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My Grandpa, the Fascist? (1)

An old family album sent me on a journey through Italy’s dark past in Libya

Stefania D’Ignoti

On a humid August afternoon last summer, I helped my mother unpack the boxes of her parents’ home, the decluttering of which we had put off for years.

I was only 9 when my maternal grandfather Alfio Leotta, a retired bus driver, died at the age of 82; his wife, my grandmother, passed away three months after my high school graduation in 2012. Their home, located in a once-wealthy neighborhood of Catania, Sicily’s second-largest city, still contained all of their belongings, left untouched through the years. 

While on a break from the selection of “toss” and “keep” items, a half-ripped family album caught my attention. I sat on the floor with my mom as we flipped through the pile of old black-and-white photos, expecting to find a handful of shots of her and her brother as children, or some from my grandmother’s golden youth.

What we found instead — spread over more than six pages — was a visual account of my grandfather’s days as a soldier in Libya. The photos were fairly mundane — here he was, looking out over the corniche in Tripoli, or petting a camel — except for one detail that caught me off-guard: In each photo, he was wearing typical fascist military attire.

“I thought you knew grandpa fought in Libya,” my mom said. I suddenly had flashbacks to my childhood, sitting at the dinner table while grandpa fed me bread and ricotta salata, a kind of hard, salty cheese ubiquitous in my city. 

As I ate, he would spend hours telling me about this other “Italian coast” he lived on for a while, where he fought alongside German soldiers during World War II. I was too young back then to understand or even remember. But seeing those photos triggered my memory of random words, such as “Tripolitania” and “Cyrenaica,” which I later learned, while a university student of Middle Eastern studies, refer to geographical regions of modern-day Libya. 

When my mom and I picked up some of the photos, we found handwritten notes hiding behind them, mostly locations and dates, some stretching back to 1938. “But that’s way before the war began,” I told my mother as we both looked puzzled. In his tales, grandpa had always told us that he was conscripted to fight in Libya — where the Nazi and fascist troops fought against the Allies for control of North Africa — and was stationed there when he was just 19. But apparently that wasn’t his first tour on the southern Mediterranean coast.

I came back from that unpacking day disoriented and nursing a sense of dread, but curious to understand more about my grandfather’s prewar presence in Libya. Growing up, Italian colonialism had always been a kind of footnote; at school we were simply taught we occupied Libya in 1911 after taking it from a collapsing Ottoman Empire, with the hope of leveraging newfound, if belated, colonial power to catch up with France and the British Empire in the scramble for Africa — and that we succeeded at that, until World War II dealt a blow to our campaign. But that’s about it. After 1945, there’s no mention of the occupation, nor of its impact on the local population.

I took the photo album with me, and the more I researched and asked around, the more I discovered that Italy’s colonial past in Libya had always been within my family, and everywhere around me, but hiding in plain sight. From my parents’ best friends — who were born and raised in Libya, but for years avoided mentioning it — to my dentist’s announcement that he would take a one-year leave to teach at a dentistry college in Libya, in Italian and visa-free, with an annual salary triple the local average, I suddenly realized how meaningful it was for me to face the microcosm of my family’s turbid past.

This reckoning seems especially urgent as, two generations later, my country witnesses a dismal fascist setback under Giorgia Meloni’s far-right government. These days, zapping through Italian TV channels seems like a journey through dystopia. A new, critical TV show about the foundation of fascism just premiered to loud plaudits from pro-fascists, while newscasts of RAI — Italy’s state channel, which Meloni’s government openly controls — barely mentioned the latest neo-fascist commemoration in Acca Larentia, where hundreds gathered making Roman salutes. They were interrupted by a lone protester who was jailed for saying “Viva the Resistance.” 

But I never thought I would find that skeleton in my own home’s closet. I wonder how many other Italians are similarly naive about the pasts of their families and communities — pasts that we are now being encouraged to glorify. 

The project of Italian settler colonialism in Libya is still fairly obscure, even within the country. Italy joined the rush to conquer a share of the African continent centuries after many of its European counterparts. In history books, Italians — including soldiers — are always defined as “brava gente” (“good people”). 

The widely accepted myth describes them as harmless, innocent and at times even cluelessly naive, as a way to whitewash the country’s war crimes and contrast them with those of other European powers, particularly during colonial times. But like Italy’s brutal campaigns in Ethiopia and Somalia, the invasion of Libya was actually ruthless.

“Italy looked at Libya as the ‘fourth shore,’ an extension of Italy, much like the French treated Algeria,” Libyan author and professor Ali Abdullatif Ahmida argues in his book “Genocide in Libya.” His research has revealed that Italy’s colonial goal was to settle between 500,000 and 1 million Italians in the fertile Green Mountain areas in the east of the country, especially landless peasants from central and southern Italy, like my ancestors. 

Settlers, however, encountered widespread local resistance to their project, a detail hardly ever mentioned in Italian school textbooks. When the fascists under Benito Mussolini arrived in 1922, they came with an even more vicious plan: replacing the local population with settlers. 

In his research, Ahmida uncovered that Italian settlers built several concentration camps in the desert of Sirte where about 100,000 Libyans were confined. They were mostly those who resisted Italy’s colonial project; but many were also simple civilians with their herds who had to be forcibly removed to clear the land and make space for the incoming settlers. The first wave of 20,000 Italian settlers arrived in 1938. That’s the year my grandpa arrived in Libya, too. Did that mean he was one of them?

About two-thirds of imprisoned Libyans died in concentration camps. This brutal chapter of history has never been tackled within my family, nor collectively as a nation. The widespread lack of self-awareness and academic research on the matter has made it difficult for Italy to come to terms with its colonial crimes. If anything, Italy’s rhetoric since the end of the war and of colonialism has been that Italians themselves were victims of fascism and German Nazism. 

My mom was completely unaware of this part of our country’s history; she never wondered why her father spent time in Libya, nor did she ever question it. One afternoon we sat down again over a cup of coffee, and we started connecting the dots in a family quest to understand our past and, we hoped, to make peace with it.

While revisiting her childhood memories of time spent with her own grandfather, Giusepe Leotta, my mother recalled that he spoke fluent Greek.

“How come?” I asked her. “He was a carabiniere [member of the Italian national police force] in Rhodes, a Greek island. Didn’t you know that part of Greece used to be Italian?” she told me.

Of course I didn’t, because no one ever spoke about it, neither at school nor at home. 

In an attempt to increase its power in the Levant, in 1911 Italy also occupied the Dodecanese islands, which under Mussolini later became the testing ground for another project of Italianization of the area. By 1940, thanks mainly to a resettlement program, about 25% of the population was Italian. A brutal police force was sent there to “protect” the settlers and their property. My great-grandfather served in that police force.

Through my mom’s fading memories and her older brother’s help, we were able to discover that it was my great-grandfather, motivated by the fascist propaganda of the time — which spurred Italians to reconquer lands once part of the Roman Empire — who pushed his son, my grandfather, to set out for Libya. Just like his father, grandpa joined the colonial security forces for what he saw as protecting settlers and “taming” rebels on another Mediterranean coast.

The settlers believed that since Libya used to be part of the Roman Empire, they were simply reclaiming a land that was their birthright. (The echo of this in the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not lost on me.) The idea of reviving Roman Africa was an integral part of the propaganda to justify colonization. Although the Italian fascists’ experiment in colonialism ended in 1943, when they were defeated by the Allies in World War II, many settlers stayed and more followed, continuing to settle until well into the 1970s.

***

Stefania D’Ignoti is an award-winning independent journalist covering conflict, migration and the rise of the far right.

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Russian Military and Strategic Expansion in Libya Through the Maaten al-Sarra Airbase

Executive Summary

Russia is expanding its military footprint in Libya, focusing on the Maaten Al Sarra airbase near the Chadian and Sudanese borders. This action shows a strategic reorientation by Moscow toward the Sahel, resulting from challenges encountered in Syria.

Satellite imagery and international open sources indicated Russia is modernising the airbase and leveraging its alliances with key Libyan factions, particularly the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar. The base might serve as a logistical hub for operations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and potentially Sudan.

This report examines Russia’s activities near the Libyan airbase, analysing the significant geopolitical consequences, such as heightened regional conflict, increased Russian influence in Africa, and the weakening of Western security efforts.

Information Background

Libya has been a fragmented state since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, with competing factions vying for control. The country remains divided between the internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the LNA, led by Khalifa Haftar, which controls eastern Libya.

Russia has fostered a strong relationship with Haftar, offering military aid for strategic advantages. Prior to its restructuring under the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Wagner Group, Moscow’s leading operative force in Africa, played a crucial role in advancing the Kremlin’s interests.

The Maaten Al Sarra base, originally used during the Libyan-Chadian war of the 1980s, has acquired renewed significance because of its proximity to the Sahel. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia has repositioned military assets from its Syrian bases to Libya, viewing the country as a gateway to Africa. Moscow’s increasing involvement with Libyan tribes in the south strengthens its regional power, improving logistical coordination across the Sahel.

Analysis of Key Developments

  • Military Expansion at Maaten Al Sarra: Russia has transferred personnel, including Syrian military defectors, and equipment to restore and expand the Maaten Al Sarra airbase. Reconstruction efforts include runway repairs, the establishment of storage facilities, and enhanced logistical capabilities. The base might facilitate operations across the Sahel.
  • Strategic Realignment in Sudan: Moscow has distanced itself from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and has instead aligned with Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. This shift suggests the Kremlin is reassessing its interests in Sudan, a move that could change the regional balance of power.
  • Air Transport Operations: Reports from publicly available information (PAI) show an increase in cargo flights between Russian bases in Syria and Libya since December 2024. These flights probably carried military equipment and personnel, strengthening Moscow’s influence in North Africa.
  • Russian Influence in the Sahel: Russia has developed deeper ties with military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso, positioning itself as a security partner amid the withdrawal of Western forces. Establishing Maaten Al-Sarra as a logistics hub will bolster military operations in these states.
  • The Role of the “African Corps”: The Russian Armed Forces deployed the newly formed private military company (PMC) “African Corps” across key areas in Libya. Its presence extends from Tripoli’s outskirts to the Haruba military base in the east, providing operational flexibility across the region.
  • Increasing Paramilitary Activities: Russia’s bolstered presence in Libya could facilitate an expansion of paramilitary activities across the Sahel, emboldening military-led governments in Mali and Burkina Faso while undermining Western-led counterterrorism efforts. A continuous supply route from Libya to sub-Saharan Africa strengthens Moscow’s ability to support allied governments militarily, solidifying its role as an alternative security partner.
  • Increasing Challenge for Western actors: NATO and the European Union now face the challenge of countering the Kremlin’s growing influence in the region. As Western forces withdraw from the Sahel, Russia’s involvement may undermine diplomatic and military efforts to stabilise the region. There is also an increasing geopolitical risk of a direct clash between the Russian Federation and the West in North Africa, especially given the growing strain on European interests in the region, including energy supplies.
  • Economic Implications: Control over critical supply routes and access to the Sahel’s resource wealth, including gold and uranium, could serve to bolster Moscow’s strategic and economic leverage. Stronger military and political ties with Sahel states could give Russia economic advantages, increasing its economic role in Africa and reducing Western influence.

Conclusion

Russia’s military expansion in Libya and the Sahel reflects a calculated strategy aimed at consolidating influence across North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Developing Maaten Al-Sarra as a logistics hub expands Moscow’s operational capabilities, enabling greater involvement with Sahel’s military governments.

The geopolitical implications of this shift are far-reaching, necessitating a reassessment of Western diplomatic and security strategies to mitigate the risks associated with Russia’s growing foothold in Africa.

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Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 51 Issue 2
SpecialEurasia OSINT Unit

The Tip of Russia’s Spear: When Wagner came to Libya (2)

John Lechner

The Austrian, an investigation by the Insider found, wanted his own mercenary company after the GRU arranged for him to LARP as a Russian soldier in Syria alongside Wagner’s head of intelligence, Anatoly Karazii. Marsalek envisioned his RSB not only demining the cement factory but training an army of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand Libyan mercenaries to guard “the country’s southern border and [restrict] migration flows at gunpoint . . . mercenaries could be outfitted with state-of-the-art body cams to record ‘awesome video material’ of them shooting people.”

Though it seems he wasn’t directly involved in the GRU’s deal, Prigozhin was well embedded within its network, which had now effectively monopolized the Libya portfolio. And in the end, Prigozhin’s capacity to move men and material, far larger than anything Krinitsyn or Jan Marsalek could muster, paved the way for Wagner to service Haftar’s need for mercenaries. It helped, too, that Prigozhin was already working with the UAE in Sudan, where Emirati officials allegedly connected Wagner’s boss with the head of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, Muhammad Dagalo “Hemedti.”

There are two pillars supporting the United Arab Emirates’ foreign policy. The first is security. Abu Dhabi seeks to counter Islamism and jihadism before it reaches its shores. The second, advanced by Dubai, is commerce: the desire to see the UAE as a twenty-first-century Venetian empire. Despite the population boom in places like Dubai, there are few UAE citizens.

With only one million nationals and incredible oil wealth, the country can outsource its foreign policy priorities. In Prigozhin, UAE officials found the perfect partner. As one Russian intelligence official put it: “When you have military equipment, military technologies and skills, trained and motivated personnel, and someone has money, then a form of cooperation is always found and easy . . . why not shake the hand with the money in it?” Abu Dhabi would provide the financing in Libya, and Prigozhin would supply the men.

In October 2018, those men were spotted at Al-Watiya Air Base, a slice of land the Haftar’s LNA controlled in western Libya. Months later, in early 2019, Haftar’s forces launched an offensive on Libya’s southern region, officially an effort to oust “Chadian gangs.” He took the main cities of Sabha and Ubari and captured the Sharara oil fields, bringing the majority of Libya’s oil production under his control. Haftar, though, wanted more than just the south: he wanted Libya’s capital.

On April 4, 2019, Haftar launched a surprise attack on Tripoli. The head of the Tripoli government (GNA), Fayez al-Sarraj, promised to resist and launched a counteroffensive, dubbed the “Volcano of Anger.” Seizing Tripoli, home to 1.2 million residents and a host of militias armed to the teeth, would prove no easy task.

But Haftar had sold outside powers, particularly the UAE—but also the Trump administration—on the notion he could unite Libya. The UAE poured weapons, cash, and drones into the conflict. In mid-April, Haftar left Saudi Arabia with more funding. And while the French denied any connection, the LNA general had met French diplomats just two weeks prior to the attack. Soon French weapons also appeared on the battlefield. Abu Dhabi would provide the financing in Libya, and Prigozhin would supply the men.

Everyone wanted a slice of the offensive. Security entrepreneurs flocked to Haftar. Christiaan Durrant—a former Australian fighter pilot, founder of security firm Lancaster 6, and a good friend of Blackwater founder Erik Prince—also had men in Benghazi.

According to a confidential UN report, a few days after he started his attack, Haftar met Prince in Cairo. Prince proposed an $80 million contract to the Libyan National Army, which would cover the provision of “assault aircraft, cyber capabilities and the ability to intercept ships at sea.” He outlined a program to kidnap and kill high-value targets in west Libya as well.

The plan, according to the UN, swiftly fell apart. The Jordanians cancelled a deal to sell Cobra helicopters, forcing Prince’s team to look for backups. They procured some utility helicopters from South Africa, then supplied crop dusters previously outfitted with weapons through Bulgarian and Serbian companies.

Durrant contends the UN investigation mixed up all sorts of timelines and geographies. “There’s nothing ‘united’ about the United Nations,” he later told me. “I’ve been in countries where the UN is feeding the rebels, criminals really, on the other side.”

It was Durrant, not Erik Prince, who rolled into Libya quickly, after a separate deal in Jordan fell through. “In our line of work, the first mover picks up most of the business,” he continued. “So, we were on the ground early talking not just with Haftar, but with the National Oil Corporation of Libya and U.S. government logistics.” As a former associate of Prince’s company, Frontier Services Group, Durrant had worked on crop dusters before and was well positioned to purchase planes and other assets for his own company.

After landing in Benghazi to assemble civilian helicopters, Durrant’s team were pulled in front of Haftar. “They were told to put a machine gun on the helicopter and fly it over Tripoli.” When the team refused—the mission was both “suicide and illegal”—Haftar’s men were furious and started waving guns around. The twenty unarmed men decided they needed to get out of dodge. In the dead of night, Durrant’s men escaped through Benghazi to reach two small inflatable boats, then crossed nearly two hundred miles of the Mediterranean to arrive safely in Malta.

With Trump in the White House, Durrant believes, there were those in the UN interested in using Erik Prince as a means to link the U.S. president to a “scandal.” “Everyone else, Britain, France, is sending in javelins, meanwhile we get reams of reports written up about a potentially armed crop duster.”

(An Austrian court later found that the crop dusters did not constitute war material.) With regards to the assassination program, Durrant notes there’s nothing illegal in proposing business. “I will do any work, as long as it’s legal,” he added, “and on the side of the right guys. If we are helping the U.S. stamp out terrorism, and we are able to make money doing it, then that’s great.”

“By August 2019, we knew Russian mercenaries were in the country,” Heithem, a militia commander, told me when I met him outside his former base a few years later. Rocket blasts had ripped the building half-open. Concrete, furniture, cooking utensils—the scaffolding of daily life—pooled onto the street below. It was early 2020, and the front line had settled where we now stood, in Ein Zara, a suburb south of Tripoli. In his late twenties, stocky, and shy, Heithem, at the time part of an anti-Haftar militia from Benghazi, stared down the enemy’s old position in a whitewashed house a few hundred yards away.

Walking softly across the rubble-strewn courtyard, Heithem waved me over. “Wagner played a logistical role in August, not an offensive one. Then in October, the guys in that white house started to look very different, like special forces. They had special vests, cameras on their helmets, different equipment.” The mercenaries started to make a difference. “The LNA usually takes four or five shells to hit a target,” Heithem added. “The Russians were hitting us immediately.”

Wagner’s intervention put Tripoli’s forces in a dangerous position. Growing desperate, the head of Tripoli’s GNA government, al-Sarraj, signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey in November. The memorandum established maritime boundaries that effectively cut a direct line between Libya and Turkey and prompted immediate protests from Turkey’s rivals in the east Mediterranean—Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus—where Turks and Cypriots were competing for oil blocs.

Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in return, ramped up his support to the beleaguered Tripoli government, shipping in air defense systems, the Turkish military’s infamous Bayraktar drones, and mercenaries.

Turkish intelligence selected al-Hamzat, one of eight armed groups in Turkish-controlled Syria, to recruit mercenaries for Libya. Al-Hazmat emerged in 2013 as a division within the Free Syrian Army. The group received training and equipment directly from the United States and United Kingdom, first to fight Bashar al-Assad’s regime, then to fight ISIS. In 2016, under the leadership of Seif Abu Bakr, al-Hamzat joined Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield against the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces.

Turkish military officers put no restrictions on the number of recruits for the Libyan front. An influx of Syrians would provide more time to train Libyan fighters and free up GNA personnel for offensive operations. Syrian commanders quickly took advantage. The more men commanders sent to Libya, the more money they could skim off the top.

One recruit, “Ahmed,” had previously fought with al-Hamzat. In Syria, Ahmed recalled, fighters were rarely forced into battle. If conditions in a skirmish became unfavorable, many would simply fall back and fight later. In Libya, however, Ahmed discovered this was not the case. Seeing the front line in south Tripoli, the barrage of artillery and the drones hovering overhead, he asked to go home. His commanding officer told him: “Coming to Libya was your choice, going back is not.”

Together with fellow recruits, Ahmed reluctantly moved into an empty villa close to the front line. The first disbursement of his salary would be in three months, upon his return to Syria. Food became an issue, and it didn’t take long for Ahmed to understand how things worked. “A shopkeeper introduced us to the black market,” he said, “where we could sell our bullets and weapons to pay for groceries.”

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US Officials in Tripoli, Benghazi, Growing Alarm Over Russia’s Presence

In Benghazi, General John Brennan met with “Field Marshal” Haftar, who stressed “the key role of the United States in contributing to the stability of Libya”

A high-level delegation from Africom, the US military command in charge of Africa, has completed a visit to Libya, stopping in the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, the hubs of power in the country divided into rival political-military administrations.

In the west, there is the Government of National Unity (GUN) led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, recognized by the United Nations and supported mainly by Türkiye; in the east, the influence of the Libyan National Army (LNA) of the five-star general prevails Khalifa Haftar, a controversial figure with strong ties to Russia and a past in the United States as an opponent of Muammar Gaddafi. The mission, led by Africom’s deputy commander, three-star general John brennan, took place against a backdrop of growing rumours about the expansion of Russia’s military presence in Libya, a phenomenon observed with concern following the fall of the Syrian regime in Bashar al Assad.

In Tripoli, the general John brennan, accompanied by the chargé d’affaires of the US embassy, Jeremy Berndt, visited the Training Center of the 111th Border Guard Brigade. The visit included participation in a special forces military exercise, which showcased counter-terrorism techniques using real weapons, including rocket launchers.

During the visit, the delegation was briefed on the capabilities of the Center and the training programs implemented, aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the security forces in border control and combating security threats.

Interestingly, the 111th Brigade itself received training from Amentum Services Incorporated. This US company, founded in 2020, provides security services to both government and commercial clients and provides training in various military and security areas.

According to the latest report by UN experts, Amentum confirmed that it provided training to “potential Libyan security actors” outside of Libya, under two contracts with the US government: the Global Anti-Terrorism Assistance contract awarded by the US Department of State and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program contract awarded by the US Department of Justice.

Amentum also stated that it “has no record of working in Libya or involving Libyan security actors” outside of these contracts. However, contrary to Amentum’s claims, the Panel identified that the company provided training to Libyan armed actors at Mitiga Air Base in early 2024.

In Tripoli, Brennan also held talks with Prime Minister Dabaiba, the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army, General Mohamed al Haddad, and the Deputy Minister of Defense, Abdel Salam al-Zoubi. According to an official note released by the Tripoli government, the Libyan Prime Minister stressed “the importance of continuing the military partnership with the United States and of leveraging international experiences to improve the capabilities of the Libyan armed forces, ensuring security and stability”.

During the meeting, the US representative reiterated Washington’s support “for efforts to strengthen Libya’s security capabilities” and highlighted the “crucial role of military cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime in the region”.

In Benghazi, Brennan met with “Field Marshal” Haftar, who stressed “the key role of the United States in contributing to the stability of Libya” and highlighted the progress in bilateral relations. According to the LNA press office, General Haftar praised “the joint efforts in the fight against terrorism and extremism” and reiterated the commitment to continue working with Washington.

During the meeting, Brennan expressed to Haftar his “appreciation for the efforts made by the LNA in consolidating security and stability, as well as in the fight against terrorism and extremism,” the Benghazi note reads. The Africom representative stressed that “the continuation of these efforts is essential to ensure the stability of the region,” the Libyan note continues.

General Brennan also met in Benghazi with Saddam Haftar, the Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army Ground Forces, commanded by his father Khalifa. The meeting focused on ways “to strengthen U.S.-Libyan security cooperation, as well as support for Libyan-led efforts to reunify military and security institutions,” the U.S. Embassy in Libya said.

The U.S. delegation also toured LNA military facilities during the visit. “We thank Lieutenant General Haftar for the excellent welcome and tour of the facilities,” the U.S. Embassy said in a statement on X.

The meetings come as a Russian naval group departed from the Tartus base in Syria and is returning to Russia after many observers and experts had identified Libya as a possible destination. Vesselfinder tracking systems confirm that the Russian-flagged roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II, which were detected by Maxar Technologies satellite imagery on January 25 in the Syrian port of Tartus, were in the Sardinia Channel, heading west as of Wednesday, February 5.

Satellite imagery had revealed loading and transhipment activity at the port of Tartus, suggesting the ships were transferring equipment and personnel. Before entering the Syrian port, the two cargo ships had been at sea for several days, which analysts say points to a coordinated evacuation operation.

Earlier, military sources had reported to “Nova Agency” that the Russian naval convoy, apparently sailing aimlessly in the central Mediterranean, was off the coast of Malta and could have headed to Libya or crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to return home. Now, the Sparta and Sparta II appear to have St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad as destinations, respectively, but it is not certain that they actually reached Russian ports. A significant aspect concerns the escort of the two transport ships by Russian military units: open source images published online at the end of January showed the two ships together with the General Skobolev, Alexandr Otrakovsky, Admiral Grigorovitch and Ivan Gren.

The latter, of course, are not visible on open-source tracking systems. The movement of the Ro-Ro Sparta IV, which is currently crossing the Strait of Sicily and is en route to Port Said, Egypt, remains to be monitored. In the past, Russian ships of the same type have indicated Egypt as their destination, only to then continue on to the Syrian port of Tartus. The involvement of other ships of the same class suggests a broader redeployment of Russian naval assets in the Mediterranean, in a context that is rapidly evolving following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Moscow has already transferred military equipment via dozens of flights between Benghazi and the Russian base in Latakia, Syria. Last June, two Russian warships, the Udaloy-class frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov and the Slava-class missile cruiser Varyag, escorted by two submarines, made an official stop at the Tobruk naval base in Cyrenaica.

According to the latest report of the UN Panel of Experts, in the weeks preceding the arrival of the Shaposhnikov frigate and the Varyag cruiser, the port of Tobruk had already received other Gren- and Ropucha-class landing ships, which had unloaded military vehicles and heavy equipment. In particular, on April 14, 2024, military trucks with small trailers were observed unloading, a clear indicator of large-scale and structured logistics activity between Moscow and Cyrenaica.

In recent months, the Russian Federation has intensified operations at its four main air bases: Al Khadim base, in the east of the country; Al Jufra base, in the center; Al Brak al Shati base, southwest of Sebha, the capital of the Fezzan region; and Al Qurdabiya base, in Sirte, in the north-central area. These bases host a variety of military equipment, including air defenses, MiG-29 fighters and drones, and are operated by a mixed contingent of Russian military personnel and mercenaries from the Wagner group, far from the supervision of the Libyan authorities.

According to Libyan sources consulted by “Nova”, Moscow has further expanded its presence with a new military base: Maaten al Sarra, on the border with Chad and Sudan. High-resolution satellite images taken by Maxar Technologies in December clearly show the extension of the runway and the construction of buildings that appear to be housing, confirming Nova’s information that Russian military, together with groups of Syrian fighters, are actively working to bring the base back into operation. The same Libyan sources report that Haftar’s forces maintain control of the area stretching from Kufra to the borders with Chad and Sudan, including the area around the Maaten al Sarra base.

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The Tip of Russia’s Spear: When Wagner came to Libya (1)

John Lechner

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s facial features rested in a natural scowl. He had, by all accounts, a penetrating gaze. “I felt,” said one woman who worked for him, “that he could see right through me.” His aura, she believed, was that of a living historical figure, someone who pulsated some grand, obscure fate. A polished dome complimented Yevgeny Viktorovich’s sharp visage, evoking a Bond villain. And like any good antihero, his origins, and his path to success and fame, were anything but ordinary.

In his youth, Prigozhin spent nine years in prison for robbery and fraud. After his release, he claimed he sold hot dogs until he had enough money and connections to enter the restaurant business. In 1997, he and a partner opened a restaurant in St. Petersburg that one client in particular, Vladimir Putin, came to enjoy. That special relationship launched the restaurateur into the lucrative world of government contracting. Prigozhin’s companies provided Russian schools and the army with meals, earning him the nickname “Putin’s Chef.”

In 2014, Prigozhin became a purveyor of both meals and men. On the heels of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) was sponsoring small bands of mercenaries and volunteers to fight in eastern Ukraine on behalf of the Luhansk People’s Republic, which had declared itself independent. Prigozhin wanted in and linked up with Dmitry Utkin, a career soldier with the call sign “Wagner,” a name that would eventually become a catchall term for the companies and entities connected to both men. To insiders, Wagner Group was simply “the Company.”

“Like it or not, a twenty-first century ‘scramble for Africa’ is underway.”

Prigozhin’s men proved themselves an effective fighting force on the front, and brutal enforcers in the rear. The Company grew with Russia’s increasing assertiveness abroad. Starting in 2015, contractors worked closely with the Ministry of Defense in Syria. Wagner forces helped take Palmyra from the Islamic State, only for the generals in the MoD to claim credit for the victory and unceremoniously pull them out of the campaign. A year later, Wagner-affiliated mining companies and “security types” were arriving in Africa, a continent largely free from the bitter infighting and rivalry inherent to Russia’s competing security institutions.

It was only in 2018, however, that Prigozhin started making a name for himself. “Putin’s Chef” was known back home mostly for poisoning school children and soldiers with his food. His infamy went international when he took on the world’s sole superpower on multiple fronts. In February, Prigozhin ordered his mercenaries to attack the Conoco gas plant in Khasham, where U.S. special forces and their Syrian partners were embedded. A four-hour battle ensued between Russian and American citizens that, at its worst, could have “plunge[d] both countries into bloody conflict.” Only eight days later, a grand jury for the District of Columbia indicted Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency for its role in interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

After that, it seemed like Wagner was everywhere. Prigozhin’s political operatives were found funding candidates in Madagascar’s presidential election while Wagner soldiers were fighting a jihadist insurgency in northern Mozambique. U.S. and European governments took notice. A new Cold War was emerging, and it seemed Wagner was the tip of Russia’s spear. The U.S. Department of State called the mercenary group a state-backed organization that “exploits insecurity to expand its presence in Africa, threatening stability, good governance, and respect for human rights.” The former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, Major General Marcus Hicks declared, “Like it or not, a twenty-first century ‘scramble for Africa’ is underway.”

Back in Russia, however, who wielded the spear was never quite clear. In Putin’s system, Russian elites enjoy outsized freedom to lobby for and pursue lucrative policies they can frame within Russia’s “national interests.” Prigozhin had a unique talent for selling what Russia’s national interests were, and how Wagner fit in.

Yet he was only one of many to make riches in this second Cold War, a world where state and non-state actors position themselves to balance, and profit from, tensions among great powers. As colleagues would attest, Wagner’s boss was rarely the smartest guy in the room. What he was good at was recognizing opportunity in instability and bringing a team together to take advantage.

The siren song of war and reward echoes across Libya’s coast, luring states, jihadists, armed groups, and mercenaries of all stripes to its shores. It is hard to imagine Libya would not eventually pull in Prigozhin as well. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and the civil wars that followed, Tripoli—the capital and center of the country’s public and private institutions and thus its oil wealth—has been the key prize for a shifting web of local warring parties and their foreign patrons interested in the country’s geostrategic location and its relevance to energy markets.

In General Khalifa Haftar, ruler of east Libya, Prigozhin found his opportunity. Haftar was part of the group of officers who brought Muammar Gaddafi to power in 1969. Nearly twenty years later, Chadian forces captured Haftar during the Great Toyota War. Gaddafi disavowed him, and Haftar turned on Gaddafi, going into opposition in Chad and eventually receiving asylum in the United States. Living in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., he reportedly worked closely with the CIA on the Libya file.

In 2011, the general returned to lead forces against Gaddafi, but his clear ambition earned only distrust from other revolutionary forces. Haftar turned to building up his own military force, the Libyan National Army (LNA), in the east, establishing a base in Benghazi and framing his consolidation of power in anti-Islamist and anti-jihadist terms.

He could point to real threats. In 2014, Syrian returnees and foreign jihadists declared the eastern city of Derna a province of the Islamic State. Haftar rallied the United Arab Emirates and Egypt to his side, both of which sent funds and advisors. France deployed special forces. The United States, however, was less convinced the Islamic State represented a threat in Libya.

The Egyptians took the Islamic State on their border most seriously. And it was likely Egypt, political scientist Jalel Harchaoui notes, who first connected Haftar to Moscow. In the twilight of the Arab Spring, Egyptian military forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. The United States briefly suspended delivery of weapons in response, but it was a wide enough window for Russia to step in. In 2014, the UAE and Saudi Arabia funded a $3.5 billion weapons deal between Russia and Egypt.

A year later, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia were ramping up their lobbying efforts on behalf of Haftar. During Putin’s visit to Cairo in February 2015, President Sisi invited a Libyan officer close to Haftar to meet the Russians, and the provision of weapons and military equipment was discussed. The UAE then delivered Russian-made attack helicopters. The following year, Haftar’s force ordered another eleven.

Haftar needed more and more mercenaries. For his 2016 attack on the oil crescent, he hired thousands of men from the main Darfur rebel groups in Sudan, including factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, as well as Musa Hilal’s forces.

Later that same year, a private military company, or PMC, RSB Group, landed a demining contract for a cement factory in Benghazi, underbidding a British firm by the equivalent of $25,000,000. RSB Group, founded by Oleg Krinitsyn, a former officer in Russia’s border guards, is known to be “the first Russian PMC.” Krinitsyn’s company offered a wide variety of services: maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea; consulting; demining; and convoy, site, and personal protection. In 2007, RSB worked with American security companies guarding convoys in Iraq. “Everyone has the same task—to make money,” Krinitsyn later told Russian state-affiliated media. “Where the U.S. Army appears, private military companies follow. If you imagine a war on foreign territory as a hunt by predators for herbivores, then the American army is a lion, and PMCs are jackals that eat up the carrion of the king of beasts.”

By 2017, it was clear to many in both Russia’s private and public sectors that there was money to be made in Libya, particularly in the region under Haftar’s control. After the factory deal was signed, the GRU—Russia’s military intelligence agency, which often competed with the FSB-friendly Krinitsyn—made RSB’s boss an offer he couldn’t refuse. “[The GRU] basically said to Oleg [Krinitsyn], ‘Look, let us buy your company, and we will work more in Libya,’” a person close to the matter told me.

Krinitsyn sold RSB, reportedly for a fair price, paid in cash, then registered a new company, “RSB Security Services.” The GRU then put their own man in Benghazi.

RSB’s new owner would be Jan Marsalek, an Austrian national and GRU asset. Marsalek was the chief operating officer of the German payment processing company Wirecard, whose collapse would become the largest fraud case in German history.

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How conflict in Libya facilitated transnational expansion of migrant smuggling and trafficking (2)

Tim Eaton

Phase 2: Europe intervenes: 2015-2017 

Criminalization in Niger

By 2015, migration through the central Mediterranean via Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean via Turkey led to growing hostility among European governments and populations.

Discussion of a ‘migration crisis’ emerged, and European policymakers targeted the movement of people in northern Niger and on the northwestern Libyan coastline. This succeeded in stemming the movement of people, but had significant second-order effects that further endangered those on the move, entrenching Libya’s conflict economy and criminalizing historic and long-standing cross-border movements via Niger.

A turning point for the migration economy in Agadez came in May 2015, when the government of Niger, in consultation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and with technical and financial support from the EU and EU member states, passed Law 2015-36. Often referred to as ‘Law 36’, the legislation outlined clear punishments for those engaged in migrant smuggling. In pressing for this, European policymakers were trying to sidestep the policy quagmire faced in Libya. The policy had deep consequences in Agadez.

One humanitarian cost was the increase in migrant deaths in the desert. As early as 2017, the International Organization for Migration and the Nigerien Red Cross reported increased fatalities as smugglers abandoned migrants in the desert when detected by Nigerien authorities and took more perilous routes to avoid detection.

Another was the development of protection markets and the growing presence of armed ‘bandits’ from southern Libya and Chad in northern Niger. These bandits, active along key transit corridors linking gold sites to trading and logistics hubs, have brought heavy weaponry from Chad and southern Libya.

The rise of heavily armed ‘Chadian’ bandits in northern Niger became a source of resentment among local communities, particularly ethnic Tuareg whose ability to move throughout the region and exert control over licit and illicit activities is constrained by their presence. In interviews with Chatham House, several Tuareg leaders stressed a need to ‘securitize’ or ‘militarize’ northern Niger to restore order.

At the time of criminalization, migration was estimated to have provided direct employment for more than 6,565 people and indirect incomes to more than half of all households in Agadez. However, the crackdown in Agadez coincided with a gold rush throughout much of northern Niger, offsetting the economic impact somewhat.

More widely, criminalizing migration eroded trust between local populations and their government, as well as between local officials and the national government. The crackdown disproportionately affected Agadez, home to communities that have traditionally felt marginalized by the government in Niamey.

This in turn reinforced narratives that the national government was willing to sacrifice the well-being of northern communities to ensure that international funds tied to cooperation continued to flow to central government.

Intervention in the Mediterranean and engagement with Libyan authorities 

Two further changes significantly shifted the status of migrant smuggling on the Libyan coastline. First, on 2 February 2017, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, followed a day later by the Malta Declaration signed by EU leaders in Valletta.

Over 2017–2018, the Libyan Coast Guard became responsible for search and rescue missions near the Libyan coast. Over this period, European state rescue missions withdrew from Libyan waters, while NGO rescue missions were prevented from operating in Libyan waters.

The European naval mission Sophia, which had rescued about 48,000 migrants in the Mediterranean between 2015 and 2018, was replaced by a new mission, Irini, in 2020. Irini suspended deployment of naval forces and relied solely on unmanned aerial vehicles not equipped for sea rescues.

Second, a market for ‘anti-smuggling’ emerged on Libya’s northwest coastline over summer 2017. Armed groups that had facilitated migrant smuggling sought to evade UN sanctions. A conflict ensued in the Libyan coastal city of Sabratha lasting 19 days and armed groups complicit in smuggling posed as actors trying to prevent it.

Arrivals to Italy from Libya fell from 162,895 in 2016, to 108,409 in 2017 and 12,977 in 2018. But the numbers of migrants traversing Libya did not immediately fall. A large number of migrants were already present in Libya and other areas used by smuggling networks were not directly affected. This led to a spike in the numbers of migrants in Libya, and an increase in migrant detentions.

Phase 3: Regulation (2018-2024)

In the years since, numbers of migrants arriving in Italy have rebounded, reaching 49,740 in 2023, still well below the 2016 high. The EU has defended the partnerships developed with Libyan authorities as supporting the rule of law and compliant with EU laws. The reality has been murkier.

In particular, the penetration of Libyan state institutions by armed groups and the development of a conflict economy meant that the EU’s partners were themselves deeply involved in smuggling.

The Libyan Coast Guard and the Department for Countering Illegal Migration were accused of being complicit. A prominent Coast Guard commander was even sanctioned for his role in trafficking.
The changes provided financial support for migration management without removing financial incentives for migrant smuggling. Armed groups have profited from both prevention and facilitation of irregular migration at the same time.

The balance between the two created some regulation of migrant smuggling without stopping it. It also provided further resources for armed groups by financing detention centres, training and equipment. Arbitrary detentions increased, and a system of ‘abuse for profit’ whereby migrants were exploited, extorted and in many cases sexually abused grew dramatically.

Locally, where the presence of large migrant communities has caused tension, the armed groups presented themselves as guarantors that migrants do not remain in communities. All the while, they have cut deals with smugglers who bring migrants to the communities in the first place.

Where next? 

Smuggling delivers economic benefits to communities at departure points, transit hubs and populations in countries of origin.

Remittances have become a key source of income in Nigeria, while smuggling supports a wider economy in localities that are neglected by Libya’s central government.

Smuggling has stimulated the economies of these places. But the human cost of such activities is high for migrants who suffer systemic rights violations and abuse. A culture of impunity for such actions has prevailed. Policies focused solely on countering criminality miss such nuances that illustrate the need for broader solutions, including local development and peacebuilding.

The need for a true ‘whole-of-route’ approach 

The development of migrant smuggling shows how a conflict’s second-order effects can have impacts thousands of miles away. The rise of Mediterranean crossings stimulated European policy responses to target transit points in the Mediterranean Sea and in Northern Niger.

Framed as rule-of-law interventions, these approaches addressed the symptoms rather than causes. Flows have been reduced through a series of transnational bargains that entrench conflict and ultimately make it harder to resolve. The resulting de facto regulation of Mediterranean crossings is regarded as a relative success by EU policymakers, but has not prevented regular disasters at sea and avoidable loss of life.

To date, international approaches have sought to isolate choke points in the movement of people. A more effective policy approach would be to assess how smuggling and trafficking intersect with local dynamics in the places that the practices traverse.

In 2023, the EU laid out its intent to develop a ‘whole-of route’ approach to tackling irregular migration, but this does not extend beyond combatting trafficking and the rescue and return of migrants.

A truly ‘whole-of-route’ approach would need to be broader to be effective. It must contain a wider suite of policies beyond enforcement. That should include peacebuilding activities, local development and governance support so that it reduces demand and tackles the enabling environment within which criminal groups operate. As it stands, current policies run the risk of disrupting smuggling journeys only temporarily, with migrants bearing the worst impacts.

More directly, current policies have incentivized transactionalism in transit states. The huge funds that are being doled out to pay off states is no solution for irregular migration, and harms local populations in Libya. Those funds would be better invested elsewhere.

***

Tim Eaton – Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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How conflict in Libya facilitated transnational expansion of migrant smuggling and trafficking (1)

How the Libyan conflict transformed human trafficking routes in West Africa, and why Europe’s response has so far failed.

Migrant smuggling and trafficking has flourished through Libya since its 2011 conflict. This article explains how this happened and why European policies aimed at addressing the issue are inadequate.

Migrant smuggling generally refers to the movement of people with their consent; while Trafficking in Persons (TIP) refers to the movement of people against their will – though the distinction is not clear cut and journeys often combine elements of the two. In particular, women have been disproportionately impacted by trafficking.

The three phases

In the first of three phases, the Libyan conflict led to the emergence of armed factions and an economy dominated by violence that has fostered migrant smuggling and trafficking. This led to a smuggling boom in Niger and Nigeria, supporting economic growth in Niger and worsening violence in Nigeria. Increased flows of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers through Libya further expanded the conflict economy.

In the second phase, European policymakers sought to reduce irregular arrivals from Libya. Rather than prioritizing efforts to rein in Libyan armed groups, policymakers forged partnerships with them out of perceived necessity. In neighbouring Niger, European leaders pressurized Nigerien authorities to criminalize the movement of people.

These shifts increased the perils faced by those on the move, as migrant exploitation grew in scale and severity. In this phase, the numbers reaching Europe fell, but large numbers of people continued to move. This expanded the level of violence and exploitation suffered by migrants.
In the third and current phase, the numbers of people reaching Europe have rebounded, though remaining below the highs of 2016. A transactional pattern has emerged in which Libyan groups seek political and financial support from European policymakers while allowing smuggling to continue, ushering in a degree of de facto regulation. But this has done nothing to tackle the factors that led to the rise of migrant smuggling in Libya or beyond.

Phase 1: 2011-2017-Expansion and boom

Libya’s agricultural sector had been in decline in the south since the 1990s due to international sanctions. Cross-border trade and smuggling increased dramatically. The conflict in 2011 led to further declines in state-run agricultural projects.

The collapse of the Gaddafi regime and ongoing governance crisis led to the rapid expansion of migrant smuggling networks based in Libya to facilitate maritime passage to Europe. The numbers of migrants entering Italy across the Mediterranean increased from around 28,500 in 2011 to nearly 163,000 in 2016.

Nationally, rival groups competing for the Libyan state sought to sustain local alliances through patron-client relationships rather than by supporting the wider population. These patronage networks inhibit the rebuilding of the state. At a local level, disputes over the right to govern led to a fragmentation of legitimate authority and a decline of law and order.

This encouraged local communities to develop their own armed factions that soon grew to dominate economic activity in these areas through the establishment of protection markets, and subsequently, their own business ventures.

These dynamics have inhibited a transition to coherent national government. Rival armed groups have fought over strategic transport routes, valuable infrastructure and for influence over state institutions. The illicit economy boomed, with migrant smuggling and trafficking growing rapidly.

Such practices had existed for decades, but not at such scale. The routes from Nigeria to Libya existed in the precolonial era, were entrenched by the transatlantic slave trade and used over the past 50 years by people seeking employment in North Africa or Europe, including low-skilled agricultural workers and later (forced) sex workers to Italy. The networks were scaled up significantly after the Libyan state collapsed post-2011.

The historic legacies, combined with local disputes over land ownership and governance, have created a hostile environment for foreign nationals in Libya. Many Sub-Saharan African people have experienced racist abuse and discrimination. Against this backdrop, the exploitation of and violence against people moving through the country became a defining feature of post-2011 Libya and an important source of illicit revenue.

A Chatham House study estimated that migrant smuggling and trafficking generated $978 million in revenues within Libya in 2016. Smuggling led to wider economic development around illicit markets. In the Libyan city of Kufra, smuggling revenues have in part been invested in local services. More widely, satellite analysis commissioned through the XCEPT programme indicates that artisanal agriculture expanded after 2015 following a period of continual contraction since the 1990s.

Agadez, Niger: the development

of a transit hub 

Developments in Libya reverberated across the southern border in Niger, where smuggling was socially accepted and akin to a semi-formal industry. Agadez has a long history of transnational trade, labour migration and housing transnational communities.

As barriers to travel through Libya eased, Agadez experienced increased demand for smuggling services and an expansion of smuggling networks. By 2013, an influx of people from throughout West Africa, most of whom wanted to travel to Europe, arrived in Agadez to reach Libya.

These were different cohorts from those who traditionally went to Libya for employment and who engaged in seasonal or circular migration, where they would work in Libya for a time before returning home. The trend towards seeking entry to Europe accelerated through 2014 and 2015.

Thousands of migrants left Agadez for Libya every week, a boon for the Agadez economy. In 2016, an estimated 333,000 migrants passed through the city. ECOWAS citizens were permitted visa-free travel to Libya, where costs for crossing the Mediterranean were falling dramatically, sparking a surge in irregular migration via Agadez to Sebha in Libya.

Government officials in Agadez openly celebrated the prosperity associated with migration, as drivers, fixers, landlords who ran migrant houses in neighbourhoods known as ghettos, shop owners, currency dealers, mechanics and restaurant owners benefited.

Edo State, Nigeria as a point of

origin for migrants 

Developments in Edo State, a region in southern Nigeria, illustrate the cascading impacts of Libya’s growing conflict economy. Smuggling networks in Nigeria, a point of origin for many of those on the move, expanded along with the shifts in Niger and Libya, further along the route. Incredibly, in 2017, one-in-four households in Benin City (the capital of Edo State) had at least one family member who had sought to travel to Libya.

Movement to the Libyan border was relatively affordable and prices paid to cross the Mediterranean fell dramatically – anecdotal evidence suggested a crossing may have fallen from $1,000 in 2013 to as little as $60–90 in June 2017 – as smugglers used ever-cheaper inflatable boats. The fallout of Libya’s civil war created an environment for a rapid increase in the movement of people from Edo State to Libya.

The prominence of out-migration and trafficking in and from Edo is underpinned by economic inequities. Edo’s agricultural sector – the traditional lifeblood of its economy – remains in need of investment and relies on manual labour.

Yet, such labour is increasingly insufficient for locals to make ends meet. As a result, fewer young people are entering the sector, which is contributing to its decline. Limited economic opportunities are reflected in the rates of un- and under-employment. This has led locals to seek alternative sources of income.

Interviewees in one village in Edo’s countryside said that people with the best housing often had financed it with remittances sent back from family members abroad. Seeking to access such remittances is seen as an economic lifeline.

But sending a young family member abroad to find work and send back remittances is not possible without the capital to fund travel. That leads to debt bondage, where those travelling agree to work to pay off the cost of their transportation, making those on the move more vulnerable to exploitation.

Family pressures may also play a role in encouraging travel. In some cases, where young people resist pressure to leave for Europe, families have used religious curses as a coercion tool. Traffickers have also used curses to intimidate those they traffic, preventing their escape from servitude.

Women are disproportionately impacted by trafficking dynamics. In some cases, women and girls are trafficked by their own families despite the knowledge they will be working as sex workers. Some see no alternative to make ends meet.

***

Tim Eaton – Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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Libya: Civic Space Crushed (2)

Repressive Laws, Harassment, Detentions Derail Organizations’ Work

Abusive Legal Framework

Civic groups in Libya contend with a range of abusive laws that make their work extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. The Gaddafi-era Law 19/2001 on the Reorganization of Nongovernmental Organizations greatly restricts civil society work in all of Libya, permitting registration only for groups working on social, cultural, sports-oriented, charitable, or humanitarian issues, but not other issues including human rights. The government has not clarified how organizations working on other issues can legally operate. Law 19/2001 also sets out overly burdensome registration requirements and empowers authorities to intervene in associations’ leadership and dissolve organizations without a court order. 

Some Libyan legal experts contend that Law 19/2001 was effectively suspended because the 2011 Libyan Constituent Covenant guarantees freedom of association, speech, and assembly, but that “the courts still use this law as if it’s active,” according to one expert. 

The head of a human rights group with multiple branches said the lack of a legal framework impeded the work of nongovernmental groups, forcing them to “operate in limbo,” and that it was important to ensure civil society participation in drafting a new law on associations. “People are afraid to travel as they are afraid of meeting with foreigners. Security agencies demand to give approval in advance of any meeting with foreigner groups. This is not suitable for civic work.” 

Discussions including Libyan civic groups around the adoption of a new draft law on associations are ongoing, including with officials from the civil society commission, members of the House of Representatives, and the UN special rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Activists, civil society members, and UN officials confirmed that multiple drafts of a new law on civil society were in circulation and that consultations were taking place to expedite the process, but that members of the legislative authority, rival political bodies, and civil society members had not reached consensus around a unified draft. 

Between 2019 and 2022, the former Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord regulated the work of nongovernmental groups under Decree 286.

The decree included burdensome registration requirements and stringent regulations on funding, mandating onerous advance notification for attending conferences and other events. After nongovernmental groups appealed, a Benghazi court suspended Decree 286 in 2022 for violating the 2011 constitutional declaration. 

On March 8, 2023, the Law Department of the Supreme Judicial Council issued a legal opinion, following a request by the Commission for Civil Society, declaring all civil associations and civil society organizations not established under Law 19/2001 on Nongovernmental Organizations as illegal. The Office of the Tripoli Prime Minister on March 13 reaffirmed the legal opinion and revoked the licenses of nongovernmental organizations established in Libya since 2011. However on March 21, 2023, it gave nongovernmental organizations provisional legal standing until they “correct their legal status,” without providing a clear timeline.

Legislators have yet to revoke Gaddafi-era Penal Code provisions that provide severe punishments, including the death penalty, for the establishment of “unlawful” associations.

Registration and Administrative

Impediments

She said the process for foreign nongovernmental organizations was difficult and that she and other staff members had to use their personal accounts for financial transfers, as it was not possible for the organization to open an account. “Once, we had to wait for eight months for US$2,500,” she said. “In some cases, people were not paid their salaries for seven months.” She said the financial process and reporting requirements surpassed what could be reasonably expected from a small nongovernment group and that some “banks sometimes ask for a bribe.”

Civil Society Commission

The Commission for Civil Society, established in 2018, and that operates through branches around the country, has sweeping powers to inspect and demand documents, control funding, and cancel an organization’s registration and work permits of foreign organizations. According to the head of the Commission’s branch in Tripoli, in August 2023, the House of Representatives formally took authority over the Commission from the Council of Ministers, initiated a unification process, and assigned the Commission a budget and legal status. 

The various Commission branches have taken different approaches to resolving the impasse over organizations’ registration and renewal. The director of the Zawiyah branch said it provides an interim annual document renewing existing nongovernmental organizations’ registration, while other branches, such as in Tripoli, apply standards established by the Benghazi commission in the east to register organizations. The heads of two Commission branches said intelligence agencies on occasion requested information about certain civic groups, and that nongovernmental groups sometimes needed intelligence agencies’ approval to register. 

An activist in Tripoli, whose human rights group is active on press freedom in eastern Libya, said that security agencies in the east not only harass activists and try to control their activities, but held influence with authorities, including the Commission. “You will only get the Ishhar [notice of approval] if the agencies approve of you,” he said.

Another activist who heads a media freedom organization in Tripoli accused the Commission’s branches in east and west Libya of overreach: “Independent groups [based in Libya] are under a lot of pressure, as only those affiliated with the government are able to work. In the east, there is harassment by the armed groups and control over our activities.” He also said that the registration process had become more complicated: “We got our first notice of approval [Ishhar] in 2013, and only had to renew our registration in 2021. So, in January [2021] we first applied in Tripoli, but the Commission refused to give us our registration, so in March 2022, we applied in Benghazi. It took the commission there over a year to approve.”

Arrests and Detention

An Internal Security agency in eastern Libya accused him of “contacts with international organizations,” and “attempting to undermine state security” because of his activities with a youth forum around three sensitive issues: supporting the 2021 elections roadmap, transitional justice, and social responsibility of oil companies. He said, “I, for one, was detained without an arrest warrant and released without having to make any pledge. I was beaten in detention and even contracted a skin disease that I ended up treating in Tunis after leaving Libya.” He also said that he did not have access to a lawyer throughout his arrest and detention. 

Harassment, Threats, and Attacks

Another exiled activist, from eastern Libya, said that Internal Security officers called a relative to warn against the activist speaking publicly after he was released from detention in 2022. A member of an armed group in eastern Libya called the same relative in 2023, warning him over the activist’s public criticism of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ management of major flooding that killed thousands of people in the eastern region and left thousands more missing or homeless. 

Self-Censorship and Exile

Those who remained in Libya said that they had to self-censor their speech or activities to avoid being targeted by authorities and armed groups. One seasoned activist at a human rights organization based in western Libya said that security threats were increasing and that activists had resorted to working undercover. “Most work is done in secrecy.” He said that in 2022, local groups in Tarhouna with close ties to a militia threatened him over political disagreements.

Another activist from the south said he had to restrict his activities to remain in Libya, because of an “unsafe” environment for nongovernmental organizations. He said: “Although I might occasionally post something on my personal Facebook account, since 2020, I stopped publishing articles and no longer take media requests on general or human rights issues to avoid becoming a target for militias. I do not want to leave Libya and therefore have to maintain a low profile.”

“The south used to be safer for human rights activists, but since the military offensive in 2019, civic space shrunk just as much as anywhere else. Now, there’s nowhere safe in Libya, neither in the east nor in the west. Freedom of speech has become non-existent.” 

Six of the activists interviewed said that they had been compelled to leave Libya and settle in Tunisia or in another country due to the fear of being persecuted for their work, and one said he had to leave his region and settle in Tripoli.

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Migrants in Libya: “Your destiny can change at any moment”

“People living undocumented in Libya have no protection, either in law or from the country’s fragile institutions”—inhibiting access to health care.

“Your destiny can change at any moment in Libya, all it takes is one little thing and your life is turned upside down,” said Nelson, who lost is family in a shipwreck trying to reach Europe.

In Libya, migrants and refugees live in precarious conditions and are subjected to a range of violence and abuse, both inside and outside the country’s detention centers. While some of them have come to Libya in search of work, others aim to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea from its coast. In addition to abductions, sexual assault, and other abuses, they face extortion and trafficking practices, with severely limited access to health care at a time when they desperately need it. 

“I fainted under the blows, and when I woke up, they were still beating me,” said Ahmed*, a young Sudanese boy who was arrested and thrown into prison while trying to travel to Tunisia. “I was disfigured, I had no teeth, and my friend Saud told me they had hit my head with a brick.”

Ahmed was taken care of by Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams in Zuwara, a coastal town around 60 miles from the capital, Tripoli. He was hospitalized for a month. Ahmed’s had an operation on his jaw, which was financed by MSF and carried out in a Tripoli hospital, as there was no alternative solution.

“People living undocumented in Libya have no protection, either in law or from the country’s fragile institutions, which prevents them from accessing health care,” said Steve Purbrick, MSF’s head of programs in Libya. “They are exposed to violence on a daily basis. We see people who have been trafficked, others who have been tortured, raped.”

No protection and no access to

health care

Libya is a country of departure for many people attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. Like Ahmed, undocumented migrants and refugees arriving there are exposed to violence throughout their journey. Once inside Libya, they often live in places that are overcrowded, dangerous, and unhealthy, including in shared rooms, abandoned sheds, or building sites where they are also at risk of contracting diseases.

“Their state of health reflects both their living conditions and the extreme violence they face,” said Issam Abdullah, a doctor and the deputy medical manager for MSF in Libya. “Without protection and access to care, their injuries and traumas are rapidly worsening.” 

All it takes is one little thing and your life is turned upside down—you can die, you can end up in prison.

MSF teams provide medical support in the cities of Misrata, Tripoli, and Zuwara for primary health care, sexual and reproductive health, mental health, diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis (TB), and sexual violence. The most serious medical cases requiring hospitalization are referred to the capital. 

In 2024, MSF teams carried out over 15,000 consultations. The majority of those receiving mental health care were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) linked to the violence they had endured.

“Your destiny can change at any moment in Libya, all it takes is one little thing and your life is turned upside down—you can die, you can end up in prison,” said Nelson, a man from Cameroon who has been under the care of an MSF psychologist since surviving a shipwreck that killed his wife and children as they were trying to reach Europe. “To go and see a doctor, for example, or to buy bread, you can take the wrong road and run into police. If it’s your lucky day, they don’t see you; if it’s not your lucky day, they arrest you.” 

From left: X-ray of a patient with suspected tuberculosis in Zuwara; a patient at one of the health centers where MSF provides care.

Dangers of delayed care

Faced with the risk of abduction and arrest by the police or militias, people are forced underground to isolated places where their health is even more vulnerable. many only seek medical care as a last resort when their health has already seriously deteriorated. 

In 2024, MSF teams diagnosed and treated more than 250 people with TB, of whom 16 died because they were not treated in time.

To go and see a doctor, for example, or to buy bread, you can take the wrong road and run into police. If it’s your lucky day, they don’t see you; if it’s not your lucky day, they arrest you.

“We receive people suffering from tuberculosis who seek treatment very late, which leads to high mortality and further spread of the disease,” said Dr. Abdullah. “Our teams are also seeing the negative impact of interrupted treatment.” 

Salma*, a university professor who has diabetes, fled the war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023. “Diabetes requires regular meals and medication, and in Libya that’s not possible,” she said. “When I had to leave; my health deteriorated rapidly as the days went by. I became incapable of doing anything—not cooking, not even getting dressed … I became completely dependent on my daughters.” Ismail, MSF community health worker in Belgium

A survivor’s harrowing journey to Europe

“There’s no legal route from Sudan to Libya for someone in my situation. Near the border, I was held for a month by the people smugglers until I could pay. Conditions were barbaric. There were so many of us crammed into a windowless room that we slept on our sides, like sardines in a box. They fed us very little, as a tactic to make people pay.

I got sick. My head pounded. I couldn’t eat. People told me it was malaria. I was told there was no possibility of seeing a doctor. When we were finally driven toward Tripoli, I was too weak to stand and a guard hit beat me. When I couldn’t climb back in the truck, he threatened to shoot me. I said, ‘I’m dead anyway, go ahead.’ I really thought I was going to die. The guard was startled, and thankfully people pulled me inside the truck …

The evacuation corridor from Libya

In April 2023, the United Nations published a report concluding there were grounds to believe a wide array of crimes against humanity have been committed against migrants in Libya. 

“People on the move are an integral part of an economic model set up by militias, with the complicity of the European Union and its member states, with the aim of extorting money from them,” said Purbrick. “They have to pay in exchange for their crossing, in exchange for their release, and for the continuation of their journey—but always with the risk of falling victim to criminal networks once again.”

[Migrants] have to pay in exchange for their crossing, in exchange for their release, and for the continuation of their journey—but always with the risk of falling victim to criminal networks once again.

Purbrick added, “This is why, in addition to providing access to health care in the country, we are also focusing our efforts on opening safe and legal pathways to evacuate people from Libya, in particular via the humanitarian corridor that exists between Libya and Italy. MSF participates in this corridor by identifying vulnerable people to be evacuated and taking charge of some of them in Italy. But these options need to be drastically increased.” 

Since 2021, this corridor has already enabled the evacuation of more than 700 people, around 60 of whom were MSF patients in Libya. Fourteen people subsequently received care from MSF in Palermo, Sicily.

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A license to kill refugees,’ a survivor of Libya’s migrant camps speaks out

Laure Giuily

As the scandal over the release of Libyan warlord Almasri continues to shake Italy, survivors of Libya’s migrant detention camps—now under international protection in Rome—are exposing prison horrors and urge Europe to take responsibility.

On Jan. 19, Lam Magok, a native of southern Sudan, felt a glimmer of hope for the first time in his life. He believed that Osama Almasri Najim—the man who had tortured him repeatedly— would finally face justice after being arrested in Italy.

But that hope quickly turned to bitter anger. Despite an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), two days later, the militiaman—leader of Rada forces, one of Libya’s most dangerous armed groups, and former director of the infamous Mitiga prison in Tripoli—was sent back to Libya on a plane chartered by the Italian government. Italian taxpayers footed the bill.

“I was imprisoned, tortured, I saw people executed, I collected corpses,” Lam said in a low voice, his eyes dark. “By releasing this criminal, the Italian government has made me a victim a second time,” the survivor confided. “It’s as if they’ve given Libyan militias a license to kill refugees.”

Days later, Rome’s public prosecutor’s office opened an investigation into “aiding an escape” against Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her interior and justice ministers, Matteo Piantedosi and Carlo Nordio. Lam Magok also filed a lawsuit against the prime minister and her ministers on the same charges—as a direct victim.

Six attempts to cross

Lam fled southern Sudan eight years ago. It was 2017. He left behind his parents and seven siblings in a country torn by civil war. A few months later, his father died on the frontlines.

On his journey to Europe, Lam first stopped in Egypt, then decided to work in Libya. At the border, he was kidnapped and forced into slavery in the desert, working for Libyan families.

He managed to escape and reached Tripoli, where he found work in construction to save money for passage to Italy. Six times, he tried to cross the Mediterranean. Each time, he was turned back by Libya’s so-called “coast guard”—in reality, militias.

After his last attempt, despite holding a refugee card issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), he was sentenced to three months in Jedida prison in Tripoli. Then, without explanation, he was sent for six more months to Mitiga—Libya’s “Guantanamo”—run by Almasri.

The brutality inside these prisons is unimaginable for those living on the safe side of the Mediterranean.

Packed into a hangar with 500 others, detainees slept on top of one another—either on the ground or on makeshift mattresses. Some were selected in the morning for forced labor. Others were forced, depending on their jailers’ whims, to collect the corpses of fellow inmates, endure hours of torture, or listen to executions. Many were beaten with bats or electrocuted with cables.

UNHCR under fire

After multiple escape attempts, Lam finally broke free from Mitiga and returned to Tripoli. In the fall of 2020, outside UNHCR’s headquarters in the Libyan capital, he met another Sudanese refugee—his former cellmate from Jedida and Mitiga—David Yambio.

More than 5,000 migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa and survivors of torture camps, gathered outside the UN building, desperate for protection. Lam and David also met Mahamat, a Darfur native who had fled Sudan at 17 and spent eight years trying to reach Europe via Libya.

The three men decided to take action, forming the group Refugees in Libya, which they still lead today.

“We wrote down the names of every refugee outside the UNHCR building and submitted them to the organization’s council. We decided to stage a sit-in in front of the building until our voices were heard,” Mahamat recalls.

The sit-in lasted more than three months. Eventually, the UN agency asked Libyan authorities to intervene.

One morning in January 2021, police arrested thousands of demonstrators and threw them into prison. Mahamat was sent back to Ain-Zara detention center. David and Lam managed to escape and hide.

After two years on the run, with help from several Italian organizations, Lam was granted refugee status and flown to Rome.

Alice Basiglini, vice president of the Baobab Experience, an organization that helps refugees upon arrival in Rome and provided Lam with housing, said his story is tragically common.

“In countries like Libya and Tunisia, UNHCR offers little to no protection and is powerless because it depends heavily on local interior ministries,” Basiglini lamented.

She insisted that Italy and the EU must stop working with these governments. “The EU must take a clear stance against border outsourcing, and the agreements signed between Italy and Libya in 2017 must end immediately.”

That memorandum—signed under then-Prime Minister Matteo Renzi—funded Libya’s coast guard to prevent migrants from crossing.

“We know full well that these so-called coast guards are militias. With this deal, Italy is financing dangerous organizations like Almasri’s—and we’re also funding prisons that were originally supposed to be transit centers,” Basiglini says.

‘We need to make our cause known’

After the Tripoli crackdown, Mahamat’s ordeal was far from over.

After escaping a Libyan prison, he crossed Algeria and reached Morocco. There, he survived the Melilla massacre on June 24, 2022, when at least 30 sub-Saharan migrants died while trying to scale an 18-meter fence between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Melilla. Survivors were sent back to Morocco.

Undeterred, Mahamat eventually made it to Tunisia and crossed to Lampedusa in August 2023. A few days later, he arrived in Rome.

A year and a half later, he is still waiting for refugee status—the key to working legally and moving freely.

“I still have many obstacles to overcome, but for the first time, I feel at home and safe,” he said.

“I will never forget what happened—I have to live with it. But I survived. Now, I can finally start living.”

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UN report accuses Saddam Haftar of trafficking Libyan oil

Several Arab dailies have cited a United Nations report to implicitly accuse Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the illegitimate armed forces in eastern Libya, of “smuggling” oil through indirect influence via a private oil company engaged in “crude sales.”

The Asharq Al-Awsat website reported on Feb. 23, that a Libyan company linked to the putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who controls eastern Libya, has exported at least $600 million worth of oil since May, according to shipping records and U.N. experts.

The report stated that Arkenu Oil, a relatively obscure company founded in 2023, may be facilitating diverting some of Libya’s oil revenues away from the Central Bank of Libya.

For its part, The Arab Weekly stated on Feb. 18 that Arkenu is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, who serves as chief of staff of the ground forces of the so-called Libyan National Army, according to the U.N. Panel of Experts.

Reuters previously investigated the company and, based on shipping documents and data from the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) and Kpler, found that some oil revenues are being “redirected away from the Central Bank of Libya.” Meanwhile, the investigative organization, The Sentry, raised “significant concerns about potential corruption.”

The Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat reported that the U.N. document underscored Saddam Haftar’s appointment to his military post in May last year, allowing him to strengthen his control over Libya’s relations with neighboring countries and its economic interests, according to experts.

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya has been plagued by conflicts between armed factions and remains deeply divided. An internationally recognized government operates in Tripoli in the west, while illegitimate forces led by Haftar control the country’s east.

Haftar’s forces, which control most of Libya’s oil fields, have periodically shut down production or exports, most recently in August last year, to ensure funds continue flowing to the east.

The Arab Weekly reported that journalists were unable to determine the owners of Arkenu, but a U.N. Panel of Experts stated in a report submitted to the Security Council on Dec. 13 that the company is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar.

Arkenu is headquartered in the coastal city of Benghazi in eastern Libya, which is under Haftar’s control, according to the company’s website.

OPEC member

Since he was appointed chief of staff of ground forces in May last year, Saddam Haftar has strengthened his control over the army’s economic relations and its dealings with neighboring countries, according to the U.N. report.

Arkenu was first linked to oil exports when it was awarded ownership of a May shipment by the Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO), a subsidiary of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), according to a document dated July 11, reviewed by Reuters.

Reuters also reported that Arkenu has exported seven oil shipments since July 11, 2024, bringing its total exports between May and December 2024 to 7.6 million barrels, valued at approximately $600 million based on average monthly Brent crude prices.

Despite Libya’s ongoing turmoil since Moammar Gadhafi’s overthrow, oil exports have remained under central government control. The National Oil Corporation, which has long operated independently and maintained political neutrality, still accounts for the majority of the country’s exports. It shipped approximately 264 million barrels of oil worth nearly $21 billion during the same period that Arkenu conducted its eight shipments, according to Kpler data.

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Libya: Civic Space Crushed (1)

Repressive Laws, Harassment, Detentions Derail Organizations’ Work

  • Libyan authorities have used a litany of overbroad and draconian legacy laws that violate international law to threaten, harass, arbitrarily detain, and attack civil society members and activists.
  • Targeting nongovernmental organizations risks completely closing the space for free assembly and association in the country. Many activists are self-censoring or leaving the country.
  • The authorities in both administrations vying for control of Libya should cease targeting civic groups and urgently adopt a civil society law consistent with international law. 


Libyan authorities’ accelerating targeting and harassment of activists and members of non-governmental organizations risks completely closing the space for free assembly and association in the country, Human Rights Watch said today. The authorities should cease targeting civic groups and urgently adopt a civil society law consistent with international law.

The authorities, backed by unaccountable militias and abusive internal security apparatuses, have used a litany of overbroad and draconian legacy laws that violate international law to frequently threaten, harass, arbitrarily detain, and attack civil society members and activists. One activist interviewed said he was tortured in detention. Since 2011, the authorities have passed decrees and regulations with onerous registration and administration requirements, preventing groups from establishing or maintaining a presence in the country. As a result, scores of activists have been driven out of the country, while those who remain have resorted to self-censorship and operating underground. 

“Libyan authorities need to urgently end their repressive policies, which are crushing civic space in the country and have made it near-impossible for organizations to carry out their vital work,” said Hanan Salah, associate Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Human rights groups and other civil society organizations should be able to operate without constantly having to look over their shoulder for fear of retaliation.”

Between April and October 2024, Human Rights Watch interviewed in-person and by phone 17 members of Libyan civil society organizations and activists in Libya and Tunisia, and met with student union representatives and members of the National Council on General Liberties and Human Rights (NCGLHR). Only five civil society members agreed to meet in person in Libya, the rest asked for telephone interviews or refused to respond altogether for fear of harassment by the Tripoli Internal Security Agency. Human Rights Watch has anonymized all interviews with activists to prevent retribution. 

Researchers also met with authorities in Tripoli, Zawiya, and Misrata, including with the justice minister, Commission for Civil Society, and with United Nations officials. Human Rights Watch did not obtain required permits to visit eastern Libya. 

Two rival authorities are vying for control in Libya: the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), appointed as an interim authority through a UN-led consensus process, and affiliated armed groups control western Libya. Their rivals, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and affiliated security apparatuses and militias, control eastern and southern Libya. A civilian LAAF-affiliated administration is known as the “Libyan Government.”

Human Rights Watch wrote to the Justice and Foreign Ministries in Tripoli on December 2, 2024, regarding its findings, but did not receive a response. 

The authorities in eastern and western Libya have used a slew of laws to repress civil society, including from the era of the former leader, Muammar Gaddafi. These include contested Law 19/2001 on the Reorganization of Nongovernmental Organizations, which greatly restricts civil society work and is considered as rescinded by some legal scholars because of the 2011 adoption of the Libyan Constituent Covenant by the National Transitional Council, as well as other laws governing expression and cybercrime and vaguely-worded laws on crimes against the state.

Libya’s Penal Code levies severe punishments, including the death penalty, for establishing “unlawful” associations, and stipulates prison terms for establishing or affiliating with international associations without prior “permission.” Regulations and decrees on organizing the work of nongovernmental organizations unjustifiably restrict and muzzle civic groups. 

Libyan legislative authorities should reform penal code articles that undermine freedom of expression, association, and assembly and should guarantee the peaceful exercise of those rights, Human Rights Watch said. The authorities should also promptly repeal the death penalty, including as a punishment for establishing or participating in unlawful organizations.

The authorities in both east and west of the country and armed groups have arrested and detained civil society members, often on bogus, politically-motivated charges. After the Tripoli Internal Security Agency – an armed group – arbitrarily arrested four members of the grass roots youth movement “Tanweer,” a court in Tripoli sentenced them in December 2022 to three-year prison sentences with hard labor for “atheism, agnosticism, being feminist and infidels.” Two activists, who did not wish to be named for fear of repercussions, said that these arrests and prosecutions sent a chilling message to civil society. One of them ended a movement on women’s issues they had started because of the incident.

Libyan authorities, particularly in the west, have imposed overbroad and often unworkable conditions and requirements on nongovernmental groups – domestic and international – who wish to register and obtain work permits, hindering their work. The authorities have imposed burdensome approval requirements on activities as simple as holding seminars and workshops, while onerous financial reporting requirements are often impossible for small organizations to meet. 

The establishment in 2018 of the Commission for Civil Society by the former Government of National Accord, tasked with registering and approving civic organizations and their activities, heralded further impediments to nongovernmental groups due to rivalries and inconsistencies between different branches. A process to unify the eastern and western branches started in 2023 and is still underway. Activists said the Commission had compelled some organizations to change their name or alter their objectives to obtain registration.

In the absence of a civil society organization law consistent with international law and best practices that guarantees the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression, Libyan authorities should scrap onerous restrictions on registration and allow for the free establishment of associations, Human Rights Watch said. 

Under international human rights law, freedom of expression, assembly, and association are recognized as fundamental human rights, often overlapping, and essential to the effective functioning of a democratic society and the enjoyment of other individual rights. 

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Libya ratified in 1970, states that no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of the rights to assembly and association “other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (“ordre public”), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The UN Human Rights Committee, which authoritatively interprets the Covenant, has stressed that a government should be no more restrictive than is absolutely required for any limitation on freedom of association, the detriment suffered, and the duration of the limitation. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which Libya ratified in 1963, states that “every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.” 

“Libyan authorities have used a slew of repressive laws to target civic groups while putting up obstacle after obstacle to prevent them from operating legally,” Salah said. “Civic groups cannot function effectively and safely as long as they remain in legal limbo, working in secrecy or constant fear of threat, attack, or arrest.”

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Libya: Russia Plays a New Card

Igor Delanoë 

The trip to Moscow, planned for this February by Fayez Al-Sarraj, head of the Tripoli government recognised by the UN, as well as the two trips to the Russian capital by General Khalifa Haftar in 2016, illustrate Russia’s increasing involvement in the Libyan situation.

The Kremlin’s renewed interest in Libya must be seen in the light of two recent developments: the Russian return to the Near-East and the rise of a new strong man, General Haftar, who must now be reckoned with on the Libyan scene.

Although Russia had regained a foothold in Libya by the late 2000s, it was ousted again following the NATO operation and the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011. The failure of all international attempts to unify the diverse Libyan factions, together with Russia’s increasing weight in Syria following its intervention there, have provided Moscow with an opportunity for a comeback in Libya.

Within the country proper, Russia is making a space for itself in the post-conflict efforts at political and economic reconstruction. Across the region, if the Russians manage to reconcile the groups competing for power in Libya, this will not be an end in itself but will have repercussions well beyond the local context, helping Moscow to further crystallise its influence in North Africa and the Middle East.

An Abortive Return

Colonel Qaddafi’s Libya became a client state of the USSR in the 1970s. The first major armament contract between the two countries was signed in 1974 and between 1973 and 1982 11,000 Soviet “advisers” were stationed there to train troops in the use of weaponry delivered by the USSR and which equip massively the Libyan armed forces. In 2008, Qaddafi went to Moscow—his first visit since 1985—and managed to negotiate the cancellation of his country’s debt, estimated at 4.5 billion dollars, in exchange for the resumption of trade between the two countries.

New contracts, worth somewhere between 5 and 10 billion dollars, were signed. Russian energy operators and arms manufacturers were not the only companies to regain footholds on the Libyan market: RZD (The Russian railways) landed a 2.2 billion dollar contract to build a 550 km high-speed line between Sirte and Benghazi. This was part of a regional project, a rail corridor through North Africa, but its construction was stopped by the events of 20111.

The overthrow of the Qaddafi regime put a damper on all those projects, but in April 2015, Abdullah Al-Thani, prime minister of the Tobruk government which was internationally recognised at the time, went to Moscow and already hinted that the Russo-Libyan contracts dating from the Qaddafi era might soon be on the table again. Besides its economic aspects, the Libyan question is also of political importance to the Kremlin.

Dmitri Medvedev, then president of the Federation of Russia, had refused to use the Russian veto to block resolution 1973 which laid the grounds for the NATO operation in Libya.

The Libyan question was one of the very few issues which gave rise to public disputes between President Medvedev and his prime minister, Vladimir Putin, who argued in favour of the veto.

Since then, Russia has been afflicted with the “1973 syndrome”, which goes a long way towards explaining its intransigence and constancy on the Syrian issue : Moscow has systematically used its veto over the last few years to block any resolution critical of the Damascus regime.

Libya is indeed a template for the Russian posture in Syria, and also seems to be an entry point for Russian influence in North Africa.

Khalifa Haftar, an “entrance ticket”?

Moscow leaders may well have found in General Khalifa Haftar the reliable partner they have been lacking in post-Qaddafi Libya. Commanding the National Libyan Army, Haftar is at war with groups he accuses of being “Islamists” currently holding sway in the Benghazi region.

Today, he appears to be the strong man in the Eastern part of the country. His two trips to the Russian capital in June and November 2016, and later his turning up on the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov which happened to be passing the Libyan coast in January 2017 – show the degree of Moscow’s interest in a man whose political and military mindset is keenly appreciated in the Kremlin.

For Haftar, the object of those meetings was probably to obtain the delivery of weapons which the Russians, assuming they would be willing to ship them, are for the moment unable to provide since Libya is under a UN arms embargo.

Since the end of 2015 Libyan affairs have been placed under the direct responsibility of Mikhaïl Bogdanov, Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Near-East, which attests to the importance the Kremlin attaches to the question.

The Russian objective was restated by foreign minister Serguei Lavrov on February 1, 2017, at the conclusion of the fourth session of the Forum on Russo-Arab Co-operation in Abu Dhabi. As he put it, the Russian objective is “to help the Libyans to restore their territorial integrity, their own State,” in other words to contribute to the reconciliation of the various players whose power struggles are a threat to the country’s territorial integrity.

In May 2016, the Kremlin began to take a more active role:

Russia printed four billion Libyan dinars (approximately 3 billion dollars) on behalf of the Tobruk government, eliciting protests from the Libyan Central Bank in Tripoli, seat of the government of national union recognised by the international community.

By helping him build his strong man image and consolidating the legitimacy of Khalifa Haftar, Moscow hopes to make him a central figure in Libyan politics so that Tripoli will have to accept him.

Here Russia has more latitude than France, Italy or the United States which can only support Tobruk covertly, for fear of finding themselves at odds with Tripoli authorities whom they are meant to be favouring.

Moscow’s is a long-term strategy, looking forward to the end of the embargo when the Russians will want a reliable partner in Libya to whom they can deliver weapons with a minimal risk of their falling into the hands of extremists.

However, Russian support for General Haftar is by no means unconditional, as indicated by the visit to Moscow which Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj is planning to make this month.

This journey demonstrates the influence the Kremlin has acquired in the inter-Libyan political process and illustrates the Russian refusal of a zero-sum game, which is one of the major principles of its diplomacy in the Near-East and North Africa.

Russia’s Return

Moscow’s renewed interest in Libyan affairs is not limited to the local context, it has a regional dimension. There are many other players active on the Libyan scene :

North-African (Algeria, Egypt), Near-Eastern (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey) and Western (France, Italy, USA).

General Haftar is backed by some of these (Egypt and the UAE and more discreetly by Italy, France and the USA), and for this reason he provides a common ground between these countries and Russia.

Having gained the upper hand in Syria, both militarily and diplomatically, since its armed intervention in September 2015, the Kremlin cannot afford to consider a military option in Libya which could compromise its positions in Syria.

At the very most, Russia has offered to participate in a multinational naval operation designed to prevent the seaborne delivery of weapons and reinforcements to the jihadi. On the other hand, Moscow has displayed considerable diplomatic activity founded on its capacity to promote wider discussions and fuelled by a recently acquired influence due to its Syrian breakthrough.

Its action in Libya has allowed it to enhance its already fruitful relations with certain States (Egypt, UAE) while providing more latitude in its damaged relations with other players (Qatar, France, USA).

Moscow’s involvement also echoes that of Algiers—another important partner for Russia in North Africa—which has been acting as a mediator in the Libyan situation, without much success up to now.

And Russian initiatives could also build on the efforts of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. For months now, Cairo has been urging the international community to openly support General Haftar, and according to certain sources he is shipping weapons to the Libyan National Army in spite of the UN embargo.

And yet Russia’s willingness to support General Haftar’s rise to power and at the same time maintain a dialogue with the weakened Tripoli government may be perceived as a form of duplicity.

While the Western powers find themselves increasingly marginalised in the settling of the Syrian crisis, its Libyan role also strengthens Russia’s hand in the tug of war with the Euro-Atlantic community over Ukraine and Syria, which has lasted for several years now.

The Libyan affair is a delicate one which, via the migration problem, is fuelling divisions within the European Union. And yet potentially Libya provides a space for dispassionate co-operation between Russia, the Western powers and the regional players in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.

***

Igor Delanoë – Deputy Director of the Franco-Russian Observatory (Moscow), doctor in history, specialist in Russian foreign policy and defence issues.

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A MUTINOUS ARMY

Major Abdessalam Elmadani

Following Libya’s liberation from Italian occupation in 1949, the first regular army units were formed as part of its national army. The British Army helped train and equip these forces.

In 1969, the United States trained and equipped the Libyan Air Force as well as their Army Signal and Engineering Corp.

When Gaddafi seized power in September 1969, oil receipt brought $1.4 billions to Libya. By 1980, this oil income had increased to an estimated $20 billions, more than $1.7 billions per month.

Gaddafi’s first priority was to build a strong military in order to protect his so called revolution from outside aggression. He was soon known as a big spender especially in the area of military arms and equipments where he spent most of Libya’s national wealth.

By 1976, his arms contracts with the Soviet Union totaled $12 Billions, this grew to more than $20 billions by 1980. Item purchased were 1,500 modern Soviet tanks, 7000 other armed vehicles and surface to air missiles, a mixture of sophisticated MIG fighters and long range Tupolev bombers.

He equipped his Navy with surface to surface, and surface to air missiles as well as other naval support equipments.

Libyan intelligence capabilities were modernized and augmented by East German security services force totaling more than 600 men. Following the collapse of the Berlin wall in November 1989 and the demise of East Germany as a viable state, many of Germans stayed on in Libya as paid members of Libyan Intelligence.

Gaddafi’s military expansion included many arms deals in hardware and software with numerous countries including France, Italy, Spain, Brazil,Yugoslavia among others.

His rapid military expansion and expenditures were a burden to the Libyan economy as well as to his 35,000 man army and resulted in shortages of trained and competent military personnel.

Consequently tanks and military deteriorated rapidly from non-use due to a poor level of maintenance. Also, Libya incurred a series of serious accidents in ammunition dumps and aircraft. Jet fighters were grounded for lack of qualified pilots and the necessary technicians needed to service them.

The developed world wondered why, such a small nation with limited human resources engaged in such an expansive and costly military effort.

Ultimately Libya attained a maximum military force of 60,000 men which was the limit Gaddafi could get from his small population.

The Arab nations as well as in parts of Africa. In a border dispute with Egypt, his military forces suffered a humiliating defeat on the ground and in the air. The Egyptian Army crossed into Libya while its Air Force conducted numerous air strikes at bases near Tobruk and the border. The Four dar war ended due to Algerian and Kuwaiti intervention.

In 1979, Gaddafi paraded his foreign legion troops in Benghazi and announced “Here are the liberators of the third world”. He wanted to destabilize Africa and Areas south of the Sahara in order to create a new Libyan empire in Africa.

His first expeditionary effort ended quickly in disaster when he flew some 3000 troops equipped with tanks and armored vehicles to aid Idi Amin in his fight against Ugandan exiles assisted by the Tanzanian army. Gaddafi’s forces in six days of fighting lost 500 dead and many more are still missing. He was soundly humiliated by this action.

His next military adventure was in Chad, that vast and impoverished country plagued by famine and civil unrest located south of Libya. A large Libyan expeditionary force estimated at 7000 troops. Crossed 750 miles of barren country to the capitol of Chad, (nd jamina) where they won a decisive victory.

This victory was short lived when Gaddafi announced his intention to merge Libya with Chad. Most of the Chadians as well as the African countries opposed this effort.

In 1987, Chadian forces in a swift assault badly defeated the Libyan troops, killing thousands and taking hundreds of Libyan prisoners. They pushed forward into Libya and captured Sarrah, a Libyan stronghold.

This opened the door to Shepha and ended Gaddafi’s dream of building an African Empire. However, Hebre’s Chadian army under heavy pressure from France was forced to withdrew from Libya.

Gaddafi’s military adventures taught him the lesson that modern military hardware alone does not constitute a viable army. He soon realized the dilemma he had created for himself by creating such a large military force structure which now was home-bound within Libya and which potentially could be threat to his region.

Gaddafi’s security unites, with support from loyal MIG Air Force squadron, proved their effectiveness in putting down this uprising. However, Gaddafi himself with his security unit was forced to take refuge from his military and political opposition in his barrack Azizia.

Thus, though still in charge, Gaddafi’s position remains in serious jeopardy from internal threats to his power ae well as from the impact of UN restraints on his economic system due to the PANAM 103 and UTA bombing incidents.

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Libya: The battleground of superpowers, Islamism and corruption

Amine Ayoub

Since Gaddafi’s 2011 assassination, warlords, extremists and foreign powers have exploited Libya’s instability, fueling terrorism, migration crises and Russian expansion; these threats endanger US allies and global stability, requiring urgent action.

Since the 2011 NATO-backed overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has spiraled into chaos, becoming a playground for warlords, foreign powers and Islamist militants. What was once a nation of immense wealth and strategic importance is now drowning in corruption, economic ruin and endless conflict.

But why does this matter to the U.S., and why should the world be paying attention? The answer lies in a deadly mix of geopolitics, terrorism and a crisis that could explode at any moment.

The United States has a direct stake in Libya’s future, whether it likes it or not. With vast oil reserves, a strategic Mediterranean location and a crumbling security structure, Libya is both an opportunity and a ticking time bomb. Situated just across the Mediterranean Sea from Europe, Libya serves as a crucial geopolitical pivot point, with potential ramifications for global trade routes, security and regional stability.

The country’s vast natural resources, especially its oil, could hold the key to stabilizing the North African region, but its current instability threatens the region’s fragile peace.

Libya’s internal turmoil is having rippling effects far beyond its borders. The chaos has allowed foreign powers such as Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to project their influence into the region, vying for control over the country’s resources and strategic positioning.

With Russia reinforcing military bases in Libya’s eastern region, the situation is dangerously reminiscent of Syria, where a proxy conflict between global superpowers raged on. If left unchecked, Libya could become another battleground for Russian expansion, undermining U.S. influence in the region.

Moreover, the geopolitical importance of Libya extends beyond the Middle East. The instability in Libya has direct consequences for U.S. allies in Europe. The country’s geographical location has made it a critical point of migration, with thousands of migrants fleeing the violence and poverty in search of better opportunities in Europe. As these migration routes become increasingly uncontrolled, Europe faces rising tensions, further complicating relations within the European Union and with its neighbors. The potential for this crisis to worsen could provoke a larger regional or even global conflict, drawing the U.S. and its allies into more significant involvement.

Libya’s post-Gaddafi power vacuum has turned it into a haven for Islamist extremists. The Islamic State (IS) may have been driven out of Sirte in 2016, but various Islamist factions, including Al-Qaeda affiliates and Muslim Brotherhood elements, continue to wield influence. These groups exploit weak governance, using smuggling networks and corruption to fund their operations. The collapse of central authority has allowed these groups to thrive and recruit, turning Libya into a haven for jihadists.

The implications of this are profound. Terrorist organizations and violent extremist factions in Libya are increasingly using the country as a base for launching attacks across North Africa, the Middle East and even into Europe. They use Libya’s chaotic environment to smuggle weapons, transport fighters and carry out training. Libya has effectively become a hub for jihadists, posing a direct threat to U.S. interests and its allies. If left unchecked, these groups could use the country as a springboard to launch attacks far beyond the region, creating the perfect breeding ground for international terrorism.

The threat of extremism is not confined to the borders of Libya alone. The country’s lawlessness makes it an ideal location for the transfer of arms and other illicit goods, further fueling conflict across the African continent. The destabilization of Libya also encourages the rise of transnational criminal organizations that engage in human trafficking, drug smuggling and arms trading, further contributing to the degradation of security throughout the region. These illicit activities often align with terrorist objectives, forming an interconnected web of instability and violence that reaches far beyond Libya’s borders.

While Libya remains in the headlines for its security threats, the silent devastation of corruption and poverty often goes unnoticed. Transparency International ranked Libya as the 8th most corrupt country in the world in 2024, with billions siphoned off by elites while ordinary Libyans struggle to survive. The country’s immense natural wealth, particularly its oil reserves, has failed to benefit the population due to widespread corruption and mismanagement. Instead of being a resource for national development, Libya’s oil wealth is a tool used by various factions to fuel their power struggles.

Poverty levels are soaring despite Libya’s immense natural resources, pushing more citizens into the arms of extremist groups who promise stability and financial support. A significant portion of the population remains disenfranchised, with unemployment rates climbing and basic services either non-existent or in severe decline. The economic collapse has led to widespread hunger and displacement, as families are forced to flee the violence or face starvation. As poverty deepens, so too does the risk of radicalization, with extremist groups capitalizing on the desperation of Libya’s youth by offering them a sense of purpose and financial security in exchange for allegiance to their cause.

Meanwhile, human smuggling has become one of Libya’s most profitable industries. Militia groups control smuggling routes, profiting from the desperate migrants trying to reach Europe. These militias, which thrive in the absence of a functioning government, also profit from the trafficking of arms, drugs and human lives. This crisis not only fuels violence but also impacts global security, as these same smuggling networks are used for recruiting terrorists and funneling weapons into conflict zones.

To prevent Libya from becoming another failed state beyond repair, the U.S. must step up with a decisive strategy. Washington must push back against Russia’s military expansion in Libya, counter foreign interference and prevent the country from becoming another proxy battleground. This means supporting the United Nations’ efforts to broker peace among the warring factions, while applying diplomatic pressure on Russia and other foreign powers that seek to exploit Libya’s chaos for their own geopolitical gains.

At the same time, intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism operations should be ramped up to eliminate extremist factions before they grow stronger. The U.S. must cooperate with regional partners such as Morocco to help combat the flow of weapons and fighters into and out of Libya. This will require a sustained, long-term commitment to fighting terrorism, ensuring that extremist groups are rooted out before they can further destabilize the region.

Financial sanctions must target corrupt elites profiting from Libya’s chaos, ensuring that aid reaches the people who need it most. The U.S. should leverage its economic power to sanction those who benefit from the looting of the country’s resources, while encouraging reform efforts that promote transparency and governance. Additionally, the U.S. and its European allies must dismantle human trafficking networks that fund militias and criminals, addressing the migrant crisis before it spirals further out of control.

Libya is at a crossroads. It can either descend further into chaos or rise from the ashes with the right international support. The U.S. must recognize that inaction is not an option—because what happens in Libya won’t stay in Libya. The battle for Libya is a battle for regional stability, global security and the future of American influence in the world. If Washington fails to act, the consequences will be felt far beyond North Africa.

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Redrawing borders across Libya would resolve nothing

Hafed Al-Ghwell

The unraveling of Libya since 2011 has become a woeful parable of post-intervention state collapse. What began as a movement fueled by democratic aspirations has devolved into a fragmented contest for power, with rival governments propped up by foreign patrons and an array of militias, smugglers, and political elites.

A decade of failed peace talks, broken ceasefires, rampant corruption, and splintered institutions has left the plight of ordinary Libyans drowned out by competing authorities, each extracting loyalty through coercion or patronage. Exhausted by perpetual instability, some now whisper of partition — a formal division of the country into eastern and western zones, maybe even a southern region, too — as the only remedy for this crisis.

Yet, even when framed as pragmatism, such a “national divorce” risks cementing the dysfunction rather than resolving it.

The roots of the appeal of partition lie in the intense rivalry between the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, and Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the east of the country. Backed by an array of external powers, these factions have become less national entities and more proxies in a regional power struggle.
Meanwhile, hybrid networks — militias-turned-municipal authorities, smuggling rings-turned-economic pillars — exploit the vacuum to consolidate localized control and launder ill-gotten gains.

Given that national elections are often proposed but perpetually delayed, these new “elites” have entrenched themselves, rendering traditional disarmament and governance reforms highly implausible.

Partition advocates argue that accepting this reality could halt open conflict and allow parallel governance. But Libya’s history, social cohesion, and economic anatomy defy such simplistic perspectives.

Unlike, say, Sudan or Cyprus, Libya lacks the sort of deep-rooted ethnic or sectarian divisions that could justify a “neat” bifurcation. Tribal affiliations cross over geographic lines; economic life depends on interconnected networks, including oil flows from eastern fields to western ports; and financial institutions in Tripoli underpin national transactions.

Partition would rupture these ties, sparking heated disputes over citizenship and control of resources that could escalate into violence. It would empower warlords and external forces while alienating communities dependent on interconnected trade and kinship. Far from ending Libya’s crisis, partition would codify its divisions, trading a fragile status quo for a future of smaller, weaker, and more volatile statelets.

Furthermore, redrawing borders across Libya would do nothing to resolve the crisis and instead institutionalize the forces perpetuating it. Formalizing boundaries between eastern and western territories would grant highly sought-after legitimacy to warlords and militias, transforming them from rogue actors into de facto heads of state.

No longer confined to operating in the shadows or within exclusive family dynasties, these groups would gain sovereign authority to negotiate oil deals, sign military pacts, and suppress dissent within their domains. It would mirror the post-1991 fragmentation of Somalia, where clan leaders-turned-presidents exploited newly granted recognition to entrench networks of patronage, fueling cycles of corruption and insurgency.

In addition, the absence of unified governance would invite external actors motivated by self-interest to deepen their interference. Regional powers, no longer constrained by the pretense of backing a single Libyan state, would be further emboldened to carve out exclusive spheres of influence, endorsed by a new ruling elite that would seek to safeguard its own grip on newfound power.

Formalizing boundaries between eastern and western territories would grant highly sought-after legitimacy to warlords and militias.

Whether it was to secure a buffer zone against perceived threats, or to control Mediterranean energy routes and resources, renewed competition would mirror the proxy conflicts of the Cold War, with fractured states becoming battlegrounds for rival powers.

Meanwhile, Libya’s own main rival factions, relieved of the need to compromise for the sake of national cohesion, would abandon even rhetorical commitments to democracy. Elections, already delayed since 2021, would fade from the agenda as elites in both camps focused on consolidating their own power. The result? A rapid descent into authoritarianism, with militias morphing into formal security forces that would silence opposition voices under the guise of unchecked state authority.

Without credible pathways to inclusive governance, Libyans — like the Iraqis after the 2003 invasion — could face a future in which “stability” is synonymous with repression, and national identity fractures along the lines of foreign allegiances.

The most immediate appeal of partition — a quick end to fighting — also overlooks the tenacity of Libya’s hybrid actors. Militias in Misrata, Zintan and Benghazi have survived demobilization efforts not through brute force alone but by embedding themselves in local governance. Formal disarmament and security sector reform programs, which would already be challenging even in a unified Libya, would face near-impossible hurdles in partitioned territories where militias would function as de facto state agencies.

Meanwhile, the recycled efforts by the UN to broker elections reflect an institutional paralysis that only values national polls as the more, and perhaps only, viable path toward unification. However, repeated delays and derailments of similar previous initiatives have allowed parallel institutions to calcify, with the eastern-based House of Representatives and Tripoli’s High Council of State now operating as rival legislatures, each resistant to the idea of ceding power.

The latest UN-sponsored initiative echoes familiar patterns of diplomatic theater that will not compel rival powers to change course, nor does it possess the mechanisms to disarm militias and counter foreign interference.

Like previous talks, from those in Skhirat to Geneva, all that the UN-facilitated efforts have managed to achieve is eke out hollow, power-sharing frameworks that collapse when rival factions refuse to relinquish control. As a result, there is simply no trust in any “new” proposals that continue to advocate centralized governance, leading to calls for a kind of “loose federalism” — in other words, devolving authority to regional power centers and municipalities.

However, while a loose federation could accommodate Libya’s fractured sociopolitical reality, it risks formalizing the same divisions it seeks to mend. Regions such as Cyrenaica, with its historical autonomy claims, might exploit any autonomy to monopolize oil revenues or invite even deeper foreign meddling. Meanwhile, Tripoli’s militias could leverage this newfound “freedom” to rebrand as regional security forces under the guise of local governance mandates.

Federal systems also require functional institutions and mutual trust, both of which are absent in Libya. Resource competition and tribal rivalries would transform semi-autonomous zones into contested fiefdoms. Rather than fostering unity, loose federalism could Balkanize the state, allowing external powers to manipulate regional leaders and permanently derail national cohesion.

The allure of federalism lies in its flexibility. But in the Libyan context, flexibility might only deepen the fractures that sustain its crises.

Partition offers merely the illusion of resolution and would, in reality, only worsen Libya’s woes by legitimizing fragmentation. Any sustainable peace will require dismantling the warlord economy, curtailing foreign interference, and reviving civic engagement. This will be a monumental and complicated task that cannot be outsourced to hastily drawn lines on a map.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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What Syrians Can Learn From Libya’s Revolution

Frederic Wehrey and Mieczysław Boduszyński

Two fateful missteps after the fall of dictator Muammar Qadhafi offer important lessons on the impact of early policy choices.

Jubilant crowds tearing down statues and posters of a hated despot. Feared prisons emptying out their longtime occupants. City squares hosting raucous rallies and solemn Friday prayers, free from the prying gazes of the security services. 

These exultant scenes in Syria, where a rebel coalition toppled longtime president Bashar al-Assad in December, recall another Arab revolution whose euphoric aftermath and bitter unraveling we witnessed firsthand.

The 2011 fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi at the hands of a popular uprising backed by NATO intervention was initially greeted with hopes for democracy. Yet the country soon fell into lawlessness, militia infighting, and terrorism. Some observers have warned that Syria could follow the same path—or worse.

Such pessimism is not misplaced: a cursory glance at the differences between Syria and Libya suggests Syria faces far greater difficulties.

Syria is more heterogeneous and fragmented than Libya, at least in ethnolinguistic, denominational, and regional terms—though these affiliations were long exploited and militarized by Assad during his repressive rule and crackdown. Its economy and infrastructure were decimated during a ten-year conflict. It witnessed the largest displacement of people in the twenty-first century. And vast chunks of Syria’s territory fell into the hands of terrorist organizations and militias.

In contrast, Libya’s population is smaller and more homogenous, notwithstanding the divisions that emerged during and after the revolution, often based on ideology, patronage, and locale. Libya’s uprising lasted only eight months, leaving its oil-dependent economy largely intact—though Libyan factions have engaged in a zero-sum struggle over the control of oil resources.

While uprisings in both countries devolved into proxy wars involving external actors from within the Middle East and beyond, Syria experienced far worse devastation given Russia’s indiscriminate bombing campaign and the intervention of militias backed by Iran.  

Yet Syria need not suffer the same fate as Libya. Rather, Libya’s experience shows that early leadership and decisionmaking matter. During this crucial period, Libya’s leaders made two fateful mistakes that Syrians should avoid.

First, they became obsessed with punishing anyone associated with the Qadhafi regime. 

All transitional leaders grapple with how to hold officials from the ancien régime accountable, deciding who should be prosecuted and who should be vetted and allowed to participate in the building of the new order. But in Libya, this imperative quickly became an excuse for score-settling and personal vendettas. 

In 2013, the country’s interim parliament passed a sweeping “isolation law” that called for the political and economic disenfranchisement of broad categories of Libyans. Many had only the slimmest of connections to the toppled government. The result was predictable: The split between Libyans who benefited from the legislation and those who suffered from it helped precipitate a violent civil war.

Syria’s new leaders should ensure that efforts to deal with Assad regime officials center on conduct rather than affiliation or title. Only those found guilty of abuses in fair trials should be excluded from government service. Bureaucrats in sectors such as education and health should not be branded as irredeemable stalwarts of the old regime. Relatedly, revolutionary leaders who exclude their former partners from power-sharing arrangements are also inviting a return to conflict.

Second, Libya’s government made the early fatal error of bolstering the country’s predatory and unaccountable militias.   

Aiming to control and reward the revolutionary armed groups that fought against Qadhafi while appeasing key political factions, Libyan authorities placed the militias on state payroll and attached them to ministries. As a result, their strength skyrocketed.  Attracted by the promise of a salary, thousands of young Libyan men—many of whom had not participated in the revolution—rushed to join a militia. Their leaders emerged as a new class of warlords. Meanwhile, the regular army and police stayed weak and underfunded.

Today, these militia bosses and their allies are the effective masters of Libya, having captured key functions of the state and its oil wealth. Unwilling to part with their privileges, they have blocked any moves toward an inclusive democracy.

To avoid a similar scenario, Syria’s leaders need to avoid empowering the country’s militias, including those that fought Assad. Revolutionaries who want to join the army and police and should be encouraged to do so—but as individuals. Enrolling the militias en masse into the government and channeling money to their commanders will create a country ruled by warlords, like Libya. 

That said, pushing for the immediate disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups is unrealistic. Given the weakness of Syria’s army and police, doing so would create a security vacuum. Instead, Syria’s leaders could adopt a two-pronged approach:  rebuilding a formal security sector governed by the rule of law while gradually dismantling the militias and ensuring that their members are given alternative opportunities for work or training.   

Analogizing is always fraught with pitfalls, yet Libya’s journey after Qadhafi underscores the impact that early policy choices have on whether a revolution succeeds or fails. Unfairly targeting a broad swathe of citizens for retribution and enabling the growth of militia power were two key blunders that sabotaged Libya’s transition from autocracy to democracy.  

As they embark on their own uncertain transition, Syrians can learn from Libya’s experience, and they would be wise to do so.

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Frederic Wehrey – Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

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Campaigner for migrants in Libya targeted in spyware attack

Angela Giuffrida & Stephanie Kirchgaessner

Italy-based David Yambio, a critic of Meloni government, was told of attempt to compromise his phone

An Italy-based human rights activist whose work supports the international criminal court in providing evidence about cases of abuse suffered by migrants and refugees held in Libyan detention camps and prisons has revealed that Apple informed him his phone was targeted in a spyware attack

David Yambio, the president and co-founder of Refugees in Libya, has been a critic of the Italian government’s migrant pact with the north African country and its recent controversial decision to release Osama Najim, a Libyan police chief wanted by the international criminal court (ICC) for suspected war crimes, including torture, murder, enslavement and rape. Yambio, 27, was an alleged victim of Najim’s abuses during his detention at the notorious Mitiga prison near Tripoli.

‘Why did we give back this alleged criminal?’ Pressure grows on Meloni after Italy releases wanted Libyan police chief

Yambio’s case followed revelations that an Italian investigative journalist and two activists critical of Italy’s dealings with Libya were among 90 people who received notifications from WhatsApp in late January alleging they had been targeted with spyware.

WhatsApp has said the spyware used in that breach – which affected journalists and activists and others in two dozen countries – was made by Paragon Solutions, an Israel-based company that makes cyberweapons. The Guardian reported last week that Paragon terminated its client relationship with Italy for breaking the terms of its contract, citing a person familiar with the matter.

Yambio received an email from Apple on 13 November seen by the Guardian, informing him he was being targeted by “a mercenary spyware attack” that was attempting to “remotely compromise the iPhone associated with your Apple account”. The message said the attack “is likely targeting you specifically because of who you are or what you do”.

It did not specify what kind of spyware was being used against him, and Yambio was not one of the 90 people who received a WhatsApp notification.

Yambio said he contacted a digital security expert at CyberHub-AM in Armenia, who in turn connected him with the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, which tracks digital threats against civil society and assisted WhatsApp in tracking hacking attempts made against the 90 people, allegedly using the spyware produced by Paragon. Seven of the alleged targets live in Italy.

In a statement, Citizen Lab said it was continuing to investigate Yambio’s case.

Any evidence that Yambio was targeted by spyware could have political reverberations for whoever was behind the alleged attack. The Rome statute, which established the ICC, is mandated to protect the safety and wellbeing of any witnesses and has the power to prosecute offences that obstruct witnesses.

“I already had suspicions in September when my phone started to behave strangely,” he told the Guardian. “For examples, calls would just hang up, the phone would get warm or the battery would run out really quickly.”

Spyware made by companies such as Paragon and NSO Group generally have access to multiple so-called vectors, or vulnerabilities that enable the spyware they make to infect a mobile phone. WhatsApp has previously been vulnerable to spyware made by both Paragon and NSO Group, but individuals can also be infected via SMS messages or other apps.

Paragon has not commented on the cases that have emerged in Italy but has said it has “zero tolerance” for clients that violate its terms of service, which includes prohibitions on targeting journalists and activists.

The office of the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, last week denied that domestic intelligence services or the government were behind the alleged Paragon breaches and has not responded to the claims that Paragon cancelled its contract with Italy.

Yambio has described the Italy-Libya migrant pact, which involves Italy funding the Libyan coastguard to capture people in the Mediterranean and bring them back to the north African country, as “a death sentence”.

“For three months, my life has been lived under constant threat: I do not know where it’s coming from, which government [is involved]. I live in Italy, I don’t live in any other country. So who should I hold accountable?”

He added: “The people who have so far come out in public are in Italy, and [some] of these people are in my close circle. We are people working to stop human suffering, to try to make a change, and yet we are being targeted. I am very afraid because the information concerns not only me but the life of people who [have been victims of abuse in Libya] and also the life of my partner and my child.”

Yambio is attending a press conference in the European parliament on Tuesday afternoon about the case involving Najim, also called Almasri, which has roiled Italian politics in recent weeks. The ICC said on Monday that it had officially asked Italy to explain why the country released Najim after his arrest in Turin instead of extraditing him to the Netherlands, where court is based.

Najim was repatriated to Tripoli onboard an Italian military aircraft. Meloni, who is being investigated over the matter by prosecutors in Rome, said Najim was immediately repatriated because he posed a risk to national security.

“We have not received any statement from the EU, from the European Commission, the European parliament or any member state on this case of an internationally wanted criminal who was smuggled away from justice,” said Yambio.

Yambio, from South Sudan, received asylum in Italy in 2022 after escaping from Mitiga prison, a facility under Najim’s watch and condemned by human rights organisations for its arbitrary detention, torture and abuse of political dissidents, migrants and refugees. He later crossed the Mediterranean by boat.

The pact between Italy and Libya, first signed in 2017 and renewed since, has long been condemned by humanitarian groups for pushing people back to detention camps where they face torture and other abuses.

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Libya hit by poverty

A third of the Libyan nation has no access to the national wealth.

Libya suffers from poverty, despite the significant resources it has, such as oil. 

At a time when official figures suggest that Libya is doubling its oil revenues, shocking statistics and figures are emerging about the rising poverty rate and the number of poor people in the country, raising questions about the fate of oil money and how it is spent in light of rivalry between two authorities, one based in the west and the other in the east. 

Abdul Hamid al-Fadhil, a professor of economics at Misrata University, revealed that poverty in Libya now affects 32.5 percent of the population. 

A study in the Journal of Economics and Business Studies, issued by the Faculty of Economics at Misrata University, stated that the percentage of Libyan families below the poverty line reached 32.5 percent, of which  1.9 percent are below the extreme poverty line. 

Fadhil said, “At the urban level, Tripoli recorded the largest percentage of families below the poverty line, at 11.3 percent, while families headed by individuals in the 45-55 age group are the poorest, at 12.6 percent, compared to other age groups.”

This came days after the Tripoli Security Directorate announced the arrest of 878 beggars in the capital Tripoli during the past year, including 461 women and 221 children. While 329 of those arrested were Libyan, including 61 children, the majority of those detained was foreigners, among them 283 women and 106 children. 

Observers believe that the fact that a significant group of Libyans has turned to begging indicates the stark reality of the critical economic situation the country is experiencing, the social repercussions of which cannot be ignored, especially among children. 

Observers point out that Libyans have always denied the existence of its own beggar citizens. The assumption is that any beggar who appears on the streets of cities, especially Tripoli and Benghazi, comes from a neighbouring countries. However, the situation is now different, because  poverty has pushed locals to begging or take up menial work that was once despised. 

Observers believe that a third of the Libyans is deprived of their country’s wealth, while oil and gas revenues go to corruption networks linked to political decision-making centres, warlords, militia leaders who control smuggling routes, monopolies, speculation and major deals. 

The National Institution for Human Rights in Libya has said it is unhappy with the Libyan citizens resorting to begging in the streets and public areas. It blames it on  deteriorating economic, social and living conditions for a large segments of Libyan society, as a result of inflation, rising prices, the collapse of the value of the Libyan dinar and the weakness of purchasing power.

The institution said that the economic crisis affected the poorest and most needy groups; namely the displaced, the sick, those with limited income, the unemployed and those with retirement pensions and basic solidarity pensions. 

The Minister of Economy in the Government of National Unity Mohammed al-Huwaij, has officially acknowledged that about 40 percent of Libyans are below the poverty line. The World Bank also announced that poverty rates in Libya have risen, especially in the eastern region, and attributed this to high inflation, the collapse of the local currency, the rise in the prices of basic commodities and food, in addition to the rise in the cost of health services and the low level of household income. 

The World Bank has found that although Libya is a country that falls within the upper segment of middle-income countries, its development indicators and institutional capabilities are not commensurate with its income level. Despite the growth in oil production, years of conflicts and divisions have led to insufficient public investments and infrastructure maintenance, in addition to a weak presence of the state in the economy, and the restriction of private sector development. 

The bank revealed the results of a field study which showed that the Tazirbu area is the poorest, with a poverty rate of nearly 80 percent, followed by Derna and Jalu, with a rate of 70 percent, while seven percent of the residents of the municipalities included in the study live below the poverty line, 29 percent live on less than $3 a day, and 13 percent cannot provide for their basic daily requirements. 

According to the report, 13 percent of families sell their property to cover their financial needs, and 35 percent of families have run into debt, primarily to buy food.

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All the ways Italy protected Libya

For years now, the Italian authorities have been financing, legitimizing and protecting militiamen and officials: the Almasri case is only the latest in a series of cases.

The case of the immediate release of Njeem Osama Elmasry, the head of the Libyan judicial police also known as Almasri, arrested on January 19 in Turin on a warrant from the International Criminal Court and then immediately returned to Libya by the Italian government, is only the latest in a series of political and diplomatic operations with which Italy has legitimized and protected the various leaders who have governed Libya since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2011.

These operations have often been on the edge of international law and highly controversial, because in the last 15 years Libya has been led de facto by armed militias implicated in potential war crimes, various illicit trafficking, systematic violations of human rights, and not by legitimate governments recognized throughout the national territory.

Since the fall of Gaddafi, successive Italian governments have had relations with these militias essentially for two reasons: to maintain a preferential channel of access to the oil wells and natural gas fields of Libya, which are effectively controlled by the militias, and to entrust them with the task of forcefully blocking the migrants who every year try to reach Italy by sea.

Maintaining a relationship with these militias has meant above all providing them with money, political legitimacy and protection from possible international judicial investigations: all “courtesies” , as defined for example by Luca Gambardella of Il Foglio , one of the journalists who most assiduously follows the evolution of relations between Italy and Libya.

An initial form of “courtesy” involved the allocation of European Union funds for Libya, many of which were approved under pressure from Italian diplomats and officials in European institutional settings. For example, from 2015 to 2022, the so-called European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa provided €465 million in projects for Libya, many of which were related to combating migration.

It is difficult to understand what happened to this money once it arrived in Libya.

An investigation by Lorenzo Bagnoli and Fabio Papetti published in 2022 on IrpiMedia managed to trace approximately 20 million, less than half, of the expenditure item “Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya”, relating to border control and migrant management. «The main expenditure items are 8.3 million for new marine vehicles (20 fast boats of various lengths); 3.4 for land vehicles (30 off-road vehicles, 14 ambulances and ten minibuses); 5.7 for spare parts and maintenance of naval assets; one million in training activities and one million for 14 containers», wrote Bagnoli and Papetti.

In a 2024 report , the European Court of Auditors highlighted the risk that equipment purchased with European money could have “been used by parties other than the intended beneficiaries,” and that the opaque subcontracting procedures with which the money had been managed could have “potentially benefited criminal organizations,” that is, other branches of the same militias.

It is entirely possible, then, that the untraceable portion of these funds had simply been pocketed by the militias to finance their own activities.

The financing of the militias organized in the so-called Libyan Coast Guard has also had international implications. Between 2017 and 2018, first the center-left government of Paolo Gentiloni and then the one supported by the League and the 5 Star Movement led by Giuseppe Conte worked hard to ensure that the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the UN body that governs international maritime navigation, recognized the Libyan government supported by much of the international community, namely the one in Tripoli, as having jurisdiction over a SAR zone.

SAR zones are areas of sea in which the competent coastal states undertake to maintain an active search and rescue service (in English  search and rescue , abbreviated to SAR). Managing an internationally recognized SAR zone is a symbolically important step for a state. At the same time, it is very demanding even for stable states with a Coast Guard included in the regular armed forces. Imagine for a failed state in which the Coast Guard is replaced by the armed militias that govern its territory.

During the process of recognizing Libya’s SAR zone, the IMO itself, through a spokesperson, explained that Italy and the European Commission were “supporting capacity-building efforts to establish SAR services in Libya”. Furthermore, in the first months of activity, the command center of the Libyan SAR zone was positioned on an Italian navy ship docked in the port of Tripoli. Without Italy’s diplomatic and logistical support, in short, Libya would never have obtained a SAR zone and the associated international recognition.

Both the supply of equipment and the establishment of the Libyan SAR, moreover, occurred thanks to a memorandum between Italy and Libya signed in 2017 between the government of Gentiloni and that of Tripoli, then led by Fayez al Serraj. The agreement is automatically renewed every three years and none of the Italian governments that succeeded the first Conte government has deemed it necessary to ask for changes: neither the second Conte government (supported by the PD and the M5S), nor the government of Mario Draghi nor the current one led by Giorgia Meloni.

We have known for years that the militias that make up the so-called Libyan Coast Guard are in cahoots with human traffickers and that interceptions off the coast of Libya are carried out with violent methods that put the lives of migrants at risk . The violence of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard has long been known thanks to journalistic investigations, testimonies of NGOs that rescue migrants at sea and reports from international organizations . No Italian government has ever openly condemned the actions of the so-called Libyan Coast Guard.

The memorandum also called for promoting the creation of “a civil and democratic state” in Libya. In 2018, the then Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte tried for months to organize a conference on the future of Libya. It was finally organized in Palermo in November. Both al Serraj and the head of the government that controlled and still controls eastern Libya, General Khalifa Haftar, arrived in the city and had themselves photographed shaking hands , along with Conte himself. However, the conference did not have any concrete consequences .

Haftar then, despite his status as a rebel leader with respect to the Libyan state recognized by much of the international community, has often met with the Italian prime ministers, and so have the officials and militiamen close to him: even from the eastern coasts of Libya, that is, those controlled by Haftar, thousands of migrants depart every year, and at various times when the flow of migrants from Benghazi, Tobruk, Bardia and other ports in the east has increased, people have wondered whether some sort of negotiation was underway between Haftar and the Italian government.

It is unclear whether Haftar ever obtained anything tangible from the Italian government, other than a certain political legitimacy.

The Italian government’s good relations with Haftar also extended to his son Saddam Haftar, head of the Tariq Ben Zayed militia and one of the most powerful men in eastern Libya together with his father. In the summer of 2024, Saddam Haftar came to Italy briefly and during a check was held for about an hour at Naples airport: however, he was then released and returned to Libya without problems.

In 2022, Amnesty International published a report accusing his militia of having committed “war crimes and other crimes under international law against thousands of alleged or actual critics and opponents” for years.

According to information gathered by Il Foglio to avoid similar incidents, at the end of January the head of the Italian secret service for foreign countries (AISE), Giovanni Caravelli, went to Tripoli to inform the Libyan officials and militiamen for whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant. In theory, this information is confidential to the member countries of the Court, therefore inaccessible to Libya.

During a hearing on Tuesday at the Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (COPASIR), Caravelli confirmed that he had been in Libya at the end of January but denied having released information on Libyan officials and militiamen wanted by the International Criminal Court.

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How migrant smuggling has fuelled conflict in Libya

Tim Eaton & Lubna Yousef

A systems analysis of key transit hubs

Summary

— Migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons (TIP) have gone through three phases of development in Libya. The first, from 2011 to 2017, saw the rapid expansion of these practices. The second (2017–19) consisted of a clampdown by international and local actors to reduce coastline departures for Europe. The third and current phase, broadly beginning in 2020, has seen an uptick in departures and the de facto regulation of migrant smuggling and TIP by local actors.

— To understand the development of transnational networks of migrant smuggling and TIP via Libya since 2011, this paper utilizes a comparative systems analysis of three key transit hubs: Kufra, Sebha and Zawiya. The findings illustrate how two interconnected feedback loops have driven the expansion of migrant smuggling and TIP.

The first is a dispute over authority in each location, which spurs competition that leads to violent conflict. In turn, this conflict further aggravates the contention over authority. The second is grounded in economics: the structure of the economies in the three locations is reliant on informal and illicit cross-border trade and the movement of people. As state support has diminished and the informal and illicit sectors have expanded, reliance upon the latter to boost economic activity has grown.

— These two feedback loops have contributed to the entrenchment of armed groups and strengthened a pervasive conflict economy. These dynamics continue to frustrate hopes to establish unified and accountable governance in Libya.

— Migrant smuggling and TIP dynamics are often solely viewed through the lens of criminality. However, a closer look at Libya’s trajectory since 2011 illustrates how the development of the country’s illicit marketplace – of which migrant smuggling and trafficking are central – is intimately connected to historical legacies, social dynamics and enduring conflicts over authority at both the local and national level.

— These components are particularly visible in Kufra, where there has been longstanding conflict between the Arab Zway and the Tebu over the right to govern the territory. Likewise, Sebha, a key transit point for trans-Sahelian trade, continues to be contested by a number of community groups, with governance divided into neighbourhood districts. In contrast, while Zawiya is more homogenous, there are ongoing violent conflicts for power and authority inside and outside the city’s borders.

— Framed as rule of law interventions, European attempts to curb migrant smuggling and trafficking have addressed symptoms rather than causes. Migratory flows have fluctuated – but are significantly reduced from their 2016 highs – due to a series of transactional bargains that entrench conflict. However, this has made the issue harder to resolve, as Libyan actors seek to leverage flows of migrants, which are once again on the rise, for financial and political support.

— A more effective strategy to tackle this issue would be to develop a ‘whole-of-route’ approach that contains a wider suite of policy tools than simply enforcement, most notably sustainable local development initiatives and peacebuilding efforts. These have the potential to reduce demand and the perceived need for migrants to move and tackle the enabling environment in which criminal groups and conflict actors operate.

Introduction: Libya since 2011

A pervasive conflict economy has developed in Libya since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Migrant smuggling and TIP became a key vector of this conflict economy, particularly in parts of the country reliant on cross-border trade. Libya has experienced three nationwide outbreaks of violent conflict and many episodes of localized fighting since 2011. A ceasefire has largely held across the country since 2020, but has been punctuated by sporadic armed confrontations between a range of rival groups.

While the initial violence was related to the popular uprising against the Gaddafi regime, the conflict soon became characterized by a quest for territory, power and resources. Apart from a limited period in 2021, the country has been administratively divided since 2014, with rival governments – based in the capital, Tripoli, and in the east of the country – claiming legitimacy. Amid Libya’s ongoing governance crisis and myriad conflicts, the country’s illicit marketplace has expanded dramatically. The distinction between the formal and the informal sectors, as well as the licit and illicit sectors, has become less clear, as much economic activity traverses these spaces.

Within this context, researchers and policymakers have focused significant attention on the development of migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons (TIP) in post-2011 Libya, primarily as a result of European interests and concerns over irregular migration. To date, two broad approaches have been adopted to analyse migrant smuggling and TIP on Libyan soil. The first focuses on the experiences of those traversing Libya as migrants and refugees, both voluntarily and involuntarily, highlighting the widespread violations of rights that they suffer.

The second focuses on detailed political-economy analysis of migrant smuggling and TIP, and is closely connected to assessments of migrant smuggling and TIP through the lens of organized criminality. Notably, emphasis on organized criminality has been a dominant feature of public discourse in European states. The analysis in this paper adopts a different focus, examining the role that conflict has played in the expansion of migrant smuggling and TIP from a broader, political-economy perspective, rather than through a detailed analysis of the modus operandi of migrant smuggling and TIP.

***

Tim Eaton is a senior research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House and Libya case study lead for the XCEPT research programme. His research focuses on the political economy of conflict in the MENA region and on that of the Libyan conflict, in particular.

Lubna Yousef is an independent researcher from Tripoli, Libya, based in Washington DC. A former activist on immigration issues herself, Lubna’s research focuses on the intersectionality of immigration, securitization, gender, violence and identity in contexts of conflict and cultural diversity.

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Almost an impossible mission!

Abdullah Alkabir

The UN Security Council has approved the appointment of Ghanaian diplomat, Hannah Serwaa Tetteh as the UN Special Envoy to Libya. A long time passed behind the scenes of the Security Council before the dispute over who would succeed the former envoy, Abdoulaye Bathily, was resolved between Russia on the one hand and America and Britain on the other.

After the name of the Ghanaian candidate was put forward to the Council by the UN Secretary-General, the members voted in approval, but the Russian delegate asked for some time to study before announcing his country’s approval of Ms Tetteh.

The UN envoy appointed by the Security Council has broad powers, compared to the limited and narrow powers of the acting envoy, as is the case with Ms Stephanie Koury, who took over the task after Bathily, and did not succeed in mobilizing international support for any political initiative that could yield some results, and break the political stalemate and the blocked horizon towards holding elections>

This prompted her to announce the formation of an advisory committee to review the election laws, and put forward proposals regarding the formation of a new executive authority. However, it does not appear that this committee has any powers other than submitting proposals, with no guarantees that they will be accepted by the de facto authorities.

Ms. Hanna, the new UN envoy, has extensive experience in political and diplomatic work. According to her resume, she has held several tasks and responsibilities both in her country and at the United Nations. However, the task entrusted to her does not only require experience, competence, and diplomatic skills.

The envoys who preceded her did not lack experience, because the Libyan crisis is becoming more complex with the passing of days, and foreign interventions with conflicting interests are increasing, in addition to the absence of national will among the internal parties, who are always ready to undermine any initiative that will inevitably lead to them losing their authority and influence. 

The problem has never been in the personality and nationality of the UN envoy, but rather in the international and regional conflict.

Perhaps the declared differences in the Security Council between the major powers, which sometimes reach the point of verbal abuse and exchange of accusations, are the main dilemma in the Libyan crisis, and there are no indications of the possibility of reaching a minimum level of consensus that translates into clear and binding decisions that put the country on the path to a solution.

Russia continues its penetration into Libya to be its main base in Africa, and a supply center for fighters, weapons and ammunition for the rest of the countries in which Russia has influence, as well as security and military agreements. This prompts America and Britain to move to confront the Russian expansion, and prevent the establishment of long-term military bases in Libya.

In addition to the Russian-Western conflict, there are other less intense conflicts because they are rather competitions than conflicts such as those between France and Italy, and between Egypt and Turkey, but they affect the Libyan situation, and any of these countries can thwart any change that does not serve its interests.

In this situation, the UN envoy finds herself/himself like someone walking on a tightrope suspended in space. S/he must walk carefully and maintain her/his balance so as not to fall into the void. Balance here means taking into account the interests of all countries involved in the conflict.

Can the new envoy, or any envoy, satisfy all these countries, despite their different and sometimes contradictory interests?

Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the mission of the UN envoy to facilitate consensus among the various conflicting parties is almost impossible, because the international and regional climate is turbulent and does not lead to calming the conflict zones or resolving the escalating crises on all continents.

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How Gaddafi’s trust in talks with US turned Libya into ruins

MeherNews

Since Donald Trump assumed the presidency of the United States, discussions and speculations about potential negotiations between Tehran and Washington have intensified. Such negotiations had previously taken place indirectly and led to the reaching of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, during his first term, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement despite Iran’s full compliance and imposed the harshest anti-Iranian sanctions under the so-called “maximum pressure” campaign.

In this regard, on Friday, February 7, in a meeting with the Air Force and Air Defense staff, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution emphasized the necessity of learning from two years of negotiations and compromises that led to no results. 

Beyond the JCPOA, a historical review of US commitments and treaties with other countries shows that such negotiations are often futile and even harmful—the 2003 US-Libya agreement being a prime example.

The 2003 US-Libya Agreement:

A Fateful Decision and American Betrayal

During the 1970s and 1980s, Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi, pursued nuclear, chemical, and missile programs to establish Libya as an independent power. However, US support for armed groups and political interventions turned him into the West’s primary adversary. In the 1990s, after facing severe sanctions and international isolation, Libya came under immense pressure and gradually moved toward negotiations with the West.

In 2003, Gaddafi decided to change Libya’s policies, dismantling its weapons programs, especially its nuclear program. For the West—particularly the US—this was a major victory. This agreement was perceived as a turning point, marking the end of Western hostilities against Gaddafi and his government. For the US, it temporarily eliminated Libya as a military threat, leading to the gradual lifting of sanctions.

Gaddafi assumed that cooperating with the US would remove any Western threats, reintegrate Libya into the international community, and even foster economic development. In response, Washington announced the lifting of economic sanctions and resumed trade and diplomatic relations with Libya. At the time, it seemed that Libya was on a path toward modernization and cooperation with the West—a prospect Gaddafi viewed as a success and a resolution to Libya’s crises.

However, over time, shifting geopolitical dynamics and miscalculations about Gaddafi’s stability led the US to gradually abandon its commitments. With evolving crises and internal changes in US  foreign policy, Western nations, particularly the US, broke their promises.

Eventually, in 2011, the US and its NATO allies intervened militarily, toppling Gaddafi and plunging Libya into civil war. Under the pretext of promoting democracy and freedom, NATO and the West provided diplomatic and military support to Gaddafi’s opponents. This intervention dismantled Libya’s central government, turning it into a fragmented nation overrun by armed militias, leading to the destruction of its infrastructure.

Gaddafi’s fate was tragic—after the collapse of his government, Libya became a battleground for various factions and insurgents. Gaddafi, who believed that abandoning his weapons programs would shield him from Western threats, was ultimately left without support. In 2011, he was brutally captured and killed following a massive military assault. His violent and humiliating death is regarded as one of the greatest diplomatic betrayals of modern times.

Ultimately, this agreement and subsequent betrayals not only led to Gaddafi’s downfall but also turned Libya into a failed state, where ongoing civil wars, humanitarian crises, and economic collapse persist to this day.

Post-Gaddafi Libya: A Nation in Ruins

Since Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, Libya has been trapped in chaos, civil war, and fragmentation. With the collapse of central authority, militias, insurgents, and terrorist groups like ISIL and al-Qaeda rapidly gained power. Once one of Africa’s wealthiest nations, Libya has become one of the world’s most unstable and unsafe countries in less than a decade.

A brutal civil war erupted between the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar, who was backed by Egypt, Russia, and the UAE. The war devastated infrastructure, crippled Libya’s oil industry, and triggered an economic crisis. According to UN reports, since 2011, over 20,000 people have been killed, and more than one million displaced.

Before Gaddafi’s fall, Libya produced 1.6 million barrels of oil per day, but after the war, the oil production dropped drastically. The economic collapse led to rampant unemployment, currency devaluation, and a surge in human trafficking. Libya became a major hub for smuggling African migrants to Europe.

Lessons from Gaddafi’s Mistake

One of the key takeaways from Libya’s experience is that trusting major powers without securing real guarantees can lead to irreversible consequences. Gaddafi believed that abandoning his weapons programs would prevent foreign military intervention and foster better relations with the West. Instead, this left Libya vulnerable to external interference, leading to the rapid collapse of his government.

Libya’s downfall illustrates that strategic military programs serve as deterrents. If a country easily surrenders its defensive capabilities, it becomes an easy target for regime change and foreign intervention. Gaddafi negotiated due to economic pressures and sanctions, but once he fulfilled his commitments, he realized that there were no real guarantees for his government’s survival.

This case demonstrates that any nation entering negotiations must maintain its leverage to avoid suffering Libya’s fate if circumstances change.

Furthermore, Libya’s fate serves as a warning about how the West exploits disarmament as a strategic tool to weaken countries. Once Gaddafi dismantled Libya’s defenses, the US and its allies no longer had any reason to uphold their commitments. When circumstances shifted, they easily abandoned Libya.

This shows that the countries that seek to negotiate to reduce international tensions must maintain their defense and deterrence structures to the extent that they have the ability to deal with and manage the crisis even if the other party violates the agreement.

Today, Libya and Gaddafi’s fate stands as a cautioning story for other nations considering security agreements with the West. They must recognize that diplomatic guarantees alone are insufficient, and without military deterrence, any agreement can be a tool leading to deception and weakening.

Had Libya retained its weapons programs, it might have had a different fate.

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Libya’s culture clampdown silences popular rap music

Jennifer Holleis

Libyan authorities have clamped down on rap music for violating “moral rules.” Artists fear a return to cultural repression as observers see a more general shift to a stricter Islamic way of life.

As bitter as it sounds, 2023 and 2024 were prime years for Libyan rap. The country’s political instability, economic hardship, ongoing conflicts, corruption, the devastating flood in the city of Derna and no real hope for a joint government offered plenty of material for new songs. 

Libyan rap flourished as authorities were fairly easy going. Last August, the Eastern administration under General Khalifa Hiftar gave their okay for the first Benghazi Summer Festival in 15 years. For the Benghazi-born rapper MC Mansour Unknown, it was the first opportunity ever to perform on stage in his hometown. 

Since then, pop up concerts and other rap events have been attracting ever larger audiences.  Last week, MC Mansour Unknown performed together with the Libyan rap star KA7LA in the city of Derna at a sold-out concert. 

Yet, it seems that this could have been the last time. This week, first the Eastern, and then the Western authorities clamped down on the popular music genre. “The spread of rap songs, some of which contain obscene words, violate the moral values of the Libyan Muslim society,” a statement by the Eastern administration said. 

From now on, rap musicians in the East have to obtain permission from the Benghazi-based Interior Ministry, whereas artists in the West have to get this from the Tripoli-based Culture Ministry. Both entities review if the content of the songs encourages crime, sex work, suicide or rebellions against the family or society. Without such permission, performances will be strictly forbidden across the country.

The same rule also applies to “theater shows, acting, musicals, dancing or singing performances in any place or through any means.” According to the Eastern Interior Ministry, the new rule is in line with the country’s constitution which states that freedom of expression ends where public morals are violated and conflicts with religion. 

“The Eastern authorities frame these restrictions as being Islamic societal rules,” Virginie Collombier, professor of practice at Rome’s Luiss Guido Carli University and co-editor of the book “Violence and Social Transformation in Libya,” told DW.

“This is done in a very skillful way as the authorities make sure that the broader society sides with them,” she said, adding that “this however marginalizes those people who would like to express their views in different ways, whether it’s through art, music or even more broadly, politically.” 

Rap as political outlet

In turn, Libyan rappers who address issues in their lyrics that can be understood as “rebellious” now fear a return to previous patterns of repression. 

During the period under dictator Moammar Gadhafi from 1969 to 2011, rap music was officially forbidden. It only existed underground and among the Libyan diaspora. However, in the run-up to Gadhafi’s overthrow in 2011, rappers such as Youssef Ramadan Said, better known as MC Swat, used their rap songs to call on young people to rise up. 

In February 2011, MC Swat released “Hadhee Thowra” (“This is Revolution”), in which he encouraged people to take to the streets and rebel against Gadhafi. The song became somewhat the anthem of the Libyan uprising and kicked off a golden era for Libyan rap. At the time, the then-23-year-old told US broadcaster CNN that his track described the feeling of “touching freedom.”

Return to repression

Only, the uprising turned into the First Libyan Civil War from February to October 2011 between forces loyal to Gadhafi and rebel groups who eventually killed him in December 2011. Libya’s population and Libyan rappers who had called for democracy and freedom found themselves back at square one.  

In December 2011, MC Swat released his song “Freedom of Speech” in which he rapped: “You were made to believe that the revolution has succeeded, but it has failed because of corruption.” After the release of this song, his life took a turn for the worse, he later told  British newspaper The Guardian

Armed militant groups didn’t take it well that he continued to write rap songs in which he rallied against atrocities, violence and corruption among supporters of the head of the Libyan National Army, General Khalifa Hiftar. His track “Benghazistan” (2013) in particular criticized recent assassinations and bombings in Benghazi, much to the dismay of the ruling forces. 

In 2014, the country’s political situation worsened. Since then, Libya has been divided between two rival administrations. The eastern part of the country remains under the rule of General Khalifa and the House of Representatives in Benghazi, while Libya’s west is under the administration of the UN-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) under President Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli. 

For MC Swat, his 2017 track “Exploitation,” in which he highlights the pain of the people who continue to be exploited, was the last we wrote in Libya. He fled to Italy, where he has been living since. “I wish every day that everything ends in Libya and I am able to go back home and stay with my mother and father,” he told the news outlet Middle East Eye at the time.

Influence of Salafist ideology

Human rights watchdogs and observers don’t see MC Swat’s dream come true anytime soon. “The recent ban on rap is no coincidence, it is part of a wider trend across Libya,” Collombier said.  “Both power centers in the east and west have increased their crackdown not only on personal freedoms but on any discourse that could be interpreted as threat to their control,” she added.

In her view, this trend has accelerated as both political authorities are increasingly relying on security bodies that are strongly influenced by a Salafist ideology, which follows a very conservative reading of Islam.

For Libyan rappers, all of this highly likely means that they will not be able to take to the stage and express views openly anymore. Only the technical advance of social media platforms such as Instagram, TikTok and Facebook has made it much easier to share songs with Libyan followers since the Gadhafi era. 

(DW’s Islam Alatrash contributed to this report. )

***

Jennifer Holleis – Editor and political analyst specializing in the Middle East and North Africa.

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Survivors of Libyan warlord’s violence ask why he was freed

Survivors of abuse perpetrated and overseen by a Libyan prison director have written a letter to Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni asking the reason for his release in a press conference at the Chamber of Deputies.

Refugees that were allegedly victims of Libyan warlord Osama al-Masri (also referred to as Almasri, ed. note) have written a letter to the Italian prime minister and took part in a January 29 press conference at the Chamber of Deputies, asking for clarification on why the self-proclaimed general was released.

Masri is the commander of the Mitiga prison and Tripoli branch of the Reform and Rehabilitation Institution, a notorious network of detention centers run by the government-backed Special Defense Forces.

“As survivors and victims of Osama al-Masri, we are asking for the immediate cessation of all accords between Italy and Libya enabling abuse of migrants; a public commitment to request the release of all those imprisoned in Mitiga and other detention centers in Libya; and an official explanation of why Masri — who the Italian government and [interior minister] Piantedosi called dangerous — was released instead of being handed over to the International Criminal Court.”

Detainees forced to remove corpses

The letter goes on to request a “legal pathway for migrants trapped inside Libyan detention centers, including the reopening of the Italian embassy in Tripoli for the obtaining of visas for humanitarian reasons.” Speaking on behalf of the refugees was David Yambio, the Sudanese spokesman for Refugees in Libya. Some refugees showed photos of when they tried to flee the Mitiga prison.

“Masri beat us, tortured us for days,” said Lam Magok, originally from South Sudan, in telling how he had been forced to remove the corpses of people who died. “It was something that I will never forget and it is unthinkable that one might be forced to do this. We want justice.”

‘Shocked’ by Masri’s release and

return to Libya

“The shock was enormous when I learned that Masri had been allowed to return to Libya,” continued Magok. “I have heard that Giorgia Meloni is a Christian and a mother, and I ask her how — as a mother — was it possible to release a person who tortures and kills even children every day.”

Taking part in the press conference promoted by Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra were Nicola Fratoianni, Elly Schlein, Riccardo Magi, Maria Elena Boschi, and Vittoria Baldino. “There was information provided on the Masri case. And it was a flood of hard truths — what happens when the stories of real people come onto the scene,” said one opposition leader at the event.

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Critic of Italy-Libya migration pact told he was target of Israeli spyware

Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Angela Giuffrida

Husam El Gomati, who reports on links between Italian government and Libya’s coastguard, fears for his sources.

A Sweden-based Libyan activist who has been a vocal critic of Italy and its dealings in Libya was alerted by WhatsApp last week that he had been targeted with military-grade spyware, raising new concerns about the possible use of powerful cyberweapons by European governments.

The alleged breach of Husam El Gomati’s mobile phone – as well as the mobile phones of 89 other activists, journalists and members of civil society – was discovered by WhatsApp in late December.

The California-based messaging app, which is owned by Meta, said it was not clear how long El Gomati and other mobile phones were “possibly compromised”. It said it believed the spyware was made by Paragon Solutions, an Israel-based company that was recently taken over by a US private equity company.

Paragon declined to comment. A person close to the company said it had about 35 government clients, which the person described as democratic governments.

In El Gomati’s case, the discovery was made shortly after he said in Facebook posts that he had gained access to documents from Libya about illegal migration networks, their connection to detention centres, and alleged links between militia leaders in Tripoli and Zawia and Italian intelligence officers.

Italy’s support of the Libyan coastguard and militias in Libya to help stop people from crossing the Mediterranean has long been a subject of criticism by activists, who say it has sown chaos in the country.

El Gomati says he is worried for the safety of his confidential sources in Libya. When a phone is successfully penetrated by Paragon’s spyware, which is called Graphite, the user of the spyware has total control of a person’s phone, including being able to read encrypted messages on apps such as Signal and WhatsApp.

“As an activist against corruption in Libya, protecting my sources is of utmost importance. There are individuals risking their lives to expose the deep-rooted corruption in my country and the corruption of the ruling class,” he said. “These matters can mean the difference between life and death.”

He added: “The thought of someone eavesdropping on you all day, reading your messages and having access to pictures of your children is terrifying.”

Like other makers of military-grade spyware, Paragon – which was founded by the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak – sells its spyware to government clients for the expressed purpose of targeting possible criminals. The company had reportedly agreed a $2m (£1.6m) contract with US immigration services last year under the Biden administration, but the deal was put on hold and placed under review after questions were raised about whether it complied with a Biden-era executive order limiting the use of spyware by the US government.

El Gomati contacted the Guardian about the alert he had received by WhatsApp just hours after the Guardian published a separate story about an Italian investigative journalist, Francesco Cancellato, who also received an alert from WhatsApp about his phone having possibly been compromised by the same spyware.

Cancellato is the editor-in-chief of Fanpage, an investigative outlet that gained attention last year after it published a report about young fascists within the far-right party of Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister.

It is not clear what government client was behind the targeting of El Gomati and Cancellato. WhatsApp said the targets it sent alerts to live in more than two dozen countries, including in Europe. Meloni’s office Meloni did not respond to a request for comment.

More recently, El Gomati said he had been playing an active role in reporting on the case of Osama Najim, also known as Almasri. Najim, who is the chief of Libya’s judicial police, is wanted by the international criminal court (ICC) for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as alleged rape and murder.

He also presides over Mitiga prison, a facility near Tripoli condemned by human rights organisations for the arbitrary detention, torture and abuse of political dissidents, migrants and refugees.

He was freed last month owing to a procedural technicality and flown on an official state aircraft to Tripoli. The ICC demanded an explanation, saying on Wednesday that he had been released from custody and transported back to Libya by Meloni’s government “without prior notice or consultation with the court”.

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Political Strife Doesn’t Shake Libya’s Position as Africa’s Top Oil Reserves in 2025

Dr. Miral Sabry AlAshry

Libya’s oil reserves remain a key pillar of its economy despite the ongoing political instability that has plagued the country for over a decade. While political strife has led to social unrest, economic challenges, and regional tensions, it has not diminished the strategic importance of Libya’s oil wealth. In fact, despite the turmoil, Libya continues to hold the title of Africa’s top oil reserves heading into 2025, with 48.36 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, according to a Business Insider Africa report.

The connection between political stability and economic growth is undeniable, and Libya’s prolonged political crisis has certainly been detrimental to stability, peace, and human rights. Wars, foreign interventions, and domestic strife have hindered progress, stalling infrastructure projects and leading to the shutdown of key oil fields. The shutdowns have intensified the country’s economic difficulties, making it more reliant than ever on its oil sector.

Nonetheless, Libya’s oil reserves remain its greatest asset, and they continue to drive the country’s economic engine. As of early 2025, the Arabian Gulf Company reported record production levels, reaching 304,000 barrels per day from fields like Sarir, Masla, and Nafoora. Despite an array of political and logistical challenges, the National Oil Corporation and Central Bank of Libya reported an impressive 1.417 million barrels of crude oil produced by the end of 2024, with an additional 1.469 million barrels including condensates.

Yet, Libya’s reliance on oil is both a blessing and a challenge. The oil sector accounts for over 95% of the country’s economy, and the government’s efforts to increase production face significant hurdles. To reach production targets of 1.6 million barrels per day, and eventually 2 million barrels by 2028, Libya requires an estimated $3-4 billion in investments. The 2024 oil sales generated around 90 billion dinars (approximately $18.16 billion), but this figure was down from previous years due to production declines and market fluctuations.

Political disputes and violent clashes, particularly in Zawiya, have delayed efforts to boost production. However, the government remains committed to increasing production. In early 2025, the National Oil Corporation is set to launch a licensing round for 22 areas, hoping to attract new investments and push production to 2 million barrels per day. The return of major international oil companies, such as Spain’s Repsol, Italy’s Eni, and Britain’s BP, signifies a cautiously optimistic outlook for Libya’s oil sector. Repsol, for instance, began drilling its first exploration well in a decade in December 2024, signaling a potential resurgence in exploration activities.

Libya’s oil production is far from free of complications. The country’s energy infrastructure continues to suffer from neglect and underinvestment, and external factors such as the fluctuating price of oil pose a threat to growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted that Libyan economic growth could reach 13.7% in 2025, the highest growth rate among Arab nations. This growth is largely dependent on the success of the oil sector, but there are concerns that declining oil prices and internal conflicts could slow progress.

In the coming years, Libya’s government plans to ramp up production to 1.6 million barrels per day by the end of 2025, with aspirations to reach 2 million barrels by 2028. The strategy includes the development of existing fields, the rehabilitation of infrastructure, and the attraction of foreign investment. Several local oil companies are already contributing to increased production, underscoring the country’s commitment to meeting these ambitious targets.

However, global market dynamics will also play a significant role in shaping Libya’s future in the oil industry. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has warned of continued overproduction from OPEC Plus members and strong growth in supply from non-OPEC Plus countries. Despite these challenges, global oil consumption is expected to rise, reaching 103.9 million barrels per day in 2025. Libya’s position as the owner of Africa’s largest oil reserves gives it an important role in the global energy market, but maintaining that position will require political stability and substantial investment in both exploration and production.

In conclusion, Libya’s oil industry continues to serve as a foundation for the country’s economy in 2025. Even amid political volatility, Libya’s position as Africa’s largest holder of oil reserves remains unshaken. The road ahead is fraught with challenges, but with strategic investments and ongoing efforts to stabilize the sector, Libya has the potential to capitalize on its vast energy resources, securing its place in the global energy market.

***

Prof. Miral Sabry AlAshry is Co-lead for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) at the Centre for Freedom of the Media, the Department of Journalism Studies at the University of Sheffield.

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eurasia review

Final report of the Panel of UN Experts concerning Libya

Summary

Armed groups in Libya have achieved an unprecedented level of influence over State institutions. In the west, this influence affected the ability of State institutions to implement their mandates outside the interests of armed groups. In the east, Government of National Stability bodies were used as a cover for the absolute control of the Libyan Arab armed forces (LAAF) over the governance functions in that part of Libya.

Saddam Haftar affirmed his control not only over the LAAF land force but also in relation to the external relations strategy and economic interests of LAAF.

In particular, armed groups considerably increased the amount of revenue that they generated from diesel smuggling by using the General Electric Company of Libya in Tripoli and the facilities in the old harbour in Benghazi to divert a considerable amount of diesel, and by influencing the National Oil Corporation and the Brega Petroleum Marketing Company.

Despite the absence of terrorist attacks in Libya during the reporting period, terrorist elements remained active in southern Libya, using cross-border illicit activities for financing and recruitment. LAAF leveraged the deteriorating security situation along the southern borders with neighbouring countries to strengthen its wider influence as a key regional actor with an oversight of cross-border movements, especially through security cooperation with Chad and the Niger. The armed conflict in the Sudan directly affected the security and stability of Libya.

The joint military force under the 5+5 Joint Military Commission failed to materialize due to political divisions and fragmentation within the country’s security sector. The presence of foreign fighters and private military companies further destabilized the national security landscape.

Five Libyan armed groups were responsible for systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including arbitrary detention, murder, torture and the destruction of civilian property, which they committed through institutionalized retaliatory systems designed to target civilians perceived as threats to their political and economic interests in Benghazi and Tripoli.

Human rights defenders and journalists were particularly vulnerable to abduction, enforced disappearance and intimidation. International human trafficking and smuggling networks, in collaboration with Libyan armed actors, utilized Libyan territory as a transit hub for operating 17 identified international trafficking routes.

Migrants and asylum-seekers, including children, were regularly subjected to rape and other sexual violence, mistreatment and extortion along these routes.

The Panel uncovered three well-developed Libyan trafficking networks, led by elements of armed groups, that expanded their operations in scale and complexity to increase funding for their illegal activities. The arms embargo did not prevent armed groups from obtaining equipment, both military and what the Panel considers dual-use. Sophisticated military equipment was acquired by armed groups in Misratah.

LAAF displayed its newly acquired equipment and extensive arsenal through its large-scale military exercise and parade. LAAF also grew its maritime assets significantly, by seizing two armed naval vessels and procuring through private companies dual-use vessels that were militarized after transfer.

The number of foreign naval vessels entering Libya more than doubled. Military equipment was transferred to Libya during one such visit.

The arms embargo remained ineffective where Member States controlled the logistical flow and supply chains to armed actors in Libya.

Some Member States became more open about the type of military cooperation they had implemented with western and eastern armed actors. This included an increased number of military training sessions provided by Member States and by a private entity inside and outside of Libya.

The National Oil Corporation underwent internal restructuring that now facilitates the access of armed groups to lucrative service agreements. The first private Libyan oil company, under an agreement approved by the Government of National Unity, has exported crude oil valued at around $460 million since May 2024.

Systemic issues in the estimation of fuel needs and in the supply chain facilitated the import of large surplus amounts of diesel to Libya, which was subsequently illicitly exported by armed groups.

The Panel identified the General Electric Company of Libya as the main source for such surplus diesel used in illicit exports. The Panel identified networks responsible for having exported around 450,000 tons of diesel from the Benghazi old harbour. In total, the Panel identified 185 illicit diesel exports from that location since March 2022, amounting to an estimated export volume of 1.125 million tons of diesel.

Ten Member States and 16 financial institutions were found in repeated non-compliance with the asset freeze. Some of these instances of non-compliance caused the erosion of the frozen assets. Inconsistent practices in charging negative interest and management fees, carrying out active asset management and crediting income on frozen funds persisted, in disregard of the relevant resolutions.

The Panel found the Libyan Investment Authority’s investment plan lacking in comprehensiveness, transparency and data consistency, resulting in inflated uninvested assets and overstated opportunity losses. The Authority’s frozen assets have grown since the imposition of the asset freeze, contrary to its claim of asset depletion due to the freeze.

Given this situation and considering the associated risks of misuse and misappropriation, the Panel provided its recommendations, including possible adjustments to the asset freeze to allow the Authority to reinvest frozen liquid assets with suitable safeguards pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2701 (2023).

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Turkey and Egypt want better relations. But will Libya doom the rapprochement?

Alia Brahimi

One major effect of the war in Gaza was to accelerate a rapprochement between rival regional hegemons Turkey and Egypt, both Sunni Muslim powerhouses, after more than a decade of hostility triggered by the Arab uprisings in 2011. As the relationship was restored, both parties made clear that a priority area of renewed cooperation would be to stabilize Libya. Beyond the rhetoric, what are the implications of the thaw between Turkey and Egypt for the frozen conflict in Libya?

Transactional impulses

Normalization between the two Mediterranean powers emerged at a depressing milestone for the region. The military regime in Egypt and the Islamist-leaning democracy in Turkey had been on opposite sides during the Arab Spring in late 2010 and 2011.

But by 2019, it became clear that the revolutionary wave had been decisively snuffed out. Mohamed Morsi, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader deposed by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, had died in prison in June, while the democratically elected ruler of Tunisia, where it all began, was sworn in as president in October and “used the law” to cement his authoritarian rule.

Ankara and Cairo were also eager for revived trade and investment flows, with both economies battered by high inflation. Talks began, diplomatic relations were reestablished, and confidence-building measures were performed.

But it was not until February 2024 that the entente seemed to culminate, as Sisi met Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at Cairo’s airport—and Turkey’s president set foot on Egyptian soil for the first time since 2012. Just as the visit from the fiercely pro-Palestinian Erdoğan boosted Sisi’s solidarity credentials, it gave Turkey’s president access to the front row of the Gaza war—and a channel for Turkish influence to shape its settlement and to secure reconstruction contracts.

At a joint press conference, the Egyptian president said that the aim was to raise trade volume with Turkey to $15 billion over the coming few years. And only days before the visit, Turkey announced the jewel in the crown of the rejuvenated friendship: It would supply Egypt with its famous Bayraktar drones—the lethality of which have been effectively showcased in Syria, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Libya. “Normalization in our relations is important for Egypt to have certain technologies,” Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Fikan explained, underscoring the transactional impulses driving the reconciliation.

Flashpoints flicker

However, while some flashpoints behind the decade-long rift have burned out, others are still flickering.

The 2021 lifting of the blockade of Qatar—Turkey’s ally—by its Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors, who underwrite Sisi’s regime, led to a full restoration of diplomatic relations. Similarly, differences softened regarding Syria.

While Erdoğan backed a range of anti-Assad rebels for more than a decade, Sisi seemed unmoved by Assad’s massacres and even expressed support for Syria’s military. Despite President Bashar al-Assad’s crimes, Syria was readmitted to the Arab League in 2023. In July 2024, Turkey extended an invitation to Assad for talks to resume ties.   

By contrast, the Eastern Mediterranean maritime border dispute is far from resolution. As Turkey and Greece have made overlapping claims to sea territories, involving controversial energy exploration in contested waters, Egypt has sided with Greece, going so far as to conclude a maritime border deal with Athens in 2020, after Turkey had signed its own provocative delimitation agreement with Libya the year before. For Turkey—and Greece for that matter—the row is as much about questions of identity and national sovereignty as it is about prospecting for oil. As such, compromise will be hard to come by.

Egypt and Turkey are also opposing stakeholders in the Libya conflict; in 2019-2020, they backed competing factions in a bitter war. As the eastern warlord, General Khalifa Haftar, laid siege to the capital, Tripoli, where the internationally recognized government was ensconced, Egypt was one of his main champions, alongside Russia and the United Arab Emirates.

Cairo extended full military, intelligence, and logistics support to Haftar, who tightly rules areas of southern and eastern Libya abutting Egypt’s land border. In its distress, the government in Tripoli mobilized deep historical ties to Turkey, calling upon Erdoğan for military aid.

Grasping the opportunity to project power in North Africa and to pursue contracts with an energy giant, Ankara responded, signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on security assistance in November 2019.

Turkey quickly deployed high-ranking military personnel and trainers, combat drones, air defense systems, tactical missiles, electronic warfare systems, and a fighting force of thousands of mercenaries recruited from Syria. No doubt, the Turkish intervention was decisive in beating back Haftar’s forces and in achieving a ceasefire in October 2020—which largely held, as Turkey deepened its military hold over western Libya throughout the subsequent deadlock.

Indeed, Erdoğan’s Cairo visit in early September 2024 was branded a hopeful moment for Libya, with the Turkish foreign minister going on to promise that Ankara and Cairo would work more closely on the file. But Turkey’s sustained, ongoing effort to institutionalize its security relationship with the authorities in Tripoli—essentially, to bed down in Libya—is one among several developments that put pressure on the rapprochement.

Hot summer

On August 12, the clauses of an MoU between Turkey and Prime Minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibeh’s government in Tripoli were made public, as Erdoğan submitted it to the Turkish parliament for approval.

Positioned as the outcome of a request from Libya to restructure its security sector, the MoU confers legal immunity and full autonomy upon Turkish military personnel, provides for sizable logistical and financial support from the Libyan treasury for Turkey’s activities, and allows Turkish forces unrestricted access to Libyan territory, airspace, and territorial waters.

Just as some Libyan analysts describe the agreement as “turn[ing] Libya into a military base for Turkey,” it also can be assumed that eyebrows have been raised in Cairo, which ultimately wants Turkish forces out of Libya.

Only a day before the MoU was publicized, Egypt revealed its own provocative decision in Cairo: Its prime minister received Osama Hamad, the head of the parallel eastern government of Libya, which is under Haftar’s control. This was interpreted as a direct challenge to Dbeibeh’s authority, who promptly ordered the expulsion of two Egyptian diplomats from Tripoli.

This escalation came amid a deterioration of the Libyan security environment throughout the summer. In mid-July, clashes between armed militia in Tajoura, a suburb of Tripoli, left a woman dead, and then on August 9, further clashes killed nine people and wounded sixteen.

Around the same time, Haftar mobilized military reinforcements toward southwest Libya, troubling neighboring Algeria, concerning the United Nations, and prompting military leaders allied with Dbeibeh’s government to order the return of all soldiers to their barracks and to raise their level of readiness.

Haftar’s son, Saddam, who is being groomed to lead his father’s military machinery, also sent his forces southwest to blockade production at Libya’s largest oil field—partially operated by Repsol—as part of a bizarre spat with Spain involving an arrest warrant and a visit to Italy.

These military movements, which represent the most significant risk yet to the 2020 ceasefire, occur alongside a significant institutional power grab. The IT director of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), which handles Libya’s vast oil revenues, was kidnapped outside his home on August 18; the following day, the powerful governor of the CBL, Sadiq al-Kabir, was sacked by one of the governing bodies in Tripoli.

The legality of the dismissal was unclear, but it underscored Dbeibeh’s determination to oust his former ally, who had begun gravitating toward the eastern camp and accusing Dbeibeh of mismanagement. Kabir and senior bank staff fled the country.

Changed game?

Certainly, while the main fault lines in Libya correspond to an east-west divide, the essence of the conflict is economic. The quarrel between the two authorities has been depicted varyingly as a battle between secularism and rabid Islamism, or between the new Qadhafism and democracy. Yet the fundamental dynamic is around elite capture.

The rivalry between ruling clans—increasingly associated with the Dbeibeh and Haftar families—is for access to the country’s finances and resources, licit and otherwise. In fact, Haftar’s military buildup may well turn out to be a means for increasing his leverage in the backroom deals that divide Libya’s institutions between its key powerbrokers.

This reality changes the equation for Turkey, or at least makes the calculation different than in 2019.

While embedding itself in western Libya’s security sector, Turkey has forged strong economic ties with eastern Libya, which has been awash with cash in recent years and is undergoing a construction bonanza. For example, in July, the Turkish steel producer Tosyali announced it would build the world’s largest iron and steel production plant in the world in Benghazi.

The Turkish foreign minister also met openly with Belkacem Haftar, third son of the general, who heads the newly established Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund, an opaque but flush vehicle established in the aftermath of the Derna flooding disaster.

Many of the key entities and individuals greasing the wheels of the Haftar family’s corrupt empire, from the money launderers to the upstart energy broker known as “BGN,” are based in or have strong links with Istanbul.

This growing financial partnership means it’s not predestined that Turkey would once more extend carte blanche military support to the government in Tripoli, whose mandate expired in 2021. Egypt, too, has advanced its own relations across the aisle, reopening its embassy in Tripoli in 2021. Crucially, there’s also the Russia factor.

Haftar’s “ride or die” ally is not Sisi—but Putin. Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in 2019 would have been unthinkable without support from the Kremlin and the Wagner Group, in the form of target spotting, sniping, directing artillery fire, disinformation, and flying war planes.

Libya remains central to Putin’s conception of Libya as a bridge with its Mediterranean operations in Syria and as a platform for sanctions busting and supplying the Wagner Group forces fanning out across sub-Saharan Africa.

The parameters of the pact are continually expanding, with the Kremlin planning for a naval base at Tobruk and to supply Haftar with air defence systems, while consolidating its presence across multiple military bases in Libya. Egypt is a significant force in shaping tribal undercurrents in eastern Libya, with which it shares a 1,000 kilometer land border. Ultimately, however, Haftar makes his decisions with Moscow.

Consequently, Turkish relations with Russia become more relevant for Libya than the rapprochement with Egypt, and the cards here have been reshuffled by Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A war now between Russia’s Libyan proxy and forces closely aligned with the Turkish military would bear significant implications for NATO and threaten to spread the conflagration in Europe to the shores of the Mediterranean.

It is likely, therefore, that Haftar would only make another move on Tripoli after consultations and accommodations were made with Turkey. However, as the sands in Libya rapidly shift, and a multiplicity of militia mobilize to protect their criminal empires, there is plenty of scope for local actors to upend the best laid plans of regional hegemons and to unleash further disaster.

***

Alia Brahimi is a nonresident senior fellow within the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and the writer and host of the Guns for Hire podcast.

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As Rome Mutinies, Justice for Libya Fades (2)

Maria Crippa and Matteo Colorio

Consequences

In the Elmasry case, Italy breached its international obligation to cooperate with the ICC. Italy failed to surrender the accused to the Court and has apparently evaded the consultation obligation under Art. 97 Rome St. The ICC’s press release reveals that the Court “is seeking, and is yet to obtain, verification from the authorities on the steps reportedly taken.” The competent Pre-Trial Chamber could bring Italy’s failure to cooperate to the attention of the UN Security Council, which referred the Libyan situation to the ICC in 2011. The Council could issue a binding resolution acting under Chapter VII or even adopt sanctions. However, previous experiences tell us the Council will unlikely act upon the non-cooperation.

Given that Elmasry’s arrest warrant also encompasses the crime of torture, Italy has also breached its obligation to prosecute or extradite Elmasry to a state willing and able to do so under Article 7.1 of the Convention against Torture (CAT). Libya will almost certainly not initiate proceedings against him. The aut dedere aut judicare is an obligation erga omnes partes, and thus – as in Belgium v. Senegal – Italy’s state responsibility could be upheld by the International Court of Justice on the initiative of any other CAT’s State Party.

At the domestic level, Elmasry’s release and expulsion could also trigger the individual responsibility of senior figures in the Italian government. On 28 January, Rome’s Prosecutor Office received a criminal complaint alleging that the Italian Prime Minister, the Undersecretary to the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministers of Justice and Interior are responsible for the crimes of aiding and abetting Elmasry to evade justice (Art. 378 Criminal Code, CC) and of embezzlement of public funds for the use of the Italian intelligence’s plane to repatriate him to Libya (Art. 314 CC).

Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced in a video that she has been served with a notice of investigation. Under Italian law, a notice of investigation constitutes a procedural prerequisite not implying any finding of criminal wrongdoing on the part of the recipient but aiming to guarantee his or her right to defence. A different act is the formal communication to members of the government of criminal complaints received against them, required – prior to any investigations – by Art. 6.2 of the Constitutional Law 1/1989.

This latter communication – not the notice of investigation – was received by Prime Minister Meloni and others in connection with the Elmasry case. It should be noted that Art. 96 of the Italian Constitution and Constitutional Law 1/1989 grant the Prime Minister and the other Ministers of the government relative immunity from prosecution for crimes allegedly committed as part of their official functions. The authority to allow the investigation to proceed is vested in the Parliament, unless the individuals concerned voluntarily waive their immunities.

Conclusion

In 2023, the Italian Prime Minister declared the government’s commitment to prosecute high-level migrant smugglers “all over the world.” The Elmasry case stands in sharp contrast with this stance. The Italian handling of this case frustrates the prospects of arresting Elmasry, at least for the foreseeable future. His triumphant return to Libya also reinforced his sense of impunity, along with that of many other perpetrators of heinous crimes around the world.

The Elmasry precedent undermines the mutual trust that underpins the functioning of the Joint Team, as the participating national authorities may question the Italian commitment to the fight against impunity for extreme violence against migrants.

The lack of sound legal justifications for the decision suggests that political considerations influenced the matter, possibly reflecting the complex relationship between Italian and Libyan authorities. The Italian government seemed eager to resolve the matter as quickly as possible, as also the immediate expulsion of Elmasry to Libya for “reasons of state security” suggests. It is questionable how bringing Elmasry back to Libya, the state where he is accused of having committed heinous crimes, can effectively address security concerns that, according to the Italian government, originate in those very crimes.

Overall, the Elmasry case reveals that, due to legal and political shortcomings, Italy failed once again to discharge its share of the burden in the international criminal justice system. Rome mutinied just as the first ICC suspect was apprehended on Italian soil.

***

Maria Crippa is a postdoctoral fellow in international criminal law at the University of Milan and a visiting researcher at the University of Tilburg.

Matteo Colorio is a PhD candidate in international law at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa and a visiting researcher at the University of Tilburg.]

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Libya’s de facto partition demands a solution designed for it—not for outside contenders

Hani Shennib

While the West continues to fixate on elections in promoting democracy worldwide, many Libyans today have become resentful. They largely perceive the elections touted by the West as part of a strategy to legitimize a government that serves foreign interests rather than fulfilling Libyans’ needs for stability and institution building.

They simply do not trust that elections conducted under current conditions—characterized by a lack of constitutional foundations, profound corruption, forceful arrests, and streets dominated by militias and warlords—can lead to fair outcomes.

Meanwhile, the West and its partners, caught up in defending democracy and human rights, feel guilt over their failure to stabilize Libya following an intervention that bizarrely morphed from a mission to protect a population from Muammar Gaddafi’s wrath into one of regime change.

Consequently, the coalition has yet again turned to an inept United Nations (UN)to push for democratic change through elections. However, this goal has not materialized and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

Historically, other countries have approached resolving the situation in Libya with a mindset of “what’s in it for me?,” highlighting how national and regional interests shape attempts at change—particularly in the context of Libya.

This was similarly true during UN discussions on how to address Italian colonies taken by the Allies post-World War II and the intense negotiations among the United States, European countries, and Russia regarding Libya’s fate in the late 1940s. Notably, strong views were expressed by Azzam Pasha (an Egyptian diplomat who was at the time the secretary general of the Arab League) regarding Egypt’s interests in Libya. Such discussions have an eerie similarity to today’s regional and international negotiations about Libya’s future.

Currently, the motivations for international involvement in Libya are shaped by three main concerns:

1) Europe’s alarm over the massive scale of illegal migration flowing through porous Libyan borders and its significant security and socioeconomic implications;

2) unease about the potential downward spiral of sociopolitical conditions in North African and Sahel states, which could undermine the economic interests of major corporations in the region; and

3) worry that a chaotic and fragile state may allow terrorist entities to thrive and potentially spread, escalating security threats.

In the eyes of the international community, these concerns require dealing with a central authority in Libya, regardless of the authority’s perceived legitimacy or its true value to the Libyan people and their institution building. These factors have, in part, led to a series of poorly devised proposals and roadmaps put forth by the UN and endorsed by international actors, which have resulted in little progress and worsened the divisions currently observed in Libya today.

From my observations during my frequent visits to the country and my conversations with Libyan leaders, politicians, and academics, I have identified five reasons why previous efforts put forth by the international community to shape a modern state in Libya have failed.

First, there are historical roots of division that have not yet been addressed. This is one of the reasons why the numerous attempts by multiple representatives of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to engage Libyan actors in various stabilizing roadmaps over the last thirteen years have failed miserably.

The last effort, expected to lead to elections in December 2022, went nowhere due to political wrangling between two executive bodies and two legislative ones located—by no coincidence—in the eastern and western parts of the country, reflecting the historical divisions between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. It is practically impossible to envision effective presidential and parliamentary elections occurring in the near future without acknowledging these historical roots of division.

Second, it is clear that political and security actors on the ground in both regions of Libya have exploited these divisions for their own political and financial benefit through alliances with benefactor militias, corrupt entrepreneurs, members of the nouveau riche, and cross-border smugglers.

This blend of neo-militocracy and kleptocracy heavily influences political and security decisions in the executive, legislative, judicial, and security branches in Libya, ensuring that national and international distractions allow them to remain in power for the foreseeable future.

Third, after forty-two years of oppression and a dismissal of rights and democracy under Gaddafi, as well as additional fourteen years of poverty and insecurity following the collapse of state institutions in 2011, the populace is busy with surviving day by day and lacks the means necessary to express their discontent.

This, along with a sense of defeat regarding their aspirations for a better life following the failed Arab Spring, renders it unlikely that any significant movement will arise from the streets of Libyan cities in the near future, creating grounds for the continuation of the status quo.

Fourth and most importantly, the emergence of more pressing global conflicts and a shift in the international community’s priorities over the past four years, particularly with a focus on Ukraine and Southeast Asia, has diminished the attention and resources devoted to Libya’s situation.

That is the case despite the fact that the West is concerned about the exponential growth of Russian and Chinese influence in Libya and the African continent at large. 

Last, it is clear that the populations of many developing countries, particularly in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya), perceive Western governments to have lost their moral compass and can no longer be trusted as custodians of democratic and humanitarian change.

This perception has been exacerbated by the catastrophe that has befallen the Arab people of Gaza—which countries in the West either failed to prevent or openly supported. Thus, in the eyes of the Libyan people, the West’s ability to recommend, supervise, or contribute to any democratic or nation-building initiatives has become compromised.

This observation reinforces a decade-long sentiment among Arabs that it is not uncommon for Western governments to support and deal with autocracies and militaries throughout the Arab world—from Algeria to Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States—contributing to their skepticism about elections and hopes for democratic change.

One of the few successes in Libya since 2020 (the year that marked the end of the civil war that divided the country into territories east and west of the city of Sirte), is that the line dividing the country has become more distinct.

Today, Libya has two governments, effectively two legislative bodies, and two security entities controlling the political, economic, and daily operations in their respective regions. Ironically—despite initial unifying efforts to address the disastrous situation in the aftermath of Storm Daniel in 2023, which claimed nearly twelve thousand lives—grand reconstruction opportunities in the regions have instead led to further segmentation of decision making and project funding.

Such mega-funding and the anticipated engagement of international corporations and governments has only further entrenched Libya’s split.

Thus, Libya is currently a de facto two-state entity. The elusive internationally recognized government based in Tripoli exists primarily to allow the international community and its corporations to advance their own interests, failing to address the complex realities on the ground in Libya.

International players such as China, Russia, and others are moving within Libya with disregard to issues of migration or border security, and are more focused on strategic economic engagement with Africa. This further undermines European and US interests while taking advantage of the West’s inertia and lack of clear strategy and engagement in Libya. 

Furthermore, Libyans have grown disillusioned with the role of the international community and the United Nations, and they no longer trust or see much value in UNSMIL. Libyans are now gradually accepting and adapting to the current de facto demarcation of the country, going along with this in almost every aspect of their daily functions.

An unnatural symbiosis seems to be developing between the aspirations of the people of Cyrenaica for more regional governance—away from the centralist hegemony Tripolitania exercised since 1969—and the military autocracy led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

At the same time, the internationally recognized government in Libya’s west continues to struggle to maintain power under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah who (along with his cousin) was sanctioned for corruption by the Libyan interim government and continues to face allegations of corruption, which he denies. Recent street anger against Dbeibah, stemming from his government’s attempt at rapprochement with Israeli officials as well as an escalation of pressure from dissatisfied militia, could catalyze the collapse of the internationally recognized government.

This, in turn, could prompt Dbeibah to resort to military skirmishes with the east to distract from public discontent and prolong his government’s lifespan.

This week, the UN secretary-general appointed Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, a seasoned Ghanaian diplomat, as the new head of UNSMIL, making her the tenth person to serve that position in thirteen years. The appointment came after much wrangling between the United States and Russia, again suggesting that foreign interests will likely continue to dominate conversations about resolutions for Libya.

Libya needs new ideas and a national and international will to reset a realistic path toward a modern state, premised on a recognition of its history and a mentality of “what’s in it” not just for the international community but, more importantly, for its own people, as well.

***

Hani Shennib is the founding president of the National Council on US-Libya Relations.

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As Rome Mutinies, Justice for Libya Fades (1)

Maria Crippa and Matteo Colorio

Introduction

Osama Elmasry Njeem, also known as Elmasry, was arrested in Italy on 19 January 2025, pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC). He registered his name at a hotel in Turin and seemed unaware that he was an internationally wanted man. Tipped by Interpol, the Italian authorities showed up at his hotel and took him into custody that morning.

As the news of Elmasry’s arrest spread, enthusiasm grew for the prospect of the first ICC prosecution in the Libyan situation. Elmasry is the head of the Libyan judicial police. The ICC accuses him of crimes against humanity and war crimes – including murder, torture, persecution, rape and sexual violence – perpetrated against migrants and refugees at Tripoli’s Mitiga detention centre from February 2015 onwards.

But hopes lasted only a few hours. In the afternoon of 21 January 2025, only two days after he was apprehended, the Court of Appeals of Rome issued an order to release Elmasry (an unofficial English translation of the order is available here). The Italian government immediately transferred him on a state flight back to Libya, where he was enthusiastically welcomed. The ICC issued a harsh press release in response, stating that the Italian authorities released Elmasry “without prior notice or consultation with the Court.”

The Elmasry case reveals Italy’s difficult relationship with international criminal justice. The Court of Appeals of Rome’s decision to order his release sheds light on controversial issues of interpretation of Italian legislation on cooperation with the ICC, particularly a hidden place for unfettered political discretion.

In 1998, Italy hosted the diplomatic conference that led to the adoption of the Statute of the ICC, therefore called the Rome Statute. Italy was among the first states to ratify it in July 1999. However, only in 2012 did Italy equip itself with the necessary legislation to cooperate with the Court (Law 20 December 2012, n° 237).

The legal framework remains incomplete as Italy has not yet domesticated core international crimes into its legislation. In 2022 a commission of experts appointed by the former Minister of Justice (MoJ) produced a comprehensive draft code of international crimes. The new government then shelved this draft code. Italy remains the only EU Member State that has not yet criminalised core international crimes at the domestic level.

Nonetheless, Italy at times demonstrates a certain willingness to contribute to accountability efforts for atrocity crimes, particularly those perpetrated in Libya. The Italian legislation for cooperating with the ICC was passed precisely in reaction to the outbreak of the Libyan crisis in 2011.

Torture and other crimes perpetrated against migrants in the detention centres in Libya were prosecuted on several occasions before Italian courts. Furthermore, Italy signed a Joint Team Agreement under the framework of Article 19 of the UNTOC in 2022, together with the authorities of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain, and the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC, with the support of Europol.

The Joint Team focuses on high-level perpetrators of extreme violence against migrants and aims to facilitate intelligence sharing and the execution of arrest warrants (see here and here).

The Elmasry’s Release Decision

The Elmasry case, however, brings back to the foreground the other side of Italy’s relationship with international criminal justice, where political interests prevail. These regressive forces are particularly evident in the Libyan situation, given Italy’s controversial financial support to Libyan authorities to ‘deal’ with migrant management since 2017, which might implicate the responsibility of various members of the current and previous governments.

On 18 January, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issued, by majority, the arrest warrant against Elmasry (the OTP’s application dated back to 2 October 2024). On the same day, the ICC Registry submitted a request for his arrest to six States Parties, including Italy, via designated diplomatic channels. The Court also asked Interpol to issue a Red Notice.

Italy, as a State Party to the Rome Statute, was obliged to cooperate fully with the Court in the execution of the arrest warrant issued against Elmasry pursuant to Art. 86 of the Statute. Art. 89.1 specifically empowers the Court to request the arrest and surrender of a person and requires States Parties to comply with such requests.

Nonetheless, on 21 January 2025, the Court of Appeals of Rome granted the General Prosecutor’s request to dismiss the proceeding on the confirmation of Elmasry’s arrest. In the absence of a legitimate legal basis for his custody, Elmasry was then promptly released.

The court ruled that Elmasry’s arrest did not comply with procedures established by Law 237/2012, rendering it “irrituale” (‘not ritual’, meaning an irregular act that does not strictly comply with procedural rules). Specifically, Elmasry was arrested at the initiative of the Italian police, acting on an Interpol Red Notice.

The court noted that such a police initiative is not explicitly provided for executing ICC arrest warrants (Art. 11 Law 237/2012), whereas it forms part of the extradition procedure (Art. 716 Code of Criminal Procedure, CCP). According to the court, this omission precludes any power of initiative upon the police in the execution of ICC arrest warrants.

Instead, any act of cooperation with the ICC requires prior formal communication between the MoJ – the central authority responsible for receiving, coordinating and following up on ICC’s requests – and the General Prosecutor (Art. 2 Law 237/2012).

This interpretation of Law 237/2012 raises two significant issues. First, the law’s general provisions explicitly state that ICC cooperation should follow extradition norms unless otherwise provided (Art. 3 Law 237/2012). Thus, the lack of reference to the concrete modalities for executing ICC arrest warrants in Law 237/2012 leaves open the applicability of provisions governing the execution of extradition arrest warrants by the police.

Requiring prior communications between the MoJ and the General Prosecutor could compromise the timely execution of Interpol Red Notices or even ICC’s urgent requests for provisional arrests. In urgent cases, the ICC may also request provisional arrest pending the production of documents supporting the request for surrender (Artt. 59.1 and 92 Rome St.).

The approach adopted by the Court of Appeals seems rather inconsistent with the teleological interpretation of Law 237/2012 and risks undermining its concrete applicability.

In any case, according to the ICC, the request for arrest and surrender was transferred to competent Italian authorities already on 18 January 2025, before Elmasry’s arrest. It is legitimate to ask what the Italian police should have done when confronted simultaneously with the MoJ’s inaction and an Interpol Red Notice.

Even if the arrest was deemed “irrituale”, the General Prosecutor retained the option to request the Court of Appeals to confirm custody pending the surrender to the ICC. Under Italian criminal procedure, the confirmation of an arrest warrant and the application of precautionary measures are subject to independent examination (Art. 391 CCP). It is not uncommon for precautionary measures to be applied even when an arrest is not validated.

However, the General Prosecutor did not request the application of precautionary measures in the absence of any instruction by the MoJ. The Minister was informed by the General Prosecutor of Elmasry’s arrest at the latest on 20 January.

Since Law 237/2012 does not prescribe specific time limits for confirming arrest warrants and precautionary measures, the provisions governing extradition apply. The police had 48 hours to submit the arrest report to the Court of Appeals, which, in turn, had another 48 hours to validate the arrest warrant and decide on custody (Article 716 CCP).

On 21 January, the MoJ publicly stated that he was “considering” whether to formally transmit the ICC’s request to the General Prosecutor. However, such a request not being received, the Court of Appeals denied custody of Elmasry, who was immediately put on board an Italian intelligence plane heading for Libya.

It is noteworthy that neither Law 237/2012 nor the Rome Statute grants the MoJ any political discretion in following up on requests for arrest and surrender from the ICC. By contrast, such discretion is explicitly provided for extradition cases that may threaten sovereignty, national security, or the State’s essential interests (Artt. 697.1-bis and 701.3 CCP).

Law 237/2012 only accords the MoJ the power to suspend the transmission of documents or disclosure of evidence if they involve national security information (Art. 5). Art. 13 stipulates that the Court of Appeals can deny the surrender to the ICC only in enumerated cases, none of which can be ascribed to a political decision by the MoJ.

Against this backdrop, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Law 237/2012 in the Elmasry release decision appears to assign a key – or even preclusive – role to the MoJ in a cooperation mechanism that instead leaves the Minister without decision-making power on the merits.

Even assuming a legitimate legal issue arose in surrendering Elmasry to the ICC when a requested State identifies any problems which may impede or prevent the execution of a Court’s cooperation request, it is bound to consult with the Court to resolve the matter (Art. 97 Rome St.).

***

Maria Crippa is a postdoctoral fellow in international criminal law at the University of Milan and a visiting researcher at the University of Tilburg.

Matteo Colorio is a PhD candidate in international law at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa and a visiting researcher at the University of Tilburg.]

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Colombian Mercenaries in Transit to Sudan via Libya – What do we Know? 

Carlos Gonzales

A video of some rocky outcrops in the Libyan desert geolocated by Bellingcat may hold clues about the journey of a missing Colombian who is among several reportedly recruited and sent to Sudan’s civil war, where his fate remains unknown.

According to reports by Colombian media and the Wall Street Journal, more than a hundred Colombian ex-soldiers were recruited to fight with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan.  Colombian President Gustavo Petro has asked the Foreign Ministry to look for options to return those involved in the scheme to Colombia.

Colombian outlet La Silla Vacia spoke to several ex-soldiers who were reportedly recruited by a Colombian security company with links to the UAE, a number of whom said they had been misled about their ultimate destination and transported to Sudan via Libya. 

In videos circulating on November 21, the passport and other identity documents of Christian Lombana Moncayo were exhibited by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in the aftermath of an alleged ambush against an RSF convoy somewhere in the desert along the border between Libya, Chad and Sudan. So far, we have not been able to geolocate this footage.

It is unclear if Lombana Moncayo was killed, wounded or detained in the alleged ambush. It is also not clear how the SAF got hold of his documentation. We reviewed his social media posts and found more details about his journey, including his final TikTok post, which we geolocated to Libya.

Sudan is in the midst of an ongoing civil war, which broke out after a peaceful uprising by civilians against dictator Omar al-Bashir. Following his ousting, two rival factions – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo known as General Hemedti and reportedly backed by the UAE among others– have been fiercely fighting over control of large swathes of the country.  Libya is one of the countries identified as a source of mercenaries moving into Sudan.

From Colombia to the United

Arab Emirates 

On November 21, videos circulated on social media allegedly showing SAF in control of pallets of ammunition after an ambush on an RSF convoy at an unknown desert location. 

Soldiers at the scene were filmed sifting through personal documents which included family letters, a passport and ID cards of Colombian nationals. But how did Lombana Moncayo’s documents end up there?

Bellingcat analysed and cross-referenced the ambush footage with social media posts made by Lombana Moncayo on TikTok. We were able to match the Christian Lombana Moncayo seen in the ID documents with the social media handles by comparing key biographical details including his name, date of birth and place of origin along with his travel itinerary with details on the TikTok account. 

Cross-referencing the series of stamps on Lombana Moncayo’s passport, his TikTok videos with details of his travels and FlightRadar data; it appears that he arrived in Abu Dhabi from Bogotá after a stop in Paris in early October, 2024. Also, based on these stamps, it seems he stayed in Abu Dhabi only a short time before departing from the UAE on October 11, 2024.

During his time in the UAE, Lombana Moncayo appears to have stayed at the hotel La Quinta by Wyndham Abu Dhabi Al Wahda in the Emirates’ capital. 

The Journey Continues 

On November 17, just four days before the alleged SAF ambush videos started to circulate online, Lombana Moncayo posted his last TikTok video on the analysed account. The footage was filmed from inside a moving vehicle passing by a series of hills, one very close to the road and the others in the background. The low sun position appears to indicate the video was filmed either in the early morning or late afternoon.

Based on the testimonies given to La Silla Vacia, we worked on the assumption that Lombana Moncayo left the UAE to Benghazi, Libya and then was transported by road to Sudan. There is only one road connecting Benghazi with the southeastern town of Al-Jawf, which is closer to the border with Sudan, as indicated in red below. He only road connecting Benghazi with the town of Al Jawf in Libya’s east highlighted in red. Using this road and Google Earth, we started our hunt for areas featuring terrain features similar to the ones seen in Lombana Moncayo’s video until we found an area of interest just north of Al-Jawf.

A close-up of the Area of Interest on Google Earth Pro. Credit: Google Earth Pro. Maxar Technologies/Landsat-Copernicus/CNES-Airbus. We shortlisted those areas where the hills were close to the road as seen in the video. The shortlisted section of road featuring hills very close to the road. Credit: TikTok.

Further review of satellite imagery allowed us to find a match in the sand pattern on the slope of one of  the hills along this sector of the road, approximately here: 25.099960, 22.955852 about 110km north of Al-Jawf and approximately 300-400km from the border with Sudan.

Further inspection of the hills in the background using PeakVisor helped us to verify the location. The solar path simulation using the same tool appears to suggest the video was filmed at around 18:00 in October-November, which is consistent with Lombana Moncayo leaving the UAE on October 11 and posting the video on November 17.

Bellingcat determined this footage was filmed from a moving vehicle heading towards the town of Al-Jawf in southwestern Libya, approximately 300-400km from the border with Sudan. If the video was indeed filmed by Lombana Moncayo, our findings tally with testimonies reported by La Silla Vacia of the transit of Colombians through Libya into Sudan.

The timing of the video, posted on November 17, would line up with the appearance of his passport and other documents on November 21, exhibited by the SAF in the aftermath of the alleged ambush in the desert along the border between Libya, Chad and Sudan.

***

Carlos Gonzales is a researcher and trainer at Bellingcat. Carlos fuses his engineering background with digital forensics. He specialises in the analysis of photographs, videos, satellite imagery, social media posts, timelines and 3D scene reconstruction. In 2020, he was nominated to the European Press Prize category Innovation.

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Italy says Libya war crimes suspect was sent home due to ‘social dangerousness’

Tim Dowling

General Osama Najim was released on a technicality and repatriated by Italy without any prior consultation, says international criminal court

Italy’s interior minister said on Thursday a Libyan man detained under an international war crimes arrest warrant and then unexpectedly released had been swiftly repatriated because of his “social dangerousness“.

Osama Najim, also known as Almasri, was detained on Sunday in Turin under an arrest warrant issued by The Hague-based international criminal court (ICC).

Najim, who is chief of Libya’s judicial police, is wanted by the ICC for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as alleged rape and murder. He also presides over Mitiga prison, a facility near Tripoli condemned by human rights organisations for the arbitrary detention, torture and abuse of political dissidents, migrants and refugees.

He was freed on Tuesday due to a procedural technicality and flown on an official state aircraft to Tripoli. The ICC demanded an explanation, saying on Wednesday that he had been released from custody and transported back to Libya by prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s rightwing government “without prior notice or consultation with the court”.

“Following the non-validation of the arrest … considering that the Libyan citizen … presented a profile of social dangerousness … I adopted an expulsion order for reasons of state security,” interior minister Matteo Piantedosi said.

Italian foreign minister Antonio Tajani made light of the ICC’s objections, telling reporters the international court “is not the word of God, it’s not the font of all truth”.

“Italy is a sovereign country and we make our own decisions,” he added.

Najim is a brigadier general in Libya’s judicial police who the ICC says is suspected of crimes against humanity and war crimes at Mitiga prison.

Meloni’s government depends heavily on Libyan security forces to prevent would-be migrants from leaving the north African nation and heading to southern Italy.

Piantedosi told lawmakers during a question time session in the Senate that Rome’s appeals court ordered Najim’s release because they considered his arrest non-compliant with procedures.

An interior ministry source told Reuters previously that he was freed because local police had not immediately informed the justice ministry of the arrest, as required.

Opposition parties said Piantedosi’s explanations were inadequate and called on prime minister Meloni to come to parliament to clarify.

“You are plunging our country into utter shame, you talk about technicalities, but you have made a precise political choice,” said senator Giuseppe De Cristofaro, from the Green-Left Alliance party.

These days I only have one rule when it comes to new year resolutions: do not, under any circumstances, write them down. Don’t put them on social media, or on a Post-it note stuck to your bathroom mirror, or in the notes section of your phone. Chances are high you won’t keep your resolutions, but as long as you don’t write them down chances are equally high you’ll have no memory of making them by next December. 

I’ve learned there is simply no point in negotiating with future you – this person who no longer shares your goal to write a play, or to read 50 books in a year. Don’t let their failure be your failure. Besides: if you only manage to read nine books in 2025, you’ll still be nine books less stupid than you were in 2024.

In the meantime here’s something you can do right now to override future-you’s lack of commitment: support the Guardian’s work in 2025. You’ll be supporting independent journalism at a time when it’s more desperately needed than ever, and I promise that we will never send you an email reminding you to practice your Italian.

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Russia Lost Syria. Can Libya Replace It?

Brandon J. Weichert

The Russian Navy is not out of

the Mediterranean Sea.

Momentous, once-in-a-generation geopolitical changes are underway in the Middle East. Since November of last year, with the sweeping away of the Iranian and Russian-backed Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, from power, a new order is rising. Whether this new order will last, or if it will even serve American and allied interests, remains very much in question.

The fact of the matter is, though, the Russo-Iranian alliance in the Middle East has been dealt a serious blow with the loss of Assad’s regime in Syria.

That is now being made all the more evident by the fact that the new Turkish-backed Islamist government in Damascus, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has officially evicted the Russian Navy from its Eastern Mediterranean redoubt in Tartus.

The Russian naval facility in Tartus had been in Russian hands since the 1970s, when the then-Soviet Union made an alliance with Hafez Assad, the blood-soaked father of Bashar Assad. Over the years, Tartus had fallen into disrepair, notably in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Moscow, however, maintained its foothold there.

Russia’s Quest for Warm Water Ports

After all, Russian leaders have striven to expand Russian access to warm water ports since the age of Peter the Great. Tartus represented one of only a handful of major Russian warm water ports from which their navy could operate unimpeded all year round. 

Other than Tartus, the Russians have only warm water ports in Vladivostok, Sevastopol, and Kaliningrad. From Tartus, Russian forces were able to project power in the Mediterranean Sea. More importantly, however, the Russians were able to use Tartus as a key base to conduct counterterrorism missions as well as to use it as a logistics hub for Moscow’s ongoing operations throughout Africa.

By the time the Syrian Civil War erupted at the tail end of the Arab Spring (or Islamist Winter), Russia’s military had decided to intervene directly against various jihadist elements seeking to overthrow Assad’s regime, with the witting or unwitting support of the West.

As an aside, many of the jihadists who comprised the ranks of ISIS and Al Nusra Front (al Qaeda in Syria), along with a coterie of other, smaller terrorist groups, founded HTS.

Between its Middle East foray and the African mission, the Tartus base, despite its relatively small size, punched well above its weight in terms of importance. Now, it’s gone.

You Break It, You Own It

Western policymakers and propagandists are spiking the football, so to speak, now that the Russians are out of Syria. But this may very well be a case of “if you break it, you own it.” If HTS reverts to its jihadist roots, then it is likely that the Americans and Israelis will have far greater problems on their hands in the long-run in Syria than they ever had before with Assad running things and the Russians maintaining a small warm-water port there. 

The gains that America has made from the exit from Tartus are particularly small because the Russian Navy is not out of the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, around the same time that HTS was storming across Syria, Russian-backed militants in the war-torn North African nation of Libya under the command of General Khalifa Haftar were intensifying their own offensive against the Turkish-backed groups struggling to control Libya.

Out of that morass, Moscow let it slip that they were interested in building a brand new, sprawling warm-water port in chaotic Libya. Russia already has a few airbases there, and reports have emerged that Moscow has been moving large numbers of aircraft and transport ships to Eastern Syria, which is controlled by Haftar’s pro-Russian Libyan militants. 

Libya is a Greater Prize for Putin

Libya has Africa’s largest proven oil reserves and, just as in Syria, the Russians are competing with Islamist Turkey for control over the country (ostensibly for control over those energy sources). 

The loss of Syria ended the decade-long push by Moscow and Tehran to build a nexus of pipelines to transport Middle East fossil fuels through Syria into Europe. Now, Syria will be controlled by Turkish-backed HTS, meaning the energy will flow through Turkey into Europe, and benefit the powers of both the Middle East and the West that are not aligned with Russia. 

Libya, though, is another matter. 

Having been on the backburner of geopolitics since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 (and the devastating events at Benghazi a year later), Libya is set to explode once more on the headlines, as there is no way that Russia can simply ignore the pristine opportunity for their naval power projection in the Mediterranean that a potential base on the Libyan coastline offers. 

What’s more, Libya’s location in Africa positions Russian supply lines much closer to their interests on the continent—all while still allowing the Russian military to project power into the Middle East next door.

While the loss of Syria is unquestionably a short-term humiliation for Moscow, the longer-term strategic benefits may go to the Kremlin. Russia now has the chance to shore up Haftar’s forces in Libya, thereby denying Libya to the oil-hungry Turks and their jihadist proxies there, all while making it possible for Moscow to establish a larger, more modern naval facility. Such a facility would make it far easier for Russia to project power into resource-rich Africa and the Middle East—all as the Americans are on the backfoot in Syria and are almost completely boxed out of Africa.

***

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest.

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Is Trump about to shake up the MENA region?

Hafed Al-Ghwell

As we enter 2025, the Middle East and North Africa region – MENA – stands at a major turning point shaped by a complex mix of unique internal dynamics and political economies, shifting geopolitical realities, economic dependencies, significant demographic shifts and persistent external influences.

The impending return of Donald Trump to the White House signals a seismic shift for the Arab region, as a rehashed “America First” agenda promises an aggressive decoupling from entanglements in the MENA region. This approach, characterized by a reduced US presence and a reliance on normalization efforts or coalition-building, seeks to empower key regional players as primary stabilizers and collaborators in overseeing the Arab world’s hotspots.

However, today’s geopolitical climate demands a reevaluation of such plans. The blend of autonomy and ambition seen in the actions of key regional players — pursuing independent security and economic agendas — reflects a departure from any reliance on or even expectation of US oversight. This independence complicates any simplistic American exit strategy, tying Washington’s hands as it navigates a myriad of intersecting disputes and alliances.

Meanwhile, Arab countries are progressively asserting themselves, filling vacuums left by US disengagement — challenging the efficacy of a wholesale withdrawal or any reconfiguration mirroring past policies. Thus, the Trump administration will be forced to consider a more integrated and contextually aware strategy, sensitive to the evolved dynamics of power and influence in this strategic part of the world.

After all, despite the region’s shifting dynamics, its strategic importance remains poised to increase even further, driven primarily by an anticipated rise in the region’s share of global oil production. Forecasts suggest that the Arab world’s contribution to global oil output will surge from under 30 percent to more than 40 percent, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for half of the Gulf’s production. This uptick not only cements the region’s dominant role in energy markets but also underwrites the growing influence of Gulf Cooperation Council states within global economic and political frameworks.

Economically, countries like Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran stand to benefit significantly from high revenues linked to the continued global demand for oil and gas. The crucial challenge, however, lies in modernization. Iraq, for instance, must proactively overhaul its production infrastructure to secure vital oil assets and mitigate risks associated with dilapidated pipelines, vulnerable export terminals and contested maritime routes. These vulnerabilities could potentially disrupt the flow of oil, causing dangerous fluctuations in national revenues.

Furthermore, rationalizing domestic consumption is pivotal. Without enhancing energy security and efficiency, the impressive potential economic windfall from oil sales may remain untapped. This predicament echoes the larger narrative of the Middle East’s economic history, where heavy dependence on oil revenues has often led to short-term prosperity but long-term instability. Nations that fail to diversify their economies and reinforce their energy sectors may find themselves unable to sustain economic growth. This year, oil producers must thus determine whether they can modernize and grow or risk regression due to infrastructural and strategic deficiencies.

However, as parts of the Arab region lean on their dependence on hydrocarbons to navigate a changing world, this reliance reveals vulnerabilities that extend beyond economic fluctuations to geopolitical instability. For instance, the presence and potential spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, particularly among unaccountable nonstate actors, poses profound threats. For countries heavily invested in petro-economies, any disruption in safety or security could precipitate economic freefall and amplify regional volatility.

Moreover, the growing possibility that regional states might pursue more aggressive nuclear capabilities as a means of deterrence further complicates this security dilemma. In this environment, the risk of an arms race looms large, exacerbated by the interplay between regional adversaries whose hostilities compound the fragile peace and could prompt conflict spillovers that reverberate globally.

As parts of the Arab region lean on their dependence on hydrocarbons to navigate a changing world, this reliance reveals vulnerabilities that extend beyond economic fluctuations to geopolitical instability

Should the situation worsen, it will test and ultimately fracture our fragmented global order, which is already stretched thin trying to address multiple crises in real time. The proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, especially among proxy actors not beholden to any state, adds another layer of complexity, making it increasingly difficult for the international community to engage effectively and promote de-escalation. As global powers grapple with shifting alliances and their own internal challenges, the Arab region risks becoming a theater for proxy confrontations, driven by miscalculation or opportunism.

Further compounding these concerns is the profound impact of demographic trends to the internal dynamics and political economies of the Arab region. Despite a forecasted drop in fertility rates, the region’s population is set to grow significantly, with the working-age population expanding by almost 50 percent. This transformation requires substantial economic opportunities and reforms to integrate the emerging workforce effectively. Some countries are already experiencing how insufficient job creation leads to high youth unemployment rates — now almost double the global average. The consequences are far-reaching.

A failure to provide economic pathways for this swelling demographic risks breeding disillusionment, potentially driving young people toward radical ideologies or mass migration, both of which could destabilize the region’s sociopolitical structures. The previous wave of youth discontent ignited the so-called Arab Spring, upending governments and causing widespread unrest. Today’s scenario, compounded by an already unstable geopolitical context, demands urgent and strategic responses before a regression into turmoil.

Next, a significant force shaping the Arab region over the next decades is the escalating scarcity of resources, particularly when combined with deteriorating infrastructure and environmental degradation. Water scarcity poses the most acute challenge, given its central role in food, energy and human security. The overlapping issues of population growth, climate change and unsustainable resource management amplify these pressures. The further straining of rapidly dwindling water resources and arable land has already-visible consequences, heightening risks of social unrest and interstate water conflicts, especially in river basins like the Nile, Tigris and Euphrates.

Finally, the region’s diminishing governability is a growing concern. Internal cohesion faces threats from myriad directions, including economic mismanagement, corruption and external geopolitical meddling, complicating effective governance. National borders are already porous to these risks, diluting state authority and fostering environments where nonstate actors and extremist groups can flourish, exploiting governance vacuums.

In sum, the year 2025 and those beyond it present a complex array of challenges and opportunities for the Arab world. Economic potential remains limitless, but only when coupled with the imperatives of modernization and security. Demographic shifts necessitate agile political and economic reforms to harness the youth bulge as an asset rather than a liability. Resource management and environmental sustainability require urgent attention to prevent further sociopolitical deterioration. The period over the next half-decade demands both strategic foresight and adaptability from leaders and international actors alike.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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