the time of Tyson’s visit, Benghazi hosted three Africa title matches for the World Boxing Association. The event was attended by more than 4,000 fans. Tyson was later pictured with Haftar as they crowned the Libyan boxer, Saad Fathi Saad, who won the light heavyweight title. Tyson would later make another appearance in Benghazi in August 2025, two months before the match between Atletico Madrid and Inter Milan.

Haftar’s ultimate strategy is to stay in power, and like any adaptive autocrat, he is mastering the art of manufacturing a different reputation for Benghazi and his regime, creating a modicum of Western appeal even as he maintains a relationship with Russia. Such a relationship has primarily focused on providing weapons and drones, as well as training for the LNA by Wagner forces.

The field marshal’s use of sports as a tool to win over the West and his own population is accompanied by a number of reconstruction projects led by Belqasim. One of the projects, which aims to rebuild the University of Benghazi, elicited a visit by the American charge d’affaires, Jeremy Brent, on Dec. 11.

Haftar’s other son, Saddam, occupies the role of LNA chief of staff. Saddam, alongside his father, hosted the U.S. Africa Command’s Gen. Dagvin Anderson on Dec. 2, with the aim of including some of their Libyan forces in the Americans’ annual special forces exercise, known as Flintlock 2026. Libya will host part of the exercise for the first time since its launch in 2005, bringing together the Libyan armed forces and some LNA members.

In addition to these efforts, Haftar hosted Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, and the pair signed a bilateral agreement on Dec. 18. Conjoined Libyan and Pakistani flags were seen hung on poles in different parts of Benghazi to celebrate Munir’s visit. Flights were either canceled or postponed upon his arrival, with Benghazi’s Benina airport shut down throughout the day on Dec. 17. The new collaboration with Pakistan brings another major actor to play a vital role in Libyan affairs, and represents another win for Haftar’s regime.

Taken together, these outreach efforts and attempts at sportswashing the family’s legacy reinforce the Haftars’ claim to being the legitimate rulers of the eastern front of the country.

Locally, Haftar seems to be faring well with at least part of his population. Beyond the billboards that have been newly installed in Benghazi to commemorate the 11th anniversary of Haftar’s “Karama” (Dignity) Revolution, many locals are seemingly content with his attempts to highlight Benghazi on the world map. The numerous conversations I’ve had with locals revealed one common theme: the collective experience of fear during the revolution and relief at the security that followed Haftar’s victory against the Islamic State group. Some have cited the sporting events as an indicator of Benghazi’s newly established status as a safer city than Tripoli, Libya’s Western-backed capital. Many were proud of the “new Benghazi,” as they put it, contrasting it with the city of the past decade, which had seen rampant Islamic State activity.

A source from Legacy Marketing and Public Relations, a Libyan agency responsible for VIP invites to the soccer match, was reluctant to weigh in on their contributions to Haftar’s efforts and refrained from speaking about the matter on the record. One of the attendees, however, a graduate from Benghazi’s law school, recalled the event as “joyous” and “pleasing,” emphasizing that the “Benghazi of the recent years was fraught with human rights violations” and that it was “impossible to imagine the Benghazi of 10 years ago hosting these clubs.”

Hazem Adam, the law graduate, described Haftar as “a nationalist, who wants to positively affect Libya on a large scale.” Adam added that “there are a number of political issues that are still impeding Haftar’s progress toward achieving his goals of bringing about a positive change to the country.” It is difficult to tell whether such sentiments are genuine or if they are generated by a fear of dissent under Haftar’s rule. Nevertheless, the response by both Adam and other locals seemed supportive, and thus something could be working in Haftar’s favor.

Remnants of Haftar’s “revolution” against the Islamic State, a three-year urban warfare campaign to eliminate the group in Benghazi and other cities, can be seen in the damaged buildings, highlighting a different time that many thought would disqualify the city from hosting these major events and prominent figures. Haftar’s most recent attempt to draw further attention to Benghazi included hosting CNN’s Isobel Yeung for a report on the city’s new skydiving center. Roughly two weeks prior, the same journalist had made an appearance in the south of Libya to document the abuse of sub-Saharan Africans by human traffickers. The two reports contrasted Benghazi under Haftar’s rule and the reality on the ground in Libya’s south.

On the western side of the country, Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah still heads the government in Tripoli, but he is hobbled by the U.N.’s desire to facilitate a path for elections, which have been regularly postponed since 2021. Nonetheless, he remains open to Western support, as seen in a recent visit by Trump’s special envoy to Africa, Massad Boulos. He also approved of the recent proposal to include his forces in Flintlock 2026, hosting Anderson on Dec. 1 to further discuss military cooperation. Dbeibah is also pursuing a gradual path of opening up to the West, as evidenced by a major event for the reopening of Libya’s national museum on Dec. 12. Prominent guests included Egyptian-American satirist Bassem Youssef and the U.N.’s special representative in Libya, Hanna Tetteh.

Despite Western support for Tripoli’s government and the gradual effort to integrate the eastern part of the country, Haftar seems to be gaining more influence. His approach seems to be more creative, and his use of sports as a tool to win over hearts and minds is arguably working in his favor. He is positioning his rule as an adaptive autocracy, copying similar approaches by other regional actors and innovating when necessary. Haftar’s latest attempt to use sports as a tool to open up to the West is not a novelty in the region, but it certainly is in Benghazi.

Benghazi’s rising status under the leadership of Haftar is a redemption story that is gradually overshadowing the Western-backed government of Tripoli. Overall, it does not seem that these attention-drawing spectacles are coming to an end; they have only just begun. Aside from the annual Reconstruction Cup, investment in infrastructure projects is still strong, and the largest construction expo in North Africa is hosting its third gathering in Benghazi this coming April. Haftar’s efforts are gaining momentum, and the city’s reputation is slowly improving.

***

Abdalla Najjar is a freelance journalist based in Libya. He received his bachelor’s degree in political science from the Lebanese American University and a master’s degree in international relations from North Carolina State University. He previously worked in broadcast media in Washington and hosted the award-winning podcast In the East Wing.

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Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni

Recent Developments: Planes, Trains

and UAVs

For years, analysts have argued that, from Beijing’s perspective, it mattered little who ultimately “won” in Libya. China’s priority, the argument went, was to keep open channels to all plausible power centers, ensuring a seat at the table when postwar reconstruction began.

China’s hedge, however, may no longer be evenly balanced. A growing body of reporting suggests that China’s interest in Libya may be drifting eastward, away from the GNU and toward Haftar. Where Chinese firms once avoided acknowledging interest in the east, now the picture looks markedly different.

Reports of Chinese interest in the Haftar-controlled Benghazi airport, the ports of Tobruk and Sirte, and long-discussed railway links connecting Cyrenaica to the Sahel now circulate with increasing frequency, often framed within the BRI.

However, these projects’ feasibility and the depth of Chinese financial commitment remain an open question. Much of the apparent uptick may simply reflect improving operating conditions in the east, particularly following the establishment of the Energy and Mining Bank, intended to provide eastern authorities greater financial autonomy and contracting capacity.

Even if the headline projects remain aspirational, Chinese firms appear sufficiently active in the east to have provoked a reaction from Tripoli: the GNU has suspended Huawei’s operations in western Libya, citing the company’s role in developing telecommunications infrastructure in LNA-controlled areas.

Economic engagement with multiple sides is hardly unusual for China, and, on its own, would not signal a strategic realignment. What has truly fueled speculation are several high-profile, security-related episodes that hint, however ambiguously, at a more direct role.

In June 2024, Italian customs authorities intercepted two Chinese-made military drones at the port of Gioia Tauro. Shipped from Yantian and bound for Haftar-controlled Benghazi, the cargo was concealed as wind turbine components, an apparent attempt to circumvent the UN arms embargo on Libya.

More troubling still was an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which alleged that China-linked firms had plotted to supply the LNA with up to US$1 billion worth of drones, disguised as COVID-19 humanitarian assistance. Shell companies were allegedly used to mask state involvement, with the investigation suggesting the possible deliberate involvement of Chinese state-owned defense firms and even elements of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Investigators went further, suggesting that Beijing’s underlying logic may have been “using war to end war quickly” by tipping the balance in Haftar’s favor. That conclusion, however, remains contested. Ghiselli, for example, has cautioned against reading the episode as evidence of a centrally directed Chinese strategy, noting that even large Chinese state-owned enterprises have at times acted with considerable autonomy, often to Beijing’s irritation.

Moreover, Chinese-made drones have been present in Libya for more than a decade, most prominently the Wing Loong systems deployed by the LNA as early as 2016. Those drones were procured and operated by the UAE, not China, with Beijing insisting that such sales were purely commercial transactions unrelated to its political stance on Libya. Even Western officials have largely concurred.

In 2020, Wolfgang Pusztai, former Austrian defense attaché to Libya and chairman of the advisory board of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations, noted that there was no evidence China had directly supplied weapons to either side. Chinese drones, after all, are ubiquitous across the region and can just as easily be found trained on one another in the arsenals of rival states such as Algeria and Morocco.

More recent developments, however, have further muddied the waters. Last month, Pakistan reportedly finalized a US$4 billion deal to supply the LNA with military equipment over the next two and a half years, including sixteen JF-17 “Thunder” fighter jets.

The fourth-generation fighter is jointly developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, a fact that has drawn attention to Beijing’s possible role. However, the driving force behind this deal appears to be Pakistani, not Chinese.

Islamabad has aggressively marketed the JF-17 as a cost-effective, combat-tested alternative to Western aircraft following its reportedly successful deployment during recent clashes with India.

This push is both recent and potentially overextended, and may amount more to marketing than sustainable export capacity. Libya remains subject to a UN arms embargo – frequently violated, but still consequential – and analysts have questioned if Pakistan has the industrial and logistical capacity to honor a growing slate of large, long-term, and in some cases unconfirmed defense agreements, most notably an alleged deal with Saudi Arabia. 

These uncertainties cast doubt on whether fulfilling a contract with the non-UN-recognized authorities in eastern Libya would rank as a strategic priority for Pakistan, let alone for China.

Amid this landscape of ambiguous commercial ties and third-party arms transfers, Beijing’s clearest move has come not on the battlefield or in the boardroom, but in the diplomatic sphere.

After much delay, China has relocated its embassy staff from Tunis back to Tripoli. Far from signaling support for the LNA, a rival authority that has repeatedly sought to seize the Libyan capital by force, this move points to a measure of confidence in the GNU and a desire to further strengthen ties with the UN-recognized government.

More plausibly still, it reflects a pragmatic need to monitor developments more closely on the ground, as Libya, and the wider region, enter a period of recalibration shaped by the end of the war in Syria and an emerging rift pitting the UAE and Israel against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye.

Has Libya Become the New Syria?

In the immediate aftermath of the Assad regime’s collapse in Syria to rebel forces, a wave of reporting suggested that Russia was rapidly redeploying military and naval assets from the Syrian port of Latakia to LNA-controlled territory in Libya. Since then, Tobruk and the base in Maaten al-Sarra have been cast by analysts as the new logistical gateways for the Africa Corps – the rebranded successor to the Wagner Group – supporting Russian operations across sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the Sahel.

Beyond Russian maneuvers, another decisive dynamic reshaping Libya is the widening rift between the once close partners of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Abu Dhabi’s normalization with Israel under the Abraham Accords, and its continued engagement with Tel Aviv amid the Gaza war, has increasingly set it apart from Riyadh and other Gulf capitals, particularly after Israel’s escalatory military actions against Syria’s new regime, Iran and Qatar.

Simmering tensions over Sudan, Somalia and Yemen finally boiled over in December 2025. In Yemen, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council launched an offensive against the Saudi-backed internationally-recognized government. Riyadh responded with a direct military intervention, decisively routing the southern forces and laying bare the depth of the Gulf rupture.

Libya is deeply enmeshed in this broader fracture. The UAE remains one of the LNA’s main external backers, with Haftar serving as a critical nexus in a wider Emirati-backed network that includes Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces, now locked in a brutal civil war against the Sudanese Armed Forces, who in turn, are backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.

As Emirati assertiveness grows, Cairo, Riyadh and Ankara have increasingly coordinated their stances on regional files. Should this alignment deepen, the once-cohesive external coalition supporting the LNA could begin to unravel if Egypt and Saudi Arabia draw closer to Türkiye, Tripoli’s most influential military patron.

Recent developments in Syria and Yemen have also delivered a hard lesson for Haftar: his key backers, Russia and the UAE, are far from infallible guarantors. Still, this does not necessarily spell the end of the LNA.

While Haftar is now eighty-two, he has already cultivated a successor in his son Saddam Haftar, who has embarked on an international tour stopping in Paris and Cairo. Moreover, the LNA’s firm grip over eastern Libya, both territorially and militarily, sharply contrasts with the west, where the GNU remains hollowed out by corruption and fragmented authority, hostage to militias and local power brokers.

Adding further complexity is the Mediterranean dimension. Amid concerns over migration flows and volatile energy prices, Libya retains strategic importance for Italy, France, and Greece. However, European involvement has been anything but straightforward. The rival ambitions of Rome and Paris, each backing opposing factions or trying to outmaneuver the other as peace broker, have undermined any hope of a unified EU strategy on Libya.

China and Russia’s entrenched presence in the country has only heightened Italian and European unease. Though the Syrian case cautions against assuming seamless Sino-Russian alignment in Libya, the revival of power-politics thinking in Europe has fueled skepticism toward China’s role.

This skepticism is especially pronounced in Italy, where commentators, policymakers and military voices view the former Italian colony as within Rome’s “natural” sphere of influence, vital to energy security, migration management, and national security. This is despite Chinese diplomats having in the past indicated openness to cooperate with Italy on Libya, likely motivated by a shared preference for Tripoli over Benghazi.

In such a crowded and complex environment, which recently saw the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) extend its mandate in hopes of advancing the UN roadmap, it is unsurprising that Chinese officials have sought a more visible on-the-ground presence by reopening their embassy – a move which, however, should not be mistaken for deep commitment.

Conclusion

As Libya and the wider region enter a period of recalibration shaped by the end of the war in Syria and the emerging rift between the UAE and Israel against Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye, the return of Chinese diplomats to Tripoli reflects Beijing’s pragmatic need to monitor developments more closely on the ground while maintaining a position of cautious and calculated neutrality between the Libyan factions.

While Chinese defense companies have seemingly participated in Libya’s security landscape through third parties, it remains highly unlikely that China would seek a direct role in the conflict.

The most plausible explanation is that Beijing tolerated some security-related engagement with the LNA as a way to maintain relations with the most significant stakeholder in eastern Libya. The LNA’s relative cohesion, compared to the fractured and internally weak GNU, might also position Haftar as a key player should a long-anticipated power-sharing agreement materialize.

The Syrian experience likely informs this cautious approach. China’s steadfast support for the UN-recognized government of Bashar al-Assad ultimately left it exposed when his regime collapsed, temporarily locking Beijing out of engagement with the new Syrian authorities and undermining Chinese interests, particularly regarding Uyghur fighters operating in the country.

Any Chinese engagement with the LNA, then, is best understood not as a pivot but as insurance: a way to remain relevant without becoming entangled. As Libya remains only more crowded with external actors as Syria ever was, Beijing’s most rational course is to remain present, visible, and determined above all to keep its options open.

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China Global South Project

Rania Hadjer

Denied citizenship, civic rights and access to services, Libyan Tuareg face a growing marginalisation that has become a factor of regional instability.

“We have always been on the margins of the state, but we have never been outside our homeland.”

Abdulbaqi Hamdi, a Tuareg in his early 20s, sums up in a single sentence the paradox that defines his life. Like thousands of others in the southwestern Libyan region of Fezzan, he was born in Libya and grew up there without ever obtaining official recognition from the state.

“We have tried, like our parents and grandparents before us, every possible avenue to obtain an identity card or a passport. The procedures were an endless labyrinth,” Hamdi told Middle East Eye.

“Every attempt ends in refusal or indefinite postponement, under the pretext of a ‘security file review’ or ‘insufficient evidence’,” he added.

For Tuareg in Libya, the absence of citizenship is not an administrative accident, but the result of a long history of unfulfilled promises, political marginalisation and institutional collapse, exacerbated since the 2011 uprising that toppled long-term autocrat Muammar Gaddafi.

An indigenous Amazigh people of North Africa, traditionally nomadic and spread across five states – Libya, Mali, Niger, Algeria and Burkina Faso – the Tuareg have been marginalised by policies that view them as difficult to control.

From the 1960s and 1970s onwards, many Tuareg families from Mali and Niger settled in southern Libya, fleeing Sahelian droughts and armed rebellions. During Gaddafi’s reign, their presence was tolerated, and at times even encouraged.

“Many were recruited into the army or paramilitary camps, with the promise of eventual naturalisation. But that promise was never fulfilled,” Mohamed, a former tour guide who became a community mediator for NGOs in the Fezzan and is now a refugee in France, told MEE, using a different name for security reasons.

“Gaddafi deliberately maintained this ambiguity to keep these populations under control, through a form of administrative blackmail,” he added.

Meanwhile, several generations were born on Libyan soil without passports, national ID numbers and, therefore, civic rights.

The fall of Gaddafi in 2011 marked a brutal turning point. The Tuareg of the Fezzan were quickly suspected of loyalty to the former administration, due to the involvement of some of them in Gaddafi’s army.

“They paid twice,” Mohamed said. “First by serving the state in order to survive, and then by being stigmatised after its fall.”

Since 2014, Libya has been divided between two rival administrations competing for legitimacy and control of the territory: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli, and a parallel government backed by eastern commander Khalifa Haftar, based in Benghazi.

This fragmentation has durably weakened governance in the south of the country, where the state remains largely absent. Most Tuareg-inhabited areas in the southwest – including Ghat, Ubari, Sebha and Murzuq – are under the control of Haftar’s forces.

In the cities of Sabha and Ubari, entire neighbourhoods – such as Talaqine or al-Tayouri – remain excluded from public services.

Non-existent roads, lack of sanitation networks, near-absence of health facilities: these areas function like forgotten enclaves.

“People live trapped in an area they no longer dare to leave. They can be arrested at any moment and treated as illegal migrants, even though they were born here,” Mohamed said, in a context where migrant people in Libya face arbitrary detention, violence and torture.

Administrative limbo

According to Majdi Bouhanna, human rights activist and rapporteur at the Supreme Social Council of Libya’s Tuareg, the community’s main representative body, around 14,000 families were affected at the time of the last official census in 2005. The figure would now reach between 16,000 and 17,000 families.

These families appear in so-called “provisional” civil registries, inherited from older legislation and supposedly designed to allow for later regularisation – which never took place.

“Legally, the file is complete,” Bouhanna said. “The necessary decisions have been taken; appeal deadlines have passed.”

The deadlock stems from an accumulation of past administrative decisions that were never fully implemented. Under Gaddafi, a commission was tasked with identifying and registering Tuareg families who lacked documentation, and formally validated their files.

Subsequent regularisation procedures were slowed by administrative dysfunctions, without ever being legally overturned.

According to Bouhanna, successive committees later confirmed the validity of these files, and the decisions to transfer them to the permanent civil registry have exceeded the appeal deadlines, making them legally final.

Contrary to a widespread belief in Libya’s public debate, this deadlock does not concern only families from neighbouring countries.

“The problem affects all Tuareg, including indigenous ones,” Bouhanna said. “The Saharan way of life, cross-border movement and the absence of clear civil registration procedures affect all communities, regardless of origin.”

He explained that rural exodus, forced sedentarisation and the expansion of modern administration transformed this historical ambiguity into a major legal problem.

“It was only when civil registration became essential to work, study or access healthcare that these families fell into administrative illegality,” Bouhanna said.

In 2014, Law No. 8 on the national identification number made the Tuareg’s situation even more critical and prone to discrimination. Without this number, it is impossible to obtain a passport, vote, own land or access social assistance. A temporary administrative number exists, but it grants very limited rights.

“Even the pilgrimage to Mecca becomes impossible for some, due to the lack of a passport,” Bouhanna said.

“And recently, discriminatory practices have multiplied: refusals to register marriages, open bank accounts, obtain SIM cards or even issue death certificates.”

Mohamed notes that the issue is not limited to the Tuareg community, but also affects the Tebu, nomadic people of the central Sahara.

He recalls that during the Chad-Libya conflict over the Aouzou Strip between 1978 and 1987, and following the International Court of Justice ruling that returned the territory to Chad, Gaddafi instructed the Tebu to “return” to Chad.

“But many of them were born in Libya and have lived there all their lives. They have nothing in Chad. To this day, they are denied Libyan citizenship,” he said, adding that many Tuareg and Tebu have been forced to use false papers in order to travel, receive medical care or study.

‘We live like ghosts’

For the families concerned, the consequences are concrete and daily.

In education, children can enrol in school, but are denied official diplomas. In healthcare, access to medical treatment is subject to numerous complications and administrative formalities that make it difficult for them to obtain the few services to which they are entitled.

“The difficulties we face every day form a wall of frustration. I cannot open a bank account, officially own land, or travel. We live like ghosts,” Hamdi said.

This exclusion fuels a deep sense of identity fracture. “I am Libyan by blood, by history, by attachment to this land. But I am not Libyan in the eyes of the law,” he added.

In Ubari, Khadidja Andidi, a 40-year-old architect and humanitarian activist, also lacks a national ID number. In 2016, following a deadly conflict between Tuareg and Tebu, she founded the volunteer centre Noor al-Ilm.

“The 2014-2015 war was a wake-up call because we understood it was a deliberate manipulation: divide and rule,” she told MEE.

Between 2014 and 2015, Ubari became the scene of an inter-tribal war driven by rivalries over territorial control, smuggling routes and local resources. The conflict, which resulted in hundreds of deaths and displaced thousands of civilians, was largely fuelled by external interference, shifting alliances with armed groups and attempts at political manipulation.

“This convinced me that we had to defend our rights and work for social peace,” Andidi added.

Her centre provides basic healthcare, training for women and youth, and emergency assistance, but operates entirely outside official channels.

“I cannot even legally register my association because I do not have a national number. It is total absurdity. We are not asking for privileges, only equality. To be seen, heard, and to live with dignity on our own land,” she said.

Andidi believes Tuareg are deliberately marginalised due to a persistent perception in the collective imagination that “if these communities were granted legitimate citizenship status, they would regain a form of power and might rebel”.

Bouhanna rejects security-based accusations levelled against his community.

“During several recent meetings, the head of the GNU confirmed to us that the final decision still lies with the security services. Some of these authorities invoke national security and border control concerns in the east and west to justify their position, but these arguments are unfounded,” he told MEE.

“The Tuareg are an integral part of Libya. They have protected its borders and defended the country at every stage of its history. The accusations levelled against them therefore have no basis,” he said.

Fueling insecurity

In a region where the Libyan state has never reasserted control since 2011, this exclusion goes far beyond the realm of human rights.

In a 2018 report, the UN refugee agency highlighted how the denial of nationality fuels chronic marginalisation and acts as an aggravating factor in conflict, forced displacement and long-term instability.

The Fezzan is criss-crossed by migration routes, smuggling corridors and trans-Saharan trafficking networks, where local militias, armed groups and criminal organisations operate. The marginalisation of thousands of Tuareg creates a major security vulnerability.

Deprived of education, formal employment and institutional protection, many young Tuareg turn to the informal economy or armed structures, often recruited as fighters or auxiliaries for militias.

“By excluding them, the state is reproducing exactly the Gaddafi-era model: using these populations as a proxy force, without ever granting them rights,” Mohamed said.

“When an entire generation is deprived of education, work and recognition, the conditions for its instrumentalisation are created,” he added.

For Bouhanna, there is an urgent need to act. “We are told that it is not the right time, that the political situation is too fragile,” he said, citing Libyan officials. “But postponing this issue only makes it worse.”

According to Mohamed, anger among the Tuareg is mounting, with a recent surge in calls for mobilisation on social media. “There is a risk of imminent explosion,” he said.

“Taken together, the Tuareg and Tebu cases have become a bureaucratic nightmare for the country. If these populations are not regularised, the situation could explode at any moment, in a country that is already extremely fragile,” he added.

______________________

Robin Mills 

• Libya’s bid round for new oil and gas exploration and production highlights its potential revival as a major oil producer and international companies’ renewed interest in the country despite risks.
• The success of Libya’s production expansion plans depend on a continuing alignment between its rival western and eastern governments and on opaque deals struck to get buy-in from key political power brokers.
• Libya’s oil growth toward its 2030 target of 2 million barrels per day could be an important factor within the OPEC+ alliance, as it considers its strategy and production levels.

***

Libya has on occasion been pivotal in global oil markets. Its light, sweet crude, adjacent to Europe, helped swell a global glut in the 1960s when it was briefly the world’s sixth-largest producer. Its revolutionary government under Colonel Muammar Gaddafi forced nationalization and renegotiation in the early 1970s, laying the foundations for the OPEC upheavals shortly afterward. And its 2011 civil war, amid uprisings in other Arab states, sent oil prices soaring.

Since then, Libya largely dropped off the oil industry’s map. From a pre-war level of nearly 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2010, output dropped to just over 400,000 bpd three times: during the 2011 civil war; in 2014–16, as militias closed down facilities for political leverage; and in 2020, when Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, effective ruler of eastern Libya, waged an ultimately unsuccessful fight to take over the capital, Tripoli, in the west. In August–October 2024, a tussle over control of the crucial Central Bank shut down more than half of national oil production. And at various times, protesting local communities, often marginalized or tribal groups in remote areas such as the southwest, or frustrated job-seekers in the “Oil Crescent” of north-central Libya, have blocked fields and pipelines.

But output this year is set for its best post-Gaddafi performance, likely to average almost 1.4 million bpd. For now, Libya’s oil revival has been built almost entirely on existing assets. But if successful new projects bring it close to its production growth targets—the National Oil Corporation (NOC) targets 2 million bpd by 2030—that would create more competition for its OPEC+ colleagues and the global oil market.

Development Plans

How does Libya plan to meet this oil production goal? Its first licensing round since 2007 features 22 blocks, which NOC says contain 1.68 billion barrels equivalent of oil and gas in-place, and 18 billion barrels of exploration potential. In 2020, national reserves were estimated at 48.4 billion barrels of oil, the largest in Africa, and 50.5 trillion cubic feet of gas, Africa’s fourth-largest.

Eleven of the blocks span much of Libya’s offshore sector, little-explored except in the far western Sabratha area adjoining Tunisia. Eleven onshore blocks are spread between the Murzuq basin in the far southwest; the Ghadames basin in the west, next to Algeria; the fringes of the central Sirte basin, Libya’s oil heartland; and the Cyrenaica plateau in the east. In July, 37 companies out of 44 applicants pre-qualified to bid (see Table 1). Bids are expected to be opened in February 2026.

Libya NOC also plans this year to auction more than 40 marginal fields with production potential of 5,000–20,000 bpd each.

It’s unlikely that exploration under the main bid round will move fast enough to make much difference by 2030, so reaching the 2 million bpd goal requires developing existing discoveries, boosting mature fields, and fixing recurrent technical breakdowns and power shortages.

What’s Triggering Growth

This new momentum is driven by a confluence of international and internal factors. International oil companies (IOCs) have recently shown more interest in non-US investment, with the relative maturing of US shale production. European firms, such as Shell and BP, who had emphasized non-hydrocarbon projects, have turned back to oil and gas development in the face of shareholder pressure.

Moderate and falling oil prices make low-cost producing areas in the Middle East and North Africa attractive, to rebalance portfolios overweighted with higher-cost shale and deepwater projects. With Iran, Russia, and Venezuela off-limits to Western IOCs, examples include not just Libya but also Algeria and Iraq. Politics in these countries is challenging but now appears manageable. Libya has substantially improved its previously very unfavorable contractual terms for upstream oil and gas investors, following a similar track as Iraq.

Some companies qualifying for the new blocks are already well-established in Libya, such as ENI, Repsol, and TotalEnergies. Beyond the current bid round, some companies are negotiating on specific opportunities. BP is discussing revitalizing the giant Messla and Sarir fields in the Sirte Basin, currently run by a subsidiary of NOC. Shell has shown interest in the Atshan gas-condensate field between the Ghadames and Murzuq basins, near the Algerian border. And a consortium of NOC, ENI, TotalEnergies, TPAO, and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company was said in September to be looking at the important NC-7 gas project, in western Libya, but through a new Benghazi-headquartered company.

Regional national oil companies are also prominent among the qualifiers, including Sonatrach from neighboring Algeria, which is familiar with Libya’s geology and operating environment; OQ from Oman; QatarEnergy; and TPAO, whose home nation of Turkey manages to have both close political ties with Libya’s Tripoli government and a growing relationship with Haftar’s administration.

There is also growing regional interest from smaller Chinese companies, several of which have established themselves in Iraq in recent years. In contrast, Russia’s Lukoil will presumably have to drop out after US sanctions forced it to seek a sale of its international portfolio.

Output and OPEC+

For Libya, relatively low oil prices encourage a volume-based strategy. Along with Iran and Venezuela, Libya is exempt from OPEC+ quotas because of its political situation. There is room for Libya to boost output without triggering a price war. Within OPEC+, only Iraq and the UAE are likely to increase production capacity substantially over the next few years.

At its latest meeting on November 30, OPEC+ decided to appoint consultant DeGolyer and MacNaughton to assess each country’s sustainable production capacity during 2026, with further annual reviews thereafter. So, before it recommits to a formal production target, it would be better for Libya to participate from a position of strength by demonstrating as high capacity as possible.

Political Standing

The country’s fractious politics have aligned, for now. Following their failed 2020 offensive, the Benghazi-based Khalifa Haftar and his sons—Saddam, Khaled, and others—tightened their grip over the east. They have now reached a modus vivendi with the western Tripoli government headed by Abdelhamid Dbeibah. There appears to be an informal understanding over fuel smuggling, whereby Libyan crude is swapped for oil product imports to be sold at very low, subsidized prices, allowing insiders to reap huge profits by diverting the refined products to neighboring countries.

Arkenu, Libya’s first private oil company, has managed to secure some of the country’s oil exports, as well as agreeing to develop three small fields. A December 2024 report to the UN Security Council said that Arkenu was indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar. Arkenu’s partner in the field development project, Bares Holding, a subsidiary of Turkish commodities trading firm BGN, has qualified as a non-operator for the latest licensing round. Meanwhile, the bid round offers Dbeibah a way to shore up his position in the west.

This convergence of interests does suggest that, despite the inevitable recurrence of disputes, community protests, and opaque backroom deals, the situation could be favorable for long-term projects for the first time since before 2011. International oil companies recognize the country’s complex politics, but bid round participants will judge whether the new Tripoli-Benghazi detente and the mediating power brought by external players such as Turkey will ensure tolerable stability for their investment and operations.

___________________

Bianca Pasquier and Leonardo Bruni

On November 12, 2025, the Chinese embassy in Tripoli officially reopened after more than a decade. However, the return of Chinese diplomatic staff to the Libyan capital passed largely unnoticed, attracting scant media interest both domestically and abroad. Most of the international coverage came from Italy, where the news outlet Formiche interviewed ChinaMed’s Head of Research, Andrea Ghiselli, on the matter.

According to Ghiselli, the reopening of the embassy in Tripoli may be linked to Beijing’s plans to restore its diplomatic mission in Syria later this year. Taken together, he argued, these moves suggest an effort by China to reintroduce a degree of “normalcy” into two long-standing Mediterranean dossiers. From this perspective, the unshuttering of the Chinese embassy in Tripoli may signal an attempt by Beijing to expand its diplomatic room for maneuver across the region.

Ghiselli is careful, however, to draw a distinction. While Syria has succeeded in achieving a measure of territorial consolidation, international recognition and investment commitments under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, Libya, by contrast, remains deeply fragmented. The country is divided between the United Nations-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli in the west, and the de facto authority of military strongman Khalifa Haftar and his self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east.

Still, the Syrian comparison is useful. As in Syria, China’s role in Libya has often been overstated, swinging between inflated expectations and undue suspicion. This edition of the ChinaMed Observer therefore revisits the past decade of Chinese engagement in Libya, tracing Beijing’s evolving relations with the country’s factions and situating them within a regional context. We explore whether dynamics reminiscent of the end of the Syrian civil war are beginning to emerge in Libya, and whether such parallels can shed light on Beijing’s future approach to the Libyan crisis.

Our assessment aligns with Ghiselli’s argument: the reopening of the Chinese embassy signals normalization, but little beyond that. As the Syrian case shows, diplomatic engagement does not imply political commitment, let alone a readiness for direct involvement. China is thus unlikely to engage deeply in Libya’s power struggles. If anything, recent developments in Syria appear to be shaping Beijing’s approach to Libya, reinforcing a preference for caution, balance, and neutrality. This posture is all the more likely given that Libya today is not only unresolved but far more crowded with external actors than Syria ever was. In such an environment, Beijing will likely opt to keep its options open, present, but uncommitted.

China and the Beginning of the

Libyan Crisis

The Libyan crisis erupted in early 2011, when the Arab Spring swept in from neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, igniting mass protests against the long-entrenched rule of Muammar Gaddafi. What began as popular unrest quickly descended into a violent civil war, one that also upended foreign economic interests rooted in the country, notably those of China.

Before the conflict, Beijing was a major importer of Libyan oil, and Chinese state-owned enterprises were deeply involved in construction, energy, and infrastructure projects nationwide. However, an unintended risk of this mutually profitable partnership was that tens of thousands of Chinese nationals were on Libyan soil when war broke out. Their safety was an immediate concern for Beijing, which mounted an unprecedented response: in March 2011, China carried out its largest overseas evacuation, extracting more than 35,000 citizens from Libya, an active war zone thousands of kilometers from its borders.

China’s unprecedented response and ability to operate in the Mediterranean caught many European observers off guard (this episode spurred the creation of the ChinaMed Project later that same year). At the same time, the operation’s reliance on chartered civilian ships and aircraft laid bare the limits of China’s power-projection capabilities. As such, experts regard the Libya evacuation as having catalyzed Beijing’s subsequent push to modernize its military, establish its first overseas base in Djibouti, and refine its doctrine for “military operations other than war.”

Analysts like Jesse Marks also see Libya as the watershed moment in China’s approach to conflict resolution in the region. In March 2011, as violence spiraled out of control, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 that sanctioned the NATO-led intervention by authorizing a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures” to protect civilians. Despite its veto power and commitment to non-interference, China chose to abstain to avoid alienating the Arab League and the African Union which supported the resolution.

By ultimately toppling Gaddafi’s regime, however, the intervention contributed to plunging the country into prolonged political instability and a severe humanitarian crisis. In the aftermath, Beijing adopted a more skeptical posture toward Western-led interventions, doubling down on the primacy of state sovereignty and negotiated settlements.

This shift was most evident regarding Syria, where China repeatedly vetoed UN Security Council resolutions it believed could open the door to regime change. At the same time, China further prioritized cultivating ties with key regional actors and expanding its multilateral frameworks in the region not merely to insulate its relationships from future diplomatic divergences, but also to shape the contours of the regional debate itself.

China’s Stance on Libya’s Factions:

Cautious and Calculated Neutrality

Although China abstained from Resolution 1973, it was quick to criticize NATO airstrikes. This somewhat discongruous posture allowed Beijing to pursue what Sandy Alkoutami and Frederic Wehrey described as a strategy of “cautious” and “calculated” neutrality during the 2011 Libya war. In practice, China hedged its bets: preserving ties with Gaddafi’s collapsing regime while opening channels to the opposition National Transitional Council (NTC), which Beijing formally recognized as Libya’s sole legitimate authority in September 2011, following the fall of the capital Tripoli.

This ambiguity initially led to mistrust.

At first, the NTC viewed Beijing warily amid accusations that China had sought to skirt the arms embargo to supply Gaddafi. However, through sustained diplomatic outreach after the war, China managed to repair relations with Libya’s post-Gaddafi leadership. As Alkoutami and Wehrey note, these efforts not only helped restore China’s prewar economic footprint but also left Beijing in relatively good standing with successive UN-recognized, Tripoli-based governments.

Those governments, for their part, proved incapable of unifying the anti-Gaddafi camp. Rival factions hardened, Islamist groups expanded their reach, and state authority steadily fragmented. Against this backdrop, Khalifa Haftar and his LNA launched Operation Dignity in eastern Libya in May 2014, ostensibly to eliminate Islamist militias, but widely perceived as a bid for dominance.

In response, opposing Islamist militants and armed groups coalesced into the Libya Dawn coalition, leading to fighting erupting around Tripoli and across the east, plunging Libya into its second civil war.

Heavy foreign intervention quickly followed, unsurprising given the strategic prize of Libya’s vast oil reserves. Broadly speaking, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, France, and Russia supported the LNA, while Türkiye, Qatar, and Italy backed the UN-recognized authorities in Tripoli.

These states did not merely act through proxies; several intervened directly, deploying airpower, military advisers, and mercenaries. Türkiye’s role was especially consequential, tipping the balance against Haftar’s 2019 surprise offensive on Tripoli.

A UN-brokered ceasefire in October 2020 briefly raised hopes for national reconciliation and elections.

Those hopes have since faded, with any progress stalling amid disputes over electoral rules and candidate eligibility. The east-west divide between the GNU and LNA has only become more entrenched, with periodic and often intense clashes continuing to punctuate this uneasy stalemate.

Throughout this second civil war and its unresolved aftermath, Beijing has largely maintained its posture of neutrality and balancing. As in conflicts such as Yemen, China has consistently called for a political solution that preserves Libya’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while condemning foreign interference.

Yet, for much of the past decade, many analysts have questioned if this neutrality has ever been truly even-handed. Samuel Ramani has argued that China tilted toward Tripoli-based governments over Haftar-aligned authorities in the east.

This tendency is consistent with Beijing’s longstanding preference for UN-recognized governments and is reflected in its sustained (though not exclusive) diplomatic engagement with the GNU and its predecessors.

Jalel Harchaoui argued that this preference is also motivated by economic concerns, (this reflects a broader tendency to view China’s Libya policy as “economy first” by default). Tripoli-based authorities control the highly contested Central Bank of Libya, the sole legal repository of the country’s oil revenues, granting the GNU the unique ability to disburse funds, sign contracts, and allocate capital.

When Chinese state-owned PetroChina signed an annual contract with Libya’s National Oil Corporation in May 2018, it necessarily relied on, and reinforced, the financial primacy of Tripoli.

Nor has the relationship been one-sided. Tripoli, for its part, has actively courted Chinese investments by joining the BRI in 2018. Since then, successive Tripoli-based governments have sought to market Libya as a destination for Chinese capital, not only in hydrocarbons, but also in infrastructure and telecommunications, pointing to firms such as Huawei and ZTE as possible partners.

This outreach has continued under the current government. In June 2024, at the inaugural Chinese-Libyan Economic Forum in Beijing, GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah urged Chinese companies to restart suspended projects, explicitly casting Beijing as a central actor in Libya’s reconstruction.

China’s response has been cautious but noteworthy.

Bilateral trade has grown over the last few years and Chinese firms have signed on to restart frozen infrastructure projects (see graphs 4 and 5). The November 2023 memorandum of understanding between the Misrata Free Zone and China Harbour exemplifies growing Chinese interest in investing in GNU-controlled territory.

However, this deepening economic and diplomatic relationship has clear limits. Even as Beijing elevated ties with Tripoli to a “strategic partnership” during the visit to China of the (GNU-linked) Libyan Presidency Council head Mohammad al-Manfi, it has stopped short of translating the relationship into tangible security support – something Tripoli has sought.

As Harchaoui noted, Beijing has declined Tripoli’s requests to help lift the UN arms embargo or to assist it in accessing Libya’s frozen sovereign wealth fund.

This restraint speaks to both China’s reluctance to become entangled in Libya’s security quagmire and its determination not to foreclose options in the east. Beijing has consistently kept open channels with Haftar, hedging against the uncertain trajectory of the Libyan conflict and likely mindful that much of Libya’s oil infrastructure lies in LNA-controlled territory.

At the same time, recent developments have led to speculation that China may be leaning toward a more active role in Libya’s security landscape, and perhaps even beginning to tilt, cautiously, toward the LNA.

___________________

China Global South Project

Felicity Bradstock 

• Libya has reopened exploration and signed major contracts with international oil companies as it seeks to raise oil and gas output.
• A new Libya–Egypt energy agreement positions Egypt as a central partner in technical cooperation, capacity building, and regional energy security.
• While investment momentum is building, Libya’s political instability remains the primary risk to sustaining both foreign partnerships and regional cooperation.

***

Over a decade since the Arab Spring and the civil war that followed, Libya has opened its doors back up to oil and gas exploration. Despite the ongoing political uncertainty, with Libya divided between two leaderships, the North African country has established a U.S.-Libya partnership and bilateral relations, as well as signed contracts with several oil majors for the redevelopment of its fossil fuel industry. 

In November, Libya announced it was offering 22 exploration blocks, with 11 offshore and 11 onshore. As home to Africa’s biggest oil reserves, at around 50 billion barrels, Libya is thought to hold significant untapped potential. As the new acreage is close to existing infrastructure, it is appealing to investors looking to develop cost-effective operations. 

At its peak, in the mid-2000s, Libya was producing around 1.75 million bpd of crude. Now, Libya’s average oil production stands at around 1.4 million bpd, according to the National Oil Corporation (NOC), having steadily climbed back up after several years of stagnation. Libya wants to increase production to around 2 million bpd in the coming years, with support from private investors.

In January, Libya and Egypt signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the oil and gas sector. The MoU establishes a framework for expanding technical cooperation, capacity building, and joint initiatives between the two countries’ energy organisations. It also highlights a greater focus on regional cooperation on energy to strengthen supply chains and boost energy security.

Libya’s Prime Minister, Abdulhamid Al-Dbeibeh, stated, “This agreement reflects our shared commitment with Egypt to deepen regional cooperation, exchange expertise and build stronger energy institutions that support production growth, energy security, and sustainable development.” 

This month, Libya has also signed several contracts with the private sector to expand its oil production. The government signed a 25-year oil development agreement on January 24 at the Libya Energy and Economic Summit (LEES) in Tripoli with the French oil major TotalEnergies and U.S.-based ConocoPhillips, worth over $20 billion in foreign investment. 

The deal was signed through NOC subsidiary Waha Oil Company, to increase crude production capacity by up to 850,000 bpd, with revenues forecast at over $376 billion, according to Prime Minister Al-Dbeibah. Waha typically produces between 340,000 and 400,000 barrels across five oil and gas fields. Its operations connect to the Sidra oil terminal via pipeline networks. 

Libya’s NOC also signed an MoU with the U.S. oil firm Chevron in January, “to evaluate opportunities” in the North African country. No details were provided on whether the deal involves onshore or offshore opportunities. Chevron is following in the footsteps of U.S. firm ExxonMobil, which signed an MoU with NOC last August to carry out studies off Libya’s northwestern coast and in the offshore section of the eastern Sirte Basin.

Meanwhile, BP and Italy’s Eni commenced their first deepwater exploration well, Matsola-1, in Contract Area 38/3 in the eastern Gulf of Sirte in January. Ahead of the drilling, Eni’s COO, Guido Brusco, said he thought the license area was “probably the largest untapped block in the Mediterranean.” Eni confirmed at LEES 2026 that the firm intends to bring its Bahr Essalam gas project online by the end of the first quarter of 2026, which is expected to add around 100 million cubic feet per day to Libya’s gas output.

Libya expects to expand gas production to between 700 and 750 million standard cubic feet a day, to enhance domestic power generation, reduce energy shortages, and support industrial activity. Sectoral growth is also expected to help Libya drive down emissions by replacing higher-carbon fuels. 

“Libya is showing that African nations can deliver energy projects at scale when stability, political will and investor-friendly frameworks come together… By prioritising energy access, domestic power generation and long-term investment, Libya is laying the foundation for inclusive growth and sustainable development,” African Energy Chamber Executive Chairman, NJ Ayuk, said at LEES 2026. “Libya’s resurgence reinforces a simple truth: Africa’s energy future will be built through pragmatism, partnerships and delivery – not delay,” Ayuk added. 

While Libya is opening the doors to foreign investment in its energy sector once again, with significant potential for oil and gas production growth, there are still concerns over the North African country’s political stability. Hamish Kinnear, a senior MENA analyst at the risk intelligence firm Verisk Maplecroft, explained, “The broad improvement in Libya’s security situation since the 2020 ceasefire between the country’s competing governments is undeniable. That said, the political situation remains fraught, with major implications for the oil and gas sector.”

After years of stagnation, Libya is seeking foreign participation in its energy sector once again, aimed at expanding the country’s oil and gas production. This could bring in much-needed energy revenues over the coming years and support regional energy cooperation. However, operational success will depend heavily on whether Libya’s political stability is maintained.

***

Felicity Bradstock is a freelance writer specialising in Energy and Finance. She has a Master’s in International Development from the University of Birmingham, UK.

_____________________

Belal Abdallah

At the start of 2025, the Libyan file was characterized by a state of vacuum and stagnation, eight months after the resignation of UN Special Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily, following the failure of his proposed settlement approach. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House – coinciding with the appointment of UN envoy Hanna Tetteh – the file gradually regained momentum over the course of 2025.

This shift reflected renewed, tangible interest from the Trump administration, alongside Tetteh’s efforts, to articulate a new framework for resolving the conflict. As 2026 begins, Libya appears to stand on the threshold of a potential breakthrough that could yield concrete progress toward ending political divisions. Against this backdrop, a central question arises over whether U.S. and UN initiatives are converging or diverging in advancing the settlement process.

American moves and the Libyan response

The U.S. approach to Libya is closely aligned with the broader economic logic underpinning the Trump administration’s foreign policy, whereby American interests across various conflicts are largely viewed through economic considerations. Within this framework, Trump’s view of Libya is primarily shaped by the country’s oil-producing status.

This recalls an earlier statement during NATO’s intervention, when he argued that the United States was entitled to half of Libya’s oil revenues in return for toppling Muammar Gaddafi. But what can President Trump offer a deeply divided Libya, and to what extent would this serve Libyan interests?

Experience over recent years has demonstrated the risks that institutional fragmentation poses to the interests of external actors. These include oil production shutdowns and the difficulties of concluding major oil deals, such as the NC7 field agreement.

In light of this pattern of interaction, the realization of economic gains in Libya requires pursuing two parallel tracks: addressing existing divisions and their adverse effects on the investment environment on the one hand, and, simultaneously, initiating economic deals with the Libyan authorities on the other hand.

Libyan power-holders in both eastern and western Libya were quick to grasp this interest-driven, economically rooted approach. They sought early alignment with U.S. interests before advancing any settlement-related milestones.

In practical terms, the Dbeibeh government, based out of Tripoli in the west, moved quickly to act on this approach. In March 2025, the National Oil Corporation launched its first oil licensing round in eighteen years. Available data on shortlisted bidders show that U.S. companies – absent from Libya for over a decade – were among the main beneficiaries. 

In August, the NOC signed a memorandum of understanding with ExxonMobil to conduct geological and geophysical surveys targeting hydrocarbons in four offshore blocks off the northwestern coast and in the Sirte Basin. Finally, in January 2026, Libya concluded a landmark development deal exceeding $20 billion with ConocoPhillips and TotalEnergies.

During Massad Boulos’ July 2025 visit to Tripoli, the Dbeibeh government outlined a strategic economic partnership involving $70 billion in investments. Boulos has served as the U.S. President’s envoy to the Middle East and Africa and the administration’s most active official on Libya.

At the same time, eastern Libyan actors too have signaled their interest in economic engagement with the Trump administration, reflected in the late-April visit of General Khalifa Haftar’s sons, Saddam and Belqasem, to Washington. There, Belqasem, as head of the Libya Reconstruction Fund, took part in the Libya-U.S. Forum for Development and Reconstruction, during which multiple cooperation protocols were signed with American corporations.

The U.S. administration continued to advance its settlement approach. Alongside engagement with de facto authorities in Tripoli and Benghazi – through official visits or the reported clandestine Rome meeting in September 2025 between Saddam Haftar and Ibrahim Dbeibeh, attended by Massad Boulos – Washington maintained pressure on rival factions to take concrete steps toward ending the political split.

In a Bloomberg interview on 20th October 2025, Boulos stated that efforts were being accelerated to reach a comprehensive agreement to end the division dating back to 2011, describing the moment as favorable for a stability-ensuring settlement.

These efforts soon translated into practice with the unification of the “development chapter” in the national budget, a step that resulted from American mediation, as High Council of State member Abdul Jalil al-Shaush confirmed. Trump’s Independence Day message to Presidential Council head Mohamed al-Menfi reinforced this path, stressing the need to end division and expand cooperation with American companies to generate shared economic opportunities.[xi]

UN initiatives and the Libyan response

Unlike the U.S. approach, focused on ending institutional and political divisions, UN-led efforts consistently promote a comprehensive settlement vision – culminating in general elections and the creation of representative institutions reflecting popular legitimacy. Within this framework, existing authorities are implicitly seen as part of the problem rather than neutral stakeholders.

The central contradiction in approaches by successive UN Special Envoys is that, while designed to disengage the political process from its reliance on entrenched de facto authorities, implementation clashes with the principle that any solution must be Libyan-led and not imposed externally.

In practice, this ostensibly principled slogan has been used deceptively by actors benefiting from the status quo, creating a circular dilemma: the settlement aims to replace existing authorities through elections, yet achieving this depends on the cooperation of the same authorities whose removal is a prerequisite.

Consequently, failure has often been an almost inevitable outcome of the approaches pursued. To avert this, the UN Special Envoy has repeatedly signaled to the Security Council the possibility of resorting to alternative political bodies if formal entities fail to provide sufficient cooperation. Although these alternatives have yet to be officially revealed, it is possible to identify several actors with secondary legitimacy, situated on the margins of the central decision-making circle governing the settlement process and assigned complementary roles.

Among these is the Advisory Committee, established by the UN Mission shortly after Tetteh assumed her post, which issued its final report in April, offering proposals to overcome entrenched points of contention in the settlement process. Another example is the structured dialogue launched in December 2025, comprising four tracks.

In her December briefing to the Security Council, Tetteh indicated that recommendations from this dialogue would be used to advance the settlement process, potentially providing legitimacy for measures adopted by the Mission to counter the intransigence of Libya’s formal political actors. Additionally, recently elected municipal councils may offer further alternative legitimacy to exert pressure on national political bodies, given their genuine electoral legitimacy.

Libyan authorities have exhibited an early adversarial stance, even before reaching the most sensitive stages of the settlement process. For instance, several demonstrations were organized outside the Mission’s headquarters in Janzour throughout 2025. Furthermore, during the Special Envoy’s periodic briefing to the Security Council in August, the Mission’s headquarters was targeted by a rocket attack. In eastern Libya, Osama Hammad, head of the Benghazi-based government, threatened to completely sever cooperation with the Mission.

Despite Tetteh’s repeated hints at resorting to alternative mechanisms should official parties fail to cooperate, both the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to display significant intransigence on issues requiring consensus, such as agreement on sovereign positions and the restructuring of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC).

Moreover, the heads of both councils rejected a French initiative for a joint meeting during their visit to Paris in December. Most indicators point toward a continued effort by these parties to stifle the momentum of the settlement process as outlined in Tetteh’s initiative.

Where do we stand?

In light of the divergence between the American and UN approaches, an important question is to what extent this divergence may generate negative or positive repercussions for the settlement process. U.S. objectives largely converge with the UN roadmap in its initial stages, particularly those aimed at ending institutional fragmentation and forming a unified government. At this stage, the UN Mission seeks to capitalize on U.S. pressure on Libyan actors to achieve progress. However, a point of divergence between the UN effort and the American role may emerge in a later phase.

Aware of this divergence, Libyan actors have sought a selective separation between the American and UN roles – a dynamic reflected in their differentiated responses to each track. The clearest illustration is the agreement between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State on unifying the development item within the general budget.

While this objective had remained unattainable for years despite UN efforts – and amid ongoing escalation between the two bodies, making meetings of the two chambers’ leaders impossible – U.S. mediation succeeded in pushing both councils to unify the development budget line, likely curbing parallel spending and strengthening financial governance.

The miscalculation by Libyan actors may lie in a narrow interpretation of the U.S. preference for engaging with de facto power holders – an interpretation that does not necessarily imply preserving current figures or allowing them unrestricted latitude. While removing the Haftar family entirely may be difficult, financial reforms, strengthening national institutions, and insulating them from political conflict could significantly curtail the family’s role, confining it mainly to the military sphere.

This process would also restrict their unchecked economic influence, limiting their role to a defined share within a unified government. The same logic applies to Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, against whom protests were mobilized in Tripoli and Misrata in late 2025. This dynamic was compounded by speculation surrounding his reported health crisis in early 2026 and its potential link to scenarios of his departure from power.

As for the limits of progress in the settlement track beyond forming a unified government, or at least addressing the adverse effects of division on national financial institutions, the issue can be framed in terms of the philosophy guiding international management of the settlement process. Nearly a decade and a half after Gaddafi’s overthrow, this period can be divided into three roughly equal phases.

During the first five years, electoral solutions were attempted, resulting in a division whose repercussions persist, alongside difficulties in reviving the electoral approach as a viable conflict-resolution method. The second phase was marked by the Government of National Accord under Fayez al-Sarraj, emerging from arduous negotiations soon undermined by reversals.

Nevertheless, the international community maintained its commitment to its legitimacy, enabling Sarraj to enter Tripoli in March 2016, remaining in power for five years. This was followed, in February 2021, by the emergence of the Presidential Council and the Dbeibeh government, a hybrid solution partly electoral and partly consensus-based. Despite renewed division, the international community continues to uphold the legitimacy of this authority five years on.

There appears to be a pattern of five-year governance cycles in Libya, primarily anchored in international recognition of the authorities in Tripoli. Cycles that experimented with electoral, consensual, and subsequently “hybrid” solutions all of failed to resolve the conflict. What might follow?

The current momentum of the settlement process is split between two actors, each favoring a contradictory approach. The Trump administration appears inclined toward a consensual, power-sharing solution, whereas the UN Mission remains committed to its classical preference for an electoral path.

A direct exit from this predicament may not be feasible from within the settlement process itself. The Special Envoy’s hint at resorting to ‘alternative options’ may lack alignment with global power dynamics, particularly if such a path lacks the backing of the U.S. administration. At best, this alternative could only be utilized to broker a consensus on yet another new transitional authority.

Further progress in the settlement process is likely to be contingent upon a set of converging pressure factors. The first relates to the potential success of the U.S. approach to financial governance, which may limit incumbents’ ability to buy social support, weaken clientelist networks, and encourage social actors to favor electoral solutions that better represent their interests. Falling global oil prices could intensify this effect by reducing state revenues and constraining the Central Bank’s unregulated funding of the rival governments.

The second factor involves Libyan actors potentially overplaying tactical maneuvers, misjudging each side’s ability to block the settlement, and offering minimal concessions, which could force major powers to back new arrangements and marginalize current leaders.

The third factor concerns the possibility of Washington pursuing a more assertive stance toward Tripoli and Benghazi, especially in reaction to growing economic or military ties with Beijing and Moscow, aiming to influence Libyan actors’ behavior.

Conclusion

In 2026, Libya appears on the verge of a new cycle of transitional arrangements. The accumulation of international power balances and multiplicity of stakeholders suggest a decisive outcome leading to a fully-fledged, durable settlement remains unlikely, reinforcing continued management of the Libyan file through an international governance framework.

This dynamic is compounded by the Trump administration’s insistence on a highly transactional approach aimed at maximizing economic gains, without a corresponding commitment to a comprehensive political settlement aligned with the UN. Nevertheless, American opportunism – despite narrow calculations – may still yield benefits that can constrain de facto power holders from exercising unchecked control over national wealth. In this sense, it could contribute indirectly to gradually forming more favorable conditions for a broader, representative political settlement reflecting the Libyan people’s interests.

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Nova News

A series of converging dynamics suggests that Libya is returning to the center of a broader reshuffling of regional alliances

Amid the Sudanese crisis and growing intra-Arab competition for influence in the Sahel, Libya is once again emerging as a strategic hub in rapidly shifting regional balances. In recent weeks, critical assessments of the Marshal’s role have begun to emerge in Saudi media circles and related commentary circles. 

Khalifa Haftar, explicitly referencing the precedent of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen and the possibility of a reduction in regional support if the Cyrenaica leader does not distance himself from the UAE’s plans. In the absence of official confirmation from Riyadh, these signals remain informal, but they are part of a rapidly changing regional context.

A series of converging dynamics suggests that Libya is returning to the center of a broader reshuffle of regional alliances, in a context that sees the emergence of an increasingly structured confrontation between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey on the one hand, and the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and a constellation of non-state actors—including the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, Somaliland, and armed networks active in eastern and southern Libya—on the other.

The border triangle and the return

of the Sudan dossier

This is the context of a military incident that occurred in early January in the remote border triangle between Libya, Sudan, and Egypt, which has refocused attention on one of the most sensitive areas of the central Sahara. According to Sudanese sources close to the RSF, consulted by Nova Agency, an armed convoy linked to the Sudanese paramilitary group was reportedly hit by an air raid after crossing the Libyan border.

The operation, informally attributed to the Egyptian Air Force but never officially confirmed, reportedly took place in an area southeast of the city of al-Kufra, far from both Tripoli and Cairo. Sources report that the convoy consisted of dozens of vehicles loaded with fuel, weapons, and military equipment, and that the attack caused significant losses, with most of the vehicles destroyed.

The area represents a strategic corridor for cross-border trafficking between Libya and Sudanese Darfur, including the flow of men, goods, and military supplies, in open violation of the international arms embargo. The incident reportedly occurred on the eve of the visit to Cairo by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), received on January 10 by the Egyptian Minister of Defense Abdel Mageed Saqr and by the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces Ahmed Khalifa.

Al Kufra, between maintenance

and political signals

A few days after these developments, the administration of al-Kufra Airport announced the temporary closure of the airport starting from January 19, 2026, for a period of one month, officially to allow for extensive maintenance work on the runway.

The airport serves the eponymous oasis city of al-Kufra, the capital of southeastern Libya, bordering Sudan, Chad, and Egypt, and is the only operational airport in this vast desert region. Precisely because of this location, the closure has implications that go beyond the technical aspect. According to several local sources, the airport has been a key logistical transit point in recent months to Sudan, the site of the civil war between the regular army and the RSF led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti.

In this context, the suspension of airport operations is being interpreted as a possible sign of a slowdown in the flow of external support to Sudan, against the backdrop of Egypt’s pressure on Haftar’s forces, who control Cyrenaica and large portions of southern Libya.

The announcement of a closure for “maintenance” therefore appears, according to local observers, to be a diplomatic move useful for freezing sensitive operations without formalizing explicit political positions, especially considering that the airport had already undergone major renovations last May.

Pressure on the leadership of Cyrenaica

According to a Libyan source close to the dossier, the current dynamics would reflect a phase of instability in the relations of the leadership of Cyrenaica – which includes not only Khalifa Haftar, but also his sons Saddam and Khaled, active in the armed forces, while Belqasem Haftar leads the National Reconstruction Fund – between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and the United Arab Emirates, on the other.

In this context, the month-long closure of al-Kufra airport would be a response to Egyptian pressure, rather than a purely technical measure, although it would not completely interrupt logistical flows to Sudan.

The same source reports that support for the Sudanese theater has not been eliminated, but rather reallocated along alternative routes, particularly fuel supplies. Air support activities linked to the eastern Libyan network have been diverted to other African countries, including Ethiopia, Cameroon, and South Sudan, reducing direct exposure along the Libyan-Sudanese border.

According to this interpretation, Haftar currently has no real scope for breaking with Abu Dhabi, despite growing regional pressure. The link with the United Arab Emirates remains structural, both politically and financially. Libyan sources familiar with the matter emphasize that a significant portion of the financial leverage attributable to the Cyrenaica leadership is controlled by the Emirates, which continues to represent a guarantee of protection and stability for the internal balance of power.

The Field Marshal’s strategy therefore appears to be geared not toward a clear choice of sides, but toward tactically managing opposing pressures through operational adjustments and indirect signals.

The analysis: the shift to the west

In this fluid context, marked by cross-pressures and gradual realignments, analysts’ readings suggest looking above all at territorial dynamics. Jalel Harchaui, an analyst specializing in security dynamics in North Africa and the Sahel, interviewed by Agenzia Nova, the key to understanding this should not be sought in an immediate break between Haftar and his regional sponsors, but rather in a progressive geographical and operational shift towards the West.

“What matters is that Saddam Haftar is moving further west to maintain the strategic corridor that the United Arab Emirates considers active,” says Harchaui. According to the analyst, the Matan al-Sara area, a desert town in southern Libya on the border with Chad, is being transformed into an operational air base, while the passages to Chad and the flow of migrants to Sudan are gradually moving further west, without directly impacting areas like Qatrun, in the deep Fezzan.

“Migration from Sudan passes through Chad and then enters Libya. The effects of the Sudanese war are moving westward, Saddam is moving westward, everyone is moving westward,” the analyst observes. From Tripoli’s perspective, this movement does not pose an immediate threat, at least for now. However, according to Harchaui, the patience of some regional actors may not be infinite, particularly that of Turkey, which has a strong presence in Tripoli and Misrata.

“Throughout 2025, Turkey tried to persuade Saddam to ratify the maritime border agreement. It achieved nothing,” the analyst states, noting that Ankara provided military support, drones, weapons, and political recognition without receiving concrete compensation. In this scenario, Ankara could become more assertive, strengthening its support for forces in western and southwestern Libya, including in Fezzan, with the risk of gradually tightening Saddam Haftar’s political and military grip, in concert with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.

The Algeria factor

The rapprochement between Algeria and Saudi Arabia also contributes to the picture, amidst a cooling of relations between Algeria and the United Arab Emirates. According to some reports, Riyadh is working to build an Arab front based on the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, in contrast to the Emirati approach, perceived as favorable to non-state actors and fragmentation.

In this context, Algeria is increasingly wary of Abu Dhabi’s policies, both on Libya and on other sensitive regional issues. These include Western Sahara, where the United Arab Emirates has taken a clear stance in favor of Moroccan sovereignty, while Algeria has historically supported the Saharawi people’s right to self-determination, in line with United Nations resolutions. This divergence, while not new, is part of a broader context of political and strategic tensions.

At the same time, Algeria is strengthening its dialogue with regional actors who share a more traditional vision of state stability, based on the rejection of external interference and separatist logic.

According to Harchaui, closer alignment between Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey on certain lines cannot be ruled out in the medium term.

It remains to be seen whether this phase of realignments will remain tactical or whether it will mark the beginning of a new regional architecture, in which Libya will once again become not only a competitive arena, but a litmus test of Arab balances in the Sahel.

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Turkey’s economic engagement is closely intertwined with its political and military footprint.

Turkish-Libyan relations are entering a new phase, with energy emerging as the central focus, following the announcement by Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Alparslan Bayraktar, that 2026 will be designated “the year of energy” in Ankara’s cooperation with Tripoli. The declaration signals Turkey’s determination to consolidate its economic and strategic presence in Libya, building on the political and military support it previously provided to the authorities controlling western Libya.

The announcement came during the 22nd session of the Turkish-Libyan Joint Economic Committee, coinciding with the Libya Energy & Economic Summit, an event carrying significant political and economic symbolism. Notably, the meeting marked the resumption of the committee’s work after a 17-year hiatus, signalling a structured and renewed phase of coordination between the two countries.

Bayraktar described the reactivation of the joint economic committee as a historic moment. While he stressed that cooperation extends beyond energy to sectors such as transport, healthcare, education and trade, he emphasised that energy remains, from Turkey’s perspective, the primary gateway for consolidating economic influence and establishing long-term partnerships in a country holding one of Africa’s largest oil and gas reserves.

The minister highlighted that bilateral trade reached approximately $4.4 billion in 2025, with ambitions to surpass $5 billion in 2026. Achieving this target, he noted, depends directly on expanded collaboration in oil and gas, reflecting Turkey’s strategic approach to transform the energy sector into both an economic and political lever.

Official statements indicate that Turkey is pursuing multiple pathways to strengthen this cooperation, including revisiting oil fields previously operated by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation and negotiating new agreements for exploration and development of additional fields. Ankara is also seeking partnerships with international oil and gas companies active in Libya, positioning itself at the heart of the country’s energy network and bolstering its influence in the wider Eastern Mediterranean and North African energy markets.

Observers note that Turkey’s economic engagement is closely intertwined with its political and military footprint. Ankara’s expansion in Libya is widely seen as an extension of its decisive support for the Tripoli government over recent years, a strategy that has allowed it to convert political leverage into strategic economic gains, particularly in the energy sector.

On a practical level, Bayraktar chaired the 22nd session of the joint economic committee, which concluded with the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Libyan Minister of Transport Mohamed al-Shahoubi, setting the framework for future cooperation and implementation.

The Libya Energy & Economic Summit also commenced alongside the committee meeting, drawing broad ministerial and international participation. The high-profile engagement reflects the growing regional and international attention on Libya as a potential energy hub. In this landscape, Turkey appears determined to cement its position as a leading player, placing the energy sector at the forefront of its strategy to deepen ties with Tripoli and extend its influence in Libya over the coming years.

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Jonathan M. Winer

Infrastructure decay & compounding risk

Libya’s infrastructure is aging, under-maintained, and increasingly fragile. The ongoing degradation includes not only oil and gas facilities, but also electricity generation, transmission networks, water systems, ports, and logistics corridors. Years of deferred maintenance, politicized budgeting, and fragmented authority have led to unplanned outages, environmental catastrophe, such as the September 2023 dam collapse that killed more than 4,300 Libyans and destroyed much of the eastern port city of Derna, and sharply higher future capital requirements.

Energy infrastructure does not fail in isolation. Oil and gas production depends on reliable power, functioning ports, intact pipelines, and predictable logistics. When electricity supply becomes erratic, processing facilities shut down. When ports or storage facilities degrade, exports back up. When water systems fail, workforce stability and public health suffer. Each failure compounds the next.

For Libyans, unreliable electricity and water impose daily economic and social costs, fueling frustration, protest, and political volatility. For investors, the implications are operational and financial. Infrastructure decay undermines assumptions about uptime, cost control, and project timelines, and increases exposure to force majeure events that are formally contractual but practically unrecoverable.

In this environment, energy projects cannot be insulated from systemic risk. Investors must assume that weaknesses in electricity, water, transport, and public services will increasingly shape operational outcomes. The Libyan government needs to invest in this infrastructure to meet the needs of its own people. Left unremediated, these risks also shape outcomes for foreign operators.

Why political support is not enough

External political engagement — whether by foreign governments or the United Nations — cannot by itself lower the risks of investing in Libya in the absence of domestic institutional reform.

The UN-facilitated political process remains stalled, constrained by unresolved disputes among Libyan institutions, most notably between the House of Representatives and the High State Council. There is little reason to believe this process will yield tangible political outcomes in the foreseeable future, and even less reason to expect it to resolve Libya’s economic or commercial constraints.

More importantly for investors, the UN mission has played only a limited facilitative role in Libya’s economic governance. During some periods, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has supported specific processes, such as central bank audit and reunification efforts and crisis consultations. But it has not been an implementing actor on fiscal policy, budget execution, payment discipline, or exchange-rate management, which ultimately play a large role in determining whether energy investments are viable. When institutions are weak, operating budgets uncertain, payments discretionary, corruption entrenched, infrastructure degrading, and security contingent, political encouragement alone does not make projects bankable.

In some cases, political signaling can worsen outcomes. It can raise expectations without improving execution, encourage Libyan actors to hedge rather than commit, and prompt foreign firms to preserve optionality rather than deploy capital. The result is a familiar pattern: memoranda of understanding rather than final investment decisions; feasibility studies rather than capital commitments; announcements rather than sustained spending.

For Libya, this gap between political rhetoric and commercial reality has become structural. Until the underlying economic mechanics change, political support, however well intentioned, is unlikely to alter investment behavior, except where a sponsoring foreign government is prepared to act as a commercial backstop by absorbing or subsidizing risks that the Libyan system itself cannot credibly manage.

The instability factor

Libya’s current level of oil production has been sustained by a fragile military equilibrium, shaped in part by external involvement but not reducible to it. Since Turkey’s intervention to prevent Hifter from seizing Tripoli in 2020, Ankara has acted to deter renewed large-scale offensives by either side. That posture has helped constrain the conflict and has reduced the likelihood of an outright military resolution. It has not, however, resolved Libya’s underlying political or institutional fragmentation, nor has it eliminated other sources of instability. Internal political shocks, leadership changes, militia realignments, or shifts in external calculations could all disrupt the current balance even without a Turkish withdrawal.

For investors, uncertainty about Libya’s longer-term political stability remains decisive. The military equilibrium that has allowed continued production and exports does not rest on domestic institutions capable of enforcing contracts, resolving disputes, or providing predictable security. It is contingent, external, and subject to recalibration. Any significant change in Libya’s internal political configuration, or in the posture of key external actors, risks reviving uncertainty over territorial control, contract enforceability, and asset protection. In that sense, the same military conditions that have helped sustain production also reinforce Libya’s investability problem. Some stability now exists, but it is partial, potentially reversible, and could prove insufficient to anchor long-term commercial commitments.

What would change the calculation

Near-term steps could improve Libya’s investability at the margin, not by eliminating risk, but by reducing uncertainty in ways that matter to commercial decision-making.

First, a credible, approved operating budget for the NOC, paired with a transparent and time-bound plan to clear arrears to service companies, would materially reduce operational risk. Regularized budgeting would stabilize contractor relationships, enable preventive maintenance, and reduce the likelihood that arrears translate into sudden service withdrawals and production losses. For investors, the central issue is not the absolute level of debt, but whether payment obligations are predictable and honored.

Second, predictable payment mechanisms for foreign contractors would address one of Libya’s most persistent deterrents to investment. Ring-fenced escrow structures funded directly from oil revenues would reduce discretionary interference in payments and allow companies to price risk more clearly. Without insulation from political liquidity pressures, even technically successful projects remain commercially fragile.

Third, exchange-rate reform is unavoidable. Maintaining a fixed official rate while rationing access to dollars transfers rents to politically connected importers, entrenches corruption, distorts prices, and drains public resources. Moving to a floating exchange rate would collapse much of the arbitrage that now dominates Libya’s political economy. Combined with replacing generalized fuel and commodity subsidies with direct cash stipends to households, such reform would redirect resources away from rent-seekers and toward ordinary Libyans, while restoring fiscal transparency and policy credibility.

Fourth, clarity around licensing and contract authority is essential. While the NOC is the legally mandated body for hydrocarbon contracting, other Libyan officials have recurrently blurred lines of authority and reopened settled decisions. Investors need confidence that licenses and contracts will not be revisited, contested, or renegotiated as political leverage shifts.

Finally, visible improvements in gas infrastructure, power generation, and basic utilities would signal institutional capacity. Gas output, electricity supply, and water systems are not peripheral to energy investment; they are enabling conditions. Investors will not commit long-term capital if the systems that support operations are visibly deteriorating or dependent on crisis management.

None of these steps require elections or a comprehensive political settlement. All of the measures outlined require political restraint, institutional discipline, and a willingness by Libya’s most influential political actors to reduce discretionary control over revenues and rents — conditions that may be harder to secure if meaningful foreign investment proceeds in the absence of reform.

Tests of seriousness

For US companies considering re-entry, several observable indicators will matter far more than rhetoric.

Are service companies being paid on time, with arrears stabilizing or declining rather than continuing to accumulate? Are gas exports and domestic gas supply stabilizing quarter over quarter, or continuing to deteriorate? Is the gap between official and parallel exchange rates narrowing in a sustained way? Are letters of credit processed and settled predictably rather than selectively? Are fuel shortages in Tripoli easing, or becoming more frequent and more politicized? Are new licenses and approvals honored consistently across political divides? And when disputes arise, are they resolved by institutions — or by shutdowns?

Until these indicators move decisively in the right direction, Libya is likely to remain a familiar category for energy executives: geologically attractive, politically supported, but commercially constrained.

Conclusion

Libya is not Venezuela. Its reserves are more valuable and easier to develop, its oil is of higher quality, and its NOC retains a level of technical competence that Venezuela now lacks.

But the comparison remains instructive. Resource wealth does not equal investability. And political enthusiasm does not overcome structural risk.

For now, Libya remains a country where existing operators struggle to extract consistent value, and where new entrants face barriers that political backing alone cannot resolve. Whether that changes will depend less on announcements and diplomatic signaling than on whether Libya’s institutions can do what investors ultimately require: pay on time, honor contracts, maintain infrastructure, and keep the lights on.

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Jonathan M. Winer has been the United States Special Envoy for Libya, the deputy assistant secretary of state for international law enforcement, and counsel to United States Senator John Kerry. He has written and lectured widely on US Middle East policy, counterterrorism, international money laundering, illicit networks, corruption, and US-Russia issues. He is a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

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Middle East Institute

Jonathan M. Winer

When ExxonMobil recently advised President Donald Trump that Venezuela remains “uninvestable,” the company was not making a political judgment. It was offering a commercial one. Despite some of the world’s largest proven oil reserves, Venezuela’s political fragmentation, economic mismanagement, sanctions exposure, and payment risk continue to outweigh the attraction of its geology.

That assessment provides a useful frame for Libya today.

Libya, like Venezuela, is a resource-rich country, producing a higher-quality oil that is light and sweet in comparison to the heavy “sour” oil that Venezuela produces. And in principle, Libya could produce far more than it does. Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) has long cited an installed capacity of roughly 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd) and has periodically pointed to the potential for higher output with sustained investment. In practice, however, Libya’s post-2011 experience has demonstrated how hard it has been to translate Libya’s geological potential into successful new energy production involving even the most committed international oil companies (IOCs).

That difficulty has not prevented renewed interest. Libya’s first exploration bid round in more than 17 years has drawn strong international attention, with the NOC offering 22 onshore and offshore areas under production-sharing terms and reporting interest from foreign companies. 

Several major operators have resumed or expanded upstream engagement: Eni has restarted offshore exploration drilling after a multi-year hiatus, BP and Shell have signed agreements with the NOC to study hydrocarbon potential at multiple oilfields, and a broad set of international firms, including BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, OMV, Shell, Sonatrach, and TotalEnergies, are qualified to participate in the bid round.

On January 24, Libya announced the signing of a 25-year development deal with TotalEnergies and Chevron that would see the French and American majors invest an estimated $20 billion in the North African country to boost oil production by as much as 850,000 bpd.  

Additional deals may be in the offing as well. Speaking during the Libya Energy & Economic Summit over the weekend, NOC Chairman Masoud Suleiman said the results of the new bid round would be announced on February 11.

The question facing IOCs is not whether Libya has oil and gas to develop. It does. The question is whether the country’s current political, economic, and security conditions allow that potential to be converted into reliable returns — and whether near-term changes could alter that calculation.

Oil and fuel as political instruments

Libya’s political fragmentation remains unresolved. The country continues to operate under competing centers of authority, with an interim government in Tripoli whose mandate expired years ago, a rival eastern administration aligned with General Khalifa Hifter, and national institutions that are formally unified but routinely constrained by political interference. These continuing divisions shape fiscal behavior, security dynamics, and control over revenue.

The NOC continues to be the sole authority for hydrocarbon contracting under Libyan law. Foreign companies must contract exclusively through it. Any alternative creates acute legal, operational, political, and reputational risk. But the NOC’s ability to function as a credible counterparty depends on budgets, cash flow, and institutional protection. These all are currently lacking.

In January 2026, NOC Chairman Suleiman stated publicly that the corporation had received no approved operating budget throughout 2025 and that debts to service companies and suppliers had continued to accumulate. The situation does not reflect a technical problem, but rather political decisions by rival authorities to retain leverage over the country’s primary revenue-generating institution. In Libya’s past, mounting arrears have been among the clearest leading indicators of deferred maintenance, service-company pullbacks, and subsequent production decline.

Headline crude production figures illustrate both resilience and fragility. Average crude output rose to roughly 1.37 million bpd in 2025, up from approximately 1.14 million bpd in 2024 and the highest annual average in a decade. That recovery followed a dramatic collapse in 2020, when production fell below 400,000 bpd during the civil war triggered by Hifter’s failed attempt to seize Tripoli, backed by Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and, more quietly, France, and reversed only after Turkish military intervention.

The lesson for investors is not simply that production can recover. It is that Libyan oil output remains vulnerable to political and military decisions unrelated to commercial performance.

Disruptions in Libya’s oil and fuel systems are not incidental. Armed groups, local communities, political factions, and institutional actors have routinely blocked fields, pipelines, export terminals, fuel imports, or domestic distribution to extract concessions, signal dissatisfaction, or renegotiate access to patronage.

For example, in August 2024, rival political factions used control over oil production and export infrastructure as leverage in a dispute over central bank authority, leading to the shutdown of multiple oilfields and export terminals, with more than half of Libya’s output going offline for weeks. Exports at major ports including Es Sidra, Ras Lanuf, and Zueitina were halted as eastern authorities threatened closure until political demands were met, underscoring how energy infrastructure is weaponized in domestic disputes.

The threshold for disruption is often low. Delayed payments, exclusion from revenue streams, or perceived disrespect can be sufficient. On the production side, even limited local control can halt output. On the consumer side, fuel shortages can be engineered or prolonged through diversions of imports, storage, and distribution, even when aggregate supply exists. The pattern is systemic rather than episodic.

In 2025, investigative reporting by the anti-corruption NGO The Sentry found that Libya’s subsidized fuel imports — necessitated by insufficient and unreliable domestic refining capacity — were widely diverted into smuggling networks controlled by armed and politically connected actors, with an estimated $6.7 billion worth of fuel siphoned off in 2024 alone.

While the report does not quantify the precise share of imports diverted, it characterized the scale as systemic rather than marginal, describing the phenomenon as a “major national crisis.” These diversions substantially reduced the volume of imported fuel available for legitimate domestic consumption and contributed to chronic shortages and elevated prices in the internal market, even as gross import volumes remained high.

Gas as an early warning signal

Gas production provides a particularly clear indicator of systemic stress. Unlike crude oil, gas requires continuous maintenance, reliable power, and sustained funding. When those conditions weaken, gas output is often the first casualty.

Libya’s gas exports to Italy via the Greenstream pipeline fell by roughly 30 percent in 2025, declining to about 1.0 billion cubic meters from approximately 1.4 billion cubic meters the year before, despite far higher theoretical capacity. The decline reflected underinvestment, infrastructure degradation, power constraints, and fiscal stress rather than geological factors.

Weakness in gas production also has domestic consequences. Gas supplies power generation and petrochemical facilities, meaning reduced output directly contributes to electricity shortages and broader economic disruption. When gas falters, it signals that there are deeper institutional and fiscal problems affecting the energy sector as a whole.

The economic constraint: Currency,

corruption, and parallel states

Libya’s fiscal and monetary pressures threaten the arrangements that currently sustain both western and eastern authorities. With oil prices hovering in the $60 per barrel range, hydrocarbon revenues are insufficient to cover public wages, fuel imports, and foreign currency demand simultaneously.

The imbalance is now stark. On January 13, 2026, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) reported that oil revenues deposited so far in January totaled $287 million, while foreign currency sales during the same period reached approximately $1 billion.

Some of that outflow likely reflects accelerated food and commodity imports ahead of Ramadan. Roughly three-quarters of Libya’s food is imported. But the scale of the gap is striking and over time such mismatches can create mounting risks for creditors. According to the CBL, as of mid-January 2026, outstanding letters of credit from 2025 amounted to roughly $4.3 billion.

Currency markets have responded accordingly. During January 2026, the parallel exchange rate briefly reached 9 Libyan dinars to the dollar, signaling expectations of further devaluation and tightening access to foreign exchange.

A week later, the CBL devalued the Libyan dinar by about 14.7 percent, citing ongoing fiscal pressures, political division, and weakening oil revenues, with the official exchange rate moving to approximately 6.37 dinars per US dollar. This followed the previous devaluation by the CBL in April 2025 that reset the official rate at approximately 5.6 Libyan dinars per dollar after years of defending an unsustainable peg.

These pressures cannot be understood without reference to Libya’s post-2014 fiscal history. For years, eastern authorities financed spending through counterfeit dinars printed in Russia without authorization from the Tripoli-based central bank, enabling unconstrained expenditures outside any unified fiscal framework. To prevent complete monetary fragmentation, the unified CBL later absorbed much of this currency, monetizing a parallel fiscal state.

At the same time, two governments have co-existed, cooperated, and competed, both drawing on oil revenues and central bank liquidity to sustain patronage networks. Corruption is not incidental to this system; it is structural. Multiple exchange rates, discretionary letters of credit, fuel subsidies, and barter-style arrangements have transferred vast resources to politically connected actors, often with little corresponding delivery of goods or services and fueling inflation.

For foreign investors, the implications are direct. Payment risk is not hypothetical. The CBL has historically delayed or withheld payments to foreign contractors for political and liquidity reasons unrelated to contract performance. Unless addressed, this payment risk alone is sufficient to disqualify further investment by major IOCs.

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Jonathan M. Winer has been the United States Special Envoy for Libya, the deputy assistant secretary of state for international law enforcement, and counsel to United States Senator John Kerry. He has written and lectured widely on US Middle East policy, counterterrorism, international money laundering, illicit networks, corruption, and US-Russia issues. He is a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at the Middle East Institute.

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Eastern Libyan commander undecided after Egypt and Saudi Arabia urge him to stop facilitating UAE weapons shipments to Sudan’s RSF.

Weapons continue to flow from Libya to Sudan despite Saudi and Egyptian pressure on Khalifa Haftar to stop Emirati military support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Middle East Eye has learned.

Earlier this week, MEE reported that the eastern Libya commander is coming under growing pressure from Cairo and Riyadh, which have warned that continued assistance could trigger a serious shift in Egypt’s relationship with him.

Saddam Haftar, Khalifa’s son and deputy commander of his self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), was “summoned” to Cairo earlier this month for a dressing-down, during which he was told to immediately end support for RSF, according to Egyptian sources. 

Libyan sources with direct knowledge of the matter told MEE, on condition of anonymity, that Saddam is now also under pressure from the United Arab Emirates to continue the facilitation of weapon shipments to Sudan via eastern Libya.

Saddam remains undecided, the sources said, even as weapons continue to flow to Sudan.

The pressure on Haftar forms part of a broader Egyptian-Saudi effort to block the transfer of arms, fuel and fighters to the RSF, curb Emirati influence and prevent further destabilisation along the Egypt-Libya-Sudan border.

When Saddam visited Egypt earlier this month, local media framed the visit as routine military cooperation. A source told MEE, however, that it was in fact a warning over confirmed Emirati weapons and fuel transfers to the RSF via Haftar-controlled areas.

“Egyptian intelligence and military officials delivered a strongly worded warning to Khalifa Haftar through his son,” the source said.

Officials also presented evidence of Emirati weapons shipments, drones and air defence systems reaching the RSF, along with fuel deliveries from Libya’s Sarir refinery to RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.

Since war broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF in April 2023, Egypt has watched warily as its southern neighbour descends further into chaos.

Issuing a threat

Cairo backs the Sudanese government and military, which in recent months have lost a string of strategic towns and cities to the RSF, most notably Darfur’s el-Fasher, where thousands are believed to have been massacred by the paramilitaries.

While Haftar’s authorities in eastern Libya have long been supported by Egypt, he is also backed by the UAE, which is the RSF’s main patron and has been funnelling weapons, mercenaries and funds to the paramilitaries via Libya, Chad and Ethiopia.

As revealed in a recent report, supply lines via Libya that the RSF established by seizing border areas in June directly contributed to the group’s capture of el-Fasher, following a siege lasting more than 550 days.

According to the military source, Egypt has aerial imagery showing weapons shipments moving from Abu Dhabi to Haftar-controlled areas and onwards to the RSF, as well as Libyan fuel tankers transporting supplies to the RSF in Darfur.

“Egyptian security bodies have also monitored, through audio and visual surveillance, the arrival of mercenaries from Colombia and Venezuela into Libya, from where they are transferred to Sudan to join the RSF,” the source said.

“Without such support, the RSF would not have achieved its recent advances,” he added.

“The message was clear: continued support for the RSF would force Egypt to reconsider its entire relationship with eastern Libya.”

According to the Egyptian army official, Cairo and Riyadh offered Saddam Haftar cooperation and alternative financial and military support to replace Emirati backing.

The meetings between Saddam Haftar and Egyptian officials were followed by a Saudi arms deal with Pakistan worth $4bn, the source noted.

“The weapons are expected to be distributed between Haftar’s forces and the Sudanese army led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan,” he added.

Haftar controls eastern and southern Libya, running an administration that rivals the internationally recognised government in Tripoli.

However, the army source said Egyptian military officials shared intelligence with Saddam Haftar outlining Emirati plans to fragment Haftar’s territory once the RSF secured control over Darfur and Kordofan and destabilised SAF-held northern Sudan.

“The Emirati plan involved dividing Libya into multiple zones, with some areas remaining under Tripoli’s control, others under Benghazi, and Jufra and Sirte separated,” the source said.

Regional friction

A feud between erstwhile allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE has erupted in public in recent weeks.

The UAE has sown discord across the Middle East and Africa in recent years by backing several insurgencies and separatist groups, including the RSF, which has been accused of a litany of war crimes, including genocide. 

In Yemen earlier this month, the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council separatist group was routed by pro-Yemeni government fighters backed by Saudi air strikes, after briefly seizing all of the country’s east.

The developments were accompanied by rare statements of condemnation between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Riyadh has since been openly assertive against Emirati policy in the region.

Egypt has joined Saudi Arabia in this.

Earlier this month, MEE reported that Cairo shared intelligence with Riyadh on Emirati activities in Yemen.

“The UAE’s backing of the RSF was part of a broader strategy to shape the future of Sudan and Libya and strengthen its foothold in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel,” a Cairo-based geopolitical analyst told MEE, speaking anonymously due to security concerns.

“But those ambitions increasingly clashed with Saudi interests, especially as Riyadh views the RSF’s rise as a threat to regional stability and a direct challenge to Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.”

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Tahani Elmogrbi

Tripoli’s lavish stability spectacle masks Libya’s inflation, collapsing services, and governance failures, exposing development as performance rather than lived reality.

Lavish celebrations held in Tripoli on December 12, 2025, featuring celebrity appearances, cultural events, and the rehabilitation of Libya’s National Museum, projected an image of stability that sharply diverges from daily life for most Libyans. While millions were spent on spectacle, inflation continues to erode purchasing power, the black-market exchange rate remains volatile, liquidity is scarce, and public sector wages are often delayed. Public education and healthcare systems are deteriorating, forcing families to rely on costly private alternatives they cannot afford.

The contrast becomes most visible during rainfall, when flooding and sewage overflows paralyze cities, exposing decades of neglect, corruption, and misallocated resources. Stability has increasingly become a performance, with rival authorities in the east and west competing to showcase legitimacy through flashy events rather than delivering governance, security sector reform, or economic recovery. These displays are aimed largely at international audiences, despite widespread awareness of Libya’s institutional fragility, militia dominance, and weak rule of law.

On December 12, 2025, Tripoli was transformed into a stage for lavish festivities, celebrity appearances, and carefully choreographed spectacles meant to project an image of stability and normalcy. Several million dollars were spent rehabilitating Libya’s National Museum — the main centerpiece of celebrations — while additional funds went toward hosting international celebrities, organizing high-profile media nights, and promoting cultural events under the banner of a “safe and stable Tripoli.” Yet beneath the lights, music, and curated social media moments lies a far harsher reality — one that most Libyans live every day and cannot escape.

This version of stability is painfully artificial. It raises a fundamental question about government priorities. Is stability measured by building football stadiums, equipping museums with cutting-edge technology, and hosting cultural events? Or is it measured by investing in schools that can actually educate, hospitals that can treat patients, and roads and drainage systems that do not collapse at the first sign of rain? Development is not a spectacle. Real investment is not cosmetic. And governance is not performance.

In all of Libya, inflation continues to erode purchasing power, the black-market exchange rate for the U.S. dollar remains high and volatile, liquidity is scarce, and many citizens struggle to access their own salaries despite being paid on paper. Public sector wages — on which a majority of Libyans depend — are delayed. Parents are unable to secure quality education for their children as public schools deteriorate. The healthcare sector is in an equally alarming state, with underfunded hospitals, shortages of medicines, aging infrastructure, and an increasing reliance on private care that most citizens cannot afford.

Perhaps nothing exposes the gap between official narratives and reality more clearly than rain. In Libya, rain has become the most honest indicator of corruption and institutional failure. Every year, when it rains, major cities sink. Streets flood, sewage systems overflow, and neighborhoods are paralyzed. This is not a natural disaster — it is the result of decades of neglect, misallocated budgets, and funds spent on appearances rather than infrastructure. No amount of fireworks can hide the fact that Libya’s cities cannot withstand basic weather conditions.

What makes this moment even more troubling is that this is not merely a domestic performance — it is a competition. Both the western and eastern authorities appear locked in a parallel race to outdo one another centered on who can attract the bigger celebrity, host the flashier event, or capture more international attention. Each side attempts to prove legitimacy and stability through unnecessary festivals, while neither has delivered sustainable governance, meaningful security sector reform, or real economic recovery. Stability has become a branding exercise rather than a lived reality.

This raises another uncomfortable question: Who are these events really for? They are not designed for the Libyan people, who struggle daily with liquidity shortages, rising prices, deteriorating services, and insecurity. The target appears to be the international community — foreign diplomats, investors, and observers. Yet this effort is deeply misplaced. The international community already understands Libya’s reality. No media night, celebrity appearance for a few days, or museum opening can conceal the absence of the rule of law, the dominance of armed militias, or the fragility of the economy.

Perhaps the most telling moment of that event did not come from the stage, but from within the crowd. Amid the celebrations, one woman’s quiet voice cut through the noise: “We want our money. We want liquidity. We want education and health.” Her words captured the truth more powerfully than any official slogan ever could.

True stability cannot be imported for a night, rented through celebrity appearances, or staged for cameras. It is built through accountable institutions, functioning infrastructure, economic justice, and real investment in people — not in illusions. Until Libya’s leaders realign their priorities toward genuine development, every celebration will remain a reminder not of progress, but of how far reality has been ignored.

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Diplomatically, Washington has coordinated closely with regional and international partners, including Italy, Egypt, Turkey and the United Nations, to align policies and avoid clashes.

More than fourteen years after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains a country sharply divided along political and geographic lines. The internationally-recognised Government of National Unity, whose mandate has technically expired, continues to govern the north-west of the country, while the Libyan National Army, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, controls much of the east, supported by competing foreign forces.

This division has created a complex landscape in which energy, security and migration interests intertwine, making Libya a strategic focal point not only for its location linking the Mediterranean to the African Sahel but also for its oil production, currently estimated at 1.2-1.4 million barrels per day, with ambitions to reach two million barrels by 2030. These factors have drawn intense attention from the United States and Europe, for whom Libya represents both an energy hub and a region of critical security concern.

In recent years, Libya’s situation appeared frozen, with foreign forces, most notably Russia through the Wagner Group, later integrated into an official role under the Russian ministry of defence, expanding across the east, seizing military bases, key logistical routes, and major oil fields. Under such conditions, economic activity alone carried extreme risk, vulnerable to security disruptions or foreign interference.

The United States has responded with a comprehensive, integrated approach that combines diplomacy, military engagement and economic investment to safeguard Western interests while promoting Libyan stability.

Diplomatically, Washington has coordinated closely with regional and international partners, including Italy, Egypt, Turkey and the United Nations, to align policies and avoid clashes with local and foreign actors. Senior US military delegations, including officials from AFRICOM, have visited Tripoli and Sirte, while Libya has been incorporated into the annual “Flintlock” exercise, historically focused on West Africa, signalling America’s intent to integrate Libya into a broader network of Western security cooperation rather than leaving the field open to Russia and other competitors.

Militarily, US efforts have prioritised the training and rehabilitation of Libyan special forces from both sides, emphasising joint operations and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly oil facilities. Coordination mechanisms include technical cells to monitor infrastructure, counter ISIS and al-Qaeda-linked threats and secure maritime navigation across the Mediterranean and Sahel. The aim is not to provoke conflict but to establish a balance that protects American and Western interests while limiting the influence of rival powers.

Economically, the United States seeks to bolster Libya’s investment environment in oil and gas by ensuring Western companies have access to resources under transparent, anti-corruption frameworks. Major companies such as Shell, TotalEnergies and Eni have reopened channels with the National Oil Corporation, while ExxonMobil signed a memorandum of understanding to explore offshore fields, signalling renewed confidence in Libya’s energy sector. Institutional reforms, including improved contracting practices, environmental standards and equitable revenue distribution, are designed to link economic growth with local security and stability.

The integration of these three pillars, diplomacy, military engagement and economic investment, represents a novel US model for intervention in fragile states. By coordinating efforts across these domains, Washington aims to protect its interests, enhance Libyan stability and recalibrate regional influence. Success depends on meticulous coordination among US agencies, engagement with regional partners such as the UAE and Turkey, and careful management of relations with Russia and other external actors to prevent escalation.

A key component of this approach is the reopening of the US embassy in Tripoli, providing a permanent diplomatic presence to coordinate initiatives, support military training, protect investments and facilitate cooperation between Libyan actors. Economic engagement will be supported through institutions such as the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank, offering credit lines for oil and electricity projects tied to transparency and environmental standards.

This multi-dimensional model also aims to restore energy production, manage security risks in the Mediterranean and Sahel, and offer a replicable template for engagement in other fragile states. While its implementation requires patience, coordination, and strategic opportunity, if fully realised it could mark a turning point in US policy towards North Africa and the Mediterranean, laying the foundation for a new era of sustainable, multi-faceted engagement in Libya.

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Libya has seen a remarkable recovery in its tourism sector, with 282,000 tourists visiting the country in the first half of 2025. This resurgence comes after several years of instability following the civil war and armed conflicts that plagued the country from 2020 onward. However, improvements in internal security and the development of key tourist areas have provided a boost to the tourism industry, positioning Libya as an emerging destination for international travelers once again.

One of the most notable factors driving this growth is the introduction of an electronic visa system in 2024, which streamlined the application process and made it easier for tourists to visit the country. Previously, the visa process was bureaucratic and time-consuming, often taking several months. With the introduction of the electronic visa system, visitors can now obtain their visas quickly, enabling them to plan their trips with greater ease.

In addition to the visa reforms, the renovation and restoration of Libya’s cultural and historical landmarks have also played a significant role in attracting tourists. Major tourist sites, such as the National Museum in Tripoli and the Old City, have undergone extensive restoration work, making them more appealing to international visitors. These efforts have been bolstered by international support, including from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), which has helped to preserve Libya’s rich heritage.

Key Tourist Attractions and Areas in Libya

Libya’s tourism growth is closely tied to the development of several key tourist areas, each offering a unique experience for travelers seeking history, culture, and adventure. One of the most prominent sites in the country is Leptis Magna, a UNESCO World Heritage site located near the Mediterranean coast. Leptis Magna is known for its well-preserved Roman ruins, including grand amphitheaters, temples, and bathhouses. This ancient city offers visitors a chance to step back in time and explore one of the Roman Empire’s most important cities in North Africa.

Another major attraction is the Sabratha Archaeological Site, also a UNESCO World Heritage site. Located to the west of Tripoli, Sabratha is famous for its well-preserved Roman theater, temples, and stunning mosaics. Visitors can explore the ancient ruins while enjoying views of the Mediterranean Sea, making it one of Libya’s most picturesque historical sites.

The capital city, Tripoli, has also seen significant improvements in its tourism infrastructure. The reopening of the National Museum of Libya after 14 years of closure is a testament to the country’s commitment to revitalizing its cultural tourism sector. The museum, which houses a vast collection of ancient artifacts, offers visitors an in-depth look at Libya’s rich history and cultural heritage.

Additionally, Tripoli’s Old City, with its sand-colored buildings, bustling markets, and historical mosques, has undergone extensive restoration, making it a must-see destination for those interested in exploring the country’s traditional architecture and local culture.

Libya’s Emerging Adventure Tourism Scene

Beyond its rich history and cultural heritage, Libya’s diverse landscapes make it an attractive destination for adventure tourism. From the vast Sahara Desert to the Mediterranean coastline, the country offers a variety of opportunities for adventure seekers. The Sahara Desert is a top destination for travelers interested in exploring vast sand dunes, camel treks, and remote desert camps. Libya’s desert regions also feature stunning rock formations and ancient petroglyphs that provide a glimpse into the country’s prehistoric past.

For those looking for coastal adventures, Libya’s beaches along the Mediterranean coast offer crystal-clear waters, perfect for diving, snorkeling, and sailing. The beaches near Tripoli and the towns of Zuwara and Misurata are known for their tranquility and scenic beauty, offering travelers a peaceful escape with a variety of water activities.

Libya’s Efforts to Enhance Security and Attract Tourists

While Libya’s tourism industry has seen impressive growth, the country is still regarded as a challenging destination due to its security concerns. However, the government has made substantial efforts to improve internal security, which has helped to foster a safer environment for international tourists. Increased investments in infrastructure, security personnel, and tourism-specific initiatives have contributed to this positive shift, allowing travelers to visit key tourist sites with greater peace of mind.

Libya’s tourism growth is also linked to broader initiatives aimed at economic recovery. The government’s focus on diversifying its economy away from oil dependency has led to more investments in tourism, particularly in the areas of infrastructure, heritage conservation, and local hospitality. These efforts aim to provide tourists with a high-quality experience while also promoting sustainable tourism practices that benefit local communities.

Challenges and Opportunities for Libya’s Tourism Future

Despite the tourism growth, Libya still faces significant challenges in terms of its reputation as a safe and reliable destination. Travel advisories from international governments and ongoing political instability remain potential barriers for some tourists. However, the country’s recent successes in rebuilding its tourism sector show that there is potential for continued growth, particularly if the security situation improves and international cooperation continues.

One of the key opportunities for Libya is the growing interest in cultural and adventure tourism, which aligns with global trends. As travelers increasingly seek authentic and off-the-beaten-path experiences, Libya’s rich cultural heritage, historical landmarks, and natural beauty offer a compelling draw for those looking to explore less conventional destinations.

Conclusion: Libya’s Tourism Sector on the Rise

Libya’s tourism sector is on a path of recovery and growth, with the country now welcoming more international visitors than in recent years. The introduction of the electronic visa system, alongside extensive restoration projects and security improvements, has created a more attractive environment for tourists. With its fascinating history, diverse landscapes, and emerging adventure tourism offerings, Libya is becoming a more appealing destination for those looking to experience something unique and authentic.

As the country continues to invest in its tourism infrastructure and foster a safer environment for travelers, Libya has the potential to become one of North Africa’s most sought-after travel destinations in the coming years.

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