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Wolfram Lacher

Multi-pronged strategy with dead ends

The EU is seeking not only to prevent cross­ings but also to return migrants in Libya to their countries of origin. This is done pri­marily via the International Organization for Migration (IOM)’s “voluntary humanitarian return” programme, through which more than 100,000 people have left Libya since 2015.

This component of EU migration policy is also closely linked to the detention system since, depending on the period, between 40 and 50 per cent of IOM returnees were drawn from detention centres. Their cases could hardly be called voluntary, as this was the only way out of detention short of ransom payments. This also means that the detention system effec­tively serves the EU’s objective of persuading migrants to leave Libya, thereby deterr­ing them from attempting the crossing.

Officially, the EU rejects Libya’s practice of arbitrarily detaining migrants. Since the current cooperation began in 2017, the pur­suit of alternatives to detention has been a declared policy objective. Improving con­ditions in detention centres – while a central component of EU assistance – is pre­sented as a stopgap measure until alternatives can be established.

But there has been no progress on alternatives to detention. Instead, the detention system and its web of financial entanglements have become further entrenched. Most recently, the Tripoli government presented the EU with a plan for a massive expansion of detentions and returns. Over­coming the detention system therefore appears completely unrealistic. This casts doubt on the rationale for ongoing efforts to improve conditions in the centres.

From a humanitarian standpoint, they are essen­tial for relieving acute suffering, even though they have done little to change the structural problems within the centres. Politically, however, they increasingly seem to be an attempt to make the system more palatable to European publics. Tellingly, the EU and its member states have increas­ingly toned down their demands for an end to arbitrary detention in recent years.

The final pillar of European policy is the attempt to improve the broader working and living conditions of migrants in Libya. Since 2016, the EU has spent considerable funds on this goal, for instance by financing basic services at the local level, focusing on towns along migration routes. The im­plementing agencies often hide the fact that these projects are designed to benefit both Libyans and migrants, and thus pro­mote integration – since this could provoke sensitivities.

At the political level, the EU has supported efforts to regulate labour migration more effectively in order to pro­vide migrants with some form of legal protection. Labour migration to Libya and transit migration through Libya to Europe cannot be neatly separated. From a Euro­pean perspective, it would therefore be sensible to provide labour migrants in Libya with greater protection and transit migrants with incentives to stay.

Officially, Libyan authorities profess to share the goal of regu­larisation and have repeatedly announced initiatives in this direction. However, there are vested interests associated with unregu­lated migration, which makes it easier to exploit foreign workers. As a result, there has been no progress in this area either. This policy objective must also be regarded as unrealistic, as demonstrated by the recent backlash against European initiatives.

Campaigns and conspiracy theories

It was precisely these European efforts to improve the integration of migrants that triggered a campaign against migration and EU migration policy in Libya in the spring of 2025. The immediate cause was a com­muniqué on a routine meeting between the IOM country director and the minister for local administration.

According to the communiqué, the discussion had focused on EU-funded projects for the protection of displaced persons and capacity-building for municipalities. On social media, however, the text was distorted and presented as a discussion about integrating migrants into local communities. Political opponents of the Tripoli government then orchestrated a media campaign claiming that the govern­ment and the EU were jointly planning to permanently settle and naturalise migrants in Libya.

Rather than dismissing rumours about such a plan, the government tried to demonstrate that it was protecting Libya from sinister foreign designs. The interior minister ordered arbitrary arrests of migrant workers on the streets and, yet again, stressed that Libya would never accept the permanent settlement of migrants.

In doing so, he implied that there were indeed actors pursuing this goal. Most significantly, the Internal Security Agency (ISA) closed the offices of international NGOs implementing EU-funded projects for UNHCR and UNICEF aimed at improving migrants’ conditions and interrogated their Libyan staff. In April 2025, ISA publicly accused these organisations of working towards realising an EU plan to “settle migrants from sub-Saharan Africa” in order to undermine Libya’s social cohesion. The organisations’ work remains suspended at the time of writing.

These campaigns should be taken seriously, despite the absurdity of such allega­tions. After all, preventing onward migra­tion to Europe is indeed the top EU priority. Combined with European efforts to improve conditions for migrants in Libya – and if one ignores EU financing for returns to countries of origin – it may indeed appear from a Libyan perspective that EU policy results in growing numbers of migrants in the country.

Moreover, these events should not be dismissed as an isolated overreaction by paranoid security forces. They reflect views widely shared across Libyan society – including within the top echelons of state institutions – which notably include the conviction that Libya is not a country of immigration. The public perception that the number of migrants is constantly rising is usually attributed to transit migration to Europe. This feeds into the belief that Libya was once merely a transit country but is now increasingly becoming a destination. The campaigns, therefore, have tapped into existing resentments.

The idea that Libya is only a transit coun­try was already common under Muammar Gaddafi and remains widespread today – even though it has always been squarely at odds with reality. Libya has been a key destination for foreign workers for decades. Transit migration emerged later, but labour migration has remained the dominant form of migration, even after 2011.

Without migrant workers, the Libyan economy would collapse, as Libyans avoid many manual jobs. Most of these workers come from neigh­bouring Egypt, Niger, Sudan, and Chad. The vast majority do not attempt to reach Europe: Nationals of Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad account for only a very small share of arrivals from Libya. And yet, European media outlets and politicians almost ex­clusively refer to Libya as a transit country. The large number of labour migrants often serves to fuel alarmist claims that hundreds of thousands there are only waiting to make the crossing.

Whether the number of migrants in Libya is really rising substantially is uncer­tain, as are the reasons for any increase, which might include a growing demand for labour or stricter prevention of departures. There are no reliable statistics. According to the IOM, the migrant population grew from around 585,000 in 2020 to 859,000 in early 2025, though these figures likely only cap­ture part of that population.

Far less cred­ible is the claim by Tripoli’s interior minis­ter, Emad al-Trabelsi, that the country now hosts 4 million migrants. The government has no means of counting or even estimating the migrant population. Such statements more likely reflect a general sense that migrant numbers are spiralling out of control.

Just as deeply rooted and widespread in Libya are xenophobic and racist attitudes. Migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in par­ticular are stigmatised as carriers of disease and perpetrators of crime. The popular belief that migration is driven by sinister foreign plots also dates to the Gaddafi era.

Over the years, many Libyan interlocutors have told the author that African migrants could not possibly afford the sums required for the journey to Europe, and therefore foreign organisations must be financing them. The fears and conspiracy theories voiced by the intelligence service thus reso­nate broadly with public opinion.

The material interests of powerful Libyan actors in both transit and labour migration are at odds with this discourse on migra­tion. Employers – from large companies to households employing cleaners or construction workers – depend on migrant labour and prefer informal, precarious arrange­ments.

Security forces tasked with preventing migration have an interest both in detaining migrants to extort them and in leaving routes to Europe partly open to ensure a steady supply of people to exploit. These contradictions are rarely acknowledged in public, but they are bound to feed the fears and resentments that shape Libya’s migration discourse for the fore­seeable future.

Implications

The campaigns against migration and Euro­pean migration policy give reason to take stock and draw conclusions from eight years of EU cooperation with Libya. Even as current signals from Europe point to an intensification of this cooperation, it has become clear that the “softer” components of EU policy have failed.

No progress has been made towards pro­viding more protection for foreign workers. Even tentative steps in this direction have provoked backlash in Libya. Moreover, EU projects in this area have exposed Libyan employees of humanitarian organisations to significant risks. Nor has there been any progress in establishing alternatives to the arbitrary detention of migrants.

On the con­trary, EU-backed interceptions in the Medi­terranean have supplied this system with a steady stream of detainees, and EU-funded humanitarian activities have made it more profitable for those who run it. The syste­matic abuses inside detention centres con­tinue, as they are integral to the extortion-based business model. Overall, European policy has helped consolidate this system.

It remains unclear how serious the EU was about the softer elements of its migra­tion policy in Libya. Clearly, however, it has now been reduced to its hard core, namely as measures designed to prevent migrants from crossing to Europe that are insepa­rable from the detention system. The EU’s official position – that it rejects this system and is seeking to find alternatives – is not credible. Both maritime interceptions and IOM returns depend on detention.

Any serious discussion of European migration policy in Libya must begin with the recog­nition that it is fundamentally based on the detention centres and the crimes com­mitted in them. Given the current political majorities in member states and at the EU level, this recognition alone will doubtlessly not produce a change in policy – even more so since alternative strategies are lacking towards a Libya in which warlords and criminal networks dominate state insti­tutions. Yet, a clear-eyed view of how Euro­pean migration policy actually functions in Libya is essential for assessing its political costs and consequences.

One such outcome is that the EU and its member states are empowering and legiti­mising Libyan warlords while also becoming increasingly dependent on them. This is most evident in their courting of Haftar, despite his record of war crimes, his alli­ance with Russia, and his overt use of migration control as leverage.

Should Prime Minister Dabeiba in Tripoli consolidate his power further, he would likely also adopt this tactic. At the same time, the rising num­ber of arrivals shows that Europe’s incentive structure for curbing migration is becoming less effective. The current strat­egy is therefore likely to deepen Europe’s dependence on Libyan warlords and prompt them to increase their demands.

The rejection of European migration policy by the Libyan public must also be counted among its political costs. Admittedly, this rejection is being driven less by actual EU measures than by how they are perceived and deliberately distorted by political actors. Still, the underlying conflict of interest is real. Preventing onward cross­ings keeps migrants in Libya, which is seen by the public as a growing threat. Europe’s Libyan partners, by contrast, are primarily those who profit directly from interceptions and exploitative detention.

Finally, the long-term implications for the credibility of the EU and its member states as global actors should not be under­estimated. Credibility suffers when Euro­pean governments, as described earlier, abet violations of the UN arms embargo in the service of migration cooperation.

Most importantly, no aspect of EU migration policy contradicts its stated commitment to human rights as starkly as its reliance on detention centres as a key pillar of its policy in Libya. The longer it continues, the more it will undermine this commitment itself.

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Dr Wolfram Lacher is a researcher in the Africa and Middle East Research Division.

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Frank Talbot and Karim Mezran

Turkey and Italy’s long-standing influence as external players in western Libya and backers of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) was reinforced this August‚—when Turkey’s President Recep Erdoğan and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni together welcomed Libya’s Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah in Istanbul.

The more notable development over the summer, however, centers on how both Rome and Ankara are shifting towards a model of engagement in Libya similar to that ofthe United States.

Despite the trilateral meeting between Meloni, Erdoğan, and Dbeibah, Italy and Turkey also engaged with eastern powerbrokers this summer. In June, Rome signaled its willingness to deal directly with the Haftar family’s opposition when Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi sat down with Saddam Haftar, the son of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar. In August, Turkey sent its intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin to Benghazi for talks with Khalifa Haftar and senior LNA officials. 

This increased emphasis on balanced outreach across Libya’s divide appears to be in coordination with the United States, which has also been active on the Libya file in recent months, steered by US Senior Advisor Massad Boulos. This was also on display over the summer, with Boulos’ July visit to Tripoli and Benghazi, where he met with Dbeibah and other GNU officials, as well as eastern powerbrokers, including Khalifa Haftar and his sons.

With this new convergence in strategy on Libya, Washington, Ankara, and Rome can—through sustained diplomacy with eastern and western factions—reinforce the economic opportunities presented by institutional unification and reform in Libya. 

Why Libya still matters

Libya is central to European interests and remains relevant to US priorities. It has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa, but it is also a source of instability in the southern Mediterranean and a key transit point on the irregular migration route to Europe. Since 2014, Libya has been divided between east and west with multiple stalled political transitions while remaining under the influence of armed groups, political elites, and external backers.

Washington has, in recent years, focused its Libyan policy on building stability, with a focus on encouraging steps toward security integration and preserving the independent and technocratic nature of key sovereign institutions like the National Oil Corporation and the Central Bank of Libya.

Spearheaded by Boulos, the United States has recently increased its emphasis on commercial engagement, prioritizing support to US businesses looking to enter the lucrative Libyan market.

Rome’s calculus looks different.  Italian politics are dominated by migration pressures, and Libya remains the focus of the central Mediterranean route.  At the same time, natural gas imports and energy projects are viewed in Rome as essential for Italy’s long-term economic security.

Ankara views Libya as both an economic and geopolitical stage. Its military presence and commercial contracts give it leverage, while recent outreach to eastern leaders suggests that Turkey wants to exertinfluence on both sides of the country’s divide.

Balanced engagement model

By September of this year, it was apparent that all three of these influential external actors were aligning on what had been the United States’ approach of balanced engagement across Libya’s divide. This strategy seems practical, given that no political or economic settlement in Libya is credible without eastern powerbrokers at the table.

Boulos’ meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in August included discussions on engagements in Libya and “joint efforts to deepen cooperation.” The US official’s visit to Rome in September further demonstrated this alignment of Turkish, US, and Italian strategies. Italy’s Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani, hosted Boulos on September 3 for talks on stability and migration management, while also inviting him to the consequential Mediterranean or “MED” Dialogues, scheduled for October in Naples.

A week later, Washington confirmed that Boulos’ visit also facilitated meetings between senior officials from western and eastern Libya, where they were encouraged “to overcome divisions, to unify institutions, and to promote stability and peace.” Reportedly, these officials included Ibrahim Dbeibah, the nephew and influential advisor to Dbeibah, and Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the LNA. On September 12, Fidan and Tajani announced in Rome that Turkey and Italy had signed a cooperation agreement and would increase collaboration on promoting a stable and prosperous Libya conducive toinvestment.

In addition to emphasizing balance, Turkey, Italy, and the United States are increasingly linking commerce with security in their dealings with Libyan counterparts. Energy projects, infrastructure initiatives, and trade opportunities are now frequently linked to security cooperation and migration management. The logic appears to be that commercial activity can expand as progress is made on stabilizing the security sector and consolidating key government institutions. Although each country emphasizes different priorities, together they are converging on a framework that views economic engagement and institutional unification as mutually reinforcing steps toward stability in Libya.

The most interesting development of the summer has been the alignmentof American, Italian, and Turkish strategy towards Libya around a balanced engagement model that the United States has been deploying in recent years. 

The challenge now is to ensure that this convergence addresses Libya’s deeper problems.  Widespread corruption and abuses by armed groups on both sides remain unchecked. If these issues are ignored, greater international activity in commerce and the security sector may reinforce dysfunction rather than resolve it.

What is clear is that despite Libya remaining relatively low on the priority list in Washington, US influence on Libyan policy remains real and visible. Most recently demonstrated by two very influential external actors adjusting their approach to Libya to align with Washington’s balanced model. In a fragmented and multipolar landscape, Libya offers a reminder thatUS diplomacy can still shape outcomes in meaningful ways.

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Frank Talbot is a nonresident senior fellow with the North Africa Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Rafid Hariri Center & Middle East programs.  Previously, he served in the Department of State supporting stabilization initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa.

Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and aresident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

Wolfram Lacher & Jérôme Tubiana

Migrant extortion business

Europe’s policies are not the fundamental reason why migrants are violently preyed upon in Libya: exploitation was built into the country’s migration governance during the Gaddafi era, when Libya hosted well over a million migrant labourers — among them hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharans who lacked any regular status and were already exposed to arbitrary detention and deportation. The big bang of today’s extortion racket came with the collapse of central authority, along with the Gaddafi regime itself, in 2011.

Thereafter, armed groups forming across the country could smuggle or ransom migrants in their own sphere of influence — often selling them protection from their own threats. Whether they acted as units of the fractured state’s security forces or as non-state criminal gangs initially made little difference.

European policies did, however, shape the business models used by Libya’s migration profiteers today. They incentivised extortionists to operate within state security institutions, and to profit primarily from preventing crossings rather than enabling them. Europeans — beginning with Italy — thereby helped create a now well-entrenched system of exploitation by state-sanctioned forces.

The foundational moment came in July 2017, a few months after Italy and the government in Tripoli signed an agreement to cooperate ‘in the fight against illegal migration’. The year before, Libya had become the most important route for migrants and refugees to Europe, and 2017 was on track to become another record year for arrivals in Italy. But that July, the numbers suddenly dropped.

This was not due to an increase in interceptions by the LCG, which was just then starting to receive boats and training from the EU and Italy. (They have since supplied over 30 boats to the LCG). Rather, it was because militia leaders in western Libyan coastal cities suddenly began preventing departures. Tripoli and Italian officials had reached out to them, promising them legitimacy as units of state security forces, and raising the threat of sanctions or prosecution if they kept smuggling migrants.

From then on, counter-migration became an attractive business model for Libyan militias. It offered official status, salaries and access to state budgets such as DCIM funds. Libyan state funds for food and cleaning of detention centres could be embezzled in myriad ways, as could the aid provided by UN agencies funded by the EU. Detainees could be rented out as forced labour and extorted in exchange for their release.

In fact, many militia leaders simultaneously engaged in counter-migration and migrant smuggling. In Al-Maya as elsewhere, they adapted their business model to shifting political conditions. According to migrants who made it to Europe, the best smugglers are LCG members — who run no risk of being intercepted. Recently, and increasingly, Libyan military vessels have been seen dropping migrants outside the Libyan Search and Rescue zone, in front of European vessels.

Crucially, counter-migration turned militia leaders into interlocutors for international actors. Coastguard and detention centre commanders received Italian intelligence operatives, IOM and UNHCR delegations, as well as foreign embassies seeking to repatriate their detained citizens. The heads of the DCIM and their superiors in the interior ministry were courted by European ambassadors.

Boosted by the money and foreign connections they accumulated through counter-migration, militia leaders gradually took over state institutions. In 2021 the commander of Tripoli’s notorious Tariq al-Sikka detention centre, Mohammed al-Khoja, became the head of the DCIM. Emad Trabelsi, whose group had controlled the similarly ill-reputed Al-Mabani detention centre in the city, was appointed interior minister the following year. Trabelsi picked two of his lieutenants as, respectively, Khoja’s deputy and the head of a new border guard. Trabelsi’s associates would work together on locking up migrants deported by the Tunisian authorities in Al-Assa, then moving them to a detention centre in the hinterland south of Tripoli.

The Buzribas also rose through the ranks: Essam Buzriba has been interior minister in the eastern, parallel government since 2022; in Tripoli, the Presidency Council promoted his brother Hassan to head the SSA in June 2025, despite his open enmity towards prime minister Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh. Networks that owed their rise to the migrants business now run it from the top echelons of the state.

How to amass capital

These figures’ ascent reflected a broader conquest of the state by militia leaders. Counter-migration was not their only path to accumulating capital and building foreign connections. They could make even more money by infiltrating the financial networks through which Libya’s oil revenues were channelled into imports, public contracts, subsidies and the like. But in the domain of counter-migration, they benefited from an incentive structure created by EU policies. After all, LCG interceptions supported by the EU formed the main supply of captives for the detention centres — the EU’s nominal opposition to arbitrary detention in Libya notwithstanding.

Critics of the EU’s policies often disparage its Libyan partners as mere militias, referring to the ‘so-called Libyan coastguard’. This may have been a valid criticism when the current policies were devised in 2017. Today, it misses the point: Libya’s militias have become the state. In the process, that state has developed vested interests in the continuation of the extortion business — interests that EU policies have helped to create.

On a visit of European ministers to Tripoli this July, Dbeibeh and Trabelsi pitched a grand plan to massively step up deportations of migrants and refugees.

The scheme is wholly unrealistic. The Dbeibeh government has little effective control outside Tripoli, and deportations are costly. But Dbeibeh is fighting for political survival and is seeking to mobilise European support for his government by demonstrating his usefulness. In the past, Europeans would lobby their Libyan counterparts, for whom migration was the lowest priority. But with counter-migration networks having risen to the top of the agenda, senior Libyan officials now bargain over the price for their cooperation.

Dbeibeh is competing for European support with Khalifa Haftar and his sons, whose Libyan Arab Armed Forces control three quarters of Libya’s territory. The Haftars offer the clearest example for how Europe’s obsession with curbing arrivals has led it to legitimising Libyan warlords.

Before 2022, eastern Libya had not been a point of departure for migrant boats, as western Libya is far closer to Italy. But that year, thousands of people suddenly started arriving in Italy from eastern Libya in large fishing vessels. Many had flown into Benghazi airport.

Alarmed, prime minister Giorgia Meloni received Haftar in Rome in May 2023 — the first time Italy had bestowed that honour upon Haftar since his defeat in Tripoli in 2020. Shortly afterwards, the boats from eastern Libya stopped coming.

Since then, Italian officials have regularly met Haftar’s sons, and Italy has started training his troops. The Haftars have demonstrated that they can turn the tap on and off. This year, they have allowed a surge of crossings to Crete, prompting similarly panicked visits by Greek ministers. Athens has since offered to train Haftar’s coastguard, but Haftar is still asking for more.

In July a delegation including ministers from Italy, Greece and Malta as well as EU migration commissioner Magnus Brunner were made to wait at Benghazi airport, then ejected without their scheduled audience with Haftar, who had demanded that they also meet with representatives of his parallel government. Both Brunner and senior Italian officials have repeatedly warned that Russia may ‘weaponise’ migrant departures from Libya against Europe — claims for which there is no evidence to date. There is however ample evidence that Haftar is using migration flows to blackmail Europeans, who seem only too willing to play his game.

In March this year, a campaign spread on Libyan social networks: ‘No to the settlement of Africans in Libya! No to Italy’s plan! Together, let’s drive Africans from Libya! Demonstrate this Friday!’ Pundits and Facebook posts accused the Dbeibeh government of colluding with Italy and other foreign powers in a sinister plan to permanently settle migrants in Libya, forever altering the country’s social fabric.

Political circles opposed to Dbeibeh had launched the campaign, seeking to leverage widespread xenophobia against the government. Only a few dozen people answered their call to take to the streets, but the government panicked. ‘We were worried this could cause pogroms, a bloodbath,’ one of Dbeibeh’s ministers said. He may have been only slightly exaggerating. Many vividly remember the anti-migrant riots of 2000, in which at least 130 sub-Saharan Africans and 16 Libyans were killed.

Trying to seize the initiative, Trabelsi ordered haphazard roundups of migrant workers, promised large-scale deportations, and summoned European ambassadors to tell them that Libya would never accept the settlement of migrants. Meanwhile, the domestic intelligence service shuttered the offices of international NGOs working on improving the situation of migrants and interrogated their Libyan employees. It then publicly accused these NGOs and the UNHCR of having a secret EU plan to permanently settle migrants in Libya.

The cessation of medical care provided by NGOs — some of which were acting on behalf of UN agencies — caused the deaths of several migrants.

The plot may seem familiar: as in neighbouring Tunisia, politicians and security agencies invoke a great replacement theory to present themselves as the guardians of national purity.

Yet in this case, the instrumentalisation of xenophobia by cynical politicians is just part of the story. Suspicions of foreign conspiracies are deep-seated in Libya, including among senior officials. Fear of demographic change is similarly widespread, and not only an expression of racism: naturalising foreigners would dilute the share of oil revenues available to Libyan citizens in the form of public sector salaries and subsidies.

Is Libya really the victim?

Allegations of a European conspiracy to alter Libyan society have long been part of mainstream public discourse on migration. Officials, among them Trabelsi and Dbeibeh, have repeatedly alluded to such claims, which are rooted in the almost universal view that Libya is above all the victim of transit migration to Europe. That discourse obscures the fact that the overwhelming majority of migrants — in particular those from neighbouring Niger and Chad — come to Libya to work rather than travel on to Europe, and the Libyan economy depends on a large migrant labour force.

It also ignores the EU’s funding for so-called ‘voluntary humanitarian returns’ through which the IOM has repatriated over 100,000 migrants from Libya since 2015 — far more than the Libyan authorities could achieve, and infinitely more than the UNHCR resettlement programmes to a handful of ‘safe’ countries in Europe and North America still willing to welcome refugees. (Tellingly, the IOM was spared by the domestic intelligence services’ accusations of collusion in malign European designs).

Yet EU policies have also unwittingly helped to lend such conspiracy theories a degree of plausibility.

The EU does, after all, focus on blocking migrants in Libya. Moreover, through the IOM and other organisations, the EU has also long sponsored efforts to improve the conditions of migrants in Libya, in detention centres but also through projects supporting service delivery in localities, or (unsuccessful) attempts to regularise the legal status of migrant workers.

The reasoning behind such initiatives is sensible: migrants coming to work in Libya may be forced to move on to Europe by hardship and exploitation; migrants seeking to reach Europe may choose to stay in Libya if they find work and safety there. But in a society that rejects the notion of Libya as a destination country, such efforts are easily seen as pernicious.

Libyans’ fears of Western conspiracies are certainly not assuaged by recurrent media reports that the Trump administration is looking towards Libya as a destination to which both to deport third-country nationals and to transfer hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from Gaza.

Vying for US backing, both Dbeibeh and the Haftars have reportedly signalled their openness to such plans. Whether they would actually cooperate in implementing them is uncertain — that they could weather the public backlash this would trigger is unlikely. Still, even their willingness to entertain such ideas shows how ruthlessly they pursue their quest for power.

This is also true of their cooperation with Europe which, by trapping migrants in Libya and turning Libyan forces into EU proxies, clearly runs counter to the national interest and pride as most Libyans would define them. The prevalent perception is that European policies are ‘more concerned with Europe’s interests than they are with Libya’s stability and security’

For now, Europe is satisfied with using Libya as a legal grey zone, where the lack of refugee laws conforming to international standards allows for counter-migration measures that would be illegal elsewhere. But in the long run, the EU is empowering forces that are no longer content to ransom migrants, but have their eyes set on extorting European governments too.

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Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin;

Jérôme Tubiana is an advisor on refugee and migration issues for Médecins Sans Frontières.

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Wolfram Lacher

Consolidating the Detention System, Empowering Warlords and Provoking Backlash from the Libyan Public.

The European Commission, Italy, and Greece are seeking to curb irregular migration through Libya. These efforts come at a time when several aspects of European Union (EU) migration policy in Libya must be acknowledged as having failed. This is particularly true of attempts to improve conditions in detention centres, and the situation of migrant workers and refugees more broadly.

Most recently, a campaign by Libyan authorities against what they portrayed as EU plans to permanently settle migrants in the country showed that European policy is provoking considerable backlash. As the softer components of this policy have reached an impasse, it has been stripped to its hard core, namely arrangements with Libyan security actors to prevent departures, as well as support for interceptions at sea and returns to countries of origin. These measures are inextricably tied to Libya’s system of arbitrary detention, which serves criminal interests. European attempts to disavow this system have been unconvincing and are preventing a serious reckoning with the political costs involved.

A modest rise in irregular arrivals via Libya over the past two years has prompted a flurry of European shuttle diplomacy, which intensified in the summer of 2025. Whereas irregular arrivals along other migration routes to the EU declined in the first half of the year, there was a sudden surge from eastern Libya to Crete, generat­ing alarm in Greece.

In response, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen dis­patched Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration Magnus Brunner to Tripoli and Benghazi. Joined by ministers from Greece, Italy, and Malta, Brunner met with representatives of the internationally recog­nised government in Tripoli in July to press for tougher measures to block departures – without any concrete results. The subsequent visit to Benghazi was cut short after the region’s de facto ruler, Khalifa Haftar, made an audience conditional on having the delegation officially meet his parallel government, which is not internationally recognised.

When the Europeans refused, they were compelled to leave. Since then, Greece has launched training programmes for Haftar’s forces, following Italy’s lead. But European efforts to court Haftar go even further. At the end of July, the EU naval operation Irini intercepted a container ship whose inspection in a Greek port found that it was carrying armoured vehicles to Benghazi. Although this was a clear viola­tion of the United Nations (UN) arms em­bargo, the Greek government made sure that the vessel proceeded to Libya, appar­ently fearing that seizing it would jeopardise cooperation on migration. Meanwhile, crossings from eastern Libya to Crete con­tinue, even though Haftar’s forces could prevent them.

This sequence of events illustrates the state of EU migration policy in Libya. The EU’s cooperation on migration with Libyan authorities, which it has pursued since 2017, has become increasingly ineffective, even when measured by the number of arrivals. Yet, European policymakers are doubling down on their strategy of seeking arrangements with Haftar and western Libyan militia leaders to halt departures.

In doing so, they are making themselves dependent on partners who are escalating their demands. The fact that a relatively small number of arrivals in Crete – just 7,336 in the first half of 2025 – triggered such alarm in Europe is only likely to embolden actors such as Haftar to raise the price for their cooperation.

The EU’s renewed push to contain transit migration through Libya provides an oppor­tunity to assess the workings and consequences of its migration policy in the coun­try. Beyond Haftar’s growing demands, there are further signs that the EU’s approach is reaching its limits. Although a change of course is unlikely – given the absence of alternative strategies to reduce arrivals – a sober evaluation of the political costs is essential.

Cooperating with predatory actors

EU migration cooperation with Libya, led by Italy, includes a range of measures taken by both Italy and the EU, as well as activ­ities financed by the EU and implemented by international organisations. Together these measures are intended to minimise the number of people arriving irregularly in the EU via Libya across the Mediterranean.

The most prominent of these measures is the Italian and European support provided to the Libyan coastguard for interception and rescue operations. Italy and the EU have supplied the coastguard with dozens of boats and ships, ensured their maintenance, and trained their personnel.

With European backing, a Libyan search and rescue zone was established in late 2017 together with a Maritime Rescue Coordina­tion Centre (MRCC) in Tripoli. Since then, the Italian and Maltese authorities and the EU border agency Frontex – and until 2020 also the EU naval operation Sophia – have been passing the coordinates of migrant boats primarily to the Libyan MRCC and coastguard to coordinate interception and rescue efforts.

The coastguard then transfers people it intercepts to units of the Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM). This Interior Ministry department incarcerates people in detention centres, where they face systematic abuse, torture, rape, extor­tion, forced labour, and often catastrophic sanitary conditions. Detention is arbitrary, since there is no legal remedy against it: Libya makes no distinction between refu­gees and other migrants, as the country has no asylum system and has not signed the Geneva Refugee Convention.

Pregnant women and children of all ages are detained without exception. DCIM units are usually closely tied to militias, for whom detention centres represent a source of income. Busi­ness models range from embezzling state funds for operating the centres to releasing prisoners in exchange for payment and exploiting them through forced labour or prostitution.

In its final report in 2023, the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, established by the UN Human Rights Coun­cil, concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that systematic abuse in state-run detention centres amounted to crimes against humanity, to which the EU was contributing through its support for interceptions.

European support for the coastguard has increased the likelihood of migrants being intercepted at sea.

In addition, Italian and European measures have also raised the risk of drowning. Since 2018, Italy has taken numerous legal steps to obstruct or block sea rescue operations by non-govern­mental organisations (NGOs) in the Medi­ter­ranean. Germany stopped providing finan­cial support for such operations in 2025.

At the European level, patrols by Operation Sophia were suspended in 2019, and its successor – Operation Irini, established in 2020 – was never given a mandate for sea rescue missions. Irini’s area of operation was shifted to the sea off eastern Libya, which at the time was far from migration routes. In addition, regular reviews are con­ducted to assess whether the presence of Operation Irini’s ships could act as a pull factor for migration – as some claim – and whether the operational area should be ad­justed accordingly. Such steps are justified on the grounds that they reduce the overall number of crossings, and thereby also the number of deaths.

A more plau­sible expla­nation is the intention to deter crossings by increasing the risk of death, which has risen sharply. Between 2017 and 2019, the proportion of deaths during attempted crossings on the central Mediterranean route rose from 2 to 4.8 per cent. In abso­lute numbers, the central Mediterranean re­mains the world’s deadliest migration route.

Yet, without measures being taken on land, those taken at sea would have pro­duced few meaningful results. In July 2017, arrivals from Libya suddenly dropped and then remained at a low level until 2021 (see figure). Interceptions by the Libyan coast­guard were by no means the main reason for this development, as armed groups in western Libyan coastal cities had begun preventing departures.

The main driver behind this shift was the prospect of gaining official status – and therefore funds – as state security forces, as well as escaping prosecution and international sanctions. Both the government in Tripoli and Italian officials used these incentives when engaging militia leaders.

This incentive structure for armed group still holds today. Operating in counter-migration offers the cover of state legiti­macy, international contacts, and opportunities for enrichment through the exploi­tation of migrants in detention centres. However, this calculus is continually shift­ing as domestic power relations change and Libyan actors adjust their bargaining posi­tions vis-à-vis Europe.

A series of conflicts with the Tripoli government starting 2021 prompted armed groups in western coastal cities to once again begin facilitating migrant departures, which is one reason why arri­vals from Libya have increased since 2022. Many units whose primary business model revolves around intercepting and detaining migrants maintain a foothold in smuggling networks, moving between the two markets as circumstances dictate.

The same applies to the east of the coun­try, which is controlled by the Haftar family and, because of its geographical position, was not used for crossings until 2021.

From mid-2022, thousands of people suddenly began arriving in Italy after flying to east­ern Libya and departing from there on large fishing boats, with Haftar’s forces central to orchestrating these movements. The Italian government responded by officially receiv­ing Haftar in Rome in May 2023 and offer­ing him cooperation. Around the same time, Haftar faced negative international media coverage after the Pylos disaster in June 2023, in which more than 600 people died when a boat that had departed from eastern Libya sank.

From July 2023 onward, the number of crossings from eastern Libya to Italy fell sharply, and in 2024 the num­bers remained negligible (see figure). Italy has since expanded its military cooperation with Haftar’s forces. The sudden increase in arrivals from eastern Libya to Crete in the first half of 2025 also appears to have been politically motivated. As described above, Haftar sought to use his control over the migration route as leverage to im­prove the international standing of his parallel government.

At the same time, the Haftar family has continued to profit from migration to Italy, even while preventing depar­tures from eastern Libyan shores. The main nationalities of those arriving in Italy from western Libya in 2024 and 2025 have been Bangladeshi, Egyptian, and Paki­stani, most of whom travelled via eastern Libya.

Italian officials have been claiming for several years now that arrivals from Libya are the result of deliberate Russian efforts to destabilise Europe, pointing to Russia’s military presence in Haftar’s territory. Similar concerns that Russia could politi­cally instrumentalise migration via Libya are now being voiced within the European Commission. To date, there is no evidence to support such claims. By contrast, the Haftar family’s political instrumentalisation of migration is obvious, as is the willingness of some EU member states to accommodate the Haftars’ demands.

***

Dr Wolfram Lacher is a researcher in the Africa and Middle East Research Division.

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Wolfram Lacher & Jérôme Tubiana

The EU’s push to curb Mediterranean crossings didn’t create Libya’s extortion economy, but has supercharged it, making migrants pawns in a lucrative game between the country’s rival governments.

Jackson left Cameroon in 2020, when he was 16 or 17. He spent two years in Libya and tried to cross the Mediterranean four times. On the last attempt, he was rescued by a European vessel, which took him to Italy. The previous times, he had been intercepted by the Libyan coastguard (LCG), backed by the European Union, and ended up spending months in Libyan detention centres. His struggling family in Cameroon had borrowed and wired several thousand euros for his crossing attempts and to buy his release from successive prisons.

His worst experience came after his second attempt in mid-2021, when his wooden craft was intercepted by a grey speedboat with an armed and masked crew. He and his fellow passengers were transferred not to an ‘official’ detention centre but to a series of underground pens which had apparently been used for livestock and now served to house the overflow of migrants. After two weeks, they were moved to a derelict pharmaceutical factory, which came to be known as Al-Maya detention centre.

Jackson said, ‘The place was abandoned. They opened up a large room covered in dust. We tried to clean it with our spare clothes and slept on the floor. There were more than 1,000 of us in that room. We were their first detainees; they had collected us to open Al-Maya.’ Some of this first group ended up building its future cells.

The one in which Jackson spent six months was almost hermetically sealed. Water in jerrycans and little food (a loaf or half a loaf each per day) were lowered on a rope from the roof. This was also the only way to get out. A video on social media shows a prisoner being pulled out — a rare event. Jackson mentioned a sick detainee being evacuated that way; he heard he had died shortly after. Some died from hunger, others from the winter cold.

The rope could also be used to pull out someone who had bought his release, though Jackson didn’t see this during his time there. In some Libyan detention centres, migrants are allowed to phone contacts to ask them to transfer money. Jackson and his cellmates tried to approach one of the more open-looking commanders. ‘Boss, please, what do you want from us? If it’s money, bring us a phone.’ The answer: ‘This place isn’t like other prisons. We don’t need your miserable money. We’re after the European Union. You can’t give us the sort of ransom the EU can. When we get what we’re looking for, we’ll release you’.

Not the usual sort of prison

Migrants who were detained in Al-Maya told of their surprise (and despair) when they understood that it wasn’t the usual sort of jail where they could buy their freedom. Up to 5,000 detainees were rounded up there to attract the attention of EU and UN agencies. The aim was to obtain the official recognition, equipment and funding already provided to other bodies focused on arresting migrants — the LCG and the interior ministry’s Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), which runs detention centres — by the internationally recognised government in Tripoli, as well as Italy and the EU and UN.

Those behind the Al-Maya scheme were well aware of the system. They included the Buzriba brothers from the neighbouring city of Zawiya, the godfathers of the local coastguard unit and Al-Nasr detention centre. This centre had been officially recognised by the Tripoli authorities, and visited by UN agencies, with the IOM (International Organisation for Migration) proposing the detainees’ ‘voluntary humanitarian return’ to their countries of origin. (The term ‘voluntary’ is questionable, particularly for people who have no money to buy their freedom.)

But the poor treatment of arrested migrants in Zawiya had led to Al-Nasr being delisted as an official detention centre and three of its top officials being sanctioned by the UN. The most notorious, Zawiya’s LCG unit commander Abderrahman Milad (‘Al-Bija’), was held by the Tripoli prosecutor for six months (he was later murdered in 2024). A key aim of the Al-Maya plan was to distance the new prison from these controversial figures and obtain official support.

In early 2021 the Buzribas joined the new Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) established by the Presidency Council in Tripoli, and Hassan Buzriba became its deputy chief. Largely autonomous from Tripoli, the Buzribas mended relations with former enemies in neighbouring Warshafana, and they decided to work together in Al-Maya, at the border between the two districts. They also built a port near the new detention site for patrol boats which they bought abroad, and began intercepting migrants at sea.

Yet the links with Zawiya’s controversial players remained visible. Many of Al-Maya’s detainees appear to have been arrested by Zawiya’s LCG and first held in Al-Nasr. This happened to Jackson when he attempted his third crossing, four months after his release from Al-Maya.

In Al-Nasr, the detainees were given only a few days to pay a 3,000 Libyan dinars (about $550) ransom, failing which they would end up in Al-Maya. The thought of returning there scared Jackson: ‘Relatives in Cameroon and friends in Europe paid and I was released after ten days. The next day, all the others were transferred.’ Al-Nasr had become a buffer to extort migrants’ money, and Al-Maya a dead-end prison to capture international funds.

Machiavellian and naïve

The scheme was both Machiavellian and naïve. For months following Al-Maya’s opening, the question of whether or not to visit it was hotly debated by international players involved with Libya. The EU and UN worried about reports of violence and officially avoided going there. But witnesses mentioned visits by people in IOM jackets, proposing the usual ‘voluntary’ returns. A Somalian minor, detained for six months just after Jackson, saw two IOM visits, which both went awry, turning into collective escape attempts, followed by deadly shootings.

With such a record, the scheme was unlikely to be successful. Further, the Buzribas’ relations with Tripoli soured in 2022 after they backed an unsuccessful attempt by a rival government to take over. In May 2023 government drones bombed Al-Maya’s fleet. Hopes of government and EU support faded. And gradually, the prison seemed to slide into a classic extortion model.

In fact, it wasn’t irrational for the Buzribas to gamble on obtaining European support if they could prevent a large enough number of migrants from taking to the sea, even if this involved abuses. The EU, including Italy, has relied on groups resorting to these same practices in their attempts to shut down migration via Libya.

EU migration policies have increasingly focused on controlling borders outside Europe. Commonly known as externalisation policies, they involve paying non-European states to block migrant flows, at sea and on land, as far south as possible. Yet among the 15 or so states with which the EU made agreements in recent years, Libya is unique in lacking a central authority: the government with which Italy signed its first deal in 2017 did not even control Tripoli. Currently, most of the country, including its eastern and southern borders, is controlled by the forces of Khalifa Haftar, who maintains a parallel government as a civilian façade for his military power.

Overall, the EU appears satisfied with the results of externalisation, and has repeatedly stated it intends to continue engaging with external ‘partners’. Considering the unique challenges it faced in Libya, the EU’s policies could be seen as successful in numerical terms, at least initially. Deals with Tripoli and Niger had an immediate impact on arrivals from Libya in Europe, dropping from a 165,000 peak in 2016 to 7,000 in 2019. But thereafter, arrivals from Libya again increased, reaching 47,000 in 2024.

Dubious and partial success

Seen in a broader context, even this partial success appears dubious. In 2023 some 157,000 migrants arrived in Italy, a figure nearing its earlier peak in 2016, explained by a shift in migration attempts from Libya to Tunisia. Flows continuously move from one route to another — as Libya closed down, Tunisia temporarily became a key transit country.

And the risky Atlantic crossing to the Canary Islands gained in importance when Libya, Tunisia and Morocco clamped down on departures. The nationalities currently dominating the Libyan route (Bangladeshis, Pakistanis, Syrians, Egyptians) partly reflect the fact that the Turkey-Balkans route has become tougher.

Such changes in routes have been yet another justification for the EU to continue its policies unabated and complete its North African blockade. In 2023 it quickly concluded a deal with Tunisia amid massive violence against sub-Saharan migrants, which pushed more of them to take to the sea. Tunisia then deported 13,000 migrants to the Libyan border, many ending locked in yet another new detention centre known as Al-Assa. Yet, oddly, the EU called its Tunisia deal a ‘blueprint’.

Since 2023 Brussels has also engaged in hasty partnerships with Egypt, Mauritania and Morocco — involving a softer stance with the latter on Western Sahara, from where boats also depart.

The EU’s focus on numbers has eclipsed the human cost of externalisation, beginning with mortality. Nearly 28,000 deaths have been recorded over the last decade in the Mediterranean, of which over 21,000 in the central Mediterranean. Crucially, while the rate of interceptions by the Libyan coastguard rose sharply from 12% to 50% of attempted crossings in the key 2017-19 years, the death rate at sea more than tripled, from 2% to 7%.

This contradicts the EU’s claim that its policies are saving lives. The EU’s naval operation Irini — unlike its predecessors — was established in 2020 without a mandate for sea rescue. Italy has taken to obstructing rescue ships operated by NGOs, and Germany has recently halted funding to them. All this raises the risk of death, and appears to be a deliberate strategy to maximise deterrence.

Less visibly, the desert hinterland south of Africa’s northern coast has been deadly too. In Niger, migrant deaths multiplied by five between 2016 and 2017 after an EU-backed law criminalising the transport of migrants was enforced. In Libya itself, data is lacking on deaths in the desert, in traffickers’ hangars where migrants are systematically tortured for ransom, and in official detention centres. Mass graves of migrants are occasionally discovered — but more such graves are likely filled daily.

***

Wolfram Lacher is a senior associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin; Jérôme Tubiana is an advisor on refugee and migration issues for Médecins Sans Frontières.

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Tim Eaton

A political, as well as a criminal justice based approach, is required for an effective UK policy.

Yvette Cooper became the UK’s foreign secretary earlier this month after a cabinet reshuffle. One major domestic priority that will follow her from the Home Office to the Foreign Office is migration.

The UK government has presented its strategy for tackling irregular migration to its borders under a slogan of ‘smashing the gangs’, introducing ‘counter terror-style powers to identify, disrupt and smash people smuggling gangs’.

Tackling organized criminal groups is a policy that few oppose. But the approach throws up some distinct challenges when viewed from the Foreign Office. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has suggested that the UK should look to European – specifically Italian – approaches towards tackling the source of migration flows. However, while Italy can claim to have reduced overall sea crossings to its territory, its engagement in Libya offers a cautionary tale.

Lost leverage

The horrors suffered by migrants in Libya are well documented and indefensible. Yet the effectiveness of European-Libyan cooperation is also open to question on Europe’s own terms.  

In 2017, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Italy and Libyan authorities to facilitate cooperation on combating illegal migration, human trafficking, and smuggling. That agreement included financial and technical support to train and equip the Libyan Coast Guard and other security forces, as well as detention facilities in Libya. These activities have also been supported indirectly through the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

The agreement did have a significant effect. Crossings of the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy reduced from their peak of 162,895 in 2016 to 12,977 in 2018. But the numbers remain high, despite concerted European – particularly Italian – efforts. There were 42,279 crossings reported in 2024, accounting for 81 per cent of all persons arriving in Italy. While the impact of these deals on migrants’ rights is the focus of much attention, the understanding with Libya also comes at significant political cost to Italian and broader European policy.

Two separate incidents highlight this point: The first was the controversy that swirled around the arrest and release of Osama Elmasry Njeem, a commander within a Libyan state-affiliated force.

In January 2025, Njeem was arrested in Italy on the basis of a sealed ICC arrest warrant for allegedly perpetrating crimes against humanity. However an Italian court released him on the basis of a suggested procedural error. Njeem was flown back to Libya on an Italian government plane, triggering an investigation into the actions of Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni over the incident. Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Piantedosi, later claimed Njeem had been released because of his ‘social dangerousness’.

Libyans do not seem to treat their Italian partners with such sensitivity. Six months after Njeem was returned, Piantedosi visited Libya as part of a delegation with EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner and Malta’s minister for home affairs.

The trip ended in acrimony after the delegation was held in the VIP area of Benina airport in Benghazi. While the details are unclear, it appears Khalifa Haftar, whose armed faction controls eastern Libya, wanted the delegation to meet with ministers from the eastern-based government. But the EU does not recognize the Benghazi government and had only agreed to meet with Haftar. Haftar cancelled the meeting in an incident described in one report as ‘staged’ and sent the delegation away.  

The two incidents show how the leverage of European policymakers over Libyan actors has waned: Italy transported a Libyan armed group commander out of the country on a government plane; while an Italian interior minister was left on the tarmac in Benghazi, in a very public humiliation.

Complicity of state-affiliated forces in

smuggling activities

Since March 2025, a significant surge of irregular migration has taken place from Haftar-controlled territory in eastern Libya. Haftar’s forces have been singled out for their role in these activities by the UN Panel of Experts and various investigative reports.

Meanwhile, last week, a video by NGO Sea Rescue appeared to show soldiers throwing refugees into the open sea. The soldiers were wearing the uniforms of the 111th Brigade, which is controlled by the deputy defence minister of the Tripoli-based, EU-recognized Libyan government. In this case, while these groups could be partially described as gangs, ‘smashing’ them has not been on the agenda.  

These recent events offer further evidence of how European attempts to stem migration at the source have helped entrench some of the very actors in Libya who have frustrated mediation efforts in the country.

Meanwhile, Italian and EU support for Libyan forces mean actors are financially incentivized to both disrupt migrant trafficking and facilitate it. A recent article underscored this point by arguing that migrants have become ‘pawns in an increasingly lucrative game’ between rivals, with access to European funding a key driver of behaviour.

The right lesson to draw

The lessons that Cooper should learn from Italian efforts is that first, migration routes via Europe to the UK involve complex intermingling of criminal, state and quasi-state actors than cannot always easily be defined as criminal gangs. A political, as well as a criminal-justice based approach, is required.

Second, Italian policies show that attempts to subcontract border control to actors in states mired in conflict cannot be solely based upon financial support. These approaches undermine broader political goals and lock countries into transactional relationships that are hard to escape from.

In her new role, as part of a government struggling with migration policy, Cooper will still be subject to the pressures of securing reductions in irregular migration. But the new foreign secretary should consider approaches that enhance the accountability of actors in states like Libya in a more sustainable fashion.

‘Smashing the gangs’ is not a particularly useful slogan in this regard. Instead, it would be better to consider targeted approaches that ensure a political cost is extracted from actors facilitating smuggling.

These can include sanctions on state aligned forces that profiteer from smuggling and trafficking. Such a move could be justified under the sanctions regime announced by the UK government targeting anyone complicit in people smuggling. This might have significant impact. The UK froze over £1.5 million of Njeem’s assets via a court order. Njeem is far from the only Libyan leader with assets held in the UK.

Italy’s experience also shows that ICC warrants must be enforced, to help reduce the sense of impunity enjoyed by those engaged in smuggling activities. Shielding armed group commanders is likely to backfire and would ultimately undermine the UK’s diplomatic leverage.

***

Tim Eaton – Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program.

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Ava Gilder

Since the toppling of dictator Moammar Gadhafi’s regime in 2011, Libya been stuck in a cyclical trap of governmental mismanagement and violence. The country remains divided: The internationally recognized Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU) led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh has based its power in Tripoli, and Gen. Khalifa Haftar of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) controls the country’s east and south. 

Local armed groups have taken control, threatening stability. In Tripoli, in addition to the GNU, the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DACOT/Special Deterrence Force/Rada), the Stability Support Authority (SSA), and the 444 Brigade dominate the city. Additionally, Ansar Al-Sharia, the Islamic State (ISIS), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have played a significant role in fragmenting Libyan security. Ansar al-Sharia is centralized in the east. ISIS is stronger in Libya’s center, where it has become a desert insurgency. 

While the GNU and LAAF occasionally conduct counterterrorism operations, their lack of legitimacy and commitment to counterterrorism operations limit their effectiveness. Specifically, some Libyans believe that Rada has recently held a critical role in combating ISIS and al-Qaeda, keeping certain leaders imprisoned. However, the GNU-aligned Rada and the 444th Brigade contribute to the state’s fragility, entrenching themselves in Libya’s militia-driven governmental organization. This added layer should force policymakers to look at replacements for security against al-Qaeda and ISIS.  

Russia’s growing presence in Libya poses a security and economic threat to North Africa and the international community. After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia has refocused on Libya, stationing troops and hardware in the east, where Haftar benefits from them. This arrangement gives Moscow a military command near NATO’s southern flank and influence over global energy markets. In addition, Türkiye has positioned itself militarily and economically in western Libya to expand its control in the Mediterranean and to reshape the regional balance of power.  

If the U.S. does not act strategically, there will be widespread effects beyond Libya’s borders. Russia and Türkiye will play a part in dictating outcomes in Libya and eroding U.S. leverage. If Türkiye pushes back against other NATO allies, it will threaten NATO cohesion and destabilize global energy security. European states such as France and Italy also provide a layer of complexity as they compete in tackling migration, terrorism, and energy issues. 

Additionally, the U.S. has been involved in Libya’s oil sector for decades, and U.S. companies such as ConocoPhillips still have interests and influence in Libyan oil concessions. The U.S. has an opportunity to invest in the state’s untapped access to oil and gas reserves.  

The international community and the U.S. should advocate for the creation of a transitional political framework for a unified Libyan state governed by an inclusive, democratically elected leadership that represents all groups and factions while reducing interference from Russia and Türkiye. Focusing on countering Turkish and Russian influence will give the U.S. an opportunity to collaborate with allied EU member states to deny Türkiye and Russia a stronghold in Libya that is expanding quickly. 

Instead of focusing on the national level, the crux of U.S. policy should focus on local politics and building institutions in combination with combatting Russian and Turkish influence using public benchmarks that incentivize the two Libyan governments to decrease reliance on foreign meddling. Local governments, once established, with the help of NATO Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Force, should call for unified elections to bring together the state and its people. If the international community can peacefully support the separate Libyan governments in fostering common ground, mitigating the fragile security situation of the state, and increasing stability in the region, lasting peace becomes a real possibility.  

Roots of Libyan Instability 

Post-revolution Libya has struggled with civil conflict because of its porous borders, corruption, and militaristic government structure. 

The overthrow of Gadhafi and the 2014-2020 civil war that followed exacerbated Libya’s domestic challenges. Libya continues to struggle with rebuilding critical state institutions, including the armed forces, the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil Corporation, and the House of Representatives. Haftar has set up parallels to each institution in Dbeibeh’s government in his half of Libya. The legitimacy of these central pillars of Libyan society has been questioned domestically and internationally after continuous abuses of power and mounting public dissatisfaction.  

Gadhafi’s regime fractured the foundations of Libyan unity, and local governments have been unable to reconstruct them, with political factions divided along religious, regional, and tribal lines. Within these factions, corruption and division exist, exacerbating tensions and hindering efforts to build a unified government and state. 

Armed Islamist groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia and ISIS, have taken advantage of the instability. These groups provoke violence by imposing extremist religious beliefs on Libyans through acts of terrorism, resulting in mass civilian displacement, deteriorating governance, and severe violations of human rights. Between 2008 and 2024, over 1.5 million of the country’s population of 7.1 million were internally displaced due to violence. More than 100,000 remain displaced, and thousands have fled the country. 

Russian and Turkish Strategy in Libya 

The Libyan governments have separate armed forces backed by opposite centers of power. The GNU controls Tripoli and international affairs and is backed by Türkiye and Qatar; the LAAF, based in Benghazi, controls roughly 60% of the nation’s land, including its vast oil reserves, and is supported by Russia. Western states continue to ignore the dire situation as the status quo is favored by Libya’s elites, further entrenching the vast corruption in the country. 

Russia’s support for the LAAF has increased since its influence in Syria began to dwindle after the fall of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Moscow has filled the power vacuum in Libya left by the West’s lack of engagement, expanding its forces in the region and entrenching itself into the political environment, funding Haftar’s army and officials by flooding the Libyan market with more than $10 billion. Russia’s involvement has significantly impacted the lives of average Libyans.

Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly called the Wagner Group) controls parts of Libya’s oil crescent, leading to economic disruptions, and Haftar’s forces have displaced thousands of civilians. Libyans are concerned about external powers dominating their domestic affairs. Russian influence also affects the GNA, which has lost leverage in ceasefire talks due to military pressure and diplomatic undermining.  

Türkiye has pursued a strategy in Libya to secure greater maritime influence, energy access, and leverage in the Mediterranean. After the 2019 Türkiye-Libya maritime delimitation memorandum, officially titled “Memorandum of Understanding between Turkey and Libya on Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas in the Mediterranean,” which allowed Libya to claim a wider Exclusive Economic Zone in the Mediterranean, Türkiye has taken advantage of Libya’s strategic location. This shift coincides with Türkiye’s “Blue Homeland” strategy on maritime sovereignty and control of resources.  

Türkiye has pursued connections with both the GNA and Haftar in an attempt to maintain influence in Libya no matter the balance of power.

Türkiye is leveraging this influence by facilitating regional diplomacy on issues such as migration, defense cooperation, and energy, for example, with a trilateral summit with Italy and Dbeibeh in August. Türkiye’s goal is to position itself as a Mediterranean power broker, balancing between the two Libyan governments and countering influence from Europe and the Gulf states. In 2025, Türkiye’s relationship with the Haftar family is changing towards reestablishing a new relationship as Haftar also endorsed the Turkish maritime deal.  

Türkiye and Russia have areas of both rivalry and cooperation in Libya. While they back opposing governments, they share an interest in countering Western influence and aid, and they benefit from the partition state. This form of adversarial partnership mirrors the countries’ influence in Syria, where Türkiye backed the opposition and Russia backed Assad. 

 Russia and Türkiye continue to boost their presence in Libya by increasing arms supplies and potentially building a new naval base in the port of Tobruk, for energy exploration and as the centerpiece for Russia’s strategy in Africa. Russia’s actions are rooted in the strategy of opportunism in combination with a calculated effort to disturb Western democratic influence, entrench authoritarian regimes dependent on Moscow, and secure resources and global political leverage. Controlling and monitoring Libya’s oil reserves would drastically alter dynamics beyond North Africa. Russia also uses and supports Libya’s complex smuggling network to help avoid Western sanctions on its hydrocarbon sector. 

Petroleum is not the only contentious issue. As migration from Libya to Europe has increased, so have related deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, the Greek government announced new migration laws in response to its struggles with a surge of arrivals from Libya. Libya continues to be monitored for human rights abuses against detained migrants and sex and labor trafficking, while its political deadlock deepens without hope of unity and stability.  

The state’s porous borders make it easy for smugglers to send migrants to Europe, contributing to  more than 32,000 missing migrants in the Mediterranean since 2014. In a migrant report by the United Nations in 2024, there were more than 700,000 migrants in Libya recorded from March to May 2024 from over 44 other countries seeking passage to Europe or are refugees and asylum-seekers, but Libyan officials state the number is more than 2 million. This discrepancy may be due to a lack of unity and resources for Libyan governments to accurately conclude how many migrants there are in Libya.  

As a result, European states are handling these issues by providing aid to Libya to address root causes such as poverty and security instability. Additionally, the EU has been cooperating with Libyan authorities to intercept irregular migration and migrant boats and return them to Libya; however, this approach has led to inhumane conditions and human rights abuses in detention centers.  

Policy Recommendations  

The U.S. should support Libya and counter foreign meddling so the country can flourish into a major trade hub between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. 

The U.S. and international actors should seize this moment for their benefit and for the benefit of Libyan civilians. Libya’s geographic location gives the U.S. a unique opportunity to invest in its vast energy reserves, infrastructure development, and Free Trade Zones. A change in the relationship between the U.S. and Libya would help stabilize the energy market, especially in a time of significant uncertainty.  

The U.S. should advocate for a representative and democratically elected unified government. 

Libya’s oil wealth gives it great potential to grow, and expanded production is projected to boost growth of its gross domestic product. Without action, Russia’s strategy in the Middle East and North Africa will be embedded into Libya’s strategic objectives, further destabilizing U.S. foreign policy interests and exacerbating domestic human rights abuses. If Russia continues to meddle, covertly fund Haftar’s army, and use Libya’s mass oil reserves to secure the objectives of its proxy state while the U.S. stands idly by, the responsibility will be on the U.S.  

The U.S. should put pressure on both governments to stop money laundering and corruption by publicly condemning those responsible and bringing attention to the issue alongside the U.N. Security Council and the EU. 

By strengthening anti-corruption mechanisms in Libya, U.S. credibility will increase internationally. Additionally, it will reduce opportunities to exploit illicit financial channels that could inhibit U.S. security interests. 

The U.S. should encourage the United Nations to provide support to Libyans away from the influence of Russia and Türkiye. 

The only way for these governments to agree is if both authorities benefit. Reducing the influence of rival powers in Libya, through an impartial U.N., will provide Libyans with foreign agendas. This shift will signal to European and African partners that Libya’s stabilization is not monopolized by external competitors but by a drive for lasting unity.  

The U.S. should join European nations with sanctions against key militia leaders. 

Doing so will counter Russian and Turkish influence while maintaining the U.S. commitment to counterterrorism and human rights without broader economic challenges. Sanction against key militia leaders, often backed by Haftar and Dbeibeh, will decrease their financial base to create an opening for a legitimate and peaceful government.  

The U.S. should encourage and support a plan for Libyan leaders, alongside the governments of neighboring countries and allies, to stop foreign influence and make a collaborative effort to help the people of Libya. 

This change will strengthen U.S. soft power and influence in the region, making it a valuable, collaborative stakeholder in North Africa. 

Conclusion:  

The coming months will present an opportunity for a turning point in Libya. Health issues and age may be catching up with Haftar, who is 81 years old, risking his ability to lead his forces. Although he has groomed his son Saddam as successor, he has uncertain political support, a weak point for the East. In the West, political support for Dbeibeh has weakened as discontent and protests increase. Although, if he can spur violence with militias, the militia clashes may benefit him because it allows Dbeibeh to tighten his grip on Libyans through his military and security systems.  

As Russia’s influence expands in Africa, it continues to undermine democracy and further instability. Russia’s influence in Libya could be catastrophic, and the economy will significantly diminish because of the continuous political divisions that have been stopping the authority’s capacity to control public expenditure and put reforms in place. This action could have ripple effects that would risk undermining neighboring countries, beginning with Algeria and Egypt. Russia’s growing influence in eastern Libya may prompt Türkiye to increase its own military deployments in the west, risking another war.  

To maintain U.S. oil interests and counter Russian involvement, the U.S. should promote soft-power investments to promote education in Libya, build out corruption programs for Libyan-owned oil companies, and grow civil society to resist terrorist groups and Russian and Turkish interference.  

_____________________

Nebahat Yasar

What is Ankara aiming to achieve 

Taken together, Ankara’s foray into eastern Libya is not a retreat from Tripoli, but a strategic hedge: a way to embed Turkey’s interests across Libya’s fractured landscape and secure national-level legitimacy for its long-term presence. Political normalization with the east began in earnest after the end of Libya’s civil war in 2021, with high-level visits to Ankara by key figures such as House of Representatives Speaker Aqila Saleh and Eastern Libya’s strongman General Khalifa Haftar’s sons. These engagements normalized contact, reduced diplomatic asymmetries, and established a foundation for parallel cooperation. 

In parallel, Turkish investors—particularly from the construction sector—are eyeing a return to eastern Libya, a move that appears to be welcomed by Eastern authorities. Since 2024, Libya’s Reconstruction Fund, under the Chief Belqasem Haftar, signed several agreements with Turkish companies for major infrastructure projects in Benghazi, Al-Bayda, Shahat, and Tobruk and meets Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during an official visit to Ankara to explore expanding development partnerships. 

The resumption of Turkish Airlines flights to Benghazi in January 2025—after a decade-long hiatus—further signalled Ankara’s intention to re-establish a durable economic presence in the region. For Turkey, economic cooperation offers a means to embed itself within the east’s post-conflict reconstruction and expand its reach to Eastern actors.  

Nonetheless, the most consequential developments have taken place in the security arena. Early signs emerged in October 2024, when Saddam Haftar—Khalifa Haftar’s son and Chief of Staff of the Land Forces—attended the SAHA EXPO International Defense, Aviation and Space Industry Fair in Istanbul, where he also held talks with Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler.

In November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Defense hosted both eastern and western Libyan military representatives as part of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission meetings, reflecting Ankara’s growing role as a security interlocutor.  

A pivotal moment came in April 2025, when Saddam Haftar paid an official visit to Ankara, hosted by Turkish Land Forces Commander General Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu. Subsequent visits by LNA delegations to Turkish defense facilities indicate a potential transition from dialogue to more operational forms of cooperation. Available reporting points to an emerging defense agreement that may include UAV deliveries, the training of up to 1,500 LNA troops, joint naval exercises, and long-term Turkish advisory support for military modernization. 

This recalibration reflects a layered strategy that combines short-term risk mitigation with a longer-term ambition to influence Libya’s political reconfiguration. Rather than abandoning its partnership with Tripoli, Ankara is deliberately diversifying—embedding itself across both rival camps to gain leverage over future arrangements in reconstruction, security reform, and power-sharing, branding this shift as efforts for “united and unified Libya”. 

This outreach also appears to reflect Ankara’s effort to adapt the Tripoli playbook to the east: combining defense diplomacy with economic integration in exchange of maritime agreement to gain leverage. A key element of this strategy involves Turkey’s pursuit of parliamentary ratification for the 2019 maritime and security agreements—initially signed with the GNU. If endorsed by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, this step could help address a long-standing legitimacy gap and reposition the contested deals as national rather than factional agreements. Such a development may enhance Turkey’s legal and diplomatic standing in the Eastern Mediterranean and reduce eastern Libyan and regional objections to its presence. 

In the long run, Ankara’s deepening engagement across both eastern and western Libya reflects more than short-term risk management, it seeks to position itself as a central mediator and enabler of national unification. The goal is to leverage its dual-track presence to influence key processes, including national reconstruction, security sector reform, and the eventual political settlement.

By engaging Haftar-aligned actors and building formal, strategic relations with eastern institutions, Ankara aims to move beyond the status quo of controlled instability. The underlying objective is to foster a more sustainable power balance between Libya’s rival blocs.  

Why Europe should pay attention 

European policymakers—particularly in Italy and across the EU—should carefully track how Turkey’s evolving strategy in Libya will unfold. Ankara’s simultaneous engagement with both Tripoli and Benghazi carries potential implications not only for Libya’s fragile internal balance but also for Eastern Mediterranean dynamics and the broader contest over Russian influence in North Africa. 

Turkey’s recent overtures to eastern Libya—reportedly involving defense exports and military cooperation in exchange for legal recognition—signal a potential shift in regional competition. Ankara appears to be reframing Eastern Mediterranean dynamics from a zero-sum contest into a multilateral bargaining arena, with Libya, and potentially Syria, emerging as new negotiation fronts. This recalibration may also mark the opening of a second theatre—after Syria—where Ankara quietly seeks to counterbalance Russia through military-industrial diplomacy rather than direct confrontation. 

In this context, the EU—and Italy in particular—may soon face a strategic dilemma: how to respond to Ankara’s changing posture in Libya in a way that balances maritime concerns with broader geopolitical realities. While tensions over maritime boundaries persist, Turkey’s role in potentially counterbalancing Russia’s influence in Libya and sub-Saharan Africa introduces an additional layer of complexity that cannot be ignored. 

***
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar – Freelance Researcher & Policy Analyst.

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Yusuf Kablan

Libya today stands at the centre of a fiscal and security storm with consequences that extend far beyond its borders. 

At the heart of this crisis is the eastern parallel government that operates under the de facto control of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, which since 2023 has relied on unchecked monetary financing to sustain its operations. 

In just two years, this authority has created an extraordinary LYD 129 billion (~ €24 billion) in new debt, pushing Libya’s total domestic debt to LYD 284 billion – the highest in the country’s modern history.

For a nation of fewer than seven million people, this pace and scale of debt accumulation is staggering. It raises an unavoidable question: where has this money gone?

The mechanics of unchecked

money creation

For more than four years, the eastern branch of the Central Bank has sustained itself through a practice of creating money from nothing – borrowing directly from the public treasury and issuing liquidity without a corresponding balance sheet. 

This mechanism – often described simply as “printing money” – has allowed the eastern military regime to finance its expenditures in the absence of oil revenue allocations or legitimate borrowing authority.

Independent audits have confirmed the scale of this practice. Deloitte’s forensic audit of the Central Bank of Libya, commissioned to evaluate transactions between the rival branches, revealed that billions of dinars had already been injected into the economy through LYD 46.8 billion in bank deposits and LYD 13.8 billion in currency printing. These findings demonstrated how the money supply had been expanded artificially, outside normal financial controls.

Since 2023, the situation has deteriorated further. With the re-emergence of the eastern parallel government, monetary financing has not only resumed but accelerated at unprecedented levels. In less than three years, an additional LYD 129 billion in new debt has been created – an amount equal to nearly 80% of all the public debt accumulated by rival governments during the entire period 2014-2020.

The result is a dual crisis: on one hand, the erosion of Central Bank’s independence, as the institution’s eastern branch functions as a treasury for political authorities rather than a monetary authority; on the other, the emergence of a parallel financial system that fuels corruption, destabilises the exchange rate, and provides funding streams for non-state actors operating outside Libya’s legal framework.

Financing Chaos: Wagner, Sudan,

and the Regional Web of Conflict

One of the most alarming consequences of unchecked monetary financing in eastern Libya is its role in sustaining the Wagner Group – now rebranded as Africa Corps – and extending support to conflicts beyond Libya’s borders. 

With a stronghold in Al-Jufra, Wagner has transformed Libya into a hub for its operations across Africa. The flow of unmonitored Libyan funds, channelled through irregular transactions and the black market, provides an easy and deniable means of financing these deployments, from Libya into the Sahel region.

Yet the threat does not end there. Regional reports indicate that Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) may also be receiving indirect financial support through Libya, reinforcing one of Africa’s most devastating wars. At the heart of this dynamic lies the broader network of external patrons – notably Abu Dhabi – which has long used Libya, and Haftar in particular, as a conduit for extending its influence into Sudan. In this sense, the same fiscal mechanism that empowers Wagner in Libya is also being leveraged to entrench violent actors in Sudan and across the Sahel.

The implications are grave: Haftar’s reliance on uncontrolled monetary financing creates a financial ecosystem that sustains mercenary groups and irregular militias simultaneously, embedding them more deeply in regional conflicts. This entrenchment risks prolonging instability, worsening displacement, and intensifying refugee crises and migration flows. 

For African and European policymakers, the danger is clear – Libya’s fiscal disorder is not a domestic problem – but a regional crisis multiplier, enabled by external powers who exploit its vulnerabilities.

The Shadow Economy and

International Exposure

By flooding the economy with unmonitored funds, the eastern authorities have indirectly financed a shadow economy that destabilises Libya internally while spilling over into neighbouring states. 

Drugs and arms cross porous borders into Chad, Sudan, and Niger, while human smuggling routes strengthen northward, feeding directly into the Mediterranean migration corridors that North Africa and Europe prioritises as a top security concern.

These dynamics carry not only local and regional consequences but also international risks. The billions of dinars circulating outside any transparent framework sustain mercenaries and illicit markets while creating potential liabilities for foreign actors who engage with or legitimise these structures. 

The danger is subtle but serious: long-term association with authorities tied to irregular financing risks reputational, legal, and political consequences as evidence of corruption, illicit trade, and mercenary financing continues to mount. 

For North Africa and Europe, whose priority is stability along the Mediterranean, the lesson is clear – partnership with Libya must be rooted in transparent, accountable institutions – not parallel authorities that thrive on monetary chaos.

The gravity of Libya’s monetary crisis is not simply a matter of fiscal mismanagement. It is a strategic threat multiplier, linking debt accumulation in Benghazi to mercenary financing, regional conflict, illicit economies, and refugee crises. 

If left unchecked, this path could lead to the collapse of Libya’s economy and security within a few years – with devastating consequences for its people and destabilising ripple effects across Africa and into Europe.

The crisis unfolding in eastern Libya demonstrates how monetary policy, when hijacked by parallel authorities, becomes a tool for corruption, conflict, and regional destabilisation. 

The eastern parallel government that operates under the de facto control of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has already created the largest debt in Libya’s modern history. This unchecked financing sustains Wagner, empowers smugglers, fuels conflicts in Sudan and neighbouring countries, and drives refugee crises across Africa and migration flows toward Europe.

For African and European policymakers, the stakes could not be clearer: confronting Libya’s monetary chaos is not a peripheral issue – it is central to the security of the Mediterranean, the Sahel, and Europe itself. The question is not only how Libya spends its money, but also how unmonitored billions risk financing chaos instead of peace.

***

Yusuf Kablan is Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of the UN-backed Libya Government of National Unity.

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Nebahat Yasar

Ankara hedges its bets in Libya, combining security cooperation, reconstruction projects, and diplomacy to secure a foothold across rival factions.

Few foreign policy pivots are as bold, or as fraught with risk, as betting on both sides of a civil conflict. Yet, that is precisely what Turkey appears to be doing in Libya. Having established military and political influence in western Libya, most notably through its decisive military intervention in support of the UN-backed Government of National Unity (GNU) against Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in 2019–2020, Ankara is now extending olive branches to the east—to the very actors it once sought to marginalise.  

The pace of this shift is striking. Turkey is reportedly preparing to expand security cooperation, including providing military training and arms sales, with LNA, commanded by Haftar. The Tobruk-based House of Representatives has formed a commission to review—and potentially ratify—the 2019 maritime and security agreements. In August, a Turkish naval vessel docked in Benghazi, followed by high-level talks between Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın and eastern Libya’s military leader Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi.  Taken together, these developments signal how rapidly Ankara is repositioning itself on Libya’s eastern front, seeking new security footholds to complement its growing economic presence in the last couple of years. 

Why is Turkey recalibrate in Libya 

At the core of this pivot lies the recognition that exclusive reliance on Tripoli has its limits. Tripoli’s deteriorating security environment has become particularly problematic. Prime Minister Dbeibah’s power consolidation strategy has deepened intra-militia rivalries and triggered repeated armed clashes. While Turkey maintains its backing of the GNU, its personnel and assets remain vulnerable to the volatility of localized violence. The 2020 ceasefire may have frozen hostilities between east and west, but it remains precarious—offering little assurance against future escalations that could threaten Turkey’s position. 

Compounding this is the continued fragmentation of Libya’s institutional architecture, which undermines Ankara’s legal and operational foothold. Key agreements—including the 2019 maritime MoU and a 2022 hydrocarbon exploration deal—face challenges not only from rival factions but from Western Libya’s judiciary as well. The 2019 maritime MoU—signed with the GNU but geographically anchored in Eastern Libya’s coast—has been challenged by eastern courts and remains unrecognized by the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Similarly, a 2022 hydrocarbon exploration agreement between TPAO and the NOC was suspended by Tripoli’s own judiciary. These developments highlight the legal and operational fragility of Ankara’s engagements in a divided Libya, where executive authority is both contested and constrained. 

Meanwhile, the slow pace of political transition and security sector reform has stalled Ankara’s original objectives. Under the 2019 Military Training and Cooperation Agreement, Turkey aimed to transform western-aligned militias into a unified security force. While notable efforts have been made in command restructuring and training of core units, the lack of political consensus and the continued presence of rival armed formations make this goal increasingly unrealistic. Without a broader reconciliation process, Turkey’s role risks being confined to one side of a permanently fragmented state. 

Strategic lessons from the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria—though ultimately advantageous for Ankara have also influenced this recalibration. In Syria, Assad’s departure created a vacuum that momentarily sidelined Turkey’s rivals, notably Russia and Iran, giving Ankara significant maneuvering space. However, this experience also exposed the risks of reactive posture and overreliance on geopolitical luck.

In Libya, where the conflict has remained largely frozen and the balance of power is precarious, Ankara appears determined not to leave outcomes to chance. The fragility of the current status quo, coupled with the potential for rapid shifts on the ground, has pushed Turkey to adopt hedging strategies, as well as leveraging military, diplomatic, and economic tools to shift Libya’s deadlocked equilibrium in its favor before rival actors can consolidate an alternative order.  

What enables Turkey’s eastern outreach 

Ankara’s recalibration in Libya is driven not only by these constraints and mounting strategic risks, but it is also equally enabled by a permissive regional and global environment. Regional de-escalation has played a central role. Since 2021, Turkey’s normalization with key regional powers—Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia—has removed several of the political barriers that once confined its Libya policy. Egypt’s pragmatic posture toward Turkey and the UAE’s military drawdown have diminished the intensity of proxy competition, transforming Libya from a battleground of ideological rivalries into a theatre of transactional diplomacy.

In this context, Ankara has reframed its engagement with eastern Libyan actors—no longer as adversaries but as potential partners in infrastructure, energy, and security ventures. This approach mirrors Turkey’s broader turn toward elite-level diplomacy and commercial engagement across the region. 

At the same time, Russia’s overstretch, exacerbated by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s perceived abandonment of other strategic partners, such as Armenia and Syria, has raised doubts about its long-term reliability, while opening window of opportunity for Turkey. Against this backdrop, Turkey’s perceived consistency and operational agility seems to contribute its image as a viable alternative for eastern elites looking to hedge their bets without alienating Moscow entirely.  

Turkey’s growing presence in the Sahel and Horn of Africa has reinforced its image as a regional actor and further enhances its position. As Western influence has receded in the aftermath of military coups in Sahelian countries, and Russia has filled some of that vacuum, Turkey has advanced through security cooperation agreements, arms exports, and targeted investments, particularly in the mining and energy sectors.

In the Horn, Turkey has capitalized on shifting dynamics, aligning with Ethiopia during the Tigray conflict, positioning itself in Sudan’s evolving civil war, and mediating between Ethiopia and Somalia. These engagements reinforce Ankara’s credentials as a pragmatic and adaptable partner, capable of delivering material outcomes. This emerging credibility enhances Turkey’s appeal in Libya, where its model of military-industrial engagement resonates with actors seeking alternatives to both Western restraint and Russian dependency. 

Together, these dynamics have created a strategic window of opportunity. Turkey’s objectives in Libya—securing access, protecting investments, and expanding maritime influence—have remained consistent. What has evolved is the environment: regional détente has eased former constraints, Russian overreach as alongside its eroded reliability and Western retreat has enhanced Ankara’s value as a pragmatic and reliable interlocutor. 

***
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar – Freelance Researcher & Policy Analyst.

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Joseph Hammond

Restoring the oil-for-fuel program would avert a near-term crisis and potentially provide a platform for more ambitious reform—though it is unlikely to succeed without greater transparency, international monitoring, and subsidy changes. Libya stands at a crossroads. The country is home to Africa’s largest oil reserves—some of the lightest and sweetest crude in the world—yet paradoxically, its retail gasoline pumps are running dry.

As fuel is rationed for the country’s 7 million people, goodwill is evaporating as quickly as water on sun-scorched soil. This contradiction is not new, but it has become more acute. Political division, blocked finances, and a broken import system have all but strangled the nation’s oil sector. Libya needs to find a way to import refined oil products as a stop-gap measure while promoting investment in its long-term growth and stability. 

The country maintains a significant trade surplus due to its vast oil reserves, which it exports as crude and condensate. It lacks, however, the ability to refine its oil, causing it to import almost all fuel needed domestically for transportation, energy production, and basic public services. That dependency is a symptom of Libya’s inability to develop effective state institutions following the outbreak of civil war in 2011.

Since the 2020 truce, the country has effectively functioned with two governments: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the Government of National Stability (GNS), which controls the Libyan National Army (LNA), in Benghazi. International support is also divided, with the UN, Turkey, and Italy supporting the GNU, and the UAE and Egypt backing the GNS. 

The Central Bank is similarly fractured, with a de jure branch in Tripoli and a de facto one in Benghazi. This has enabled militia groups to challenge the GNU and for the GNS to question and undermine the GNU leadership’s decisions. Most recently, the firing of the Central Bank governor led to violent protests, a halting of oil production, and calls for the prime minister to resign. The Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation (NOC) have become paralyzed in the process, further exacerbating Libya’s precarious economic situation. With Libya’s public sector employing 85 percent of the country’s labor force, the effect has been profound. 

Starting in 2021, Libya bartered crude oil in exchange for refined imports, but the Audit Bureau ordered an end to the program in 2023, citing several transparency issues. It was officially discontinued in March 2025. The NOC stressed that it used the barter system because without a functioning central bank, it could not access funds to pay for fuel imports, which in 2024 totaled $9 billion according to the Audit Bureau. Since the barter system was halted, the NOC has accrued over $1 billion in unpaid import debts. The ongoing impasse over how to pay for imported fuel now risks stalling vital infrastructure development, generating a credit freeze, paralyzing public services, and ultimately reigniting the threat of renewed conflict.

Libya’s oil industry needs to address several major issues. First are the shortcomings in its incipient domestic refining sector; Libya’s oil minister announced plans in January 2025 to expand its capacity from 300,000 barrels per day to 400,000. However, that upsurge will take several years to develop and a significant amount of foreign investment that is contingent on political and economic stability in Libya.

Another crucial concern is the bounteous subsidies on fuel and electricity produced by oil. Together they amounted to 35 percent of GDP in 2024, according to the IMF. This has significantly lowered prices at the pump to less than five U.S. cents per liter but has also encouraged fuel smuggling from Libya to neighboring countries.

According to a December 2024 UN report, this illicit trade amounts to some $5 billion annually. In short, Libya’s key actors need to agree on a program to pay for imported fuel. If the country could ensure that its domestic energy needs are met, its economic crisis could be curtailed, and it would receive a much-needed respite from the uncertainty that has characterized its politics for so long. In June 2025, senior Libyan officials and the NOC chairman held a meeting to discuss the impact of jettisoning the oil-for-fuel barter system, signaling a domestic interest in reviving it.

To begin with, a reformed oil-for-fuel barter system should be monitored by a third party to ensure transparent procurement. A 2021 report from Global Witness revealed corruption, and a UN investigation cited in that report found multiple examples of unethical practices in the previous system. A new program must also have an independent auditing and reporting mechanism. Combined with international supervision, this would go a long way toward depoliticizing its most contentious aspects. Furthermore, implementation would need to be phased, given Libya’s immediate need for debt relief and fuel imports.

To address profligate subsidies, the IMF has proposed a plan that includes establishing committees to assess real fuel requirements and increasing prices accordingly to deter smuggling. While the barter system is not a panacea, in the short term it could stabilize the supply chain, prevent budget fights, and lay the groundwork for broader reforms—revitalizing an economy desperate to get back on its feet after nearly fifteen years of civil war.

Any such program would, of course, face resistance from entrenched interests who currently profit from unimpeded oil trafficking, opaque procurement contracts, and subsidy manipulation. These bad actors have a strong incentive to preserve the status quo. For reform to succeed, these groups would need to be sidelined through a combination of legal enforcement, international pressure, and economic alternatives that make participation in a legitimate system more attractive. 

It would also require financial safeguards and political buy-in from Libya’s disjointed institutions. The lack of transparency around previous such deals remains a legitimate concern, especially in regard to some unscrupulous companies involved. Elsewhere, barter systems have been shown to have limits. Notably, the Iraq-Lebanon arrangement, which developed almost concurrently with Libya’s, has been linked to a number of corruption issues. However, the key difference is that Lebanon is heavily reliant on oil imports.

While Libya is far from a model of good governance, it is an oil exporter, which makes it better suited for a successful barter system. Despite these challenges, a functional oil-for-fuel system would provide a tangible example of financial discipline and transparency in Libya. That could build market confidence and pave the way for liberalization of the oil sector and the Libyan economy more broadly.

European nations, the top importers of Libyan oil, would benefit the most from stable energy flows and reliable transactions. Italy, the largest market for Libyan oil, is a long-time investor in the Libyan upstream sector through ENI. It is well-suited to play an organizing role in driving funding for digital tracking systems—an important step in making the fuel import system more transparent and accountable—and in supporting the modernization of refining.

Nonetheless, the Libyan government’s bifurcation poses a significant challenge to any future development. But a response to the urgent short-term fuel-supply issues could lead to investment in domestic refining and create an opening to end the economically and environmentally costly fuel subsidies. The Middle East and North Africa would benefit from a stabilized Libya. That path begins with restoring programs that can support transparent, rules-based market activity where private enterprise can thrive.

***

Joseph Hammond is a journalist and a former Fulbright Fellow who has reported extensively from the Middle East and Africa.

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Youssef M. Sawani

Policy Recommendations

The Libyan Parties

1. Libyan stakeholders should cease to rely on external actors and external solutions. They should take responsibility and start exploring collective and indigenous solutions to the protracted crisis and ways to diffuse the drivers of the conflict.

Continuing to rely on external parties and external solutions will only deepen the existing divisions and prolong the conflict. External initiatives are often linked to external interests and are not necessarily in line with Libyan interests.

2. Libyans must reach an agreement on convening an inclusive national dialogue that focuses primarily on achieving national reconciliation. This should be a Libyan-led process with a specific timeframe, a clear agenda, and rules and procedures. Libyans should explore and learn from best practices and global and regional experiences to draw lessons, so that their national dialogue effectively contributes to achieving a sustainable solution to the Libyan crisis.

3. The Libyan parties must express determination to put an end to all types of external interference and not limit their concern with such interference to the presence of foreigners and mercenaries, regardless of their origins. Libyans need to agree on cancelling or freezing all security and defense agreements with foreign countries and entities whether signed by the Government of National Accord, the General Command of the Libyan National Army, or the House of the Representatives.

4. The Government of National Unity should make every possible effort to create the necessary conditions for holding free, fair, and transparent elections – including through securing the legal framework and the technical and security arrangements for the voting process to take place in accordance with the roadmap agreed for the “Preparatory Phase for a Comprehensive Solution.” The independence and protection of the High Commission on Elections must also be ensured to safeguard the fairness and credibility of the electoral process.

5. The GNU and the Presidential Council (PC) should take all necessary measures throughout their tenure to promote democratic principles and good governance. They must refrain from practices and announcements that make them appear merely agents of one of the parties to the conflict. Instead, the GNU and the PC should both focus on promoting peace and reconciliation and protecting Libya from further disintegration.

6. All parties must abandon the ‘winner takes all’ approach. They should uphold instead the values of inclusiveness and reconciliation as the only viable solution to the Libyan crisis. The success of any national dialogue depends on the inclusion of a wide and representative array of the Libyan stakeholders. This may only be achieved through effective representation of different political trends, taking into account geographic and cultural diversity.

7. All parties must end hate speech to avoid polarization. Libyans need to transcend the divisive narratives that have prevailed so far. Divisiveness is particularly indicated by the escalation of hate speech, disinformation, and propaganda prevalent in the Libyan media, especially social media.

8. Military commanders, in various parts, of the country should commit to preventing further violence. This will require the expulsion of all foreign fighters, regardless of their nationalities, in preparation for an inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation.

The United Nations

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations should establish an independent review of the UN led mediation efforts in Libya over the last twelve years to determine whether, for an effective process, they have been conducted in conformity with the UN standards. The review should include an assessment of the consent of the parties concerned; inclusiveness; national ownership, respect for international law; coherence; coordination; and complementarity of the mediation efforts and quality of peace agreements.

2. The UN should support Libyan efforts to organize a national dialogue and provide support for its facilitation. The UN should refrain from directly leading or dictating the terms of the political process. Instead, it should support Libyan initiatives and leave the leadership of the process to the Libyans themselves. It should be noted that many Libyans question the UN selection of the participants in the current political process, as this selection was not based on an inclusive national process that entitles those participants to a legitimate representation.

3. The UN should encourage Libyan political parties to increase the participation by Libyan women. So far, women representation in the political process has been low. Furthermore, women participating in the process on behalf of certain parties or groups have largely aligned themselves with narrow political interests of their groups and have demonstrated less interest in larger national issues. The UN must encourage an approach that ensures larger participation by women, youth, and civil society organizations to achieve inclusivity and broad national ownership of a national dialogue.

4. Based on the Libyan experience, the UN should lead the effort to revisit the dominant normative assumptions which underpin the current practice of international mediation.

The International Community

1. Foreign actors should not exert pressure on Libyans to conduct hasty elections in the absence of the legal and security conditions necessary for their success. The international community has often pushed for holding elections in post-conflict

2. All states must cease interference in Libyan internal affairs. This must include the immediate cessation of violations of the United Nations Security Council andated arms embargo. All states should cease all illegitimate arms provisions to Libyan militias settings despite the risks of failure and without due consideration of lessons learnt from experience in other conflict situations. Quick fixes do not contribute to durable peace. Elections are not an end per se but rather a means to an end.

3. The international community should bring an end to the multiplicity of initiatives and proliferation of uncoordinated international mediation processes. Instead, local efforts to conduct a Libyan-led inclusive political process should be supported through a coordinated plan. and warring factions. International parties must refrain from using the UN as a fig leaf to cover their private interests in Libya.

4. The key members of the UNSC must live up to their commitments and abide by the arms embargo resolution. It is no longer acceptable that UNSC members continue to provide arms to parties to the conflict in Libya. If their destructive support to various Libyan groups and factions is not ended any effort to establish peace will be meaningless.

Neighboring Countries (Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Morocco)

1. Libya’s neighboring countries must abandon the illusion that they can resolve the Libyan crisis through unilateral action and their competitive and un-coordinated interference in Libya should cease.

2. Alternatively, neighboring countries should develop a mechanism for coordinated regional support to Libya, in concert with the Libyans. Such a mechanism would be designed to help Libyans advance their political process and limit the potential ramifications of the international rivalry over Libya on the region. It is in the interest of neighboring countries that the solution to the crisis is truly Libyan-owned, and free from extra-regional interference.

3. Neighboring countries should not treat Libya as a theatre to settle their decades old scores. Libya and Libyan stakeholders must be shielded from regional rivalries.

***

Youssef M Sawani – Academic with long teaching and research experience. Independent Researcher. , Faculty Member with University Of Tripoli.

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Younes Abouyoub

Elections are an important tool in establishing a legitimate government in any given state. Yet, in the absence of a state itself, elections can become part of the problem rather than the solution.

The crisis in Libya continues unabated, with successive interim arrangements, transitional governments, and legislative bodies having lost their legitimacy in the eyes of the Libyan constituency.

The protracted nature of this crisis further threatens the future of Libya and its territorial integrity, with the country likely to sink deeper into economic collapse, political and social turmoil, and increased insecurity.

Cognizant of this imminent threat, the new Special Representative of the United Nations’ Secretary General in Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, has been working to design a roadmap for convening national elections at the earliest, that are seen as a way to resolve the protracted crisis.

In February, the House of Representatives adopted a legislative document entitled “the 13th Amendment,” that paved the way for elections which was endorsed by the High Council of State shortly after.

The two chambers of government tasked a 6+6 joint committee to deliberate on electoral laws. The novelty this time is that a high-level panel will be established as a mechanism to ensure broader national ownership of the electoral process by Libyans from different walks of life beyond the usual small group of influential legislative actors. This is a welcome development that will ensure more inclusiveness and a wider participation.

Two governments without a state

Despite a number of positive developments, including months of relative security stability, the constitutional and political crisis remains unresolved, state institutions are fractured and polarized, particularly the executive and other sovereign institutions. According to a UN study published in 2020, the estimated cost of the Libyan conflict since its inception in 2011 has reached $576 billion.

Despite efforts exerted by the international community to assist Libya in its political transition, unfortunate policy choices were made in the immediate post-conflict phase in 2011, when a hurried electoral process preceded the stabilization of the country.

This process of stabilization required rebuilding key institutions, the most important of which the implementation of an effective security sector reform plan. Instead, a power-sharing process trumped the institutional capacity development and state-building process.

The state should have come before a government. Today, Libya has two governments, fragmented institutions but no state.

The installation of the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) in March 2021, with a mandate to hold presidential and parliamentary elections on 24 December, 2021, while a major positive development, contributed little to an effective reunification of the fiercely contested institutions between the east and the west de facto powers.

The chronic multi-level fragmentation of governance structures since the state collapse in 2011, particularly key institutions including the Central Bank of Libya and the security sector ones, has been severely taxing for stability in Libya.

This institutional fragility stalled the implementation of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Roadmap agreed upon in the Berlin Conference in 2021, as the national elections planned for 24 December, 2021 had to be indefinitely postponed due to schisms and disputes among Libyan political actors and institutions on a plethora of issues, not the least of which, the constitutional basis for elections, and eligibility requirements for presidential candidates.

The political crisis deepened polarization and tensions among political and security actors with shifting alliances among armed groups resulting in periodic armed clashes, mainly in the Tripolitania region, resulting in civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Overcoming perceptions of the state

as the ‘enemy of the people’

It is true that the current Libyan political impasse is overdetermined and multi-faceted. Some of its ramifications have their roots in the legacy of the 1951 state formation, and most of all the four decades of Gaddafi’s regime, under which the state was considered as the enemy of the people.

In other words, this crisis is symptomatic of Libya’s failure to become a modern and effective state. The apparent failure to resolve the conflict since 2011 and bring about a lasting peace, is rooted in the adoption of a series of approaches, time and again, that rest on power sharing ignoring Libya’s state-building needs.

The post-conflict transition plans lacked strategic foresight and suffered from a deficient understanding of Libya’s historical legacy and political economy. This tragic lacuna would come back to haunt both Libyans and international actors, as its components became major drivers of the protracted conflict.

Without engaging in counterfactual history, more than a decade after the events, some critical assessment is nevertheless due.

Once the Constitutional Declaration was adopted in August 2011, it would have been more appropriate for the National Transitional Council (NTC), with the assistance of the international community, to plan for a longer transition period to allow for effective institutional building and address priority issues, particularly in the security sector, and resolve the thorny issue of the armed groups through an effective disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process.

Some would argue that elections were a priority, necessary to establish a legitimate government. After all, the NTC was not an elected government. While this is theoretically true, the fact remains that elections, by nature, tend to divide constituencies along ideological and partisan lines.

In a country like Libya, whose citizens had lived under a quasi-totalitarian rule for decades, political life was non-existent since political parties, unions, and other relevant institutions were banned.

Libyans were to a large extent unified around what they did not want, i.e., Gaddafi, but this popular consensus was still too fluid, too fragile to be put to the electoral test. The reality is that 2011 elections broke the revolutionary sacred union of the Libyans.

An inclusive national dialogue should have taken place in the early phase, to broker a large popular agreement on a truly inclusive transitional authorities, which would then be mandated to prepare carefully for fair and transparent elections, easing thus the potential divisions that would surface in the post-electoral phase.

Inclusive national dialogue and

reconciliation process necessary

As SRSG Bathily rightly pointed out, “elections are not just about the constitutional and legal documents (…)There are other critical issues that need to be addressed.”

While the current context differs from that of 2011, and elections today can play a role in restoring a much-needed legitimacy, lessons learned from relatively similar post-conflict situations around the globe prove that state building has become the central objective in responding to fragility and post-conflict needs through conceptualizing and rebuilding the state and its institutions within the broader context of the relationship between state and society.

Therefore creating an inclusive process that moves states from conflict-driven fragility to resilience and legitimate statehood.

Beyond the electoral process, what is needed now is not only to bring more “excluded elite actors” into the political process through yet another power-sharing agreement, but to ensure that the right kind of participation, buy-in and most of all a genuine reconciliation happens between all national stakeholders.

This can be achieved, at the national level, through a Libyan-led inclusive national dialogue and national reconciliation process. At the international level, this Libyan effort can be supported by an inclusive National Libyan-Libyan Peace Conference modality to ensure the initiation of a broader and more inclusive consensus on a vision for building the state and a governance structure with its corollary institutions.

Short of that, Libya will be condemned to a Sisyphean fate – a never-ending cycle of power-sharing agreements, and repetitive elections, leading to more government formations with no state in sight. 

***

Younes Abouyoub has long experience in conflict resolution, peace building and governance. He previously advised the UN Under-Secretary General for Conflict Prevention including Burundi. He also advised the UN Secretary General Special Envoy to Yemen and the UN Special Representative for Libya and was a senior regional expert in the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Sudan (Darfur)

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Youssef M. Sawani

Conclusion

This report shows that for any dialogue to succeed in realizing a sustainable resolution to the Libyan crisis, it must be transformative and adaptive. This goal may be achieved with clearer and solid commitments to end foreign meddling and by designing a broader inclusive national dialogue that puts reconciliation at the forefront.

The interviewees, despite their different political and social orientations, all agree that the LPA process has actually deepened the crisis without being able to resolve anything and has led to extensive delays in the peace process in Libya, with more fault lines and divides occurring, even within each of the original two sides UNSMIL sought to reconcile.

A truly genuine national dialogue is a constructed political process on its own. This implies that dialogue must achieve the meaningful result of moving the country and the society beyond conflict.

This challenge was more acute as the LPA actually originated from the talks between a group of people UNSMIL had hand-picked, even though most of them had no clear legal status – or rather a legal status was bestowed upon them by the institutions they were supposed to represent giving them legitimacy, that was actually nullified as they acted against their mandate – as interviewees indicated.

This was another testimony that the LPA would not produce any sustainable political settlement and why the resultant institutions of the LPA were unable to gain consensus or legitimacy to serve as constituting bodies.

For any dialogue to succeed in realizing a sustainable resolution to the Libyan crisis, it must be transformative and adaptive. This goal may be achieved with clearer and solid commitments to end foreign meddling and by designing a broader inclusive national dialogue that puts reconciliation at the forefront.

The LPA was not able to generate legitimacy either in the process or its outcomes. Talks were not open to the public and this undermined the LPA’s ability to be a tool for making conflict resolution possible, at the grassroots or societal level, by shifting the existing polarised conflict.

Consequently, the same dividing narratives that dominated the Libyan conflict, such as Islamists vs non-Islamists, revolution vs counter revolution, Azlam vs revolutionaries, and many others, are still prevalent.

The LPA and its results have been exploited in these contending narratives and have been exploited in political propaganda.

As the increase in hate speech and the propaganda war in the Libyan media, especially social media, indicates, the LPA created a context in which Libyans are even more divided than before while new issues of contestation have been added.

The process failed to evolve into a transformative national dialogue that includes a change in public attitudes and the creation of an environment where there is an openness to ideas that make change possible and cause it to be sought after.

The public must be willing to accept these new ideas and play a decisive role in helping them transform into a sustainable reality. This is not the case, however, and the conflict in Libya is becoming more entrenched. The LPA was not able to generate legitimacy either in the process or its outcomes.

Talks were not open to the public and this undermined the LPA’s ability to be a tool for making conflict resolution possible, at the grassroots or societal level, by shifting the existing polarised conflict.

Despite the recent jubilation regarding the formation of a new PC and GNU that resulted in the conclusion of the LPDF talks, disagreements are still standing in the way, and, as interviewees indicate, the UNSMIL process faces serious challenges and consensus is difficult to realise.

The adoption by the LPDF of a majoritarian formula for voting on proposals has also proven problematic. While hopes of achieving tangible success are mounting, many obstacles remain in the way of consensus. Issues like the appointment to senior state roles, e.g. that of the Central Bank of Libya’s (CBL) governor, the constitutional rules, federalism and the rights of regions, and the distribution of resources are the subjects about which agreement is difficult to reach.

Moreover, foreign interventions, reconciliation, and the unification of the military forces remain the toughest obstacles.

On the ground, armed militias continue to dominate and control capabilities and resources, with a major part of them opposing any dialogue and threatening war again.

While the interviews confirm what analysts have been positing – that is that the Libyan powerbrokers have been the main obstructers of the peace process, and the realising of its objectives – they also identify foreign interference to have negatively affected the UN and other mediation activities.

As a matter of fact, some interviewees completely attribute the Libyan crisis to foreign interests and interventions that have, ever since 2011, prevented peace and reconciliation.

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Youssef M Sawani – Academic with long teaching and research experience. Independent Researcher. , Faculty Member with University Of Tripoli.

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Maureen Farrell

The Trump administration’s appointment in April of Massad Boulos as its senior advisor for Africa was initially met with some skepticism in Washington. Boulos had little previous diplomatic experience, his role seemed ill-defined, and a driving factor in his appointment appeared to be that he is Tiffany Trump’s father-in-law.

Since then, however, Boulos has successfully leveraged his family ties to US President Donald Trump and his previous experience navigating African politics to spearhead negotiations for the “Washington Agreement” between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on June 27.

Then in July, Boulos concluded a series of meetings in North Africa, which could open the door to another diplomatic breakthrough, this time in Libya, if the administration follows through.

Libya today

Libya has entered a period of fragile calm. The Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli, and the Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls the east of the country, have stabilized their respective territories, even as the two rival power centers vie for authority.

Deep problems persist. Political fragmentation and weak or absent state structures are creating the conditions for institutional paralysis.

Russia and other countries continue to exercise dangerous influence. Desperation continues to send would-be refugees on the perilous trek north across the Mediterranean. But as the cease-fire brokered in 2020 between the GNU and LNA is continuing to hold, now is the moment for the United States to put diplomacy to work.

Recent US efforts 

US policy in Libya has evolved significantly from the shocking death of US Ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi in 2012. The Biden administration, for example, made a concerted effort to engage more with Libya. In March 2023, it released a ten-year plan for preventing conflict and promoting stability in Libya under the Global Fragility Act. Then in March 2024, it notified Congress of a plan to reopen the US embassy in Tripoli.

In its first seven months in office, Trump administration has built on this earlier work. In April, it conducted a ship visit to Libya with the USS Mount Whitney, the first by a US Navy vessel in more than fifty years. In July, it dispatched Boulos to both Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as to neighboring countries Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt—presumably to look for avenues to advance peace and stability, which would pave the way for Libya’s energy resources to reach global markets.

All in the family

While skeptics criticized Boulos’s family connections or business background, he has used both to deliver a decisive advantage in diplomatic negotiations. Counterparts in the region—many of whom are not new to the influence of familial envoys—know that trusted ties mean access, and access means authority. Boulos has the latitude to promise and deliver creative solutions.

More than ever, Libya needs that authority and creativity. Boulos is well positioned to advance regional and global objectives regarding stability for Libya’s oil exports and broader economic development, countering global terrorist networks, and managing strategic competition with Russia.

Boulos has proven through his work with the DRC and Rwanda that he can leverage White House access to bring US national and global attention to complex problems. The sustainment of that effort and future progress for Libya hinges on the work of the career bureaucracy and uniformed military services to engage diplomatically and message consistently and cohesively.

It also depends on their ability to build and maintain reliable security partnerships and deliver on economic promises for US private-sector investments. Such officials maintain long-standing relationships, regional knowledge, and functional expertise that the administration can use to its advantage, and they deserve the administration’s trust to carry forth such an agenda.

Four steps forward

Combining the advantages of Boulos and career US diplomats and military officers, there are four near-term actions the Trump administration can take to bolster its ties to Libya.

First, the administration should nominate an ambassador to Libya, and the Senate should swiftly confirm this selection to replace Richard Norland, who departed the post in 2022.

Chargés d’affaires perform an incredible service and achieve remarkable things for US interests, but they cannot possibly achieve the same results or gain the same access as a Senate-confirmed personal representative of the US president.

Rather than continuing operations from Tunis, the next US ambassador to Libya should reopen the US embassy in Tripoli and maintain full-time operations in-country. The future ambassador’s presence would demonstrate a commitment to maturing the US-Libya bilateral relationship.

Until then, the US government should maintain or accelerate the pace of in-country engagements, extending each of these in duration until the US official diplomatic presence is persistent, if not permanent.

Second, the administration should roll out a concerted public information campaign articulating its policy objectives for Libya. This information campaign should outline marching orders for US departments and agencies working on Libya. It should assure Libyan stakeholders of the US interest in improving US-Libya ties. And it should reinforce to global actors—both friend and foe—that the United States is invested in Libya’s stability and economic markets.

The Trump team has demonstrated finesse in managing information flows to the US and global media. For example, their information campaigns to US and global audiences on migration are nothing if not clear.

A well-choreographed public affairs campaign articulating that the United States supports peace efforts in Libya and that the country is open for business will help reinforce other elements of US power operating in Libya in both the public and private sector. Such messages will also bolster confidence among Libyans that they can take steps toward the United States and policies that advantage the United States, while prompting allies and partners to consider aligning with US positions on Libya.

Third, the Department of Defense and Department of State should continue to incrementally increase US engagement and cooperation with defense forces and law enforcement in both GNU- and LNA-held territories. US forces have much to learn from engagements with their Libyan counterparts. Libyan forces have, for instance, tracked and countered terrorists in austere environments for decades with no reliable resourcing, and they have balanced the interests of strategic competitors waging influence campaigns within their borders.

Several US defense, law enforcement, and intelligence arms have strategic, operational, and tactical interests in collaborating with their Libyan counterparts to disrupt global terrorist operations and impede Russia’s efforts to destabilize the Sahel and Central Africa. The administration should resource such security investments.

This does mean spending US taxpayer dollars overseas. But providing security cooperation and assistance to Libyan forces can pay dividends in countering terrorism, thwarting Russia’s bids for influence on the continent, and advancing regional stability for economic markets.

Fourth, the Trump administration, with Boulos as its point person, should use its connections in the US private sector, particularly in the oil and gas industry, to broker relationships with Libya’s business community. Libya’s oil wealth is unparalleled on the African continent, but the country’s conflicts have shuttered production and export facilities.

Historically, Libya has been a wealthy and influential country, boasting elite security forces and influence throughout Africa and the Mediterranean, and there is extraordinary economic potential in the country that can help return it to that role in the medium and long term.

Moreover, the White House could leverage the Voluntary Principles Initiative to usher in respect for human and labor rights in Libya, thereby mitigating risk, creating value for Libyans, and advantaging the approaches of US companies. The Trump administration speaks the language of the private sector and brings enormous influence in this space that can catalyze deals, creating new economic opportunities. 

Trump and his team have admirably dedicated diplomatic weight to political and economic dealmaking in several global arenas. North Africa is hopefully its next target. Boulos’s family connection to Trump provides a tangible platform for brokering talks that can lead to greater stability and open economic pathways in Libya.

The Trump administration should continue to support his personal engagement in Libya in pursuit of key US national interests in bolstering security and increasing economic prosperity.

At the same time, career diplomats and members of the US military, in support of the president’s policies, must be empowered and resourced to follow through with traditional tools of US national power to reinforce and execute prospective agreements.

Absent such efforts to sustain diplomatic progress, the results of the administration’s peacemaking and dealmaking efforts will dissipate by the next news cycle. 

***

Maureen Farrell is a nonresident senior fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and vice president for global partnerships at Valar, a Nairobi-based strategic advisory and risk firm. She previously served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs and director for African affairs at the US National Security Council. 

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Youssef M. Sawani

Executive Summary

It is a long and winding road towards peace and stability in Libya. Despite some relative positive developments following the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a durable peace still eludes the Libyan people and the international community.

Today, Libya is faced with an uncertain future: a political morass; severe economic hardship; risks of renewed military escalation due to the political deadlock following the expiration of the LPDF roadmap; and a failed electoral process.

Enduring violence in Libya, though at a low intensity, as demonstrated by regular militia skirmishes, coupled with the continued presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries, makes peace fragile and vulnerable to further upheavals.

Substantial work on the political, economic, and military tracks remains pending, including the resolution of complex issues such as the future of militias, security, and the thorny issues of the electoral process and a permanent constitution.

Despite the efforts exerted by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to move the constitutional process forward during the latest high-level meeting on Libya’s constitutional track in Geneva on June 28-29, 2022, major disagreements persist on a number of issues, mainly on the eligibility requirements for the candidates in the first presidential elections post-2011.

While the several rounds of consultations in Cairo and Geneva yielded significant progress, they have fallen short in meeting requirements to hold comprehensive and inclusive national elections in Libya. The fact is that since the fall of the Gaddafi regime,

Libya has failed to transition to stability and democracy, as both the uprising and the ensuing conflict divided Libyans into essential categories of ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’

The UN and a number of international actors have attempted to bring resolution to the crisis through various mediation efforts but the role of foreign powers, including some of the permanent member states of the UN Security Council (UNSC), has not always been constructive.

Disagreement and 4 competing interests between these UNSC member states have negatively impacted the trajectory of the conflict, impeding the efforts of the UN to find a durable settlement to the conflict.

Competing foreign interests have often prevented consensus both at national and international levels. Despite some positive results in the political process, the crisis continues unabated. However, no final, inclusive, and lasting settlement looms on the horizon, in part because little serious attention has been paid to keys issues such as national dialogue, transitional justice, security sector reform, and reconciliation.

The UN has been involved in mediation in the Libyan conflict through its special mission in Libya, UNSMIL. However, each head of the mission – Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSGs) – Ian Martin, Tarek Mitri. Bernardino León, Martin Kobler, Ghassan Salamé, Acting SRSG Stephanie Williams, and Ján Kubiš – opted for different approaches.

A comparison of these efforts suggests that there have been inherent flaws in the design of the process and inconsistencies of strategy and approach.

In addition to the lack of a unified strategy in the UN led political process, there have also been concerns within large segments of Libyan society that the impartiality and neutrality of the UN has been compromised at times, and the political process has lacked transparency, according to our interviewees.

Participants were kept in the dark ahead of the political dialogue and had no access to the dialogue agenda, its minutes, or the results. Coupled with the negative influence of contending regional and international actors, the UN process was destined to fail in many respects.

This report demonstrates that in the eyes of the majority of Libyans the work of UNSMIL suffered many weaknesses and scored quite low on most criteria considered necessary for success.

As there was no clear transparent criteria for selecting the participants in the national dialogue processes, the consequent deficiencies of inclusion and ownership 5 reduced accountability and allowed participants to politicize the process.

Moreover, there were few voices representing civil society and their limited participation was seen more as a token attempt at inclusivity. Women’s participation did not constitute any meaningful representation. Thus, the process failed to address the issues related to women and civil society further reduced inclusivity, undermined public ownership, and ignored the conditions that continue to generate conflict and violence.

Lack of inclusivity and ownership also meant that implementation became essentially haphazard and circumstantial. The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), being the major achievement of UNSMIL and the framework that defines its work and determines current Libyan state institutions, has, despite all the support it had from UNSMIL and the international community, failed to achieve its objectives.

In fact, the LPA created a context in which Libyans became even more divided than before and created new issues of contestation. The process failed to become a transformative national dialogue inducing changes in public attitudes that would pave the way for desired and sustainable change, and thus the conflict has become more entrenched.

This report shows that for any dialogue to achieve a sustainable resolution to the Libyan crisis, it must be transformative and adaptive. This goal may be achieved with clearer and more solid commitments to ending foreign interference, and the designing of a broader, more inclusive national dialogue that puts reconciliation at the very forefront.

Any attempt to resolve the Libyan conflict must be based on an appropriate understanding of the socio-economic, and historical contexts, that will help parties genuinely commit to implementation of agreements.

Any effort that ignores this requirement will result in a superficial agreement that could backfire. There is a need to widen participation, uphold Libyan ownership, and limit foreign interference.

Instead of continuing to rely on foreign actors, peace in Libya will require Libyan stakeholders joining together to develop a peace and reconciliation agreement through a Libyan-led process, in which they themselves frame the contested issues as shared problems.

This would pave the way for the implementation of commitments and guarantees based on mutual, not exclusive, benefits. Such an agreement would then no longer be a mere tool for power-sharing that privileges some factions.

Instead of continuing to rely on foreign actors, peace in Libya will require Libyan stakeholders joining together to develop a peace and reconciliation agreement through a Libyan-led process, in which they themselves frame the contested issues as shared problems.

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Youssef M Sawani – Academic with long teaching and research experience. Independent Researcher. Faculty Member with University Of Tripoli.

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The MED This Week newsletter provides informed insights on the most significant developments in the MENA region, bringing together unique opinions and reliable foresight on future scenarios. Today, we shed light on the Libya’s persistent fragility and the efforts to overcome it.  

Stability in Libya still seems far on the horizon. The country remains divided between two centres of power– the West, governed by the Government of National Unity (GNU), and the East, controlled by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) – with fragile institutions constantly on the brink of violence. Rising tensions in Tripoli are once again fueling fears that renewed military escalation could spread through the city.

Pro-GNU forces are seeking to consolidate control at the expense of rival armed groups, particularly the Special Deterrence Force (Al-Rada), with which there had already been clashes in May 2025.

Against this backdrop, three years after the last meeting between Khalifa Haftar and Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, on 3 September 2025, Saddam Haftar, son of Haftar and recently appointed as Deputy General Commander of the LNA, met in Rome with Ibrahim Dbeibah, nephew of Dbeibah.

Although details of the meeting are still unclear, questions are mounting about its purpose and its implications for Libya’s future. The presence of US Envoy for Africa Massad Boulos also signaled renewed interest by the Trump Administration in the Libyan dossier.

Yet, another player is stepping up: Turkey. Long considered a “historic” ally of Western Libya, Ankara has increasingly reached out to the Eastern camp, raising the prospect of becoming an even more prominent force in shaping the country’s trajectory.

Meanwhile, back in August, UN Special Representative for Libya Hanna Tetteh presented a new roadmap for Libya, built around three central goals: forming a unified national government for both Libyas, establishing a credible electoral system, and launching an inclusive dialogue.

However, critics warn that the roadmap falls short of addressing the systemic flaws at the heart of Libya’s crisis, and risks reproducing the same patterns that derailed previous initiatives.  

Experts from the ISPI network discuss Libya’s persistent fragility. 

Rome hosted the two Libyas, but remains

on the backdrop  

“In a context marked by a looming deterioration of the security situation in Tripoli, discreet talks between Ibrahim Dbeibah and Saddam Haftar, as well as shifting stances of influential foreign actors involved in Libya, Rome hopes that there is still room to avoid another escalation in its southern neighbour.

Italy fears repercussions of instability in terms of a further rise in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean and of new threats to its energy supply – basically the two main drivers of its approach to Libya over the past years. However, as the Dbeibah-Haftar talks demonstrate, of which Rome was only the venue as negotiations were led by the United States, this approach has shown its limits.

Prioritising migration management over consistent efforts to stabilise Libya and playing an ambiguous role by engaging with both western and eastern Libyan authorities, Rome has seen its influence over the crisis progressively declining and has slid to the backdrop of discussion on the future of the country.” 

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Aldo Liga, Research Fellow, ISPI MENA Centre  

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Dbeibah’s zero-sum security:

consolidation at the cost of stability 

“The deterioration of Tripoli’s security establishment reflects both long-term neglect and acute political pressures. Following the UN Special Representative Hanna Tetteh’s political roadmap announcement, the regional procession of diplomats to Haftar reinforced Dbeibah’s sense of existential threat, strengthening his rationale for consolidating control and portraying himself as an inevitable political fixture, much as Haftar did in the East.

Yet the GNU has never prioritised substantive security sector reform. Instead, it has entrenched a system of transactional deals with armed group leaders, privileging short-term loyalty and coercive leverage over institutional reform.

This dynamic is what heightened the risk for confrontation: one of the only remaining anti-GNU Tripoli-based groups – the socially entrenched Special Deterrence Force – has invested in entrenchment and alliance-building designed to raise the costs of Dbeibah’s consolidation, betting that withstanding Dbeibah’s pressures will ultimately yield leadership change.

In this climate, both camps interpret compromise as existentially threatening, turning security arrangements into zero-sum instruments of survival rather than pathways to stabilisation.” 

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Emaddeddin Badi, Expert, Centre on Armed Groups; Senior Fellow, Global Initiative

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Against Transnational Organized Crime 

The new roadmap for Libya: Tetteh’s bid to break the Libyan deadlock 

“The last roadmap is derivative of its predecessors’ efforts, and is similarly influenced by intervening nations in Libya despite their designs running contrary to what is best for Libyans and most stabilising for Libya.

This roadmap is distinguished by the move towards a new unifying government before elections, which could be a dangerous flashpoint. All Libyan institutions and politicians are broadly considered illegitimate.

So, there are valid fears that without changing the system, any new combination of these politicians will act as all their predecessors did in the same environment: derail the transition, entrench, and facilitate private interests in place of public good.

Ultimately, the roadmap’s success is dependent on the good faith engagement of international actors and their willingness to use coercive tools like sanctions on spoilers. Something Tetteh’s predecessors all lacked and suffered for.

A fatal flaw Tetteh is trying to redress, by resurrecting the Berlin process.” 

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Tarek Megerisi, Senior Policy Fellow, ECFR 

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Trump’s new approach to Libya:

business first 

“The first Trump Administration’s dealings with Libya were simply disastrous. In fact, following more than 2 years of almost complete neglect, there came five minutes of a phone call with General Haftar in which Trump endorsed the general’s brutal military attack against the city of Tripoli ‘as long as he did it quickly’.

No further words of comment are needed.

The second Trump Administration is a bit different only because more people belonging to the President’s entourage have been, one way or the other, interested, albeit only in the economic and business potential of the North African country.

The main word characterising most relationships between the Trump government and the various states has been ‘Transactional’, clearly framing every relationship within an economic and trade framework, not a political or social one.

The appointment of Massad Boulos, the father-in-law of Trump’s daughter Tiffany, as US envoy to Africa tells exactly this story, one of disinterest for every aspect of foreign policy planning and analysis in favour of basic business deals.” 

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Karim Mezran, Director, Resident Senior Fellow, North Africa Initiative, Atlantic Council; Senior Associate Research Fellow, ISPI 

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Betting on both sides: Ankara’s

repositioning in Eastern Libya   

“Few foreign policy pivots are as bold, or as fraught with risk, as betting on both sides of a civil conflict. Yet that is precisely what Turkey appears to be doing in Libya.

Having established military and political influence in western Libya, most notably through its decisive military intervention in support of the UN-backed GNU against Khalifa Haftar’s LNA in 2019-2020, Ankara is now extending olive branches to the East – to the very actors it once sought to marginalise.

The pace of this shift is striking. Turkey is reportedly preparing to expand security cooperation, including providing military training and arms sales, with the LNA, commanded by Haftar.

The Tobruk-based House of Representatives has formed a commission to review – and potentially ratify – the 2019 maritime and security agreements. In August, a Turkish naval vessel docked in Benghazi, followed by high-level talks between Intelligence Chief İbrahim Kalın and eastern Libya’s military leader Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi.

Taken together, these developments signal how rapidly Ankara is repositioning itself on Libya’s eastern front, seeking new security footholds to complement its growing economic presence in the last couple of years.” 

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Nebahat Tanrıverdi Yaşar, visiting Fellow, SWP

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Yassin K. Fawaz

The paradox of post-Gadhafi Libya is not that it was captured by one foreign patron, but that it was abandoned too many.

Muammar Gadhafi was toppled in 2011 with Western bombs and Libyan blood. What came after was not liberation, but vacuum. America, having helped oust the dictator, promptly lost interest. Europe fumbled. The United Nations produced roadmaps that nobody obeyed. Into the void poured every power with an agenda, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Italy, France and others. Yet more than a decade on, Libya belongs to none of them. It is a country run by nobody, for nobody, except its warlords.

The paradox of post-Gadhafi Libya is not that it was captured by one foreign patron, but that it was abandoned too many. Each has meddled; none has stabilised. Libya has become an orphan of geopolitics, too important for outsiders to ignore yet never important enough for any to take responsibility. Its oil reserves make it a prize, its location on Europe’s doorstep a temptation. But its politics remain a stalemate, sustained by foreign indulgence and domestic greed.

This was not inevitable. When Gadhafi fell, Libya still had the rough outline of a state: ministries, a central bank, an oil company with global partners. What it lacked was the security and diplomatic scaffolding and political culture to make those institutions work together. Only America had the weight to provide that scaffolding. Instead it stepped back, leaving Europeans divided in their pursuit of Libya’s spoils and regional players emboldened. The result was a free-for-all in which militias flourished, revenues were carved up, and the idea of a national project slowly withered.

Today Libya is not a failed state so much as a stalled one: neither collapsing nor recovering, neither captured nor free. It is a monument not to American overreach but to American absence.

The revolution that never was

The uprising of 2011 began with chants in Benghazi and Misrata, inspired by the Arab Spring. It ended with a French-led NATO air power smashing Gadhafi’s convoys, rebels storming Tripoli and the colonel dragged from a culvert and killed. Western leaders congratulated themselves. Libyan insurgents celebrated.

But the “day after” never came. Barack Obama had no appetite for a stabilisation mission. Britain and France, loudest in calling for intervention, offered little beyond rhetoric. Italy, with oil interests at stake, pressed for contracts rather than governance. The UN dutifully drafted blueprints for elections and national councils. None materialised.

The violence soon reached America directly. In September 2012 Ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed in Benghazi, when Islamic militants stormed the US mission. His death was more than a tragedy; it was the predictable outcome of Barack Obama’s weak foreign policy of “leading from behind.”

Washington had intervened to help topple Gadhafi, but shrank from the burdens of stabilisation. A lightly protected diplomatic mission was left exposed in a city overrun by militias. You cannot topple a regime halfway. If America intervenes without stabilising, the vacuum becomes deadlier than the dictatorship. The lesson was stark: either you go all in, or you do not go in at all.

By 2012 militias ruled the streets. The national army was a fiction. Assassinations multiplied. Embassies packed up. In 2014 rival parliaments emerged in Tripoli and Tobruk, each with its own backers, each claiming legitimacy. Libya slid into civil war. America chose the halfway house, and Libya has lived with the consequences ever since. That retreat looks stranger when set against America’s past pragmatism.

Under George W Bush, Washington was prepared to do business even with Gadhafi himself. In 2003 the Libyan long-time ruler renounced weapons of mass destruction. Within a few years Condoleezza Rice was visiting Tripoli and American oil firms were rushing back. If Libya was valuable enough to rehabilitate a tyrant, why was it deemed expendable once that tyrant was gone?

The answer lies less in Libya than in Washington. Iraq had soured Americans on “nation-building.” Barack Obama wanted out of the Middle East. Libya was seen as Europe’s problem, not America’s. Yet leaving such a strategic prize, Africa’s largest oil reserves, a gateway to the Sahel, a launch pad on the Mediterranean, to squabbling warlords and meddling middle powers was a choice. And it is one that haunts Libya still.

The free-for-all

The absence of the United States created a vacuum into which every mid-level power inserted itself. The UAE armed and funded Khalifa Haftar, the strongman of the east, with drones, cash and political support. Turkey backed Tripoli, sending advisers, drones, and later Syrian mercenaries. Russia deployed Wagner fighters, carving out bases in the east and south.

Egypt, sharing a porous border, meddled to contain Islamists and migrants and safeguard its economic interests. Italy fretted about migration and ENI’s energy contracts. France covertly supported Haftar while professing neutrality. Its political class will be haunted for years by Gadhafi’s illegal financing of Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential campaign.

Each patron acted tactically. None wanted the cost of reconstruction. None had the reach to impose order. They were strong enough to spoil but not to settle. Libya became a chessboard where every piece was pinned, unable to move but impossible to remove.

Oil, which might have united the state, became the prize that kept it divided. Libya holds Africa’s largest proven reserves. Its National Oil Corporation (NOC) still commands respect abroad, selling crude to international buyers. But revenues flow into the Central Bank in Tripoli, where they are diverted into patronage. Haftar periodically blockades fields to extract concessions.

Every foreign sponsor eyes hydrocarbons. Italy leans on ENI to secure gas for Europe. France’s TotalEnergies seeks its slice. Turkey and the UAE insert themselves into contracts. Russia eyes concessions in the south. Instead of building legitimacy, oil entrenches dysfunction. Every new project abroad becomes another rent for warlords at home.

Why America mattered

No other power had the legitimacy or tools to stabilise Libya. America was NATO’s spearhead in 2011; its word carried weight with Libyans and Europeans alike. It alone had the diplomatic clout to corral allies, the financial leverage to police oil revenues and the deterrent power to restrain spoilers.

Its disengagement mattered in three ways. Diplomacy without weight: UN envoys produced roadmaps, but every faction had a foreign patron to veto progress. Without American backing, no plan stuck. Security without umbrella: militias flourished, each tied to an external sponsor. Only the US could have imposed a security framework. Economy without order: oil revenues became spoils. America could have enforced transparency. Its absence left the treasury open to looting.

For Libyans the lesson was clear: outsiders might intervene briefly, but they would not stay. The rational strategy was not compromise but waiting, bargaining and pocketing rents.

A decade on, Libya is frozen. In the west, Abdulhamid Dbeibah’s Government of National Unity presides over ministries and the central bank but relies on militias to control Tripoli’s streets. In the east, Haftar’s Libyan National Army rules by repression and clientism. His son Saddam now plays envoy abroad, groomed as heir. Both sides sometimes fight, more often collude. They divide oil revenues, share contracts and keep their foreign patrons happy.

Ordinary Libyans endure blackouts, fuel shortages, inflation and unemployment. Services barely function. A generation has grown up with no memory of a working state. Municipal councils occasionally deliver modest improvements, but national elites suffocate them, fearing competition for patronage.

Foreign limits

Foreign patrons remain. Turkey anchors Tripoli, the UAE bankrolls Haftar, Russia lurks with Wagner. Egypt interferes. Italy and France compete through energy firms. Yet all face limits. None can impose unity. None wants the bill for reconstruction. They meddle to block rivals, not to build stability.

Europe’s gamble is energy. ENI has poured billions into gas fields and pipelines. Rome hopes Libyan gas will replace Russian supplies. Yet hydrocarbons do not heal; they divide. Each new contract entrenches the carve-up. Europeans may secure molecules, but not governance.

Russia uses Libya as leverage in its wider confrontation with the West. Turkey treats it as a bargaining chip in the eastern Mediterranean. The UAE uses it to project influence. For all of them Libya is not an end but a means. That is why, despite years of meddling, the country belongs to none of them.

Ironically, even after years of disengagement, America retains the most leverage. Both Tripoli and Benghazi court its approval. Dbeibah craves recognition to shore up his legitimacy. Haftar seeks American attention to offset his dependence on Russia and the Gulf. International oil companies look to Washington as guarantor.

No deal is truly bankable without America’s nod. That makes Washington the one power both sides cannot alienate. The tragedy is that it has been unwilling to use this leverage to push for real renewal. Instead, it has confined itself to modest aims: keep oil flowing, prevent partition, discourage Russian expansion.

US re-engagement?

Change may finally be coming. The Libya file is now being handled by Massad Boulos, a senior adviser close to the White House. I know him well and have a great level of respect for him, his son is like a brother to me. My own presence in President Trump‘s world goes back further: before and after Mr Trump’s first victory in 2016. Taken together, it means that if anyone understands how to reach Donald Trump, it is those of us who have been in his orbit from the very start. And I know Massad is capable. Yet confidence alone is not enough.

The only way anything will shift is if Washington puts its leverage into play. America has tools no one else can match: sanctions that bite, financial levers that starve factions of cash, and, if necessary, military pressure. Both camps in Libya understand this, as do the outsiders who have profited from the vacuum. Under Donald Trump, American policy is not likely to be dressed up in lofty ideals. It will be tough, unapologetic and focused on results. If that toughness is brought to bear, Libya may at last move up the ladder of Washington’s priorities after more than a decade in the wilderness.

Libya is often cited as an example of Western overreach. It is better understood as an example of American absence. The US helped topple a dictator but refused to take responsibility for the aftermath. Rivals were not strong enough to replace it. They only exploited the vacuum.

The consequences extend beyond Libya. The lesson to would-be rebels across the Arab world was clear: America might back uprisings tactically, but it would not stick around to build states. To allies in Europe the message was equally stark: without American leadership, even NATO’s victories turn hollow.

Libya could have been different. With its small population, vast resources and proximity to Europe, it might have been a success story of the Arab Spring. Instead it became an orphan of geopolitics, abandoned by the powers that toppled its tyrant and picked over by lesser predators.

Meetings in Rome, Berlin or Tunis are hailed as breakthroughs. They are theatre. Oil contracts signed in Tripoli or Benghazi are touted as progress. They are spoils. For Libyans, the reality is stasis: a country that belongs to nobody because the only power that might have anchored it chose not to.

Libya is a monument not to imperial hubris but to abdication. It is what happens when America withdraws: not a prize for others, but a void for all. A decade on, the country is still waiting to be claimed, above all by its own citizens.

***

Yassin K Fawaz is an American business executive, publisher and security and terrorism expert.

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UN officials are trying to prevent tensions between government and militia forces in western Libya from burgeoning into armed clashes that threaten civilians in and around Tripoli.

Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, head of the UN-backed government in Tripoli, is intent on dismantling the militias in order to consolidate his authority in the west.

Fighting in western Libya will further complicate the already floundering years-long UN effort to unify rival governments in eastern and western Libya and hold national elections.

Through its troop deployments, Türkiye is messaging Dbeibeh not to attack militia-held installations, but Ankara is also working with the rival government in eastern Libya to secure its interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

As September began, Libya’s fractured post-Qadhafi political architecture stood at the precipice of renewed armed conflict as the UN-backed, Tripoli-based administration (Government of National Unity, GNU) of Prime Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh sought to exert a monopoly of armed force in western Libya. 

Past post-Qadhafi armed conflicts in the country have pitted the Tripoli administration against a competing power center based in eastern Libya, dominated by strongman General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).

Since Haftar’s failed 2019 offensive to conquer Tripoli and unify the country, a succession of United Nations mediators has sought, without success, to broker an agreement to combine the rival administrations into a central interim government that would hold elections for a national parliament and presidency. However, political leaders in western and eastern Libya have repeatedly thwarted the UN efforts, in large part because a unification of Libya’s governing structure would inevitably require some leaders to relinquish their authority.

The current threats of violence appear confined mainly to western Libya, where a variety of leaders and factions are competing for power in Tripoli. Dbeibeh calculates that marginalizing armed challengers to his administration will garner him additional support from outside powers and potentially position him to emerge as the leader of a united Libya.

Consolidating his control over all armed forces in western Libya might also enhance Tripoli’s ability to ward off another offensive from Haftar’s LNA, which is benefiting from a Russian redeployment of its military assets in Syria — where Russia seems to be no longer welcome. Dbeibeh and his allies suspect that the militias around Tripoli might potentially assist a future attempt by Haftar to oust Dbeibeh and unify the country by force. However, should Dbeibeh prevail over his western Libya rivals, his leverage to resist any UN-led settlement that requires him to yield office will also increase, further complicating UN efforts to unify Libya’s political structure.

The current unrest appears to represent a revival of tensions that led to deadly armed clashes in and around Tripoli in May, in which several civilians were killed in the crossfire. As was the case in May, the tensions centered on Dbeibeh’s intent to disband the militias forcibly. The proximate conflict, which has sparked competing military maneuvers and at least one clash last week, centers on Dbeibeh’s insistence that a key militia, the Special Deterrence Force (synonymous with the “Radaa Group”), yield to state authorities’ control of sensitive facilities in Tripoli, including Mitiga prison and airport.

The prison is said to hold, among other inmates, members of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Tensions have escalated in recent days as Dbeibeh ordered loyalist forces from Misurata, east of the capital, and from Gharyan to the south, to advance on Mitiga. Reflecting a broader power struggle, the Special Deterrence Force/Radaa Group is aligned with another Tripoli leadership body, the Presidential Council, which was established under a 2015 political agreement to serve as Libya’s head of state and command its armed forces.

In practice, the Council has acquired little authority, and it is seeking to elevate its influence relative to Dbeibeh’s administration, whose formal mandate expired in late 2021. Dbeibeh argues his mandate did not expire because UN-backed national elections scheduled for December 2021 — and which would have abolished his separate administration — were cancelled.

UN officials have been nervously watching the escalating tensions and military maneuvers in western Libya. On Saturday, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) warned that the sudden movement of troops and heavy weapons could trigger new violence in Libya’s capital. It stated the situation poses “potential harm” to civilians.

UN officials have urged restraint and a return to dialogue between Dbeibeh’s defense ministry and the militias he is trying to constrain. UNSMIL added that any new conflict risks not only the safety of the capital but also the potential for violence to spread across the country, “leading to a ‘lose-lose’ war that would critically endanger civilians.” The UN’s warnings appeared well-founded when, on Tuesday, a suicide attacker detonated a vehicle full of explosives at the main gate of the defense ministry’s 444th Brigade’s headquarters in Bani Walid.

Experts assess that additional pressure from outside powers, as well as from civilian leaders, might hold off an armed conflict. The Saturday UNSMIL statement noted a political dialogue among the contending factions on new security arrangements had “shown progress since June,” but that the recent military movements risk derailing those efforts. Libyan sources said that mediation was underway to dissuade Dbeibah from steps that could trigger confrontation in Tripoli, with both domestic and international actors pressing him to exercise restraint.

The so-called “5+5 Joint Military Committee” — a body set up to de-escalate military tensions after Haftar’s failed 2019 offensive — urged all armed units to return to their designated bases. The Committee called on all sides to refrain from unilateral actions and uphold ceasefire obligations, describing them as essential to protecting civilians and sustaining the political process.

UN officials are also expecting Türkiye to use its extensive leverage on all factions in western Libya to de-escalate tensions. Ankara is the leading supporter and weapons supplier of the Tripoli government, but it has also armed the militia units Dbeibeh is trying to constrain. The militias were instrumental in turning back Haftar’s 2019 offensive, and Ankara continues to see irregular forces as integral to Tripoli’s ability to deter another push by Haftar on the capital. Some Turkish troops have been based at Mitiga Airport to help secure the base and the prison there.

Ankara has rebuffed Dbeibeh’s insistence that the Turkish forces depart Mitiga, a withdrawal that would render the militias at Mitiga vulnerable. Sources in Tripoli report that Turkish forces continue their routine activity inside the base — a clear message from Ankara to Dbeibah not to storm Mitiga Airport.

But, aside from trying to deter Dbeibeh from using force against militias at Mitiga, Turkish officials do not appear actively engaged in diplomacy with the various factions in western Libya to try to de-escalate tensions there. Turkish officials have been focused on engaging Haftar and his allies in Benghazi in an effort to diversify Ankara’s alliances in Libya and promote Turkish strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

Haftar is reportedly set to visit Türkiye later in September, providing Turkish leaders with an opportunity to lobby him to urge the eastern Libyan House of Representatives (HoR, parliament) to ratify the 2019 maritime agreement between Türkiye and the GNU. A ratification by the HoR would bring the maritime deal into force. Greece and Egypt oppose that agreement as too favorable to Türkiye and an infringement on the separate 2020 maritime deal between Greece and Egypt.

The UN’s warnings, dialogue among Libyan factions, and Ankara’s efforts to deter a military move by Dbeibeh all face significant hurdles in the face of the Tripoli Prime Minister’s determination to consolidate his authority in the west. In an interview with Libya’s al-Ahrar TV channel published Monday, Dbeibeh stressed: “We are continuing our security plan. We will not back down from eliminating militias and armed formations. Whoever does not want war to be declared against them must abide by the state, its institutions and laws.”

He explained the militias had refused offers to join the formal military institutions, and he characterized them as “criminal gangs” whose insistence on remaining autonomous constituted a “coup against the state…” Dbeibeh claimed the militias were better armed than government forces, including operating combat aircraft, and he accused militia leaders of using their armed formations to “blackmail official institutions.”

Dbeibeh stated the government’s policy is clear and that “all ports and airports will be affiliated with the relevant state institutions,” adding: “The time has come to take back the state, and we will not leave any airport, port or prison outside the state’s control.” Dbeibah’s insistence on consolidating control of armed forces in western Libya, including using force if necessary, seems to justify the pessimism expressed by many global diplomats that Libya can be stabilized and unified any time soon.

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Karim Mezran and Dario Cristiani

On August 21, the United Nations Special Representative for Libya, Hanaa Tetteh, presented a new roadmap to the UN Security Council aimed at reviving the country’s stalled political process and offering a renewed prospect for stability after years of deadlock. The proposal comes at a time marked by widespread institutional distrust and growing public frustration, as Libyans grow weary of endless transitional phases that yield no tangible outcomes.

Against this backdrop, a significant political development unfolded in eastern Libya: General Khalifa Haftar recently appointed his son, Saddam Haftar, as Deputy General Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA). He framed the move as part of the “General Commander’s Vision 2030” to modernize and enhance the military’s overall performance. Haftar also signaled that this was just the beginning of a broader restructuring involving appointments to “key positions.”

Soon after, the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) unanimously approved Saddam Haftar’s promotion. The HoR also appointed Lieutenant General Abdelrazek Al-Nadouri as National Security Advisor, removing him from his post as Chief of Staff of the eastern forces. His replacement? Khaled Haftar, another of the general’s sons.

The fact that the appointment came just days before the UN announced its new roadmap aimed at guiding Libya toward elections and a unified government is, to say the least, notable. The developments also come amid a growing rapprochement between Haftar and Turkey, despite a history of tensions.

The developments may well set the stage for a potential power shift in Tripoli. Notably, they suggest that Haftar is not only shaping the current political landscape, but is also positioning himself—and his family—for long-term strategic influence.

The UN roadmap

The UN roadmap is structured around three central goals: establishing a credible electoral framework, forming a new unified national government, and launching an inclusive dialogue that engages not only political elites but also youth, women, civil society, and marginalized communities. The core idea is that only a genuinely inclusive process can ensure legitimacy and address the root causes of the conflict.

The proposed timeline spans twelve to eighteen months. It is intended to avoid the same gridlocks that derailed the 2021 elections, which were not held in the end, despite being the most significant task that the interim Government of National Unity (GNU) established as a result of a UN-led process, which was supposed to be carried out.

Under this new plan, initial efforts will focus on strengthening the High National Electoral Commission, addressing leadership gaps, and resolving legal and political disputes that have obstructed voting over the past decade. Once these foundational steps are secured, attention will turn to forming a unified government responsible for guiding the country toward elections.

A significant element of the plan is its grounding in prior consultations conducted by the UN, which included input from over 22,000 Libyan citizens. A clear message emerged from these discussions: the need to restore political legitimacy through elections and move beyond institutions widely seen as ineffective and lacking credibility.

While “free and fair” elections are a cornerstone of any democratic system, in Libya’s current context, national elections—particularly in the short term—could risk exacerbating instability rather than resolving it. Though local elections were recently held, the event passed largely unnoticed. The UN marked it as a positive step, as the recorded turnout was considered significant (71 percent). Yet only twenty-six out of sixty-three municipalities participated, so the turnout concerned only the municipalities that actually voted.

This underscores that popular enthusiasm for elections is far from universal, and that entrenching forces fighting for the maintenance of the status quo are still very powerful and capable of spoiling the electoral process. At the moment, Libya remains divided into two, competing governments: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the West, which – as mentioned above – was supposed to be an interim executive whose main task was to prepare elections in 2021 but which has remained in office since, and the eastern, non-recognized government backed by the forces of Khalifa Haftar and the HoR, the Parliament elected in 2014 whose speaker is Aguila Saleh.

While acknowledging the need to work with existing power structures until new institutions are in place, Tetteh warned that the path forward will be fraught with resistance and potential attempts at sabotage. In light of these challenges, she urged members of the Security Council to remain united and resolute, emphasizing the importance of holding accountable those who obstruct progress. In her words, the roadmap represents “a real opportunity” to restore legitimacy and stability in Libya—an opportunity to end the cycle of perpetual transitions and lay the groundwork for state reconstruction after more than a decade of fragmentation.

Haftar’s power grab and Turkey’s

emerging influence

All of Haftar’s sons now occupy senior positions in eastern Libya, both in military and economic spheres. Among them, Saddam is widely perceived as the heir apparent. His latest promotion cements his status within the family’s power structure, effectively positioning him as a crown prince and the most likely political and military successor to his father. The significance of this move is amplified by persistent speculation surrounding General Haftar’s advanced age and health.

Saddam’s elevation coincides with his increasingly visible international presence. In recent months, he has undertaken a series of high-level diplomatic visits on behalf of his father. In July, he traveled to Islamabad to meet with Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to discuss defense cooperation and naval relations. Earlier in the year, he visited Washington for meetings with US State Department officials; Rome, where he met with Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto; and Cairo, where he discussed military and security coordination with Egyptian Chief of Staff Ahmed Fathi Khalifa.

Perhaps the most notable visit was to Turkey, marking the first direct military engagement between the Haftar family and Ankara. In Istanbul, Saddam met with Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Chief of Staff Selçuk Oğuz.

In a context marked by endemic fragmentation and deep political-institutional polarization, Saddam’s appointment was met with mixed reactions. As expected, the decision was welcomed by leaders in the eastern part of the country, many of whom remain closely—perhaps even literally—tied to General Haftar’s will. Conversely, it sparked concern and criticism among factions aligned with the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU).

Just days after the UN announcement, on August 25, General Haftar hosted Ibrahim Kalin, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), in Benghazi. Alongside Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Kalin is widely seen as one of President Erdoğan’s most powerful and trusted figures. His decision to visit Benghazi—without stopping in Tripoli—was highly symbolic. The day before, the Turkish Navy corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) docked in Benghazi, where it was received by Saddam Haftar. This marked the first visit by a Turkish warship to eastern Libya, a region firmly under Haftar’s control.

Also on August 25, Khaled Haftar met with US Chargé d’Affaires Jeremy Berndt, currently the highest-ranking American official in Libya following the end of Richard Norland’s term as Special Envoy this past May. Their meeting focused on the US–Libya security partnership. Berndt emphasized the importance of “unifying Libya’s military and security institutions and promoting long-term stability for the Libyan people,” adding that the United States “will continue to engage with security leaders across Libya.”

Our Libyan sources on the ground reported that on the same day, General Haftar also held meetings with representatives from Turkey, France, the United States, and Italy. This series of engagements further confirms the diplomatic momentum Haftar has cultivated in recent months, especially with respect to Turkey. The timing of both his “dynastic” appointments and these high-level diplomatic contacts together suggests Haftar’s aims of establishing a long-term hold on power for himself and his family.

For the current leadership in Tripoli, these developments present serious challenges. Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbeibah of the Government of National Unity (GNU) has paradoxically seen his political space narrow since the killing of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli (known as “Ghaniwa”) in May. In the weeks following al-Kikli’s death, it became increasingly clear that the militias supposedly underpinning Dbeibah’s control over Tripoli and its surroundings are more autonomous—and less loyal—than previously assumed. In fact, the local militias determined the width of the clashes and their maximum profundity, halting the battle when more convenient for them.

At the same time, Turkey was operating another strategic turn by pursuing more decisively a rapprochement with its eastern Mediterranean main rival, Egypt. This brilliant diplomatic action clearly showed Ankara’s pragmatic approach in the Mediterranean towards old foes, although the road to full cooperation with Cairo is still bumpy.

After years of tension, sparked by the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi in 2013 and the rise to power of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to power, bilateral political and diplomatic strains had long limited Ankara and Cairo’s collaboration on regional crises across Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, with Libya being an obvious case in point. However, as a result of the war in Gaza, Turkey and Egypt began working to end a decade of hostility, opening the gates for cooperation on new strategies to tackle enduring crises. Even so, regional rivalries, conflicting loyalties, and the role of other external actors still complicate cooperation.

In Libya, it is becoming evident that, rather than aligning with specific actors, Turkey appears focused on outcomes: securing acceptance of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Exclusive Economic Zone, winning contracts for Libya’s reconstruction, and leveraging Libya as a strategic counterweight to Greek-Cypriot-French efforts to isolate Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The MoU is Turkey’s most significant interest in Libya. If both governments in Libya agree on that, this would be Turkey’s best guarantee against any attempts from regional rivals to isolate it and undermine its interests in energy exploration. Indeed, this MoU was crucial for Ankara’s military intervention in November 2019, as it happened only after the then Government of the National Accord (GNA) signed this MoU in return for Turkey’s military assistance against Haftar’s forces.

In the short term, Turkey will likely encourage both Libya’s western and eastern factions to reach a compromise and form a power-sharing government. However, from a longer-term perspective, the outlook for Dbeibah appears significantly less favorable.

With the decisions made in recent days, Haftar has cemented dynastic control over the eastern forces, making it clear that he and his family dominate the security apparatus in Cyrenaica. Dbeibah, by contrast, cannot claim the same level of control in the west, as he remains dependent on the support of Tripolitania militias—rather than commanding them. Actually, even more correct would be to say that his power position depends in good part on the goodwill of the militias, but mostly thanks to the Turkish army stationed in the western territory. Not really a popular endorsement or a clear-cut legitimacy.

In this context, once the probable power-sharing arrangement brings Haftar and his allies in Tripoli, his firm grip on the eastern forces could be used to assert control over the capital, as well. Whether that control is achieved through negotiation or coercion will depend on the response of militias in Tripoli and Misrata—and on the interests of key external actors, particularly Turkey, in that evolving scenario.

Turkey likely remains the only actor capable of setting real limits on Haftar’s ambitions. Yet, as recent developments demonstrate, Ankara has shown a willingness to engage with eastern factions—particularly after Haftar and his inner circle began aligning more closely with Turkish strategic interests. After his failed blitzkrieg on Tripoli in 2019–2020–repelled only by decisive Turkish military intervention—Haftar may now find himself entering the capital not through force, but through diplomacy. In a striking reversal, he could walk into Tripoli triumphantly—without firing a shot—thanks to this unexpected convergence with Ankara.

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Karim Mezran is the director of the North Africa Initiative and a resident senior fellow with the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council, focusing on the processes of change in North Africa. 

Dario Cristiani is a political risk consultant and an associate fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali global actors program in Rome. He is also a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, working on Italian foreign policy, the Mediterranean, and global politics. 

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Didenur Daştan

Ankara’s balanced outreach to rival Tripoli and Benghazi factions seeks unity for Libya while navigating tensions with Greece over maritime rights, expert opines.

Türkiye is stepping up its outreach to Libya’s rival factions, seeking to balance ties with both Tripoli and Benghazi as it pushes for unity in the conflict-torn country while strengthening its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

A rare meeting this week between Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın and eastern commander Khalifa Haftar marked Ankara’s first high-level contact with Benghazi in years. Libya has been divided since the NATO-backed uprising in 2011, with rival administrations in the east and west vying for power.

While Türkiye remains a key supporter of the U.N.-recognized government in Tripoli, it is now broadening engagement with Haftar’s camp, a move that reflects Ankara’s bid to help stabilize Libya without alienating either side, according to Murat Aslan, a security analyst at the Turkish think-tank Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA).

Policy of inclusion

The outreach comes as Libya’s political process remains stalled. Disputes over elections and a constitutional referendum continue between Tripoli-based leaders and the eastern parliament, while armed groups still wield influence across western Libya, often competing with one another.

Here, Türkiye has carved out a stabilizing role. Its military presence in western Libya has helped calm rival militias, while active coordination among Ankara’s Foreign Ministry, intelligence service, and defense officials has, according to Aslan, had “a constructive impact on Libya in such a situation.”

Central to Türkiye’s strategy, Aslan stressed, is engaging with all Libyan factions. “If you only meet with one side in any country, you reduce yourself to a position of supporting that side while alienating the other,” he said. “Türkiye is not making this mistake.”

He emphasized that Ankara’s outreach to Benghazi was done in coordination with Tripoli. “The initiative in Benghazi wasn’t undertaken to offend Tripoli. It’s being carried out in close coordination with Tripoli,” Aslan said.

For Ankara, the payoff lies not in military victories but in creating political space. “Such a political success is being achieved,” Aslan said. “It demonstrates the success of Türkiye’s Libya policy.”

Maritime stakes

That balancing act carries weight far beyond Libya’s borders. A core part of Ankara’s calculations is the 2019 agreement on the delimitation of maritime jurisdictions with Tripoli, a deal that expanded Türkiye’s reach in the Eastern Mediterranean but has yet to be ratified by Libya’s eastern-based parliament.

Aslan said Türkiye’s outreach to Benghazi could pave the way for that approval, a step that would strengthen Ankara’s hand against Greece and the European Union. “The maritime jurisdiction protocol between those two countries must also be ratified by the Assembly,” said Aslan. “If the Assembly in eastern Libya ratifies that agreement, Greece will no longer be able to mount a counterargument.”

Two historic rivals wrangling for influence in their region, Türkiye and Greece are also at odds over energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Ankara’s deal with Libya, which allows Turkish ships to probe Libya’s territorial waters for hydrocarbons.

Kalın’s visit coincided with the docking of the Turkish navy corvette TCG Kınalıada in Benghazi and military-to-military talks between Turkish and Libyan delegations. Haftar’s son and deputy, Saddam Haftar, boarded the ship, highlighting the growing thaw between Ankara and the east.

For Türkiye, the outreach is part of what Aslan describes as a steady policy of engaging both sides. “Türkiye’s Libya policy essentially remains unchanged,” he said. “But Libya is currently de facto divided for certain other countries’ politics, which they intend to maintain. Türkiye is opposed to this and has taken steps to help achieve unity.” That effort has included reopening its consulate in Benghazi and welcoming Saddam Haftar at defense industry events in Istanbul. Such gestures, Aslan argued, “naturally led Haftar to align himself more closely with Türkiye.”

Waves in Athens, Cairo

The prospect of ratification, however, has sparked anxiety in Athens. Greek media described Kalın’s meeting with Haftar as a turning point, with Kathimerini declaring, “Ankara and Haftar are now closer together.”

For Greece, approval of the deal would strip away a key argument against the 2019 accord, which it insists is “illegitimate,” although its legal framework is based on international law. A Europost commentary went further, criticizing the Greek government for lacking a coherent strategy, warning that “Türkiye surrounds Greece from all sides.”

Ankara’s Libya moves are also closely tied to its normalization with Egypt. After years of strained ties, Türkiye and Cairo have largely restored relations, and Libya has become central to their dialogue. “When it comes to Khalifa Haftar and Libya, it’s necessary to delve into Turkish-Egyptian relations,” Aslan explained. “Because Egypt sees eastern Libya as crucial to its own security.”

If Ankara, Cairo, and Benghazi were to reach a trilateral understanding, Aslan argued, it could reshape the Eastern Mediterranean. “If Egypt, Libya, and Türkiye reach an agreement to share maritime jurisdictions in the region, this will bring peace to the ongoing Gaza war, the turmoil in Lebanon, Israel, and the Greek Cypriot administration,” he said.

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Fatih Mehmet Küçük

Türkiye strives for a ‘United and Single Libya’ through military, political and diplomatic support

The Second Libyan Civil War, which began in 2014 and lasted for approximately six and a half years, involved a power struggle that divided the country into two main axes. On one side is the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in Tripoli, while on the other is the House of Representatives (HoR) in the east, backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar.

This internal conflict in Libya quickly turned into an international proxy war. Haftar’s forces received significant military and financial support from countries such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Russia, France and Saudi Arabia. These countries have supported Haftar through air strikes, mercenaries (Wagner Group) and the supply of weapons and ammunition. In contrast, the GNA, which holds international legitimacy, has received political and military support from countries such as Türkiye, Qatar, Italy and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.

The long-running war reached a new turning point in 2019 when Haftar launched a major offensive to capture the capital, Tripoli, but failed due to Turkish support. The failure of the offensive and increased international mediation efforts forced the parties to seek a cease-fire. With the permanent cease-fire approved on Oct. 23, 2020, widespread fighting in Libya effectively came to an end. However, this did not mean that peace had been established. The end of the war was the result of a stalemate, as neither side achieved absolute military victory. Therefore, the peace process froze the fighting on the military fronts, leaving the resolution of underlying disputes to a political transition process.

Although armed struggle gave way to different conflicts, small-scale clashes continued throughout the country. For example, the capital, Tripoli, was shaken on May 12, 2025, by the outbreak of fighting between two powerful armed groups affiliated with the Government of National Unity: the 444th Infantry Brigade and the Stability Support Agency (SSA).

Triggered by the assassination of an SSA commander, the clashes resulted in at least eight civilian deaths and more than 70 injuries before a cease-fire was declared on May 14. These clashes are a critical indicator that the nature of the “civil war” has undergone a significant shift. The primary conflict is no longer a clear confrontation between East and West. Instead, it has become a complex, unpredictable struggle for power and influence within each faction’s own territory.

The internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) formally requested military support from Türkiye on Dec. 26, 2019. In response to this request, the Turkish Parliament approved a presidential decree on Jan. 2, 2020, authorizing the deployment of troops to Libya. This decree granted the President the authority to deploy the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) in Libya for a period of one year, which has been extended in subsequent years. In addition to sending Turkish troops to Libya, it is known that various products developed by the Turkish defense industry, primarily the Bayraktar TB2, are being used in Libya.

5+5 Joint Military Committee

Türkiye provides comprehensive support in the political and military fields to achieve the goal of a “United and Single Libya.” This support is carried out through military talks, technical delegation visits and naval activities.

A key aspect of the cooperation between Turkey and Libya is the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC) talks. These meetings were held in Ankara in 2021 and 2024. In December 2021, during a meeting held by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), steps that could be taken to promote peace and stability in Libya were discussed, and information was shared about the Action Plan announced in Geneva on Oct. 8, 2021.

Another meeting in November 2024 focused on additional steps to promote Libya’s peace, stability, and security. The talks emphasized the importance of Libya’s territorial integrity and national unity. Statements made by Libya indicated that Türkiye approached the matter not with a colonialist attitude, but with a friendly and supportive stance. These meetings confirmed both sides’ commitment to the goal of a “United and Single Libya.”

Agreement on intelligence sharing

The establishment of relations between Türkiye and Libya has not been limited to the military sphere. In this context, an agreement was signed in October 2024 to develop intelligence sharing and law enforcement cooperation. The agreement outlines cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and the prevention of organized crime. The signed agreement establishes a secure communication channel for the real-time sharing of intelligence between Turkish and Libyan law enforcement agencies.

In addition, under the agreement, Türkiye commits to providing joint training programs and technical assistance to modernize Libya’s security infrastructure. In other words, Türkiye will provide logistical and technical support to Libyan law enforcement agencies to increase operational efficiency. Thus, in addition to efforts to restore Libya’s military stability, Türkiye is also working to ensure the country’s internal security.

Building contacts with LNA

In line with its determination to cooperate with all parties in Libya, Türkiye has also increased its contacts with the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). In this context, on April 4, 2025, the son of Gen. Khalifa Haftar and Deputy Commander of the LNA, Col. Gen. Saddam Haftar, paid an official visit to Ankara to meet with Minister of National Defense Yaşar Güler. This visit was considered a “new, important strategic step” toward the goal of “ending the fratricidal conflict” and establishing a “United and Single Libya.”

During the visit, Hafter praised Türkiye’s operational experience, discipline and high technological capacity, emphasizing the competence of the TSK in border security. Following this visit, between June 15 and 28, 2025, three military technical delegations from eastern Libya conducted inspections at various military headquarters and training institutions in Türkiye.

Güler and Hafter also met at the IDEF 2025 Defense Industry Fair, where they continued their bilateral contacts. It is also worth noting that Saddam Hafter met Güler previously, when he attended the “Saha Expo 2024” International Defense and Space Fair, held on Oct. 22, 2024. In this regard, it is also possible to say that Libya is interested in Turkish defense industry products.

Turkish, Libyan navies side by side

Türkiye’s efforts to bring stability to Libya also continue by sea. In this context, the TCG Kınalıada corvette visited both the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi in August 2025. During the visit to the Port of Tripoli on Aug. 17-18, 2025, meetings were held with several high-level Libyan officials, including the Libyan minister of Defense, the chief of the general staff, and the commander of the navy. It is stated that these visits demonstrate Türkiye’s inclusive approach to its “One Libya” goal and its determination to develop relations with all Libyan officials.

In addition, the Turkish Naval Task Group operating off the coast of Libya conducted various training exercises with the Libyan Navy and students from the Libyan Naval Academy. Such training exercises are interpreted as another element supporting Türkiye’s efforts in the region.

Türkiye’s ambassador to Tripoli, Güven Begeç (2nd R), visited the TCG Kınalıada Corvette and met with naval commanders in Tripoli, Libya, Aug. 17, 2025. (AA Photo)

From support to partnership

Türkiye’s involvement in the Second Libyan Civil War has not only changed the course of the conflict but has also been a strategic move that reshaped the regional equation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The main motivations for the intervention can be summarized as Libya’s geopolitical and economic potential, as well as the prevention of policies that exclude Türkiye in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The most critical impact on the ground was the transformation of the conflict dynamics in favor of the GNA, as Turkish UAVs targeted Khalifa Haftar’s forces’ air superiority and logistical lines. This military success paved the way for Haftar’s defeat and a lasting cease-fire. In this context, Türkiye’s actions in Libya constitute an important case study demonstrating the impact of technological superiority on proxy forces in modern warfare.

Recently, Türkiye’s role in Libya has evolved from a military presence to an economic and political partnership. Military support has paved the way for a political solution, laying the groundwork necessary for Türkiye to maintain its economic and political influence in the long term. Although the political process in Libya remains uncertain, Türkiye’s steps reflect a multifaceted and determined foreign policy approach that integrates hard and soft power elements. This strategy supports Türkiye’s goal of increasing its power and influence in the region.

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Hanaa Mohamed

According to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), at least 60 people have been arbitrarily detained in the first half of 2024 alone.

For more than a year, Jumaa al-Darsi, 40, has scoured Benghazi and beyond for any trace of his brother, Libyan lawmaker Ibrahim al-Darsi, 47, who disappeared in Benghazi in 2024, after attending a military parade marking the tenth anniversary of “the Dignity Revolution,” the uprising led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA). 

Al-Darsi has knocked on doors and called in old favours. He has followed whispers and chased rumours. But every path has led to silence. His family still does not know why he was taken, or if he will ever come home. His brother’s disappearance is among the countless cases in Libya, where abductions have become a weapon against dissent, utilised by the rival factions and infighting militias that have carved up the country since 2011.

“We still cling to any hope of finding Ibrahim, but the security and human rights authorities aren’t cooperating with us on my brother’s case,” al-Darsi told The New Arab. “His situation remains unknown. We don’t know which entity or individuals kidnapped him or the reason behind it.”

According to the UN human rights office and United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), at least 60 people have been arbitrarily detained in the first half of 2024 alone for peacefully expressing their political views. The practice, entrenched under Muammar Gaddafi to muzzle critics, has endured even after his ouster through years of upheaval and division. 

Today, both the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern Government of National Stability (GNS), alongside their affiliated armed groups and militias, continue to detain opponents in secret locations, cutting them off from their families and denying them legal counsel. The UN has noted that “these unlawful practices have created a climate of fear, shrinking civic space, and eroding the rule of law.”

No safety in Libya

According to human rights activist Ahlam al-Warfali, the systematic violations committed by law enforcement and security agencies in detention centres and prisons in eastern and western Libya against activists, journalists, and human rights defenders constitute “crimes against humanity punishable under international law.”

“There’s no safety in Libya,” she said to TNA. “Everyone is vulnerable to kidnapping, torture, and sometimes killing, for refusing the presence of certain groups or publishing political posts criticising the current political landscape.” Media outlets and social media users had circulated photos and video footage reportedly of al-Darsi, showing him chained and stripped of his clothes in a secret prison in eastern Libya.

Al-Darsi refused to comment on the widely shared images, saying only: “My brother is still missing, and the security authorities aren’t providing us with any information about his condition or whereabouts.”

Most recently, the abduction of human rights activist Youssef al-Taweel in Misrata—seized from his workplace after he criticised Fathi Bashagha, the former interior minister in Fayez al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord, the predecessor to the GNU, and a powerful militia leader who later rose to become prime minister under Libya’s Parliament in 2021—sent shockwaves through the city. “This confirms that Libya has neither freedom of opinion nor expression,” she added.

Security expert Mohamed al-Mahshash argues that impunity for perpetrators of these crimes increases the severity of these brutal acts, considering that security and executive agencies do not operate according to laws but according to orders and instructions they receive from dominating figures heads in either eastern or western Libya.

“These acts don’t only affect Libyans, activists, and journalists, but also foreigners, migrants, and asylum seekers, often committed out of revenge or to obtain confessions under duress, or based on political or ideological affiliation, despite repeated demands and calls for the necessity of putting an end to such operations,” he remarked. 

The Libyan watchdog Monitoring Crimes in Libya reported that in November, security forces linked to the GNU in Tripoli arrested more than 200 asylum seekers, mostly Sudanese and Nigerian nationals, among them women and children.

The organisation also held the GNU responsible for the wave of arbitrary arrests, pointing most recently to the case of Abdel Moneim Rajab al-Marimi, a 51-year-old activist and journalist who died from severe injuries after falling from the third floor of the Public Prosecutor’s office in Tripoli. He had been seized in Tripoli in July by armed men and handed over to the Internal Security Agency over his critical political and human rights views. 

Social media users have also circulated in August leaked footage showing the conditions inside prisons run by the Special Deterrence Forces, known as Rada, a hard-line Islamist paramilitary unit that controls Mitiga International Airport. The videos appear to reveal the violence and torture inflicted on detainees within the airport. The group is also accused of torturing and killing Sharaf al-Din Hamdan, who had been arbitrarily detained for more than 11 years without trial. 

Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah’s government ordered an assault on Rada in May, after the militia affiliated with the Presidential Council had expanded its grip over parts of Tripoli. The government also demanded the release of all detainees held in its prisons without legal justification. But after the recent cease-fire, their fate remains uncertain. 

In a 6 July interview, Dbeibah insisted that the inmates of Mitiga prison be referred to the Office of the Attorney General and that control of Mitiga International Airport be transferred to the Ministry of Transport.

Unknown fates

Women, girls, and female human rights activists and journalists face enforced and arbitrary disappearance and various forms of torture, violence, and assault in the absence of legal protection for women. 

Among them is Libyan lawmaker Siham Sergiwa, who has been missing for more than six years, and whose alleged leaked photos recently reignited debate about her unknown fate since her kidnapping. The circulated images showed a body believed to be MP Sergiwa after being assaulted and killed by forces affiliated with the LNA in Benghazi.

These leaks sparked condemnation from the Council of Elders and Notables of Misrata over what Sergiwa was subjected to after being taken from her home and tortured. 

Council member Khalifa Lamloum told TNA that this act was committed by gangs operating outside the law, executing authorities’ instructions without recourse to law, calling on the Attorney General and judicial authorities to “open an investigation into the leaked photos, verify their authenticity, and urgently hold those involved accountable.”

“If these acts go unpunished, they will only entrench impunity and reinforce the dominance of armed force and violence,” al-Warfali warned. 

“There are no reliable figures on the kidnapped, detained, or missing across Libya, and the victims range from activists and journalists to community elders, targeted for their political or tribal affiliation or simply for views critical of the authorities in both east and west. Many are even coerced into recording false confessions to crimes that may not exist,” al-Warfali concluded. 

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