Author - ab_mnbr

Alexander Dziadosz and Giulia Paravicini

A small airport in southern Libya – controlled by a military commander allied to the United Arab Emirates – has become a vital conduit for weapons, fuel and mercenaries to a Sudanese paramilitary group, experts and officials say.

A remote airstrip in southeastern Libya has reshaped Sudan’s civil war by providing a lifeline to the Rapid Support Forces paramilitary group, according to more than a dozen military, intelligence and diplomatic officials.

The paramilitary group – which grew from the “Janjaweed” militia mobilised two decades ago by Sudan’s government to subdue its western Darfur province – has been fighting the Sudanese army since April 2023 when the two fell out over how to integrate their forces.

The conflict has since killed tens of thousands of people, displaced millions and spread famine across the vast country.

Military supplies sent via the airstrip in Kufrah, about 300 km from Sudan’s border, helped the RSF revive its fortunes after the Sudanese army retook the capital Khartoum in March, the officials said. The supply route was central to the RSF’s brutal capture of the city of al-Fashir in October, which allowed the paramilitary group to consolidate its control over Darfur and preceded a series of victories in Sudan’s south.

The vast desert region of Kufrah is controlled by a Libyan military commander allied with the United Arab Emirates – a Gulf nation that U.N. experts and the U.S. Congress have accused of sponsoring the RSF. The UAE denies backing either side in Sudan’s conflict.

The airport – largely unused before this year – has undergone extensive renovation and received dozens of cargo flights since the spring, coinciding with a growing RSF presence to its south, an analysis of satellite images, flight tracking data and social media shows.

A U.N. official familiar with RSF operations, who asked not to be named, said the group’s use of Kufrah had “changed the whole game” by providing a conduit for supplies and fighters to bolster the 18-month siege of al-Fashir.

Justin Lynch, managing director of the Conflict Insights Group analysis firm, said he identified at least 105 cargo plane landings at Kufrah between April 1 and November 1 by correlating satellite images with flight tracking data. Reuters was not able to confirm his figure independently.

The “pattern, location, and aircraft” of the flights into Kufrah “correlate with UAE support to the RSF,” Lynch said. “Kufrah and southern Libya have become a significant logistics hub for the RSF.”

UAE also has economic interests in Sudan, where it had planned billions of dollars in investments in a Red Sea port and Sudanese farmland before the war. It also has ties to the RSF’s commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who sent thousands of troops to fight for the UAE in Yemen.

The UAE did not respond to requests for comment. The RSF, which has denied receiving Emirati support, also did not respond to Reuters questions.

Sudan’s army has repeatedly accused the RSF of securing military cargoes via Libya and in September submitted a complaint to the United Nations that alleged Colombian mercenaries had traveled via Kufrah to support the RSF.

The Libyan National Army, which is under the command of Khalifa Haftar, controls eastern and southern Libya where the airport is located. It has repeatedly denied backing the RSF and insisted it is not taking sides in Sudan’s conflict.

Reuters could not reach LNA leadership for comment. An LNA military official in Kufrah, who declined to be named, said the cargo flights into Kufrah had transported civilians, soldiers and police to and from other eastern Libyan airports. He denied there were RSF fighters in the area.

To determine the scale of the Kufrah operation, Reuters spoke to 18 diplomatic, military, intelligence and other officials from Western and African countries, and 14 experts on regional and military affairs.

In October, the Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. officials as saying the UAE had stepped up arms deliveries to the RSF via Libya and Somalia. The details of the airport’s role are reported here for the first time.

THE LIBYA ‘PIVOT’

Libya has been divided for years between rival factions which have both been accused of smuggling weapons, drugs and migrants. Local units of the LNA, which seized control of eastern Libya with UAE backing nearly a decade ago, have long-established trafficking ties with elements of the RSF, according to a Dec. 1 report from the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.

Shortly after Sudan’s war broke out, some LNA fighters helped move military cargo down to the border that had arrived to Kufrah by plane from Benghazi, according to a U.N. expert report. But army advances soon disrupted the route, and the airport fell back into disuse.

The RSF renewed its interest in Kufrah after political pressure last year complicated its use of a supply line through a remote airstrip in eastern Chad, significantly closer to the frontlines in Darfur, according to officials and experts.

By January, a camp about 80 kilometers south of Kufrah can already be seen forming in Copernicus satellite service images. The Centre for Information Resilience (CIR), a UK-based non-profit, said in a July report it had traced RSF vehicles and fighters at the camp to Darfur.

The RSF’s retreat from Khartoum moved the war’s center of gravity to Darfur, making the re-establishment of supply lines from Libya imperative, the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime report said.

After the RSF re-captured key border areas in June, the “Libya corridor” became “a key focal point” for RSF supply operations, according to a Western diplomatic cable sent to other Western countries in September, reviewed by Reuters.

KUFRAH’S ROLE GROWS

By May, Kufrah’s airport had already been revamped, with a new facade, fountains and lawn. Two local airlines began flights with Benghazi in June.

The number of large cargo planes on the tarmac also increased. None were visible in any of last year’s Copernicus images, available roughly every three to five days.

But in April, at least one appears in six out of seven images.

The numbers rose throughout the summer and in the weeks before al-Fashir’s fall as many as five were visible at a time.

Flight tracking data from FlightRadar24 shows at least some of the cargo flights to Kufrah were operated by airlines previously accused of involvement in trafficking weapons from the UAE.

One Ilyushin-76 with the tail number EX-76008, which flew to Kufrah from Dubai on June 5, was operated by a Kyrgyz airline, Sapsan Airlines LLC.

A May 2022 UN expert report on Libya said the airline had carried out flights “for the direct, and indirect, supply of military equipment and other assistance” as part of an airbridge to Haftar in the early 2020s.

The same plane flew to Kufrah on July 12 from Bosaso in Somalia’s Puntland region, where the UAE has trained and funded local security forces. The UAE has denied using the airport to supply the RSF.

Two Ilyushins operated by FlySky Airlines – another Kyrgyz operator accused in the U.N. report of trafficking weapons from the UAE to Haftar – have also landed in Kufrah, flight tracking data and social media posts show.

Both planes – EX-76017 and EX-76022 – had made at least a half dozen flights each from the UAE to Amdjarass, the airstrip in eastern Chad, according to a previous Reuters analysis. U.N. experts in a January 2024 report cited “credible” accusations the UAE was supplying the RSF with weapons via that runway, which Abu Dhabi denied.

FlySky did not reply to requests for comment. A Sapsan Airlines employee said by phone the airline was being shut down and directed questions to the airline’s UAE-based owner, Bu Shames FZE. Bu Shames did not reply to phone calls and emails seeking comment.

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Tim Eaton

Elite capture and shifts in economic

governance

More widely, these dynamics reflect the fact that the Libyan state is increasingly being captured by elite networks associated with a handful of leaders. It appears that some of these leaders have overseen a massive expansion of corruption that has been dubbed a ‘kleptocratic boom’.

The ever closer links between elite networks and the state have been particularly noticeable in the oil sector, where private Libyan and foreign companies alike have received significant contracts to sell oil on behalf of the Libyan state.

On the domestic side, one example is the emergence of Arkenu, a private Libyan firm believed to be controlled by vested interests connected to prominent political families, and noted by the UN Panel of Experts to be ‘indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar’.

On the international front, meanwhile, Turkish and Emirati political influence appears relevant to the growing role of BGN in Libya’s oil sector. Such developments suggest that the consolidation of commercial influence also has an international dimension.

Indeed, the nature of international engagement with Libya’s state has shifted in recent years: where once there was multilateral consensus on the need for unified and stable governance, this shared understanding has given way to competition between foreign actors over spheres of influence and access to Libyan territory and resources.

Similar dynamics are visible in other sectors. In telecommunications, a new company, O3, has emerged with close links to Libya’s rulers. In the infrastructure sector, al-Aamar Holding Company offers a further such example.

These trends appear to indicate that where the private sector is replacing public companies, it may be doing so in concert with vested interests.

In short, a predatory political economy dominates Libya’s state landscape, with a number of vested interests extracting increasingly large amounts of funds from the state for little in return.

This trend has driven an expansion of state spending, albeit one that has been masked in the official figures because two major sources of spending are absent from the CBL’s figures. The first is the massive increases in fuel subsidies, data for which were removed from the CBL’s disclosures in November 2021.

If the CBL and Libyan Audit Bureau’s own estimates of fuel subsidy expenditure are factored in, an additional US$50 billion was spent between 2022 and 2024.

The second reason for the discrepancy between official data and actual fiscal outlays is that expenditures by the eastern-based authorities, made via their own financing mechanisms, are also excluded from the CBL’s figures.

The World Bank estimates that the government debt owed by the eastern authorities totalled LYD 71 billion (approximately US$65 billion) in 2014–20. In 2023, the eastern branch of the CBL engaged in monetary financing of around LYD 7.2 billion (US$1.5 billion) in support of the GNS.

Also in 2023, capital expenditure escalated significantly through the Haftar family-controlled Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund; such spending reached LYD 59.1 billion (approximately US$12.3 billion) in 2024.

While these figures remain estimates, they provide a sense of the extent to which official figures under-report total state expenditures, indicating that in reality such expenditures may have climbed from US$18.5 billion in 2021 to an average of around US$45 billion a year in 2022–24.

In 2024, more funds appear to have been expended via the eastern authorities and fuel subsidies (LYD 154.5 billion) than outgoings reported via the CBL’s official channels (LYD 107.1 billion).

The impact of these shifts on Libya’s fiscal dynamics is striking. Based on the same calculations for expenditures as above, Libya’s true fiscal position – once off-book spending, etc. is accounted for – has moved from a surplus of around US$4.3 billion in 2021 to a deficit of over US$10.4 billion in 2024.

(This would equate to more than 22 per cent of GDP – a high, and unsustainable.) These problems are not just about unrecorded expenditure: deep concerns are also present on the revenue side. Between late 2021 and March 2025, the practice of fuel-for-crude swaps reshaped the flow of funds by removing the CBL from the financial process.

Previously, when crude oil had been sold internationally, the proceeds were routed first to the CBL and subsequently to the NOC to purchase fuel (via a budgetary process). But the scaling up of fuel swaps meant that the NOC obtained the fuel by directly swapping crude oil for it, leading to a significant reduction in revenues being transferred to the CBL.

The subsequent scaling up of fuel imports (as part of the fuel subsidy) by around 50 per cent is reported to have been connected to a surge in fuel smuggling.

The rise in public debt associated with these developments is driving inflation. Notably, the CBL has been increasing money supply via the creation of digital money that is not offset by a decrease in physical paper currency, a process described by some as reliance on ‘helicopter money’.

As a Libyan expert explains: ‘This approach effectively enables elites to erode citizens’ wealth through inflation, transferring economic costs to the public. If left unaddressed, this dynamic is likely to trigger serious social and political unrest in the future.’

Against this backdrop, the Libyan public is bearing the cost of currency devaluation. Official rates of inflation as measured by international financial institutions remain low (2.1 per cent in 2024, down from 2.4 per cent in 2023).

However, the margin between Libya’s official rates of exchange for the dinar to the US dollar and the parallel rate on the black market presents a different picture. The black market is in fact a better indicator of prices paid by Libyans for everyday goods and services, and thus a more reliable barometer of cost-of-living pressures.

A pattern in which prices have continued to rise until the CBL has intervened with devaluations and new policies. Yet, the trend remains clearly inflationary. Economists warn of a ticking time bomb over Libya’s public finances as the Libyan dinar loses its value.

Libya devalued the dinar in both 2020 (though the decision took effect in January 2021) and 2025, taking the official rate of exchange from LYD 1.22=US$1 in February 2011 to LYD 5.56=US$1 in April 2025. In the black market, a clear indicator of the true weakness of the currency, the exchange rate reached over LYD 7.5=US$1 at the time of writing, in November 2025.

***

Tim Eaton is a senior research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the political economy of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and on the political economy of the Libyan conflict in particular.

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Ali Bin Musa, Faozi Al-Goidi, and Abdalftah Hamed Ali

Libya has been in the grip of armed conflicts that have led to the collapse of state institutions and the fragmentation of central authorities among multiple, externally supported actors.

Over the past decade, international efforts have proven insufficient, on their own, to resolve these protracted conflicts and achieve comprehensive peace in these countries.

This has brought to the fore local mediation mechanisms, which show potential as key ways to manage and resolve domestic conflicts at the grassroots level.

In environments characterized by protracted conflict, the proliferation of armed forces, and the fragmentation of the ruling system, local mediation can complement or provide an effective alternative to international and national efforts, which often find it hard to address the root causes of conflict in a way acceptable to all sides.

In Libya, local mediation in the form of reconciliation committees has in many cases helped prevent armed clashes from escalating, as well as helping reopen roads between cities and regions, and mediating the exchange of bodies, prisoners, and detainees.

The work of these committees has often come as a complement to existing truces, which are mainly established between the leaders of armed militias and military units. Yet although their achievements may seem small, their impact in terms of alleviating suffering and saving lives is significant within the context of Libya’s long-running political impasse.

Local mediation differs from international efforts in several ways. The former relies on actors from within the conflict-affected community, drawing on local customs and values. Agreements are often verbal, underpinned by customary traditions, and aimed at containing escalation or restoring the situation to the status quo prior to the conflict.

International mediation, on the other hand, depends on a foreign third party, is often limited to a specific timeframe, and seeks technical solutions derived from diplomacy and international law or norms. This often attracts suspicion from local parties to the conflict, or from their competing external backers, lest their interests be threatened.

The process of mediation starts when the conflicting parties come together, or the mediator enters talks with each party separately. This stage involves each party listening to the others’ narratives and establishing the facts. This leads to the proposal of compromise solutions such as the payment of compensation and damages in cases of killing, establishing pathways for care, or temporarily halting the fighting until national law can resolve the conflict.

The agreement is usually announced to the community, and sometimes written down, making it binding on all parties. Local administrations or committees then monitor implementation and impose fines on those who violate the agreement.

This makes such a mechanism effective, in the short term, in reducing violence or mitigating its humanitarian impact. However, the absence of an institutional framework to protect these solutions leaves them in a fragile state when the balance of power shifts and the conflict expands. This means it is essential to consider ways to integrate them into broader national and regional peace processes.

The paper argues that when the state weakens, local solutions based on customary, tribal, and religious mediation mechanisms step in to fill the void created by the absence or weakness of a central authority. Through our analysis, we aim to draw practical lessons for policymakers on how to support, activate, and ensure the sustainability of local mediation, alongside formal conflict resolution processes.

Diverse Mediation Mechanisms

Between East and West

Following the fall of Moammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, Libya descended into a maelstrom of armed conflict. While the international community focused on formulating a plan for a political transition and national elections, local mediation efforts flourished on the ground, going some way to reining in the country’s descent into total chaos.

As security institutions collapsed, many communities were forced to rely on tribal customs and local reconciliation committees to settle disputes and provide some semblance of security within the community. Libya has a long history of tribal traditions for resolving disputes, especially in rural areas.

These include the practices of al-mīʿād and jabr al-khawāṭir, which involve tribal elders meeting to settle disputes and promote harmony in the event of a community-level conflict over a certain issue. After 2011, new entities such as municipal councils and civil society organizations emerged and came to mediate in such conflicts.

Between 2011 and 2018, at least eight reconciliation agreements were concluded between local Libyan groups linked to various armed militias from various Libyan regions and cities and with differing objectives and loyalties. 

One of the most prominent such agreements was the Misrata-Tawergha Agreement (2016–2018), which led to the return of thousands of displaced Tawergha residents to their city after seven years of forced displacement.

A senior UN official remarked that “Local mediation is the best thing that has happened in Libya since the revolution.” Similarly, mediation efforts led by tribal councils in the southern region of Sabha resulted in a peace agreement between armed groups from the Tebu and Tuareg communities in 2015 after repeated bouts of armed violence.

While successive governments have failed to unify and rebuild Libya’s security institutions, such grassroots reconciliation efforts have played a crucial role in containing localized conflicts and preventing them from escalating. That said, their impact has often remained limited, and their success has varied across both space and time due to the absence of a unifying national framework.

A Mix of Traditional and Modern Actors

Local mediation in Libya is organized at the group level, often through “reconciliation committees” comprising tribal elders and sheikhs, religious figures, local council members, and civil society activists. These bodies are typically formed in response to armed clashes, whether on a large scale or within a certain locality.

They often include real or nominal representatives of the conflicting parties, along with “neutral” figures and dignitaries not affiliated with any side.

A string of ceasefire agreements in western Libya in 2014-2015—between the Misrata and Warshafana militias; Misrata and Zintan; Zintan and Gharyan; Zuwara and Zawiya; as well as neighboring towns in the Nafusa Mountains—serve as pertinent examples of the role of mediation committees in containing conflict and de-escalating tensions in western Libya.

In most of these cases, the truces were supported by confidence-building measures, as stipulated in the peace agreements signed by committees representing the belligerents. These measures typically included a ceasefire, prisoner exchanges, the withdrawal of armed forces from contact zones, the reopening of closed roads, compensation for victims and the return of displaced persons, among other things.

This approach made a notable contribution to installing a general state of peace in western Libya which paved the way for the signing of the Libya-wide peace deal known as the Skhirat Agreement, in December 2015.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) later played a bigger role in supporting these local mediation efforts. From 2015 onwards, it began to rely partially on local mediators in its own efforts, providing them with technical expertise or even accompanying them with observers on national reconciliation committees, to give the latter international momentum.

Another important mechanism in Libya is that of the tribal social councils, which were resurrected in certain cities and regions after the 2011 uprising. For example, the Warfalla Tribal Social Council managed the affairs of the city of Bani Walid with a fair degree of independence from the main power centers of eastern and western Libya, helping to resolve conflicts between armed groups in the city through the historical legacy of local and tribal customs. 

In summary, local mediation mechanisms in Libya have evolved from traditional meetings in private living rooms into national reconciliation conferences sponsored by the government and the international community, mainly seeking to prevent local disputes from escalating or spreading.

Challenges and Lessons Learned

The successes of local mediation efforts in Libya have several key characteristics and offer important lessons that can be built upon.

Firstly, cultural and social legitimacy is a vital key to success. Besides adding national ownership to peacebuilding, it also gives mediators a form of influence that international institutions cannot provide.

Secondly, experience has shown that the tactical flexibility of local mediation allows it to contain escalation quickly, even if these solutions are temporary and partial.

Thirdly, while it is clear that local mediation cannot replace the state and its institutions in addressing the root causes of conflicts or putting in place a sustainable peace, it is nonetheless a key piece of the puzzle, one that complements national and international processes.

Finally, the contribution of women and civil society, even if limited, has increased the effectiveness of mediation and given it wider legitimacy by bridging the gap between traditional structures and new actors.

In short, despite its fragility, local mediation has shown its value and made a tangible difference in people’s lives, representing an indispensable building block in any comprehensive peace process.

These modest successes notwithstanding, local mediation mechanisms face challenges and obstacles stemming from the broader conflict environment, and lack the tools to ensure that their achievements are sustainable and become integrated into broader, national processes.

The first challenge is the lack of financial and logistical resources. Local mediators—whether tribal elders, community leaders, or civil society activists—operate in impoverished environments and often lack institutional support. They frequently embark on mediation efforts with their limited personal resources, making them hostage to local circumstances and unable to expand or sustain these efforts for extended periods.

This vulnerability leaves mediators susceptible to burnout and a loss of capacity to follow through, especially when dealing with agreements that require long-term monitoring and implementation.

The second challenge lies in the direct security threats mediators face. In Libya, armed groups often view local mediators as obstacles to expanding their own military and economic interests, and have resorted to intimidating them. As a consequence, this dangerous environment undermines public trust in the process itself, as people fear engaging in a process that could lead to personal repercussions. Political interference presents a third, equally serious challenge.

The absence of guarantees is a fourth challenge that threatens many locally mediated agreements with collapse. Accords brokered through local efforts are often verbal or undocumented, relying more on trust and moral commitment than on institutional, executive, or judicial mechanisms.

In Libya, too, many ceasefires have disintegrated in cases of significant imbalances of power between the warring parties; in Sudan, local ceasefire agreements are frequently violated due to the ongoing war.

Conclusion

Local mediation efforts in Libya reveal that such tools are not merely a traditional mechanism for resolving minor conflicts, but a vital tool that has kept community life going during moments of complete state collapse.

These processes have achieved tangible breakthroughs in protecting civilians, opening roads, negotiating prisoner exchanges, and ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, they have notable limitations, namely their inability to address the root causes of conflict or to ensure the sustainability of agreements in the face of the whims of major political and military powers.

These findings highlight the need for a new approach that sees local mediation as an essential component of peacebuilding, not merely a temporary solution to crises. No national or international agreement can succeed unless it is rooted in legitimacy with the local community and the latter’s own mechanisms for conflict resolution.

Furthermore, ignoring these mediation mechanisms means leaving vast areas of conflict unmanaged, inevitably leading to a resurgence of violence later on.

Based on these findings, we recommend that international and regional organizations provide sustained financial and technical support to local mediators, including training in negotiation skills and protection mechanisms, without attempting to impose external control over them.

Local agreements should be formally recognized and integrated into national political processes, transforming them from ad hoc achievements into the building blocks of a comprehensive peace process.

It is also essential that local mediators are provided with effective protection, through international and regional monitoring mechanisms that prevent them from being targeted or blackmailed by armed groups.

There is also a need for stronger partnerships between civil society and traditional structures, creating bridges between modern and historical legitimacy.

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Sharp disputes over the management of the central bank in 2024 and 2025 further undermined confidence in the banking system.

Libya’s central bank governor has urged the head of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity Abdulhamid Dbeibah to intervene immediately to regulate imports, warning that continued loopholes allowing foreign trade to be financed outside the formal banking system could expose the country to international financial isolation.

In a series of letters, widely leaked to Libyan media, Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Governor Naji Issa said the bank was unable to conduct effective monetary policy while a large share of the money supply, in both dinars and foreign currency, continued to circulate beyond official channels.

Issa linked his call to mounting risks to financial and security stability, chief among them what he described as “non-bank-financed imports.” Such trade relies entirely on purchasing foreign currency from the parallel market, driving up demand for hard currency and pushing down the value of the dinar.

He also warned of what he called “diversion” in the use of foreign currency allocated for personal purposes, or leakages from opened letters of credit, with funds recycled to finance a parallel trade that undermines the wider economy.

“The situation is catastrophic,” Issa said in the letters, cautioning that Libya would lose control over its foreign currency resources and be unable to protect citizens’ purchasing power unless all import channels were unified under the banking sector.

Most serious, he warned, was the risk of an international financial clampdown. Global watchdogs, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), closely monitor cross-border financial flows, he said.

If the current disorder persists, Issa warned, correspondent banks abroad could sever ties with Libyan banks, plunging the country into financial isolation and leaving it unable to import even basic foodstuffs and medicines.

Libya, he said, now stands at a crossroads: either entrench financial chaos and collide with international sanctions and economic collapse, or comply with the central bank’s rules enforcing transparency and good governance.

The governor described Libya’s financial system as suffering from a destructive duality, with the shadow economy expanding at the expense of the formal sector. Misuse of personal foreign currency allocations, such as the annual $4,000 allowance or welfare-linked cards, has, he said, turned from a means of helping citizens into an illicit supply channel, with currencies pooled and sold to traders to finance goods entering the country without oversight.

Leakages from letters of credit mean funds officially released to import specific goods are instead diverted to parallel deals or retained abroad as private balances, draining the public purse of foreign currency with little economic return.

Libya’s financial crisis, Issa argued, is structural rather than purely resource-driven, rooted in a complex overlap of politics, economics and security. Rival governments have fragmented monetary policy and prevented the adoption of a unified state budget, creating what he described as “fiscal dominance,” with institutions facing competing spending pressures.

Sharp disputes over the management of the central bank in 2024 and 2025 further undermined confidence in the banking system and its ability to implement effective monetary policy, he said.

As a result, many Libyans and businesses prefer to hold cash outside banks, fearing they will be unable to withdraw funds later, deepening liquidity shortages within the formal banking system.

In the leaked correspondence, Issa instructed the prime minister, the Internal Security Agency, the interior ministry and the Municipal Guards Authority to shut down unlicensed foreign exchange offices operating without permits. He also urged the prime minister to direct the economy ministry to issue a decree banning imports and exports except through banking transactions.

The central bank reiterated calls for “genuine economic reforms” aimed at improving living standards, including measures to strengthen the dinar, ensure cash availability, curb inflation and lower prices.

It warned of a sharp rise in the activities of unlicensed black-market operators, citing uncontrolled domestic and cross-border fund transfers and the financing of illegal activities in violation of commercial regulations and anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing laws.

The warnings come against a fragile backdrop. Global oil prices have fallen to around $55 a barrel, hitting Libya’s main source of revenue. Last week, the dinar briefly slid to 8.40 to the dollar on the parallel market, intensifying price pressures, while cash shortages persist at banks.

Issa had pledged in August that the dinar would strengthen to below seven to the dollar on the black market and that the cash crisis would end by October. Neither target has been met.

His latest moves form part of a broader push by the central bank to reform Libya’s economic, monetary and financial system, curb money laundering and tax evasion, reduce reliance on the dollar in the parallel market, stabilise prices and shore up the dinar.

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Tim Eaton

II – Economic drivers of conflict,

past, present and future

Libya’s centralized economic model and huge public sector – both Gaddafi-era relics – create fiscal vulnerabilities, incentivize state capture and corruption by elites, and greatly complicate prospects for economic governance reform.

Libya’s economic reform challenges reflect its curious combination of centralized state power and fragmented on-the-ground governance.

In de jure terms, the economy is by design highly centralized in key respects – partly a legacy of Gaddafi-era top–down control. But in a practical, operational sense, cohesive policymaking is often impossible because of the current administrative split between competing power centres in the west and east of the country, a problem epitomized by the lack of a unified national government.

Control of the state in Libya implies control of economic resources. Many Libyan experts have argued that this dynamic is inherently unhealthy, and that competition over resources and rents is a structural driver of conflict.

Certainly, economic drivers of conflict in Libya are intertwined with conflicts over state authority, as different social constituencies and political factions vie for control of public institutions. This has implications both for the day-to-day management of the state and its resources and for the structural underpinnings of the state, making it impossible to address problems in one area without reforms in the other.

The period since the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi has featured a complex bargaining process among Libya’s social constituencies over control of the state. The lack of formal, organized representations for these constituencies means that these diverse interest groups are represented largely by informal social networks encompassing neighbourhood-, town- and city-based identities, tribal and familial loyalties, and religious, political and ethnic identities.

Given the fragmented nature of this social fabric, the contest for power and access to economic rents has resulted in the division of the state (and of control of its institutions and resources) among multiple actors. The dominant logic of this trend – explicitly reinforced by internationally supported efforts to secure political consensus – has been predicated on power-sharing.

Libya’s post-2011 power-sharing system initially included a wider array of elite interests than are influential today. However, since 2021 – following the consolidation by Khalifa Haftar of control in eastern Libya and the appointment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli – this circle of elites has narrowed.

People in positions of authority have become increasingly distant from the social constituencies they claim to represent, as elite consolidation has accelerated.

This pattern has corresponded with a reduction in the delivery of public goods by the state, as governance and public sector performance have been undermined by corruption, a lack of capacity, internal disputes and inefficiency.

State largesse has remained visible in persistent public sector salary increases, However, the salary bill is divided among an increasing number of state employees on modest salaries, while other channels of spending show lavish payments to supporters of well-connected elite interests.

(In just one example, videos emerged on social media in September 2025 depicting a games lounge kitted out with luxury computer gaming stations and a café for members of the state-affiliated 111 Brigade, which is closely aligned with the GNU in Tripoli.) The result is that reported spending of the state budget (salaries) and (operating expenses, including state officials’ salaries and other procurements) has grown from 11 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 34 per cent of GDP in 2024.

Economic and political marginalization – real and perceived – has played a potent role in Libya’s conflict and continues to present significant questions about the future of the Libyan state with regard to the locus of authority between the country’s western and eastern regions.

Groups that clearly have been marginalized – such as the Tebu and Tuareg communities, based predominantly in the country’s south – have fought to improve their status, but have had relatively little impact over national-level governance. Yet, in recent years such problems have become increasingly subordinate to the governance challenges associated with state capture.

The state as a resource

Libya’s economy is dominated by the state at all levels. To the extent that hyper-centralized, Gaddafi-era structures remain in place, economic governance has, formally at least, changed little since 2011. Gaddafi’s regime had accelerated ‘Libyanization’ reforms – whereby internationally owned commercial enterprises were nationalized by the state – following his ascent to power in 1969.

This resulted in all oil companies and banks being under state ownership by the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s, the regime went further as political institutions were reformed to deliver ‘direct democracy’.

In the economic realm this translated into the partial abolition of the private sector in favour of state-run enterprises, and in the nationalization of most remaining foreign-owned companies and assets. This state dominance created a complex web of committees, agencies and monopolies.

If anything, the situation has become even more complicated in the post-2011 period, as more institutions have been formed while existing institutions have remained in place.

This legacy means that state institutions and state-owned enterprises effectively have dominion over the sectors in which they operate. For example, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) not only is responsible for monetary policy and financial regulation, but also has ownership stakes across most of the banking sector.

Consequently, the CBL has over the last 10 years been able to influence appointments at commercial banks which the CBL owns. In the post-2011 period, a number of CBL employees accepted board roles at these commercial banks, creating potential conflicts of interest.

Moreover, the CBL maintains a monopoly on the distribution of foreign currency and must authorize all documentary letters of credit for the import of goods. These extensive powers place the CBL in a dominant position in the banking sector.

The situation is mirrored elsewhere in the state system, notably in relation to the National Oil Corporation (NOC). The NOC owns 15 subsidiaries and is part owner of nine joint ventures. International companies operating in the Libyan oil sector can only hold minority shares in these joint ventures.

The dominance of state institutions and state-owned enterprises leaves little room for development of the private sector based on fair competition. Indeed, the principal customer of Libya’s private sector is very often the state itself, rendering private companies reliant on cultivating relationships with state entities and officials.

Private companies operate as contractors to the state in areas ranging from construction to catering to oil services. In recent years, companies associated with armed groups have expanded in these areas. Because state institutions are the customers, control of these institutions in turn assures control over the distribution of contracts. Private companies also complain that state-owned enterprises enjoy market-distorting advantages.

In some instances, procurement rules explicitly stipulate that state-owned entities should be given preferential treatment. State-owned enterprises are also often shielded from considerations of profit and loss, meaning that works can be subcontracted to the private sector at inflated prices, sustaining corrupt practices.

These factors have facilitated the expansion of patronage networks and the rise of vested interests. Officials in control of state institutions are often able to use their positions to sign contracts with companies in which they may hold a beneficial interest.

Where this happens, the state entity loses money and the official gains private profits. This pattern has become particularly notable in sectors such as healthcare, where procurement is strongly impacted.

***

Tim Eaton is a senior research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the political economy of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and on the political economy of the Libyan conflict in particular.

________________

By Frank Talbot

When Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in December 2024, many analysts predicted that Russia was on the verge of losing the military infrastructure it had built up over the past decade.

Moscow’s access to the strategically important Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval facility appeared uncertain as new Syrian authorities reassessed foreign relations. Media reports told of Russia facing new restrictions and renegotiations with the new Syrian authorities that limited its freedom of movement.  

This raised concerns among Western policymakers that Russia might shift its regional posture to Libya if its foothold in Syria unraveled, given Russia’s existing relationship with the Libyan National Army (LNA). 

Moscow has cultivated ties with LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar for nearly a decade to secure access to eastern Libyan territory and military infrastructure, turning Libya into a logistical hub for Russia to project power deep into Africa. 

One year later, Russia’s situation in Syria appears better than many expected in the early post-Assad days. Russia has preserved a reduced but durable presence in Syria. High-level engagements between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa reaffirmed Moscow’s role in the country, and al-Sharaa publicly committed to honoring preexisting military agreements.

The result is a more constrained footprint, but not one that represents a strategic loss. 

While its plan B in Libya proved unnecessary, Russia nevertheless has spent the past year building up its logistical network in eastern and southern Libya.

Serving as a transit hub, Libyan airbases give Russia the ability to reach deep into the African continent, where it seeds for instability with arms shipments and members of its Africa Corps—a Russian defense ministry-controlled paramilitary group and successor to the Wagner Group.

Why southern Libya became Russia’s new strategic platform

By late 2024, before its future in post-Assad Syria was determined, Russia was actively searching for alternatives for strategic relationships in the Middle East and North Africa.

Flights from Syria to eastern Libya, movements of personnel and equipment, and diplomatic visits by Russian officials to eastern Libya were being reported, as concerns about Russia establishing a naval port in eastern Libya grew among Western leaders.

A year later, Russia still has not secured a port in the southern Mediterranean, likely because Libya’s eastern authorities are unwilling to jeopardize improving ties with the United States, Turkey, and European partners by granting Moscow a major coastal facility. 

Instead, Russia expanded inland in Libya. The Maaten al-Sarra airbase provides a key example.

This strategically located airbase near the borders with Chad and Sudan is a staging point for Russia’s destabilizing operations across the Sahel. It predates the Assad regime’s collapse and is reportedly financed by the United Arab Emirates. But beginning in December 2024, Russian equipment, personnel, and Syrian fighters tied to the Assad regime began arriving at the desert airbase 

Although Maaten al-Sarra is a key location in Russia’s southern Libya presence, Moscow uses multiple airfields as part of its transit corridor to the Sahel. These include the al-Khadim base in eastern Libya, the al-Jufra base in central Libya, the Brak al-Shati base near Sabha, and the al-Qardabiya base south of Sirte.

Together, these dispersed locations form a resilient transit network connecting Russia’s foothold in Syria to its growing activities in the Sahel, increasing Russia’s ability to sustain Africa Corps deployments and arms supplies to its African partners. 

The inland network faces less international scrutiny, requires fewer political concessions from Libyan authorities, and gives Moscow access to remote corridors that support long-range logistical movements.

Countering Russia’s gains in Libya  

Russia’s increased presence in Libya over the past year hasn’t gone entirely unchecked. The United States and its key international partners have sought to counter Russian activities and influence. 

This has primarily been through a strategy to accelerate military unification between eastern and western Libya, with promises of security cooperation and training. LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar has been the main focus of these efforts to untangle the LNA from Russia’s hold.  

In February, the United States sent two B-52H Stratofortress aircraft into Libyan airspace as part of a joint training with Libyan military tactical air controllers. In April, the US Navy conducted its first port call to Libya in over fifty years with stops in Tripoli and Benghazi.

That same month, Ankara hosted a visit by LNA’s Saddam Hafter, and in August, the Turkish Navy conducted port calls to both Tripoli and Benghazi as well. On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly this September, the United States hosted a senior officials meeting on Libya.

Participants included representatives from Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The importance of Libyan east-west security integration was highlighted, as was the importance of modifying the UN arms embargo in January 2025, which enables joint training and technical assistance in support of east-west integration. 

In October, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. John Brennan announced that Libya will participate and co-host part of the US military’s annual Flintlock exercise in the spring of 2026. Brennan commented that “this exercise isn’t just about military training; it’s about overcoming divisions, building capacity, and supporting Libya’s sovereign right to determine its own future.” 

During the first week of December, AFRICOM Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson met in Tripoli with Deputy Minister of Defense Abdulsalam Zubi and Chief of Staff Gen. Mohamed al-Haddad, as well as with Haftar and his son Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar in Benghazi. These discussions focused on maintaining regional stability, supporting Libyan efforts to unify military institutions, and US-Libya security cooperation, including Flintlock 26.

While these efforts by the United States and its partners have likely nudged along east-west military integration in Libya, it remains unclear if the strategy has done much to counter Russian activities or separate Russia and LNA leadership. Incentives, such as legitimacy and security cooperation, may be insufficient when used alone to try to pull the LNA away from Russia’s orbit. Economic sticks, such as targeted sanctions, may be required too.  

Eliminating or greatly diminishing Russia’s use of Libya as a transit hub for its arms shipments and for personnel to flow into the Sahel would be a significant step toward promoting stability and ending conflicts on the continent. This would advance US President Donald Trump’s peacebuilding priorities, pushed forward over the past year by Senior Advisor Massad Boulos. 

One year after the fall of Assad, Russia’s most important bases in the region may not be Khmeimim Air Base or the Tartus naval facility in Syria, but instead a handful of small air bases scattered across Libya. This represents a key front in Washington and its partners’ efforts to counter Russia. 

***

Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East programs. Previously, he served in the Department of State supporting stabilization initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.

__________________

Tim Eaton

I- Introduction

Libya’s conflict and its intersection with economic governance

Negotiations to resolve Libya’s political and security crisis, and to end the disruptive co-existence of parallel governments, have largely separated political issues from economic ones. That approach is not working.

Libya’s ongoing political and security crisis is exacerbating – and exacerbated by – weak economic governance. A stable peace remains elusive. Following the civil war in 2011, two further outbreaks of nationwide violence occurred in 2014 and 2019, while concentrated local fighting took place in Benghazi between 2013 and 2019.

A number of local conflicts have also continued sporadically. Although a nationwide ceasefire has been in place since October 2020, and a unified government – the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) – was appointed in March 2021, attempts to hold national elections in December 2021 fell through. 

Libya’s governance split re-emerged in February 2022 when a new, rival entity – the Government of National Stability (GNS) – was set up in Benghazi. As such, Libya’s conflict cannot be said to have been resolved.

The result is that Libya remains in a state of ‘no war, no peace’, with a fragile status quo supported by a fundamentally flawed system of mediation among an increasingly limited set of elites. Real power increasingly resides with these elites rather than with institutions of the state, whose legitimacy and effectiveness are undermined by (among other factors) the division of administrative powers between the west and east of the country.

In this context, describing Libya as in a state of conflict remains apt, even if large-scale armed violence is not currently taking place. The fact that no formal agreement underpins the country’s political governance was illustrated in May 2025, when the killing in Tripoli of Abdelghani al-Kikli – a prominent armed group commander known popularly as ‘Ghneiwa’ – triggered a violent reordering of the capital’s security sector. The fallout from the killing heightened tensions between the GNU and the Special Deterrence Forces (known locally as ‘al-Radaa’), and drew in forces from outside Tripoli, threatening to drive an expansion of conflict.

The essential feature of the incident was that both armed groups involved in the dispute were affiliated in one way or another with the state – which in effect was thus fighting itself.

At the forefront of mediating the Libyan conflict has been the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), particularly following the breakdown of Libya’s post-Gaddafi political transition in 2014. UNSMIL’s mandate requires it not only to mediate among rival parties via an inclusive political process, but also to support the provision of humanitarian aid and public services.

This means that UNSMIL is simultaneously tasked with brokering a sustainable settlement among rival parties and supporting day-to-day governance. At times, these responsibilities conflict with each other: on the one hand, UNSMIL is engaging with competing political actors in a way that challenges their hold on state power; on the other, it is responsible for supporting their administration of the state.

This duality runs through debates over what could and should be done in the UNSMIL-led political process. A similar conflict between short-term imperatives and structural reform is reflected in the challenges of economic governance.

How short- and long-term imperatives collide

At the heart of the economic governance debate is the question of whether a so-called ‘economic track’ in negotiations between Libya’s factions should (a) principally serve efforts to reach a formal political settlement, (b) should address management of the economy on an ongoing basis, or (c) ideally combine the two.

Consequently, while there is a broad consensus among Libyan experts and international policymakers that structural failings in economic governance in Libya contribute to ongoing conflict, opinions diverge on how best to address this issue.

It is no surprise, therefore, that the policy approaches adopted to date have been in tension with one another.

International mediation has largely focused on resolving immediate security crises or settling disputes among rival factions, with the primary objective of achieving sufficient consensus to facilitate the restoration of unified government. This type of approach assumes, in effect, that political stabilization necessarily precedes economic governance reforms, and that implementation of the latter must therefore be left to a future government.

However, crisis-driven interventions have often been poorly aligned with broader international assistance aimed at supporting development programming and state-building. For instance, significant international support has been provided for reconstruction and development in Libya, yet development spending through formal state processes has remained in gridlock since 2011.

Similar outcomes have been observed in other countries and contexts, where elites have effectively ‘bought the peace’ by capturing foreign aid and development assistance, resulting in a deterioration in state capacity as a result.

Conversely, many Libyan experts have argued instead that reform of economic governance must be a key element of any political settlement – and built into negotiations from the outset – to prevent a relapse into conflict.

They contend that any political agreement that leaves the current economic governance system intact will simply enable the ‘victors’ in a post-conflict settlement to distribute resources through patron–client networks, perpetuating instability and economic decline.

While this logic is widely held to be sound in principle, many policymakers still consider integration of an economic track into political negotiations to be unrealistic. As such, the need for pragmatism often leads to more limited approaches – the argument being that no critical mass of Libyans exists to call for systemic economic reform in the face of elite intransigence. The author’s discussions with Western policymakers underline the prevalence of this thinking.

The above differences in perspectives have created a significant gap in understanding of the economic track and its potential scope, and this presents a policy dilemma: on the one hand, striking limited economic deals among elites to achieve short-term economic and political progress risks further undermining the administration of the state and weakening its institutions, thereby limiting accountability and transparency; on the other, if discussions around ambitious reforms that could entirely restructure the state take place purely among technocrats – without sufficient regard for the agendas and capacities of those wielding political and military power, and without adequate public buy-in – there is little chance of the status quo changing.

About this paper

In response to the reform dilemmas outlined above, this paper makes the case for an enhanced, internationally mediated ‘economic track’ within political negotiations on stabilizing Libya.

The paper draws together the findings of a three-year, UK government-funded project that has sought to identify and address drivers of conflict as they manifest in the economic and financial institutions of the Libyan state. As part of these efforts, Chatham House has sought to identify means of strengthening accountability and transparency in the management of Libyan resources, including via internationally mediated processes.

The project has sought to understand how Libyan policymakers can improve state performance despite ongoing political disputes among rival authorities; the project has also explored how the state could better expose and clamp down on corruption in relation to the management of financial and physical resources.

The paper seeks to draw these themes together by presenting a series of options that Libyan and international policymakers can consider in order to achieve both objectives.

The paper reflects conversations with Libyan and international experts over a number of years.

It builds on a body of work, published by the author, that has assessed the nature of Libya’s conflict economy, how state institutions have found themselves at the heart of conflict, how networks of elites have sought to control institutions, and how armed groups have controlled economic and financial interests.

***

Tim Eaton is a senior research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the political economy of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and on the political economy of the Libyan conflict in particular.

________________

Hafed Al-Ghwell

Libya’s woes are often described in terms of armed factions, oil, kleptocracy, and the collapse of governance. Yet one of the country’s deepest fractures is not the lost barrels of crude or warring brigades. It is measured in the bodies of women. Libya has, in effect, waged a quiet but devastating war on women, characterized by unchecked killings, the normalization of abuse, and institutions hollowed out to the point where protection is more fiction than function.

To understand why women in the country bear the brunt of the slow-motion collapse of the state, one must begin with an understanding of the basic structure of Libyan governance. Or, more accurately, its absence.

Two rival governments, both of which claim legitimacy while neither offers any real security, have created a vacuum in which affiliated armed groups rule by force rather than law. With militias embedded within ministries, the “police” compromised, and the courts incapable of enforcing rulings, impunity is woven into the fabric of everyday life.

It is within this context that femicide and gender-based violence have flourished. The data, though incomplete, points to a chronic and escalating crisis. Within a week of a recent UN campaign on violence against women there were three high-profile murders in Libya: a social media influencer shot in her car, a doctor killed by relatives, and the body of an unidentified woman dumped outside Tripoli.

Worse yet, many cases never become public knowledge because most killings happen at home, often committed by husbands linked to armed groups or carrying trauma from years of conflict. Such violence is not confined to domestic spaces, however. Migrants, Christian minorities, and other vulnerable groups face conditions that amount to blatant predation.

More than 14,000 migrants were intercepted and returned to Libya in mid-2025 alone, over a thousand women among them. They were detained in facilities run by militias or traffickers masquerading as state agents. Reports regularly document the systemic abuse, torture, and exploitation that happens in those detention facilities.

Even the recent rescue of 11 kidnapped migrant women by military units reveals an uncomfortable reality: When the same actors responsible for enforcing “security” are sometimes complicit in abuses, safety becomes a lottery.

Another underlying ill is the endurance of a social contract that treats the autonomy of women as negotiable. The legal framework in Libya still fails to criminalize domestic violence, spousal abuse, or sexual harassment.

Even the act of reporting gender-based violence risks prosecution for victims. A draft law recognizing all forms of violence against women has been in limbo since 2023. And a ban on the word “gender” in official policies reflects a political culture that treats equality as a threat, rather than a constitutional commitment.

Libyan society finds itself in a strange “protector-perpetrator” paradox. Basically, social norms in the country task male guardians with safeguarding women. In practice, however, the men who are supposed to provide the protection are often those who inflict the most harm.

Throughout Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha, for example, women are forced to rely on male guardians for mobility, financial security, and social legitimacy. This dependency creates conditions in which control easily mutates into abuse — or worse. Many women describe such enforced guardianship as a trap: a system in which protection is conditional on obedience, and disobedience invites punishment. 

The political economy of violence worsens the situation. Armed groups, flush with state funds through networks of patronage, wield both resources and the power of coercion. Some women even marry militia members simply to avoid harassment at checkpoints, a survival strategy that paradoxically places them at even higher risk of violence, at home.

The paralysis of governance in Libya has amplified ideological policing. In the east of the country, authorities endorse gender segregation and restrictions on the mobility of women. In the west, morality policing has resulted in the arrest of women on vague charges such as hosting “mixed gatherings.”
The retreat of the state has allowed other actors, both official and unofficial, to selectively impose draconian norms, heightening the pressure on women to self-censor and completely withdraw from public life.

Online violence has surged as well, turning social media into yet another arena of intimidation; election monitors documented an 89 percent increase in such attacks on women this year.

In such a climate, political participation becomes an act of personal risk. High-profile assassinations — such as those of rights activists Salwa Bugaighis in 2014, Hanan Al-Barassi in 2020, among others — have had a chilling effect. Each killing sends the same message: women who speak out are fair game.

But the consequences extend beyond individual tragedy: Libya’s war on women corrodes state-building as well. The exclusion of women from public life reduces political competition, stunts civic debate, and removes essential actors from critical peace processes.

Decades of research into post-conflict governance have shown that states with higher levels of gender inclusion are more stable, more democratic, and less prone to relapse into violence.
Libya, in contrast, has reversed even the limited gains it made after 2011. In effect, the women who helped ignite the revolution now find themselves pushed to the margins of the very system they hoped to reshape.

There is also an economic cost. When half of a country’s population is constrained by fear, harassment or mobility restrictions, productivity drops, labor markets contract, and household vulnerabilities deepen.
Moreover, Libya’s stalled diversification efforts, a youth unemployment crisis, and its shrinking civic space are all linked to this degradation of women’s rights.

A society that fails to criminalize, or even merely tolerates, violence against women is a society that burns its own social capital. This is precisely why the treatment of women should not be relegated to the periphery, it should be a diagnostic tool — a litmus test for whether Libya can sustainably rebuild itself.
After all, a country that cannot protect women cannot stabilize. A state that allows militias to terrorize women cannot govern. And a political class that refuses to enact basic protections for women cannot claim legitimacy.

Libya needs functioning institutions that are capable of enforcing the law, not simply mimicking it. It needs courts that treat violence against women as a crime, not a family matter. It needs a political compact that commits to equality, not as a concession to foreign patrons but as the foundation for a stable state.

Most importantly, it needs to reimagine the very idea of protection, shifting from a guardian-centric model to a citizenship-based system in which rights are inherent, not negotiated.
Libya’s war on women is, ultimately, a war on its own future. No road map for elections, ceasefire agreement or constitutional committee will succeed if half of the population remains confined, silenced, or brutalized.

The ultimate measure of Libya’s reemergence will be whether women can drive without fear, speak without threats, and live without bargaining for protection. Until then, Libya remains a country fighting the wrong battles — and losing the most important one.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center in Washington and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies.

_______________________

Libya Geopolitical Analysis 2025

Libya enters 2025 as a profoundly fragmented polity, where persistent divisions between the western Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the eastern Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) under Khalifa Haftar perpetuate instability and undermine state-building efforts. This report examines the country’s geopolitical positioning, economic vulnerabilities, civil society dynamics, military capacities, and external relations, drawing on real-time verification of primary sources from international institutions and think tanks. The analysis integrates insights from the attached monitoring document on hybrid migration systems, which highlights how political fragmentation sustains illicit economies like human smuggling, while expanding the scope to encompass broader structural factors. Methodology employs rigorous open-source intelligence protocols, cross-verifying quantitative claims with at least two independent sources from permitted domains, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, alongside qualitative assessments from Chatham House and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). All data reflect conditions as of December 2025, with hyperlinks resolved live to exact documents.

Politically, Libya’s bifurcation traces to the 2011 revolution’s aftermath, exacerbated by the failed 2014–2020 civil wars. The GNU, led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, controls western regions but grapples with internal rivalries, as evidenced by the August 2024 Central Bank of Libya (CBL) crisis that disrupted oil revenue distribution and fiscal oversight. This event, stemming from the dismissal of governor Sadiq al-Kabir, led to a power struggle that weakened patronage networks essential for coalition maintenance. In the east, the LAAF has consolidated a personalized system around the Haftar family, with civilian entities like the Government of National Stability (GNS) serving primarily as patronage vehicles. Fragmentation manifests in localized conflicts, such as the September 2024 assassination of Abd al-Rahman Milad (al-Bija), a sanctioned coast guard commander in Zawiya, which created a power vacuum and intensified rivalries between armed groups like the Busriba network and Mohammed Bahroun‘s forces. These dynamics, detailed in How migrant smuggling has fuelled conflict in Libya – Chatham House – February 2025, illustrate two feedback loops: authority disputes fueling violence, and economic reliance on illicit cross-border activities entrenching armed actors. In Kufra and Sebha, ethnic tensions between Arab Zway and Tebu communities further fragment governance, with armed groups leveraging smuggling for financial and political capital. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has facilitated dialogue, but as of November 2025, no unified elections have occurred, perpetuating a stalemate that hinders reform.

Economically, Libya remains hydrocarbon-dependent, with oil comprising 95% of exports and 60% of GDP. The World Bank projects 12.3% GDP growth in 2025, driven by oil output averaging 1.3 million barrels per day (mbpd), a 17.4% rise from 2024 levels, surpassing the decade-long average. This rebound follows a 2024 contraction due to the CBL crisis and global price volatility, as noted in Libya: Leveling the Playing Field Towards Private Sector Growth – World Bank – June 2025. However, fiscal deficits persist under high public spending, with the IMF forecasting a small current account surplus in 2025 before shifting to deficit amid subdued oil prices. The IMF‘s Article IV consultation emphasizes that political divisions impede expenditure control, with $47 billion in 2024 budgets fueling inflation at 2% and eroding intergenerational equity from oil revenues. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate, incurring losses through overstaffing and inefficiencies, crowding out private sector growth. Non-oil sectors, at 40% of GDP, suffer from insecurity, as the CBL crisis halted foreign exchange allocations, disrupting imports. Geopolitically, oil fields like Sharara and El Feel are flashpoints, with shutdowns in 2024 costing $2 billion in lost production due to rival claims. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) navigates east-west divides, but unified revenue sharing remains elusive, risking escalation. Civil impacts include 6.9 million population facing 23% unemployment, with youth at 35%, exacerbating migration pressures. Remittances from diaspora, at $1.5 billion annually, provide a buffer, but inequality widens as elites capture rents.

Civil society in Libya operates amid repression and division, with 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of December 2025, per UNHCR data. Human smuggling ecosystems, as analyzed in the attached document, underscore civil vulnerabilities: hybrid systems—air arrivals at Benina airport followed by overland transport to west coast departures—sustained 71,000 attempted crossings in 2024, consistent with 72,000 in 2023. Migrant origins shifted to South Asia (Bangladesh 13,800 arrivals in Italy) and the Levant (Syria 12,500), reflecting semi-legal entry via $500 (€452) LAAF clearances. Instability in Zawiya and Sabratha, fueled by Milad’s assassination, enabled smugglers to exploit power vacuums, with departures fluctuating based on enforcement. In Kufra, 150,000 Sudanese refugees surged by January 2025, but few crossed the sea, with 2,000 arrivals in Italy. Horn of Africa migrants faced abuses, including mass graves near Kufra, as smugglers charged $18,000 (€16,300) for routes. The Central Mediterranean route claimed over 1,000 lives in 2025, adding to 25,600 since 2014, as per Latest deadly shipwreck highlights need for safer migration – UN News – November 2025. Civil actors, including tribes like Awlad Suleiman, mediate but often entrench illicit economies. Women’s participation remains low at 16% in politics, hampered by insecurity.

Militarily, Libya’s forces are divided, with the LAAF commanding 35,000 personnel in the east, equipped with Russian-supplied hardware, while western militias like the SSA and Rada Forces number 20,000. SIPRI data reveals arms flows to non-state groups despite UN and EU embargoes, with three Libyan factions receiving major arms in 2020–2024, as documented in SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary – SIPRI – June 2025. Conflicts have de-escalated but persist without resolution, with LAAF curbing large-scale smuggling in Tobruk while tolerating small-boat operations to Crete. Budgets, at $10 billion (20% of GDP), prioritize salaries over modernization, per IMF assessments in Libya: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff Report – IMF – June 2025. Foreign backers—Russia for LAAF, Turkey for GNU—sustain proxy dynamics, with Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) bases in the east.

Libya’s relations with Europe and NATO center on migration and energy security. As a non-participant in NATO‘s Mediterranean Dialogue (involving Algeria, Egypt, etc.), Libya engages bilaterally, as per Mediterranean Dialogue – NATO – September 2025. EU partnerships focus on border control, with Italy leading via the Trans-Mediterranean Migration Forum. Alignment between US, Italy, and Turkey seeks stability, with Italy prioritizing migration ( 62% of Italy’s 2024 arrivals from Libya) and energy imports, as analyzed in US, Italy, and Turkey alignment could push the needle in Libya – Atlantic Council – October 2025. Turkey‘s military presence in the west and contracts enhance leverage, while US pushes institutional unification. However, European symptom-focused interventions, like supporting coast guards implicated in abuses, entrench conflict without addressing roots, per Chatham House.

Implications are multifaceted. Geopolitically, fragmentation invites external meddling, risking escalation if oil disputes flare, as in 2024‘s $2 billion losses. Economically, 12.3% growth masks vulnerabilities: without diversification, volatility threatens 23% unemployment and $47 billion spending. Civilly, smuggling ecosystems exacerbate abuses, with 1,000 2025 deaths underscoring humanitarian costs. Militarily, divided forces hinder counterterrorism, with arms embargoes violated. For Europe and NATO, rising arrivals (71,000 attempts) demand whole-of-route strategies, including development aid to reduce demand, rather than enforcement alone. Policy recommendations include unified elections under UNSMIL, fiscal reforms per IMF guidance, and EU-led private sector initiatives to foster non-oil growth. Absent reform, Libya risks deeper instability, with migration surges and illicit economies sustaining armed groups into 2026.

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Why an enhanced ‘economic track’ must be integrated into political negotiations

Policies to address Libya’s interminable political and security crises have too often relied on a flawed system of elite bargains in which power- and wealth-sharing are used to keep the peace among rival factions.

The irony is that such policies often aggravate some of the very conflict dynamics they are intended to remedy, for example incentivizing economic predation and rent-seeking via control of state institutions.

This paper makes the case for an alternative approach. Efforts to tackle the economic causes of conflict in Libya must be systemically integrated into political negotiations, given equal status to the political ‘track’, and reinforced by active mediation.

The paper argues that an enhanced economic track of this nature should focus on five areas:

(1) immediate stabilization of the economy, with the UN and other international partners spearheading the development of technical governance;

(2) structural economic and political reform, pursued through a consultative process, so that more equitable and stable economic models are developed and entrenched;

(3) capacity-building to equip Libyan officials and institutions with the skills and resources to implement reform programming;

(4) anti-corruption enforcement; and

(5) public diplomacy, so that ordinary people and civil society have a stronger say in Libya’s political and economic future. 

Summary

• With the political situation in Libya remaining precarious, there is a critical need to make economic reform an integral part of any national settlement. Yet despite broad acceptance among analysts that economic drivers of conflict play a significant role in Libya’s state dysfunction, international policy interventions have insufficiently addressed this dimension of the country’s problems. This paper makes the case for a change in approach.
• At the heart of the challenge is the fact that political contestation – including between parallel governments operating in the west and east of the country respectively – is all but indivisible from competition for control of economic resources and rents. Policymakers have at times reached ad hoc agreements on discrete aspects of economic governance, but these have never been integrated into an organized, internationally mediated ‘economic track’ within broader peace negotiations.
• Political mediation to date has been tacitly predicated on dividing resources among rival domestic parties to avoid outbreaks of violent conflict. But this merely entrenches clientelism, further undermining economic governance. Compounding domestic drivers of instability, international engagement with Libya’s state has degenerated in recent years into a competition between foreign patrons and other external actors over spheres of influence and access to territory and resources. As a result, any previous multilateral consensus on the need to secure unified and stable governance has been lost.
• State capture by elite networks has fuelled corruption and caused public spending to soar. (If expenditures unrecorded in official data are accounted for, the author estimates that Libya’s true fiscal deficit in 2024 may have exceeded US$10.4 billion – which would equate to more than 22 per cent of GDP.) This is manifestly unsustainable. With government revenues acutely vulnerable to fluctuations in oil and gas prices, any significant market shock could disastrously impact the state’s ability to pay public sector salaries, let alone fund economic development. Just as fiscal pressures are rising, moreover, the appetite of Libya’s elites to access more state funds is growing – a trend illustrated by the increasingly active role of private companies in previously state-dominated sectors such as oil.
• For Libyan citizens, the practical impact of such failings is that the state’s ability to deliver public goods is declining. With consumer prices rising, the country’s huge public sector workforce – historically dependent on government salaries – is struggling to survive financially. Subsidized medicines and other essentials are increasingly unavailable, while liquidity problems in the banking sector mean that some public servants have been unable to withdraw salaries from their bank accounts.
• Drawing upon lessons from Libya and comparable countries, this paper argues that breaking the country’s cycle of violence and instability requires political negotiations to formally integrate measures to address the economic drivers of conflict. An enhanced approach will need to focus on five areas:

• Immediate stabilization of economic governance via international mediation. 

The UN, its international partners and international financial institutions must coordinate to identify technical solutions for improving economic governance. A focus must be on (a) bolstering transparency and accountability, particularly in relation to state expenditure, revenue collection and the financial declarations of state institutions; and (b) formulating a unified state budget.

• Structural economic governance reform pursued through a consultative process. 

The new, formalized ‘economic track’ must be situated within the broader, internationally mediated political process. The focus of this track must be to reform Libya’s rentier system of government; this will mean finding alternatives to the use of power-sharing (and wealth-sharing) among competing factions and local elites. What is needed is a strategic, structured programme of reforms within a clear accountability structure.

• Capacity-building. 

Libyan officials and institutions lack sufficient capacity to implement these ‘programmatic’ reforms. The provision of targeted institutional support by international financial institutions should be aligned with the delivery of governance reform.

• Anti-corruption enforcement. 

International policymakers and donors should develop partnerships with Libyan anti-corruption agencies and related bodies. The aim of such partnerships should be not only to support better governance, but also to combat the growing transnational illicit financing mechanisms that are underwriting the activities of rival powerbrokers and undermining the foundations of the Libyan state.

• Public diplomacy. 

The Libyan public must be meaningfully included in internationally led efforts to negotiate the formation of a unified national government. Existing conflict resolution has focused on achieving agreement among a familiar set of elites who are profiting extensively from the country’s instability (and who consequently have little interest in ceding power). The UN and its international partners can capitalize on previous efforts such as the socio-economic dialogue led by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Work could also build on the efforts of the Libyan Peace Makers group, a dialogue programme that brings together Libyans from across the country and with different perspectives to inform international mediation.

***

Tim Eaton is a senior research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. His research focuses on the political economy of conflict in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and on the political economy of the Libyan conflict in particular.

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Sam Jones in Vienna and Paul Murphy in London

In November 2016 he presented “Project Phoenix” to the German company’s board. Approval was made for $10mn of funding — which was lent via an entity in Singapore, Senjo, and then to the Dubai account of a Swiss lawyer who in turn put the funds into Isle of Man-registered Emerging Africa Energy Limited.

EAEL would invest its $10mn in Lorasco, while LHG would invest $4mn and manage the company. At first EAEL’s ultimate beneficial owner was declared by Lorasco’s LHGappointed management to be the Swiss lawyer. In a 2020 due diligence review, however, Lorasco updated its know-your-customer file to indicate that EAEL was in fact controlled by an offshore trust — the Labels Foundation. The trust’s UBO was named as James Henry O’Sullivan, who at the time was publicly identifiable as a Singapore-based businessman with strong connections to Wirecard. O’Sullivan, a co-conspirator of Marsalek in the Wirecard fraud, was convicted in Singapore this year and will be sentenced in January.

But the true UBO of EAEL was and always had been Marsalek, according to two people who built the structure. A third party declared they were “100 per cent sure” Marsalek was the beneficiary based on what he himself had told them. LHG and Ben Halim have stated that, as with LCC, they had no knowledge of Marsalek’s financial involvement until Bowman informed them of it in 2022. At that point, they said, they had acted swiftly to freeze EAEL’s shares in accordance with the law.

“At no time during the due diligence processes carried out by LHG companies was it discovered or suspected that Marsalek was the UBO of any investing party,” they said. Despite that claim, documents reveal a close financial relationship between Ben Halim and Marsalek at the time. In December 2016 Marsalek underwrote a $4mn bridge financing loan from Ben Halim’s British Virgin Islands-based family investment vehicle to fund EAEL’s acquisition of Lorasco shares, as the promised $10mn in funding from the Swiss lawyer — and ultimately Wirecard — was late to arrive. According to Ben Halim and LHG, Marsalek agreed to incur this $4mn liability as a “favour”. It did not make them think he might also be the owner of EAEL, they said.

The bridge loan guarantee was not Ben Halim’s only direct financial relationship with Marsalek. In 2018 Marsalek invited Ben Halim and other backers of the Libya projects to invest in a new crypto token being launched by messaging platform Telegram, whose founder Pavel Durov had met Marsalek and invited him to participate. A special purpose vehicle was set up for them to pool their money and invest but Credit Suisse, which was organising the sale of the token, blocked the transaction. It turned out the bank was happy to take money from Marsalek, whose role in the biggest corporate fraud in recent European history had yet to be revealed, but was wary of his Libyan friends.

As a workaround, Ben Halim and others decided to let Marsalek invest their money in his name, sidestepping Credit Suisse’s money laundering checks. However, the US Securities and Exchange Commission blocked Telegram’s issuance of the tokens and Marsalek refunded his Libyan associates.

In responses to questions from the FT and Bayerischer Rundfunk, Ben Halim and LHG repeatedly stressed that all relationships with Marsalek had been arranged through Bowman, who they said had concealed the true nature of Marsalek’s involvement and interests in Libya. Bowman acknowledged he had been the main contact between LHG and Marsalek but insisted Ben Halim and others at the company were fully aware of the Austrian’s investments.

“I’ve never had any reason to be disingenuous about Marsalek’s past involvement. He was a fantastic investor and a good friend. What we were doing at the time was completely legitimate and even though it might be obvious in hindsight, we had no idea about his other life . . . To all of us, he was just this hugely talented, very successful European businessman,” Bowman told the FT.

“He was the anchor investor in Lorasco from day one and it was known to all of us internally [at LHG] — and there’s substantial evidence to support that. The business wouldn’t have been created without him. That was really one of the reasons why I parted ways with LHG. They have been trying to bury the truth,” Bowman said.

Other people who were part of the LHG-Marsalek network also dispute the notion that Ben Halim was not enthusiastic about the Austrian’s involvement.

Correspondence reviewed by the FT shows Ben Halim was involved in extensive and frequent discussions about projects involving Marsalek over a period of several years. One topic that often cropped up was Libyan politics. A 2018 photograph obtained by the FT shows Marsalek in Benghazi, taking tea with Ben Halim, Bowman and Wanis Bukhamada, the late head of eastern Libya’s special forces under General Haftar who was widely revered in Libya as the “black panther” for his success in fighting Isis.

People present on the trip even recall Marsalek asking Ben Halim whether he would be interested in running for political office, with a view eventually to becoming prime minister of the country. Ben Halim confirmed details of the meeting but said he dismissed out of hand Marsalek’s suggestion, which led him to believe Marsalek to be a dangerous fantasist. Others dispute that, and say Ben Halim knew about Marsalek’s connections in Russia and engaged with him, albeit irregularly and indirectly, as an interlocutor for Russian interests. While Ben Halim did not wish to enter politics, other discussions took place over other potential candidates who might be sympathetic to LHG and Marsalek’s interests.

When Marsalek fled in 2020, everything changed — not least for him. He faced one particular irony: having salted away millions of dollars behind complex structures and frontmen around the world, he was now, trapped in Russia, vulnerable to losing control of his hidden assets. “Assholes” were trying to “steal” his money, he would write in a December 2020 Telegram message to Orlin Roussev, one of the Bulgarian spies convicted last year in Britain, “because they think I am hiding in a cave in Afghanistan”. While he did not indicate to whom he was referring, his hidden financial interests in Libya were being eroded.

Lorasco in 2020 and 2021 initiated a series of capital raisings that began to vastly dilute Marsalek’s holding in the company. EAEL’s stake dropped from more than two-thirds to just 10 per cent. Matters became even more complicated in 2023 when Bowman started to acquire — via Damviol, a company controlled by his wife — shareholdings that had once belonged to Marsalek, taking part of EuroAtlantic’s stake in LCC and trying to acquire all of EAEL’s stake in Lorasco. Bowman told the FT this was a case of sweeping up assets that were going cheap and would never be reclaimed.

LHG, however, claimed this was suspicious and has refused to acknowledge the transfer of EAEL shares to Damviol. It says it is legally bound to keep the proceeds of a crime frozen. It also says it has questions about Bowman’s motive as Marsalek’s former friend and even the origin of his funds. Bowman told the FT he had not spoken to Marsalek in five years and that the idea he could be so stupid as to act as a front for him, given their known relationship, was ludicrous. Bowman’s dispute with LHG will soon come to a head — in court. Damviol in October filed a civil case in London alleging a conspiracy to defraud it, accusing Ben Halim and LHG of trying to use Bowman’s past relationship with Marsalek as a pretext to freeze the company out of his rightful minority shareholdings.

LHG, which denies the allegations, filed its legal response this week, saying there was no “animus” between Ben Halim and Bowman and stated that LHG blocked the transfer of EAEL-held shares on purely legal and fiduciary grounds.

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A growing American footprint is taking shape in Libya, made unmistakably clear by the first official visit of Gen. Dagvin Anderson, the head of United States Africa Command. His trip stood out not only for its timing but also for its breadth, bringing him face-to-face with political and military power brokers in both western and eastern Libya.

In early December 2025, Anderson held meetings in Tripoli with Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, Deputy Defense Minister Abdul Salam al-Zoubi, and Presidential Council Chief of Staff Mohammed al-Haddad. The visit was billed as part of a wide review of the country’s security and political landscape.

Strengthening Ties

During the talks, al-Dbeibah stressed what he described as his government’s commitment to promoting security and stability and countering regional threats. He also emphasized the need to bolster the military through meaningful partnerships and high-quality training programs.

A report published on the AFRICOM website on December 2 quoted Anderson as saying that meeting leaders from both sides was essential to understanding the current challenges. He encouraged Libyan actors to commit to dialogue and joint action in order to achieve lasting peace and stability.

Anderson noted that the coming months will involve coordinated work between eastern and western forces as they prepare for the Flintlock 2026 exercises. He said Libya will host part of the drills for the first time, a step he argued will help strengthen the integration of the country’s military institutions.

In the same context, United States Chargé d’Affaires Jeremy Berndt said he was pleased to accompany Anderson during his visit to Tripoli and Benghazi. He stressed that AFRICOM’s partnership continues to support United States objectives in Libya and reinforces counterterrorism efforts.

Berndt added that the visit offers a chance to deepen ties with Libyan partners. He emphasized that unifying the country’s military institutions remains a crucial step toward long-term stability.

The United States official said Washington supports the Libyan-led political process and stressed that strengthening security and economic integration are essential pillars for long-term sovereignty and stability.

He noted that the talks also covered threats linked to terrorism and organized crime, and said Washington hopes to push Libyan actors toward a more unified approach that strengthens the country’s ability to confront those challenges.

In its coverage of the recent developments, the Libyan newspaper Alwasat reported that Washington has for months adopted a pragmatic approach to the Libyan file, one built on direct coordination between the armed groups aligned with rival authorities in the east and west. The paper said this amounts to a form of mutual recognition.

A report published by the outlet on December 5 argued that Washington is largely brushing aside the escalation coming from political players who have been calling for self-rule, for creating a three-presidency council in Tripoli, and for sharply criticizing the United Nations mission and its head, Hanna Tetteh.

The report added that Anderson’s visit is part of a broader United States effort to reinforce its military and security presence in Africa. The paper pointed to the upheaval across the Sahel, shifting geopolitical dynamics in West Africa, and Washington’s loss of influence in a region it considers strategically sensitive.

The report continued that the Trump administration’s new approach reflects a desire to play a more active role in shaping political and economic understandings inside Libya through a process of direct dialogue under full United States supervision.

According to Alwasat, this approach follows a method adopted by President Donald Trump in conflict management, one that relies on direct communication between rival parties.

The outlet said United States mediation helped broker the November 18 agreement that laid the groundwork for a unified development program for eastern and western Libya and addressed the long-running dispute over oil revenue distribution.

It added that these efforts come as part of ongoing talks in which White House envoy Massad Boulos has served as the lead mediator. He brought together Saddam Haftar and Ibrahim Dbeibah at a meeting in Rome in early September 2025.

Regional Calculations

The United States military push in Libya cannot be separated from the wider regional chessboard, particularly Russia’s expanding ambitions. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Sudan has offered Moscow the chance to build a military base at a strategic port on the Red Sea.

A United States official told the paper that a Russian base in Libya or Port Sudan would significantly expand Moscow’s ability to project power and give it new ways to operate outside the reach of sanctions.

Retired Air Force General Mark Hicks, who once led United States special operations units in Africa, argued that any Russian military foothold on the continent would strengthen the Kremlin’s hand by granting it greater international leverage and prestige.

The journal noted that the possible establishment of a Red Sea base has alarmed United States security officials who have been competing with both Moscow and Beijing for military influence in Africa for years. The paper added that a base in Libya or along the Red Sea would allow Russian ships to remain at sea far longer in both the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Masoud al-Salami, a professor of international relations at Libyan universities, said the AFRICOM commander’s visit to Libya fits within a broader United States strategy to solidify its role as a leading global power and maintain the balance of power in North Africa.

Speaking on the Libyan channel Wasat TV on December 4, al-Salami said the visit was not limited to Libya but followed earlier stops across North Africa as part of a wider American effort to manage regional conflicts and track Libya’s rival factions more closely.

He explained that the trip aims to gain a comprehensive understanding of Libya’s political and military landscape rather than a narrow snapshot. The central goal, he said, is to stabilize the current military environment and prevent the widening of rifts among Libya’s competing armed groups, which could easily trigger a much larger conflict.

Al-Salami added that unifying Libya’s fragmented armed forces under a single command is not the immediate objective because the conditions on the ground are nowhere near ready. For now, Washington’s focus is on ensuring the situation does not slide into deeper military division.

He also noted that AFRICOM’s movements in Libya run parallel to broader United States political efforts and that this trip marks the first personal visit by the AFRICOM commander after earlier visits by deputies and other delegations.

Al-Salami added that the AFRICOM commander’s public remarks made clear that the visit was centered on efforts to bring greater cohesion to Libya’s armed forces and to preserve a measure of military stability on the ground.

New Directions

Abdul Basit al-Qadi, head of the International Commission for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime, said AFRICOM’s visit sends a clear signal about Libya’s shifting political and military landscape.

“The trip signals there will be no political change in Libya before the end of April 2026, since arrangements for joint military exercises scheduled for that month have already been agreed and signed,” he told Al-Estiklal.

“This means that any expansion of AFRICOM’s footprint in Libya will directly affect the interests of regional and international players involved in the Libyan file.”

“Washington’s push to activate its new Africa strategy in Libya, along with the recent spike in military and diplomatic activity by AFRICOM, is primarily aimed at stabilizing the country and using its internal divisions to position Libya as an advanced front in political competition,” al-Qadi added.

“AFRICOM’s top priorities,” he noted, “include establishing a hub for monitoring, counterterrorism work, and securing the country’s oil fields.”

Al Qadi urged Libyan officials to take this seriously and to reassess the security cooperation embedded in existing contracts and agreements, placing strict legal limits that prevent Libyan territory and territorial waters from being used as a staging ground for military maneuvers or for threatening any third party.

For Libyan academic Osama Alshhoumi, the recent flurry of AFRICOM visits reflects a deliberate American trajectory and marks a clear rise in Washington’s engagement with the Libyan file, shifting the relationship from diplomatic contact to direct military involvement. He told Annahar that unifying the military institution sits at the top of the agenda, alongside counterterrorism, organized crime and border control, especially in the south, where instability in West Africa is spilling over.

He stressed that Russia’s presence in the region remains a key concern and that Washington is looking to put new security arrangements in place before Libya enters a decisive political phase. The meetings held by senior American officers, he said, send a clear message: military legitimacy in Libya will rest only with unified state institutions.

Alshhoumi added that Washington is also signaling that Libya’s future security architecture will not be built around competing armed groups and that the United States will not recognize any militia, regardless of its local influence, as a political or security actor. He expects other countries and the United Nations to follow the same line that Washington is now setting.

He said the international community increasingly understands that no political or economic process in Libya can endure without a unified security structure. The urgency Washington places on military unification, he argued, directly serves to create a less polarized environment and reduces the ability of armed actors to derail the political track.

Alshhoumi noted that a cohesive military institution is critical for protecting the country’s oil fields, especially as Libya works to reassert itself in the oil and gas investment market. He concluded that Washington wants Libya to manage its resources without resorting to violence or confrontation and that a unified security sector is the key to unlocking the country’s political and economic gridlock.

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Melissa Pawson

Bir al-Ghanam is an unofficial detention centre south-west of Tripoli, which Tilley said receives “even less scrutiny” than other sites and is known for its “horrific” conditions. “There’s no access, oversight or registration of the people who go there, so they are much more likely to disappear and to be extorted,” said the researcher.

The site has also been flagged by the US State Department’s country report on human rights practices for arbitrarily detaining migrant children.

A 2023 UN fact-finding mission reported found “overwhelming evidence” that migrants are “systematically tortured” in Libya’s detention centres, where “acts of murder, enforced disappearance, torture, enslavement, sexual violence, rape and other inhumane acts are committed in connection with their arbitrary detention”.

Salahadine Juma, a co-founder of activist group Refugees in Libya, has firsthand experience of what happens to those detainees whose families can’t afford to pay. “I was held in a [Libyan] detention centre for a year and a half. I was forced to do hard labour because I couldn’t pay the ransom,” he said.

Juma, who co-founded Refugees in Libya before arriving in France 18 months ago, said its hotline receives between 50 and 80 messages a day from trapped refugees and migrants asking for help to escape the centres. “They [Libyan officers] force them to pay a ransom, and if they can’t pay, they force them to work. Or, if they are women, they are sexually abused.”

Juma said there’s not much the group can do to help them, other than putting pressure on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ representatives in Libya. “But there are many stories of refugees and migrants being neglected by UNHCR in Libya,” he added.

Italy’s ‘deliberate obstruction’

The journey to Italy from the international waters north of the Libyan coast where we’d picked up Omar’s boat could be done in 13 hours, but it was six days before Humanity 1 finally reached the port of Ortona in central east Italy on 1 December.

During the long journey, many survivors on board asked why we had not yet reached Italy. At one point, we were so close to the shore we could see the details of buildings and wind farms – and yet we were still over 24 hours from arriving.

Since Italy’s adoption of the ‘Piantedosi decree’ in January 2023, rescue ships requesting a safe port to disembark rescued people have regularly been forced to travel to distant ports, sometimes over 600 miles away, or risk their boats being detained for non-compliance. Rescue organisations say the policy is a “deliberate obstruction” designed to limit their ability to rescue people in distress at sea.

When Omar and the other survivors eventually disembarked in Ortona, they were met by the Red Cross and Italian police. This moment marked the start of a new and challenging chapter for them – the start of their asylum processes in Italy. Those from countries that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have declared to be ‘safe’ (which includes Egypt) could face a fast-tracked detention and a deportation order.

Stefania, the protection representative onboard Humanity 1 said the dangerous sea crossing is “not the only challenge” the rescued people will have to face.

“Under Italian law, some categories are protected, for example, if you’re a victim of torture or trafficking,” she said. “[Otherwise] they could be detained in administrative detention centres [in Italy]. I don’t want to exaggerate but they could look like something they lived through in Libya.”

Bribes in one hand, EU salary in the other

For Omar, arrival in Italy also started the countdown for him to contact the Libyan smuggler awaiting payment.

“The money is due on arrival,” Omar told me before the boat docked. “As soon as I get on shore and have reception, I have to send the smuggler a message on Facebook to tell him I arrived. Then he’ll get in contact with my father to arrange payment.”

Omar owed the smuggler 360,000 Egyptian pounds (£5,650) for the crossing, which was due in full only if he arrived in Europe alive. “The smuggler told me that if the sum isn’t paid, he will kill any of my cousins or brothers in Libya,” said the teenager. “He told me he has contacts in Egypt and could hurt one of my family members there too. He knows who my relatives are, he’s observed me. The thing that matters to him is the payment.”

Omar has good reason to believe these are not empty threats. “The smuggler was always carrying his gun [while we were waiting to cross],” he said. “One time I picked up my phone to send a voice message on WhatsApp and he pointed his gun at me. He told me if you do that again, I will shoot you and bury you here.”

Omar described how most smugglers he interacted with during his time in Libya appeared to be connected to the Libyan internal police. “They have police cars, they’re wearing police uniforms and carrying the guns,” he said. “Those police pay money to the coastguard to get the boats through.”

This claim is difficult to verify, but likely has a measure of truth, according to Juma. “The majority of smugglers in Libya have some connection with the police or coastguard,” said the activist. “They know when the coastguard boats will be at sea, so they know which days to send boats. Some are even members of the coastguard themselves.”

Tilley told openDemocracy that Libyan internal police may not be smugglers “in the traditional sense”, but they could be seen as “facilitators” who turn a blind eye to smuggling, often in exchange for a financial incentive.

The 2023 UN fact-finding mission found “reasonable grounds” to believe that high-ranking staff in the Libyan Coast Guard, Libya’s Stability Support Apparatus and the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration in Libya had “colluded with traffickers and smugglers.” The report stated that trafficking and smuggling generated “significant revenue” for individuals, groups and state institutions.

“The Libyan coastguard are border guards for Italy, not for Libya,” said Omar. “They get paid bribes by the smugglers, and they get their salaries from Europe.”

Mounir Satouri, a French MEP and chair of the EU’s Subcommittee on Human Rights, said the EU’s continuing support for the Libyan coastguard “only ensures that atrocities are committed in our name and with European taxpayers’ money.” He described the coastguard as “an uncontrollable armed militia that violates international law and tramples on human rights.”

“To tackle both militia abuses and smuggling networks, the European Union must coordinate genuine search-and-rescue operations and open safe pathways for those seeking refuge in Europe,” said Satouri.

“On 13 October, a boat carrying 140 people was attacked, leaving a man between life and death with a bullet lodged in his skull. Just last week, the rescue vessel Louise Michel was targeted. This is unacceptable. This impunity and Europe’s silence must end.”

The EU Commission (Migration and Home Affairs) was approached for comment. Italian interior ministry was approached for comment.

When I asked Omar if there was anything he would like people to know about the journey, he said his only message was for others looking to make the crossing. “Don’t travel to Europe through Libya,” he said. “Find another way.”

***

Melissa Pawson is the editor for Beyond Trafficking and Slavery. She also works as a freelance journalist, covering migration, human rights and the climate crisis.

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Sam Jones in Vienna and Paul Murphy in London

FT investigation sheds light on Wirecard fraudster’s activities in north Africa and shadow life as a Russian agent of influence.

***

From a townhouse in London’s Mayfair, a secret deal was sealed last year to sell three Libyan cement factories. Hidden behind layers of offshore shell companies and non-disclosure agreements, the strategic assets passed into the hands of a businessman with connections to General Khalifa Haftar, the Russian-backed warlord who rules the east of the north African country.

But the biggest sensitivity for many of those involved was not the identity of the buyer, but that of a legacy investor in the plants: Jan Marsalek, Europe’s most-wanted financial criminal — and most-hunted Russian spy.

For years Marsalek was the toast of Europe’s business world, a dynamic young executive helping lead German fintech Wirecard to ever-greater heights, until the company was exposed as a fraud. But he was also embroiled in the world of Russian espionage, driven by a fascination with risk and power as well as an outlook on life in which he treated almost everything as a game.

In the five years since Wirecard’s collapse, two central questions about the Austrian’s role have remained a mystery: where did the money he stole end up, and how might it have been used to further Russia’s interests?

An investigation by the Financial Times and German broadcaster Bayerischer Rundfunk now sheds light on one small but geopolitically important tranche of Marsalek’s missing millions. It is also a story about the shadow battle for control of assets by his former business partners, which has been held in check until now by their desire to keep their ties to Marsalek as quiet as possible.

In the 2020 article that first exposed Marsalek as a likely Russian spy, the FT reported on his interests in Libya. Marsalek had boasted about “his” businesses there, including the Libyan Cement Company. However, LCC’s owners — London-based Libya Holdings Group — denied ever having had anything to do with him.

Now, based on hundreds of pages of leaked documentation, court filings, interviews with current and former employees, investors and consultants, and Marsalek’s own emails obtained after the collapse of Wirecard, a detailed picture of his years-long involvement with LHG, now known as LH Severus, can be revealed. Marsalek’s investments in the country, if he could still access them, are now worth tens of millions of dollars. LCC was just one of them.

Although the sums are small in comparison to the €2bn fraud Marsalek helped mastermind at Wirecard, the Libya projects shine a light on how he operated as an agent of influence, using access to illicit funds and relationships with risk-hungry businessmen to blend his own financial interests with those of his Russian masters.

The paper trail also hints at Marsalek’s political interests in Libya — how he sought to build connections with powerful factions and warlords, showcasing his usefulness to his handlers in Russian intelligence and harnessing people’s greed to further a covert geopolitical agenda.

Marsalek’s Munich-based lawyer, who has represented him in the Wirecard fraud trial, did not respond to requests for comment. Questions remain about whether Marsalek, now in Moscow under the protection of the Russian state, continues to wield any influence over his holdings, and how aware UK authorities are of his financial network in London.

Barely six months since six British-Bulgarian citizens were convicted of spying for Marsalek in a sensational trial at London’s Old Bailey, his erstwhile financial partners — who still operate multimillion-pound businesses and travel around Europe on private jets — say they have not been contacted by security services.

Marsalek’s current involvements in Libya are unclear. But the importance to Russia of the country — a gateway to Africa, a lever to influence Europe, an arms bazaar and a geopolitical bargaining chip — makes the investments and activities of the London network more relevant than ever to Moscow’s agenda.

Marsalek’s financial interests in Libya began a decade ago through a man who would become one of his closest friends. Joe Bowman, a US-born entrepreneur who was based in London but had spent years in Moscow, was exploring opportunities in the north African country including a payments venture. A mutual acquaintance suggested Marsalek could help.

But the Austrian soon became interested in more than just businesses aligned with his day job. Mayfair-based financier Ahmed Ben Halim contacted Bowman in 2015 with an investment proposition. Three Libyan cement factories were on the market at a knockdown price after the bankruptcy of their former Austrian owner.

Ben Halim, the son of a 1950s Libyan prime minister under King Idris, had been forced into exile along with his family after Muammer Gaddafi’s 1969 revolution. He grew up in London where he pursued a career in finance and founded private wealth manager The Capital Partnership. After Gaddafi’s fall in 2011 he set up the Libya Holdings Group to make investments in his native country.

Bowman, who was already operating in Libya, seemed a good fit for the cement plants. The business case was clear: the country’s reconstruction would require huge amounts of cement and the factories could have a chokehold on the resource in the east of the country. Other investors were scouted out and Marsalek came onboard — although his name would never appear on official corporate documentation.

Instead, his investment in LCC came via a Cypriot entity, EuroAtlantic, according to four people involved in the transaction. Officially, the ultimate beneficiary of the LCC shares was EuroAtlantic’s founder, a Dubai-based businessman. Marsalek was his silent partner. Ben Halim and LHG insist they never had any idea the Austrian was involved. However, a close relationship between Marsalek and LCC management — a small group of individuals who reported to Ben Halim and LHG — is clear from email correspondence reviewed by the FT.

Topics discussed include an attempt by LCC to set up an account at Wirecard Bank, and the hiring of Russian mercenary group RSB to clear the cement plants of unexploded ordnance. Marsalek was integral to both projects — at the very least, as a trusted adviser to LCC.

What is more, he soon became involved in an even bigger LHG-backed project: backing an opportunity in 2016 to acquire lucrative assets in Libya through a company called Lorasco, which operates drilling rigs that are rented out to oil companies and is now worth more than $80mn. Marsalek was Lorasco’s anchor investor and ploughed millions into the business with money siphoned off from Wirecard.

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Amanda Mapanda, James Chapman, Noah Rubins KC; and Anne-Lise Ménagé

Libya is re-emerging as a significant destination for international investment, particularly within the energy, renewables, and infrastructure sectors. While this follows a sustained period of political instability, recent developments suggest renewed momentum as the country targets economic diversification, energy capacity expansion, and infrastructure upgrades.

1. New Oil & Gas Licensing Round and EPSA V Framework

In March 2025, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) launched its first oil and gas licensing round in 17 years, offering 22 blocks (onshore and offshore) across three key basins: Sirte, Murzuq, and Ghadames. This round is a centrepiece of Libya’s strategy to boost production (targeting 2 million barrels per day by 2028) and to add 8 billion barrels to proven reserves in the next 25 years. 37 companies (e.g. bp, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni) are qualified to bid, with companies expected to submit offers and open bids in February 2026. The terms of the exploration contracts will be governed by the new Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) V, which is designed to enhance Libya’s competitiveness for international oil companies (IOC). The terms of EPSA V include:

• More favourable profit-sharing: EPSA V eliminates the “B factor” that previously, under EPSA IV, reduced contractors’ profit share as production increased. It also incorporates a new “R factor” which smooths reductions in profit share once contractors reach certain earnings. This results in a steadier investor return and allows contractors to expand production without automatically losing a larger share of revenue.
• Enhanced cost recovery: Fixed rate cost recovery allows contractors to recoup investment faster, shortening payback periods.
• NOC tax handling: The state continues to pay income tax on behalf of contractors, reducing administrative burden and mitigating fiscal exposure.
• Risk allocation: Contractors bear all costs, but benefit from potentially higher internal rates of return and accelerated profit-sharing mechanisms.

Historically, EPSA dealt with disputes by (1) amicable settlement and (2) arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. While it is not yet clear if EPSA V follows the same model, bilateral investment treaty protections (encompassing, in most instances, similar dispute resolution mechanisms) will regardless be available where relevant. The competitive reform of Libya’s EPSA could result in more stable and internationally recognisable risk allocation and dispute resolution mechanisms, which in turn could trigger rising interest in Libyan energy assets among private equity and institutional investors.

2. Key Developments & Opportunities

Aside from the licensing round, recent notable developments in Libya include:

• Oil & Gas: Structures A&E and Mellitah Oil & Gas have been advancing a major offshore gas development project, involving an $8.8 billion investment. As large-scale projects advance and Libya ramps up its upstream capacity, there will be growing opportunities for international investors to participate in project development or provide specialised services.
• Renewables: TotalEnergies and GECOL have been progressing what will be Libya’s largest solar PV plant at 500MW. Commissioning is expected in 2026. Such major renewables investments signal Libya’s intent to diversify its energy dependence and embrace sustainable development, offering substantial opportunities for those with expertise in clean energy and technology transfer. Further, continued investment in renewables reflects growing policy support for green energy and offers inroads for climate finance and public-private partnerships in the region.
• Water: International donors IFAD and UNOPS launched a water project aimed at combatting water scarcity, funded with $9.2 million from the Adaptation Fund grant. The reliance on blended finance and concessional capital for essential sectors like water reflects an increasing openness to innovative financing approaches – investors exploring sustainable or impact-driven strategies may find growing prospects here. Ongoing donor-backed water initiatives may catalyse broader interest in sustainable infrastructure, agritech, and circular economy solutions among environmentally minded stakeholders.
• Digital infrastructure: Medusa Submarine Cable System and Inwi’s project, the Medusa submarine cable, connects Europe and North Africa. It has been operational since May 2025 and involved c. $390 million in investment. The development of Libya’s digital infrastructure positions the country as a potential regional connectivity hub in future cross-border data, fintech, and telecom ventures across MENA and southern Europe; investors seeking inroads into Africa’s digital economy boom should monitor this evolving landscape for early opportunities.

3. Investment Climate and Risks

Libya holds Africa’s largest proven oil reserves, but about 70% of its land and 65% of its waters remain unexplored. The country benefits from OPEC+ quota exemption, proximity to Europe, and a regulatory framework considered predictable by the industry. However, risks persist:

• Security and governance: As political divisions in Libya remain, bids may face opposition from the public or eastern authorities. This increases the risk of production disruptions or protests. Therefore, enhanced due diligence and dynamic risk monitoring will be vital in navigating Libya’s political complexities and shifting security environment; investors who incorporate flexible operational frameworks and contingency planning may better safeguard their assets and project timelines as conditions evolve.
• Wait-and-see approach: As a result, IOCs may prioritise pilot projects and exploration, delaying major capex (capital expenditure) decisions pending political clarity and legal assurances. Investors seeking first-mover advantage should consider building local partnerships and keeping a watching brief on regulatory developments, as market sentiment may shift rapidly with political stabilisation.

4. International Investment Protections

Investments in Libya may benefit from protection under international law, in addition to contractual and legislative provisions. Libya is party to 26 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in force with a range of countries, including Singapore, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland. In addition, Libya is a signatory to the Agreement on Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments among the Member States of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (1981) (OIC Agreement), a multilateral investment treaty that introduces a protection regime across the OIC member states.

• Dispute resolution: Most BITs and the OIC Agreement provide for the resolution of investor-state disputes through international arbitration, offering investors a neutral and enforceable dispute resolution mechanism. Common fora for arbitration under these treaties include the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International Chamber of Commerce, or ad hoc arbitration usually under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
• Substantive protections: While the core substantive protections – such as fair and equitable treatment, protection against expropriation, full protection and security, most favoured nation treatment, and free transfer of funds – are generally provided for in similar terms across BITs, each instrument is different, potentially with varying scope and strength of protections. For example, the OIC Agreement does not require fair and equitable treatment. In addition, most favoured nation treatment under the OIC Agreement is subject to several exceptions that may limit its practical effect for investors.

Therefore, before investing in Libya, investors should identify which treaty may apply to their investment and carefully review the substantive and procedural protections offered, including the dispute resolution provisions and any limitations or special conditions that may apply.

Conclusion

Libya’s renewed oil and gas tender, modernised EPSA V, and emphasis on progression signal a strategic opportunity for international partners. While market entry risks remain, the tender’s improved legal and fiscal framework, coupled with Libya’s project development, creates key opportunities for sophisticated investors and their advisers. Early engagement, thorough risk assessment, and flexible investment models will be critical for those looking to unlock Libya’s long-term growth and diversification trajectory.

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Hafed Al Ghwell

Libya’s unity is a political fiction masking entrenched fractures, rival power centers, and a decade of failed state-building.

For more than a decade, Libya has been treated as a country that merely needs one more election, one more agreement, or one more summit to finally reunify. But beneath this hopeful rhetoric lies a harsher landscape: rival quasi-states, militia fiefdoms, hollowed institutions, and a political class invested in preserving fragmentation. Laws, currencies, and even basic freedoms differ by region, creating separate realities for Libyans depending on which checkpoint they reach first.

Understanding this fractured landscape is essential, not only to puncture the illusion of a unified state but to imagine solutions grounded in what Libya actually is — not what outsiders wish it to be. The fiction of “one Libya” has survived so long, but it is critical to understand how it masks systems of power that thrive on division, and why a decentralized or federal framework may offer the only realistic path toward stability.

Libya’s long march toward democracy has been a tragic comedy of delusions and missed opportunities. Each time politicians or mediators pledge loyalty to a “unified Libya,” it papers over deep fractures born from a patchwork of rival governments and militia fiefdoms with competing claims to legitimacy. The sad truth is that after 11 years of limbo, violence, and highly touted summitry, Libya is as divided as ever. A flag in Tripoli means something very different from the one raised in Benghazi.

Since 2014, Libya has effectively split into two virtual quasi-states. In the west, a Tripoli-based administration, the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU), governs most of the population there. In the east and south, a different regime in Benghazi backed by an illegitimate House of Representatives (HoR) and the warlord Khalifa Haftar and his sons rules the rest. Each side keeps its own treasury, oil revenues, ministries, and taxes. In practice, a law or decree passed in Tripoli means absolutely nothing in the east and vice versa.

National institutions, the first casualty of Libya’s deepening fragmentation, have become hollow shells. The Central Bank of Libya, split after the 2014 clashes, briefly reunited in 2022 — only to fracture again. By late 2023, eastern authorities were secretly printing billions of dinars off the books. That flood of unrecorded cash worsened inflation and drove dollars underground, leaving ordinary Libyans in the lurch.

Security is no longer unified. Libya has no national army or police. Instead, dozens of militias hold real power under the banner of either the west or the east. In the east, Haftar’s so-called Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) commands numerous brigades, including extremist Salafi militias. In the west, Tripoli’s defense falls to other armed groups, from Rada Special Deterrence forces to Misratan brigades, some tied to the UN government, others not. These factions control airports, border posts, and checkpoints — all critical chokepoints for Libya’s economic activity. Libyans may draw salaries from the government, but on any given day, it is the gunmen, not the politicians, who hold sway.

The divisions even show up on the map of daily life. Consider the Soumoud Convoy bound for Gaza in June 2025. It was welcomed with open arms across western Libya, from Zliten to Misrata, with locals offering water, food, and aid. But a few hours later, as it neared Sirte, armed men under Haftar’s command halted it under the guise of “security.” Volunteers were stranded at a desert roadblock for days. This exposed an awful, often dismissed truth: Libya is not under one rule of law; each faction enforces its own. The split plays out in politics, too.

Take Libya’s municipal elections of 2024–25. Dozens of towns held council elections with remarkably high turnout (over 70% in the first round), a hopeful sign for local democracy after nearly a decade and a half of false starts. But in the east, parallel authorities simply cancelled elections in 27 municipalities, often through threats. Residents were simply told there would be no vote. So, while Libyans in the west and south were choosing mayors, Libyans under Haftar’s control were barred from voting at all, making a complete mockery of any claims that “one Libya votes as one.”

Money has also become a battlefield — perhaps Libya’s bloodiest to date. Libya’s economy depends almost entirely on oil, yet even that flow is contested. In 2024, eastern militias, for instance, shut half of Libya’s output (about 700,000 barrels per day) to press their demands. Tripoli’s National Oil Corporation may sign export deals, but eastern factions can simply seize shipments or shut down pipelines. For example, when Tripoli’s leaders fired the central bank governor, Haftar’s forces blocked ports and halted more than half of Libya’s oil exports, which cost well over $100 million in a few days. Elsewhere, separate printing presses churn out dinars, so Libyans cannot trust that the cash in their hands will be accepted tomorrow.

All the while, Libya’s politicians and foreign diplomats keep parroting the word “unity,” with every press conference and peace plan repeating the mantra of one country, one flag, one election. But these are empty words that are very detached from reality. On the ground, eastern elites have cemented their mini-state. In the west, leaders still negotiate through militia brokers. Neither side wants to give up control, yet outsiders insist on “one Libya” anyhow.

A dose of reality might be more useful than hope. Admitting that Libya is split does not mean surrender; it means starting from where the country is. It is no surprise that there are suggestions and murmurs of federalism, i.e., dividing Libya into its historical regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, or increasing them to several states, each with its own government under a weak central state. It sounds radical, but it would align formal structures with on-the-ground divisions. Better to manage a decentralized Libya than keep playing a unity game that only ends in violence.

History backs this lesson. Each time outsiders have tried a winner-take-all solution, Libyan factions have simply torn it apart. Every “final” roadmap collapsed when militias smelled defeat. Every unity government lasted only as long as its strongest backer allowed. Foreign mediators keep pushing all-or-nothing plans, as if militia brigades would simply disarm on command. They ignore that each side has heavy patrons of its own from Europe to the Gulf, and the past 11 years show clearly that power here is enforced at gunpoint, not by the ballot box.

The reality of Libya is a patchwork of fiefdoms and mafias, not the unified state its ruling elite claims it is. Cities like Sirte, Benghazi, Misrata and Sabha each have their own de facto “rulers,” since the “government” in Tripoli is mostly just a label on a map.

Libyans need practical fixes: empowered local councils, strengthened community policing, and newly built institutions from the ground up. It is in that radical reset that a sustainable balance will be found and a modern state built, perhaps a loose federation or rotating leadership, but one chosen by today’s realities, not sloganeering and fever dreams.

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Soraya Rahem

Cultivating Ripeness

The repeated failure of transition processes in Libya, particularly when it comes to the sustainability of compromises among elites, often reveals that proposed all-encompassing agreements have not had time to ripen. Yet this maturation is crucial to the success of the undertaking. To paraphrase William Zartman, renowned American researcher of and expert in conflict resolution, the ripeness of a proposed settlement must be nurtured by the mediating party in any conflict. In the case of Libya, the onus is on UNSMIL to do this by establishing a rigorous framework for any roadmap or agreement, one that would create space for dialogue among opposing parties, and, even more importantly, clear up ambiguities fully or at least partially.

The resumption of negotiations among the 6+6 Committee—composed of members of the House of Representatives and its rival claimant to the upper house of parliament, the High Supreme Council—is a step in the right direction. Tasked with reaching an agreement to revise the constitutional framework governing the electoral process, the body is supported by the recommendations and co-supervision of an Advisory Committee composed of twenty Libyan experts, in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2755 (2024). This format requires their members to work together on technical aspects of the constitution and elections. However, reaching solid compromises takes time, and the 6+6 members are struggling to achieve their mission.

For it to reach a sufficient degree of ripeness, any framework must elicit participation by a wide segment of the Libyan population. This would ensure more transparent and representative negotiations as well as political openness, and would limit the exclusion of minority groups. UNSMIL head Tetteh plans to resume and strengthen the inclusive initiatives already implemented within the framework of the ongoing National Dialogue and the LPDF by proposing the establishment of a Structured Dialogue platform. This would include representatives of civil society, municipalities, political parties, and security actors, and would guarantee the representation of women and certain geographic and cultural groups.

With the primary objective of laying the groundwork for a clear national vision and overseeing the constitutional process, the Structured Dialogue platform could help to limit the so-called kingmaking ability of elites. For one thing, including members of civil society within future bodies would facilitate a cyclical replacement of elites before each and every round of elections. And, for another, it would help see to it that authority over several matters devolves to grassroots civil society individuals and groups. This would counterbalance the traditional arrangements observed among elites, which restrict access to those beyond their circle.

Seizing Opportunities

Since its inception, UNSMIL has faced constant disruptions due to external interference that has competed with and undermined its mission. Despite UNSMIL representatives’ efforts to petition the UNSC to sanction those who obstruct the process—whether Libyan or foreign—the effectiveness of any such proposed measures remains uncertain due to structural divisions and persistent conflicting interests within the Security Council regarding the Libyan issue. In the conclusion of her book recounting her years as a former UNSMIL representative, Stephanie Williams examines the profound transformations currently taking place in peacemaking processes: “Will conflict negotiations be taken up by the relevant regional organizations or individual, interested member states? Or by private mediation organizations? Are there other formulas that can be pursued?” In setting out a remedial course of action, Williams argues that UN mediators must position themselves as “conductors” who define the framework and lead the process, rather than restricting themselves to the role of “soloists” who guide it from the background.

While it is essential to maintain a multilateral approach to negotiations for conflict resolution, UNSMIL could take advantage of the opportunities presented by the strategic ambitions of external actors. These ambitions may serve to incentivize such actors to resolve the conflict. Take, for example, the peace agreement that was concluded in September 2025 between the national unity government and Tripoli’s Rada militia, which controls Mitiga Airport. Türkiye’s support for the agreement illustrated how external economic and security interests could promote the establishment of new mediation arrangements in parallel with traditional efforts.

The U.S. desire to play a more active role in resolving the Libyan conflict could emerge as similarly constructive. This was demonstrated by the Rome meeting in September 2025 between Massad Boulos, senior advisor for African affairs in the Trump administration, and two powerful Libyan figures linked to opposing forces from the east and west. The meeting reportedly focused on how to draw up a unified budget among rival institutions to promote the country’s openness to commercial opportunities.

A separate U.S. initiative to merge segments of the armed forces of eastern and western Libya—as part of U.S. Africa Command’s annual Flintlock special operations exercise—could also present an opportunity to resolve the conflict. This initiative could be conducted in coordination with, rather than in competition with, UNSMIL’s efforts to establish a Joint Technical Coordination Team that brings together security groups from the west and east in joint exercises. For their part, by engaging in initiatives that enable them to take on recognized institutional roles with international mediators and partners, key Libyan actors could well find it in their interest to end the various conflicts among their respective factions.

Conclusion  

External actors, particularly those invested in Libyan affairs, already feel tempted to double as “dealmakers” in Libya. This phenomenon, if properly harnessed by UNSMIL, can help to resolve the conflict. However, it is important not to grant these outside powers a blank check; instead, UNSMIL and Libyan actors themselves should place limits on their prerogatives. Otherwise, as seen in the mediation process with the Palestinians in Gaza, there is a risk that foreign powers will shunt aside the concerns and aspirations of the people on the ground.

It is not difficult to imagine how this would look in the Libyan context. Left unchecked, regional and world powers might reach agreements among themselves through short-term transactions based more on commercial than political considerations—and self-serving commercial considerations at that. In such a scenario, the underlying issues that shape the Libyan conflict would remain unaddressed. UNSMIL should grasp this reality. If ordinary Libyans are to avoid marginalization at the hands of foreign powers and the local elites moving within their orbit, UNSMIL must find a way to truly involve influential external parties in its mediation strategy without going so far as to hand them the reins.  

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Soraya Rahem – Affiliated researcher at the Center for Economic, Legal, and Social Studies and Documentation (CEDEJ) in Cairo.

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Ferhat Polat

The path to peace in Libya is clear but fraught with difficulties; it will demand much greater courage, consensus, and commitment than have been demonstrated thus far.

Renewing the arms embargo on Libya may serve to increase pressure on rival factions and their foreign supporters, but by itself, it cannot resolve the core challenges the country faces, namely the ongoing fragility and deep divisions within its state institutions.

The United Nations Security Council has recently voted to extend its authorization to inspect vessels suspected of violating the international arms embargo off the coast of Libya for six months. This renewal highlights the international community’s ongoing concern about the North African country’s fragile security environment and a lack of progress toward peace and stability.

The renewal of the ship inspection mandate may reflect a continued, at least formal, commitment by the international community to stem the flow of illicit weapons that fuel Libya’s conflicts. In theory, strengthening maritime monitoring should reinforce the credibility of the arms embargo, constrain external actors from supplying rival factions, and support Libya’s progress toward sustainable stability. Yet in practice, the embargo has been widely ineffective: for years, various external actors have funneled weapons, equipment, and even foreign fighters into Libya by sea, land, and air with little consequence. Against this backdrop, the extension carries an ambiguous weight—symbolically important, but operationally limited.

Symbolism without enforcement

Politically, the move helps maintain pressure on armed actors and their foreign sponsors, demonstrating that Libya’s stability remains on the global agenda. Yet, without a robust international enforcement mechanism and genuine unity within the Security Council, these periodic renewals risk becoming mere technicalities that achieve little on the ground. The divided nature of both Libyan politics and the international response means there is no single “enforcer” willing or able to hold embargo violators accountable, undermining efforts to bring about sustainable security sector reform and rebuilding state institutions, especially security institutions.

The practical impact of the extension ultimately depends on how it is enforced. Although the EU-led Operation IRINI has carried out maritime inspections, its effectiveness has been limited and its approach has often been criticized as uneven, scrutinizing some actors while overlooking others who also violate the embargo. As a result, interceptions at sea have had only a marginal effect on curbing illicit arms flows. Moreover, maritime monitoring covers just one dimension of the problem.

Libya’s land borders, especially the extensive frontier with Egypt, as well as aerial supply routes, continue to provide opportunities for smuggling. This reality underlines that the arms embargo remains highly permeable and far from being comprehensively enforced.

Militias, power balances and stalled

compromise

On the ground, these enforcement gaps help maintain the existing balance of power among Libya’s opposing factions. Well-armed militias, still able to access weapons through multiple channels and shielded by the uneven application of sanctions, have little incentive to disarm or integrate into a national structure. As a result, the embargo has struggled to push armed groups toward genuine political compromise.

What Libya urgently needs is a credible, unified security institution capable of asserting authority, accelerating the disarmament process, and bringing militias under a single professional military umbrella.

Without such a force, international restrictions will continue to be easily bypassed and the broader political transition will remain fragile.

The extension also highlights the limits of the international system in managing crises. Multilateral mechanisms continue to function, but only barely, sustained by fragile consensus and hindered by insufficient resources, weak coordination, and a lack of real political unity.

The message to Libya’s political and armed actors is therefore mixed: the world is paying attention, but its patience and its ability to act decisively are limited.

Yet real progress will require more than just surveillance. Stronger enforcement of the embargo, along with disarmament efforts and bringing Libya’s security forces together, could help create the basic security conditions needed for credible elections and meaningful political dialogue. If these gaps continue, however, militias will be encouraged, public trust will weaken, and genuine reconciliation will become even harder to achieve.

The UNSC’s extension of the ship inspection mandate off Libya’s coast is a necessary step—an expression of international concern and intent. However, its ultimate value lies in action rather than authorization. To break the cycle of deadlock and insecurity, the international community must go beyond renewing mandates and address the root causes of Libya’s turmoil: fragmented authority, foreign meddling, and the empowerment of militias over institutions.

A strategic misstep

Renewing the arms embargo on Libya may serve to increase pressure on rival factions and their foreign supporters, but by itself, it cannot resolve the core challenges the country faces, namely the ongoing fragility and deep divisions within its state institutions.

The early international focus on holding elections, without first establishing the solid foundations necessary for effective governance, was a fundamental misstep.

Going forward, Libya’s prospects for lasting peace and security depend on a comprehensive process of reconciliation and robust institution-building. Unless Libya moves decisively toward unity, institution-building, and the rule of law, with sustained, coordinated support from the international community, the ongoing six-month renewals of the arms embargo, though significant, will remain merely temporary measures rather than practical solutions.

The path to peace in Libya is clear but fraught with difficulties; it will demand much greater courage, consensus, and commitment than have been demonstrated thus far. In the absence of an inclusive approach that addresses the underlying political, economic, and social issues, the cycle of conflict and deadlock is likely to persist, undermining hopes for a stable and unified Libyan state.

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Ferhat Polat is a Senior Researcher at TRT World Research Centre, specializing in North African geopolitics and security, with a focus on Libya.

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Soraya Rahem

The UN Support Mission in the country should reassess its approach so that consensus between the warring parties becomes the eventual goal, rather than a procedural matter that dogs the negotiating process at every turn.

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Introduction

On August 21, Hanna Tetteh, head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and special representative of the secretary-general, presented to the United Nations Security Council a new roadmap aimed at breaking Libya’s persistent political deadlock. Focused on reviving the electoral process and legitimizing institutions, the new UN initiative aims to create the conditions for a unified Libyan state. Yet the plan is likely to suffer the same fate as those of its predecessors, all of which sought to introduce power-sharing mechanisms in an attempt to resolve conflicts among Libyan factions.

This approach is supposed to guarantee each political or security actor a place in the main power structures and bring an end to the country’s fragmentation. In practice, however, the consociationalist model of establishing a power-sharing interim government gives the elites that are its constituent elements veto power over most major decisions. This reinforces rivalries, deepens corruption, and can even scuttle the intended transition to democracy.

Essentially, the various initiatives undertaken by UNSMIL serve to highlight the limits of the power-sharing approach, at least insofar as it is focused on elites. It is time to rethink the framework. Rather than seeking to bring the major actors together around a fragile and constantly renegotiated system of agreements, UNSMIL should reassess its approach so that consensus becomes the eventual goal, as opposed to a procedural matter that comes up at every turn.

And in order to prevent repeated deadlocks and address the structural and contextual challenges at play, UNSMIL should advocate for mediation frameworks that move beyond bargaining among elites. This can be done by managing temporality, given that the timetable for any process is all-important; cultivating ripeness, so that a final settlement is proposed only when all parties are ready for it; and seizing any and all major opportunities to resolve the conflict.

UNSMIL’s Structural Limitations

For nearly a decade, Libya has been marked by deep institutional division: a government executive based in Tripoli; and a House of Representatives based in Tobruk. This fragmentation of power has fueled a lasting crisis of legitimacy, hindering the reconstruction of the state and the unification of the country. While both institutions are internationally recognized, the House of Representatives has withdrawn its confidence in successive governments in Tripoli, granting it instead to rival bodies that it has appointed itself.

The proliferation of armed groups—some of which act as proxies for external powers—and their control of territory have made the ruling elites dependent on them. While successive Tripoli-based governments have had to negotiate their authority with the Tripoli militias, the House of Representatives is allied with Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA).

Since 2015, UNSMIL has repeatedly indicated a preference for a power-sharing approach to reconcile the two sides, and has pushed for the establishment of a transitional government that would unify the country and hold free and fair elections. However, examination of the major UNSMIL-brokered accords, whether the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) in 2015 or the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) in 2020, reveals that this consensus-based approach was flawed from the beginning.

In 2015, the LPA established a Presidential Council, to be made up of three members based on representation from Libya’s three main regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan), and tasked it with forming a government of national accord. Despite sending representatives to the negotiations, the House of Representatives ultimately refused to grant its confidence to this new government, as it disagreed with provisions regarding the distribution of powers as well as certain military-related issues.

Furthermore, the consensus on the composition of the council fractured, as various parties sought representation within the power-sharing model. Ultimately the Presidential Council was undermined by rivalries among elites and no longer fairly represented the country’s three regions despite being expanded to nine members.

In 2019, the internationalization of the Libyan conflict resulted in the active involvement of the Wagner Group—a Russian private military company with strong ties to the Russian state that existed from 2014 until 2023—alongside LNA units, and the deployment of Turkish forces to support the government of national accord in Tripoli. In 2020, UNSMIL initiated “outside-in” mediation within the framework of the Berlin process, a series of diplomatic initiatives to revive Libyan inter-dialogue.

By including foreign powers in mediation and resolution efforts, the Berlin process made it possible to negotiate a ceasefire in October of that year. Paradoxically, the continued presence of foreign forces had ensured a balance of power among the Libyan elites and therefore an acceptable status quo.  

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), launched by UNSMIL after the 2020 ceasefire, was conceived as a more inclusive mediation framework. The LPDF brought together members of the main rival institutions but also, more importantly, created a broad representation of Libyan society: women, youth, civil society, and political parties were included in order to increase the legitimacy of the process.

At the same time, consultations and initiatives on security and economic issues were launched to complement the political component. At the end of these discussions, the seventy-five Libyan participants in the LPDF designated a list of three members (one each for Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan) to form the new Presidential Council, as well as a prime minister to steer the country toward elections.

However, the subsequent national unity government—formed in Tripoli in March 2021—proved unable to overcome the transactional logic of the elites and the persistent problem of corruption. Similarly, it failed to resolve the sticking points that served as an excuse for local and international “spoilers” to prevent change.

Unresolved debates over electoral laws, eligibility to run in elections, and constitutional amendments have allowed dominant groups to preserve their advantages and prevent the emergence of new political figures and the implementation of reforms, as well as to block presidential and legislative elections that had been set by UNSMIL for December 24, 2021. Instead of the durable pact among elites envisioned by the power-sharing framework, bargaining among those very elites became the order of the day.

How to Benefit from Temporality,

Ripeness, and Opportunities

Although the roadmaps proposed by UNSMIL have often been perceived as failures in the immediate sense, they have helped to create space for dialogue and established methodological frameworks that continue to offer hope for the evolution of the Libyan political process. The problem lies in continuing uncertainty about the medium and long-term sustainability of these roadmaps. Considering this uncertainty, mediation efforts should leverage three strategic tools to strengthen the consolidation of any roadmaps: temporality, ripeness, and opportunities.

Tinkering with Temporality

The issue of temporality is central to the success of the political mediation processes led by UNSMIL. The latter has historically favored tight schedules for the implementation of its plans. In part, this is due to the short-term nature of UNSMIL’s mandate. For example, its most recent mandate was renewed in October 2025 for one year by the UNSC under Resolution 2796. While a tight schedule can prevent certain blockages, such as the ability of “spoilers” to undermine the political transition, it risks fueling a short-term crisis management approach, one that is based on stabilization rather than long-term resolution.

UNSMIL’s latest roadmap sets out the goal of unifying institutions and organizing national elections within twelve to eighteen months. Yet the Libyan experience shows that tight timelines are largely illusory and frequently exceeded due to persistent disagreements, ambiguities in the text of agreements, and competing interests related to the nature of power-sharing. Ultimately, failure to adhere to timetables further erodes the legitimacy of interim institutions and fuels accusations of illegitimacy. Faced with this impasse, it would be wise to alter the process in favor of an incremental, long-term approach to agreements.

Such an approach would enable stakeholders to gain greater confidence in each other as well as in the power-sharing framework itself. This could allow for more extensive oversight of reforms. The latter could include decentralization—which has already been identified by several researchers as an effective practice in Libya, and which enables a more accurate representation of local realities.

For example, although the state has failed to fulfil several of its duties since 2011, municipalities have on several occasions proven able to guarantee security, ceasefires, elections, and access to certain services for the population. From an economic perspective, it is necessary to consider implementing reforms aimed at the redistribution of hydrocarbon revenues. This could facilitate a better distribution of wealth and, in the long term, strengthen local governance.

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Soraya Rahem – Affiliated researcher at the Center for Economic, Legal, and Social Studies and Documentation (CEDEJ) in Cairo.

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Emadeddin Badi

The war in Sudan has transformed far more than its own frontlines. It has reshaped the security economies of its neighbours, activating new supply nodes and embedding weapons and combatants into cross-border markets that now function as self-reinforcing “collateral circuits.” 

As seized stockpiles from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) entered circulation – alongside new external transfers moving into Sudan – these circuits fused manpower mobilization, convoy protection, fuel, communications technology and arms distribution. In doing so, they rewired the conflict economies of Chad and Libya. 

As the report shows, Sudan’s descent into civil war accelerated the spread of weapons and spurred the mobilization of mercenaries. Far from being peripheral, mercenary leaders coordinated convoys, negotiated access, escorted shipments and kept arms flowing despite shifting frontlines. In effect, they built and managed the logistical networks that sustained the war, creating two interlinked circuits – of mercenaries and of weapons – that reinforced one another and gathered their own momentum. 

The analysis traces how pre-war networks in Libya and Chad were revived and repurposed once the Sudanese conflict erupted in April 2023. In southern Libya, units aligned with the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), including formations in Sebha, Kufra, Murzuq and Qatrun, adapted to new demand by securing infrastructure, escorting flows and managing access to desert corridors. In northern Chad, rebel remnants and ex-combatants embedded in goldfields and border regions operated as brokers, escorts and intermediaries, grounding arms circulation in commercial and kinship-based arrangements. 

As fighting intensified, supply routes evolved. Initial RSF resupply through Kufra was disrupted by the loss of the Chevrolet base, forcing convoys onto harsher desert tracks and constraining high-volume deliveries. From mid-2023 onward, Amdjarass emerged as both a logistical and political pivot. Cargo flights disguised as humanitarian assistance, convoy marshalling and coordination with local stakeholders transformed the town into the backbone of RSF resupply into Darfur. Mercenary mobilization followed this realignment, with Chadian fighters and rebel splinters entering transactional relationships that linked eastern Chad to RSF positions. 

By 2024, mounting pressure from SAF-aligned factions along the eastern Chadian routes pushed operations back toward Libya. The refurbishment of Ma’aten al-Sarah – a previously disused airbase near the tri-border zone – turned it into the epicentre of a new corridor linking Chad to southeastern Libya. From this hub, weapons and vehicles were aggregated, stockpiled and pushed directly into Darfur, creating a revitalized supply route designed to bypass interdictions and sustain the flow of materiel to the RSF. 

The study also traces outbound proliferation. Weapons moved through Chad and Libya via diversion, resale and spillovers shaped by brokerage networks, local tensions, price signals and the involvement of mercenary and auxiliary forces. These flows deepened a regionalized economy of insecurity in which arms markets and armed labour sustain each other. 

The report’s forward-looking assessment highlights four principal risks: the durability of collateral circuits, the regionalization of instability, escalation from localized disputes and the politicization of logistical hubs. Recommendations include integrating mercenary dynamics into disarmament planning, draining surplus weapons, targeting brokerage networks and embedding arms management into any future Sudanese political settlement. 

Executive summary

The war in Sudan has not only reshaped its own frontlines but also transformed the wider security economies of its neighbours. The proliferation of arms and the growing reliance on mercenaries are reshaping the security architecture of the Sahel and Sahara region, not as residual effects of war, but as persistent forces that rewire conflict economies and deepen structural fragility.

Mercenary groups – often composed of rebel remnants or newly recruited fighters contracted as quasi-state auxiliary forces – now move fluidly between ideologically motivated conflict, organized crime and contract-based warfare.

At the same time, the circulation of weapons has become increasingly regionalized, opportunistic and commercially oriented. In weakly governed borderlands, the market for mercenary labour and the market for weapons interact to entrench a regionalized economy of insecurity.

When they intersect, they create self-reinforcing circuits: networks in which weapons, fighters, fuel and communications technology move together. Weapons incentivize the mobilization of armed labour, and mercenaries, in turn, move to secure, transport or profit from weapons.

It is the way each market sustains and depends on the other that defines them as ‘collateral circuits’, secondary but interlocking systems that derive momentum from one another. The markets for weapons and mercenary labour generated by the Sudan conflict have become collateral circuits – logistical systems in which arms and combatants circulate together.

Few events have accelerated this process as dramatically as the war in Sudan, which erupted in April 2023, triggering both inbound and outbound flows of arms. The collapse of internal military control and the fragmentation of command structures enabled a rapid proliferation of arms outflows from both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) stockpiles in Sudan into regional markets.

At the same time, significant transfers into Sudan by external state and non-state actors created new inflows, some of which have already been diverted back out. Mercenary leaders have organized convoys, provided escort services, and negotiated access at checkpoints, binding manpower mobilization and weapons transfers into a single system.

These dynamics clearly reflect the four proliferation pathways identified by the United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries (UNWG-M) its 2024 report: state-enabled supply, diversion of state stockpiles, opaque brokering networks and illicit exchanges involving mercenary and auxiliary forces.

Sudan’s war has activated all four, embedding them in cross-border markets that extend to the broader Sahel. The destabilizing effects of this have radiated beyond Sudan itself. Neighbouring Chad and Libya have been drawn into the churn, emerging as zones of weapons proliferation, mercenary recruitment and logistical facilitation.

The Sudan conflict has activated new supply nodes, expanded and reshaped trafficking infrastructures, embedded Sudanese-linked materiel into arms markets and created fresh incentives for cross-border mercenary mobilization. These patterns have illustrated in real time how the UNWG-M’s proliferation pathways materialize in fragile borderlands, undermining disarmament efforts and complicating conflict resolution.4 Mercenaries have been central to every phase of the war and to the functioning of its different supply pipelines.

They do not operate on the margins of trafficking but act as organizers and enablers of the circuits: escorting convoys, managing access and keeping flows moving across borders. Their involvement has ensured that arms continue to circulate, even when frontline demand shifts, making them integral to both the operationalization of resupply and the wider patterns of proliferation.

Beyond arms, mercenary actors also intersect with other illicit economies, particularly gold, raising the risk that their influence will persist even if the intensity of the war in Sudan declines. This reinforces the durability of collateral circuits and their deep integration into conflict economies across the region.

This report focuses on northern Chad and southern Libya because their internal dynamics – post-ceasefire realignment in Libya and post-Doha fragmentation in Chad – have made them especially susceptible to these pressures. It traces how regional arms markets and mercenary networks have evolved in tandem, highlighting key actors, shifting routes and the ways Sudan-linked inflows have altered the circulation of weapons and labour.

The analysis proceeds in three parts. First, it traces key contextual developments in Libya and Chad in the lead-up to Sudan’s war. Second, it examines how weapons have flowed into Sudan by way of state-enabled supply chains. And third, it assesses how weapons are proliferating back out into Chad and Libya, reshaping markets, pricing structures and security dynamics.

A dedicated sub-section also considers the role of mercenaries as vectors of proliferation, drawing on the framework of the UNWG-M. The report concludes with a forward-looking assessment of what these dynamics could mean for the region once Sudan’s conflict becomes less acute and offers recommendations for mitigating the twin risks of arms outflows and mercenary mobilization.

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Emadeddin Badi – Senior Fellow, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime.

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Dr. Miral Sabry AlAshry  

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya’s call for the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to build on the agreement on sovereign positions reflects growing international concern over the persistent deadlock that continues to suffocate Libya’s political process.

The Mission’s appeal to the two councils to advance the agreement, signed in a manner that ensures fulfilling the requirements of the “Roadmap” announced by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Hanaa Tetteh, last August, signals that this step is considered essential for reviving the political process. This indicates that any further delay may push the prospect of elections even farther out of reach.

The agreement on sovereign positions is now seen as one of the few available avenues for achieving progress. The deal signed between the two committees of the councils in Tripoli represents a rare step, as it sets mechanisms for selecting the leadership of key sensitive institutions, including the High National Elections Commission, the National Anti-Corruption Authority, and the Administrative Control Authority. These institutions serve as the backbone of the electoral process and the pillars of transparency and accountability. Restructuring them through political consensus could pave the way for holding elections, or at least demonstrate the councils’ ability to produce joint outputs that strengthen democratic legitimacy.

However, these positions become an arena for power sharing among competing blocs, raising the critical question: Is the objective genuine institutional reform, or simply a redistribution of power?

From the perspective of the UN Mission, completing the roadmap’s is requirements remains a necessary condition for advancing the political process and ending the increasing polarization and stagnation that threaten Libya’s stability and the unity of its institutions. This comes as representatives of both councils signed an agreement outlining the mechanism for selecting the head and members of the High National Elections Commission, as well as key posts within the National Anti-Corruption Authority and the Administrative Control Authority.

Reform or Power Retention

Do these bodies genuinely seek institutional reform, or are they aiming to maintain their hold on power? The UN’s close monitoring and active presence reinforce this concern from the participation of Deputy Special Envoy Stephanie Khoury in the signing ceremony sends two clear messages ” the UN supports the agreement and positions itself as a guarantor of its implementation and the Mission intends to link any real progress in Libya to processes conducted under its supervision, particularly following recent criticism about the lack of concrete outcomes. This indicates that the UN aims to demonstrate that the current understandings are not merely symbolic, and that it will hold parties accountable should they retreat or delay implementation.

ICC Developments Add Further Pressure

Meanwhile, the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, during her briefing before the UN Security Council, pledged to continue investigations in Libya under Resolution 1970 (2011) throughout 2026 and committed to moving rapidly toward completing the current phase of investigations. The situation in Libya was referred to the ICC by the Security Council on 26 February 2011. In May of this year, Libya announced its acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction retroactively from 2011 until the end of 2027, while eight additional arrest warrants remain outstanding.

Libya is suffering from a complex political crisis, marked by the existence of two rival governments: the first in the east, led by Osama Hamad, appointed by the House of Representatives, and the second in the west, led by Abdelhamid Dbeibah, who refuses to hand over power except through elections. Presidential elections were scheduled to be held in Libya on 24 December 2021, but political disputes between the conflicting parties, along with disagreements over the electoral law, prevented them from taking place.

The segment related to the International Criminal Court’s briefing to the UN Security Council adds an important dimension: the international community is refocusing on the issue of justice and violations in Libya. Libya’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction retroactively until 2027 reinforces this perspective and places any political or security arrangements under the umbrella of “potential accountability.” This may restrict the movements of some actors, but it could also push towards quicker settlements to avoid broader internationalization.

The real political message from the United Nations is that the UN Mission is not merely calling for the two councils to build on the agreement; it is implicitly saying: “We have given you a roadmap the ball is now in your court. Any failure or obstruction will not be acceptable.” This message aims to pressure both councils, hold them accountable before the international community, and create political momentum that prevents a return to a complete deadlock.

Haftar: The repercussions of the political

crisis in Libya 

The commander of the Libyan National Army, Khalifa Haftar, has warned that the repercussions of the political crisis threaten the unity and future of Libya, stressing that real solutions stem from the will of the people to determine their destiny and preserve the unity of the country. During his meeting in the city of Benghazi, he stated that “the repercussions of the political crisis in Libya threaten the unity and future of the country,” emphasizing that “real solutions come only from the will of the Libyan people, who must reclaim their right to determine their destiny, chart the course that resolves the crisis, and build the state they aspire to, in a way that preserves national unity and guarantees a dignified life.”

The achievements and gains accomplished in the eastern, central, and southern regions of the country starting with terrorism, building the national army, and the resulting security, stability, and progress in construction and development, as well as reinforcing state authority contrast with “some cities and villages in other regions of the country, which still suffer from neglect, where residents live in unstable security conditions, lack development projects and infrastructure, and have limited services, with no clear signs of solutions from the relevant authorities.”

After more than 13 years, Libya continues to suffer from a complex political crisis, marked by the existence of two rival governments. In the east, one government is led by Osama Hamad, appointed by the House of Representatives; in the west, another is headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, who refuses to relinquish power except through elections. Power has still not been transferred, raising an urgent question: Is this persistent power vacuum the result of deliberate chaos engineered by internal factions to maintain political instability or is it the consequence of foreign interests, particularly European countries seeking economic advantage?

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Prof. Miral Sabry AlAshry is Co-lead for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the Centre for Freedom of the Media, the Department of Journalism Studies at the University of Sheffield.

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The Sentry

Fuel smuggling has become deeply entangled with Libya’s security, political, and economic structures.

Addressing this issue requires a carefully designed set of medium-term domestic policy initiatives, cou pled with international targeted action against key perpetrators and facilitators.

Libya

Budget for all fuel-related expenses.

The Presidency Council, the Government of National Unity (GNU), the House of Representatives, and the High Council for Energy Affairs, which includes the leaders of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), and the Libyan Audit Bureau, should collaborate on a budget law that articulates an itemized breakdown of fuel consumption for the fiscal year.

After three years of concealing its fuel-related expenditures from most official reports, Libya urgently needs a public, legislatively approved schedule that explicitly plans and accounts for all fuel-related spending.

Clarify and reduce GECOL’s fuel consumption.

The same actors should work closely with GECOL to establish a clear, public assessment of the legitimate fuel requirements for Libya’s electricity plants.

An accurate and transparent account of GECOL’s true consumption is essential to end the misuse of electricity generation as a pretext for unjustifiably large fuel deliveries to armed groups and other participants in the fuel smuggling sector.

Moreover, GECOL should reduce its reliance on fossil fuel.

Lift the fuel subsidy.

The GNU should gradually phase out the fuel price subsidy and replace it with a cash stipend that is disbursed directly to households, thereby removing financial incentives to engage in fuel smuggling.

Replacing the subsidy with direct cash payments would result in Brega Petroleum selling fuel domestically at prices in line with international market rates, eliminating the price gap that underpins Libya’s fuel smuggling sector.

Forbid fuel exports until large-scale smuggling is eradicated.

The NOC and associated companies should be formally prevented from exporting diesel, gasoline, and heavy marine fuel. Because Libya is a net importer of those refined petroleum products, their export should raise red flags.

Apply chemical marker on all fuel distributed.

The NOC should initiate a program to mark both do mestic and imported refined fuel with a unique chemical signature that would enable authorities to trace its origin, improving efforts to combat fuel smuggling.

Increase transparency and competitiveness of all fuel imports.

In February 2025, the NOC pledged to subject all foreign fuel purchases to open bidding and to buy only from energy merchants who own refineries, underscoring the importance of transparent reporting. The measures announced by the NOC mark a step in the right direction and should be thoroughly implemented.

Remove top smuggling facilitators from the NOC’s cadres.

In April 2025, the Libyan Audit Bureau and the Administrative Control Authority established a committee to review certain contracts for irregu larities in the oil and gas sector.

The same committee — or one similar to it — should also recommend dismissing those NOC officials who have been significantly implicated in fuel-related abuses. Complicit functionaries such as Brega Petroleum chief Fuad Belrahim should step down or be removed from their positions.

Regulate NOC dealings with traders.

The Attorney General’s Office, the Libyan Audit Bureau, and other relevant domestic institutions should regulate dealings with energy merchants and require rigor ous financial reporting.

Enforce the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative standards.

The NOC should adopt Ex tractive Industries Transparency Initiative standards for all fuel transactions and strengthen in-house trading capabilities to reduce reliance on external energy merchants who do not own oil refineries.

Investigate past swaps.

The Attorney General’s Office, the Libyan Audit Bureau, and other relevant domestic institutions should investigate the reasons the NOC acquired foreign diesel and gasoline at prices far above market levels in 2024 and, potentially, in the preceding years.

Build an additional refinery.

The Libyan government should fulfill the existing pledge to build a new refinery in southwestern Libya, as the oil-rich country needs to reduce its dependence on imported fuel.

US, EU, and UK

Investigate Ali al-Mashay and, if appropriate, designate him for sanctions.

The US, the UK, and Canada should investigate senior LAAF officer Ali al-Mashay and, if appropriate, designate him under their respective Global Magnitsky-style sanctions regimes for his pivotal role in Saddam Haftar’s mul tibillion-dollar fuel smuggling enterprise and the misappropriation of Libyan state assets on a massive scale.

Demonstrated US concerns over high-level LAAF corruption will also position Washington to demand tangible reforms as part of its broader diplomacy toward the Haftar family.

The EU and other jurisdictions should investigate and designate Ali al-Mashay for his illicit activities.

Issue targeted sanctions on other key figures.

The US, the EU, the UK, and other like-minded jurisdictions should investigate and, if appropriate, impose targeted sanctions on the principal perpetra tors and facilitators of fuel smuggling.

Such individuals should also be excluded from any cooperation with the US, the EU, and the UK.

They include:

► Brega Petroleum Finance Director Faraj al-Jaedi

► Joint Force leader Omar Bughdada

► Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad leader Omar Mrajae al-Maqarhi

► Battalion 87 officer Mohammed al-Mazughi ► Zawiyah Petroleum Facilities Guard leader Mohammed Koshlaf

Embrace a network approach to sanctions.

US organs such as the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) should revisit the case of Koshlaf, who, despite being sanc tioned in 2018 for human smuggling, has continued his organized crime activities, including fuel smug gling.

The US and other like-minded jurisdictions should investigate the mechanisms that he has used to evade the 2018 sanctions, as this could inform stronger, more network-oriented measures against other top members of his group and family.

Help Libya investigate.

Given the nexus linking Libya’s vast fuel smuggling industry to the US dollar,494 the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) should assist the Libyan Attorney General’s Office in investigating the swaps concluded from 2022 to 2024.

This collaboration should be organized in the form of a task force that includes other jurisdictions, such as the UK and the EU.

Issue a business advisory.

To inform and caution the American business community, the US Treasury Department and other relevant organs should issue a business advisory on the illicit networks exploiting Libya’s fuel subsidy program, including suspicious energy merchants, brokers, intermediaries, and transporters potentially involved in those schemes.

International Banks

Know your customers.

Correspondent banks processing dollar transfers initiated by the NOC for fuel imports should exercise heightened caution and require comprehensive documentation when payments go to energy merchants lacking proven track records or refineries.

UN and Member States

Make the fuel crisis a priority in the economic track.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) should recognize the fuel crisis as one of its top agenda items in its political and economic discussions.

When Libyan stakeholders or member states commit to measures, UNSMIL must act as the central coordinator to ensure these pledges are fulfilled, consistently reminding all parties of the urgency and importance of carrying out agreed-upon measures.

Issue sanctions.

The 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee should utilize its authority to apply targeted UN sanctions under listing criteria including:

► Individuals or entities providing support for armed groups or criminal networks through the illicit exploitation of crude oil or other natural resources in Libya [Resolution 2174 (2014), para. 4(c) and Resolution 2213 (2015), para. 11(c)].

► Individuals or entities threatening or coercing Libyan state financial institutions and the NOC or engaging in any action that may lead to or result in the misappropriation of Libyan state funds [Resolution 2213 (2015), para. 11(d)]

Maritime forces deployed in the Mediterranean Sea, including but not limited to Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, should prioritize enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 2146 (2014) — most re cently reauthorized with UN Security Council Resolution 2701 (2023) — regarding the maritime inter diction of vessels illicitly exporting refined petroleum products from Libya. IRINI should make its fuel-related maritime inspections public.

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The Sentry

The End of NOC Bartering

In February 2025, shortly after taking office, incoming NOC chairman Masoud Suleiman announced the end of the oil barter system, effective March 1, 2025. The NOC had conducted billions of dollars in crude-for-fuel swaps annually between 2021 and 2024, apparently without transparent accounting. With his announcement, Suleiman committed the NOC to using public tenders to sell crude oil and purchase fuel through separate transactions — a policy he said aimed at achieving better governance.

This decision was an acknowledgment that the barter system used between 2021 and 2024 under two successive NOC chairmen lacked both transparency and competitiveness. The possibility that the NOC gave away excessive national wealth via these swaps underscores the need for a full investigation into the barter process used during that period. In fact, data from high-volume years like 2023 and 2024 suggests that the NOC paid far above prevailing market rates in its fuel-for-crude swaps, with economically unjustifiable overpayments potentially reaching nearly $1 billion annually.

An inquiry must determine exactly why the NOC overpaid, and, crucially, it must identify the actors who profited from these overpayments. Formally ending the oil barter system isn’t enough to solve Libya’s fuel smuggling problem, however. Although the NOC’s fuel imports from January September 2025 decreased by about 8% compared to the same period in 2024, their volume remains far above the country’s legitimate needs.

These excessive fuel imports continue to feed a resilient smuggling sector. Efforts are required to reduce imports further and increase transparency, including regarding how fuel imports are funded. In response to The Sentry’s request for comment about the transparency of its barter transactions from 2021 through 2024, the NOC stated that pricing committees had overseen the process. The NOC added that these committees determined prices based on internationally recognized global bulletins and that the competition for the barter transactions was conducted transparently with major international companies submitting bids.

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Illegally Reexported Fuel

Every day, millions of liters of imported fuel are illegally reexported via maritime routes to Malta, Albania, Italy, Turkey, and beyond. While some of that activity takes place in western Libya, it is far more extensive in the east—particularly through ship-to-ship transfers.

In a typical example, the NOC legally imports fuel into Benghazi’s modern port, but illicit actors load it onto a vessel at the city’s old harbor. At sea, the fuel is transferred to another ship, which then delivers it to its final destination.

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Major Fuel Depots in Western Area

1- Zuwarah’s fuel depot

In the mid-2010s, Zuwarah—a coastal city near the Tunisian border—served as a major hub for reexporting subsidized fuel by land and sea. In 2023, an incident involving a ship called Serdar revealed that the city’s seaport was still being used for illegal fuel exports. Despite security changes at the Ras Jdir border crossing in 2024, local sources told The Sentry that smuggling through Zuwarah continues, albeit at a lower rate than before.

2- Misrata’s fuel depot

located just south of the commercial port and connected to the sea by an underground pipeline, is one of the largest in Libya. From there, the product is transported by trucks to municipalities in the immediate vicinity, as well as to towns and cities in southwestern Libya. Smuggling networks tap into this transport network to move fuel into sub-Saharan African markets, such as Chad and Niger.

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The LAAF Network in Eastern Area

This network profits from moving Libya’s subsidized fuel to the southern borders in two main ways: First, its brigades impose taxes at checkpoints along north-south routes, collecting fees from small-scale smugglers, including large makeshift trucks driven by Tubu actors. Second, the LAAF diverts officially distributed fuel; by restricting operating hours at legitimate stations, it ensures that surpluses are rerouted south for illicit gain.

Tubu smugglers drive the non-official fuel truck across the southern border under Haftar coalition protection, official fuel trucks head south. A large portion of the foreign-refined fuel delivered to Benghazi’s port is kept at a storage facility located in the northern outskirts of the city.

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The 101st Infantry Battalion

This Battalion is a unit of the LAAF’s Brigade Tareq bin Ziyad, suppresses popular activism and perceived opposition across southwestern Libya. Known in this region as the long arm of Saddam Haftar, the battalion enforced a QR code system that allowed each civilian car owner to buy subsidized fuel only once every five days.

This is one of several mechanisms that the LAAF has used to control both the legal distribution and illicit diversion of fuel. As fuel shortages grew more acute and public complaints mounted across southwestern Libya, Saddam Haftar eliminated the QR code system in the southern region in October 2025, a decision likely motivated by a desire to restore his deteriorating popular standing.

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A $6.7 Billion per Year Issue

Independent maritime data service Kpler indicates that in 2024, Libya imported an average of about 234,000 barrels of fuel per day, equating to roughly 37.2 million liters daily. In addition to the imported fuel, another 13.8 million liters a day is produced domestically.

Electricity generation in Libya, which relies on natural gas, crude oil, and fuel, requires about 5.8 million liters of fuel each day. Beyond electricity generation, heavy industry, and transport activities — such as manufacturing, steel plants, agriculture, maritime, and aviation — likely consume 2.4 million liters per day.

Aside from these categories, Libya has about 3.5 million motor vehicles, which consume roughly 15.7 million liters per day, assuming that each vehicle travels 20,000 kilometers per year on average. All in all, the combined fuel consumption for electricity generation (5.8 million liters), other industrial activities (2.4 million liters), and motor vehicles (15.7 million liters) stands at around 23.9 million liters per day.

Given the availability of roughly 50.9 million liters per day, this leaves 27 million liters per day likely diverted. The fuel imports of 37.2 million liters per day cost the NOC $9.46 billion worth of crude oil per year, which works out to be $0.70 per liter. As for the fuel produced domestically by the NOC, its fair valuation is $0.62 per liter, based on average Mediterranean market prices in 2024. From these elements, one can deduce that approximately $6.7 billion worth of fuel was smuggled out of the country in 2024.

This means that the national wealth presently lost to fuel smuggling would be sufficient for Libya to more than triple its spending on both healthcare and education. In fact, the cost to the Libyan population is even higher, given that many legitimate consumers in peripheral areas must pay inflated prices for what should be subsidized fuel — markups not reflected in any official statistics.

Plus, even in cases where legitimate consumers do access the subsidized fuel and pay 0.15 dinars ($0.03) per liter, most of the collected payments end up unaccounted for, leaving the state with virtually no revenue from fuel sales. In response to a request for comment, the NOC denied The Sentry’s estimate of diverted fuel, adding that the NOC is not responsible for managing land or sea ports.14

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Justyna Gudzowska

International firms should address graft before participating in a deeply compromised sector.

International oil companies are lining up to reenter Libya’s oil sector. Libya is currently rolling out its first bid round for new oil exploration and development in nearly two decades, and there appear to be many takers from around the globe, including U.S. companies.

At first glance, this might appear to be a promising development for the Libyan people. The country desperately needs reconstruction, political stability, and investment. But new oil deals are unlikely to provide these benefits. Libya suffers from an entrenched system of predatory graft through which the country’s oil riches have been siphoned off by a corrupt elite. The result is to drive up fuel prices for everyday Libyans and leave them struggling.

To avoid perpetuating this corrupt network, policymakers and executives in Britain, Europe, and the United States should proceed with caution. While new commercial opportunities may deliver short-term gains for Libya, they will offer little long-term benefits so long as leaders in Tripoli and Benghazi continue to line their pockets while excluding the Libyan people from the country’s vast natural wealth. Only an effective, transparent, and accountable Libyan state can be the partner international companies require.

A major new investigation has revealed a massive expansion of gasoline and diesel smuggling from 2022 to 2024 via Libya’s fuel subsidy program. According to our research, this cost the Libyan state almost $20 billion in three years.

In 2021, Libya’s National Oil Corp. (NOC) began to directly swap Libyan crude oil for refined fuel from abroad. Previously, the proceeds from all sales of crude went to Libya’s central bank, which would in turn provide funds to the NOC to purchase fuel in line with budgetary allocations. But unlike allocations from the central bank, swaps did not register on the public balance sheet. This meant the NOC was able to increase its fuel imports without any increase in reported state spending. The result was that, in just three years, Libya’s fuel imports more than doubled, reaching about 41 million liters per day by late 2024.

Why did imports skyrocket? The Libyan authorities suggest that the increases were needed due to shifts in the gas supply chain and the growing need for fuel to power Libya’s electricity grid. But the amounts imported are far above what Libya’s legitimate economy could reasonably consume. The reality is that more than half of this fuel is smuggled back out of the country, by sea or by land.

Saddam Haftar, the ambitious son of Khalifa Haftar—who rules much of eastern Libya as head of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF)—was the primary force behind this escalation. Saddam has used his role as heir apparent in the LAAF to consolidate control over both maritime smuggling operations and crucial overland routes into sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, he was instrumental in bringing smuggling to unprecedented levels. Benghazi’s old harbor serves as Libya’s principal channel for reexports, using doctored papers and “dark” vessels to move millions of liters per voyage. LAAF officer and Saddam subordinate Ali al-Mashay acts as the main gatekeeper.

While Libya remains politically divided, everyone got a cut of the illicit profits. The recent surge may have been orchestrated by Haftar’s family, but they were operating in tacit conjunction with figures linked to the Tripoli-based government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh. Culpability also extends to northwestern Libya, where local warlords such as Zawiya’s Mohamed Koshlaf and Misrata’s Omar Bughdada (who is aligned with Prime Minister Dbeibeh) move fuel by sea and by land. Large volumes head south, where Haftar’s forces take over.

Many of the international backers of Libya’s civil war are involved as well. This multibillion-dollar heist was orchestrated with quiet assistance from Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. As a result, Libyan citizens must often cough up 40 times the official subsidized price for fuel while many of their leaders illicitly sell the fuel to foreign networks in Libya and neighboring countries.

The Haftar coalition, for example, diverts subsidized diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel to Russian military personnel entrenched at several air bases in Libya, who in turn ship the fuel to other Russian missions in sub-Saharan Africa. The Haftar coalition has also been a strategic fuel supplier to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) throughout the ongoing civil war in Sudan, enabling the paramilitary group’s atrocities in Darfur. Neither the fall of El Fasher in late October nor the horrific massacres of civilians that followed have changed that arrangement: The Haftar family continues to provide fuel to the RSF.

By 2024, almost $7 billion in subsidized fuel—about 15 percent of total public spending—was stolen annually. This is billions of dollars in public wealth that should fund hospitals, schools, and other essential infrastructure. The scheme has deprived the central bank of the hard currency needed for essential imports such as food and medicine, driving consumer price inflation and the Libyan dinar’s depreciation. In an ironic twist, citizens of one of the world’s richest oil nations are often forced to wait in long lines at petrol stations and pay inflated black market prices for fuel. Early this year, the NOC said it was ending crude-for-fuel swaps. Even so, fuel import volumes remain unjustifiably high, and large-scale smuggling persists.

International oil companies and Western policymakers are clearly hoping that there are profitable deals to be made in Libya’s oil sector. They are not wrong about the fundamentals: Libya’s geology, both onshore and offshore, remains rich with untapped reserves, and the NOC is, by and large, staffed by a cadre of skilled hydrocarbons professionals. But foreign companies would be wise to consider how sustainable their new projects are likely to be. As the Libyan state is hollowed out by vested interests, the risk of social unrest and renewed conflict rises. A new round of war, particularly one that rearranges the country’s political leadership, could quickly put any new deals at risk.

So, what can the United States and like-minded states actually do about this? Quite a lot. Libya’s oil sector is wedded to the U.S. dollar. This provides a means of applying direct pressure and dictating the terms on which international companies can reenter Libya’s market.

Libyan leaders are currently negotiating with ExxonMobil and Chevron, for example. Rather than leaning on informal deals to facilitate these companies’ reentry, the Trump administration should be looking to bolster the Libyan NOC as a technocratic institution capable of sustaining reliable and lasting contracts. For U.S. companies to pursue long-term investments, they need a better degree of lasting security than the kleptocrats can provide. To this end, U.S. senior advisor Massad Boulos is believed to be pursuing a fixed budget for Libya’s NOC to help limit the potential for off-book expenditures. Yet such a push will be rendered entirely futile if the issue of rampant fuel smuggling is allowed to persist.

Policymakers in the United States and other like-minded countries should send a firm message that the NOC must remain independent. Investigating and sanctioning key players such as Mashay for their plunder of Libya’s public funds would help do so. Sanctions have not been used against Libya’s most corrupt actors and their enablers; changing that would go a long way toward deterrence. Similarly, the United States could issue a business advisory warning U.S. firms about the illicit networks of merchants, brokers, intermediaries, and transporters exploiting Libya’s fuel subsidy program.

As part of its Libya policy, the Trump administration has stated that it seeks to pursue trade over aid. Public messaging has also emphasized the importance of reunifying Libyan state institutions and the critical role played by the NOC, in particular. As economic dealmaking continues, the latter two conditions cannot be forgotten. It would be a mistake for policymakers in Washington and other foreign capitals to assume that corruption is inevitable in Libya and thus deals must be done with individuals such as Haftar or Dbeibeh rather than the NOC.

Unless the United States and its allies deal with the appropriate Libyan institutions rather than its ruling families, corruption will continue. First and foremost, this will hurt the Libyan public. But as the likelihood of violence and political disruption increases, it will harm international investors as well. If Washington wants U.S. companies to succeed in Libya in the long term, it must help rein in Libya’s kleptocrats. Their massive fuel smuggling operation is the place to start.

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Justyna Gudzowska, the executive director of The Sentry.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

In Libya, the language of state-building is often just a dialect of theft. While political leaders publicly champion sovereignty and institutional reform, their private battles are waged over control of money flows, government contracts, and the influence these bring. This unseen war has hollowed out the state, creating a system where public institutions function as private treasuries for armed factions and their political sponsors.

The recent power struggles in western Libya are the logical outcome of an operating model where corruption is not a side effect but the central purpose of governance.

Under the Government of National Unity in western Libya, this model was perfected. The real governance occurred not in ministerial meetings but through shadowy networks where security figures placed loyalists across ministries and state-owned companies. For years, Abdulghani Al-Kikli, known as Ghneiwa, was a titan of this system. As head of the Security Support Apparatus, he installed allies in key offices to manipulate payrolls, secure kickbacks, and launder money. His power was built on turning public agencies into instruments of personal enrichment. But in a system with finite spoils, every alliance has an expiration date.

Ghneiwa’s growing dominance alarmed his partners. In May 2025, a coalition led by the 444th Brigade lured Ghneiwa to his death and dismantled his militia. The operation was framed as a move to strengthen state control. In reality, it was a hostile takeover, a violent reshuffling of the deck that changed the players but not the game.

Into the power vacuum stepped Deputy Defense Minister Abdulsalam Al-Zoubi, a former ally of Ghneiwa. Al-Zoubi’s rise exemplifies the fluid loyalties of Libyan politics, where partnership is fleeting and power is permanent. He quickly absorbed much of Ghneiwa’s network, establishing himself as the new face of western Libyan security. His primary source of influence was control over the Administrative Control Authority and, crucially, the Contracts Review Office. This office is the nexus of the system; it approves every major government contract, allowing its controller to demand bribes for approval, block rivals, and push through lucrative deals for allies.

Al-Zoubi and Ghneiwa had previously exploited this office with impunity. One brazen example involved the General Electricity Company of Libya. They approved a contract to import electricity meters at a grossly inflated price, pocketing the difference. In another scheme, they authorized the illegal export of scrap metal to Turkiye through a company owned by Al-Zoubi’s brother. This was not governance; it was a heist administered by a government office.

The linchpin of accountability, however, proved to be Audit Bureau chief Khalid Shakshak. He successfully challenged the law that handed the Contracts Review Office to Al-Zoubi’s authority, with Libya’s Supreme Court eventually ruling the move unconstitutional. This judicial decision was a direct blow to Al-Zoubi’s revenue stream, cutting him off from the lifeblood of his power. The current stalemate is, therefore, highly volatile.

Al-Zoubi is unlikely to accept this loss passively. Any attempt by him to forcibly retake control of the Contracts Review Office from Shakshak could easily trigger another round of street fighting in Tripoli. Furthermore, in this environment, today’s allies are tomorrow’s rivals. Just as Al-Zoubi betrayed Ghneiwa, his own partners may soon see him as the next obstacle to their ambitions.

This self-cannibalizing cycle in the west is mirrored by a more consolidated kleptocracy in the east. Khalifa Haftar and his sons have transformed their territorial control into an economic empire with no oversight. Their dominance is built on similar pillars: commandeering public budgets and orchestrating illicit revenue streams. A primary example is the massive fuel-smuggling scheme orchestrated by Saddam Haftar.

By exploiting Libya’s bloated fuel subsidy program, his network siphons off billions of dollars annually, selling subsidized diesel on the black market and depriving the state of crucial hard currency. This starves the national economy and fuels inflation, hurting ordinary Libyans. To date, the Haftars have industrialized corruption, using their armed dominance to coordinate smuggling routes by land and sea, with the proceeds strengthening their grip on power and even fueling conflicts in neighboring countries such as Sudan.

The international community often misreads this chaos. Figures like Al-Zoubi are frequently treated as stabilizers and reliable partners. World powers, including the US, France, and Turkey, engage with them as bridges between east and west or as bulwarks against terrorism. This engagement is a fatal miscalculation. It mistakes a temporary strongman for a foundation of stability. By granting these figures legitimacy and diplomatic cover, the international community removes any incentive for reform.

It rewards the very behavior that perpetuates the crisis. The recent illegal detention of Mohammed Mensli, head of Libya’s Asset Recovery and Management Office, is a case in point. Just as Mensli was on the verge of recovering billions in stolen state assets, he was arrested and held without trial. His imprisonment is widely seen as an effort by corrupt networks to seize control of those assets or silence a threat. The muted response from many international capitals in the face of such acts speaks volumes.

Libya is thus trapped in a feedback loop of predation. The western system constantly collapses in on itself as rivals battle for a larger share of a shrinking pie. The eastern system feigns as a disciplined criminal enterprise, extracting wealth with brutal efficiency. Both models are sustained by foreign powers that prioritize short-term security cooperation or commercial contracts over genuine stability.

The pattern is not new, but its consequences are becoming harder to ignore. Libya keeps recycling the same elites, each claiming to secure the state while fighting over the same revenue streams. The system collapses not from lack of capacity but from the way capacity is intentionally repurposed. Every office becomes a prize. Every alliance has an expiry date. Every attempt at reform becomes a redistribution of rents dressed as governance.

Until this calculus changes, Libya will remain a country consumed by its leaders, a nation where the fight to build a state is lost to the endless, unseen war over who gets to loot it. Libya’s instability is, therefore, not driven by ideology, foreign actors, or structural weakness alone. It is driven by a competition for money, contracts, and influence that has replaced the state itself — leaving the country to continue feeding on its own institutions, as the ruling elites mistake the pursuit of personal gain for political strategy.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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Tom O’Connor

At the Crossroads of Crises

Risks posed by Libya’s fractured state and the presence of foreign actors are compounded by instability in neighboring nations—some of which can be traced back to the initial shock of Qaddafi’s sudden downfall and the subsequent vacuum of power.

The collapse of Libya in 2011 sparked a major influx of arms and fighters through the Sahel, with ethnic Tuareg fighters who once fought on both sides of the Libyan Civil War staging a 2012 uprising in Mali. This was followed by an explosion of Islamist insurgency, including groups linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, that is spreading across the region today.

To the southeast, Haftar’s troops have been accused of aiding the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces against the Sudanese Armed Forces in the civil war that first erupted in Sudan in 2021. The Government of National Unity has further alleged that Haftar supported the Rapid Support Forces with fuel transfers backed by the United Arab Emirates, though UAE officials have repeatedly rejected direct involvement in Sudan’s civil war.

The conflict in Sudan is considered to be the world’s worst humanitarian crisis today, driving millions of people out of the large African nation. Many of these refugees from Sudan and others fleeing conflicts and harsh conditions elsewhere in Africa find their way to Libya, taking advantage of the country’s disunity and unpatrolled borders to embark on a treacherous trip across the Mediterranean to Europe.

Nearly 60,000 people survived the journey and another 1,500 are known to have perished in 2025 alone, according to the European Union’s Frontex border security agency, which identifies Libya as the primary departure point. The total number of those who fled from Libya by sea since 2011 is believed to at least be in the hundreds of thousands, with potentially more unreported.

“Europe has a big problem with the immigrants who come with ships,” Sahad said. “Why do we have these immigrants? Because we could not control the borders, our southern borders. We cannot control them. We need help in that regard. We need technology.”

“We cannot control the vast borders in the south, but with technology, you can, and Europe is not giving us that help,” he added.

Yet there’s hope Washington may be able to step in here, as Sahad believes this is “another thing the United States can help us with,” and do so with a promise of reciprocal benefits.

“We’re not saying that we are demanding or asking, but also Libya will give the United States the energy, and we will give their states the stability of that region,” Sahad said. “If Libya is stable, then there are big advantages for Northern Africa, for Africa.”

Alftise reiterated this point, arguing that, while the Government of National Unity has so far been able to keep the threat of Islamist militant resurgence in the west at bay, the lack of control over the southern border and growing jihadi infiltration of nations such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger meant U.S. support was necessary not only for safeguarding Libya, but far beyond as well.

“It’s not only for the sake of Libya,” Alftise said, “it’s the sake of Africa and the sake of southern Europe.”

Unity First

As the 15th anniversary of the uprising that toppled Qaddafi nears in February, uncertainty prevails over the nation of roughly 7.5 million people once considered one of the richest nations in Africa that has still yet to rebound from its pre-2011 economic performance.

Alftise said that “there is still a big hope that things will be okay,” though he acknowledged a wave of nostalgia for Qaddafi’s rule, fueled largely by social media and foreign outlets. In response, he said, “we’re trying to tell the people that era has more bad things than good things.”

And while the cautious calm that continues to hold has produced some positive growth in the economy and social development in recent years, so much potential is hindered by the still-unwavering split between the opposing governments.

In the east, Haftar continues to entrench his position, promoting at least two of his sons, Saddam and Khalid, to senior military positions and a third, Belqasim, as his top political adviser. Critics accuse of him emulating Qaddafi in his dynastic tendencies and strongman persona that overshadows Government of National Stability Prime Minister Osama Hammad.

In the west, Dbeibah faces not only the rival government in Tobruk and its foreign backers but also a complex array of internal factions, including Islamist forces who seek to push their own vision of Libya in backing the Government of National Unity. His leverage is further challenged by incessant clashes over Libya’s oil and gas infrastructure, a backbone of the national economy that has been sapped by the dual power rivalry and rampant fuel smuggling.

Nevertheless, Dbeibah’s administration continues to enjoy international recognition and his outreach to the White House has not gone unnoticed. Trump’s senior adviser on Africa affairs, Massad Boulos, traveled to Tripoli in July to hold talks with Dbeibah that reportedly included a Libyan offer to forge a $70 billion economic partnership with the U.S.

But Libya has also caught the eye of the administration on another matter often tied to Trump’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. In April, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, named Libya as among six nations that could potentially join the Abraham Accords, a series of agreements through which the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco established diplomatic ties with Israel in late 2020 and early 2021.

The deals marked the first Arab-Israeli normalization pacts since those struck by Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, save for Mauritania’s short-lived recognition offered in 1999 and rescinded amid a war in Gaza a decade later. Like the rest of the Arab world and many Muslim nations, Libya has never recognized Israel and has consistently expressed support for Palestinians, once constituting a major source of Palestinian militia funds and arms throughout the Qaddafi era.

Even years from Qaddafi’s ouster, the Israeli-Palestinian issue remains a sensitive one for Libya. Both Alftise and Sahad said unifying and stabilizing the nation remained the first order of business before such decisions could be taken.

“The important thing for us at the moment is to revive Libya as a as a country with a civil government, with democracy, so we can have our country in a sovereign situation, and it could take whatever decisions built on, one, the sovereignty of the nation, and, two, the agreement of the people, because that’s democracy,” Sahad said. “So, this is what we are facing.”

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Tom O’Connor – Senior Writer, Foreign Policy & Deputy Editor, National Security and Foreign Policy

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