Author - ab_mnbr

Sema Kalaycioglu  

As of 2024, China has increased its interest in North Africa again and has started a comprehensive opening to the region, especially through Libya. Its approach based on the principle of political neutrality allows it to establish simultaneous relations with the Tobruk and Tripoli administrations. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Project, rail system, energy, infrastructure and port investments come to the fore, while high-cost initiatives such as the Benghazi Metro Project are a symbol of China’s return to Libya. …

Return to Libya

China’s interest in North Africa has increased again as of 2024. The Trump administration’s lack of focus on the region has paved the way for new initiatives for Beijing. With Libya, which needs support, meeting this interest, political and military contacts, especially economic projects, have started to revive since the spring of 2023. China’s Libya policy is based on the principle of political neutrality.

This approach offers the opportunity to establish simultaneous relations with the Tobruk and Tripoli administrations. Although it does not seem possible to achieve reconciliation between the two sides in the short term, it can contribute to the reduction of tensions through investments in housing, infrastructure, employment and industry.

In particular, the rail system investments to be initiated within the scope of the Belt and Road Project will not only strengthen the logistical ties between Tobruk and Tripoli, but will also enable regional integration for Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, which has not been implemented for a long time. Thus, China will also gain access to new market opportunities.

Concrete project initiatives have been on the agenda under the umbrella of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF) for the past year. China, which effectively used Libya’s influence on the African Union during the Gaddafi era, aims to revive this legacy by increasing its influence in Libya today. Although economic goals seem to be a priority in Beijing’s Libya policy, the political consequences cannot be ignored.

China’s orientation towards development projects simultaneously with Tobruk and Tripoli meets the common interest of different political groups within the country in the reconstruction processes. While this approach has the potential to reduce the influence of Western Europe in the region, it also carries the risk of the US-China rivalry moving to North Africa via Libya. In this context, it remains unclear whether Washington will turn to an intervention again.

Multiple Projects and Investment Areas

China is acting with a long-term strategy rather than taking unplanned steps in Libya. It has simultaneously submitted project proposals to central and local governments and diversified them. Within the framework of the Belt and Road Project, infrastructure investments, renewable energy initiatives, renewal of oil pipelines, increasing refinery capacities and port construction are prominent topics.

In eastern Libya, the Libyan Fund for Development and Reconstruction, established by Khalifa Haftar to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by the floods, is trying to attract Chinese investments to the country. In this context, the Chinese BFI Consortium has put solar power plants, water treatment plants and railway line projects that will connect Benghazi to the city of Musaid on the border with Egypt on the agenda.

In addition, the Benghazi Metro Project, which is planned to be largely financed by China and whose cost is estimated to be 24-30 billion euros, draws attention. The implementation of the project in cooperation with China Railways International Group Company (CRI), Germany’s Siemens and Britain’s Arup International Engineering Company will be one of the first examples of China-Europe partnership in North Africa. In addition, housing and workplace projects in Derna and Benghazi have also come to the fore.

Security Dimension

For China, Libya is important not only economically but also geopolitically. It has a strategic location, especially in terms of being an alternative to the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) announced in 2023.

In this context, China has included Algeria and Tunisia in the scope of the Belt and Road Project. Excluding Turkey from IMEC may make it attractive for Ankara to support China’s expansion into North Africa. However, the fact that Turkey’s military presence in Libya remains relatively in the background makes the possibility in this direction uncertain.

China’s opening up to Africa is not limited to economic initiatives; The security dimension is also becoming more and more prominent. Beijing, which has developed military and security cooperation with more than 100 countries within the framework of the Global Security Initiative, carries out military training activities with Egypt, Algeria and Sudan. Although there is no clear agenda for direct arms sales yet, this possibility cannot be ruled out in the long term. The concretization of China-Libya military cooperation in the near future is not limited to Libya but can reshape the balances in North Africa.

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Faisal Edroos

National Security Adviser Ibrahim Dbeibah, a relative of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, has quietly held talks with Israeli officials over deal that would see US release $30bn in frozen assets, sources say

A senior official in Libya’s internationally recognised government has held talks with Israeli officials over a proposal to resettle hundreds of thousands of Palestinians expelled from Gaza, multiple sources have told Middle East Eye.

Speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the issue, Libyan, Arab and European officials told MEE that National Security Adviser Ibrahim Dbeibah, a relative of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, was spearheading the talks despite Palestinians in Gaza flatly rejecting US President Donald Trump’s postwar plan for the enclave.

One Libyan source said that “practical talks” had already taken place but the specifics were vague. “The mechanisms and implementation have not yet been spoken about,” the source said. Another Libyan source said that discussions were still ongoing and that members of the Tripoli-based parliament were deliberately being kept in the dark as pro-Palestine sentiment runs deep in the country.

The source said that in an attempt to placate some Libyan leaders, the US was prepared to confer economic support or other benefits in exchange for the country taking in Palestinians. The source said that Ibrahim Dbeibah had already received guarantees that the US Department of Treasury would release some $30bn in frozen state assets.

In May, separate sources had told MEE that Massad Boulos, an adviser to Trump and father-in-law to his daughter Tiffany, had held discussions with Ibrahim Dbeibah about unlocking billions of dollars in sanctioned frozen wealth funds.

The assets were frozen in early 2011 by former US President Barack Obama, several months before the Nato-backed ouster of Muammar Gaddafi. Boulos flatly denied that he was involved in talks over the resettlement of Palestinians, telling MEE that the reports were “inflammatory and totally false”.

However, White House Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly said that Trump had “long advocated for creative solutions to improve the lives of Palestinians, including allowing them to resettle in a new, beautiful location while Gaza rebuilds”.

Seeking legitimacy from the US

The idea of Libya serving as a possible new home for expelled Palestinians comes amid reports that Khalifa Haftar, a powerful military leader who also oversees a rival rubber-stamp parliament in the country’s east, was offered greater control over the country’s oil resources if he agreed to resettle hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.

Haftar, who has played a seminal role in the widespread destruction and instability in Libya, as well as the ensuing civil war in neighbouring Sudan, has denied the reports. Meanwhile on Monday, hours after receiving a request for comment from MEE on the issue of resettling Palestinians, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah said that his government would not engage in the “crime” of resettling Palestinians.

He reiterated a line from a statement by the US embassy in Tripoli in May which dismissed reports that Washington was pursuing a relocation plan for Palestinians in Libya. Israel has publicly mulled expelling Palestinians from Gaza and last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israeli officials were in contact with “several countries” about absorbing displaced civilians from the war-torn territory.

“I think this is the most natural thing,” Netanyahu said. “All those who are concerned for the Palestinians and say they want to help the Palestinians should open their doors to them. What are you preaching to us for? We’re not pushing them out – we’re enabling them to leave… first of all, [leaving] combat zones, and also the Strip itself, if they want to.”

Recently, Israel’s Agriculture Minister, Avi Dichter, singled out Libya as “the ideal destination” for Palestinians saying they would “happily leave” Gaza if the necessary international support was provided. “Libya is a huge country, with vast areas and a coastline similar to Gaza’s,” he said. “If the world invests billions to rehabilitate Gazans there, the host country will also benefit economically.”

Israeli officials have long advocated expelling Palestinians from Gaza and within a week of the 7 October attacks, Israel’s intelligence minister at the time, Gila Gamliel, presented the cabinet with her “voluntary migration plan” where she hoped 1.7 million Palestinians would leave the enclave. Forced displacement, as observed in Gaza, violates international humanitarian law, notably Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the forcible transfer of protected persons by an occupying power. 

The European source told MEE that Dbeibeh and Haftar were “simultaneously negotiating with the Israelis” in the hope of getting “more legitimacy from the Americans”. The source said that if the resettlement plan was forcibly imposed on Libya, Palestinians would find themselves moving out of the frying pan and into the fire. “It will be catastrophic at multiple levels,” the source said. 

“Firstly, for the Palestinians themselves, who would have just about made it out of the Strip alive and escaped an obliterated life in Gaza, facing forced expulsion to a country like Libya which is in deeply complicated political turmoil with divided governments, where systems and society is broken by its civil war.”

“The Palestinians will not be getting any care from those governments, which will push them to the following catastrophe, [which] will lead to a new wave of migration towards the shores of Europe. And this is also a scary thought, firstly because the past decades have proven to us that many of them will only make it halfway through the Mediterranean, like many of those boats that capsized. And those that would eventually get to Europe, I do not think that Europe would be welcoming of another one million Arabs arriving at its shores, as the Syrians who just made similar journeys just few years ago.”

The Arab official, who was intimately aware of the latest talks, warned that complicity in Israel’s ethnic cleansing plan could provoke widespread anger across all of Libya. “This will be a shock to the Libyan people,” he said. Mohamed Mahfouz, a Libyan political analyst, echoed his remarks, telling MEE that the US was acutely aware that discussions around Libya resettling Palestinians could cause great distress for Libyan authorities.

“Accepting Palestinians could come at a high price for any of the parties that will engage with the United States on this matter. This in itself may explain why neither [Libyan] government is yet to normalise relations.”

Outreach to Africa

In recent weeks Israeli officials have publicly said, then later denied, reaching out to leaders from across Africa and Asia to use their territories as potential destinations for expelling Palestinians. Plans have been mooted for Palestinians to be resettled in Sudan, South Sudan and the breakaway region of Somalia known as Somaliland, despite all of the territories being plagued by violence.

Sudan has been gripped by intense violence since its civil war broke out in 2023, with an estimated 150,000 people killed in the past two years. South Sudan has struggled to recover from a civil war that broke out after independence, with more than seven million people facing food insecurity and at least 2.3 million children at risk of malnutrition.

Meanwhile, Somaliland continues to face threats from the armed group al-Shabab over the region’s memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia – one of the greatest enemies of the group. A Libyan political analyst, who requested anonymity due to fear of reprisal attacks by government-aligned militias, said that it was “unsurprising” that Ibrahim Dbeibah was leading the outreach efforts with Israel.

“[Ibrahim] Dbeibah, like the Libyan government, is marked by self-interest. He is well aware of the benefits of ingratiating himself with the US and Trump.” While Libya does not officially recognise Israel, the Tripoli-based government, known officially as the Government of National Unity (GNU), is known to have held several secret meetings with Israeli officials in recent years.

In 2023, Najla al-Mangoush, then foreign minister under Dbeibah, secretly met Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen in Italy. The revelation sparked outrage in Libya, resulting in angry protests and her suspension. In a later interview with Al Jazeera Arabic, Mangoush claimed she had attended the meeting on direct orders from Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and that it was coordinated between his government and Israel.

Arabic Post later reported that Ibrahim Dbeibah had orchestrated the meeting, citing unnamed sources. 

Middle East Eye reached out to the prime minister’s office and the GNU for comment but did not receive a response by time of publication.

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Hassuna Baishu

Under the scorching sun, Libyans wait in long lines at fuel stations, sometimes for hours or even days, just to buy a few liters for their cars or household generators.

Meanwhile, heavy oil tankers speed down highways toward ports, where smugglers load shipments bound for global markets.

Libya, one of the world’s major oil producers and home to Africa’s largest reserves, has seen generous subsidies turn fuel into a prime target for organized smuggling rather than a relief for its citizens.

Fuel smuggling drains an estimated $5 billion from Libya each year, according to the World Bank. More critically, revenues lost outside the state budget have become a key funding source for militias that control vital distribution routes, fueling the armed struggle for power.

In October 2024, a World Bank report noted that “southern Libyan regions repeatedly experience fuel shortages, with prices on the parallel market reaching 7 dinars per liter when available,” while the official price is less than 0.15 dinar.

“We cannot find fuel, and when it is available, it’s sold at higher prices because gas station owners trade it on the black market,” said Mohamed al-Sayyid, a resident of the southern city of Sabha.

With queues stretching outside the few stations that still open, many citizens return home with nearly empty tanks. Families, al-Sayyid explained, are forced to buy from smugglers at exorbitant prices to keep their cars and generators running — “while government subsidies remain only theoretical, with no tangible benefit for ordinary citizens in the south.”

The latest International Monetary Fund figures show Libya paid a steep price for energy subsidies in 2024, allocating $9 billion for fuel alone. The electricity sector — which uses part of that fuel — consumed several more billions.

“When the cost of domestically refined crude oil and natural gas used for power generation is added — estimated at $3.9 billion and $4 billion respectively — the total energy subsidy bill in 2024 reaches about $17 billion, or 35% of GDP,” the IMF said.

Sleepless Ships

On the eastern coast, Benghazi’s old port has become a hub of illicit trade, transformed into a complex center for organized fuel smuggling.

A 2024 United Nations expert report offered a stark picture of the port, controlled by the Libyan army. While Libyans live with chronic fuel shortages, large vessels remain busy, laden with smuggled oil.

The UN documented at least 137 smuggling operations between October 2022 and September 2024, involving 48 ships that called at the port more than 185 times. These were not small shipments: the average cargo per vessel rose from 5,700 tons to 9,970 tons of diesel, bringing the total smuggled volume to about 1.125 million tons.

The ships were often chartered or carried no clear registration, relying on forged or fictitious documents, the report said.

“Benghazi port now reflects a different equation: a strategic location that should support the national economy but has instead become a lifeline for fuel smuggling to foreign markets,” political analyst Ahmed al-Saadi told Alhurra.

Since May 2022, the National Oil Corporation has filed repeated complaints with the prosecutor general about fuel smuggling to Turkey, Spain, Malta and Italy via vessels such as the Queen Majeda, which was seized in Albania carrying shipments worth more than $2 million, al-Saadi added.

“The continuation of this pattern means the port operates with two faces: an official, public activity and another illegal one under the table, doubling state losses and adding pressure on citizens who stand daily in fuel queues.”

In western Libya, smuggling also flourishes through coastal towns such as Zuwara, Zawiya, Sabratha and Khoms.

A 2023 United Nations expert report documented several maritime smuggling cases and identified routes including Sidi Ali near the Tunisian border.

“The situation in Khoms, Zuwara, Zawiya and Sabratha reflects a recurring pattern,” al-Saadi said. “Fuel allocations meant for citizens are diverted through intermediaries to smugglers, who transport them by land toward Tunisia or by sea across the Mediterranean.”

Al-Saadi warned that these towns will remain hubs of the shadow economy — funding armed groups and undermining stability — unless strict oversight is imposed on distribution chains and ports.

Barter Deals: Fuel Outside the Budget

Until 2021, Libya’s central bank imposed a strict ceiling on fuel import allocations, leaving the National Oil Corporation (NOC) up against a financial wall each year.

“Often these allocations ran out before year’s end, and the bank refused the NOC’s requests for more, citing budget violations. This happened amid volatile oil production and low prices, causing liquidity crises and foreign currency shortages alongside rising domestic demand for fuel,” economist Mohamed al-Safi told Alhurra.

To cover the shortfall, the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity authorized the NOC to use a mechanism known as “barter,” exchanging crude oil with intermediaries for refined fuel delivered directly to Libya without cash payments.

“The barter system was fast and effective in supplying fuel, bypassing bureaucratic hurdles such as financial approvals and transfers,” al-Safi said. “But the fuel Libya obtained was not officially recorded in the state budget or accounts.”

“The absence of accurate data on quantities or value opened the door to a lack of transparency and corruption,” he added.

The Libyan Audit Bureau’s 2021 report noted that the National Oil Corporation “exported crude shipments without collecting revenues, instead swapping them for fuel outside the state budget without disclosing the process to the Ministry of Finance.”

The report also said the NOC delayed collecting taxes and royalties from foreign companies worth 10.4 billion dinars that should have been counted as 2021 revenue.

Warnings continued. In its 2023 report, the bureau revealed that spending on subsidized fuel purchases had more than doubled, rising from $2.9 billion (16 billion dinars) in 2021 to more than $7.6 billion (41 billion dinars) in 2023, justified as covering market demand and power plants.

In January 2025, the prosecutor general intervened, sending an official letter to the NOC demanding an end to the barter system. The mechanism was suspended after an agreement between the central bank, the Audit Bureau and the NOC, which created a committee to review all crude-for-fuel transactions during 2024.

War on the Western Coast

Along Libya’s western coast, a silent, undeclared war has raged since mid-2023. Using Turkish drones, forces aligned with the Tripoli government have launched repeated airstrikes on suspected fuel smuggling and storage sites, particularly in Zawiya, home to the country’s largest refinery and a key export port.

The most recent strike took place in August 2025. But images and videos posted by activists on social media showed some raids hitting not only alleged smuggling dens but also residential neighborhoods and civilian facilities. With Tripoli remaining silent, suspicions grew over the campaign’s motives. Observers described it as politically driven, aimed at eliminating militias believed to be loyal to the eastern-based Libyan National Army.

“The airstrikes on smuggling hideouts deterred some armed groups, but they weren’t enough,” political analyst Ibrahim Belqasim told Alhurra.

“There is selectivity in these campaigns. They target groups opposed to Prime Minister Dbeibah’s government, while pro-government militias receive clear military and logistical support, including uniforms, weapons and training,” Belqasim added.

He linked this selectivity to the absence of army and security institutions in western Libya since Abdulhamid Dbeibah came to power, fueling militia dominance in cities such as Zawiya.

Jalal al-Haroushi, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute, was even more skeptical. He argued the campaign lacked credibility from the outset because armed groups were notified in advance of strike times.

Writing on X, al-Haroushi added that Zawiya refinery has been under the control of Dbeibah’s political rivals, the Awlad Bu Hamira tribe, since 2013 — making the strikes less about combating smuggling and more about local power struggles.

Subsidy Reform: Shock or

Gradual Change?

At the start of 2024, talk of lifting Libya’s fuel subsidies moved from rumor to public declaration.

Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah presented the step as necessary to “stop smuggling losses” and stabilize the market. He sought to reassure citizens with three proposed compensation mechanisms: direct cash payments, salary increases, or fuel cards with limited subsidized amounts.

In the east, the position was similar despite political divisions. Parliament-appointed Prime Minister Osama Hammad’s government endorsed ending subsidies but gave no clear timetable.

Public protests and political criticism, however, were swift. In Tripoli, Benghazi and even smaller towns, fear of rising prices dominated daily discussions.

Economists argue that any subsidy reform in Libya must be gradual, paired with compensation for low-income groups and tighter controls on borders and ports to curb smuggling. Others contend a “shock” approach would be more effective for security, swiftly cutting off smuggling networks.

“Gradual subsidy removal has economic benefits. Studies show the inflation from a one-year shock equals the inflation from gradual removal over five years. Gradualism allows citizens to diversify income and adapt to inflation, while shock may push them below the poverty line,” economist Mohamed al-Safi explained.

“The shock method, however, has security advantages, as some politicians argue. It cuts off legal profiteers from subsidies and contains street anger that could pressure the government to back down. But Libya needs a study to determine which option is best,” he said.

Caught between sacrificing the familiar and risking the unknown, Libyans fear the reforms may be a false mask hiding deeper deterioration in living conditions. They face a stark choice: accept a decision that could curb corruption draining the country’s wealth but add a heavy economic burden amid weak guarantees — or remain trapped in a cycle of crises fueled by smuggling networks, with cheap fuel continuing to drive an endless national crisis.

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Hassuna Baishu – Libyan journalist based in Washington with over a decade of experience in strategic communications and media work across the United States, the Middle East, and North Africa. He has worked with international and media organizations including Voice of America, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), focusing on Libya and regional politics.

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Mohammed Amin

In June, the Rapid Support Forces captured Sudan’s wild border frontier with Libya and Egypt. This is how they did it.

On 10 June, Ismail Hassan, an artisanal gold miner and trader in the triangle border region that straddles Sudan, Egypt and Libya, watched as more than 250 fully equipped military vehicles entered his local market, al-Katma. The vehicles carried fighters from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudanese paramilitary group that has been at war with Sudan’s army since April 2023, alongside a host of Libyan mercenary groups connected to the eastern military commander Khalifa Haftar.  

“The RSF and Libyan forces entered the area and advanced into the market, declaring control of the region,” Hassan told Middle East Eye, referring to the Sudanese part of the triangle.  The Libyans then moved out, Hassan said, leaving the RSF to loot the area’s markets, making off with gold, money, cars, mobile phones and much more. 

Hassan was one of many miners who fled the area following the attack, before speaking exclusively about it to MEE over the phone.  The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their allied Joint Forces militia were forced to leave in the wake of the RSF-led attack. Two days later, on 12 June, the RSF announced that it successfully taken “control of the strategic Almuthallath ‘triangle’ area, which constitutes a pivotal junction between Sudan, Libya and Egypt”. 

As the army has taken Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, and made inroads in other parts of central Sudan, the takeover of the Sudanese part of the border triangle region has cemented the RSF’s hold on western Sudan, where it holds almost all of Darfur. According to satellite imagery, flight tracking data seen by MEE, and interviews with gold miners and other eyewitnesses, this success in the wild, lawless border regions would not have been possible without Haftar’s Libyan forces and the patronage of the United Arab Emirates and Russia. 

The involvement of the UAE has brought Abu Dhabi into further conflict with Egypt, which has tried – and so far failed – to mediate better relations between Haftar and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces. At the beginning of July, MEE revealed a secret meeting hosted by Egypt between the Sudanese general and the Libyan commander, both of whom are its allies. The meeting did not go well.

RSF attack

Key to the RSF’s capture of the Sudanese part of the triangle region was Subul al-Salam, a Libyan militia affiliated with Haftar’s forces. A cousin of Hassan, who works with him as a gold miner and trader, told MEE that forces from Subul al-Salam “helped the RSF until it reached the market and controlled the entire area”. 

He said that the group, alongside RSF fighters, carried out ethnically motivated killings. Another miner, Abu Zar, said there were Libyan fighters inside the main market at al-Katma. He told MEE that an armed group called the Tariq Ben Zeyad brigade, which is believed to be controlled by Saddam Haftar, Khalifa’s son, was also part of the attack on the triangle border region.

“We heard that Saddam Haftar, the strong son of the Libyan commander, was closely monitoring the military operation before he ordered the forces to withdraw back to Libyan territory,” another miner, who asked for anonymity, said. The RSF then advanced into Sudan’s northern state, seizing Karb al-Toum, an oasis near the Jebel Arkenu mountain range, as well as a host of other small villages. 

The Joint Forces – Darfur rebels fighting alongside the Sudanese army – were forced to withdraw from areas in the northern desert, while some of them had to retreat through Egypt alongside army soldiers. It was reported that RSF fighters also crossed the border into Egypt but that they were ordered by senior commanders to withdraw.

The UAE’s project

Libyan sources, Sudanese officials and a former US diplomat all told MEE that Haftar’s forces and the RSF had been given the green light and logistical support from the UAE to take control of the triangle border region. Though it denies it, the UAE has been the RSF’s main patron throughout the war in Sudan.

An unpublished study leaked to MEE by a Libyan researcher reported that two Emirati planes landed at southeastern Libya’s al-Kufra airport on 10 July, unloading weapons and supplies that were then transported to the RSF in Darfur through the Chadian-Libyan border. The dossier revealed that the UAE ordered Haftar to move his Libyan National Army (LNA) forces from Camp 87 in Benghazi to support the RSF “with hundreds of vehicles in its attack on the SAF and Darfur rebels in the desert”. 

This movement of Haftar’s forces comes partly in response to resistance in Chad to the continued supply of the RSF through the country’s desert regions. A Libyan source close to the issue, who did not want to be named, said the “recent interference by Haftar through its allied militia Subul al-Salam” had changed the balance of power in the triangle region, which has a Sudanese, Libyan and Egyptian component. 

Egypt, the source said, was “looking suspiciously at the UAE and Haftar”, with the region vital to Cairo’s national security. “Subul al-Salam matters, but this is an Emirati project,” Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst focusing on Libya, told MEE. “The big event is the fact that the RSF now controls the Sudanese part of the triangle… Subul al-Salam was instrumental because the Libyan part of the triangle was very permissive until mid-May. The SAF, the Joint Forces and civilians from Egypt were all able to access it.” 

“What was necessary, as preliminary step, was for Subul al-Salam to shut all of that down – and this is how the RSF was able to use that platform to carry out that incursion and take over the Sudanese part of the triangle,” Harchaoui said. Former US diplomat and CIA expert Cameron Hudson believes the UAE is still working to ensure the victory of the RSF in Sudan’s war. 

“The RSF’s control of its border areas will worsen and extend Sudan’s war, making it even more difficult to resolve. This has been the UAE’s plan, not just in Libya, but in Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Control of borders gives them free access to weapons, to recruit fighters and to smuggle out gold,” Hudson, who is also a senior associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Africa programme, told MEE.  

“It is no coincidence that the UAE maintains bases in all these countries near the border with Sudan to help facilitate that military and economic trade,” he said. Libyan researcher and political analyst Islam Alhaj said that the UAE was exploiting the security vacuum in southern Libya to send the weapons to the RSF and support other illegal activities, including gold smuggling, in the region. 

Russian planes

Satellite imagery reported by Nova Italian news agency disclosed that two Russian-made cargo planes were recently tracked flying from al-Kufra airport to RSF areas in Sudan. According to previous reporting by MEE and the imagery provided by the Copernicus programme, the IL-76 plane is typically used for transporting military personnel and equipment, as well as for medium-range logistical operations.

The shipment was part of an Emirati-directed flow of arms shipments from southeastern Libya to the RSF that has been in operation since May, a month before the paramilitary’s capture of the Sudanese part of the border triangle. Harchaoui told MEE that the “brand new phenomenon” was the act of flying supplies from UAE bases outside Libya directly in al-Kufra, rather than transporting them overland or by air from within other parts of Libya.   

The airport at al-Kufra plays a key operational role, serving as a logistical base to facilitate the flow of supplies to RSF forces through remote and lightly monitored corridors. Russia, as MEE has reported before, is most interested in securing a naval base at Port Sudan, with the government in Moscow building ties with the Burhan-led Sudanese administration now based in the Red Sea city. Wagner, the former Russian paramilitary group, left Sudan at the end of 2023, but ties between Moscow and Abu Dhabi remain strong.

Regional power plays

With Turkey recently stepping up its help for the Sudanese army and other regional powers, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, aligned with Burhan, external actors continue to struggle for control and profit in Sudan, which still contains vast untapped natural resources and an expansive and strategically positioned coastline. The RSF has declared a parallel government in Nyala, South Darfur. This self-declared entity would border five countries, including South Sudan, Central African Republic, Chad, and now – following the capture of Sudan’s triangle border area – Libya and Egypt. 

“The new government will face many challenges to carry any civilian duties including the good governance, protecting the civilians and oversight the finance and this will lead to big failure which will threat the other neighbouring countries,” Suliman Baldo, the executive director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, told MEE. “I don’t think it will be able to stop the smuggling of gold and crops from Sudan and maintain the other supplies coming from neighbouring countries towards Sudan as its big investments for the RSF commanders,” he said.

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Mohammed Amin is a Sudanese journalist specialising in geopolitics and human rights abuses in Sudan and South Sudan, as well as elsewhere in northeast Africa.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

Libya has since become a brutal case study in the consequences of institutional and governance collapse. The 2011 rebellion shattered Muammar Qaddafi’s hyper-centralized state but failed to replace it with a functional alternative. Instead, the international community’s fixation on centralized power-sharing deals with warlords and loose militia coalitions continues to neglect the crucial work of subnational institution-building.

Thirteen years of political limbo have not yielded a single coherent local governance framework, enabling parallel power structures to metastasize. To date, Libya remains split between the Tripoli-based, UN-recognized Government of National Unity and a rogue eastern fiefdom dominated by the warlord Khalifa Haftar and his sons. These, in turn, also compete with more than 100 autonomous militias, including tribal-affiliated groups exploiting administrative vacuums.

A conspicuous absence of well-defined, legally enforceable administrative boundaries is the principal accelerant. Law 59 of 2012 envisaged governorates as intermediaries between municipalities and the state, but zero have been operationalized. Proposed maps, like the Government of National Unity’s 2022 blueprint for 19 provinces, remain theoretical amid venomous disputes over territorial jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, tribal councils fill service-delivery voids in regions like Fezzan, where public structures have simply vanished. Elsewhere, municipalities consequently shoulder functions spanning healthcare, policing and infrastructure without budgets or coordination mechanisms, resulting in woeful outcomes such as crippled hospitals and extremely high dropout rates in schools. Such an operational vacuum is now fueling resource predation as local factions continue to seize parts of Libya’s petroleum sector. 

Tribal and militia leaders have also become adept at exploiting institutional ambiguity, converting geographic influence into lucrative monopolies. Illicit economies and networks are now generating sums close to one-tenth of Libya’s pre-2011 gross domestic product via ports and desert crossings administered by de facto warlords. At the same time, boundary disputes between Zintan and Gharyan municipalities have frozen $120 million in reconstruction funds for three years.

Such paralysis is not incidental; it is structural.

The persistent failure to establish legitimate subnational governance structures, particularly resolving the question of administrative boundaries, entrenches division and dims prospects for a unified, sovereign state. Delaying the resolution of this cartographic standoff means that Libya’s fragmentation risks becoming irreversible at the cost of more than 2 million Libyans who require humanitarian aid in a country that once boasted high life expectancy, literacy rates and per capita income.

There is some precedence to the depth of the challenge Libya faces now.

The country’s territorial administration has always been unstable, from the Ottoman sanjaks designed for tax extraction, to Italy’s colonial divisions, to King Idris’ short-lived federal experiment (1951-1963) balancing Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. Qaddafi’s 1969 coup replaced provinces with “people’s districts,” eviscerating local capacity. Post-Qaddafi, the 2012 Local Administration Law envisioned governorates, municipalities and sub-municipal tiers, yet the critical governorate level remains non-existent. This absence cripples coordination on regional transport, resource management and security, overburdening a weak central authority and leaving municipalities isolated.

Current proposals for administrative boundaries reveal crippling tensions. 

Advocates of three regions (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Fezzan) invoke historical legitimacy but ignore perilous realities. Similar “federalizations” around the world with minimal regional units, e.g. Bosnia (two entities), Comoros (three) and Pakistan (1973: four) all exhibit chronic instability. In addition, Nigeria’s post-independence shift from three to 36 states deliberately diluted ethnic domination. Libya’s three-region model risks entrenching the very divisions that fueled past civil strife: Fears of secessionism, resource-hoarding by dominant cities like Benghazi or Misrata, and the marginalization of smaller tribes within macro-regions. 

Alternative frameworks, for instance, 12 provinces or 13 units based on electoral districts, aim for balance but face legitimacy deficits. Electoral districts, drawn for technical convenience, often ignore deep-seated tribal animosities or socioeconomic ties. Proposals for “economic regions” coordinating multiple governorates require robust planning institutions and fiscal autonomy that Libya lacks. Crucially, all models stumble on the core political schism: Federalists demanding regional autonomy vs. centralists fearing state fracture. This deadlock paralyzes reforms while illicit economies flourish; fuel-smuggling alone generates at least half a billion annually for militias, entrenching rule-by-gun-barrel. 

However, there is still some hope yet.  

South Africa’s post-apartheid boundary delimitation offers curious parallels. Facing similar risks of ethnic polarization, it established a technocratic Commission on Demarcation and Delimitation guided by clear criteria: Historical boundaries, economic viability, infrastructure and cultural realities. 

Crucially, it embedded this within a Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, separating technical work from political bargaining. Four months of consultations yielded 780 written submissions and 157 oral testimonies, with hearings translated into 11 languages. The result: Nine provinces replacing apartheid’s racial Bantustans, validated through inclusive participation. 

Libya’s path demands a similarly structured process, not just a map. 

A boundary commission must integrate multidisciplinary expertise, such as demographers to quantify population distributions, economists to model resource allocation and geographers to assess topographical constraints, as seen with South Africa’s commission, which included 16 specialists across seven fields. Crucially, such a body must derive its mandate from an inclusive political forum representing Libya’s fragmented power centers, ensuring decisions reflect negotiated consensus rather than unilateral imposition. 

Historical continuities must be weighed alongside contemporary realities: Tribal land claims governing 65 percent of southern territories, hydrocarbon reserves concentrated in three basins and population disparities where Tripoli hosts 2 million residents while southern municipalities average 30,000. Resource distribution formulas must be codified to prevent rent-seeking, particularly given Libya’s lucrative oil revenues. 
Public consultations require robust methodologies, not tokenism. Besides, imposing boundaries without tribal and community buy-in guarantees rebellion. Yet Libya’s context demands added safeguards: Independent dispute-resolution mechanisms and explicit rejection of referendums, which magnify polarization in fractured societies. 

Lastly, dispute resolution necessitates permanent architecture. Nigeria’s National Boundary Commission, operational since 1987, offers a template: A neutral technical body empowered to adjudicate inter-provincial conflicts and manage cross-boundary resources. However, in Libya, where 40 percent of proposed boundaries overlap with militia territories, such a commission will require authority to deploy verification teams and impose binding arbitration, backed by international guarantors to prevent politicization. 

A tall order, given the current context, but the cost of inaction escalates daily. 

Libya’s chief export — oil, remains hostage to blockades by armed groups, even as 1.5 million people lack healthcare access, while municipalities, starved of funds and authority, cannot provide basic services. Each year of fragmentation deepens kleptocratic networks, radicalizes marginalized populations and erodes faith in public institutions. 

Strangely, the 2011 rebellion demanded dignity and equitable development. Redrawing administrative boundaries should therefore not be a mere cartography exercise but the very foundation for dismantling militias, redistributing resources and rebuilding social contracts. 

Without this, Libya’s sovereignty will remain a fiction sustained only by foreign patrons and kleptocrats.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies. 

______________________

Gregory Holyoke

Family at home, friends abroad

Over the decades, Haftar had built up close relationships in Cairo, but when he returned to Libya, Egypt was also in the midst of revolutionary fervour, tending towards the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood group. As Gazzini explained, “There was a jihadist threat in Libya and then we have Egypt, which was very weak.”

“If you go back to before 2013 before (President Abdel Fattah) El-Sisi, there was this fear that Egypt could implode … And the Europeans also didn’t want Egypt to collapse,” she explained. Faced with difficult choices and fearing the likes of the self-proclaimed IS group spreading their influence in North Africa, some analysts believe that European leaders gave Haftar — whose power and army grew in strength — the silent nod of approval to do what he thinks is right.

“They needed a new Gaddafi, someone who could stop democracy from becoming contagious. Haftar fit the mould: ruthless, ambitious, and willing to trade sovereignty for support,” El Gomati believes. Egypt also backed him as a known known, someone in the immediate neighbourhood who understood the context, but also the perils the region was facing.

The list of backers, silent or otherwise, only continued to grow from there on out. In addition to Cairo, Haftar gained the support of governments ranging from Moscow to Washington, even though the UN did not recognise his wider authority as a legitimate head of state. However, according to Gazzini, it was Abu Dhabi and Paris who ended up as his most unquestioning supporters. While the Emirates saw the allure of Libya’s oil reserves — the largest in Africa — France and Europe more widely were dealing with an influx of refugees through the Mediterranean, hundreds of thousands of whom were hoping to reach the continent via Libya.

In all that, Haftar saw his chance to utilise the international support and finally become the ruler of Libya — and who knows, maybe even bigger than Gaddafi himself. When Haftar announced his intention to overthrow the Tripoli-based, internationally recognised Government of National Accord on the day UN Secretary General António Guterres arrived in the capital in 2019, even Egypt warned him against it.

“But he was full of hubris from the Emiratis who wanted to do it. They were giving him aerial cover. The French also wanted to do it,” Gazzini told Euronews from the IRG offices in Rome. It is a hubris that some have compared to his ally Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Yet similarly, Haftar’s attempts also failed. Tripoli refused to fall into Haftar’s troops’ hands, and Libya fell back into a form of stalemate.

Divided we stand

Throughout this time, Haftar was accumulating extraordinary wealth for his family, whom he had installed in various positions, experts say. As Eaton told Euronews, “There was a debate on whether when Khalifa (Haftar) died, could his sons come in and take over. It seems that they have come in and started creating their own portfolios even before.” And it is all in the family and the hands of his children, as El Gomati succinctly outlined.

“Saddam runs the ground forces. Khaled commands the personal guard. Belkacem controls the billions in Libya’s reconstruction fund. Sedig runs the reconciliation file,” he explained. The family has amassed a portfolio estimated to be worth billions. Despite his failure to seize the wider country, Haftar and his sons continue to run much of Libya. “He controls everything that matters in eastern Libya,” El Gomati said.

“Oil fields, ports, airports, military bases, and the central bank’s printing press. He has his own air force, controls cross-border smuggling routes… It operates like a state within a state.” As shown by the EU’s lack of retribution over the past week, the self-proclaimed field marshal also maintains significant international backing. He was recently in Russia for talks with Putin – a trip he was rumoured to have died on, but once again, he miraculously recovered.

The “humiliation” of the EU delegation also isn’t the first time Haftar has managed to push around supposed allies in Europe. The analysts Euronews spoke to put this down to Europe’s domestic wranglings over “irregular migrations,” and the simple fact that “there’s no way migrant boats would be leaving the east without Haftar knowing.”

Gazzini gave the example of her native Italy: “At some point, a lot of migrants were going to the coast of Italy about a year and a half ago, he let it be known that he wanted an official visit and an official invitation to Rome. And he got that.” At the end of his interview, El Gomati did not mince words about the European approach to the Libyan commander. “Europeans keep volunteering as victims. Haftar treats EU diplomats like desperate suitors because that’s exactly what they are.”

It is a point that Eaton also touches upon, albeit somewhat more diplomatically. “There’s a real imbalance,” he concluded. However, Europe is not acting in a vacuum either. It is often trying to play by international rules and conventions in an arena where shady actions speak much louder than words and agreements on paper.

Sometimes, it is better to have a strongman on your side — or at least his ear. “We have very little leverage compared to other states. Compare it with the Russians, who have MiGs and have fighter jets that are at Haftar’s disposal,” Gazzini admitted. “Compare us to the Emiratis who bring in reinforcements and ammunition in violation of the embargo.”

When a senior EU delegation travelled to the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi last Tuesday, they were hoping to discuss ways to limit the increasing numbers of migrants leaving Libya heading north to Europe. However, shortly after their jet touched down at Benghazi Airport, the cluster of EU foreign ministers – as well as European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner – were sent packing.

There was no agreement, not even a meeting. They were unceremoniously kicked out and declared “personae non gratae,” a source on the European side told Euronews at the time, adding that the delegation was caught in a diplomatic “trap” in which Haftar tried to force them to take a photo with, and tacitly legitimise, his Benghazi-based government.

While the EU itself has been remiss to publicly comment on what one senior Libyan analyst said was outright “humiliation,” it is understood that the man they were hoping to strike a deal with was General Khalifa Haftar.When a senior EU delegation travelled to the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi last Tuesday, they were hoping to discuss ways to limit the increasing numbers of migrants leaving Libya heading north to Europe.

However, shortly after their jet touched down at Benghazi Airport, the cluster of EU foreign ministers – as well as European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner – were sent packing. There was no agreement, not even a meeting. They were unceremoniously kicked out and declared “personae non gratae,” a source on the European side told Euronews at the time, adding that the delegation was caught in a diplomatic “trap” in which Haftar tried to force them to take a photo with, and tacitly legitimise, his Benghazi-based government.

While the EU itself has been remiss to publicly comment on what one senior Libyan analyst said was outright “humiliation,” it is understood that the man they were hoping to strike a deal with was General Khalifa Haftar.

________________________

Gregory Holyoke

After an EU delegation was humiliated by the commander in control of large swaths of eastern Libya, Euronews explores Haftar’s fall, then rise to power and who is helping him maintain it. When a senior EU delegation travelled to the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi last Tuesday, they were hoping to discuss ways to limit the increasing numbers of migrants leaving Libya heading north to Europe.

However, shortly after their jet touched down at Benghazi Airport, the cluster of EU foreign ministers – as well as European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner – were sent packing. There was no agreement, not even a meeting. They were unceremoniously kicked out and declared “personae non gratae,” a source on the European side told Euronews at the time, adding that the delegation was caught in a diplomatic “trap” in which Haftar tried to force them to take a photo with, and tacitly legitimise, his Benghazi-based government.

While the EU itself has been remiss to publicly comment on what one senior Libyan analyst said was outright “humiliation,” it is understood that the man they were hoping to strike a deal with was General Khalifa Haftar.

As the head of the powerful Libyan National Army, despite not leading the internationally recognised government, Haftar has become the de facto ruler of vast swathes of the North African country, which has lacked a unified state since the fall and assassination of notorious dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

Although Haftar is arguably the most powerful person in Libya today, he was once persona non grata himself, living quietly in exile right up to Gaddafi’s demise.

Keep your friends close…

Born to an Arab Bedouin family in northeastern Libya at the start of Britain’s eight-year occupation of the country, Khalifa Belqasim Omar Haftar was, even according to his allies, “a very quiet young lad who did not do much work.”

However, he managed to gain admission to the Benghazi Military University Academy, where friends from his time there reportedly also refer to him as “a very stern boy”. “He would not ask for a fight, but if it came to him, he knew how to handle it,” Haftar’s friends described him. It was at the academy where Haftar got to know a student in the year above — one Muammar Gaddafi.

They became fast friends, with Haftar even labelling Gaddafi an “angel”. The two united over their revolutionary spirit, fomented by a recent political coup that toppled the monarchy and political class in Libya’s neighbour, Egypt. “We were massively affected by Jamal Abdel Nasser’s era and what was going on in Egypt,” Haftar later explained.

Haftar was also said to be a massive admirer of the Iraqi vice president at the time — soon to become another household name. “Khalifa’s most important son is named Saddam, who by the way is named after Saddam Hussein. He’s the most like his father, I think that tells you all you need to know,” Tim Eaton from the Chatham House Institute said during an interview with Euronews from London.

It is also likely that he chose his title, field marshal, as a nod to Yugoslav socialist leader Josip Broz Tito, experts believe. Just three years after his graduation, Haftar was instrumental in the 1969 coup, which toppled King Idris and replaced him with Gaddafi, who had expansionist ambitions of spreading his Islamic socialist ideology — also known as Jamahiriya — beyond Libya’s borders.

In subsequent years, Haftar trained in the Soviet Union and rose through the ranks of Gaddafi’s military, commanding the Libyan troops supporting Egyptian troops entering Israeli-occupied Sinai during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. This cemented what was to become an enduring relationship between the Libyan military commander and leaders in Cairo.

But keep your enemies closer

In 1986, Haftar was made a colonel before becoming the military chief of staff. As the Gaddafi regime became increasingly authoritarian and rogue, his rise seemed inexorable. However, his luck suddenly turned: Gaddafi’s favourite commander led a disastrous mission in the late 1980s into neighbouring Chad, which led to the capture of almost 700 Libyan soldiers, including Haftar himself.

He was jailed, along with his men. Then it was the US, not Libya, that secured his release, which Libyan analyst Anas El Gomati contends was a turning point in the Haftar-Gaddafi relationship. “Haftar was like Gaddafi’s chosen sword until he became his sharpest blade turned inward,” the founder of Libya’s self-described first think tank told Euronews.

As El Gomati explained, Haftar “was abandoned as a scapegoat, then spent two decades in Virginia plotting revenge.” “He didn’t just oppose Gaddafi, he became his dark mirror, learning every lesson about authoritarian control,” El Gomati pointed out.

In fact, Haftar spent the next 24 years in exile and working with Libyan opposition movements, living just kilometres away from Washington, in Langley, the home of the CIA. In 2019, a former advisor to Haftar in the mid-2010s, Mohamed Bouzier, concurred with El Gomati in an interview with the BBC. “He was inhabited by Gaddafi. He was inhabited by envy of Gaddafi. How Gaddafi ruled this country,” Bouzier said.

However, some Libya insiders privately told Euronews of rumours that Gaddafi had actually gifted his former military chief an opulent mansion in Cairo during this time — the same house in which Haftar’s most powerful son, Saddam, grew up.

Back in the fold

When protests erupted across the Arab world in 2011, Libyans took to the streets in cities across the country. After decades of discussing plots to overthrow Gaddafi with willing Western ears and, as Libya expert Claudia Gazzini describes it, “sort of defecting to the Americans”, Haftar finally saw cracks emerging and soon went to the Libyan capital Tripoli.

However, the International Crisis Group’s senior analyst pushed back on the idea that Haftar was a key US puppet in the Libyan revolution. “I haven’t heard anybody make it so explicit. It would make sense, but nobody has said the Americans told him to go back there,” Gazzini said. Even if they did, it would not have been a short-term success, she continued.

“In 2012-2013, he based himself in Tripoli, but he wasn’t a big name at the time, because there were just so many different armed groups in Tripoli an the power was balanced out between all these people.” El Gomati was less diplomatic: “Haftar was a footnote, a Cold War fossil.”

It was not until 2014 that Haftar’s head really appeared above the parapet, when he announced an operation which he said was to root out extremists in Benghazi. Even then, Gazzini contends that he was not taken seriously. “It was very pathetic. He actually came on TV with a big map behind him saying: ‘Hey, you know, we need to rebel against these bad Islamists.’”

A claim that both Gazzini and Eaton doubt, with the latter telling Euronews that “for Haftar, there’s always been good Islamists and bad Islamists.” “There’s actually a lot of Salafists (Islamist extremists) in his ranks, just ones who can take orders,” Eaton explained.

However, Operation Dignity, as it was known, helped consolidate Haftar’s power over Libya’s second biggest city and much of the country’s east. Over the following years, he built up his power and became the supreme commander of the Libyan National Army in 2015.

None of this happened in a vacuum.

______________________

Julia Fengler

Since 2020, Libya has recorded the largest improvements in the Global Peace Index. However, ongoing challenges, fragmented governance, foreign interference, and institutional weaknesses, continue to undermine stability, explains Julia Fengler.

After nearly a decade of civil war, Libya in the past few years has substantially reduced its levels of open conflict. However, this relative peace belies its extreme social fragility and fractured military and political landscape, which leaves it at heightened risk of renewed conflict. 

After nearly a decade of civil conflict that followed the 2011 overthrow of long-time ruler Muammar Ghaddafi, Libya has recently experienced a notable improvement in peacefulness. Since 2020, it has registered the largest improvement of any country in the Global Peace Index (GPI), improving by 25 places in the global rankings.  

Yet Libya’s progress in reducing outward manifestations of violence belies the country’s extreme social fragility amid its deeply fractured military and political landscape. This fragility is reflected in Libya’s ongoing deteriorations in Positive Peace, IEP’s measure of social and institutional resilience. While Libya’s recent reductions in violence are welcome, they have come as the result of an untenable socio-political stalemate. Unless Libya’s fractures can be overcome and its institutional resilience can be strengthened, peace will remain unsustainable, as shown in the outbreaks of violence earlier this year.

Historical context  

Libya’s present-day instability is deeply rooted in the legacy of Gaddafi’s four-decade rule. Coming to power in 1969 through a military coup, Gaddafi established an authoritarian regime that dismantled formal institutions. His jamāhīriyyah system replaced traditional government structures with a complex network of people’s committees and revolutionary councils. Political dissent was harshly repressed, and opposition groups were exiled. While Gaddafi used oil wealth to fund social programs and infrastructure, his rule left Libya without functioning political institutions or a clear succession plan.  

In the context of the Arab Spring, civil war broke out in the country in 2011, causing tens of thousands of deaths and leading to the regime’s collapse. This created a major power vacuum, in which militias, tribes and rival political factions competed for control.  

Without strong institutions or a unified national army, Libya struggled to transition to democratic governance. Elections in 2012 initially brought hope, but growing tensions between Islamist and secular factions, along with the rise of powerful militias, led to renewed violence. This fragmentation triggered a second civil war in 2014, with frequent clashes and the involvement of external actors costing thousands more Libyan lives.  

After six years of intensive fighting, this second civil war ended through a ceasefire agreement in 2020. These successive conflicts of the 2010s, combined with a substantial upsurge in terrorist activity, drove the massive deterioration in the country’s peace score, and their cessation has driven its subsequent improvement.

The records of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, for example, count around 4,000 deaths from internal conflict in 2011. And from 2012 to the end of the decade, the country averaged more than 1,100 conflict fatalities per year, but it has recorded fewer than 15 conflict deaths each year since 2021.  Similarly, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, terrorism peaked in Libya in the mid-2010s. There was a high of 234 terrorism-related deaths in the country in 2015. But there have been no recorded terrorist attacks or deaths since 2022.

Contemporary challenges 

While negative peace, defined as the absence of violence or fear of violence, has recently improved in Libya, this trend has not been accompanied by corresponding gains in Positive Peace. Positive Peace encompasses the social systems, institutions and governance structures that support long-term stability. By this metric, Libya has been on a largely consistent deteriorating trajectory for more than a decade. As of 2024, it ranks 145th out of the 163 countries in the Positive Peace Index (PPI).

Libya’s dearth of Positive Peace has been reflected in, and exacerbated by, the country’s fractured political landscape. In recent years, it has effectively been ruled by two governments, each controlling a large portion of its territory. The internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) is based in Tripoli and controls the western part of the country, while a rival authority backed by Commander Khalifa Haftar controls Benghazi and the eastern part of the country.  

Both factions claim legitimacy, but neither has been able to carry out the long-promised national elections, originally scheduled for December 2021. This stalemate has frozen reform efforts and left much of the country in a state of political uncertainty. Unless meaningful steps toward unity are taken, this persistent fragmentation of governance will leave the country vulnerable to renewed eruption of violence.  

In early May 2025, for example, Tripoli experienced its most severe outbreak of violence in over a year, following the assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli, a commander affiliated with the Government of National Unity. His death triggered armed clashes between government-affiliated forces and non-state actors. The violence quickly escalated in densely populated neighbourhoods, resulting in the deaths of both combatants and civilians. Although a UN-brokered ceasefire was reached by mid-May, the incident revealed the fragile nature of Libya’s security landscape.

Future prospects 

Since that ceasefire, militia mobilisations have continued, particularly around Tripoli. These movements have prompted the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to issue repeated warnings, most recently in July. While the overall conflict intensity has declined, the risk of future violence remains high. 

Foreign involvement has further complicated this picture. Türkiye backs the GNU, while Russia, through proxies and private military contractors, supports Haftar’s forces. Though these powers may bring temporary stability to certain regions, they also obstruct national reconciliation.  

Libya’s post-2011 trajectory reflects the gap between the absence of war and the presence of peace. While the country has moved beyond the peak of open conflict, the underlying drivers of instability – fragmented governance, foreign interference, and institutional collapse – remain in place. As a result, gains in peacefulness may prove temporary without deeper structural reforms and a resolution to the political and military deadlock.

______________________

Chiara-Lou Parriaud and Grace Spalding-Fecher

JUST SECURITY

France’s Dangerous Game in Libya

In his dealings with the Libyan regime, Sarkozy strayed away from the more restrained foreign policy approach of his predecessor, Jacques Chirac (1995-2007), and instead pursued a more assertive stance.

This shift culminated in the French- and British-led NATO intervention that toppled Gaddafi in 2011. Yet France’s interventionist legacy did not end with Sarkozy’s defeat in the 2012 presidential election.

His successors, François Hollande (2012-2017) and Emmanuel Macron (2017-present), despite their criticism of the NATO operation, have continued to meddle in Libya’s political process at the expense of Libyans’ fundamental freedoms.

Since 2011, France has officially backed the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), supporting efforts to hold free elections, rebuild public institutions, and prevent armed conflict.

Yet as the U.N.-brokered Libyan Political Agreement in December 2015 was leading to the formation of the GNA, France’s domestic priorities shifted as the country was hit by multiple Islamist terrorist attacks in its capital.

The national security crisis reinforced the Middle East strategy of then-Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, under former President Hollande, who prioritized a security approach in Libya at the expense of democratic considerations.

Le Drian saw a pragmatic ally in Haftar, especially because of his victories against ISIS and al-Qaeda. For France’s counterterrorism operations in the Sahel region, Haftar appeared capable of imposing order and stability in a fragmented Libya that had become a haven for jihadist groups.

The Libyan Political Agreement called for broad inclusion of Libyan factions in the political process and civilian oversight of the military. In contrast to these terms, France began quietly bolstering Haftar’s eastern regime.

Since early 2015, it provided support via special forces, advisers, and clandestine operations. The death of three French secret service agents in a helicopter crash near Benghazi in 2016 forced Hollande to confirm France’s military presence in the country.

France’s meddling and double standards in Libyan political affairs became more blatant under Macron, who hosted Haftar and the GNA’s then-Prime Minister Fayez al‑Sarraj for peace talks in July 2017, circumventing the established U.N. peacebuilding efforts.

Though both pledged support for a ceasefire and prompt national elections, Macron’s move – making him the first European leader to host Haftar – granted the warlord international legitimacy, despite EU, NATO, and U.N. support for the rival GNA.

Although professing support for the Libyan Political Agreement, Macron failed to include other factions in the talks and made no demands on Haftar.

In May 2018, Macron continued to sideline the U.N.-led process by convening Haftar and Sarraj along with Libyan parliamentary leaders, where he proposed a plan to hold elections by December 10, a timeline widely seen as unrealistic at the time.

Macron’s unilateral initiative only incentivized the U.N. plan’s detractors to stall negotiations. After this plan fell apart, U.N. special envoy Ghassan Salamé postponed elections till spring 2019, but Haftar derailed the process by launching an offensive on Tripoli.

In response to the offensive, France leveraged diplomatic protection to thwart the EU from condemning Haftar, downplayed the humanitarian toll, and portrayed the warlord’s opponents as terrorists.

On the ground, U.N.-backed forces found four American-made Javelin anti-tank missiles, supplied by France, in a Haftar-controlled stronghold south of Tripoli. Meanwhile, France’s Emirati allies hired Russian mercenaries, cementing a long-term Russian presence in Libya. Through the end of 2019, Haftar’s forces made fast territorial advances until Turkey sent troops to bolster opposing GNA forces, prompting the GNA to declare a unilateral ceasefire in October 2020.

Going Beyond Counterterrorism

Paris’ adulation of the Libyan war general goes beyond counterterrorism; it is also rooted in its strategic alliances with key military partners across the wider Middle East, primarily Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, both major buyers of French weapons and backers of Haftar’s LNA.

The warlord also enjoys support from Russia, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, while the GNU is backed by Turkey and Qatar. Marginalizing Haftar could jeopardize lucrative military contracts with Egypt and the UAE, two of France’s most important clients.

Although the Franco-Emirati relationship has deteriorated since 2021, Sisi and Macron’s ties remain strong.

Natural resources also dictate France’s presence in Libya, as the French energy company Total holds exploration rights in several oilfields in the West and a share of one of Libya’s main oil companies.

Furthermore, as Ali Albayaa, a research fellow specializing in the Middle East and North Africa region at the Human Rights Foundation, told us, “We should not overlook Macron’s personal ambitions of projecting France as a guarantor of European continental security.”

Libya is a crucial piece in France’s puzzle, as Haftar controls the majority of the country’s territory and, by extension, the masses of immigrants pouring into France in search of a safer future.

Haftar’s capacity to shape immigration realities in Europe partly explains France’s tacit support to the dictator.

The Costs of French Realpolitik

Not only does France’s diplomatic and military support for Haftar delegitimize the U.N. political process, but it also abets the perpetuation of human rights abuses by Haftar’s LNA.

In fact, Haftar himself was convicted by a U.S. judge in 2022 of war crimes for his role in ordering extrajudicial killings and torture in Libya. The militias that make up the LNA are no better and have been accused of a host of human rights abuses.

The Tareq Bin Zeyad Brigade (TBZ), led by Haftar’s son Saddam, has been accused of crushing any opposition to the LNA. Amnesty International has documented the TBZ’s links to a “catalog of horrors,” particularly against migrants, including torture, mistreatment, and forced expulsions in total impunity.

Haftar’s 2019 offensive on Tripoli, which France tirelessly sought to shield from international condemnation, was marred by significant human casualties, killing at least 430 civilians and displacing 250,000 more.

Rampant corruption and mismanagement further infringe on the local populations’ fundamental freedoms. One example is the collapse of two dams in September 2023 in the city of Derna after a storm brought heavy rains to the country’s northeastern coast. The resulting devastation killed at least 4,000 people and left tens of thousands of people missing to this day. Corruption within both the GNU and the LNA is to blame for the floods’ cataclysmic impact.

The dams collapsed after over a decade of warnings about their degrading state and a half-hearted attempt to fix them by Libyan politicians on both sides. The widespread protests that erupted following the disaster were met with the eastern regime’s brutal retaliation and arbitrary arrests of activists.

Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst on Libya security and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, pointed out to us that these authoritarian tactics are not unique to the Eastern regime; in fact, the GNU in the West has adopted more totalitarian actions in recent months, with little objection from the international community.

France’s Pervasive Legacy

“What started out as military aid in the context of France’s fight against terrorism ended with Haftar managing to transform that technical aid into political and ideological support,” Harchaoui explained in an interview. “Once Haftar gained absolute control of Benghazi from ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Libyan political opponents in 2017, France should have ended its support.

Instead, under Macron’s presidency, it continued to support Haftar diplomatically.” Harchaoui concluded, “It’s in the name of realpolitik that France lacked realism in Libya.

By solely backing Haftar, France left key players out of its unilateral vision for the country’s future. As a result, France does not hold the same relevance that it did in 2019. Libya has turned into a playing field for non-Western powers.”

Despite its waning influence, the damage France has done will persist. The Libyan civil and political spaces are rife with human rights violations, as both regimes deploy authoritarian practices to repress any form of dissent and political pluralism.

Libya’s window of opportunity for nationwide elections, which briefly opened in 2021, is not available today due to the partisan nature of foreign interference that has sown divisions rather than the unity sought by the U.N.-led political process. France needs to bear responsibility for the long-term consequences of foreign interference.

With the Sarkozy-Gaddafi trial, French democracy upholds its commitment to holding its former leaders accountable for their wrongdoings. France owes this self-healing, in large part, to its civil society.

Without the Médiapart journalists who first uncovered the affair, or anti-corruption organizations like Sherpa, Transparency International, and Anticor, which coalesced as civil parties in the trial “to underscore the systemic mechanisms facilitating financial flows and the associated repercussions on the populations of impacted states,” and without the French Association of Victims of Terrorism (AfVT), which also joined as a civil party to represent the families of the DC10-UTA flight victims, France’s judiciary would not have had the tools to address the complex web of corruption weaved by Sarkozy, Gaddafi, and their respective ministers.

If Libyans are to have a real chance at democracy, France must stop undermining the U.N.-led peace process by legitimizing warlords through backchannel diplomacy. Instead, it should hold perpetrators of violence in both Libyan regimes accountable for their human rights abuses through individualized and targeted sanctions.

On the commercial front, any lucrative contract passed between France and its Middle East allies should be conditioned on the respect of human rights.

Repression should not be rewarded. And at the grassroots level, in light of civil society’s vital role in democratic processes – as witnessed during the Sarkozy trial – France should support and fund civil society efforts in Libya to ensure diverse voices are included in a viable political solution.

Although Libyan civil society organizations, such as Together We Build It, are working to address the absence of women’s participation in peace-building processes, foreign powers should also empower an intergenerational, gendered approach to peace-building. It is only by pushing for accountability, transparency, and letting Libyan voices be heard that France will truly play a constructive role in ensuring Libyans’ access to their fundamental freedoms.

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Mona ElShazly

D. Proposed Reform Plan

12. The intricate political landscape of Libya requires a cautious and strategic approach.

As discussed, the main issue is not merely the price of fuel and electricity, as this is only one step in a long process of reform. To be successful, the energy reform program will have to be well designed and implemented with political consensus. Given the current political division and conflicting regimes, an open dialogue and a long negotiation process entailing compromise between the various political groups in Libya will be necessary.

In our view, and in line with the IMF’s approach, the reform plan should be implemented in successive phases in the following order:

• Establishing real fuel demand
• Controlling the fuel supply chain
• Launching a public communication plan
• Introducing a well-structured mitigation plan
• Gradually raising prices
• Implementing an automatic pricing mechanism

13. Establishing actual fuel needs is the first prerequisite.

An independent committee representing different entities must be established to assess real fuel requirements, in line with international consumption norms, for both individuals and institutional consumers. Imports would then be limited to these established quantities, after taking into consideration the local refining capacity. Furthermore, the real cost of subsidy must be quantified and properly reflected in the fiscal accounts.

The fiscal budget allocated to fuel and electricity must be separated from oil exports and not netted out from revenues directly. The cost of the crude oil that is locally refined and natural gas and diesel used in electricity generation must be included in the annual budget under fuel and electricity subsidies, respectively, to properly reflect their true burden on the budget. Currently, only the direct subsidy provided to the electricity company is included in the government’s fiscal presentation, which significantly undervalues the actual cost of subsidy.

14. The distribution and collection systems should be restructured before any reform is undertaken.

Any price increases will not be effective if there is no control over the fuel supply chain. Securing the distribution network through a digitalized monitoring system that tracks fuel quantities through the production, storage, distribution stages to final selling points will help identify any leakages outside the official network. This also must include fuel sold to the electricity company and to local refineries. At the same time, an effective collection system must be put in place to ensure the pass-through of price increases to all consumers equally, including state enterprises. The government may then allocate a subsidy to the electricity company to compensate for any losses until electricity tariffs reflect real production costs.

Furthermore, residential and commercial electricity meters must be changed to prepaid systems and illegal connections must be terminated to ensure enforcement of the new tariffs. There is already a new system being implemented in the South of Libya, whereby each citizen gets a weekly gasoline quota (using a QR code) that cannot be exceeded. This system could be further developed and implemented all over the country to track quantities sold and revenues collected.

15. A comprehensive communication strategy with the public is essential.

Before any reform is introduced, a clear and transparent communication plan must be undertaken to educate the public on the welfare losses under the existing system and potential benefits from reform. The substantial budget allocated to energy subsidies should be disclosed, along with the drawbacks of the existing system and how the public will be compensated for the anticipated price increases.

The key message should focus on the fact that not only are the Libyans paying inflated parallel-market prices but are also bearing the cost of a subsidy that they are not actually receiving. This will help foster public support and acceptance for the reform, and it will prevent social unrest that could arise if the people feel estranged from the reform process.

16. The proposed increase in prices must be sufficient to eliminate smuggling.

Gradualism is usually the preferred method for any subsidy reform to allow for adjustment by households and firms. However, subsidy reform must be customized to each country’s economic and political conditions.

Given the substantial price disparity and the large-scale smuggling, a front-loaded increase may be essential in Libya’s case. In the table below, an illustrative scenario is presented that eliminates around half of the current subsidy on gasoline and diesel in the first year and then phases out the remaining subsidy over the subsequent two years, coupled with a gradual reform for electricity and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders over 5 years. In this scenario, the target price is based on the current import prices, after applying a 10 percent discount for the transportation costs of the locally refined portions of these products, except for electricity, which is based on current cost per kWh.

17. An automatic pricing mechanism should be introduced after total elimination of the subsidy to avoid any further build up in price gaps.

An automatic fuel pricing mechanism would pass through any change (increases and decreases) in international fuel prices to domestic fuel prices based on a pricing formula that takes onto account international prices, transportation costs and taxes (Coady et al., 2012). The formula is revised at regular intervals (monthly or quarterly) and may include a smoothing factor to avoid any sharp increase or decreases in prices. This ensures that prices continue to reflect actual costs and eliminates the need for fuel subsidies again in the future.

Establishing a credible and sustainable automatic pricing mechanism requires a number of institutional conditions to ensure transparency and effectiveness, including a clear legal and regulatory framework and appropriate infrastructure.

E. Mitigation Plan to Accompany Subsidy

Reform Plan

18. A well-structured mitigation plan for subsidy reform is vital to minimize potential negative impacts on the population and ensure a smooth transition. International experience suggests that countries that have adopted broad-based and relatively generous social protection programs covering a large segment of the population faced fewer implementation challenges and less pushback during the early stages of reform .

In the case of Libya, direct cash transfers may be the easiest to implement and the most accepted by the public. There are already several social programs in place that could be easily expanded to incorporate the subsidy reform transfers. A thorough design of the chosen compensation system will be essential.

The social protection plan needs to consider a few trade offs:

• Target groups: whether to target the lowest deciles of the population (lowest 40-50 percent) based on income or to extend the transfers to all citizens uniformly,

• Type of program: whether to expand existing programs or design new ones exclusively for subsidy reform,

• Size of budgetary savings: whether to redistribute all savings or re-invest them in other sectors,

• Timeline: whether the transfers will be permanent or temporary.

19. Libya has a unique chance to fully compensate the population for welfare losses and still achieve budgetary savings.

Whether the government decides to use general transfers or targeted support based on income brackets, it can compensate for the expected increase in energy prices and realize some budgetary savings at the same time. Based on the 2022 household spending survey, the average household spending on energy and transportation is LYD 78 per family with an average family size of 5.

The illustrative scenario below shows that transfers can cover the average welfare loss per family and still have sizable savings starting from the third year after smuggling is contained and the gasoline and diesel subsidies are fully phased out. These savings shall be reinvested in health, education, and public infrastructure-coordinated with the budget process according to a pre-determined and communicated plan with the public to ensure transparency.

F. Conclusion

20. Energy subsidy reform has become crucial for Libya.

Eliminating subsidies is always a challenging process. The cost to the budget is large, and Libyans are bearing the burden of a subsidy that they do not fully receive. Furthermore, energy subsidies lead to over consumption of energy, eventually leading to premature resource depletion.

Given the significant price disparities and considerable levels of smuggling, slow price gradual adjustments are unlikely to be effective in Libya. Libya has an opportunity to gradually phase out subsidies, compensate citizens for the anticipated welfare loss and realize budgetary savings.

A clear and effective communication with the public early on would facilitate adjustment and minimize potential public rejection.

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Africa Defense Forum

After the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Russia has scrambled to transfer military equipment to other areas, including eastern Libya. Experts question Russia’s long-term strategic goals and fear the expanded presence of mercenaries and military personnel could further destabilize Libya, Sudan and other nations in the region.

The Kremlin increasingly has used Al-Khadim air base, about 100 kilometers east of Benghazi, as a hub for conducting operations, supplying arms, and trafficking resources in and out of the restive Sahel region.

“One of former Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s greatest foreign policy failures was undoubtedly his 1980s attempt to use his Soviet-armed military to spread Libyan rule and influence in the African Sahel region,” researcher Andrew McGregor of the Jamestown Foundation think tank wrote in an April 17 analysis. “Now, Russia is focused on a similar effort in the Sahel, using the same remote airbase in south-eastern Libya that Qaddafi used to launch his offensive into neighboring Chad.” Using satellite imagery, flight logs and radar information, multiple news outlets have traced the movements of Russian military assets from Syria to Libya.

In May, an Antonov-124 cargo plane left a base in Syria and embarked on a nearly 10,000-kilometer journey to Sub-Saharan Africa. Its first stop was Al-Khadim. From there it traveled to Bamako, Mali’s capital, and Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, according to flight logs seen by Radio France International (RFI).

Although the type of equipment that was loaded and unloaded during this trip was unclear, the aircraft’s cargo bay is large enough to carry several aircraft or armored vehicles. Russian cargo planes have been known to deliver aircraft, helicopters, radars and surface-to-air systems to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, where Russian mercenaries continue to help military juntas maintain power.

Between December 2024 and January 2025, French newspaper Le Monde documented eight flights from Syria to Al-Khadim. RFI reviewed several Telegram messaging app channels linked to Russian paramilitary groups and found references to Russian weapons deliveries to Al-Khadim, including heavy weapons and armored vehicles — the same type used by Russia in Syria.

One video message read: “New organizations. New technology. Old places. Remember your roots!” Moscow’s on-again, off-again ties with Libya pre-date the Cold War. According to RFI, the footage was shot at Al-Khadim. Lou Osborn, of the All Eyes On Wagner investigative group, said Russia’s presence at Al-Khadim is the product of an effort to bolster ties with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) and has controlled eastern Libya since 2017.

“We saw a kind of logistical ballet of Russian planes towards Libya,” Osborn told RFI. “There is a fairly strong rapprochement, political and military, between Haftar’s Libya and the Kremlin.” Moscow also has tried to forge ties with the officially recognized government in Tripoli by opening embassies, and it has made overtures to do the same in Algeria and Tunisia. These countries are “very aware of what is happening in the region, with military attachés, particularly in Algeria, who travel back and forth to Libya,” Osborn said.

Russia’s presence in Libya is not limited to Al-Khadim. In December 2024, Russia moved troops from Syria to revive the Matan al-Sarra air base near the borders with Chad and Sudan, according to Italian news Agency Nova. The base had been abandoned since 2011. Anas El Gomati, director of Libyan think tank the Sadeq Institute, said that disengaging from Syria was just one factor in Russia’s use of the air base.

“Matan al-Sarra isn’t just another airbase renovation, it’s Russia repositioning its chess pieces in Africa,” he told The New Arab website. “The timing is telling: as they lose Syrian bases, they’re rapidly developing this strategic location near Chad’s and Sudan’s borders. But this isn’t about replacing Syria; it’s about creating something potentially more valuable: a new network of influence stretching from the Mediterranean deep into Africa.”

From Maaten al-Sarra, Russia can directly supply Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan. Russian technicians and troops have restored runways and warehouses at the base. Haftar’s LNA secured the area and protects routes that supply Sudan with weapons and fuel from the northeastern Libya port of Tobruk.

Some members of Libya’s divided government oppose Russia’s activities. Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, prime minister of the Tripoli government, said he rejected any attempt to turn Libya into a center for major-power conflicts and warned that the transfer of Russian weapons to Libya would complicate the country’s internal crisis. “No one with an ounce of patriotism wants a foreign power to impose its hegemony and authority on the country and the people,” Dabaiba told The Guardian. Jalel Harchaoui, associate fellow at the defense think tank RUSI, characterized Dabaiba’s remarks as a “watershed moment.”

“Just him saying those words is deeply problematic to Russia because part of the Russian doctrine in the Middle East is never to be perceived as being completely 100% on one side against the other,” Harchaoui told The Guardian. “So Russia was supposed to be this magical actor that was basically eliciting the active approval of both sides of the Libyan crisis. And all of that is gone.”

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The Africa Defense Forum (ADF) magazine is a security affairs journal that focuses on all issues affecting peace, stability, and good governance in Africa. ADF is published by the U.S. Africa Command.

Mona ElShazly

Abstract:

Energy subsidies have become a significant burden on government finances in Libya. The pervasive nature of subsidies has led to rampant corruption, smuggling, and a diversion of resources from essential public services. The paper identifies key barriers to reform, including opposition from vested interest groups and public apprehension regarding inflation and welfare loss.

To address these challenges, a strategic reform plan is proposed, emphasizing a phased approach, a comprehensive communication plan and social protection measures to mitigate the adverse effects of subsidy removal. By taking these steps, Libya can transition towards a more sustainable framework that supports macroeconomic stability.

A. Introduction

1. Energy subsidies in Libya are extremely generous and poorly targeted.

Given Libya’s substantial oil wealth, the government has historically provided fuel subsidies as a form of redistribution, effectively allowing citizens to benefit from the country’s rich natural resources. However, fuel prices have not changed since the 1970s, making the price of gasoline in Libya currently the lowest in the world.

Although designed to protect citizens, subsidies are typically regressive and primarily benefit the wealthier segments of the populations. Libya’s fuel subsidy has been costly and gave rise to corruption and wide-scale smuggling, effectively transferring the benefit of the subsidy to specific interest groups and adjacent countries.

2. This comes at the cost of availability and quality of public goods.

Subsidies drain government resources thereby diverting funds from infrastructure and public services, hindering economic development in the longer run. This is especially relevant in Libya, given that development spending on education and health together account for less than 1% of total spending, whereas subsidies alone take up more than one third of the total budget.

Furthermore, by lowering the cost of fossil fuel, subsidies make energy-intensive industries more attractive, discouraging diversification and potential non-oil private sector investment and suppressing long term sustainable growth.

B. Size and Burden of Energy Subsidies

3. Direct energy subsidies accounted for one third of revenues and 20 percent of GDP in 2024 (adjusted to include the crude oil swap).

Although Libya is an oil-rich country, it imports most of its fuel since the capacity of its domestic refineries is limited and cannot meet local demand. Fuel imports jumped from an average of US$3 billion in 2016-2019 to US$9 billion in 2024, according to the Libyan Audit Bureau. Power generation in Libya utilizes heavily subsidized natural gas, diesel and crude oil.

The government subsidizes the electricity sector in two ways; direct financial assistance to cover the sector’s losses (due to the high cost of electricity production relative to the electricity tariff) and subsidized fuel supplied for electricity generation. Adding the cost of crude oil refined locally and natural gas used for electricity generation, estimated at an additional US$3.9 billion and US$4 billion, respectively, the total energy subsidy bill reaches US$17 billion in 2024.

4. The jump in imports coincided with the adoption of the crude oil swap agreement.

Prior to 2021, the government allocated a budget for fuel imports, which was then distributed to the National Oil Corporation (NOC) through the CBL. In late 2021, NOC started to implement a crude oil swap that barters crude oil for the refined fuel to make up for the shortages in the budget allocations. Since then, imported quantities of fuel products have jumped 50 percent.

Gasoline and diesel represent the bulk of fuel consumption of which imports currently account for around 90 and 70 percent of total consumption, respectively. Under the swap, fuel imports are based upon the stated requirements of fuel distribution companies and state enterprises (electricity and cement companies), which are typically exaggerated, under the claim of increased demand from the electricity company and petrol stations.

5. Electricity subsidies have also grown substantially.

The electricity tariffs in Libya are one of the lowest in the world at US$0.008 per kWh, well below the cost of production and average international prices. In 2023, electricity generation utilized 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 5 million barrels of crude oil at a cost of US$4.4 billion.

According to the General Electricity Company, generation capacity has increased by around 40 percent between 2020 and 2024 which required more diesel and natural gas. Libya’s per capita electricity consumption is already one of the highest in the region and given that Libya is country with a modest population growth and limited industrial activity, it is not clear how consumption could be increasing at such pace.

6. The extremely low prices encourage cross border smuggling.

The sharp increase in “consumed” quantities of gasoline and diesel are most likely due to the rise in smuggling to neighboring countries, owing to the significant difference in prices. Authorities estimate that as much as 30 percent of the imported fuel is being smuggled. The distribution networks are the suspected source of this leakage.

The lack of strong control on the distribution system leads to the diversion of the allocated diesel and gasoline from the formal distribution network either to the black market inside Libya or across the border to the neighboring countries.

7. The collection system is fundamentally flawed.

Despite the extremely low prices of fuel and electricity in Libya, collection of revenues is extremely low. The annual fiscal statement and the Audit Bureau reports show significant gaps between the estimated revenues from local sales of fuel and electricity and the actual revenues transmitted to the government, suggesting that even these modest revenues are not being collected. Furthermore, the majority of citizens do not settle their electricity bills despite the very low tariffs, which confirms that the main issue is not the price, but rather the urgent need to put in place a strong collection system first.

C. Barriers to Implementation

8. Opposition from interest groups hinders any reform agenda.

The lack of security and the presence of competing militias have led to large-scale smuggling that benefits influential groups. Smuggling the subsidized fuel to the parallel market yields about US$0.7 per liter, generating an annual revenue of around US$3 billion to key beneficiaries. Any proposed reform will threaten this lucrative business and thus will be met with strong opposition from various stakeholders, that could potentially escalate into violent conflict as factions strive to protect their revenue streams.

9. The absence of a unified government complicates any reform.

The deep fragmentation in Libya, marked by the presence of multiple factions and a lack of a unified government, leads to conflicting interests and agendas and makes it difficult to achieve consensus on critical issues. Moreover, the absence of a cohesive policy framework complicates the development and execution of long-term strategies needed for stability and growth in the country. As a result, efforts to address economic challenges, improve security, and enhance public service delivery are hampered.

10. The lack of trust in the political system raises concerns that the government may not provide adequate compensation if and when these subsidies are eliminated.

Subsidies in Libya are regarded as an integral component of the social contract and are perceived as a fair method of redistributing the natural wealth of the country. There have been several attempts to reform energy subsidies over the years that were met with objections and eventually reversed due to political pressure and public discontent. However, Libya was able to phase out food subsidies in 2014 and can capitalize on that experience as well as the experience of other countries with fuel subsidy reform.

11. The inflationary impact from the proposed energy price adjustments may cause social discontent.

The direct effect of energy price shocks on inflation is limited by the share of energy spending in the consumer basket. Even though spending on energy currently constitutes a small portion of Libyan households’ monthly expenditure given the very low prices, as prices are adjusted the spending as a share of household expenditure would be expected to rise appreciably.

However, since most of the consumption basket of goods is composed of imported goods, the second-round effects of fuel price increases are likely to be felt through the cost of services and higher operating expenses in transport, electricity generation and wages. The social impact from this necessary adjustment in relative prices should be contained through sufficient social transfers as discussed in the mitigation section below.

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Rome and Athens have identified Turkish and Russian involvement in a growing security threat from North Africa. Don’t focus so much on Ukraine that you miss the severe threats to European security brewing in Libya. That’s the message Italy and Greece are trying to deliver to their EU and NATO allies, but without much success. Migrant flows from Libya are spiking again, at a time Rome is increasingly concerned about Russia’s growing influence in the unstable North African nation, wielded through arms supplies and a potential new naval base in the northeastern port of Tobruk.

Athens has also sent two warships to conduct patrols off Libya in response to the migration surge and its strategic concerns that its archrival, Turkey, is working with the Libyans to carve up the Mediterranean into maritime zones for energy exploration. The zones claim waters just south of the Greek island of Crete, while Athens deems them illegal under international maritime law. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has described Libya as “an emergency that Europe must address together,” but a European attempt to make some diplomatic headway last week degenerated into farce.

EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, accompanied by ministers from Italy, Greece and Malta, was declared “persona non grata” in Benghazi, the territory of the eastern Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar. Accused of unspecified “violations,” the delegation was ordered to leave. “Russia’s role in Libya continues to expand, using it as the central node in its African strategy,” warned one EU diplomat who follows the dossier closely. The diplomat added that a politically connected smuggling network in Libya was supporting Russia’s strategic efforts, helping Moscow to circumvent sanctions and to weaponize migration.

Italy and Greece know, however, that tackling a problem as complex as Libya — a country more than three times the size of Spain — will require support from big allies such as the U.S. and France. So far, however, the response from those allies has been underwhelming.   

Migration again tops the agenda

The Greek government announced tough new migration rules on Wednesday as it struggles to cope with a surge in arrivals from Libya on Crete at the height of the tourist season. “An emergency situation requires emergency measures and therefore the Greek government has taken the decision to inform the European Commission that … it is proceeding to suspend the processing of asylum applications, initially for three months, for those arriving in Greece from North Africa by sea,” Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis told lawmakers.

Some 9,000 people have arrived in Crete from Libya since the start of the year, most of them in recent weeks, already almost double the number for the whole of 2024. In late June Greece deployed two warships in a bid to curb the recent surge of migrant arrivals. Senior government officials doubted their effectiveness, however, warning that naval patrols may encourage migrants to pitch themselves into the water to seek rescue. Sure enough, in the last week alone over 2,000 migrants came ashore in Crete.

The Greek government is also taking criticism from both the opposition and its own officials for having abandoned the Libya file in recent years. Overall there has been a 7 percent rise in irregular crossings in the central Mediterranean in the first part of the year, almost entirely from Libya, compared to an overall 20 percent drop on all the other main routes. The Greek crackdown has also triggered fears in Italy that more migrants will be pushed into Italian waters. “We are concerned about the situation in Libya and the recent increase in irregular departures,” a European Commission spokesperson said before last week’s EU visit to the country. Being concerned is one thing, finding a solution quite another.

Diplomats described last week’s diplomatic mission as an attempt to determine what solutions could be feasible. EU cash, after all, would likely play some role. The EU struck a highly controversial deal with Tunisia in 2023 in which it paid the authorities to stem migrations, but diplomats doubt such a model could be replicated in a country as destabilized by rival militias as Libya.

Russians at the gate

A recent display of Russian weapons in Benghazi during a military parade showed the Kremlin’s growing proximity to Haftar. Russia wants a stronghold in the Mediterranean, especially after the new authorities in Syria terminated Moscow’s lease at the Port of Tartus after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Italy’s Tajani issues regular warnings that Libya is the most likely destination for a replacement naval base. According to a report by the Agenzia Nova news agency, Moscow also wants to install missile systems at a military base in Sebha in southern Libya, which is controlled by Haftar, and to point the rockets at Europe. 

Many analysts and diplomats are skeptical that Moscow is already at the stage of pointing rockets at Europe from Libya. But even without the missiles, Russia can already use a handful of military bases in Libya for logistics, “which theoretically could hit Europe,” said Arturo Varvelli, a senior policy fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations. So far, Russia has mainly used Libyan bases to run its operations in the rest of Africa, operating mainly through the Africa Corps, backed by Russia’s defense ministry.

There are also growing fears among southern European officials that Russia could soon be able to harness migration from Libya in a rerun of the hybrid war it launched on the EU’s eastern front, when it forced Middle Eastern refugees over the Belarusian border into Poland. Still, not everything is going Russia’s way. One of the diplomats said the costs of the war in Ukraine were depriving the Africa Corps of the funding it needed to pay Libyan militias, creating tensions with its proxies and Haftar.

“I don’t see the Russians taking over” the migrant smuggling business, said Karim Mezran, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, but “I see the Russians telling the people: Now I’m the new ruler and you just follow my orders.” 

A quest for allies

Despite the gravity of these threats from Libya, Italy and Greece are struggling to convince their allies to step up. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni discussed Libya with French President Emmanuel Macron at a three-hour meeting in Rome on June 4. Libya “is of course a topic of key relevance for both Italy and France,” said an Italian official with direct knowledge of the talks between Paris and Rome, stressing “common concerns, especially on security — as regards also Russia’s increasing presence there — and migration.”

The Italian official, however, acknowledged that there are “nuances” between the two countries’ positions “on the possible political solutions.” Libya is increasingly being added to the agenda of more diplomatic talking shops, but in practical terms little is happening. While Italy desperately wants buy-in from military heavyweight France, the subject simply isn’t as vital to Paris as it is to Rome, and even exposes France’s recent failures in Mali and Niger.

“For Italy, the question of Libya is more central in the short term than for France,” said Virginie Collombier, a professor at Luiss University in Rome and an expert on Libya. “Politically, the French government has little interest in crying wolf on Russia because it highlights the failures of the French government,” she said, noting that France has gradually withdrawn from African countries in the Sahel region while Russia has upped its presence.

And with the U.S. increasingly looking to the Pacific, there is scant hope that Washington will invest much political capital in stabilizing the country. Most tellingly, the most recent NATO declaration, signed June 25 in The Hague, doesn’t even mention Africa. “No one wanted divisive issues [included] as NATO now has a very minimalist agenda,” said Alessandro Marrone, head of the defense, security and space program at the Rome-based Istituto Affari Internazionali think tank. That’s a bitter pill for the Italians. Rome has “now to face this reality,” Marrone added.

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SinoSage

Energy Finance and Institutional

Frameworks

To facilitate these complex infrastructure and energy investments, eastern Libya has approved the establishment of the Libyan Bank for Energy and Mining. Its director, Juma Jaballah, has disclosed plans to bring in substantial Chinese capital and is currently awaiting Central Bank of Libya approval for a SWIFT code to begin international transactions.

This development underscores China’s preference for building institutional foundations alongside infrastructure. The bank would serve as the financial conduit for refinery construction, port upgrades, and associated service contracts. It is expected to play a pivotal role in easing capital flows and ensuring compliance with international norms, even as Libya remains politically divided.

Kerui Petroleum, a major Chinese oil services firm, has already begun preliminary studies for the Tobruk refinery under contract from Benghazi’s Ministry of Investment. This underscores the operational readiness of Chinese firms to move forward with detailed planning, even as geopolitical approvals remain pending.

In support of this growing partnership, a high-level Libyan delegation—led by one of Field Marshal Haftar’s sons and representing the Fund for the Development and Reconstruction of Libya—recently traveled to China to advance multiple avenues of cooperation. The delegation held meetings with leading Chinese companies, including Huawei and the China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC), to discuss a wide array of projects spanning telecommunications, energy infrastructure, and logistics.

Notably, according to our sources inside Libya, Huawei is already leading the rollout of a dedicated telecom network in eastern Libya through a joint venture with local authorities, with the system currently in the testing stage. These developments highlight China’s deepening multi-sector engagement in Libya’s east.

Link to Africa: Roads to Chad and Sudan

China’s vision for Libya transcends national borders. With Africa’s population set to double by 2050, Beijing aims to deepen trade routes that bypass maritime chokepoints like the Suez Canal. Tobruk’s transformation includes plans to extend highway and logistics corridors southward into Chad and Sudan. These overland routes would allow Chinese-manufactured goods to reach African interior markets quickly and cost-effectively.

In return, China would gain access to African raw materials—oil, rare earth elements, and agricultural goods—transported north to Tobruk for processing and export. This multimodal corridor strategy mirrors similar Chinese projects in East Africa, such as the Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis Ababa corridor.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

China’s interest in North Africa is not new. Since the 1960s, Beijing has maintained a presence in Africa, supporting liberation movements and later pivoting to infrastructure and trade. Libya, once marginalized due to internal conflict, is now reemerging as a candidate for strategic partnership. China’s non-interference policy and track record of dealing with non-Western regimes appeal to Haftar’s administration, which remains internationally unrecognized.

Importantly, the eastern region of Libya—historically known as Cyrenaica—played a pivotal role in the Allied campaign during World War II, serving as a key staging ground in the fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The region’s legacy as a frontline in the defense of liberal democracy underscores the strategic importance of its alignment today. In the context of growing Chinese and Russian activity, many Western analysts argue that restoring Libyan unity under a government aligned with Western institutions is not only a matter of regional stability but a vital component of broader transatlantic security.

Meanwhile, Libya’s fractured governance deters Western investment and engagement. The United States has prioritized counterterrorism and migration control over state-building in Libya, while the EU remains divided over the best approach. The absence of cohesive Western policy has opened the door to alternative actors—including Russia, Turkey, and increasingly, China.

Implications for European Energy Security

The implications of this Chinese pivot toward Libya for European energy security are profound. Europe’s ongoing energy diversification efforts, especially since the Russia-Ukraine war, have made the continent more reliant on alternative sources from the Middle East and North Africa. If Beijing gains control over a large-scale refinery in Tobruk and the associated port infrastructure, it will possess significant influence over supply chains feeding Europe.

This is not just about access to oil. With the ability to refine, store, and transport energy products directly from North Africa to Europe, China could dictate pricing, volume, and prioritization in times of crisis. Such leverage would challenge Europe’s energy autonomy and increase its dependency on Beijing at a time when the transatlantic alliance is already under strain.

Additionally, China’s control over container logistics through Tobruk would provide Beijing with leverage over not just energy, but manufactured goods and critical technologies. The dual-use airport, coupled with surveillance and digital infrastructure, could also serve intelligence and military interests.

Strategic Consequences and Outlook

Should Haftar approve the Chinese proposals, Libya would become the western anchor of a vast, China-led logistical and energy network spanning the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. The Tobruk refinery and associated infrastructure would give Beijing new leverage over European energy markets, especially as the EU seeks to diversify away from Russian gas.

Moreover, the dual-use nature of Tobruk’s upgraded airport and port could extend Chinese naval or intelligence capabilities into the Mediterranean. This possibility has already raised concerns in some NATO circles, although no formal opposition has been articulated.

If successful, China’s Libya strategy would reshape Eurasian supply chains and trade flows. It would also signal a shift in the balance of soft power and strategic influence in North Africa, with potentially profound implications for Europe’s energy security and geopolitical autonomy.

Libya may appear a fragile and fractured state, but to Chinese planners, it represents a gateway—one with the potential to tie Africa, Europe, and Asia together under a new global trade architecture led by Beijing.

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Al-Estiklal

Inside a Carefully Laid Political Trap

In an unprecedented diplomatic incident, a delegation that included the interior ministers of Italy, Greece, and Malta—along with the EU Commissioner for Migration—was formally expelled from Benghazi Airport in eastern Libya.

What was initially planned as a visit focused on security talks around irregular migration quickly turned into a political ambush orchestrated by coup leader general Khalifa Haftar, aimed at extracting implicit recognition for the eastern Libyan government.

The European officials, who had just met with the internationally recognized government in Tripoli led by Abdulhamid AlDabaiba, were caught off guard when local arrangements staged their arrival as an official reception by the unrecognized Benghazi-based authorities—complete with cameras and protocol.

Unwilling to play into a scene that could be spun internationally as a political breakthrough for Haftar, the delegation refused to proceed. They were subsequently declared “persona non grata” and ordered to leave.

What initially looked like a clumsy protocol mix-up soon revealed itself as part of a calculated strategy by eastern Libyan “authorities” to challenge the international consensus on who represents the Libyan state—at a time when Europe is increasingly relying on Libya as a frontline barrier against migration.

A Calculated Move

The high-level European delegation had traveled to Libya on an official mission to discuss border security and irregular migration.

According to European diplomatic sources cited by Reuters on July 8, 2025, the incident was far from a misunderstanding. Rather, it was part of a deliberate political maneuver by Haftar, the dominant figure in eastern Libya, to force the European Union into engaging—if only symbolically—with his unrecognized government.

The delegation, which included EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, interior ministers from Italy, Greece, and Malta, and the EU Ambassador to Libya Nicola Orlando, had begun their tour in Tripoli.

There, they met with the UN-recognized Government of National Unity headed by Abdulhamid AlDabaiba. The talks focused on joint border monitoring, migrant repatriation, and disrupting human trafficking networks. On the eve of their planned stop in Benghazi, Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi praised the agreements reached in Tripoli.

“Our shared goal is to stop migrant departures, dismantle smuggling networks, and develop European programs to combat cross-border organized crime,” Piantedosi said on X.

A Staged Welcome

At Benghazi Airport, Libyan authorities orchestrated what appeared to be a formal reception for the European delegation—complete with cameras, civilian ministers, and the head of the unrecognized eastern government, Osama Hamad.

Although prior agreements specified that the delegation would be received only by Haftar’s military or security officials, the Europeans were surprised to find political representatives from a government Brussels does not recognize.

As previously reported by Italian and international media, EU representative and head of delegation to Libya Orlando was instructed to disembark first and politely asked that no photos be taken, due to the potential diplomatic implications.

Any public footage of European ministers standing alongside Benghazi’s leadership could be spun as a tacit endorsement of Haftar’s political authority.

After behind-the-scenes negotiations, the European delegation refused to go along with the staged optics. In response, Libyan authorities declared the group “persona non grata” and issued a public statement accusing them of violating national sovereignty and carrying out an unauthorized mission.

Multiple European sources confirmed to Reuters that this was no protocol mishap—it was a deliberate trap designed to draw the EU into engaging with eastern Libya on new terms.

Haftar’s goal wasn’t just to embarrass the Europeans but to create a new political reality that forces Brussels to treat his administration as a legitimate counterpart to Tripoli’s internationally recognized government.

According to a Brussels source familiar with the incident, the Libyan side made clear that “in the meeting with Haftar, the government and the prime minister will also be present.”

Despite repeated efforts by the European side, the Libyans refused, insisting: “We are the government.” The source told Euronews. “It was obviously a trap.”

Despite Europe’s attempts to save face by pushing for a military-only meeting or including Tripoli reps for balance, Libya’s eastern authorities stood firm on a political show—ultimately forcing the delegation’s expulsion.

This escalation didn’t come out of nowhere. Benghazi’s government is gaining confidence, boosted by expanding military strength and financial resources—backed in part by a steady flow of Russian arms and logistical support from Cairo and Abu Dhabi.

“In recent weeks, there have been significant developments, and the eastern government has become emboldened. Now they have Russian weapons, so they are very powerful — and have a lot of money,” another source familiar with the issue told Euronews.

“This government is trying to assert itself and is using all forms of pressure,” the source added, citing migrant departures to Europe as an example. Their aim is to “to push Tripoli aside and be the only government.”

Despite rising tensions, some European capitals attempted to downplay the incident, calling it a “protocol misunderstanding.” Italy’s interior minister described the incident as a “sudden cancellation of a meeting,” not a political snub—though he also admitted it was a “serious incident.”

The shock within EU institutions was clear. In response, Greece took a precautionary step and temporarily suspended asylum requests from North African arrivals.

Sharp Backlash

In Italy, the fallout was immediate. Opposition lawmakers criticized Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, highlighting the irony of Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi being expelled from Libya—despite his administration’s hardline stance on migration.

“Piantedosi was sent back from Libya for illegal entry. I was about to write a sarcastic comment, but facts have done the job perfectly,” Democratic Party MP Matteo Orfini posted on X.

The episode quickly became political ammunition in Italy, exposing contradictions in the right-wing government’s rhetoric on migration and its standing on the international stage.

“The European visit had originally been arranged solely to meet with retired general Khalifa Haftar and discuss irregular migration,” Libyan journalist Omar al-Hassi told 

“However, the surprise came when Haftar attempted to impose the presence of Osama Hamad, head of the parallel eastern government, in the meeting—an intentional move, to give political legitimacy to an administration that lacks international recognition.”

EU Commissioner Magnus Brunner firmly rejected the proposal, stressing that his mandate was limited to meeting Haftar alone.

When the European delegation refused to comply with the pressure, Haftar canceled the meeting—prompting the delegation to leave.

Al-Hassi noted that the narrative was flipped when Hamad’s government rushed to issue a statement claiming it had expelled the delegation in defense of Libyan sovereignty, calling it a clear attempt to manufacture a hollow media victory.

He described the entire episode as “a transparent diplomatic charade,” pointing out the contradiction in Haftar’s behavior: just 48 hours earlier, he had hosted the Greek foreign minister in Benghazi without raising any issues of sovereignty or protocol.

“How does meeting the Greek interior minister suddenly become a breach of sovereignty just two days after hosting the foreign minister from the same country?” al-Hassi said.

“Such inconsistencies reflect either a fundamental ignorance of basic diplomatic norms or a desperate attempt to force international recognition of the eastern government. When that failed, Haftar resorted to fabricating a crisis to cover the setback and spin it as a win.”

Al-Hassi said the EU’s stance was clear—and firm: it treated Haftar as a de facto actor on the ground but refused to extend any political legitimacy to Hamad’s government.

That position, he added, was evident in Commissioner Brunner’s post on X, which completely ignored Benghazi and made no mention of the expulsion—something al-Hassi described as “a silent diplomatic rebuttal.”

“Invoking sovereignty and dragging international delegations into meetings with unrecognized bodies only reveals the depth of Haftar’s political crisis and a glaring lack of diplomatic and strategic vision in his dealings with the international community,” the journalist said.

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Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

Militias shift roles as allies, enemies,

and mediators amid power struggles

The incidents of infighting between Tripoli’s main armed groups reveal a set of dynamic and situational alliances in which yesterday’s enemy may become tomorrow’s mediator — or ally.

In January 2023, for example, the SDF and the 111th Brigade clashed with medium and heavy weapons in the Airport Road area, after which the 444th Brigade deployed in an effort to defuse the situation. 

Just four months later, on 28 May, it was the SDF and the 444th Brigade that clashed, again using heavy weapons, in various areas of Tripoli. A few months on, in August — following another confrontation between the same two groups over Hamza’s arrest — the 444th Brigade commander was handed over to the SSA.

At the time, the SSA was still seen as a neutral actor. Less than two years later, it would be expelled from Tripoli.

These dynamics suggest a broadly transactional and tactical approach to alliances by the main armed groups in Tripoli, driven in part by a lack of institutional loyalty, temporary shared interests, prevailing power balances, and external pressures.

This logic often extends beyond the battlefield as well. In March 2025, a photo taken at a hospital in Rome where GNU Minister of State Adel Juma was being treated after surviving an assassination attempt in Tripoli, pictured, among others, Kikli and Ibrahim Dbeiba, Prime Minister Dbeiba’s nephew and a key power broker in Libya.

Just a few days later, Ibrahim Dbeiba hosted a Ramadan iftar banquet attended by several prominent militia leaders from Tripoli and nearby areas, including Kikli; Zubi; Trabelsi; the commander of Tajura’s Rahbat al-Dara Brigade, Bashir Khalaf Allah; and the leader of Zawiya’s First Support Force, Muhamad Bahrun.17 Many of them would clash in Tripoli just weeks later.

The swift intervention of leaders from Tripoli’s armed groups — including, at times, those directly involved in fighting — to mediate outbreaks of violence reflects well-established channels of communication and a shared interest in preserving a degree of stability.

By stepping in as mediators during moments of crisis, militia leaders can also accrue political capital by positioning themselves as stabilizing actors. In August 2024, amid heightened tensions following the dismissal of Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir, a broad meeting of armed group leaders from Tripoli and beyond played a key role in containing the situation in the capital.

The meeting included Trabelsi, Zubi, and Abdurrauf Kara from the SDF. In August 2023, at the height of the clashes between the SDF and the 444th Brigade, the decision to hand over Hamza to the SSA was reached in a meeting that brought together nearly all the major power brokers in Tripoli, including Prime Minister Dbeiba, Ibrahim Dbeiba, Trabelsi, Kara, Kikli, Zubi, Khalaf Allah, and Bahrun.

However, moving beyond these temporary and tactical understandings and resolving deeper-rooted tensions has proven far more difficult. In June 2024, 444th Brigade leader Hamza and the SDF commander Kara met in Tripoli’s Souq al-Juma district in an effort to reconcile.

That same month, additional reconciliation meetings paved the way for the TRB leader Ayub Abu Ras and Nawasi Brigade commander Mustafa Qaddour to return to Tripoli. Both left the capital in 2022 after their failed attempt to unseat Prime Minister Dbeiba and install his rival, Bashagha.

Even so, the intense clashes that have since erupted in the city, particularly between the 444th Brigade and the SDF, reveal the limited reach of these reconciliations within Tripoli’s fractured landscape.

Armed groups call in forces from

beyond Tripoli as clashes escalate

In the most serious incidents, particularly strategic offensives, armed clashes in Tripoli have mobilized allied forces from beyond the capital, with tensions also spilling over into nearby cities and feeding back into disputes in Tripoli itself.

This dynamic was most evident during the outbreak of violence in May 2025. In the days leading up to the clashes between the coalition of armed groups aligned with Prime Minister Dbeiba and the SSA, ACLED records significant movements of forces from outside Tripoli.

On the SSA side, this included the dispatch of forces from Zawiya, notably some 200 vehicles from Bahrun’s First Support Force. Reinforcements also arrived from Zintan, including around 40 vehicles carrying light and medium weapons, to bolster the ranks of Trabelsi’s Public Security Service. The Misrata Joint Force (MJF), allied with Dbeiba, sent troops into the capital as well, while forces from Tajura declared a state of general alert.

The movement of forces was even greater, and more decisive, in the subsequent clashes between the coalition of armed groups aligned with Dbeiba and the SDF. This time, the SDF managed to rally a broad coalition of militias from Zawiya, along with additional forces from Wershefana, home to a powerful armed group.

Their deployment in western Tripoli proved instrumental in opening a new front, especially against the Public Security Service, which was active in the area, thereby relieving pressure on the SDF, whose stronghold lies in the east of the city. The SDF’s ability to mobilize support from armed groups based outside Tripoli was a key factor that enabled it to mount far more sustained resistance than the SSA had. Meanwhile, the 444th Brigade was also backed by groups from outside Tripoli, like the Misrata Joint Force.

In the other major strategic offensive in Tripoli, during Bashagha’s 2022 attempt to enter the capital, unseat Dbeiba, and install his government, forces from outside the city also played a key role. Bashagha, a Misratan politician appointed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, had the backing of the eastern authorities.

During his failed push into Tripoli, he not only relied on local allies such as the Nawasi Brigade and the TRB but also forged support from key armed actors from outside the capital, including from Zintan, Zawiya, and Wershefana. Alongside groups like the SDF and the SSA, Dbeiba also counted on support from other forces from Zintan, Zawiya, and his native Misrata.

This pattern may even extend beyond western Libya, particularly if Haftar’s LNA, which controls the country’s east and much of the south, perceives vulnerabilities within the coalition of armed groups aligned with the GNU.

In May 2025, the mere prospect of LNA involvement was enough to shape dynamics in the capital. Amid rising tensions and armed clashes in Tripoli, the LNA declared a state of alert.

It deployed additional forces toward Sirte, located on the ceasefire line established in 2020 after the Second Libyan Civil War, and sent at least three mysterious military cargo flights to Sirte airport.

On the ground, its mobilization did not progress beyond these maneuvers, but its actions triggered alarm and were likely a key factor in deterring additional Misratan armed groups from deploying to Tripoli during the offensives against the SSA and the SDF amid concerns over a potential escalation on their eastern flank.

Stability on borrowed time

Since the establishment of the GNU in 2021, the trajectory of armed group dynamics in Tripoli points not to rupture, but to the emergence of a more concentrated yet fiercely contested armed order shaped by fluid alliances and intra-elite competition.

While the recent removal of the SSA and the offensive against the SDF may signal further consolidation, these shifts can also be viewed as recalibrations within a system in which short-lived but intense clashes, typically followed by rapid de-escalation, are a tactical means of renegotiating power and access. 

Open violence does not appear to serve the shared interests of Tripoli’s main armed groups. This is not due to strategic coordination, but rather a mutual recognition of vulnerabilities, the risks of ungovernability, and external pressures.

These dynamics reflect how political change in the capital is shaped less by formal agreements than by the alignments and rivalries of armed actors embedded within state structures. In this context, the GNU’s ability to project power depends less on institutional reform than on its capacity to navigate a fluid and transactional web of armed group alliances.

This system has been held together by transactional arrangements and financial co-optation by the GNU, instead of sustainable institutional reform. Armed groups have been effectively accommodated into Tripoli’s security order through government-linked funding and power-sharing, a strategy that has helped defuse major confrontations.

Yet these arrangements remain deeply flawed. A significant drop in oil revenues, particularly amid the GNU’s deepening fiscal crisis, could swiftly unravel them, weakening the government’s ability to manage rivalries. 

This risk is compounded by the latent threat that renewed infighting in Tripoli could invite interference by the LNA, whether directly or through allied groups in western Libya.

Turkey, which remains deeply embedded in Tripoli’s security architecture and has cultivated increasingly close ties with the Haftars, will also play a key role in shaping any future reconfiguration, whether through deterrence, mediation, or selective backing.

As Tripoli is once again attempting to recalibrate its security architecture following the SSA’s collapse and the confrontation with the SDF, the foundations of that order remain fragile and highly vulnerable to shocks. Its erosion, or collapse, would carry far-reaching implications for the national balance of power.

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Abdullah Alkabir

Greek authorities have considered Haftar’s expulsion of the official European delegation a “calculated move,” one prepared in advance to thwart European attempts to develop joint plans with Haftar’s authorities to curb migration flows through Libya to Europe’s southern shores. Haftar stipulated the participation of his government in the meeting, a request the European delegation rejected for well-known reasons.

The Europeans recognize the Tripoli government as the legal authority recognized by the United Nations, and meeting with any other government is not only a violation of UN resolutions and norms, but also a waste of valuable time with comical figures who play the role of props on the stage of a single actor.

The Greek government spokesperson commented that the delegation was subjected to “unprecedented treatment directed against the European Union,” referring to the expulsion as an incident that “reveals clear political intentions.”

The expulsion, therefore, was a message conveying a refusal to cooperate with Europe on the migration issue. Consequently, migration rates from the shores of eastern Libya will not decrease, and may even increase. Europe must bear sole responsibility for addressing this issue, as long as it seeks to protect its territory,  security, and its entire system. 

What would Haftar gain from the migration issue? And why does he risk not responding to the European Union on Europe’s most sensitive and dangerous issue?

Haftar doesn’t care about European recognition of his government. He doesn’t require their presence with the other officials he meets, they do not accompany him during his foreign visits, and he doesn’t treat them as a government partner in decision-making.

Rather, he uses them to carry out specific tasks that relieve him of certain legal and political responsibilities. Therefore, the positions or statements issued by this government are worthless, as they merely echo what Haftar and his family want, but which he doesn’t announce publicly.

The Europeans know that Haftar is the decision-maker in his areas of influence. They could have negotiated with him about the details of the meeting’s set-up without violating diplomatic norms, had there been a strong possibility of the meeting’s success and achieving their goal of a clear agreement that would serve the European Union in curbing migration flows from the east.

Therefore, they refused to pay the price in advance without guarantees of receiving the goods. The position expressed by the Greek government through its spokesperson, with clear political intentions prior to the aborted meeting, is that Haftar intends to accept the maritime agreement with Turkey. 

This raises an important question that Libya’s political elites must address: What will Turkey offer Haftar in exchange for Salah’s ratification of the agreement? After officially receiving his sons in Ankara, opening the Turkish consulate in Benghazi, and Turkish companies receiving contracts from his son, Belkacem, Haftar’s goal is certainly not to gain Turkish recognition of his authority. This is already being achieved through the development of his relations with Turkey, a natural extension of the development of relations between Egypt and Turkey. 

Therefore, Turkey may have a greater role in strengthening Haftar’s authority at the expense of its other allies.

On the one hand, European concerns about irregular migration, and fears that the issue will transform from its humanitarian, legal, and political aspects into a pressure tool wielded by opponents and enemies to influence European decisions regarding its position on the war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, and because Russia enjoys strong influence and significant impact on Haftar, it is not unlikely that the expulsion of the European delegation is merely a prelude to a further escalation in migration rates towards Europe via Libyan territory, serving Russia’s goals in its conflict with Western powers.

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Europe’s mission to tackle migration flows from North Africa became a fiasco in a row over a photo opportunity. When a delegation of top European ministers and officials landed in the summer heat of Libya to discuss migration with a Russia-backed warlord, they found they had flown into a political ambush. 

Waiting on the plane at Benghazi, EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner alongside senior ministers from Italy, Greece and Malta, discovered that the talks they had planned with Khalifa Haftar had been gatecrashed. Without the Europeans’ agreement, two senior ministers from Haftar’s administration in the east of the country had turned up to meet them too. 

The problem was that this eastern Libyan “government” is not regarded as legitimate by the U.N. — and meeting Haftar’s ministers would have been tantamount to giving them the EU’s seal of approval. That, many on the European side believe, was Haftar’s goal all along. 

What followed was a diplomatic fiasco for the ages. 

Apparently enraged by the Europeans’ attitude, the 81 year-old Haftar threw them all out of town without any talks on migration taking place. The EU’s attempt to address people-smuggling gangs operating across the Mediterranean was in disarray, as officials on all sides blamed each other for the mess. 

Based on interviews with multiple people familiar with Tuesday’s debacle, all of whom were granted anonymity in order to speak candidly, POLITICO can reveal the full story of the disagreement that derailed the EU’s mission to solve the crisis at its southern border. 

Behind it all lurks a deeper warning for Europe, with the suspicion that Vladimir Putin’s Russia is finding new ways to cause trouble in the region. 

Team Europe 

Undocumented migration is a critical challenge for the EU’s capacity to address voters’ concerns about border security, and tackling the route from North Africa to Greece and Italy has long been among the most difficult tests for Brussels. 

Brunner’s trip was meant to display what EU officials like to call “Team Europe” in action, tackling the migration crisis. Team Europe is Brussels-speak for a combined diplomatic show of force in which the EU’s most powerful institutions — such as the Commission and the European Investment Bank — work with member countries “so that our joint external action becomes more than the sum of its parts.”

Brunner boarded a plane with Greek Migration Minister Thanos Plevris, Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi and Byron Camilleri, the Maltese home affairs minister. Their first destination in Libya was Tripoli, home of the internationally recognized Government of National Unity. 

While no deal was struck on tackling migration, the conversation was cordial and the meeting progressed smoothly and according to plan. Then they landed at Benghazi’s Benina International Airport — and the trouble began. 

The envoy

EU ambassador Nicola Orlando cuts a dash on the diplomatic scene in Libya with his shaven head, square-rimmed spectacles and neat, navy blue suits. He has a long acquaintance with the country, having previously served as Italy’s deputy ambassador in Tripoli, and it had been his job to set up the meetings. 

Orlando and his companions knew the risks of dealing with Haftar: The warlord controls the Libyan National Army and has been de facto ruler of eastern Libya since 2017, running the region as a military dictatorship, with some support from Russia. The EU has never had an institutional relationship with his administration. 

When the Europeans’ plane taxied to its stand at Benghazi, to be unexpectedly welcomed by two of Haftar’s ministers, Orlando was in the firing line. 

The Italian, Greek and Maltese ministers told him to get off the plane on his own, and go and talk to Haftar’s side. On no account must the European delegation of ministers and officials be photographed with Haftar’s representatives, they all agreed. That would send an international signal that the EU was recognizing an administration most of the world does not regard as legitimate. 

Orlando trudged off on his own to speak to the two eastern Libyan ministers in person and Haftar’s office by phone. Eventually, they assured him that the Europeans, who had remained stuck on board their plane, could disembark and wait, out of the sun, in the airport’s more comfortable VIP lounge, promising that nobody would be photographed in the process. 

Breaking promises

The Libyans immediately broke that assurance, too, and began taking pictures of the Europeans and the Libyan ministers as they waited to discover if the talks could begin. As Orlando continued trying to rescue the situation, it became clear that Haftar was not happy. He wanted that photo of his ministers meeting some of the most senior politicians from the EU, including Brunner, the commissioner. 

In the end, the EU side proposed a compromise. Despite their reservations about the eastern Libyan regime, they would go ahead and hold a meeting with Haftar’s ministers present — but only on the condition that no photograph would be released showing it had taken place. 

Haftar apparently then became angry, declared Brunner “persona non grata” and ordered all the Europeans to get back on their plane and leave. The debacle triggered immediate recriminations. How could the EU side put themselves in a position where Haftar could ambush them with a camera lens in pursuit of international recognition? If they knew there were risks, why didn’t they prepare better? 

Blame game

Brussels got the blame, with officials from Rome and Athens privately suggesting the EU team had let the rest of them down. Within the EU’s own institutions, some Commission insiders were also quietly critical of how it had been handled, with the finger of suspicion pointing at the bloc’s diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service. 

According to some involved, the risks of Haftar setting a trap were known but they decided to try their luck and hope to be able to work it out in person on the ground if anything went wrong. 

“Brussels and the rest of the Europeans are fully aware that the commissioner and ministers walked into a trap in a desperate attempt to appease Haftar over his migration blackmail,” said one person familiar with the discussion in Brussels. “Now the Commission and Italy, which came up with the mission at the worst possible time, are under attack, with others opposed to further concessions and capitulations to Haftar, a staunch ally of Russia.”

On Friday, the Commission confirmed that Team Europe would try again. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed with the leaders of Italy, Greece and Malta to keep pressing when they met on the sidelines of a Ukraine support summit in Rome on Thursday. 

A Commission spokesperson said von der Leyen and the other leaders agreed “to continue to engage with Libya and to pursue the Team Europe approach including by resending the Team Europe delegation to Libya to continue the visit.” The idea, the spokesperson suggested, would be to engage with “both sides” in Libya, the implication being that this would include the Haftar-ruled east. It’s not clear exactly when the new mission to Libya will take place or who will be on board the plane next time.

One major risk is that Putin’s Russia now sees eastern Libya and its migration routes across the Mediterranean as an irresistible opportunity to destabilize the EU. Haftar has held multiple meetings with Russian ministers and his army has received support from the Russian military.

“No one really knows what to do,” said the same person familiar with the discussions quoted above. “But it’s clear that appeasement isn’t working and that Haftar will keep asking for more, thus advancing Russian interests in Libya in exchange for a handful fewer migrants landing in Crete.” 

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Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

On 12 May, the security architecture of Libya’s capital, Tripoli, underwent an upheaval of seismic proportions. That evening, a meeting between the leaders of Tripoli’s main armed groups — purportedly convened to reduce tensions in the city — turned into a deadly shootout for reasons that have not been fully clarified.

Among those killed was Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, known as “Gheniwa,” the commander of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). Until this happened, the SSA was regarded by many as the capital’s most powerful armed group. But, in the months leading up to his killing, tensions between Kikli and Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeiba’s camp escalated amid growing competition for control over state institutions and state-owned enterprises. 

Following Kikli’s death, a coalition of rival armed groups led by the 444th Brigade launched a well-coordinated lightning offensive to seize SSA headquarters across Tripoli, including in its heavily populated stronghold in the Abu Salim district. By dawn, the Ministry of Defense of the GNU — to which the 444th Brigade is nominally affiliated — announced the conclusion of the offensive: The SSA had been wiped off Tripoli’s map.

Building on its successful push against the SSA, on 13 May, Dbeiba’s camp moved against its other main rival in Tripoli, the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF), also known as Rada. At sunset, the 444th Brigade began to engage in armed clashes with the SDF and the SDF-aligned Judicial Police at strategic positions in the city.

By dawn, two of the capital’s other major armed groups — the 111th Brigade and the Public Security Service, led by Abdullah Trabelsi, brother of GNU Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi — rallied to the side of the 444th Brigade.

Their coordinated advance forced the SDF to withdraw from key positions in the city, entrench in its eastern strongholds, and rely on allied militias — mainly from Zawiya, west of the capital — to relieve pressure on its western flank. Almost as quickly as the fighting had begun, however, by noon on 14 May the sides had reached a new ceasefire.

Despite the magnitude of this latest round of clashes, the removal of the SSA from Tripoli and the attempt to follow suit with the SDF reflect dynamics that have long shaped political violence in the Libyan capital. Since the establishment of the GNU in March 2021 following a political process launched by the United Nations mission in Libya, Tripoli’s security architecture has undergone an uneven but steady consolidation around a handful of armed groups.

These groups have been locked in persistent intra-elite competition over authority and access to state institutions and rents.8 Within this fragile accommodation, episodes of infighting remain frequent and tend to follow familiar patterns, often playing out through fluid alliances that at times extend well beyond Tripoli’s boundaries.

Contested arrests, territorial incursions,

and power shifts trigger infighting

From March 2021 through June 2025, ACLED records 64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.

These stemmed from 28 distinct outbreaks of violence that collectively spanned 26 days. This infighting is often localized, short-lived, and easily de-escalated. It is also generally linked to attempts at signaling dominance within the blurred space between formal state authority and militia autonomy in which these groups operate and, on occasion, to attempts to renegotiate the existing political order in the context of growing intra-elite competition.

However, the main trigger for armed clashes in Tripoli is contested arrests and captures that escalated into fighting — a pattern ACLED records on nine occasions over the same time period. The most illustrative instance of this dynamic followed the SDF’s capture of the 444th Brigade commander, Mahmud Hamza, at Mitiga Airport in August 2023. This led to clashes between the two groups between 14 and 15 August.

The fighting subsided after a ceasefire was brokered between the sides, whereby Hamza was handed over to the SSA and later released. 

A revealing manifestation of this pattern involves the SSA and the Judicial Police. The two parties have clashed on three occasions, including with heavy weapons, following disputed arrests. The most recent of these occurred on 25 April 2025, when the Judicial Police and the SDF clashed with the SSA after attempting to arrest a person allegedly linked to the SSA, prompting its intervention.

Another major driver of armed clashes in Tripoli is territorial incursions into areas controlled by rival groups or considered neutral. These are often perceived as provocations, which suggests that disputes over perceived jurisdiction remain delicate. On 9 June, the SDF and the Public Security Service clashed in Tripoli after the latter set up a checkpoint in a contentious area of the capital falling within the deconfliction zone established by the May ceasefire agreement.

The SDF then responded by expanding its own positions, triggering brief clashes that lasted several hours. This type of retaliation underscores the fragile balance of deterrence that governs Tripoli’s armed ecosystem, where absorbing a blow without responding risks inviting further attacks.

Less frequent, but with far more profound repercussions, are the armed clashes sparked by strategic offensives tied to shifts in power, such as the Dbeiba camp’s successful offensive against the SSA in May and the failed push against the SDF. Prior to these, in August 2022, an attempt by former Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha, appointed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, to unseat Dbeiba in Tripoli also triggered clashes across several neighborhoods. 

Fighting broke out between the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) and Nawasi Brigade, which backed Bashagha, against the SSA and the SDF, which were both aligned with Dbeiba at the time. Bashagha’s failed bid to enter Tripoli ultimately led to the ouster of the TRB and Nawasi from the capital.

Despite the recurrence of clashes, ACLED data show that, except in strategic offensives, fighting in Tripoli tends to be localized in certain neighborhoods and short-lived. Over 80% of incidents last less than a day. This dynamic suggests a broad aversion among armed groups to prolonged and large-scale violence.

This is likely driven by strategic and reputational concerns tied to the fact that they are heavily armed, embedded in state structures, and have strong incentives to appear as guarantors of order rather than warlords.

An all-out conflict would also risk opening the door to outside actors, most notably the Libyan National Army (LNA), seeking to capitalize on the situation. What emerges is a pattern of calibrated violence, conflict containment, and a shared preference for de-escalation.

This is often achieved through back-channel communications and quasi-institutionalized conflict management mechanisms that enable swift compromises.

ACLED records fatalities in about one-third of all outbreaks of violence involving Tripoli’s main armed groups between March 2021 and June 2025. While details about casualties are often scarce, in 60% of the incidents in which fatalities were documented, the people killed were within the ranks of the armed groups involved.

The most violent clashes — typically those that escalate beyond their point of origin and involve operations in residential areas, the use of artillery, and indirect fire — tend to result in civilian injuries and deaths, as well as significant property damage.

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Amandine Hess

Officially, Brussels is cooperating with the government of national unity based in Tripoli. However, exchanges are also taking place with General Khalifa Haftar, who controls large swaths of Libya’s east. The last visit turned into a fiasco.

European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner and three ministers from EU countries were expelled from Libya on Tuesday due to a “protocol problem”, according to Brussels.

Sources told Euronews the issue arose after they wanted to meet General Khalifa Haftar, who controls large parts of eastern Libya.

Following a meeting with the Libyan government of national unity (GNU) in Tripoli, the European delegation was scheduled to meet with Haftar in Benghazi to discuss migration.

However, Haftar apparently tried to force the EU’s hand by imposing the presence of his ministers, which then led to the expulsion of European officials as “personae no gratae”.

“It was simply a ruse on Haftar’s part to try and legitimise his government and the civilian face of his military dictatorship”, says Tarek Megerisi, senior researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

“He declared European diplomats personae non gratae and essentially sent them back to Europe because he was unable to use them for this political charade he was trying to pull off,” he believes.

A divided country

After the civil war and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya eventually became divided into two. In the west of the country, the UN-recognised government of national unity is led by Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah.

The east is controlled by Haftar, head of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army. And Brussels formally recognises only the government in Tripoli.

“The European Union is working with the government of national unity, which emerged from the United Nations mediation process as an internationally recognised national executive. The UN is engaging with the authorities throughout the country in line with our One Libya policy”, said Anouar El Anouni, European Commission spokesman for foreign affairs.

However, faced with the absence of centralised governance, territorial division and the challenge of migration, the EU is also engaging with non-state actors.

“At a lower level, the EU is also interacting with militia leaders and groups running detention centres. At the level of member states and some EU representation, they engage with the Haftar family as the de facto rulers of eastern Libya, for what they claim is political realism,” says Tarek Megerisi.

The European Union is cooperating with Libya to combat illegal immigration and smuggling networks.

“The EU has been working, both the EU and the member states, particularly Italy, with the Libyan coastguard in the west to try and reduce migratory flows in one way or another,” James Moran, former EU ambassador to Libya and associate researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), told Euronews.

“The EU has also supported Libyan efforts to take back migrants once they are back on Libyan soil. This, of course, has been controversial because there have been a lot of questions about human rights, about the treatment they receive when they are in Libya,” he adds.

The NGO Amnesty International has accused Brussels of complicity in human rights violations against migrants in Libya.

A Russian proxy

In recent years, crossings to Europe from eastern Libya have been on the increase.

“Migration concerns are well known throughout Europe. And since (Haftar) controls such a large part of Libya’s coastline, I think it was logical to talk to him,” Moran said.

“What wouldn’t have made sense would have been to give him any kind of recognition, de facto or otherwise,” he explained.

However, questions remain about the EU’s need to meet Haftar, whose links to Moscow and President Vladimir Putin are well-established.

“We are in the process of strengthening a Russian proxy that is antagonistic to European interests. And so, once all the mess of the current crisis is sorted out, it’s pretty clear that what Europe really needs in Libya is a stable and sovereign government,” Megerisi told Euronews.

In fact, the Haftar family is exploiting migration to try to obtain concessions from the EU, according to Megerisi.

In recent days, the Greek islands have seen a large influx of migrants from Libya, prompting the EU member state to suspend asylum applications from the North African country.

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Ufuk Necat Taşçı

Türkiye advances diplomacy to stabilize Libya amid regional tensions and rival claims.

For an extended period, Libya’s circumstances have been perplexing. Libya has recently emerged as a source of both local and regional tension, despite being nearly overlooked in the midst of the region’s major crises, including the Gaza genocide, the Syrian mobilization, and the conflict between Iran and Israel.

While the issue of legitimate authority in the country exists, the clashes in Tripoli last May, the ongoing high tension in the capital, and the clashes between the military forces loyal to the Tripoli government and other groups garnered public attention for a period, Libya was not as prominently discussed as it had been in the past.

Greece shows discontent

Greece continues to express apprehension regarding the maritime jurisdiction area delimitation agreement between Türkiye and Libya in 2019. Athens’ anxiety is further exacerbated by a recent assertion. Greece was concerned about Türkiye’s return to a broader perspective policy in Libya, its adaptation of its policy to the field conditions in the face of rapidly changing dynamics, and the rumors that the eastern side of Libya will also ratify the agreement made in 2019 as a result.

Greece, which has maximalist claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, is quite apprehensive as a result of Türkiye’s expansion of its political perspective, particularly in the east of Libya, and its emergence as an effective actor not only in the west but also in the east of Libya.

Ultimately, earlier this month, the Greek Foreign Minister visited Libya and engaged in a meeting with Khalifa Haftar. On the other hand, there is speculation that Egypt is exerting pressure on Haftar’s faction in Libya via the United States to prevent the Türkiye-Libya agreement from being approved.

Türkiye’s strategic diplomacy

Türkiye is not trailing behind in the actors who will serve as diplomatic interlocutors for Haftar, despite the fact that it appears to have set aside its issues with him.

Despite the fact that they lack legitimacy, numerous actors, including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, have maintained dialogue with Haftar, in contrast to the legitimate government backed by the U.N., up until the present. In order to avoid risking its gains and to prevent the country from being dragged into greater chaos, Türkiye has taken these steps towards the eastern side of Libya, which is directly related to the Eastern Mediterranean issue, and in an environment where this status quo has been established by the main elements of the U.N. itself.

It is evident that the protagonists in the eastern region of Libya must collaborate with Türkiye in accordance with the conjunctural realities of the region as a result of this process. The approval of the maritime jurisdiction delimitation agreement between Türkiye and Libya by the parliament in eastern Libya will enable an equitable distribution of maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, as opposed to Greece’s unilateral maximalist assertions.

In 2019, it is crucial to emphasize that the U.N. endorsed the agreement between Türkiye and Libya in 2020. The rhetoric that Greece has developed in response to the 2020 agreement with Egypt, which followed the Türkiye-Libya Agreement, and the principle of equitable sharing in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, which it is attempting to disrupt with anti-Türkiye motivation, is in conflict with the interests of not only Türkiye and Libya but also Egypt and other countries in the region.

The media has reported that Greece, which is cognisant of this, will not only visit Haftar, with whom it has maintained a close relationship until today by adopting a copycat strategy and exploiting anti-Türkiye sentiment, but will also engage in discussions with the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli on July 15.

It is a significant actuality that Türkiye has intensified its cooperation with the U.S. in accordance with the U.S.’ wishes following the election of President Donald Trump for a second term in the U.S. The security concerns of European countries in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict have also made Türkiye a very important potential ally for them. In addition Türkiye’s proactive foreign policy, military, political, and sociological responses in the region, as well as the developments in Syria, are presently of greater significance to all regional and global actors than Greece’s maximalist assertions.

In this context, Türkiye’s capacity to stabilize Libya is significant in light of both historical and contemporary realities, as Russia, which has been one of the significant powers active in Libya until today, has lost power due to the Ukrainian front, and its regional policies have reached a deadlock with the overthrow of the Assad regime it supported in Syria.

What does Libya need?

Currently, Libya’s most significant issue is the lack of a legitimate political protagonist. Türkiye has a significant and historic role to play in the preparation of a civilian constitution and a fair and legitimate election process by serving as a mediator between the two parties.

In Libya, a government that is recognized by all and has no legitimacy issues can emerge if Türkiye complements the comprehensive relationship it has established with both the western and eastern sides of the country in the recent process with an inclusive constitution and if Ankara prevents third parties from sabotaging the process.

A process that will persuade all of the over 140 tribes, hundreds of armed groups, and groups with unique agendas can only be accomplished under the supervision of Türkiye. The unification of the armed forces will be the most critical and initial step in this direction. In a transition process of this nature, all parties are cognizant of the significant role that an actor such as Türkiye can play in establishing an egalitarian relationship with all parties in Libya, in contrast to crisis-opportunist countries like Greece.

It may be feasible for Türkiye to establish a process that is supported by the U.S. and the U.N., potentially in collaboration with Egypt and other countries in the region. Actors such as Greece, which prioritizes its own maximalist interests over Libya’s political stability and has the potential to escalate the already high tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, should be excluded from the Libyan process. In an environment where Israel’s genocidal policies are destabilizing the region on a daily basis, it will be crucial to ensure stability not only in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean but also in the region if the countries of the region take responsibility for the process in Libya in coordination with Türkiye.

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