Author - ab_mnbr

Mona ElShazly

D. Proposed Reform Plan

12. The intricate political landscape of Libya requires a cautious and strategic approach.

As discussed, the main issue is not merely the price of fuel and electricity, as this is only one step in a long process of reform. To be successful, the energy reform program will have to be well designed and implemented with political consensus. Given the current political division and conflicting regimes, an open dialogue and a long negotiation process entailing compromise between the various political groups in Libya will be necessary.

In our view, and in line with the IMF’s approach, the reform plan should be implemented in successive phases in the following order:

• Establishing real fuel demand
• Controlling the fuel supply chain
• Launching a public communication plan
• Introducing a well-structured mitigation plan
• Gradually raising prices
• Implementing an automatic pricing mechanism

13. Establishing actual fuel needs is the first prerequisite.

An independent committee representing different entities must be established to assess real fuel requirements, in line with international consumption norms, for both individuals and institutional consumers. Imports would then be limited to these established quantities, after taking into consideration the local refining capacity. Furthermore, the real cost of subsidy must be quantified and properly reflected in the fiscal accounts.

The fiscal budget allocated to fuel and electricity must be separated from oil exports and not netted out from revenues directly. The cost of the crude oil that is locally refined and natural gas and diesel used in electricity generation must be included in the annual budget under fuel and electricity subsidies, respectively, to properly reflect their true burden on the budget. Currently, only the direct subsidy provided to the electricity company is included in the government’s fiscal presentation, which significantly undervalues the actual cost of subsidy.

14. The distribution and collection systems should be restructured before any reform is undertaken.

Any price increases will not be effective if there is no control over the fuel supply chain. Securing the distribution network through a digitalized monitoring system that tracks fuel quantities through the production, storage, distribution stages to final selling points will help identify any leakages outside the official network. This also must include fuel sold to the electricity company and to local refineries. At the same time, an effective collection system must be put in place to ensure the pass-through of price increases to all consumers equally, including state enterprises. The government may then allocate a subsidy to the electricity company to compensate for any losses until electricity tariffs reflect real production costs.

Furthermore, residential and commercial electricity meters must be changed to prepaid systems and illegal connections must be terminated to ensure enforcement of the new tariffs. There is already a new system being implemented in the South of Libya, whereby each citizen gets a weekly gasoline quota (using a QR code) that cannot be exceeded. This system could be further developed and implemented all over the country to track quantities sold and revenues collected.

15. A comprehensive communication strategy with the public is essential.

Before any reform is introduced, a clear and transparent communication plan must be undertaken to educate the public on the welfare losses under the existing system and potential benefits from reform. The substantial budget allocated to energy subsidies should be disclosed, along with the drawbacks of the existing system and how the public will be compensated for the anticipated price increases.

The key message should focus on the fact that not only are the Libyans paying inflated parallel-market prices but are also bearing the cost of a subsidy that they are not actually receiving. This will help foster public support and acceptance for the reform, and it will prevent social unrest that could arise if the people feel estranged from the reform process.

16. The proposed increase in prices must be sufficient to eliminate smuggling.

Gradualism is usually the preferred method for any subsidy reform to allow for adjustment by households and firms. However, subsidy reform must be customized to each country’s economic and political conditions.

Given the substantial price disparity and the large-scale smuggling, a front-loaded increase may be essential in Libya’s case. In the table below, an illustrative scenario is presented that eliminates around half of the current subsidy on gasoline and diesel in the first year and then phases out the remaining subsidy over the subsequent two years, coupled with a gradual reform for electricity and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders over 5 years. In this scenario, the target price is based on the current import prices, after applying a 10 percent discount for the transportation costs of the locally refined portions of these products, except for electricity, which is based on current cost per kWh.

17. An automatic pricing mechanism should be introduced after total elimination of the subsidy to avoid any further build up in price gaps.

An automatic fuel pricing mechanism would pass through any change (increases and decreases) in international fuel prices to domestic fuel prices based on a pricing formula that takes onto account international prices, transportation costs and taxes (Coady et al., 2012). The formula is revised at regular intervals (monthly or quarterly) and may include a smoothing factor to avoid any sharp increase or decreases in prices. This ensures that prices continue to reflect actual costs and eliminates the need for fuel subsidies again in the future.

Establishing a credible and sustainable automatic pricing mechanism requires a number of institutional conditions to ensure transparency and effectiveness, including a clear legal and regulatory framework and appropriate infrastructure.

E. Mitigation Plan to Accompany Subsidy

Reform Plan

18. A well-structured mitigation plan for subsidy reform is vital to minimize potential negative impacts on the population and ensure a smooth transition. International experience suggests that countries that have adopted broad-based and relatively generous social protection programs covering a large segment of the population faced fewer implementation challenges and less pushback during the early stages of reform .

In the case of Libya, direct cash transfers may be the easiest to implement and the most accepted by the public. There are already several social programs in place that could be easily expanded to incorporate the subsidy reform transfers. A thorough design of the chosen compensation system will be essential.

The social protection plan needs to consider a few trade offs:

• Target groups: whether to target the lowest deciles of the population (lowest 40-50 percent) based on income or to extend the transfers to all citizens uniformly,

• Type of program: whether to expand existing programs or design new ones exclusively for subsidy reform,

• Size of budgetary savings: whether to redistribute all savings or re-invest them in other sectors,

• Timeline: whether the transfers will be permanent or temporary.

19. Libya has a unique chance to fully compensate the population for welfare losses and still achieve budgetary savings.

Whether the government decides to use general transfers or targeted support based on income brackets, it can compensate for the expected increase in energy prices and realize some budgetary savings at the same time. Based on the 2022 household spending survey, the average household spending on energy and transportation is LYD 78 per family with an average family size of 5.

The illustrative scenario below shows that transfers can cover the average welfare loss per family and still have sizable savings starting from the third year after smuggling is contained and the gasoline and diesel subsidies are fully phased out. These savings shall be reinvested in health, education, and public infrastructure-coordinated with the budget process according to a pre-determined and communicated plan with the public to ensure transparency.

F. Conclusion

20. Energy subsidy reform has become crucial for Libya.

Eliminating subsidies is always a challenging process. The cost to the budget is large, and Libyans are bearing the burden of a subsidy that they do not fully receive. Furthermore, energy subsidies lead to over consumption of energy, eventually leading to premature resource depletion.

Given the significant price disparities and considerable levels of smuggling, slow price gradual adjustments are unlikely to be effective in Libya. Libya has an opportunity to gradually phase out subsidies, compensate citizens for the anticipated welfare loss and realize budgetary savings.

A clear and effective communication with the public early on would facilitate adjustment and minimize potential public rejection.

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Africa Defense Forum

After the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Russia has scrambled to transfer military equipment to other areas, including eastern Libya. Experts question Russia’s long-term strategic goals and fear the expanded presence of mercenaries and military personnel could further destabilize Libya, Sudan and other nations in the region.

The Kremlin increasingly has used Al-Khadim air base, about 100 kilometers east of Benghazi, as a hub for conducting operations, supplying arms, and trafficking resources in and out of the restive Sahel region.

“One of former Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s greatest foreign policy failures was undoubtedly his 1980s attempt to use his Soviet-armed military to spread Libyan rule and influence in the African Sahel region,” researcher Andrew McGregor of the Jamestown Foundation think tank wrote in an April 17 analysis. “Now, Russia is focused on a similar effort in the Sahel, using the same remote airbase in south-eastern Libya that Qaddafi used to launch his offensive into neighboring Chad.” Using satellite imagery, flight logs and radar information, multiple news outlets have traced the movements of Russian military assets from Syria to Libya.

In May, an Antonov-124 cargo plane left a base in Syria and embarked on a nearly 10,000-kilometer journey to Sub-Saharan Africa. Its first stop was Al-Khadim. From there it traveled to Bamako, Mali’s capital, and Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, according to flight logs seen by Radio France International (RFI).

Although the type of equipment that was loaded and unloaded during this trip was unclear, the aircraft’s cargo bay is large enough to carry several aircraft or armored vehicles. Russian cargo planes have been known to deliver aircraft, helicopters, radars and surface-to-air systems to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, where Russian mercenaries continue to help military juntas maintain power.

Between December 2024 and January 2025, French newspaper Le Monde documented eight flights from Syria to Al-Khadim. RFI reviewed several Telegram messaging app channels linked to Russian paramilitary groups and found references to Russian weapons deliveries to Al-Khadim, including heavy weapons and armored vehicles — the same type used by Russia in Syria.

One video message read: “New organizations. New technology. Old places. Remember your roots!” Moscow’s on-again, off-again ties with Libya pre-date the Cold War. According to RFI, the footage was shot at Al-Khadim. Lou Osborn, of the All Eyes On Wagner investigative group, said Russia’s presence at Al-Khadim is the product of an effort to bolster ties with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) and has controlled eastern Libya since 2017.

“We saw a kind of logistical ballet of Russian planes towards Libya,” Osborn told RFI. “There is a fairly strong rapprochement, political and military, between Haftar’s Libya and the Kremlin.” Moscow also has tried to forge ties with the officially recognized government in Tripoli by opening embassies, and it has made overtures to do the same in Algeria and Tunisia. These countries are “very aware of what is happening in the region, with military attachés, particularly in Algeria, who travel back and forth to Libya,” Osborn said.

Russia’s presence in Libya is not limited to Al-Khadim. In December 2024, Russia moved troops from Syria to revive the Matan al-Sarra air base near the borders with Chad and Sudan, according to Italian news Agency Nova. The base had been abandoned since 2011. Anas El Gomati, director of Libyan think tank the Sadeq Institute, said that disengaging from Syria was just one factor in Russia’s use of the air base.

“Matan al-Sarra isn’t just another airbase renovation, it’s Russia repositioning its chess pieces in Africa,” he told The New Arab website. “The timing is telling: as they lose Syrian bases, they’re rapidly developing this strategic location near Chad’s and Sudan’s borders. But this isn’t about replacing Syria; it’s about creating something potentially more valuable: a new network of influence stretching from the Mediterranean deep into Africa.”

From Maaten al-Sarra, Russia can directly supply Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan. Russian technicians and troops have restored runways and warehouses at the base. Haftar’s LNA secured the area and protects routes that supply Sudan with weapons and fuel from the northeastern Libya port of Tobruk.

Some members of Libya’s divided government oppose Russia’s activities. Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, prime minister of the Tripoli government, said he rejected any attempt to turn Libya into a center for major-power conflicts and warned that the transfer of Russian weapons to Libya would complicate the country’s internal crisis. “No one with an ounce of patriotism wants a foreign power to impose its hegemony and authority on the country and the people,” Dabaiba told The Guardian. Jalel Harchaoui, associate fellow at the defense think tank RUSI, characterized Dabaiba’s remarks as a “watershed moment.”

“Just him saying those words is deeply problematic to Russia because part of the Russian doctrine in the Middle East is never to be perceived as being completely 100% on one side against the other,” Harchaoui told The Guardian. “So Russia was supposed to be this magical actor that was basically eliciting the active approval of both sides of the Libyan crisis. And all of that is gone.”

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The Africa Defense Forum (ADF) magazine is a security affairs journal that focuses on all issues affecting peace, stability, and good governance in Africa. ADF is published by the U.S. Africa Command.

Mona ElShazly

Abstract:

Energy subsidies have become a significant burden on government finances in Libya. The pervasive nature of subsidies has led to rampant corruption, smuggling, and a diversion of resources from essential public services. The paper identifies key barriers to reform, including opposition from vested interest groups and public apprehension regarding inflation and welfare loss.

To address these challenges, a strategic reform plan is proposed, emphasizing a phased approach, a comprehensive communication plan and social protection measures to mitigate the adverse effects of subsidy removal. By taking these steps, Libya can transition towards a more sustainable framework that supports macroeconomic stability.

A. Introduction

1. Energy subsidies in Libya are extremely generous and poorly targeted.

Given Libya’s substantial oil wealth, the government has historically provided fuel subsidies as a form of redistribution, effectively allowing citizens to benefit from the country’s rich natural resources. However, fuel prices have not changed since the 1970s, making the price of gasoline in Libya currently the lowest in the world.

Although designed to protect citizens, subsidies are typically regressive and primarily benefit the wealthier segments of the populations. Libya’s fuel subsidy has been costly and gave rise to corruption and wide-scale smuggling, effectively transferring the benefit of the subsidy to specific interest groups and adjacent countries.

2. This comes at the cost of availability and quality of public goods.

Subsidies drain government resources thereby diverting funds from infrastructure and public services, hindering economic development in the longer run. This is especially relevant in Libya, given that development spending on education and health together account for less than 1% of total spending, whereas subsidies alone take up more than one third of the total budget.

Furthermore, by lowering the cost of fossil fuel, subsidies make energy-intensive industries more attractive, discouraging diversification and potential non-oil private sector investment and suppressing long term sustainable growth.

B. Size and Burden of Energy Subsidies

3. Direct energy subsidies accounted for one third of revenues and 20 percent of GDP in 2024 (adjusted to include the crude oil swap).

Although Libya is an oil-rich country, it imports most of its fuel since the capacity of its domestic refineries is limited and cannot meet local demand. Fuel imports jumped from an average of US$3 billion in 2016-2019 to US$9 billion in 2024, according to the Libyan Audit Bureau. Power generation in Libya utilizes heavily subsidized natural gas, diesel and crude oil.

The government subsidizes the electricity sector in two ways; direct financial assistance to cover the sector’s losses (due to the high cost of electricity production relative to the electricity tariff) and subsidized fuel supplied for electricity generation. Adding the cost of crude oil refined locally and natural gas used for electricity generation, estimated at an additional US$3.9 billion and US$4 billion, respectively, the total energy subsidy bill reaches US$17 billion in 2024.

4. The jump in imports coincided with the adoption of the crude oil swap agreement.

Prior to 2021, the government allocated a budget for fuel imports, which was then distributed to the National Oil Corporation (NOC) through the CBL. In late 2021, NOC started to implement a crude oil swap that barters crude oil for the refined fuel to make up for the shortages in the budget allocations. Since then, imported quantities of fuel products have jumped 50 percent.

Gasoline and diesel represent the bulk of fuel consumption of which imports currently account for around 90 and 70 percent of total consumption, respectively. Under the swap, fuel imports are based upon the stated requirements of fuel distribution companies and state enterprises (electricity and cement companies), which are typically exaggerated, under the claim of increased demand from the electricity company and petrol stations.

5. Electricity subsidies have also grown substantially.

The electricity tariffs in Libya are one of the lowest in the world at US$0.008 per kWh, well below the cost of production and average international prices. In 2023, electricity generation utilized 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 5 million barrels of crude oil at a cost of US$4.4 billion.

According to the General Electricity Company, generation capacity has increased by around 40 percent between 2020 and 2024 which required more diesel and natural gas. Libya’s per capita electricity consumption is already one of the highest in the region and given that Libya is country with a modest population growth and limited industrial activity, it is not clear how consumption could be increasing at such pace.

6. The extremely low prices encourage cross border smuggling.

The sharp increase in “consumed” quantities of gasoline and diesel are most likely due to the rise in smuggling to neighboring countries, owing to the significant difference in prices. Authorities estimate that as much as 30 percent of the imported fuel is being smuggled. The distribution networks are the suspected source of this leakage.

The lack of strong control on the distribution system leads to the diversion of the allocated diesel and gasoline from the formal distribution network either to the black market inside Libya or across the border to the neighboring countries.

7. The collection system is fundamentally flawed.

Despite the extremely low prices of fuel and electricity in Libya, collection of revenues is extremely low. The annual fiscal statement and the Audit Bureau reports show significant gaps between the estimated revenues from local sales of fuel and electricity and the actual revenues transmitted to the government, suggesting that even these modest revenues are not being collected. Furthermore, the majority of citizens do not settle their electricity bills despite the very low tariffs, which confirms that the main issue is not the price, but rather the urgent need to put in place a strong collection system first.

C. Barriers to Implementation

8. Opposition from interest groups hinders any reform agenda.

The lack of security and the presence of competing militias have led to large-scale smuggling that benefits influential groups. Smuggling the subsidized fuel to the parallel market yields about US$0.7 per liter, generating an annual revenue of around US$3 billion to key beneficiaries. Any proposed reform will threaten this lucrative business and thus will be met with strong opposition from various stakeholders, that could potentially escalate into violent conflict as factions strive to protect their revenue streams.

9. The absence of a unified government complicates any reform.

The deep fragmentation in Libya, marked by the presence of multiple factions and a lack of a unified government, leads to conflicting interests and agendas and makes it difficult to achieve consensus on critical issues. Moreover, the absence of a cohesive policy framework complicates the development and execution of long-term strategies needed for stability and growth in the country. As a result, efforts to address economic challenges, improve security, and enhance public service delivery are hampered.

10. The lack of trust in the political system raises concerns that the government may not provide adequate compensation if and when these subsidies are eliminated.

Subsidies in Libya are regarded as an integral component of the social contract and are perceived as a fair method of redistributing the natural wealth of the country. There have been several attempts to reform energy subsidies over the years that were met with objections and eventually reversed due to political pressure and public discontent. However, Libya was able to phase out food subsidies in 2014 and can capitalize on that experience as well as the experience of other countries with fuel subsidy reform.

11. The inflationary impact from the proposed energy price adjustments may cause social discontent.

The direct effect of energy price shocks on inflation is limited by the share of energy spending in the consumer basket. Even though spending on energy currently constitutes a small portion of Libyan households’ monthly expenditure given the very low prices, as prices are adjusted the spending as a share of household expenditure would be expected to rise appreciably.

However, since most of the consumption basket of goods is composed of imported goods, the second-round effects of fuel price increases are likely to be felt through the cost of services and higher operating expenses in transport, electricity generation and wages. The social impact from this necessary adjustment in relative prices should be contained through sufficient social transfers as discussed in the mitigation section below.

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Rome and Athens have identified Turkish and Russian involvement in a growing security threat from North Africa. Don’t focus so much on Ukraine that you miss the severe threats to European security brewing in Libya. That’s the message Italy and Greece are trying to deliver to their EU and NATO allies, but without much success. Migrant flows from Libya are spiking again, at a time Rome is increasingly concerned about Russia’s growing influence in the unstable North African nation, wielded through arms supplies and a potential new naval base in the northeastern port of Tobruk.

Athens has also sent two warships to conduct patrols off Libya in response to the migration surge and its strategic concerns that its archrival, Turkey, is working with the Libyans to carve up the Mediterranean into maritime zones for energy exploration. The zones claim waters just south of the Greek island of Crete, while Athens deems them illegal under international maritime law. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has described Libya as “an emergency that Europe must address together,” but a European attempt to make some diplomatic headway last week degenerated into farce.

EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, accompanied by ministers from Italy, Greece and Malta, was declared “persona non grata” in Benghazi, the territory of the eastern Libyan strongman Khalifa Haftar. Accused of unspecified “violations,” the delegation was ordered to leave. “Russia’s role in Libya continues to expand, using it as the central node in its African strategy,” warned one EU diplomat who follows the dossier closely. The diplomat added that a politically connected smuggling network in Libya was supporting Russia’s strategic efforts, helping Moscow to circumvent sanctions and to weaponize migration.

Italy and Greece know, however, that tackling a problem as complex as Libya — a country more than three times the size of Spain — will require support from big allies such as the U.S. and France. So far, however, the response from those allies has been underwhelming.   

Migration again tops the agenda

The Greek government announced tough new migration rules on Wednesday as it struggles to cope with a surge in arrivals from Libya on Crete at the height of the tourist season. “An emergency situation requires emergency measures and therefore the Greek government has taken the decision to inform the European Commission that … it is proceeding to suspend the processing of asylum applications, initially for three months, for those arriving in Greece from North Africa by sea,” Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis told lawmakers.

Some 9,000 people have arrived in Crete from Libya since the start of the year, most of them in recent weeks, already almost double the number for the whole of 2024. In late June Greece deployed two warships in a bid to curb the recent surge of migrant arrivals. Senior government officials doubted their effectiveness, however, warning that naval patrols may encourage migrants to pitch themselves into the water to seek rescue. Sure enough, in the last week alone over 2,000 migrants came ashore in Crete.

The Greek government is also taking criticism from both the opposition and its own officials for having abandoned the Libya file in recent years. Overall there has been a 7 percent rise in irregular crossings in the central Mediterranean in the first part of the year, almost entirely from Libya, compared to an overall 20 percent drop on all the other main routes. The Greek crackdown has also triggered fears in Italy that more migrants will be pushed into Italian waters. “We are concerned about the situation in Libya and the recent increase in irregular departures,” a European Commission spokesperson said before last week’s EU visit to the country. Being concerned is one thing, finding a solution quite another.

Diplomats described last week’s diplomatic mission as an attempt to determine what solutions could be feasible. EU cash, after all, would likely play some role. The EU struck a highly controversial deal with Tunisia in 2023 in which it paid the authorities to stem migrations, but diplomats doubt such a model could be replicated in a country as destabilized by rival militias as Libya.

Russians at the gate

A recent display of Russian weapons in Benghazi during a military parade showed the Kremlin’s growing proximity to Haftar. Russia wants a stronghold in the Mediterranean, especially after the new authorities in Syria terminated Moscow’s lease at the Port of Tartus after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. Italy’s Tajani issues regular warnings that Libya is the most likely destination for a replacement naval base. According to a report by the Agenzia Nova news agency, Moscow also wants to install missile systems at a military base in Sebha in southern Libya, which is controlled by Haftar, and to point the rockets at Europe. 

Many analysts and diplomats are skeptical that Moscow is already at the stage of pointing rockets at Europe from Libya. But even without the missiles, Russia can already use a handful of military bases in Libya for logistics, “which theoretically could hit Europe,” said Arturo Varvelli, a senior policy fellow for the European Council on Foreign Relations. So far, Russia has mainly used Libyan bases to run its operations in the rest of Africa, operating mainly through the Africa Corps, backed by Russia’s defense ministry.

There are also growing fears among southern European officials that Russia could soon be able to harness migration from Libya in a rerun of the hybrid war it launched on the EU’s eastern front, when it forced Middle Eastern refugees over the Belarusian border into Poland. Still, not everything is going Russia’s way. One of the diplomats said the costs of the war in Ukraine were depriving the Africa Corps of the funding it needed to pay Libyan militias, creating tensions with its proxies and Haftar.

“I don’t see the Russians taking over” the migrant smuggling business, said Karim Mezran, a resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, but “I see the Russians telling the people: Now I’m the new ruler and you just follow my orders.” 

A quest for allies

Despite the gravity of these threats from Libya, Italy and Greece are struggling to convince their allies to step up. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni discussed Libya with French President Emmanuel Macron at a three-hour meeting in Rome on June 4. Libya “is of course a topic of key relevance for both Italy and France,” said an Italian official with direct knowledge of the talks between Paris and Rome, stressing “common concerns, especially on security — as regards also Russia’s increasing presence there — and migration.”

The Italian official, however, acknowledged that there are “nuances” between the two countries’ positions “on the possible political solutions.” Libya is increasingly being added to the agenda of more diplomatic talking shops, but in practical terms little is happening. While Italy desperately wants buy-in from military heavyweight France, the subject simply isn’t as vital to Paris as it is to Rome, and even exposes France’s recent failures in Mali and Niger.

“For Italy, the question of Libya is more central in the short term than for France,” said Virginie Collombier, a professor at Luiss University in Rome and an expert on Libya. “Politically, the French government has little interest in crying wolf on Russia because it highlights the failures of the French government,” she said, noting that France has gradually withdrawn from African countries in the Sahel region while Russia has upped its presence.

And with the U.S. increasingly looking to the Pacific, there is scant hope that Washington will invest much political capital in stabilizing the country. Most tellingly, the most recent NATO declaration, signed June 25 in The Hague, doesn’t even mention Africa. “No one wanted divisive issues [included] as NATO now has a very minimalist agenda,” said Alessandro Marrone, head of the defense, security and space program at the Rome-based Istituto Affari Internazionali think tank. That’s a bitter pill for the Italians. Rome has “now to face this reality,” Marrone added.

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SinoSage

Energy Finance and Institutional

Frameworks

To facilitate these complex infrastructure and energy investments, eastern Libya has approved the establishment of the Libyan Bank for Energy and Mining. Its director, Juma Jaballah, has disclosed plans to bring in substantial Chinese capital and is currently awaiting Central Bank of Libya approval for a SWIFT code to begin international transactions.

This development underscores China’s preference for building institutional foundations alongside infrastructure. The bank would serve as the financial conduit for refinery construction, port upgrades, and associated service contracts. It is expected to play a pivotal role in easing capital flows and ensuring compliance with international norms, even as Libya remains politically divided.

Kerui Petroleum, a major Chinese oil services firm, has already begun preliminary studies for the Tobruk refinery under contract from Benghazi’s Ministry of Investment. This underscores the operational readiness of Chinese firms to move forward with detailed planning, even as geopolitical approvals remain pending.

In support of this growing partnership, a high-level Libyan delegation—led by one of Field Marshal Haftar’s sons and representing the Fund for the Development and Reconstruction of Libya—recently traveled to China to advance multiple avenues of cooperation. The delegation held meetings with leading Chinese companies, including Huawei and the China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC), to discuss a wide array of projects spanning telecommunications, energy infrastructure, and logistics.

Notably, according to our sources inside Libya, Huawei is already leading the rollout of a dedicated telecom network in eastern Libya through a joint venture with local authorities, with the system currently in the testing stage. These developments highlight China’s deepening multi-sector engagement in Libya’s east.

Link to Africa: Roads to Chad and Sudan

China’s vision for Libya transcends national borders. With Africa’s population set to double by 2050, Beijing aims to deepen trade routes that bypass maritime chokepoints like the Suez Canal. Tobruk’s transformation includes plans to extend highway and logistics corridors southward into Chad and Sudan. These overland routes would allow Chinese-manufactured goods to reach African interior markets quickly and cost-effectively.

In return, China would gain access to African raw materials—oil, rare earth elements, and agricultural goods—transported north to Tobruk for processing and export. This multimodal corridor strategy mirrors similar Chinese projects in East Africa, such as the Mombasa-Nairobi-Addis Ababa corridor.

Historical and Geopolitical Context

China’s interest in North Africa is not new. Since the 1960s, Beijing has maintained a presence in Africa, supporting liberation movements and later pivoting to infrastructure and trade. Libya, once marginalized due to internal conflict, is now reemerging as a candidate for strategic partnership. China’s non-interference policy and track record of dealing with non-Western regimes appeal to Haftar’s administration, which remains internationally unrecognized.

Importantly, the eastern region of Libya—historically known as Cyrenaica—played a pivotal role in the Allied campaign during World War II, serving as a key staging ground in the fight against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The region’s legacy as a frontline in the defense of liberal democracy underscores the strategic importance of its alignment today. In the context of growing Chinese and Russian activity, many Western analysts argue that restoring Libyan unity under a government aligned with Western institutions is not only a matter of regional stability but a vital component of broader transatlantic security.

Meanwhile, Libya’s fractured governance deters Western investment and engagement. The United States has prioritized counterterrorism and migration control over state-building in Libya, while the EU remains divided over the best approach. The absence of cohesive Western policy has opened the door to alternative actors—including Russia, Turkey, and increasingly, China.

Implications for European Energy Security

The implications of this Chinese pivot toward Libya for European energy security are profound. Europe’s ongoing energy diversification efforts, especially since the Russia-Ukraine war, have made the continent more reliant on alternative sources from the Middle East and North Africa. If Beijing gains control over a large-scale refinery in Tobruk and the associated port infrastructure, it will possess significant influence over supply chains feeding Europe.

This is not just about access to oil. With the ability to refine, store, and transport energy products directly from North Africa to Europe, China could dictate pricing, volume, and prioritization in times of crisis. Such leverage would challenge Europe’s energy autonomy and increase its dependency on Beijing at a time when the transatlantic alliance is already under strain.

Additionally, China’s control over container logistics through Tobruk would provide Beijing with leverage over not just energy, but manufactured goods and critical technologies. The dual-use airport, coupled with surveillance and digital infrastructure, could also serve intelligence and military interests.

Strategic Consequences and Outlook

Should Haftar approve the Chinese proposals, Libya would become the western anchor of a vast, China-led logistical and energy network spanning the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. The Tobruk refinery and associated infrastructure would give Beijing new leverage over European energy markets, especially as the EU seeks to diversify away from Russian gas.

Moreover, the dual-use nature of Tobruk’s upgraded airport and port could extend Chinese naval or intelligence capabilities into the Mediterranean. This possibility has already raised concerns in some NATO circles, although no formal opposition has been articulated.

If successful, China’s Libya strategy would reshape Eurasian supply chains and trade flows. It would also signal a shift in the balance of soft power and strategic influence in North Africa, with potentially profound implications for Europe’s energy security and geopolitical autonomy.

Libya may appear a fragile and fractured state, but to Chinese planners, it represents a gateway—one with the potential to tie Africa, Europe, and Asia together under a new global trade architecture led by Beijing.

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Al-Estiklal

Inside a Carefully Laid Political Trap

In an unprecedented diplomatic incident, a delegation that included the interior ministers of Italy, Greece, and Malta—along with the EU Commissioner for Migration—was formally expelled from Benghazi Airport in eastern Libya.

What was initially planned as a visit focused on security talks around irregular migration quickly turned into a political ambush orchestrated by coup leader general Khalifa Haftar, aimed at extracting implicit recognition for the eastern Libyan government.

The European officials, who had just met with the internationally recognized government in Tripoli led by Abdulhamid AlDabaiba, were caught off guard when local arrangements staged their arrival as an official reception by the unrecognized Benghazi-based authorities—complete with cameras and protocol.

Unwilling to play into a scene that could be spun internationally as a political breakthrough for Haftar, the delegation refused to proceed. They were subsequently declared “persona non grata” and ordered to leave.

What initially looked like a clumsy protocol mix-up soon revealed itself as part of a calculated strategy by eastern Libyan “authorities” to challenge the international consensus on who represents the Libyan state—at a time when Europe is increasingly relying on Libya as a frontline barrier against migration.

A Calculated Move

The high-level European delegation had traveled to Libya on an official mission to discuss border security and irregular migration.

According to European diplomatic sources cited by Reuters on July 8, 2025, the incident was far from a misunderstanding. Rather, it was part of a deliberate political maneuver by Haftar, the dominant figure in eastern Libya, to force the European Union into engaging—if only symbolically—with his unrecognized government.

The delegation, which included EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner, interior ministers from Italy, Greece, and Malta, and the EU Ambassador to Libya Nicola Orlando, had begun their tour in Tripoli.

There, they met with the UN-recognized Government of National Unity headed by Abdulhamid AlDabaiba. The talks focused on joint border monitoring, migrant repatriation, and disrupting human trafficking networks. On the eve of their planned stop in Benghazi, Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi praised the agreements reached in Tripoli.

“Our shared goal is to stop migrant departures, dismantle smuggling networks, and develop European programs to combat cross-border organized crime,” Piantedosi said on X.

A Staged Welcome

At Benghazi Airport, Libyan authorities orchestrated what appeared to be a formal reception for the European delegation—complete with cameras, civilian ministers, and the head of the unrecognized eastern government, Osama Hamad.

Although prior agreements specified that the delegation would be received only by Haftar’s military or security officials, the Europeans were surprised to find political representatives from a government Brussels does not recognize.

As previously reported by Italian and international media, EU representative and head of delegation to Libya Orlando was instructed to disembark first and politely asked that no photos be taken, due to the potential diplomatic implications.

Any public footage of European ministers standing alongside Benghazi’s leadership could be spun as a tacit endorsement of Haftar’s political authority.

After behind-the-scenes negotiations, the European delegation refused to go along with the staged optics. In response, Libyan authorities declared the group “persona non grata” and issued a public statement accusing them of violating national sovereignty and carrying out an unauthorized mission.

Multiple European sources confirmed to Reuters that this was no protocol mishap—it was a deliberate trap designed to draw the EU into engaging with eastern Libya on new terms.

Haftar’s goal wasn’t just to embarrass the Europeans but to create a new political reality that forces Brussels to treat his administration as a legitimate counterpart to Tripoli’s internationally recognized government.

According to a Brussels source familiar with the incident, the Libyan side made clear that “in the meeting with Haftar, the government and the prime minister will also be present.”

Despite repeated efforts by the European side, the Libyans refused, insisting: “We are the government.” The source told Euronews. “It was obviously a trap.”

Despite Europe’s attempts to save face by pushing for a military-only meeting or including Tripoli reps for balance, Libya’s eastern authorities stood firm on a political show—ultimately forcing the delegation’s expulsion.

This escalation didn’t come out of nowhere. Benghazi’s government is gaining confidence, boosted by expanding military strength and financial resources—backed in part by a steady flow of Russian arms and logistical support from Cairo and Abu Dhabi.

“In recent weeks, there have been significant developments, and the eastern government has become emboldened. Now they have Russian weapons, so they are very powerful — and have a lot of money,” another source familiar with the issue told Euronews.

“This government is trying to assert itself and is using all forms of pressure,” the source added, citing migrant departures to Europe as an example. Their aim is to “to push Tripoli aside and be the only government.”

Despite rising tensions, some European capitals attempted to downplay the incident, calling it a “protocol misunderstanding.” Italy’s interior minister described the incident as a “sudden cancellation of a meeting,” not a political snub—though he also admitted it was a “serious incident.”

The shock within EU institutions was clear. In response, Greece took a precautionary step and temporarily suspended asylum requests from North African arrivals.

Sharp Backlash

In Italy, the fallout was immediate. Opposition lawmakers criticized Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, highlighting the irony of Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi being expelled from Libya—despite his administration’s hardline stance on migration.

“Piantedosi was sent back from Libya for illegal entry. I was about to write a sarcastic comment, but facts have done the job perfectly,” Democratic Party MP Matteo Orfini posted on X.

The episode quickly became political ammunition in Italy, exposing contradictions in the right-wing government’s rhetoric on migration and its standing on the international stage.

“The European visit had originally been arranged solely to meet with retired general Khalifa Haftar and discuss irregular migration,” Libyan journalist Omar al-Hassi told 

“However, the surprise came when Haftar attempted to impose the presence of Osama Hamad, head of the parallel eastern government, in the meeting—an intentional move, to give political legitimacy to an administration that lacks international recognition.”

EU Commissioner Magnus Brunner firmly rejected the proposal, stressing that his mandate was limited to meeting Haftar alone.

When the European delegation refused to comply with the pressure, Haftar canceled the meeting—prompting the delegation to leave.

Al-Hassi noted that the narrative was flipped when Hamad’s government rushed to issue a statement claiming it had expelled the delegation in defense of Libyan sovereignty, calling it a clear attempt to manufacture a hollow media victory.

He described the entire episode as “a transparent diplomatic charade,” pointing out the contradiction in Haftar’s behavior: just 48 hours earlier, he had hosted the Greek foreign minister in Benghazi without raising any issues of sovereignty or protocol.

“How does meeting the Greek interior minister suddenly become a breach of sovereignty just two days after hosting the foreign minister from the same country?” al-Hassi said.

“Such inconsistencies reflect either a fundamental ignorance of basic diplomatic norms or a desperate attempt to force international recognition of the eastern government. When that failed, Haftar resorted to fabricating a crisis to cover the setback and spin it as a win.”

Al-Hassi said the EU’s stance was clear—and firm: it treated Haftar as a de facto actor on the ground but refused to extend any political legitimacy to Hamad’s government.

That position, he added, was evident in Commissioner Brunner’s post on X, which completely ignored Benghazi and made no mention of the expulsion—something al-Hassi described as “a silent diplomatic rebuttal.”

“Invoking sovereignty and dragging international delegations into meetings with unrecognized bodies only reveals the depth of Haftar’s political crisis and a glaring lack of diplomatic and strategic vision in his dealings with the international community,” the journalist said.

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Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

Militias shift roles as allies, enemies,

and mediators amid power struggles

The incidents of infighting between Tripoli’s main armed groups reveal a set of dynamic and situational alliances in which yesterday’s enemy may become tomorrow’s mediator — or ally.

In January 2023, for example, the SDF and the 111th Brigade clashed with medium and heavy weapons in the Airport Road area, after which the 444th Brigade deployed in an effort to defuse the situation. 

Just four months later, on 28 May, it was the SDF and the 444th Brigade that clashed, again using heavy weapons, in various areas of Tripoli. A few months on, in August — following another confrontation between the same two groups over Hamza’s arrest — the 444th Brigade commander was handed over to the SSA.

At the time, the SSA was still seen as a neutral actor. Less than two years later, it would be expelled from Tripoli.

These dynamics suggest a broadly transactional and tactical approach to alliances by the main armed groups in Tripoli, driven in part by a lack of institutional loyalty, temporary shared interests, prevailing power balances, and external pressures.

This logic often extends beyond the battlefield as well. In March 2025, a photo taken at a hospital in Rome where GNU Minister of State Adel Juma was being treated after surviving an assassination attempt in Tripoli, pictured, among others, Kikli and Ibrahim Dbeiba, Prime Minister Dbeiba’s nephew and a key power broker in Libya.

Just a few days later, Ibrahim Dbeiba hosted a Ramadan iftar banquet attended by several prominent militia leaders from Tripoli and nearby areas, including Kikli; Zubi; Trabelsi; the commander of Tajura’s Rahbat al-Dara Brigade, Bashir Khalaf Allah; and the leader of Zawiya’s First Support Force, Muhamad Bahrun.17 Many of them would clash in Tripoli just weeks later.

The swift intervention of leaders from Tripoli’s armed groups — including, at times, those directly involved in fighting — to mediate outbreaks of violence reflects well-established channels of communication and a shared interest in preserving a degree of stability.

By stepping in as mediators during moments of crisis, militia leaders can also accrue political capital by positioning themselves as stabilizing actors. In August 2024, amid heightened tensions following the dismissal of Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir, a broad meeting of armed group leaders from Tripoli and beyond played a key role in containing the situation in the capital.

The meeting included Trabelsi, Zubi, and Abdurrauf Kara from the SDF. In August 2023, at the height of the clashes between the SDF and the 444th Brigade, the decision to hand over Hamza to the SSA was reached in a meeting that brought together nearly all the major power brokers in Tripoli, including Prime Minister Dbeiba, Ibrahim Dbeiba, Trabelsi, Kara, Kikli, Zubi, Khalaf Allah, and Bahrun.

However, moving beyond these temporary and tactical understandings and resolving deeper-rooted tensions has proven far more difficult. In June 2024, 444th Brigade leader Hamza and the SDF commander Kara met in Tripoli’s Souq al-Juma district in an effort to reconcile.

That same month, additional reconciliation meetings paved the way for the TRB leader Ayub Abu Ras and Nawasi Brigade commander Mustafa Qaddour to return to Tripoli. Both left the capital in 2022 after their failed attempt to unseat Prime Minister Dbeiba and install his rival, Bashagha.

Even so, the intense clashes that have since erupted in the city, particularly between the 444th Brigade and the SDF, reveal the limited reach of these reconciliations within Tripoli’s fractured landscape.

Armed groups call in forces from

beyond Tripoli as clashes escalate

In the most serious incidents, particularly strategic offensives, armed clashes in Tripoli have mobilized allied forces from beyond the capital, with tensions also spilling over into nearby cities and feeding back into disputes in Tripoli itself.

This dynamic was most evident during the outbreak of violence in May 2025. In the days leading up to the clashes between the coalition of armed groups aligned with Prime Minister Dbeiba and the SSA, ACLED records significant movements of forces from outside Tripoli.

On the SSA side, this included the dispatch of forces from Zawiya, notably some 200 vehicles from Bahrun’s First Support Force. Reinforcements also arrived from Zintan, including around 40 vehicles carrying light and medium weapons, to bolster the ranks of Trabelsi’s Public Security Service. The Misrata Joint Force (MJF), allied with Dbeiba, sent troops into the capital as well, while forces from Tajura declared a state of general alert.

The movement of forces was even greater, and more decisive, in the subsequent clashes between the coalition of armed groups aligned with Dbeiba and the SDF. This time, the SDF managed to rally a broad coalition of militias from Zawiya, along with additional forces from Wershefana, home to a powerful armed group.

Their deployment in western Tripoli proved instrumental in opening a new front, especially against the Public Security Service, which was active in the area, thereby relieving pressure on the SDF, whose stronghold lies in the east of the city. The SDF’s ability to mobilize support from armed groups based outside Tripoli was a key factor that enabled it to mount far more sustained resistance than the SSA had. Meanwhile, the 444th Brigade was also backed by groups from outside Tripoli, like the Misrata Joint Force.

In the other major strategic offensive in Tripoli, during Bashagha’s 2022 attempt to enter the capital, unseat Dbeiba, and install his government, forces from outside the city also played a key role. Bashagha, a Misratan politician appointed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, had the backing of the eastern authorities.

During his failed push into Tripoli, he not only relied on local allies such as the Nawasi Brigade and the TRB but also forged support from key armed actors from outside the capital, including from Zintan, Zawiya, and Wershefana. Alongside groups like the SDF and the SSA, Dbeiba also counted on support from other forces from Zintan, Zawiya, and his native Misrata.

This pattern may even extend beyond western Libya, particularly if Haftar’s LNA, which controls the country’s east and much of the south, perceives vulnerabilities within the coalition of armed groups aligned with the GNU.

In May 2025, the mere prospect of LNA involvement was enough to shape dynamics in the capital. Amid rising tensions and armed clashes in Tripoli, the LNA declared a state of alert.

It deployed additional forces toward Sirte, located on the ceasefire line established in 2020 after the Second Libyan Civil War, and sent at least three mysterious military cargo flights to Sirte airport.

On the ground, its mobilization did not progress beyond these maneuvers, but its actions triggered alarm and were likely a key factor in deterring additional Misratan armed groups from deploying to Tripoli during the offensives against the SSA and the SDF amid concerns over a potential escalation on their eastern flank.

Stability on borrowed time

Since the establishment of the GNU in 2021, the trajectory of armed group dynamics in Tripoli points not to rupture, but to the emergence of a more concentrated yet fiercely contested armed order shaped by fluid alliances and intra-elite competition.

While the recent removal of the SSA and the offensive against the SDF may signal further consolidation, these shifts can also be viewed as recalibrations within a system in which short-lived but intense clashes, typically followed by rapid de-escalation, are a tactical means of renegotiating power and access. 

Open violence does not appear to serve the shared interests of Tripoli’s main armed groups. This is not due to strategic coordination, but rather a mutual recognition of vulnerabilities, the risks of ungovernability, and external pressures.

These dynamics reflect how political change in the capital is shaped less by formal agreements than by the alignments and rivalries of armed actors embedded within state structures. In this context, the GNU’s ability to project power depends less on institutional reform than on its capacity to navigate a fluid and transactional web of armed group alliances.

This system has been held together by transactional arrangements and financial co-optation by the GNU, instead of sustainable institutional reform. Armed groups have been effectively accommodated into Tripoli’s security order through government-linked funding and power-sharing, a strategy that has helped defuse major confrontations.

Yet these arrangements remain deeply flawed. A significant drop in oil revenues, particularly amid the GNU’s deepening fiscal crisis, could swiftly unravel them, weakening the government’s ability to manage rivalries. 

This risk is compounded by the latent threat that renewed infighting in Tripoli could invite interference by the LNA, whether directly or through allied groups in western Libya.

Turkey, which remains deeply embedded in Tripoli’s security architecture and has cultivated increasingly close ties with the Haftars, will also play a key role in shaping any future reconfiguration, whether through deterrence, mediation, or selective backing.

As Tripoli is once again attempting to recalibrate its security architecture following the SSA’s collapse and the confrontation with the SDF, the foundations of that order remain fragile and highly vulnerable to shocks. Its erosion, or collapse, would carry far-reaching implications for the national balance of power.

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Abdullah Alkabir

Greek authorities have considered Haftar’s expulsion of the official European delegation a “calculated move,” one prepared in advance to thwart European attempts to develop joint plans with Haftar’s authorities to curb migration flows through Libya to Europe’s southern shores. Haftar stipulated the participation of his government in the meeting, a request the European delegation rejected for well-known reasons.

The Europeans recognize the Tripoli government as the legal authority recognized by the United Nations, and meeting with any other government is not only a violation of UN resolutions and norms, but also a waste of valuable time with comical figures who play the role of props on the stage of a single actor.

The Greek government spokesperson commented that the delegation was subjected to “unprecedented treatment directed against the European Union,” referring to the expulsion as an incident that “reveals clear political intentions.”

The expulsion, therefore, was a message conveying a refusal to cooperate with Europe on the migration issue. Consequently, migration rates from the shores of eastern Libya will not decrease, and may even increase. Europe must bear sole responsibility for addressing this issue, as long as it seeks to protect its territory,  security, and its entire system. 

What would Haftar gain from the migration issue? And why does he risk not responding to the European Union on Europe’s most sensitive and dangerous issue?

Haftar doesn’t care about European recognition of his government. He doesn’t require their presence with the other officials he meets, they do not accompany him during his foreign visits, and he doesn’t treat them as a government partner in decision-making.

Rather, he uses them to carry out specific tasks that relieve him of certain legal and political responsibilities. Therefore, the positions or statements issued by this government are worthless, as they merely echo what Haftar and his family want, but which he doesn’t announce publicly.

The Europeans know that Haftar is the decision-maker in his areas of influence. They could have negotiated with him about the details of the meeting’s set-up without violating diplomatic norms, had there been a strong possibility of the meeting’s success and achieving their goal of a clear agreement that would serve the European Union in curbing migration flows from the east.

Therefore, they refused to pay the price in advance without guarantees of receiving the goods. The position expressed by the Greek government through its spokesperson, with clear political intentions prior to the aborted meeting, is that Haftar intends to accept the maritime agreement with Turkey. 

This raises an important question that Libya’s political elites must address: What will Turkey offer Haftar in exchange for Salah’s ratification of the agreement? After officially receiving his sons in Ankara, opening the Turkish consulate in Benghazi, and Turkish companies receiving contracts from his son, Belkacem, Haftar’s goal is certainly not to gain Turkish recognition of his authority. This is already being achieved through the development of his relations with Turkey, a natural extension of the development of relations between Egypt and Turkey. 

Therefore, Turkey may have a greater role in strengthening Haftar’s authority at the expense of its other allies.

On the one hand, European concerns about irregular migration, and fears that the issue will transform from its humanitarian, legal, and political aspects into a pressure tool wielded by opponents and enemies to influence European decisions regarding its position on the war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, and because Russia enjoys strong influence and significant impact on Haftar, it is not unlikely that the expulsion of the European delegation is merely a prelude to a further escalation in migration rates towards Europe via Libyan territory, serving Russia’s goals in its conflict with Western powers.

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Europe’s mission to tackle migration flows from North Africa became a fiasco in a row over a photo opportunity. When a delegation of top European ministers and officials landed in the summer heat of Libya to discuss migration with a Russia-backed warlord, they found they had flown into a political ambush. 

Waiting on the plane at Benghazi, EU Migration Commissioner Magnus Brunner alongside senior ministers from Italy, Greece and Malta, discovered that the talks they had planned with Khalifa Haftar had been gatecrashed. Without the Europeans’ agreement, two senior ministers from Haftar’s administration in the east of the country had turned up to meet them too. 

The problem was that this eastern Libyan “government” is not regarded as legitimate by the U.N. — and meeting Haftar’s ministers would have been tantamount to giving them the EU’s seal of approval. That, many on the European side believe, was Haftar’s goal all along. 

What followed was a diplomatic fiasco for the ages. 

Apparently enraged by the Europeans’ attitude, the 81 year-old Haftar threw them all out of town without any talks on migration taking place. The EU’s attempt to address people-smuggling gangs operating across the Mediterranean was in disarray, as officials on all sides blamed each other for the mess. 

Based on interviews with multiple people familiar with Tuesday’s debacle, all of whom were granted anonymity in order to speak candidly, POLITICO can reveal the full story of the disagreement that derailed the EU’s mission to solve the crisis at its southern border. 

Behind it all lurks a deeper warning for Europe, with the suspicion that Vladimir Putin’s Russia is finding new ways to cause trouble in the region. 

Team Europe 

Undocumented migration is a critical challenge for the EU’s capacity to address voters’ concerns about border security, and tackling the route from North Africa to Greece and Italy has long been among the most difficult tests for Brussels. 

Brunner’s trip was meant to display what EU officials like to call “Team Europe” in action, tackling the migration crisis. Team Europe is Brussels-speak for a combined diplomatic show of force in which the EU’s most powerful institutions — such as the Commission and the European Investment Bank — work with member countries “so that our joint external action becomes more than the sum of its parts.”

Brunner boarded a plane with Greek Migration Minister Thanos Plevris, Italian Interior Minister Matteo Piantedosi and Byron Camilleri, the Maltese home affairs minister. Their first destination in Libya was Tripoli, home of the internationally recognized Government of National Unity. 

While no deal was struck on tackling migration, the conversation was cordial and the meeting progressed smoothly and according to plan. Then they landed at Benghazi’s Benina International Airport — and the trouble began. 

The envoy

EU ambassador Nicola Orlando cuts a dash on the diplomatic scene in Libya with his shaven head, square-rimmed spectacles and neat, navy blue suits. He has a long acquaintance with the country, having previously served as Italy’s deputy ambassador in Tripoli, and it had been his job to set up the meetings. 

Orlando and his companions knew the risks of dealing with Haftar: The warlord controls the Libyan National Army and has been de facto ruler of eastern Libya since 2017, running the region as a military dictatorship, with some support from Russia. The EU has never had an institutional relationship with his administration. 

When the Europeans’ plane taxied to its stand at Benghazi, to be unexpectedly welcomed by two of Haftar’s ministers, Orlando was in the firing line. 

The Italian, Greek and Maltese ministers told him to get off the plane on his own, and go and talk to Haftar’s side. On no account must the European delegation of ministers and officials be photographed with Haftar’s representatives, they all agreed. That would send an international signal that the EU was recognizing an administration most of the world does not regard as legitimate. 

Orlando trudged off on his own to speak to the two eastern Libyan ministers in person and Haftar’s office by phone. Eventually, they assured him that the Europeans, who had remained stuck on board their plane, could disembark and wait, out of the sun, in the airport’s more comfortable VIP lounge, promising that nobody would be photographed in the process. 

Breaking promises

The Libyans immediately broke that assurance, too, and began taking pictures of the Europeans and the Libyan ministers as they waited to discover if the talks could begin. As Orlando continued trying to rescue the situation, it became clear that Haftar was not happy. He wanted that photo of his ministers meeting some of the most senior politicians from the EU, including Brunner, the commissioner. 

In the end, the EU side proposed a compromise. Despite their reservations about the eastern Libyan regime, they would go ahead and hold a meeting with Haftar’s ministers present — but only on the condition that no photograph would be released showing it had taken place. 

Haftar apparently then became angry, declared Brunner “persona non grata” and ordered all the Europeans to get back on their plane and leave. The debacle triggered immediate recriminations. How could the EU side put themselves in a position where Haftar could ambush them with a camera lens in pursuit of international recognition? If they knew there were risks, why didn’t they prepare better? 

Blame game

Brussels got the blame, with officials from Rome and Athens privately suggesting the EU team had let the rest of them down. Within the EU’s own institutions, some Commission insiders were also quietly critical of how it had been handled, with the finger of suspicion pointing at the bloc’s diplomatic arm, the European External Action Service. 

According to some involved, the risks of Haftar setting a trap were known but they decided to try their luck and hope to be able to work it out in person on the ground if anything went wrong. 

“Brussels and the rest of the Europeans are fully aware that the commissioner and ministers walked into a trap in a desperate attempt to appease Haftar over his migration blackmail,” said one person familiar with the discussion in Brussels. “Now the Commission and Italy, which came up with the mission at the worst possible time, are under attack, with others opposed to further concessions and capitulations to Haftar, a staunch ally of Russia.”

On Friday, the Commission confirmed that Team Europe would try again. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen agreed with the leaders of Italy, Greece and Malta to keep pressing when they met on the sidelines of a Ukraine support summit in Rome on Thursday. 

A Commission spokesperson said von der Leyen and the other leaders agreed “to continue to engage with Libya and to pursue the Team Europe approach including by resending the Team Europe delegation to Libya to continue the visit.” The idea, the spokesperson suggested, would be to engage with “both sides” in Libya, the implication being that this would include the Haftar-ruled east. It’s not clear exactly when the new mission to Libya will take place or who will be on board the plane next time.

One major risk is that Putin’s Russia now sees eastern Libya and its migration routes across the Mediterranean as an irresistible opportunity to destabilize the EU. Haftar has held multiple meetings with Russian ministers and his army has received support from the Russian military.

“No one really knows what to do,” said the same person familiar with the discussions quoted above. “But it’s clear that appeasement isn’t working and that Haftar will keep asking for more, thus advancing Russian interests in Libya in exchange for a handful fewer migrants landing in Crete.” 

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Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

On 12 May, the security architecture of Libya’s capital, Tripoli, underwent an upheaval of seismic proportions. That evening, a meeting between the leaders of Tripoli’s main armed groups — purportedly convened to reduce tensions in the city — turned into a deadly shootout for reasons that have not been fully clarified.

Among those killed was Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, known as “Gheniwa,” the commander of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). Until this happened, the SSA was regarded by many as the capital’s most powerful armed group. But, in the months leading up to his killing, tensions between Kikli and Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeiba’s camp escalated amid growing competition for control over state institutions and state-owned enterprises. 

Following Kikli’s death, a coalition of rival armed groups led by the 444th Brigade launched a well-coordinated lightning offensive to seize SSA headquarters across Tripoli, including in its heavily populated stronghold in the Abu Salim district. By dawn, the Ministry of Defense of the GNU — to which the 444th Brigade is nominally affiliated — announced the conclusion of the offensive: The SSA had been wiped off Tripoli’s map.

Building on its successful push against the SSA, on 13 May, Dbeiba’s camp moved against its other main rival in Tripoli, the Special Deterrence Forces (SDF), also known as Rada. At sunset, the 444th Brigade began to engage in armed clashes with the SDF and the SDF-aligned Judicial Police at strategic positions in the city.

By dawn, two of the capital’s other major armed groups — the 111th Brigade and the Public Security Service, led by Abdullah Trabelsi, brother of GNU Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi — rallied to the side of the 444th Brigade.

Their coordinated advance forced the SDF to withdraw from key positions in the city, entrench in its eastern strongholds, and rely on allied militias — mainly from Zawiya, west of the capital — to relieve pressure on its western flank. Almost as quickly as the fighting had begun, however, by noon on 14 May the sides had reached a new ceasefire.

Despite the magnitude of this latest round of clashes, the removal of the SSA from Tripoli and the attempt to follow suit with the SDF reflect dynamics that have long shaped political violence in the Libyan capital. Since the establishment of the GNU in March 2021 following a political process launched by the United Nations mission in Libya, Tripoli’s security architecture has undergone an uneven but steady consolidation around a handful of armed groups.

These groups have been locked in persistent intra-elite competition over authority and access to state institutions and rents.8 Within this fragile accommodation, episodes of infighting remain frequent and tend to follow familiar patterns, often playing out through fluid alliances that at times extend well beyond Tripoli’s boundaries.

Contested arrests, territorial incursions,

and power shifts trigger infighting

From March 2021 through June 2025, ACLED records 64 instances of battles, mainly armed clashes, among Tripoli’s main armed groups.

These stemmed from 28 distinct outbreaks of violence that collectively spanned 26 days. This infighting is often localized, short-lived, and easily de-escalated. It is also generally linked to attempts at signaling dominance within the blurred space between formal state authority and militia autonomy in which these groups operate and, on occasion, to attempts to renegotiate the existing political order in the context of growing intra-elite competition.

However, the main trigger for armed clashes in Tripoli is contested arrests and captures that escalated into fighting — a pattern ACLED records on nine occasions over the same time period. The most illustrative instance of this dynamic followed the SDF’s capture of the 444th Brigade commander, Mahmud Hamza, at Mitiga Airport in August 2023. This led to clashes between the two groups between 14 and 15 August.

The fighting subsided after a ceasefire was brokered between the sides, whereby Hamza was handed over to the SSA and later released. 

A revealing manifestation of this pattern involves the SSA and the Judicial Police. The two parties have clashed on three occasions, including with heavy weapons, following disputed arrests. The most recent of these occurred on 25 April 2025, when the Judicial Police and the SDF clashed with the SSA after attempting to arrest a person allegedly linked to the SSA, prompting its intervention.

Another major driver of armed clashes in Tripoli is territorial incursions into areas controlled by rival groups or considered neutral. These are often perceived as provocations, which suggests that disputes over perceived jurisdiction remain delicate. On 9 June, the SDF and the Public Security Service clashed in Tripoli after the latter set up a checkpoint in a contentious area of the capital falling within the deconfliction zone established by the May ceasefire agreement.

The SDF then responded by expanding its own positions, triggering brief clashes that lasted several hours. This type of retaliation underscores the fragile balance of deterrence that governs Tripoli’s armed ecosystem, where absorbing a blow without responding risks inviting further attacks.

Less frequent, but with far more profound repercussions, are the armed clashes sparked by strategic offensives tied to shifts in power, such as the Dbeiba camp’s successful offensive against the SSA in May and the failed push against the SDF. Prior to these, in August 2022, an attempt by former Prime Minister Fathi Bashagha, appointed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, to unseat Dbeiba in Tripoli also triggered clashes across several neighborhoods. 

Fighting broke out between the Tripoli Revolutionaries Brigade (TRB) and Nawasi Brigade, which backed Bashagha, against the SSA and the SDF, which were both aligned with Dbeiba at the time. Bashagha’s failed bid to enter Tripoli ultimately led to the ouster of the TRB and Nawasi from the capital.

Despite the recurrence of clashes, ACLED data show that, except in strategic offensives, fighting in Tripoli tends to be localized in certain neighborhoods and short-lived. Over 80% of incidents last less than a day. This dynamic suggests a broad aversion among armed groups to prolonged and large-scale violence.

This is likely driven by strategic and reputational concerns tied to the fact that they are heavily armed, embedded in state structures, and have strong incentives to appear as guarantors of order rather than warlords.

An all-out conflict would also risk opening the door to outside actors, most notably the Libyan National Army (LNA), seeking to capitalize on the situation. What emerges is a pattern of calibrated violence, conflict containment, and a shared preference for de-escalation.

This is often achieved through back-channel communications and quasi-institutionalized conflict management mechanisms that enable swift compromises.

ACLED records fatalities in about one-third of all outbreaks of violence involving Tripoli’s main armed groups between March 2021 and June 2025. While details about casualties are often scarce, in 60% of the incidents in which fatalities were documented, the people killed were within the ranks of the armed groups involved.

The most violent clashes — typically those that escalate beyond their point of origin and involve operations in residential areas, the use of artillery, and indirect fire — tend to result in civilian injuries and deaths, as well as significant property damage.

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Amandine Hess

Officially, Brussels is cooperating with the government of national unity based in Tripoli. However, exchanges are also taking place with General Khalifa Haftar, who controls large swaths of Libya’s east. The last visit turned into a fiasco.

European Commissioner for Migration Magnus Brunner and three ministers from EU countries were expelled from Libya on Tuesday due to a “protocol problem”, according to Brussels.

Sources told Euronews the issue arose after they wanted to meet General Khalifa Haftar, who controls large parts of eastern Libya.

Following a meeting with the Libyan government of national unity (GNU) in Tripoli, the European delegation was scheduled to meet with Haftar in Benghazi to discuss migration.

However, Haftar apparently tried to force the EU’s hand by imposing the presence of his ministers, which then led to the expulsion of European officials as “personae no gratae”.

“It was simply a ruse on Haftar’s part to try and legitimise his government and the civilian face of his military dictatorship”, says Tarek Megerisi, senior researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

“He declared European diplomats personae non gratae and essentially sent them back to Europe because he was unable to use them for this political charade he was trying to pull off,” he believes.

A divided country

After the civil war and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya eventually became divided into two. In the west of the country, the UN-recognised government of national unity is led by Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah.

The east is controlled by Haftar, head of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army. And Brussels formally recognises only the government in Tripoli.

“The European Union is working with the government of national unity, which emerged from the United Nations mediation process as an internationally recognised national executive. The UN is engaging with the authorities throughout the country in line with our One Libya policy”, said Anouar El Anouni, European Commission spokesman for foreign affairs.

However, faced with the absence of centralised governance, territorial division and the challenge of migration, the EU is also engaging with non-state actors.

“At a lower level, the EU is also interacting with militia leaders and groups running detention centres. At the level of member states and some EU representation, they engage with the Haftar family as the de facto rulers of eastern Libya, for what they claim is political realism,” says Tarek Megerisi.

The European Union is cooperating with Libya to combat illegal immigration and smuggling networks.

“The EU has been working, both the EU and the member states, particularly Italy, with the Libyan coastguard in the west to try and reduce migratory flows in one way or another,” James Moran, former EU ambassador to Libya and associate researcher at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), told Euronews.

“The EU has also supported Libyan efforts to take back migrants once they are back on Libyan soil. This, of course, has been controversial because there have been a lot of questions about human rights, about the treatment they receive when they are in Libya,” he adds.

The NGO Amnesty International has accused Brussels of complicity in human rights violations against migrants in Libya.

A Russian proxy

In recent years, crossings to Europe from eastern Libya have been on the increase.

“Migration concerns are well known throughout Europe. And since (Haftar) controls such a large part of Libya’s coastline, I think it was logical to talk to him,” Moran said.

“What wouldn’t have made sense would have been to give him any kind of recognition, de facto or otherwise,” he explained.

However, questions remain about the EU’s need to meet Haftar, whose links to Moscow and President Vladimir Putin are well-established.

“We are in the process of strengthening a Russian proxy that is antagonistic to European interests. And so, once all the mess of the current crisis is sorted out, it’s pretty clear that what Europe really needs in Libya is a stable and sovereign government,” Megerisi told Euronews.

In fact, the Haftar family is exploiting migration to try to obtain concessions from the EU, according to Megerisi.

In recent days, the Greek islands have seen a large influx of migrants from Libya, prompting the EU member state to suspend asylum applications from the North African country.

________________________

Ufuk Necat Taşçı

Türkiye advances diplomacy to stabilize Libya amid regional tensions and rival claims.

For an extended period, Libya’s circumstances have been perplexing. Libya has recently emerged as a source of both local and regional tension, despite being nearly overlooked in the midst of the region’s major crises, including the Gaza genocide, the Syrian mobilization, and the conflict between Iran and Israel.

While the issue of legitimate authority in the country exists, the clashes in Tripoli last May, the ongoing high tension in the capital, and the clashes between the military forces loyal to the Tripoli government and other groups garnered public attention for a period, Libya was not as prominently discussed as it had been in the past.

Greece shows discontent

Greece continues to express apprehension regarding the maritime jurisdiction area delimitation agreement between Türkiye and Libya in 2019. Athens’ anxiety is further exacerbated by a recent assertion. Greece was concerned about Türkiye’s return to a broader perspective policy in Libya, its adaptation of its policy to the field conditions in the face of rapidly changing dynamics, and the rumors that the eastern side of Libya will also ratify the agreement made in 2019 as a result.

Greece, which has maximalist claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, is quite apprehensive as a result of Türkiye’s expansion of its political perspective, particularly in the east of Libya, and its emergence as an effective actor not only in the west but also in the east of Libya.

Ultimately, earlier this month, the Greek Foreign Minister visited Libya and engaged in a meeting with Khalifa Haftar. On the other hand, there is speculation that Egypt is exerting pressure on Haftar’s faction in Libya via the United States to prevent the Türkiye-Libya agreement from being approved.

Türkiye’s strategic diplomacy

Türkiye is not trailing behind in the actors who will serve as diplomatic interlocutors for Haftar, despite the fact that it appears to have set aside its issues with him.

Despite the fact that they lack legitimacy, numerous actors, including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, have maintained dialogue with Haftar, in contrast to the legitimate government backed by the U.N., up until the present. In order to avoid risking its gains and to prevent the country from being dragged into greater chaos, Türkiye has taken these steps towards the eastern side of Libya, which is directly related to the Eastern Mediterranean issue, and in an environment where this status quo has been established by the main elements of the U.N. itself.

It is evident that the protagonists in the eastern region of Libya must collaborate with Türkiye in accordance with the conjunctural realities of the region as a result of this process. The approval of the maritime jurisdiction delimitation agreement between Türkiye and Libya by the parliament in eastern Libya will enable an equitable distribution of maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, as opposed to Greece’s unilateral maximalist assertions.

In 2019, it is crucial to emphasize that the U.N. endorsed the agreement between Türkiye and Libya in 2020. The rhetoric that Greece has developed in response to the 2020 agreement with Egypt, which followed the Türkiye-Libya Agreement, and the principle of equitable sharing in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, which it is attempting to disrupt with anti-Türkiye motivation, is in conflict with the interests of not only Türkiye and Libya but also Egypt and other countries in the region.

The media has reported that Greece, which is cognisant of this, will not only visit Haftar, with whom it has maintained a close relationship until today by adopting a copycat strategy and exploiting anti-Türkiye sentiment, but will also engage in discussions with the U.N.-backed government in Tripoli on July 15.

It is a significant actuality that Türkiye has intensified its cooperation with the U.S. in accordance with the U.S.’ wishes following the election of President Donald Trump for a second term in the U.S. The security concerns of European countries in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict have also made Türkiye a very important potential ally for them. In addition Türkiye’s proactive foreign policy, military, political, and sociological responses in the region, as well as the developments in Syria, are presently of greater significance to all regional and global actors than Greece’s maximalist assertions.

In this context, Türkiye’s capacity to stabilize Libya is significant in light of both historical and contemporary realities, as Russia, which has been one of the significant powers active in Libya until today, has lost power due to the Ukrainian front, and its regional policies have reached a deadlock with the overthrow of the Assad regime it supported in Syria.

What does Libya need?

Currently, Libya’s most significant issue is the lack of a legitimate political protagonist. Türkiye has a significant and historic role to play in the preparation of a civilian constitution and a fair and legitimate election process by serving as a mediator between the two parties.

In Libya, a government that is recognized by all and has no legitimacy issues can emerge if Türkiye complements the comprehensive relationship it has established with both the western and eastern sides of the country in the recent process with an inclusive constitution and if Ankara prevents third parties from sabotaging the process.

A process that will persuade all of the over 140 tribes, hundreds of armed groups, and groups with unique agendas can only be accomplished under the supervision of Türkiye. The unification of the armed forces will be the most critical and initial step in this direction. In a transition process of this nature, all parties are cognizant of the significant role that an actor such as Türkiye can play in establishing an egalitarian relationship with all parties in Libya, in contrast to crisis-opportunist countries like Greece.

It may be feasible for Türkiye to establish a process that is supported by the U.S. and the U.N., potentially in collaboration with Egypt and other countries in the region. Actors such as Greece, which prioritizes its own maximalist interests over Libya’s political stability and has the potential to escalate the already high tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, should be excluded from the Libyan process. In an environment where Israel’s genocidal policies are destabilizing the region on a daily basis, it will be crucial to ensure stability not only in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean but also in the region if the countries of the region take responsibility for the process in Libya in coordination with Türkiye.

_________________________

Kaan Devecioglu

The cooperation agreement signed between the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), covering geological exploration in four marine fields, sits at the intersection of Libya’s post-war economic recovery and Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean and Africa energy vision. This agreement has multidimensional meanings such as energy security, geopolitical sphere of influence and economic integration, rather than a technical discovery process.

In the process of restructuring the energy resources of a country like Libya, which is in the process of political transition, foreign partnerships are critical both in terms of increasing production capacity and re-establishing international trust. Turkey’s involvement in this process should also be considered as a reflection of past military, diplomatic and economic cooperation in the energy sector.

Benefits of the Agreement for Libya

and Turkey

Libya’s declared daily production target of 2 million barrels by 2024 is not only a technical capacity increase target for this country’s energy sector, but also the economic basis of its national reconstruction vision. The daily production level, which is currently around 1.2 million barrels, is considerably lower than in the pre-war period. Closing this gap and reaching the targeted level is not only possible with the rehabilitation of existing sites.

The discovery of new reserves is directly related to geological studies to be carried out, especially in marine (offshore) areas. The hydrocarbon potential off the coast of Libya, which has not yet been fully utilized, stands out as a sustainability element in this country’s energy strategy. The agreement signed with TPAO is a technical partnership model that can meet this need.

From Turkey’s point of view, this agreement has its counterparts on different levels. First of all, in Turkey’s energy supply security strategy, providing resource diversity and reducing import dependency stand out as a main goal. In this context, TPAO’s natural gas discoveries in the Black Sea have been expanded with the outward opening process that started with exploration activities in Somalia.

The agreement signed with Libya is a step that complements this enlargement both geographically and geopolitically. Turkey’s goal of consolidating its position in the Eastern Mediterranean within the framework of the Maritime Jurisdiction Areas Agreement signed with Libya in 2019 has gained a more concrete ground with the energy activities carried out in the field. In this context, the seismic research and possible drilling activities to be carried out by TPAO in Libyan waters should be read as a move that provides not only economic but also strategic depth.

TPAO-NOC cooperation has a meaningful place not only in the context of bilateral relations but also within the framework of Turkey’s African energy vision. Increasing energy demand in Africa has led to a reshaping of global interest in the continent’s natural gas and oil resources. Technical cooperation that will strengthen Turkey’s position in this field, where actors such as China, France, the USA and Russia are in competition, make strategic contributions in terms of both energy security and foreign policy diversification.

Such an energy-based partnership with Libya reinforces the energy pillar of Turkey’s multifaceted engagement strategy in the region, while at the same time adding economic depth to the geopolitical equation in the Mediterranean.

The Strategic Importance of

the Agreement for Libya and Challenges

Offshore power generation is a more costly and technically complex process compared to onshore generation. Considering the long-standing internal conflicts and inadequacies in Libya, high-cost investments are required for the sustainable progress of activities in this field. It is estimated that each deep-sea drilling can be carried out at a cost of approximately 60 to 120 million dollars, and if production is started, the total investment cost, including platform installations, transportation lines and processing facilities, can reach 3 to 5 billion dollars.

It is not possible for Libya to meet this level of financing alone. For this reason, establishing a partnership with an actor such as TPAO, which has a strong technical capacity, public support and long-term planning, provides a critical advantage for Libya. In addition, such partnerships mean a positive signal for foreign investors and facilitate the integration of fields into international markets.

It is clear that the agreement will not directly achieve Libya’s production target of 2 million barrels; Because the agreement is currently in the exploration and research phase, not production. However, this stage is the first and perhaps the most important link in the chain of production increase. Geological surveys will not only reveal the existence of new reserves, but also prove the economic feasibility of these fields.

This will not only mean an increase in technical capacity for Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), but will also support Libya to regain the image of a reliable producer country in the oil and gas markets. Therefore, such technical cooperation should be considered as structural investments that directly support Libya’s goal of increasing energy production.

On the other hand, there are difficulties in achieving the long-term success of such cooperation without taking into account the main structural problems faced by the Libyan energy sector. In this sense, political polarization is still one of the most important obstacles.

Although the tension between the Tripoli-based National Unity Government in Western Libya and the Benghazi-based House of Representatives in the East over the sharing of energy revenues and control over oil fields threatens the sustainability of field work, it can be said that the relations developed by Turkey with all parties within the framework of the “One Libya” policy are the main determining factor in overcoming these difficulties.

In addition, the lack of energy infrastructure, aging refineries, an unregulated power grid and security risks seriously undermine Libya’s ability to attract investment. The intervention of militia groups in energy facilities or the use of production areas as an element of political pressure causes foreign investors to approach the projects in Libya at a distance. In this context, in addition to technical support, Turkey should also contribute more to Libya’s institutional capacity building, security sector reform and energy infrastructure modernization.

As a result, the cooperation agreement signed between TPAO and NOC is an important tool that will contribute to the reconstruction of Libya’s economic and technical capacity. This agreement will not only produce seismic surveys and drilling data; It will serve to remap Libya’s energy resources, improve the international investment climate, and increase Turkey’s regional influence through energy diplomacy. However, the success of this process is not only technical; At the same time, it necessitates a holistic approach in political, legal and institutional dimensions.

Otherwise, the strategic gains expected to be obtained from the sea may face difficulties such as structural weaknesses on the coast. For this reason, it is in the common interest of both countries to maintain Turkey-Libya energy cooperation with a long-term and multidimensional strategic vision.

_________________________

Sean Mathews and Oscar Rickett

Sudan’s army chief and de-facto leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan accused Libya’s eastern commander Khalifa Haftar of not being honest. Egypt hosted direct talks between Sudan’s army chief and de-facto leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Libya’s eastern commander Khalifa Haftar this week, in a bid to mediate between two allies on opposing sides of Sudan’s war, multiple sources told Middle East Eye.

Underscoring the sensitive nature of the talks, the Egyptian government released separate photos of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi meeting first the Libyan delegation and then the Sudanese delegation in what appeared to be the same room in the Mediterranean coastal city of el-Alamein.

Privately, however, Burhan and Haftar, along with their delegations, held face-to-face talks as part of an effort by Sisi to manage tricky relations between two important partners. Egypt backs both Burhan, who is fighting a brutal war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Haftar, the commander who controls eastern Libya. According to a Sudanese intelligence source, the meeting between the two leaders did not go well.

Extremely worried by the prospect of Sudan’s war spilling over into Egypt and by the disruption of trade in the volatile triangle border region that takes in Libya, Sudan and Egypt, Sisi was hoping to broker a peace deal between Burhan and Haftar. Instead, the Sudanese army chief accused the eastern Libyan commander of smuggling weapons to the RSF, and of working with the United Arab Emirates to assist the paramilitary of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo in other ways, the sources said.

Haftar, who had one of his sons with him, denied the accusations. Burhan told him that he was not being honest, and that the Sudanese had proof of his involvement. The Sudanese delegation mentioned that Sadeeq Haftar, Khalifa’s son, had been in Sudan before the war began in April 2023, and had met with Dagalo, the RSF chief better known as Hemeti. 

Days after the war began on 15 April, MEE reported that Sadeeq had flown to Khartoum on a private jet and donated $2m to a football club connected to Hemeti, before breaking his fast with the RSF leader at his home in the Sudanese capital. According to the Sudanese intelligence source, the meeting between Burhan and Haftar ended badly, with Sisi also not happy about the conversation.

Border trouble

Sudan, Libya and Egypt’s borders all meet in the vast, lawless, triangle desert region. When fighting between Burhan’s army and the RSF first erupted in 2023, Haftar sent military supplies by truck and planes to the RSF. Those supplies tapered off as the RSF turned to a more convenient route through neighbouring Chad.

More recently, forces in southern Libya loyal to Haftar joined the RSF in attacking border posts controlled by the Sudanese army. The RSF’s seizure of the border triangle alarmed Cairo. Now, the Sudanese intelligence source said, the RSF had taken over Maaten al-Sarra airbase in the Kufra district of southern Libya. This base is integral to the supply of weapons to the paramilitary in Sudan and to the export of gold out of the country from the mines of Darfur, which are owned and controlled by the Dagalo family. 

Egyptian officials have blamed Haftar’s youngest son, Saddam, for the raid in the triangle region. Saddam serves as chief of staff in his father’s army and controls militias, including Islamists, in southern Libya. He is increasingly seen as the successor to his 81-year-old father and has been courting support in Washington and Ankara.

One regional analyst, who requested anonymity to discuss a sensitive subject, told MEE that Khalifa Haftar was losing power as he gets older, with control now taken on by his three sons. The relationship between Saddam Haftar and the RSF is “a problem”, the analyst said. Egypt works with Sadeeq Haftar, but Saddam and Khaled Haftar control the “Islamist groups that work with the RSF” in the triangle border region.

According to the sources briefed on the meeting in Egypt, both Saddam and Khaled Haftar attended the meeting with Sisi. Egypt’s director of general intelligence service, Major-General Hassan Rashad, was also at the talks.

Egypt, Libya, Sudan

Egypt has played an outsized role in Libya since the Nato-led ousting of longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The country descended into civil war, which became a proxy conflict with Russia, the UAE, Egypt and France backing Haftar and Turkey supporting a rival government in western Libya. Like in Libya, Sudan’s ruler Omar al-Bashir was overthrown in 2019, having taken power in 1989. Four years later, fighting broke out between Burhan’s army and the RSF, a paramilitary once loyal to Bashir and allied to the army.

Egypt supports Burhan and his army, though this support is, for the most part, just logistical. At the onset of the conflict, Egyptian pilots flew planes supporting Sudanese army operations against the RSF. The longstanding relations between Egypt and Sudan’s armies and its support for Burhan in Sudan’s ongoing war have been a problem for relations between Cairo and its powerful Gulf ally, the UAE, which is the RSF’s main patron.

External monitors have documented military shipments emanating from the UAE to the RSF. Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab recently reported that Chinese-made drones “consistent with FH-95s” bought by the UAE had been flown into RSF-controlled Darfur. In May, Amnesty International found that the UAE, which continues to deny supporting the RSF, was sending Chinese-made weaponry, including GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers, into Darfur despite an ongoing UN arms embargo.

Gold continues to flow out of the Dagalo family’s lucrative gold mines in Darfur, with Hemeti stashing much of his wealth in Dubai. Some of the gold also finds its way to Russia, which is continuing to play both sides in Sudan’s war – the Russian government offers support to Burhan’s army while the Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group, continues its partnership with the RSF.

Sudan and Libya underscore the convoluted web of alliances and counter-alliances that have come to define the region since leaders like Gaddafi and later Bashir were removed from power. The old ideological fault-lines that emerged in the post-2011 Arab Spring era have become murkier. Egypt and the UAE both supported Haftar in 2019 in his bid to conquer Tripoli, the seat of Libya’s internationally recognised government. At the time, the RSF sent fighters to bolster Haftar’s ranks.

Haftar still enjoys support from the UAE, but Saddam Haftar has been courting Qatar and Turkey more recently – two of the UAE’s traditional foes. Likewise, cash-strapped Egypt has received billions of dollars in investments from the UAE and continues to back Haftar, but is opposed to the RSF.

_____________________________

Hafed Al-Ghwell

The sobering reality facing Libya far surpasses mere political stalemate; it embodies the active calcification of a partitioned state. Two distinct centers of power now operate with parallel bureaucracies, military structures, and international recognition circuits, each solidifying its control over significant territory and resources. This is no theoretical fragmentation typically subject of erudite observations by scholars, but an operational division measured in concrete terms.

One administration commands the capital and its international legitimacy, while the other dominates about 60 percent of the nation’s landmass, including the lion’s share of proven oil reserves — Libya’s primary economic lifeline, responsible for over 90 percent of state revenue. Each entity fields its own armed forces, estimated in the tens of thousands collectively, backed by rival foreign patrons whose military footprints are expanding.

The division even extends beyond security; separate legislative bodies pass laws for their respective zones, while reconstruction efforts have devolved into competing, regionally siloed projects. An entrenched reality has settled, where daily governance functions independently on either side of a virtual iron curtain, reflecting a partition actively constructed and resourced, rendering the notion of a unified Libyan state increasingly unlikely.

Tripoli’s authority, nominally the UN-recognized Government of National Unity, is visibly fraying under the weight of its own internal power struggles and widespread popular rejection. Its attempt to violently purge rival militias in May, triggering intense urban warfare and displacing civilians, culminated in the resignation of influential ministers. Ultimately, Tripoli’s “fausse paix” was shuttered by urban combat spanning 72 hours and 11 districts, including the affluent Dhat El-Imad towers and seafront — zones historically insulated from conflict.

The clashes also displaced 2,500 civilians, halted operations at Mitiga International Airport for 48 hours, and stranded foreign nationals. Critically, the resignations of finance and economy ministers, architects of a state budget dependent on $20 billion in annual oil revenue, exposed the government’s evaporating fiscal control. The spectacle of rival militias, some state-funded while others operate extortion rackets, engaging in pitched battles across the capital also cast a glaring spotlight on the fragility of Tripoli’s control of its affiliated militias.

Now, the GNU’s sovereignty has become a facade maintained by force, not legitimacy, with its institutions hollowed out via state capture and endemic corruption, with multibillion-dollar state companies becoming battlegrounds for rival kleptocratic networks. Militias now treat state parastatal coffers as mere plunder, with one faction having seized control of Libya’s Post, Telecommunications & Information Technology Company, a $3 billion state entity, in a firefight that killed eight civilians and left 58 bodies abandoned in a militia-controlled hospital.

On the other hand, parallel security structures are a further mockery of governance: 27 officially funded militias operate in Tripoli alone, yet the state cannot mobilize 500 coherent troops without triggering inter-militia warfare. Worse yet, foreign backers compound the chaos. This duality, where “state” forces assassinate rivals in extrajudicial executions while citizens burn tires in protest, frames partition as simple arithmetic, as Tripoli’s authority dwindles, reaching no further than its allied militias’ checkpoints.

On the other side of the divide, Benghazi has meticulously constructed a de facto state apparatus in the east, seemingly achieving some level of internal cohesion and international normalization unimaginable just a few years ago. Exploiting Tripoli’s chaos and legitimacy deficits, the rival administration has leveraged relative stability and a unified military command structure under its Libyan Arab Armed Forces to attract wary international partners. The ensuing diplomatic shift is palpable: Over the past year alone, Benghazi hosted delegations from the US military, the Italian Interior Ministry and intelligence chief, Turkish generals, Philippine diplomats, the Vatican ambassador, French NGOs, and British trade missions.

It has not escaped notice that a dedicated “foreign ministry” in the east has since chronicled over 100 diplomatic engagements across 12 months via more than 200 official social media posts, averaging one every four days. Such expanding engagement signals institutional permanence, not temporary rebellion, and since then, military normalization has only accelerated with the participation of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces in the US-led African Lion 2025 joint exercises, while hosting Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunusbek Yevkurov five times since August 2023.

Clearly, dual approaches, where 31 countries now treat eastern institutions as viable partners, proves partition transcends rhetoric. When foreign embassies relocate staff to Benghazi citing “prosperity and security,” and reconstruction contracts bypass Tripoli’s hollowed ministries, the de facto statehood of the east becomes irreversible arithmetic, and idyllic aspirations for Libya’s reunification remain just that — ideals.

Given the prevailing dynamics, it is possible to draw a fairly unambiguous picture of international actors no longer being mere observers of Libya’s debilitating bifurcation. They are now actively enabling and profiting from it. Previous models of exclusive recognition for Tripoli’s revolving door interim authorities have ceased to exist.

This “dual-track” engagement, replicated by Rome, Paris (hosting the eastern leader at the Elysee), and even Washington, reveals a cynical international consensus. Stability, narrowly defined as the absence of all-out war and the preservation of self-interested aims (migration “control,” construction contracts, oil and gas, Sahel access, and transnational networks), is prioritized over the messy pursuit of genuine national unification, democratic legitimacy, or the removal of foreign mercenaries.

What remains is an accelerating drift toward a redrawing of Libya’s map rather than a temporarily frozen conflict. Each faction now monopolizes force within its domain, while foreign fighters answerable to external powers bolster both sides, further eroding national sovereignty. What constitutional processes and fleeting hopes for elections that still remain are indefinitely postponed — deemed too destabilizing by elites and their international backers who benefit from the current rent-seeking arrangements.

However, average Libyans, suffering in a state on the brink of total collapse, see their demands for unity and accountable governance ignored by domestic warlords and foreign powers alike. Their protests, while newsworthy, lack unified leadership or international backing to overcome an entrenched militarized duopoly. Now, the global community’s comfort with this enforced status quo, prioritizing manageable instability over risky democratic restoration, is the most powerful engine of partition.

Without a fundamental shift from this external calculus of short-termism and economic opportunism toward a concerted, impartial push for inclusive elections, disarmament of militias, and the removal of foreign forces, Libya’s map risks being definitively redrawn — not by the will of its people, but by the interests of its fractured elites and their global enablers.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

_______________________

Filippo Sardella 

Risks to state stability

The rise of armed groups such as RSF in key areas of cross-border networks can threaten the authority of sovereign states in the region. Egypt, in particular, is exposed to a potential increase in infiltration, illicit trafficking and instability in its southern provinces. Libya, still without a unified central authority, risks a new destabilization in the southern areas already marked by military fragmentation. More generally, the multiplication of non-state power centers undermines the ability of governments to exercise a monopoly of force and to manage cross-border dynamics.

Intersection of war and crime

The overlap between armed conflict and criminal networks transforms the area into a hybrid of war and illegal business. The RSF could take advantage of the strategic position to combine military control with illicit economic activities, creating a de facto system of governance that escapes any institutional regulation. This hybridization of militia and crime poses a long-term threat to regional security, hampering peacemaking and institutional reconstruction efforts.

Humanitarian and local instability

The progressive territorial expansion of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), particularly in the border region between Sudan, Libya and Egypt, aggravates a humanitarian crisis that is already classified among the most serious in the world. The ongoing armed conflict has generated an extremely high number of internally displaced persons and external refugees, in a context already marked by economic fragility, the collapse of civilian infrastructure and the absence of a functional state authority.

Increased pressure on displacement

With more than 13 million people already forced to flee their homes due to the violence, the strengthening of RSF in strategic areas risks producing further waves of displacement. Access to escape routes through the northern borders can encourage forced migration to Egypt, Chad and Libya, with destabilizing effects both on the logistical level (refugee camps, health and food management) and on the political level, for the destination states. In particular, poorly equipped border regions are at risk of collapsing under sudden demographic pressure.

Compromise of humanitarian access

The instability generated by the armed presence of the RSF and the progressive emptying of state structures significantly reduces the ability of humanitarian agencies to operate safely. Supply corridors are being disrupted, food warehouses looted and hospitals occupied or destroyed. Widespread insecurity also undermines the distribution of essential goods, such as drinking water, medicines and foodstuffs, especially in rural areas and secondary urban centres.

Food crisis and famine risk

Many of the conflict-affected areas are already acutely food insecure. Agricultural activities are severely reduced or completely stopped, local markets dysfunctional and galloping inflation has made primary goods inaccessible for most of the population. The expansion of hostilities to new production and trade transit zones could aggravate a pre-existing crisis, pushing some regions over the threshold of famine. In the absence of coordinated action and lasting stabilisation, the material condition of the population is likely to deteriorate further in the short term.

Fragmentation of the social fabric

In addition to material impacts, war contributes to a deep fragmentation of the social fabric. Ethnic, tribal and territorial divisions are sharpening, fueled by the dynamics of forced recruitment, local revenge and survival logics that encourage the widespread militarization of communities. The RSF, operating as a de facto force in many areas, can establish parallel forms of government which, while able to guarantee apparent order, are often based on coercive practices and the subordination of the civilian population to military commands.

Role of the African Union and IGAD

The evolution of the Sudanese conflict and the expansion of the involvement of external actors greatly complicate the work of African regional bodies, in particular the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Both organizations have historically assumed a central role in the management of continental crises, but in the Sudanese case they find themselves progressively marginalized by geopolitical dynamics that surpass them in operational capacity and political influence.

Erosion of African diplomatic centrality

The growing presence of regional and extra-regional powers in the Sudanese theatre reduces the room for manoeuvre of African actors, who appear unable to impose an autonomous or binding negotiating agenda. The diplomatic initiatives promoted so far have proved to be fragmented, lacking a unified vision and often lagging behind the speed of events on the ground. The lack of coercive instruments and adequate financial resources prevents AU and IGAD from exerting a concrete influence on the parties to the conflict.

Conflict between neutrality and influence

The principle of non-interference, a pillar of post-colonial African diplomacy, clashes with the growing reality of a war in which the main African powers are already deployed, directly or through an intermediary. Egypt, a member of the AU, openly supports the Sudanese Armed Forces; at the same time, other countries in the Horn of Africa, albeit in a more discreet way, are ambiguous in their position. This heterogeneity of interests undermines the effectiveness of multilateral initiatives and places the AU in an ambivalent position: on the one hand it promotes peace, on the other it is unable to guarantee the equidistance necessary to manage the negotiations.

Risk of diplomatic substitution

In the absence of strong and legitimate regional leadership, the negotiating space tends to be occupied by external actors, often animated by divergent strategic interests. The real risk is that diplomatic processes will be moved outside the African sphere and entrusted to global multilateral platforms or bilateral agreements decided by Middle Eastern or Western powers. This scenario would further reduce Africa’s political sovereignty in managing its internal conflicts, paving the way for externally imposed solutions that are potentially unsustainable in the long run.

Need for reform and strategic

repositioning

To regain a central role in the management of the Sudanese crisis, AU and IGAD should undertake a structural reflection on their operating methods. Greater integration between preventive diplomacy and the capacity for political pressure would be needed, accompanied by a professionalization of the negotiating bodies and a strengthening of cooperation with the European Union and the United Nations on an equal basis. Without a renewed protagonism, the risk is that the continental institutions will become mere observers in a crisis that is played out on their own territory.

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Filippo Sardella 

The seizure of the Sudan-Libya-Egypt triangle by the RSF is not just a military fact. It is the turning point of a conflict that is regionalizing, getting out of hand and turning into a platform for trafficking, proxy wars and out-of-control humanitarian crises.

Logistics line and RSF reinforcement

The conquest of the border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Egypt represents for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) not only a military success on a territorial level, but a decisive qualitative leap on a strategic level. In a conflict increasingly marked by the logic of proxy warfare, the control of this geographical crossroads – known to be a historic hub of smuggling and armed trafficking – allows the paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemetti”) to build a real external military logistics line.

Libya as an armed rear

The axis with eastern Libya controlled by General Khalifa Haftar is consolidating. Militias linked to the Libyan National Army (LNA), and in particular the Subul al-Salam Brigade based in Kufra, act as facilitators of the logistical network.

The latter, historically involved in the trafficking of weapons, fuel and migrants, operates under the umbrella of Haftar’s power, and is suspected of receiving direct funding from the United Arab Emirates – a key element in the triangulation of weapons to the RSF.

Operational effects

The corridor allows the direct supply of ammunition, light armored vehicles and tactical drones, bypassing the central areas still controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

In addition, the north-western Sudanese border becomes a safe rear, capable of accommodating training camps, fuel depots and evacuation corridors.

There is a growing risk that the RSF could host Libyan or Chadian mercenaries in exchange for opportunistic compensation or alliances.

The Emirates-Libya-RSF triangulation

The UAE, already suspected of supporting Haftar in Libya and the RSF in Sudan, seem to be pursuing a strategy of “proxy dominance” in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.

Through an opaque triangulation (Dubai → Benghazi → Kufra → Darfur), weapons and capital reach the heart of Sudan, eluding international controls and fueling a system of perpetual war.

Military implications

The logistical superiority now available to the RSF could overturn the balance of forces in the medium term, especially if access to the border with Chad were to be consolidated.

The presence of drone warfare, tactical satellite support and new mercenary recruitment lines contributes to a “decentralized militarization” that challenges the containment capacity of Sudanese regular forces and regional partners.

Foreign involvement: Libya, UAE, Egypt,

and Turkey

The Sudanese conflict has now gone beyond national borders, turning into a regional arena where the strategic interests of different actors intersect, often indirectly but decisively. The seizure of the tri-border corridor by the RSF has further heightened the concerns of neighbouring countries, which are involved — directly or by proxy — in the ongoing conflict.

Libya (Haftar’s LNA)

Eastern Libya, under the control of the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar, represents a central node in the logistical reorganization of the RSF. Although Haftar’s command denies any direct involvement, the evidence of logistical, military and territorial collaboration with Sudanese militias leaves room for strong suspicions. Control of eastern Libya allows the RSF access to a stable rear through which weapons, vehicles and personnel can transit. The ambiguous relationship between Haftar and the RSF is indicative of a dynamic in which political and military support can be exercised without official statements, while maintaining a margin of strategic deniability.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The Emirates represent an extra-regional but highly influential player, with a well-established posture of strategic projection in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The logistical and financial support offered to Khalifa Haftar in Libya has paved the way for an indirect triangulation in favor of the Sudanese SFRs. The possible supply of war material through opaque channels and non-state intermediaries strengthens the operational capacity of the RSF, allowing them to maintain pressure on the ground and expand their zones of influence. The UAE’s objective appears to be twofold: to contain the influence of Islamist actors in the region and to consolidate its role as a Middle Eastern power capable of influencing African conflicts.

Egypt

Cairo has historically maintained a strategic alliance with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), by virtue of geographical contiguity, bilateral military cooperation and a common aversion to radical Islamist movements. The advance of the RSF towards the Egyptian border represents a direct threat to Egypt’s national security, both in military and migratory terms. The risk of destabilization of the Egyptian South, combined with the possibility that armed non-state actors gain control of the traffic routes to the Mediterranean, could lead Egypt to become more involved in the conflict, even if only in the form of logistical support or intelligence in favor of the SAF.

Turkey

Ankara adopts a strategy of regional influence based on support for moderate Islamic parties and electorally legitimized governments in the context of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The expansion of the RSF — perceived in some Turkish circles as spurious military entities, backed by regional rivals — raises concerns about the possibility of Salafist groups or anti-Turkish extremist networks strengthening their position in the Libyan and Sudanese theaters. Although Turkey is not directly involved in the Sudanese conflict, the overlapping of interests with Egypt, the Emirates and Libya could push it to take a clearer position if the Sudanese civil war threatens its strategic assets in north-east Africa or its economic interests in the Red Sea.

Regional security and cross-border crime

The Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) control of the border triangle between Sudan, Libya and Egypt introduces a critical variable in the regional security balance. This area, characterized by poorly controlled territories and a long tradition of illicit trafficking, represents one of the main nodes of instability in the Eastern Sahel. The acquisition of this space by a paramilitary actor outside state control risks multiplying the threat vectors for neighboring states and for the entire Mediterranean region.

Organised crime and informal networks

The border triangle has historically been associated with established networks of smuggling fuel, small arms, goods and, above all, human beings. The ability of the RSF to exercise effective control over these routes can result not in an interruption, but in an informal and militarized regularization of criminal activities. The militias, in fact, could exploit these networks to obtain funding, strengthen their local alliances and consolidate territorial control through forms of economic and social co-optation.

Unregulated migration flows

The absence of recognized state control over the Sudanese desert corridor opens new channels of irregular migration to the north. The Sudan-Libya-Europe route becomes particularly exposed to an increase in illegal passages, both for economic reasons and to flee violence. This dynamic could accentuate the pressure on the Egyptian and Libyan borders, and subsequently on the European ones, making the migration containment strategies implemented by the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean more complex.

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Federica Saini Fasanotti

Rome’s migration deals with Tripoli may unravel as militia influence grows and stability deteriorates.

In a nutshell

• Italy’s deals with Libya rely on militia-controlled governance structures
• Realpolitik compromises threaten Rome’s credibility and regional influence
• Meloni slowed migration, but challenges in Tripoli could undo the gains

Since her rise to power in 2022, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has displayed a strong focus on foreign policy – at times even overshadowing her own foreign minister, Antonio Tajani. Among the top priorities of her international agenda is Africa, and more specifically, Libya. In light of the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the increasingly political (rather than purely demographic) nature of migration flows, Libya has regained strategic relevance for Rome.

Prime Minister Meloni’s vision was clearly laid out in the “Mattei Plan for Africa,” an international cooperation project officially launched at the end of 2023 and inspired by Enrico Mattei, founder of Italian petrochemical giant Eni. It envisions an equal, mutually beneficial partnership between Italy and Africa. The plan is divided fundamentally into six areas of investment: energy (renewables, gas, rural electrification), infrastructure (ports, roads, water networks), health (hospitals, medical training), education and vocational training, agricultural development and food security, and, of course, migration management.

Key Italian companies cooperating with Rome on the African engagement plan include Eni, national aerospace champion Leonardo and natural gas system operator Snam. The primary beneficiary countries are Libya, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

What deserves attention now is Italy’s approach in one of these target countries: Libya, where violence is on the rise, short shrift is paid to human rights by those holding power and making deals, and an unraveling of existing power structures is possible.

What Italy has achieved with Libya

Italy – through Eni – in January 2023 signed an agreement worth 8 billion euros with Libya’s National Oil Corporation and the Government of National Unity in Tripoli, chaired by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh. Over the ensuing two years, the Libyan Coast Guard has been strengthened through the supply of Italian patrol boats, while detention centers for illegal migrants on Libyan territory continue to operate and are run by local militias. These efforts have resulted in a sharp drop in illegal immigration to Italy; last year migrant arrivals were down 60 percent compared with the previous year.

In October 2024, the Italy-Libya Business Forum took place in Tripoli, during which agreements were concluded in strategic sectors such as energy, fishing, healthcare, infrastructure and professional training. The countries also announced resumption of direct flights between Italy and Libya.

Italian Premier Giorgia Meloni (left) welcomes Libyan Government of National Unity’s Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibeh at the Italy-Africa conference at the Italian Senate in Rome in January 2024 to announce the Mattei Plan. © Getty Images

While these agreements appear reliable, it must be noted that dealing with the current Libyan leadership presents significant problems of various kinds. Since the fall of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya’s governance has been unstable and the country is split in two, each half under the control of a rival administration.

In the west is the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, which is aligned primarily with Turkey and enjoys support from the United Nations, Qatar, Algeria and Pakistan. It stands accused of maintaining ties to Islamist extremism and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Government of National Stability (GNS), located in the country’s eastern city of Benghazi, is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar with support of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, along with the Libyan National Army and foreign powers such as Egypt, Russia and the United Arab Emirates.

The militia problem

While the GNU − with whom Rome has made agreements to stem northward migration − ostensibly holds power in the country’s western half, the reins of power are contested. At a political meeting in Tripoli on May 12, Abdul Ghani al-Kikli, leader of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), one of western Libya’s strongest militias, was shot dead at the headquarters of another important militia, the 444th Brigade, which in turn is commanded by Mahmoud Hamza, who is also director of military intelligence for the GNU. Leading figures from the GNU’s security establishment as well as leaders from the Misratan Brigades, which is one of the country’s largest armed factions, were all present at the meeting.

The bold assassination paints a stark picture of who really holds power in Tripoli: Al-Kikli was shot dead in the presence of a deputy defense secretary and an interior minister. After the killing, the city descended into chaos before calm returned. Yet since then, mass graves have been uncovered, indicating that the Libyan regime that Rome cooperates with turns a blind eye to torture and extrajudicial killings.

February 22: A demonstration in Naples against the cooperation of Italian Prime Minister Meloni with Osama Almasri Najim, a suspected Libyan warlord. © Getty Images

Additionally, as power is contested, another large militia, the Special Deterrence Force (RADA), has entered the fray. This group is commanded by Abdurrauf Kara, a person linked to Osama Almasri Najim, who was at the center of an international scandal. Mr. Najim was arrested in Turin on an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but in January he was released from Italian custody and returned to Libya on an Italian state flight.

This decision sparked outrage within Italy, with critics accusing the Meloni government of bypassing international justice and collaborating with criminal militia networks in Tripoli.

Mr. Najim, notably, at that time served as head of Libya’s Judicial Police. Ironically, it was not Italy’s Justice Minister Carlo Nordio but Libya’s Prime Minister Dbeibeh himself who, on May 15, made a surprise announcement accepting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and pledging to hand over Mr. Najim and other non-compliant militia figures. Mr. Dbeibeh’s televised statement was unequivocal when he claimed that certain militias “had grown excessively, to the point of controlling the entire political, financial, economic, and even social landscape.” This marked a turning point in GNU internal politics and has complicated Ms. Meloni’s efforts in northern Africa.

Italian connections and a realpolitik

dilemma

What makes the situation more problematic for the Italian government is that al-Kikli was spotted in Rome as recently as March, two months after the Najim affair. He was accompanied by Ibrahim Dbeibeh, the prime minister’s advisor and nephew. They went to visit Libya’s Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Adel Jumaa, who was admitted to the European Hospital in Via Portuense after being injured in a gun attack in Tripoli.

This public appearance sparked outrage in Italy’s opposition and highlighted the controversial ties between the Italian government and Libyan warlords. Historically, al-Kikli played a key role in the “Volcano of Rage” military campaign defending Tripoli against the 2019 offensive led by Field Marshal Haftar. Al-Kikli’s SSA militia, originally approved by the Presidential Council, had been integrated into Tripoli-based institutions such as the interior ministry. He gradually extended control over areas west and east of Tripoli (Gharian and Zliten), arguably becoming too powerful.

Many observers interpreted his elimination as the first major shift in Tripoli’s security dynamics since August 2022. This underlines the fundamental issue faced by the Meloni government: how to engage with Libyan authorities and militias without undermining Italy’s credibility.

Since the 2017 Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (initiated by then-Interior Minister Marco Minniti), successive Italian governments – left and right – have partnered with local militias to curb smuggling and migration. While migrant arrivals dropped, so did Italy’s moral standing, with accusations of strengthening militias at the expense of Libya’s institutional stability. Today, under Prime Minister Meloni, Italy appears to be making similar trade-offs – once again in the name of realpolitik.

The issues at stake now are similar to those of the past: namely, the control of migration routes, which are a strategic node in human trafficking toward Italy and are currently overseen by the militias named above. The fragility of local interlocutors consistently undermines the durability and effectiveness of any agreement between Italy and Libyan decision-makers. Rome’s approach has been marked by ambiguity, as it has engaged both with Prime Minister Dbeibeh’s Tripoli-based GNU and with the eastern-based authorities in Tobruk, including General Haftar.

This dual-track diplomacy has weakened Rome’s leverage in the eyes of more assertive players such as Turkey and Russia – recently joined, at least rhetorically, by Belarus. The results speak for themselves. Moreover, the endemic instability of Libya, as well as that of other countries of the Mattei Plan (notably Ethiopia, but also the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique), threatens to undermine the very foundations of Italy’s long-term cooperation strategy in Africa.

Scenarios

Italian political engagement with Libya in the years since the death of strongman leader Qaddafi have been characterized by a conflict between pragmatism and ethics. Consequently, the real question is whether Prime Minister Meloni will be able to navigate a medium- to long-term strategy that is economically productive, reduces migration and at the same time is respectful of human rights.

Unlikely: Meloni succeeds as a power player by reducing migration

The most challenging scenario, albeit the most appealing, sees Italy rise to the role of true international mediator, accompanied by progress in the internal political dialogue in Libya, an improvement in migration flows and in the conditions of the exiles themselves. However, such progress would require significant stabilization in Libya, which currently resembles more a “proto-state” – fragmented and feudal – than a functioning democracy. As such, this outcome is unlikely.

Likely: Meloni fails to realize her vision and migration may soar again

The more likely outcome is that despite a superficial calm in Tripoli, the risk of renewed violence is real. If Mr. Dbeibeh’s government collapses under militia pressure, which is a real possibility, existing migration agreements would unravel. That would leave a power vacuum that might be filled by General Haftar – forcing Italy to renegotiate deals under less favorable terms and risking further reputational damage.

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Amid renewed relations with Libya, Russia is relying on the Al-Khadim base near Benghazi to strengthen its military presence in the Sahel region of Africa. RFI journalists were able to trace the itinerary of a Russian cargo plane from Syria to Libya, one of many flights operating on this route.

The airbase in Hmeimin in the Latakia province of Syria, along with the naval base in Tartus are key military outposts for Russia. The overthrow of longtime Syrian ruler and Russian ally Bashar al-Assad in December cast the future of these bases into doubt, with Western countries hoping to pressure Damascus into closing them.

Russia, whose military backing helped Assad cling to power, has sought to retain the two bases and has begun discussions with the new interim leadership under former rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. In the meantime, reports show that Russia has begun shifting some of its equipment to other bases – notably in Libya.

Using satellite imagery and flight radar information, RFI’s investigative unit Info Vérif was able to trace last month’s voyage of a Russian Antonov-124 plane, which took off from the Hmeimin base and arrived at the Al-Khadim base in Libya.

The Antonov-124 is designed to carry heavy, bulky loads (up to 100 tonnes), but it requires long, concrete runways for lift-off. In total, there are an estimated 20 aircraft of this type still in service worldwide, mostly used by Ukraine and Russia.

RFI journalists focused on an Antonov-124 (RA-82030) operated by a logistics company known as 224 Flight Unit, a subsidiary of the Russian Ministry of Defence.

Numerous clients, both private and state-owned (including the French army), used its services for special air transport missions, before the unit’s fleet was placed under international sanctions. Their website’s mission history has not been updated since 2014.

10,000km round trip

Among the aircraft in its fleet is the aircraft coded RA-82030, registered as a civil aircraft. At the end of May, as indicated by data from the tracking website Flight Radar 24, it completed a journey of nearly 10,000km between Syria and sub-Saharan Africa.

Its first stop was the Libyan base of Al-Khadim, located around 100km east of Benghazi, the capital of Cyrenaica – a region in the hands of Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Russia. The Russian cargo plane initially appeared on screens on 16 May, 2025, at 3:17pm, a few dozen kilometres from the Russian base in Syria.

The speed and altitude at the time the data was transmitted to online open-source tracking sites confirmed that the plane took off from the Hmeimin base. But less than an hour later, the sites lost track of it before it reappeared north of Egypt, heading southwest. An aeronautical engineer who wished to remain anonymous told RFI that it is not unusual in some cases for location data to suddenly disappear.

“The transponder’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast [AIS] function can be cut off, which isn’t very prudent if the crew is flying in the United States, the European Union, and a few other countries. But it’s not illegal as long as the transponder’s Mode S [aircraft communication mode] is maintained,” he explained.

“It could also be that the plane is simply flying through dead zones in terms of ADS-B receivers connected to tracking platforms. In this case, it looks very much like an intentional disconnection. It’s quite typical. Moreover, the plane is over the Mediterranean and the airspace is not congested, so no one is going to come and protest,” the expert added. To confirm the exact whereabouts of the Antonov 124 plane, RFI contacted Maxar, a North American company specialising in satellite images and Earth observation.

On 18 May, two days after leaving Syria, the aircraft was found parked on the Al-Khadim runway. No other aircraft of the same type had been reported in the area at the same time. According to flight logs, the aircraft continued its journey, stopping in the Malian capital Bamako and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso between 20 and 26 May, before finally heading back to Russia.

It is not clear what type of equipment was unloaded or loaded on this particular flight, but the aircraft’s cargo bay is large enough to carry several aircraft or armoured vehicles without having to completely dismantle them. In the past, these large carriers have delivered aircraft, helicopters, radars and surface-to-air systems to countries in the Alliance of Sahel States.

RFI’s investigative unit analysed the records of previous flights to get an idea of the scale of Russian activity in the region. They found that the same plane took off from Syria on 4 May, departing from Syria and reappearing later in the vicinity of the Al-Khadim base. Several open-source reports suggest that similar activities have been happening at this base in recent months.

Telegram messages

Earlier this year, French newspaper Le Monde documented eight flights between December 2024 and January 2025 between Hmeimin and Al-Khadim. RFI reviewed several Telegram channels close to the paramilitary Wagner Group and the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps, and found references to Russian weapons deliveries to Al-Khadim – including heavy weapons and armoured vehicles of the same type as those used by Russia in Syria.

One Telegram post reads: “New organisations. New technology. Old places. Remember your roots!” The author is likely referring to Wagner’s first deployments in Libya in 2018, or to the Cold War era in which the Libyan army fielded Soviet equipment. RFI was able to geolocate this video, which was filmed in front of the hangars at the Al-Khadim base. Another video broadcast on Telegram, taken from the cockpit of a transport aircraft, confirms the use of this area by Russian cargo planes.

Diplomatic moves

For Lou Osborn, of the All Eyes On Wagner collective, this presence can be explained by a rapprochement between Moscow and Benghazi. This became more apparent following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose plane crashed in August 2023 shortly after he led a rebellion against Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria also sped up a push for stronger diplomatic ties elsewhere, Osborn said. “We saw a kind of logistical ballet of Russian planes towards Libya. There is a fairly strong rapprochement, political and military, between Haftar’s Libya and the Kremlin.”

Moscow has also tried to forge ties with the officially recognised government in Tripoli, through the opening of embassies, Osborn added, saying that there have also been overtures in Algeria and Tunisia – “countries that are very aware of what is happening in the region, with military attachés, particularly in Algeria, who travel back and forth to Libya”.

The flight of the RA-82030, which was also tracked in early June, is one of many signs that Russia appears to have successfully restructured its overseas presence, and is able to rely on a network of bases in Africa – ensuring the growth of the Africa Corps, and broader support for Moscow’s regional allies.

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This article is based on an original report in French by Olivier Fourt and Grégory Genevrier and has been edited for clarity.

Simon Watkins

Libya aims to boost oil production to 2 million bpd by 2028, with new bidding rounds attracting major global energy firms. Rising political instability, including the recent assassination of a militia leader, threatens new oil blockades and production disruption. Eastern-backed forces may challenge Tripoli’s control over oil revenues, risking a repeat of costly shutdowns unless a revenue-sharing deal is reached.

Given that around 97% of its government revenues come from oil, it might seem obvious to all Libya’s principal factions that increasing production is a very good idea. There is plenty of scope to do so, as before the removal of long-time leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 it had easily been able to produce around 1.65 million bpd of predominantly high-quality light, sweet crude oil. Additionally positive back then was that production had been on a rising trend, up from about 1.4 million bpd in 2000.

Further increases were on the horizon to push output close to the circa-3 million bpd achieved in the late 1960s, with the National Oil Corporation (NOC) planning to roll out enhanced oil recovery techniques at maturing oil fields to that effect. Up until very recently, new plans were progressing well from the ‘Strategic Programs Office’ (SPO) to boost oil production from the current 1.4 million bpd level up to 1.6 million bpd within a year or so and then to 2 million bpd by 2028/29. However, rising political unrest again threatens not only to derail this process but also to see the imposition of widespread blockades on Libya’s existing oil output as well.

At the beginning of this year, oil minister Khalifa Abdulsadek stated that the country still required US$3-4 billion to reach the 2026/27 1.6 million bpd production target. Towards this end, early March saw Libya announce plans to launch its first oil exploration bidding round in over 17 years, with 22 areas up for grabs across the country, which still has 48 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves in place — the largest in Africa. These include major sites in the Sirte, Murzuq, and Ghadamis basins as well as in the offshore Mediterranean region.

According to an update from the Oil Ministry in the middle of last month, the bidding had already attracted more than 40 applicants, including some of the world’s biggest and most technologically advanced oil firms. U.S. supermajor ConocoPhillips is one firm that has voiced its interest in expanding its operations in Libya, in which it currently runs the Waha concession. Other interest is likely to come from major firms from Europe, for which Libya has become one country targeted to substitute for lost supplies from Russia due to sanctions resulting from its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as analysed in full in my latest book on the new global oil market order.

These may well include Italy’s Eni, Spain’s Repsol, Austria’s OMV, and the U.K.’s BP, OilPrice.com has been told by sources close to the bidding process. Each of these firms were quick to resume exploration activities in Libya following blockades last August that halted around 700,000 bpd of oil production, despite a 10-year hiatus in their activities beforehand.

That said, it may be that their patience will be tested again very soon as the possibility of new blockades rises sharply following the 12 May assassination of Abdul Ghani al-Kiklii – a militia leader and head of the Presidential Council-affiliated Stability Support Apparatus (SSA). According to a source who works closely with U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the country, spoken to by OilPrice.com last week, al-Kiklii was specifically targeted as retaliation for the shooting of Salaheddin Elnajih, chairman of the Libyan Post Telecommunications and Information Technology Company and an appointee of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister, Abdulhamid Dbeibah.

The GNU is the successor to the previous Government of National Accord (GNA). More broadly, the killing has been seen by rival factions as part of ongoing manoeuvres by Dbeibah and his supporters to consolidate his power through the elimination of key rivals in his main opposition groups. Following all this, it remains to be seen precisely how these opposition groups will react, but it is unlikely to portend well for the GNU government’s plans to boost oil production.

One group in particular may believe that the timing is right to launch another major offensive, political, economic and/or military, against the GNU, and this is Libya’s alternative government – the Government of National Stability (GNS), based in the east – which in turn is backed by Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the Libyan National Army. Early signs of trouble ahead was a report on 28 May that the NOC’s headquarters in the GNU-controlled Tripoli had been stormed by gunmen, although the NOC later bizarrely said that this had only been “a limited personal dispute”.

Nonetheless, shortly after the GNS’s Haftar threatened to declare blockades of key Libyan oil fields again due to such attacks on institutions such as the NOC and suggested that its headquarters be moved into the eastern area – controlled by the GNS and his army – which would be “safe”. He has made it clear since an agreement signed on 18 September 2020 that there can be no reconciliation in Libya between the opposing GNU and GNS governments so long as there is no sustainable equitable way for the country’s oil revenues to be distributed between the rival groups.

More specifically, at the time of signing the 2020 agreement that ended an economically devastating series of oil blockades across Libya, Haftar and his opposite number from the then-GNA at the signing, Ahmed Maiteeq, made an in-principle agreement to look into establishing a commission not only to determine how oil revenues across Libya are distributed but also to consider the implementation of several measures designed to stabilise the country’s perilous financial position.

The blockade from 18 January to 18 September cost the country at least US$9.8 billion in lost hydrocarbons revenues. Key to this tentative agreement was the formation of a joint technical committee, which would – according to the official statement: “Oversee oil revenues and ensure the fair distribution of resources… and control the implementation of the terms of the agreement during the next three months, provided that its work is evaluated at the end of the 2020 and a plan is defined for the next year.”

In order to address the fact that the then-GNA – and now GNU — effectively held sway over the NOC and, by extension, the Central Bank of Libya (in which the revenues are physically held), the committee would also “prepare a unified budget that meets the needs of each party… and the reconciliation of any dispute over budget allocations… and will require the Central Bank [in Tripoli] to cover the monthly or quarterly payments approved in the budget without any delay, and as soon as the joint technical committee requests the transfer.”

Due to the influence of various domestic and international disruptive elements – notably Russia – since that idea was mooted it has never been properly implemented. However, there is still hope from several quarters – including the U.S. and U.N. – that such a deal could work well, and indeed that it might still be able to solve the ongoing impasse over the country’s oil and gas revenues. In the meantime and in the absence of such a deal, it looks highly likely that Libya will remain subject to further oil blockades and shutdowns as part of the ongoing struggle its warring factions for control over Libya’s oil resources.

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Laila Wyatt 

Challenges to the Potential Pivot 

Libya’s prospects as a launchpad for Russia’s African operations have downsides beyond logistical concerns. Assad’s international isolation allowed Russia to operate more freely in Syria. While Russia is Haftar’s primary backer, the general retains a good relationship with France, complicating Russian negotiations and theoretically requiring a more conditional presence in comparison to Syria. Further complications abound due to the sheer number of other international players in Libya, including Italy, the UAE, Qatar, and Egypt.  

Türkiye retains a presence in Libya, intervening in support of the GNU to secure resources and favorable maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye agreed with the GNU in November 2019 to extend Turkish maritime boundaries to Derna and Tobruk, complicating a potential Russian permanent presence and resulting in a wary coexistence in a sensitive strategic area.

Despite their agreement, the GNU resents Türkiye’s presence, leading to Turkish troops rarely leaving bases and maintaining a lighter footprint. Russian troops reportedly do the same. In December 2023, an official ceremony was held by a Haftar-controlled unit at the Russian al-Qardabiyah airbase to give the impression it was under LNA control.  

Russia will have to operate in a much more covert manner in Libya than in Syria, and Libya cannot be a stronghold of Russian geopolitical strength and influence projection like Syria. Libya’s political instability limits the space for an unobstructed Russian presence. GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh voiced resistance to a heightened Russian presence in December 2024. If Haftar accepts an improved relationship with Russia, his relationship with France could deteriorate, though his position could be strengthened with increased Russian materiel support. 

A larger Russian military presence could further destabilize Libya, especially with the pass-through presence of natural resources Russia is extracting out of Africa, particularly gold. Russia extracted $2.5 billion worth of gold from Africa from 2022 to 2024, which is likely to have helped fund its war in Ukraine. Gold provides the Kremlin with a portable, easily laundered, vital backstop for the Russian Central Bank amid sanctions and currency pressures. In Niger, Russia was attempting a form of energy blackmail by blocking France’s access to Niger’s uranium mines. About a fifth of France’s uranium used in nuclear energy is imported from Niger.  

Moreover, increased engagement from Russia could encourage Türkiye to strengthen its presence in western Libya, potentially escalating the conflict to civil war levels. However, Sadam Haftar, the son of the general, met with senior Turkish officials in early April, signaling a potential step toward reconciliation. Despite the possibility of deepening competition by foreign actors, shifting troops to Libya remains viable for Russia in case it loses influence in Syria. 

Russia could also simply stay in Syria. Comments made in February by Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra indicated Russia could retain its bases if it would benefit Syria. This statement could be motivated by Israeli incursions into southern Syria after the collapse of the post-2018 deconfliction mechanism between Russia and Israel that prevented this.

The new interim government lacks any capacity to defend against Israeli strikes, due in part to earlier Israeli strikes on Syria’s key military hardware. Israel, Assad, and local forces had previously formed a delicate security arrangement in 2018, partly ensured by Russia.  

This agreement limited the Golan Heights to Syrian forces and specifically banned Iranian or Hezbollah troops from having a presence there, disincentivizing Israel from invading further into the Golan Heights and beyond. Recently identified documents, known as the “Moses Documents” showed close coordination between an Israeli operative code-named “Mousa,” former Syrian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Ali Mahmoud Abbas, and former National Security and Military Advisor to Assad Ali Mamlouk.

This mechanism became obsolete following the fall of Assad. However, a continued Russian presence at a base close to the border could regain such a deterrent. This could lead to Russia retaining a presence in Syria, diminishing potential American outreach. Furthermore, an Islamic State resurgence is likely in the probable event of a full U.S. withdrawal from Syria. U.S. President Donald Trump has called for the Syrian government to take over Islamic State detention camps, despite doubts that the government possesses the necessary security capacity. 

Conclusion 

The U.S. has been losing ground to Russia and China in the Sahel, predominantly due to a lack of engagement under former U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration and the more recent USAID cuts. Groups like al-Shabaab are poised to exploit vacuums created by both the cuts to health care funding in Africa and reduced service of AFRICOM.

The Trump administration is additionally considering merging AFRICOM with the U.S. command in Europe, potentially fueling vacuums of instability. Therefore, an expensive and time-consuming move to Libya by Russian forces could challenge Russian influence in not only Syria but also Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Russia retaining its presence in Syria would hamstring American security considerations both in Syria and across Northern Africa.  

The lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria would lead to increased resources at the Syrian government’s disposal, but a further delay could destabilize the security situation and push Al-Sharaa into reliance on Russian forces. The U.S. should engage the new Syrian regime to counter Russia and enhance stability across the region. This aligns with the Trump administration’s priority of detangling U.S. forces from regional conflicts, and removing Russian forces from Syria would undermine Russian influence across Africa and the Middle East through strategic diplomacy rather than direct military confrontation. 

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Laila Wyatt is an analyst researching on the Middle East and Northern Africa, particularly concentrating on Russian private military and mercenary structures in regional states.

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Laila Wyatt 

Russia’s legacy of supporting Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s regime could either lead to its eviction from Syria or its voluntary withdrawal, considering the fluctuating Syrian security landscape and the recently opened door for U.S.-Syria engagement. If the interim Syrian government vetoes a permanent Russian presence, Moscow sees Libya as workable replacement. In north and central Africa, the U.S. and European powers have faced dwindling influence while Russia has swooped into the vacuum. As the Middle East has experienced intensified escalation between Iran and Israel, Russia may seek to exploit international distraction and fulfil its goal to expand influence in Libya and Africa. 

A year ago, the Kremlin would not have viewed Syria as the weak link in Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Syria was the central bastion of Russia’s foreign outposts. Russian military flights stopped at Khmeimim, the Russian-operated airbase in Latakia, to refuel, carrying loot, goods, and fighters perpetuating Russia’s neo-colonialist efforts across Africa. Russia’s naval base at Tartus has been an essential strategic position and the only point on the Mediterranean where Russia could both service its vessels and deter NATO’s presence. Meanwhile, Russia played a major role in the Syrian Civil War. Its drone strikes and private military contractors helped regime forces regain large swathes of territory before solidifying the front line. 

This situation changed dramatically in late November 2024 when a constellation of opposition groups, led by Sunni Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, toppled Assad’s regime. Russia’s loss of a key ally in Assad embarrassed it internationally and could lead to the loss of crucial military installations.  

Syria is still the best option for Russia as the linchpin for its activities in Africa. Its eastern location generally meant less NATO oversight and access to the Bosphorus Strait, a key maritime chokepoint and deterrent to Türkiye. It was a crucial maintenance and repair hub for the Russian navy, with the port able to both accommodate four medium-sized vessels, including submarines, and replenish warships via helicopter. Without Tartus, Russian vessels must travel to Novorossiysk without refueling. With the last submarine departing Tartus on Jan. 2, some analysts have gone as far as to call the base irreplaceable.

With the potential loss of Syria, Russia likely will prioritize the preservation of its activities in Africa by pivoting to Libya to springboard fighters and units into “partner” countries. Because this pivot involves significant adjustments and financial investment, Russian supply lines will be strained, and its influence in Africa will be shaken. Therefore, it remains in the United States’ interest to apply pressure for Russia’s withdrawal from Syria to destabilize Russia’s African network. 

Russian Influence in Africa 

Khmeimim’s 3½-hour flight time from Moscow makes it a perfect refueling stop for Russian forces headed to Africa. From Syria, it takes a further 5½ hours to Bangui in the Central African Republic, where the former Wagner Group, now rebranded as Africa Corps, acts like a neo-colonial entity. Africa Corps promotes the Kremlin’s interests in Northern and Central Africa through a “survival package” to leaders: providing military capacity and political disinformation operations in exchange for favorable economic contracts and embedded Russian influence.

Africa Corps fighters comprise personal bodyguard units and protect Russian investments in extractive sectors, besides fighting insurgents and opposition forces. Syria’s location as the gateway of influence extends Russia’s reach into Africa. Russia’s partner countries in Africa with active front lines, such as Mali and the Central African Republic, will face increased pressure on supply lines, equipment, and unit rotations until an alternative logistical hub to Syria is secured. This is especially crucial in countries where Russian fighters provide leaders’ personal security, or during the run-up to elections, such as in Mali. 

Putin also faces a crisis of Russian influence in North and Central Africa with the fall of Assad. His armed mercenaries and Africa Corps-linked entities are the chief component promoting and protecting Russian interests in Africa. Partner governments like Niger and the Central African Republic will be concerned about whether Russia will withdraw support in a crisis, and the overthrow of Assad may be seen as a warning sign. Russian-aligned governments could seek a new security partner, particularly with continual Russian setbacks in Mali and stagnation in Sudan.

The Wagner Group particularly struggled to combat jihadist militants in Mali and experienced a humiliating defeat in late 2019, suffering significant fatalities against an Islamist insurgency led by Al-Shabaab. These underlying cracks make this a crucial moment to disrupt Russian activities amid Moscow’s growing influence across the Sahel. The Wagner Group particularly struggled to combat jihadist militants in Mali and experienced a humiliating defeat in late 2019 in Mozambique, suffering significant fatalities against an Islamist insurgency led by Al-Shabaab. These underlying cracks make this a crucial moment to disrupt Russian activities amid Moscow’s growing influence across the Sahel.  

A recent wave of military coups in the Sahel, fueled by anti-colonial sentiments, expelled French, U.S., and U.N. forces. Russia and China have stepped into the vacuum with respective security forces and investment. The region has considerable natural resources such as oil, lithium, uranium, and natural gas, but it is also strategically located between North and sub-Saharan Africa.

The head of AFRICOM, Gen. Michael Langley, recently called Burkina Faso the “global epicenter of terrorism,” where growing jihadist insurgent elements are ramping up their ability to attack the United States. Indeed, the Sahel now accounts for over half of global terrorism deaths.  Groups include the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, Islamic State in West Africa Province, and Boko Haram.  

Contemptuous of any western influence, Niger’s ruling junta revoked the military accords allowing U.S. military personnel in the country, and the U.S. lost its drone base in Agadez, withdrawing in August 2024. Russian troops immediately moved in. The base had served to monitor violent extremist activity across the Sahel.

Additionally, the Sahel is increasingly becoming a major drug trafficking corridor, made worse by the involvement of jihadist insurgents operating in the area. With these insurgents controlling vast swathes of territory and with a Western withdrawal from the region, there is the potential for narco-terrorism to emerge. Overall, the decline of U.S. influence in this key strategic region has been to Russia’s gain. 

Clinging to Syria 

A top-level Russian delegation has been negotiating for continued use of their bases in Syria. While the Russian company Stroytransgaz’s port lease at Tartus was canceled, other aspects of Russia’s relationship with Syria’s new administration have been slightly warmer. Russia’s close alignment with Assad and provision of a place of refuge is still a point of contention, but pragmatism has guided Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s government so far. Internationally imposed sanctions had forced the interim government to maintain a relationship with Russia. The new government simply could not afford to alienate any country willing to open relations. Russia previously flew in desperately needed banknotes, and civilians even sheltered at Russian bases during the coastal violence in March.  

However, the United States’ lifting of sanctions reduces the need for continued Russian engagement, particularly considering that Russian airstrikes caused 24,000 Syrian civilian deaths during the civil war. Russia’s support of Assad could lead to its eviction from Syria or its voluntary withdrawal, considering both the changeable Syrian security situation and the recently opened door for U.S.-Syria engagement. 

Libya as a Russian Alternative 

A potential replacement for a significant Russian logistical headquarters is Libya. Many analysts have speculated that Russia could move operations there, with satellite images indicating Russian reinforcement of their Libyan airbases. Russia has backed Libyan Gen. Khalifa Haftar of the Government of National Stability (GNS) since 2015, reportedly to secure Russian access to significant energy investments and base agreements. However, Russia’s military support did not come until the Wagner Group joined the GNS for its UAE-financed 2019 Tripoli offensive.  

Russia appears to have hedged its bets by continuing relations with the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU), hosting diplomatic talks between the two sides in January 2020. More recently, following U.S. military maneuvers in Libya, a top-level Russian diplomat visited Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli to assert strengthening bilateral relations.  

The GNS controls most of the east, including Benghazi, enabling Russian control of four Libyan bases, including the al-Khadim airbase near Benghazi and the al-Qardabiyah base close to Sirte. The Telegraph’s analysis of such bases in December 2024 discovered Russian military transport planes, upgraded runways, strengthened perimeter defenses and improved infrastructure. This expansion was made possible by four maritime deliveries in April 2024 via GNS-held Tobruk, indicating a growing partnership with Haftar. While Russia reduced its Libyan-based personnel due to its sudden need for fighters for the war in Ukraine, its presence recently re-expanded and is now estimated at 2,000 personnel.  

Libya would be a workable staging post for Russia. Compared to Syria, it takes an extra hour to fly from Moscow to Benghazi, while a flight from Benghazi to partner African countries is still in range for most cargo planes. Russia’s most-flown military cargo plane, the Ilyushin Il-76, can fly roughly half-loaded for 2,700 miles without stopping to refuel, while the An-124 Ruslan has a max-payload range of 2,300 miles. However, the An-72, which is also used a significant amount, only has a range of 1,243 miles at max payload and is unable to travel the 1,826 miles between Moscow and Benghazi. By comparison, the distance between Moscow and Latakia is 1,385 miles. While Libyan airbases could rapidly reach Khmeimim’s operational capacity, flying half-full planes is more costly and will limit Russia’s expansion of activities. 

Tobruk in eastern Libya, however, could be a replacement and provide Russia with a NATO deterrent as well as a deep seaport and servicing point on the Mediterranean. Some analysts have questioned Tobruk’s capability to accommodate significantly higher traffic and large military vessels, but Tartus could provide a blueprint for Tobruk. Developing Tobruk’s capacity to service and refuel diesel-electric powered submarines and service nuclear-powered submarines would be crucial to Russian aims in the region. However, Russia may not currently possess enough spare resources for such significant development because of the economic fallout from the invasion of Ukraine. 

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Laila Wyatt is an analyst researching on the Middle East and Northern Africa, particularly concentrating on Russian private military and mercenary structures in regional states.

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Alessandra Bajec

The shift by Haftar to potentially ratify the 2019 maritime deal reflects how Turkey has expanded its influence across both sides of Libya’s divided politics.

Media reports surfaced earlier this month that Libya’s eastern-headquartered parliament, which is aligned with General Khalifa Haftar, was considering ratifying a maritime agreement with Turkey that grants Ankara access to a vast economic zone in the Mediterranean.

In 2019, Ankara and the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli signed the demarcation memorandum of understanding (MoU), which sparked significant controversy with Greece and other regional actors for excluding them from exclusive economic zones.

At the time, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, along with Libya’s eastern-based authorities, strongly rejected the pact as illegal, arguing it breaches international maritime law and infringes on their territorial waters.

Tobruk-based parliament speaker Aguila Saleh previously declared the Turkey-GNA boundary deal “null and void” since it was not approved by the assembly, calling it a violation of Libyan sovereignty. But reports claiming that the Libyan House of Representatives (HOR) is set to review the disputed agreement suggest a potential shift in position.

The signing of the Libyan-Turkish memorandum on maritime sovereignty came amid increased tensions as forces loyal to Commander Khalifa Haftar launched a renewed campaign to seize the capital, Tripoli.  At the time, the GNA signed another security pact with Ankara, allowing Turkey to provide military support to repel the offensive, an offer the Tripoli government accepted.

In an interview with The New Arab, Tim Eaton, a senior MENA research fellow at Chatham House focusing on Libya, observed that while the deal was initially a political move, since then Turkey has expanded its ties in eastern Libya and now maintains broad relationships across the divide.

“This shift reflects a broader political reality: Turkey is no longer seen with hostility by the east, but as a partner to court and influence,” he said.

A rethink of the maritime accord by General Haftar and his allies could bring eastern Libya in line with Ankara’s maritime claims.

More than a tactical adjustment, the eastern bloc’s renewed stance on the agreement seems to show Turkey’s ongoing efforts to build up its relationships with eastern partners over time, Eaton indicated.

Although Haftar-controlled eastern Libya has long opposed Turkey’s influence, backed by Egypt and the UAE, ties between the military strongman and Ankara have begun to ease in recent years.

Turkey deepens roots in Libya

Turkey has been stepping up its engagement with eastern Libyan authorities in recent months. In early April, Haftar’s son, Saddam, was received by the Turkish defence minister and other top military officials. Saddam’s visit to Ankara marked the peak of Turkey’s evolving strategy in Libya since the cessation of hostilities in mid-2020, starting with outreach to the legislature in the east and the swift revival of Turkish trade in Benghazi.

Turkish construction firms have gradually returned to eastern Libya, signing contracts with the Haftar-run Libyan Reconstruction and Development Fund. The Turkish consulate in Benghazi was reopened late last year. Turkey’s expanding presence in the east reflects both economic ambition and a shifting geopolitical calculus.

“They’ve been courting each other,” Anas El Gomati, founder and director of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, told The New Arab, referring to the Turkish-east Libya thaw. “The relationship is about insurance, not a true rapprochement. The Turks are hedging their bets in case the government in Tripoli collapses,” he contended.

Haftar’s self-styled Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) have provided relative stability in the east and south, home to much of Libya’s oil wealth, whilst the Turkey-aligned western camp lacks a unified military command and political leadership and remains fragmented.

This has driven Turkey’s pragmatic pivot toward eastern Libya and its de facto recognition of the LAAF as a legitimate military actor while maintaining ties with its allies in the west of Libya. By engaging both eastern and western camps, Ankara is consolidating its foothold in Libya to protect its interests and assert itself as a key regional player.Turkey’s overtures to Haftar and the LNA appear aimed at countering Egyptian and Greek influence in the Eastern Mediterranean [Getty Images]

Talking to The New Arab, Rhiannon Smith, director of the think-tank Libya-Analysis, explained that the HoR’s reconsideration of the maritime accord is linked to recent political unrest marked by clashes between rival militias in the Libyan capital in mid-May.

As protests followed in Tripoli against PM Dbeibah, head of the now Government of National Unity (GNU), and calls for his resignation grew, the HoR seized on public pressure by intensifying its efforts to appoint a new prime minister to lead a unified governing body.  

“If a new government can guarantee the Turks their same strategic interests -military bases in western Libya and the maritime agreement – Ankara has little reason to remain tied to the GNU if it becomes untenable,” Smith stated, suggesting that a revaluation of the deal by the Libyan parliament is aimed at convincing the Turks to relinquish their support for the Dbeibah administration.

Yet, the eastern authorities seem unlikely to move forward with enacting the protocol as their U-turn appears to be a tactical manoeuvre in an ongoing internal power struggle.

“Aguila Saleh is dangling the idea to lure Turkey away from supporting Tripoli’s embattled prime minister,” Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told TNA, pointing out that eastern factions are courting the Turks as they sense weakness in Dbeibah’s government.

Harchaoui also claimed that the HoR’s speaker has a long record of floating schemes he never enacts, and said he expects no imminent ratification.

Similarly, Smith believes the parliament is using the agreement as leverage to pressure Turkey to withdraw support for the GNU amid ongoing political uncertainty.

“It’s more about signalling a willingness to reopen talks with Turkey,” the Libya analyst said. She indicated that the authorities in the east might try to renegotiate or amend it, and validate a revised version to soften its impact.

Observers see these overtures as part of a broader strategy to cement Turkish influence in Libya and secure rights over energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The step by Libyan authorities in Tobruk to reevaluate the maritime deal is anticipated to bolster Turkey’s push to position itself as the leading maritime power in the region while entrenching its presence across Libya’s political fault lines.

Sadeq Institute’s head emphasised that Ankara is seeking to guarantee long-term leverage in Libya as well as to reap a “dividend” from the accord as a regional energy broker, therefore a geopolitical actor. “That would reposition Turkey not only as a prime player in Libya but as a kingmaker in the East Mediterranean,” he affirmed.

He also remarked that Libya’s east-west standoff is shifting toward a scramble for new realignment whereby Turkey aims to land a “diplomatic coup” by securing eastern Libya’s backing on the maritime memorandum. That way, Ankara would claim the MoU is no longer unilateral but endorsed by both sides.

Energy vacuum in the Eastern

Mediterranean

On the other hand, such a development would directly challenge Athens’ bilateral maritime agreement with Egypt. The Greeks would view it as a betrayal and attempt to undermine the credibility of the Turkish interpretation, while Cairo may push back.

Smith said that moving forward with the deal could spark controversy and mark the start of a renegotiation or rebalancing, as shifting dynamics begin to reshape regional relations and impact the Eastern Mediterranean energy space.

“With Turkey and Libya eager to advance energy exploration, tensions are likely to grow in the coming period,” the Libya researcher anticipated.

Greece, which in 2020 signed a rival maritime delimitation accord with Cairo in response to the Turkey-Libya arrangement, is now reportedly preparing to lobby Egypt to help stop Haftar or eastern Libya’s parliament from endorsing the 2019 MoU with the GNA.  

As recently as 2019, Turkish President Erdogan refused to recognise the legitimacy of his Egyptian counterpart Sisi, however, ties have since improved. A push by Cairo to rally against the contested memorandum could therefore strain this fragile détente.

Chatham House’s Eaton noted that while players like Greece and Egypt, who oppose the deal with Turkey, lack influence in Libya, Ankara may capitalise on their disunity or inattention to push its interpretation of the MoU as a de facto reality, leveraging its prominent role in the North African country.

“Libyan power brokers see building strong relations with Turkey as key to advancing their own goals,” the MENA researcher said, stressing there is closer coordination with Ankara in Libya’s east. “Turkish support is considered critical by anyone seeking control in Libya,” he added.

El Gomati highlighted the transactional nature of alliances in Libya, claiming that Haftar will side with the Turks if he sees a better deal, and has obtained all he can from the Egyptians and the Emiratis.

He also mentioned that passing the maritime pact could also legitimise broader involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean energy space, as more countries would seek to tap the region’s natural gas reserves.

The Libyan analyst criticised the realignment of regional powers involved in Libya’s conflict in the last few years, noting it does not signal a reset but rather underscores the unlikely prospect of such actors coexisting while backing opposing sides.

“It’s a deeper reflection of how paralysed and divided the country is,” he argued. “If the same regional states have truly reset ties, why do their rival forces, mercenaries, and military bases remain in Libya?”

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Alessandra Bajec is a freelance journalist currently based in Tunis

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Vassilis Nedos

Greece’s fragmented foreign policy in eastern Libya contrasts with Turkey’s methodical approach of the region.

Before the end of June, Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis will travel to North Africa again. This time, he will make two stops – one in Tripoli and one in Benghazi, to meet with both Libya’s United Nations-recognized government in the west of the country, under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, as well as with the eastern-based House of Representatives, under Aqila Saleh and the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who has appointed his son, Saddam, as the leader of the armed forces.

Until recently, the difference between the East and the West Libya, at least as far as Greece was concerned, was that the eastern part of the country was firmly anti-Turkish. This offered Athens extra reasons to reject the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement as the deal had not been ratified by the national assembly initially based in Tobruk and now in Benghazi.

Haftar now appears open to discussing it, as Turkey has taken several steps to approach Benghazi, in a methodical manner. The Turkish charm offensive was facilitated by Greece’s failure to follow a foreign policy that would provide results, from the very next day of Haftar’s visit to Athens in January 2020 onwards, despite some initial activity.

The first two years were marked by highly symbolic steps. Greece, as of July 2021, was one of only three countries to have a consulate in Benghazi (along with Egypt and Italy). Benghazi started making a series of requests, most of which Greece failed to satisfy. Haftar’s side had requested some old-style ammunition (artillery and bullets), which Athens was hesitant to provide.

There had been some further discussions on economic cooperation, most notably covering some of Eastern Libya’s needs for consumer goods, through ships that would travel from Greece to the port of Benghazi. In fact, Greece financed, through the UN’s World Food Program, the rehabilitation of part of the port of Benghazi (a container warehouse and a corridor connecting two piers), as an entry point for humanitarian aid to the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa.

There were attempts to revive contacts with eastern Libya on a commercial level, initially with a proposal for a coastal ferry connection, or an airline to Crete or Athens, but these efforts have also failed.

The failure in the Greek government’s efforts over the past five years to revive trade or other economic relations is largely due to the Greek business community, which is extremely skeptical of taking risks in a country that is divided into two. In addition, there are unpaid debts that Libya owes to Greek businesses since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and the early years of the civil war.

Especially after February 2023 and the gradual normalization of Greek-Turkish relations, which made it look like investments in hydrocarbon exploration by American giants in the southwest of Crete would continue, Athens somewhat relaxed contacts with Libya. 

It is also a given that Greece’s failure to assist Benghazi when Storm Daniel swept through eastern Libya in 2023 destroying the city of Derna and leaving thousands of dead, also played a very important role. Greece at the time attempted to organize a small aid mission, which ended in the death of three Greek soldiers and Angela-Moira Mandalios and Philip-Antonios Mandalios, two local young Greeks, on September 17, 2023. On its side, Turkey sent tankers with about 400 personnel, set up mobile hospitals and supported Haftar’s faction intensively.

Then, in November 2024, Turkey reopened its consulate in Benghazi, with a much larger presence than before. Many Turkish construction companies are active in the country, while last April saw the first visit of Haftar’s son, Saddam, to Istanbul. The Turks have also expressed their willingness to train soldiers from the militias of Eastern Libya, which Greece has also been extremely hesitant to do.

Lieutenant General Saddam Haftar, is also seen by the West as the official representative of the armed forces of Eastern Libya, which is why last Monday, June 2, he was in Toulon, following an invitation from his French counterpart, General Pierre Schill, Chief of Staff of the French Army, to a symposium of his Mediterranean counterparts. In his speech, Haftar did not mention Greece’s role but had many positive things to say about Turkey.

Since the beginning of last month, Tripoli has asked the UN Security Council not to renew resolution 2733, which provided for the surveillance of the movement of ships to Libya, to comply with the arms embargo. To this end, the European Union had launched a naval mission in the Mediterranean Sea, dubbed Irini, aimed at enforcing the arms embargo. Turkish ships had repeatedly bypassed or even refused to be inspected by warships of EU member states.

In mid-May, the French proposed to Dbeiba that the mission receive a technical rollover of six to nine months, something the Italians also agreed with.  Turkey is the only country to have deployed land, sea and air weapons systems in Libya, while it has been training Tripoli’s forces since 2019. For Ankara, this is about acquiring significant experience in intelligence gathering missions, as well as promoting the value of its weapons.

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