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A new phase of Russian expansion on the African continent opens, after the loss of positions in Syria following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime.

Russia is expanding its military presence in Libya by transferring men and equipment to the Maaten al Sarra base, on the border with Chad and Sudan. This was reported by well-informed Libyan sources to “Agenzia Nova”. Located in a strategic position, this air base, used during the Libyan-Chadian war of the 1980s, is now at the center of a major Russian operation to strengthen control over the Sahel region, an area increasingly at the center of Moscow’s geopolitical interests.

In December 2024, the Russian Federation sent a group of Syrian soldiers fleeing Hay’at Tahrir al Sham to re-establish the base, with the aim of transforming it into a strategic point for military operations in Africa, from which to directly supply Mali, Burkina Faso and, potentially, Sudan. This marks a new phase in Russian expansion on the African continent, after the loss of its positions in Syria following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime .

Russia is stepping up its involvement in Libya, transferring military equipment via dozens of flights between Benghazi and the Latakia base in Syria. In recent months, Moscow has expanded its presence in the North African country, strengthening its operations at its four main air bases:

(a) al Khadim base, in the east of the country;

(b) al Jufra base, in the center;

(c) al Brak al Shati base, southwest of Sebha, the capital of the Fezzan region; and

(d) Al Qurdabiya base, in Sirte, in the north-central area.

These bases host a variety of military equipment, including air defenses, MiG-29 fighters and drones, and are operated by a mixed contingent of Russian military personnel and Wagner Group mercenaries, far from the supervision of Libyan authorities.

According to Nova sources , Moscow has recently expanded its presence with a new military base, namely Maaten al Sarra, in an area that has historically had strategic importance. The same sources report that, in December 2024, Russia transferred large quantities of military equipment and sent a force of Syrian officers and soldiers to the base, many of whom had previously been deployed in Syria and left the country after the fall of the Assad regime.

The Syrian military, together with Russian technicians, have begun to put the base back into operation, restoring infrastructure such as runways and warehouses. However, the base still needs new facilities, including housing, warehouses, control towers and security fences. However, sources say the work will not take long and that Russia has already begun to take control of a base that has been abandoned for years in the Libyan desert.

The Maaten al Sarra base is set to become a key logistics hub for Russian operations in Africa, and an important hub for the flow of supplies to other areas of the Sahel, particularly Mali and Burkina Faso, where Russia has already consolidated its military presence. In addition, the base is also strategic for protecting supply routes to Sudan, a country experiencing serious internal instability.

According to “Nova” sources , a large military convoy of the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade – affiliated with the LNA Ground Forces Chief of Staff, Saddam Haftar – recently headed towards Maaten al Sarra to secure the area and protect the routes to Sudan, including the supply of weapons and fuel from the port of Tobruk, in north-eastern Libya, to Sudan.

Despite Russia’s growing military presence in the region, Nova’s sources point out that Moscow has distanced itself from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudanese paramilitary group commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo , known as Hemeti. Russia has in fact developed closer ties with General Abdel Fattah al Burhan , head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while ties with Hemeti have cooled following the death of the Wagner group’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin , in 2023. Be that as it may, the sources point out that the Russians do not oppose the flow of supplies from Libyan territory to Hemeti’s forces.

Another significant aspect of the Russian operation in Libya is the growing connection with the tribal communities of Fezzan, a desert region in southern Libya that extends towards Chad and Niger. The Russians have been able to forge alliances with local tribes, especially those who control the border areas, to strengthen their strategic position and access natural wealth, such as the gold mines of the Kalanga mountains. These mines, located in an area controlled by the Tebu tribes, are a valuable asset for Russia, which has intensified its presence in the region.

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Libya on Monday voiced a strong commitment to renewing previous agreements with Türkiye, seeking to finalize a free trade deal and boost investments with its largest commercial partner.

The North African country is looking to diversify its economy beyond oil and considers Türkiye as a strategic partner in achieving sustainable development, its Economy and Trade Minister Mohamed Al-Hwej said.

Libya has Africa’s most abundant hydrocarbon reserves but is struggling to recover from years of conflict after the 2011 NATO-backed uprising that overthrew longtime dictator Moammar Gadhafi.

It has since been split between a U.N.-supported government in the capital, Tripoli, and rival authorities based in the east. Each side has been backed by different armed groups and foreign governments.

There have been frequent blockades of oil installations, often because of social demands or political disputes. Al-Hwej’s remarks came on the sidelines of the Libya Energy and Economic Summit in the capital city of Tripoli.

“This summit is about energy because we know there is no economy without energy. Whether it’s transportation, industry, agriculture or services, energy forms the backbone of economic activity,” he told Anadolu Agency (AA). Türkiye has been a significant supporter of Libya and its Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA).

The two states saw closer ties in recent years, especially after the signing of security and maritime boundary pacts in late 2019, along with Ankara’s aid to help the legitimate U.N.-backed Libyan government push back putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces.

The deal over the Eastern Mediterranean demarcated the countries’ shared maritime borders to prevent any fait accompli by regional states. The two countries also signed an energy exploration agreement in October 2022 to explore hydrocarbons in Libya’s exclusive economic zone and the mainland by Türkiye.

Highlighting Türkiye’s successful economic model, the minister added, “Türkiye’s experience is one of the best in the short term, and we hope to benefit from this expertise.”

The minister described Türkiye as Libya’s top commercial partner, noting that Ankara’s role extends beyond trade. “We now see Türkiye as a strategic partner in every sector, including infrastructure, the petroleum industry, services, energy, health care and economic development,” he said.

FTA talks to resume

The minister revealed that Libya is preparing to renegotiate and renew previous agreements with Türkiye, with the goal of reaching a free trade agreement (FTA) and promoting investment. “We recently met with the Turkish trade minister. We now aim to finalize a free trade agreement, encourage investments and update all prior agreements and memoranda of understanding,” he stated.

Libya and Türkiye, both members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC), are also working to finalize a double taxation avoidance agreement. “We have already presented a comprehensive project on this, and it is close to being signed,” Al-Hwej said, adding that a project for free trade and exemption from double taxation was also proposed.

“We will meet with Türkiye’s trade minister and other relevant ministries to finalize this free trade agreement between Libya and Türkiye, overcoming all challenges between the two countries,” he said.

‘Long-term strategic partner’

The minister stressed the importance of removing barriers to trade and facilitating private-sector partnerships. “Libyan businessmen and the private sector prioritize Türkiye because they see it as a key player in Libya’s next phase of economic development. We consider Türkiye a long-term strategic partner,” he added.

The minister emphasized that Libya’s strategic location as a gateway between North and South, East and West, combined with its vast energy resources, positions energy as a cornerstone of the national economy. “We are prioritizing Türkiye within the framework of previous agreements and memoranda of understanding,” Al-Hwej said.

“Turkish companies are welcome to participate not only in exploration activities but also in the downstream sectors such as refining and petrochemicals. As the Ministry of Economy, we are committed to providing all possible legal facilitations for these partnerships,” he said.

Al-Hwej said Libya prioritizes partnership with Türkiye “because of our long shared history.” The minister expressed confidence in Libya’s economic trajectory. “Libya is undergoing a rapid transition toward sustainable economic growth. In this environment, we expect our growth rate to surpass that of other Mediterranean countries. We will take practical steps toward these goals,” he concluded.

TPAO eyes opportunities in Libya

Separately, Turkish Petroleum Corporation’s (TPAO) top executive said the state energy company is ready to invest in Libya’s energy sector, banking on the country’s vast untapped resources. Speaking on the sidelines of the Libya Energy and Economic Summit (LEES) 2025 in Tripoli, General Manager Ahmet Türkoğlu underscored TPAO’s renewed interest in Libya as part of its global expansion strategy.

“We are here because we see great potential,” Türkoğlu said on Sunday, citing the North African nation’s ambition to boost oil production to 2 million barrels per day. “I am sure Libya will achieve much more.” Oil production in Libya had hovered for a decade at around 1.2 million barrels per day but rose to 1.4 million barrels per day in early December. Pre-uprising output was between 1.5 million and 1.6 million barrels per day.

Türkoğlu reiterated Ankara’s confidence in Libya’s energy prospects, stating that TPAO is ready to commit significant investments. “In the past, we invested but unfortunately had to leave. Now, we plan to rebuild relations and are ready to invest billions of dollars in this great potential,” he said.

He highlighted Libya’s offshore energy sector as a promising area for exploration and development, describing existing fields and brownfields as holding immense opportunities. “We believe in offshore potential. Current fields and brownfields have great opportunities for investment. We are ready to invest in this potential,” he noted.

Türkoğlu ​​also said TPAO is prepared to secure contracts for both new exploration blocks and existing ones to enhance their performance and efficiency.

Transparency in Libya’s energy market

Türkoğlu emphasized the importance of competition and transparency in Libya’s energy market to attract foreign investment. “We need to create a win-win environment where both Libya and investors can thrive,” he said, stressing the need for improved sustainability, predictability, and financial compliance.

He pointed out challenges faced by foreign investors in Libya, calling for straightforward, competitive, and transparent market access to allow for broader participation and contribution to Libya’s economic growth. Despite obstacles, Türkoğlu expressed optimism about Libya’s energy future, provided a balanced environment benefiting both the country and its investors is established.

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David Cowan

The single most important piece of evidence from the case was a thumbnail-sized fragment of circuit board, found embedded in the neck band of a shirt from the suitcase that held the bomb.

The trial judges accepted evidence from scientists that it was part of an MST-13 bomb timer sold to Libya by MEBO, a Swiss firm with connections to Megrahi.

Towards the end of the Sky drama, Dr Swire becomes even more convinced of Megrahi’s innocence after learning that tests on the fragment showed it had a different coating from the MST-13 timers obtained by Libya. This evidence was examined by the SCCRC before it sent Megrahi’s conviction back to the appeal court in 2020.

It said it was “not persuaded” that it called into question the judges’ conclusion that the fragment came from an MST-13 timer which triggered the bomb. The drama tells viewers that the British government used public interest immunity certificates to prevent the disclosure of “secret intelligence documents allegedly implicating Iran and the PLFP-GC” and that those documents “remain classified to this day”.

The certificates were imposed in 2008 and again in 2020, when the UK’s foreign secretary said their disclosure would harm the UK’s international relations and damage counter-terrorism liason and intelligence gathering. An independent investigator from the SCCRC was allowed to view the two documents in 2006 and concluded that the prosecution’s failure to disclose one of them to the defence might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The matter wasn’t dealt with in court because Megrahi abandoned his second appeal. In 2019, the SCCRC looked at them again. This time it decided one of the documents involved inadmissable hearsay and the second would not have made any difference to the defence, had it known about it.

The appeal court accepted the SCCRC’s views and the government’s argument that disclosure could harm national security. The Sky drama informs its audience that some names, scenes and characters have been “changed or fictionalised for dramatic purposes”. There are examples of that throughout, including its portrayal of the day of the verdicts at the Lockerbie trial.

Megrahi stood trial alongside another Libyan, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah, at Camp Zeist – a specially convened Scottish court in the Netherlands. The programme ramps up the tension as the judges announce they have found Fhimah not guilty and Megrahi guilty. This prompts jubilation among almost all of the relatives in the court’s public gallery, with people leaping to their feet and hugging each other.

A distressed young Libyan woman bangs on a glass partition shouting “That’s my dad!” as a bewildered Megrahi is sentenced to life in a Scottish prison. Played by Colin Firth, Dr Swire faints and falls to the floor. In real life, the judges announced the verdict the other way round. There were gasps and tears but no outbursts of emotion; the atmosphere remained sombre; Megrahi was impassive; no-one banged on the glass.

In a shocking and unforgettable moment, Dr Swire did faint and had to be carried from the courtroom. The sentence was announced later that day. A group representing relatives of some of the American victims has criticised the Sky drama. Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 said it “amplifies falsehoods and unsupported theories; ignores the work of hundreds of family members by focusing on one; disregards the work of investigators and prosecutors; and brings to life, in grotesque detail, the events of 21 December 1988”.

The group continued: “Worst of all, the series presents a convicted murderer as an innocent man that should be empathized with.” Sky said it understood that there were “opposing opinions” and that the series did not attempt to tell the definitive version of the Lockerbie disaster or present a conclusion.

“We do not underestimate the responsibility of telling this story sensitively,” it added. “We engaged with victims’ families and support groups throughout production and in the lead up to the series launch.” Dr Swire said he hoped the series would cause people to “have another look at the criminal investigation after Lockerbie. “I would like to know the whole truth about my daughter’s brutal murder along with those of 269 other people.”

The second Lockerbie trial

Scotland’s Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service said the trial had found that the bombing was orchestrated by the Libyan government and that multiple individuals were involved. “Megrahi was found guilty and two appeals have upheld that conviction,” a spokesperson said.

“Scottish prosecutors are working with their US counterparts to support the current prosecution. The trial in Washington will bring the facts before the public again and the circumstances of what happened can be fully understood.” In May, a Libyan man in his 70s will stand trial in Washington, accused of the destruction of a civil aircraft resulting in death.

Abu Agila Masud has denied building the bomb which destroyed Pan Am 103 in a Libyan intelligence operation involving Megrahi and Fhimah. Prosecutors in Washington are likely to lead evidence from the first trial along with new information gathered in the years that followed.

The defence will be armed with all the counter arguments from Megrahi’s legal teams and the SCCRC’s doubts over the safety of his conviction. In addition to the Sky series, a BBC/Netflix drama on Lockerbie is also due to be screened later this year, focusing on the joint Scottish/US investigation.

More than 36 years after the tragedy, the controversy surrounding the deadliest terror attack in British history shows no sign of fading away.

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Andrew Byers

As in many cases, the United States would be better off having done nothing than triggering such a calamitous descent into violent chaos.

In 2016, near the conclusion of his second term, President Barack Obama was asked by Chris Wallace about his greatest mistake as president. Obama didn’t hesitate to respond. He said his “worst mistake” was “probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya.”

Five years earlier, a coalition of NATO members, led by France, Britain, and the United States, intervened in the Libyan civil war and overthrew the government of Muammar Gaddafi. This resulted in Gaddafi’s death and the transformation of Libya into a failed state, a condition that persists thirteen years later, which has resulted in an ongoing civil war, countless deaths of civilians, and a humanitarian and refugee crisis. The US-led intervention in Libya was strategically misguided and ultimately harmful, providing a cautionary example for future US foreign policy. It would have been a better option for the United States to have done nothing than to trigger such a calamitous descent into chaos.

Today, Libya is essentially split between two rival factions: the Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli, which controls parts of western Libya, and the Government of National Stability (GNS), backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), which operates in the east and south of Libya. 

Efforts to hold national elections have repeatedly failed. Numerous armed groups, militias, and foreign mercenaries regularly clash. In mid-December 2024, a battle between two rival groups led to a major fire and destruction in the country’s second-largest oil refinery, which will lead to further economic turmoil as Libya’s economy depends almost entirely on oil production.

Reports of arbitrary detentions, torture, and extrajudicial killings by various armed factions are widespread. The situation has been exacerbated by the aftermath of natural disasters, notably the floods in Derna in September 2023, which resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements. Libya’s economy, heavily reliant on oil exports, has been disrupted by the conflict and counterfeiting is widespread. Ordinary Libyans face a deteriorating economic situation. Many Libyans have fled to Europe, though severe human rights abuses against migrants, including in detention centers where forced labor, extortion, and sexual assault have been reported, are common. In short, the thirteen years since the United States and NATO invaded Libya have been nothing short of disaster.

The US-led intervention that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 is the direct cause of Libya becoming a failed state. If the goal was simply to overthrow a tyrant, it achieved that. If the goal was to put an end to the ongoing Libyan civil war, or to alleviate the suffering of civilians, or to transform a dictatorship into a democracy, or to demonstrate that Western military power could be a force for good in the world — all goals claimed by the Western powers involved — then it failed disastrously.

Libya, post-intervention, remains undemocratic and war-torn, with countless civilian casualties. It can reasonably be argued that the average Libyan’s — those still alive — quality of life is far lower today than it was under Gaddafi. Millions have been displaced, many of whom have flooded into Europe, poverty has increased (more than 800,000 need humanitarian assistance out of a population of under seven million), and food security and the availability of basic services have dramatically decreased. These criticisms collectively paint a picture of an intervention that, while initially justified on humanitarian grounds, led to unintended and severe negative consequences for Libya and the wider region.

It is clear that the United States should never have allowed France or Britain to talk it into intervening in Libya. There was a complete disconnect between the use of military force to overthrow a minor regional power — that was the easy part — and fostering an environment in which violence would cease and an effective and democratic government would emerge. The use of military power could never achieve the desired end goals. No US nor NATO plan existed for the aftermath of Gaddafi’s overthrow. This lack of planning led to a power vacuum that was filled by competing factions and militias rather than a stable, democratic government. (Keep in mind just how poor the US track record of democracy promotion is.) Critics, including Obama himself, have acknowledged that they failed to “plan for the day after” the intervention. Even had the United States and its feckless NATO allies been willing to invade and occupy Libya for years, the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate the folly of such an approach.

By no means should this critique be read as a defense of Gaddafi. He was an odious tyrant, a proliferator of weapons of mass destruction, a once-active sponsor of international terrorism, and a perpetual thorn in the side of the United States and Western Europe. But the US and NATO military intervention in Libya has been an unmitigated disaster for the people of Libya. Like Iraq (and many other locales before it), the military intervention in Libya began with positive, humanitarian intentions. To some Europeans and Americans, the prospect of overthrowing a violent tyrant was worth the cost of intervening militarily. But that military intervention has had, predictably, a host of negative unintended consequences.

In Libya, just like in Iraq, ideology — the desire to promote democracy and humanitarianism — trumped realism and American national interests, and has resulted in a series of costly failures for all concerned. The interests of the United States and Western Europe, not to mention those of ordinary Libyans, were in no way served by overthrowing Gaddafi.

The problem is that the US military has been, and continues to be, used to conduct operations that far exceed American national interests. The invasion of Libya not only was unnecessary and cost significant resources and lives, but it also destabilized the country and region, and has opened the door to increased Russian influence in Libya. 

US national interests would have been much better served by simply taking no action in 2011 and beyond. It is also worth noting that the Congress never authorized the use of military force in Libya; the Obama administration did not seek Congressional authorization, and justified the intervention based on the president’s constitutional powers as Commander in Chief and an international mandate from the UN Security Council. The House of Representatives even voted against a resolution (HJRes. 68) that would have authorized continued US involvement, but this did not legally bind the administration to stop the operation.

Libya should be seen as a cautionary tale for future American policymakers and strategists. In deciding whether or not to use US military force to affect some outcome abroad in the future, we should return to first principles. Does taking military action, and expending our precious, finite military resources, meaningfully advance significant US interests? If not, we should take no military action. 

The best arguments mustered by supporters of military intervention, including Bill Kristol, were that Gaddafi was committing humanitarian violations and that he had once sought nuclear weapons and supported terrorism (though we should note that long before 2011, Gaddafi seems to have given up his weapons of mass destruction programs and support for international terrorism). In this neoconservative mindset, such actions justified US military action. Ironically, deposing Gaddafi only seems to have increased the amount of violence and suffering within Libya, which is likely only to exacerbate the terrorist threat. 

We should always follow the advice of past American leaders and strategic thinkers like George Washington and George Kennan: avoid unnecessary wars, defend and maintain our constitutional order, and ensure that every American has the opportunity to achieve economic prosperity. 

We can do that, placing the national interest at the core of everything we do as a nation, and remain perfectly secure, while doing no harm abroad.

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Chris Stephen

The Russian leader must find a new home in the Mediterranean or risk his gains in Africa.

Vladimir Putin’s search for new military bases in the Mediterranean has ended in Libya, a country as factional and complicated as Syria, from which Russian forces have effectively been expelled. 

Without ports and airports to supply it, Russia’s imperial mission in Africa may become as ill-fated as its failed intervention in Syria. The Kremlin has installed mercenaries in a growing number of mineral-rich countries deep within the African continent. But supplying those units is far from easy.

Hence the need for bases within reach of Russia. The Kremlin’s movement of men and equipment from Syria to Libya since the fall of Bashar Assad in December is not just an evacuation, but also a pivot from the Middle East to Africa, the one continent where Moscow still has leverage.

Flight trackers have logged daily journeys by military transport planes from Russia’s Syrian airbase at Hmeimim to three bases in Libya since mid-December  

Meanwhile, a flotilla of four transports sailing from Russia into the Mediterranean is thought by some analysts to be delivering heavy equipment to Eastern Libya, which is run by the pro-Russian warlord, Khalifa Haftar. The ships, ostensibly heading for Syria in mid-December, hit the headlines when one of their number, cargo vessel Ursa Major, blew up and sank shortly after transiting the Straits of Gibraltar.

Then on December 29, ship tracking site Itamilradar reported another of the transports, Sparta, cut its transponder signal off the east Libyan coast. Four days later the transponder, which all merchant ships carry in international waters, was switched on again, triggering suggestions it had delivered equipment to eastern Libya in the interim.

The prospect of Russia amping up its presence in Libya has set off alarm bells on the other side of the Mediterranean, with Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto comparing Moscow’s redeployment from Syria to Libya with the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis.

“Russian ships and submarines in the Mediterranean are always a concern, and even more so if instead of being 1,000km away they are two steps from us,” Crosetto said.

Russian forces have already been in Libya for nearly a decade, their presence dramatically underlined in 2016 when warlord Haftar was invited for a full-dress military visit aboard a Russian aircraft carrier cruising off the coast.

Moscow has provided troops, equipment, and strike planes for Haftar, commander of the forces of Libya’s eastern government. From 2014, it was locked in a civil war with a rival Western government in Tripoli, itself armed by Turkey. A UN-brokered 2020 ceasefire ended the fighting but the two sides remain at loggerheads in a divided country. 

Libya would be a rich prize for either Russia or Turkey, as it contains Africa’s largest oil reserves. Russian oil giant Rosneft already has a hefty deal to buy and re-sell Libyan oil.

More importantly, with the loss of its Syrian bases, Libya remains the only feasible transit hub to supply Russian mercenary units across Africa. The most noted of these groups is Wagner, renamed the Africa Corps after an abortive coup against Putin by its late leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin. 

It operates in Sudan and Central African Republic, and Moscow’s influence is growing. A group of three sub-Saharan states, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, have banded together after the armies of all three seized power, and are looking to Russia for support. Mali recently expelled French forces, while Burkina Faso hired another Russian mercenary group, the Bear Brigade, to provide security for its leaders.

Russia needs not just Libyan airbases, but a port to take heavy lift cargo. Moscow’s deputy defense minister Yunus-bek Bamatgireyevich has been making shuttle visits to Libya for the past two years seeking permission to build a naval base similar to the one it is now evacuating at Tartus in Syria.  

Tobruk, near the eastern border, is the favored option for the Russian navy, although it could also open a base at the eastern capital, Benghazi, already used by Libya’s diminutive navy. There is speculation in Libya that Russia may choose a deep water anchorage midway between the two at Susah, which is already slated for development as a container port. 

Whatever the chosen site, a warm water port is key, not just for Russia’s Africa operations but globally. Its main naval bases are either icebound (Archangel, Murmansk), remote (Vladivostok), or easily blocked. In the event of war, its Baltic Fleet would be bottled up by NATO closing the Kattegat. Turkey has already prevented the Black Sea Fleet from reaching the Mediterranean by closing another choke point, the Bosporus, citing the Montreux Convention preventing its use by belligerent navies.

Haftar has yet to give Russia the green light for a naval base, and that probably reflects US pressure. Washington, like most Western powers, backs Haftar’s rival, the Tripoli government. But that backing is conditional because Tripoli also supports Islamist militias blamed by US investigators for the killing of America’s Libya ambassador Chris Stevens in Benghazi in 2012. 

Additionally, in the highly atomized chaos of Libya, Western powers sometimes find Haftar useful. In 2019 Tripoli allowed rebel groups opposed to Chad’s French-backed government to base themselves in southern Libya. So Paris turned to Haftar. He launched an offensive in southern Libya and the rebels fled back to Chad. By luck or design, French jets were waiting as the rebels crossed the border, inflicting devastating air strikes.

All of this means Western powers would rather charm than threaten Haftar. Even as he courts Russian ministers, he is also being visited by US officials, hoping to convince him that Washington is a better long-term partner than Moscow. 

Haftar, meanwhile, may be entertaining doubts about getting too close to Russia. Its planes and mercenaries are useful, but allowing a naval base may be too high a price if it comes at the expense of antagonizing Washington. 

For one thing, Russia’s prestige is sinking. Putin has been made to look a fool with his Ukraine invasion, an invasion that has seen Russia’s once-mighty tank force wrecked by NATO-supplied weapons. Now Moscow has tasted another humiliating defeat in Syria, its forces there too puny to prevent Assad from being ousted by Turkish-backed rebels. 

The 83-year-old Haftar must also consider his future. He is a US citizen, a reward after he led a CIA-funded Libyan rebel group decades ago. He and his family have extensive and growing property interests in Virginia, which could be frozen, along with his bank accounts, if Washington were to put the general on its sanctions list.

Until now, Haftar was able to keep both Washington and Moscow happy, but Russia’s urgency in finding a naval base may now compel him to make a difficult choice.

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Chris Stephen is a former Moscow correspondent for The Scotsman and The Irish Times and a former Libya correspondent for The Guardian. His book, The Future of War Crimes Justice, was published last year by Melville House (London and New York).

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Peter Fabricius

Russia’s apparent fast-tracking of plans to establish a military hub in Libya could worsen that country’s protracted conflict.

For Russia, as for Iran, last month’s fall of the 54-year-old Assad dynasty in Syria was a major geo-strategic setback. Former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s sudden defeat threatened Russia’s important military presence in the eastern Mediterranean.

Now Moscow is believed to be trying to negotiate a continued presence with the new Syrian authorities. But it is also transferring military equipment from Syria to nearby Libya, apparently to establish or strengthen Russia’s presence in that country as a new hub for its African operations. This could seriously damage efforts to resolve Libya’s protracted conflict.

The end of al-Assad’s regime also has repercussions for Russia’s growing presence across Africa. Moscow’s naval and air bases in Syria have been the hubs for supplying Russia’s continental operations – mainly in Libya and also in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic and Sudan.

Assad hosted a major Russian military presence in Syria with a warm-water naval base in the port of Tartus, an air base at Khmeimim to the north near the port of Latakia, and a helicopter base at Qamishli in the far northeast. 

‘The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria,’ the Institute for the Study of War said on 9 December.

‘Putin … intervened on behalf of Assad in 2015 to secure Russian military bases in Syria, support Russia’s wider efforts to project power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, increase its global footprint in the Middle East and Africa, and threaten [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] southern flank. 

‘Russia is attempting to secure its bases in Syria as opposition forces come to power, but Russia’s continued military presence in the country is not guaranteed. [This] especially as Russia’s actions in support of Assad over the past nine years have likely undermined Moscow’s ability to form a lasting, positive relationship with ruling Syrian opposition groups,’ the institute said. 

Uncertainty about who might constitute the new government also probably complicates these negotiations. And so perhaps as a precaution, Moscow has begun shifting military resources to Libya, where it had already started reinforcing its military presence in 2023/24.

‘Four weeks ago, Russia experienced a clear setback in Syria – an outcome it had not planned for, since losing Assad undermines a key logistical hub that, for nine years, supported its operations in Libya and beyond into Sub-Saharan Africa,’ an analyst at The Sentry, a US-based investigative and policy organisation, told ISS Today.

‘In a bid to preserve its African operations, Moscow has been bolstering its footprint in Libya to compensate for its deteriorating circumstances in Syria in recent weeks. And so far, it has done so without introducing a naval element – at least not yet.

‘Over the last four weeks, Russia has been moving substantial amounts of military resources by air to Libya, from Syria, from Russia and from Belarus.’

Several other reports in mainstream media as well as intelligence sites confirm several flights of large Russian Air Force cargo aircraft from Khmeimim Air Base in Syria to Russia’s al-Khadim near Benghazi in eastern Libya in the last week of December. They speculate the planes were carrying military equipment.

This week, Ukrainian intelligence sources who asked to remain anonymous and other analysts said several Russian ships were scheduled to dock in Tartus. They said that the roll on-roll off Sparta and Sparta II would be used to transport military equipment to Libya, though some would be transported back to Russia.

The bolstering of Russia’s military presence in Libya threatens to perpetuate, if not aggravate, the conflict in that country. Russia has for years backed the eastern strongman General Khalifa Haftar of the Benghazi-based government in its protracted struggle with the United Nations-backed government in Tripoli.

In December, Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, Prime Minister of the government of national unity in Tripoli, strongly objected to Russia reinforcing its Libyan bases. He said this was turning Libya into a base for major-power rivalries and would complicate the country’s internal crisis.

It should also be noted that in terms of the peace agreements among rival Libyan parties, all foreign militaries should have left Libya long ago.

‘The sudden collapse of the Assad regime also raises questions about Russia’s ability to continue providing military and security support to its allies,’ says Denys Reva, an Institute for Security Studies Researcher. ‘It seems that Russia might currently be overstretched and unable to spare additional resources.’

He says that if Russia were also to lose its access to Libya, that would undermine Moscow’s ability to appropriately support and supply its troops in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

‘The Russians have definitely seen their circumstances degrade in Syria,’ says The Sentry’s analyst. ‘Even if one assumes that they stay in Latakia and Tartus, the environment has become more uncertain, less convenient and riskier.

‘By strengthening its footprint in Libya, Russia may be attempting to compensate for that deterioration in Syria – or at least part of it. If it didn’t do so, Moscow would be risking a fragilisation of its missions in Sub-Saharan Africa.’

For Africa, the net effect of Assad’s demise remains uncertain. A weakening of Russia’s military presence on the continent would arguably be positive, given its performance in the Sahel especially. In Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, Russia is propping up military regimes that took power via coups, and is accused of gross abuses against civilians, without any visible improvement in curbing terrorism.

For Libya, the likely consequences seem to be more unambiguously negative. By switching the focus of its military operations to Libya, Russia has acquired an even stronger incentive to entrench itself in that country and perpetuate the internal conflict, as Dabaiba warned.

________________

David Cowan

The first of two TV dramas on the Lockerbie disaster to be broadcast this year will, for many people, be their first glimpse into this labyrinth of a case. Based on a book by the father of one of the victims, Lockerbie: A Search for Truth focuses on longstanding claims that the only man found guilty of bombing Pan Am 103 was innocent. The production – which has provoked fierce criticism from relatives of American victims – does not mention that the conviction of Abdulbasset Al Megrahi for murdering 270 people was upheld twice on appeal.

Each episode of the Sky Atlantic series starts with a declaration that it’s “inspired by the work and research” of Dr Jim Swire, whose daughter Flora was on board Pan Am 103 when it broke apart over Lockerbie in December 1988. Flora Swire was one of 259 passengers and crew who were killed along with 11 residents in Lockerbie when the wreckage destroyed their homes.

In 2001, after an eight-month trial, Scottish judges convicted Megrahi of bombing the plane while acting with other members of the Libyan intelligence service. For more than 20 years, Jim Swire and his supporters have argued that Megrahi and Libya were framed for political expediency. They believe the real culprits were Iran and a Syrian-backed group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC). Relatives of other victims dismiss that as a baseless conspiracy theory.

Later this year, the case will be examined all over again when another Libyan suspect goes on trial in Washington, accused of building the Lockerbie bomb.

The warnings before the bombing

The controversy over Lockerbie began within days of the tragedy on 21 December 1988. As the drama recounts, it soon emerged that there had been warnings that a bomb attack on a Pan Am flight was imminent. Those warnings had not been made public. The passengers, including a CIA agent, boarded Pan Am 103 without knowing anything about them.

The US president Ronald Reagan said afterwards: “Such a public statement with nothing more to go on than an anonymous phone call, you would literally have closed down the air traffic in the world.” In a BBC documentary in 2008, the government official who took that call at the US embassy in Helsinki described it as a hoax and a “horrible coincidence”. But for 36 years, Dr Swire and other UK relatives have called for a public inquiry to examine the warnings and the failures of airline and airport security which allowed the bomb to slip through. As the drama points out, this inquiry has never happened.

Just last week, Scotland’s First Minister John Swinney said he could not consider the request while the judicial process in the US was still going on. The destruction of Pan Am 103 was an attack on the United States. Of the 270 victims, 190 were American. The rest came from 20 other countries, including 43 people from the UK.

Suspicion initially fell on Iran.

Five months before Lockerbie, an American warship shot down an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf after mistaking it for a fighter jet. The 290 men, women and children on board were killed. Iran swore revenge. In October that year, West German police raided flats in Frankfurt where members of the PFLP-GC were preparing bombs in radio cassette players. They had timetables for airlines, including Pan Am. Less than two months later, Pan Am 103 was brought down.

A joint Scottish/US investigation established that the bomb had been concealed inside a different model of radio cassette player in a suitcase. The involvement of the PFLP-GC and Iran made sense, but Scottish police and the FBI say they found no evidence to justify charges against anyone from the group or Iranian officials. The defence at the Lockerbie trial blamed the Palestinians for the bombing but the judges said they had heard nothing to prove their involvement or undermine their belief that Libya was responsible.

The prosecution case was that the Libyans smuggled the unaccompanied suitcase onto an Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, where it was loaded on to Pan Am 103a, the feeder flight for Pan Am 103. This assertion was supported by baggage records.

The suitcase was transferred onto Pan Am 103 at Heathrow. Clothes from the suitcase were traced to a shop on Malta. Its owner told the court they were bought by a Libyan who resembled Megrahi, a crucial piece of evidence which has been hotly disputed ever since. The day before the bombing, Megrahi travelled to Malta using a false passport supplied by the Libyan intelligence service.

He was at Malta airport when luggage was being loaded onto the flight to Frankfurt and flew back to Libya shortly afterwards. He never used the passport again and later denied being on Malta. Dr Swire and his supporters remain convinced the US needed to shift the blame from Iran, which was backing groups holding American hostages.

The prosecution did not need to prove a motive at the Lockerbie trial but there was a long history of antagonism between the US and Libya. This culminated in 1986 with the bombing of a Berlin nightclub, which killed two American servicemen, and a retaliatory raid by the US airforce on Tripoli and Benghazi. That attack killed dozens of people including, it was claimed, the adopted daughter of Libyan leader Muanmar Gaddafi.

Megrahi lost his first appeal against his conviction in 2002 but won a second after a four-year investigation by the independent Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission. The SCCRC found there was no proper basis in allegations that investigators had manipulated, altered or fabricated evidence to make a case against Megrahi. But it did conclude the court had no reasonable basis for finding that Megrahi bought the clothes in Malta, undermining a cornerstone of the prosecution case.

The commission said the verdict had been “unreasonable” and that Megrahi might have suffered a miscarriage of justice. The case was sent back to the courts but Megrahi abandoned the appeal after he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. Terminally ill, he was freed on compassionate grounds by the Scottish government in 2009 and died three years later in Tripoli.

In 2020, after a request from Megrahi’s family, the SCCRC referred the case back to the appeal court a second time. Once again, the commission said the trial court should not have accepted that Megrahi bought the clothes that were beside the bomb. It also said he was denied a fair trial because of non-disclosure; the prosecution didn’t give the defence certain information which could have helped him.

Five of Scotland’s most senior judges upheld the conviction, saying the identification of Megrahi was just one part of the overall picture and the information which was not disclosed to the defence would not have changed the verdict.

_____________________

Omar Swehli

Since the start of the Libyan conflict in 2014, Khalifa Haftar has played a pivotal role in the political and military scene as he sought to control Libya with the support of regional and international powers, including Russia. Although Russia supported Haftar through weapons, mercenaries, and political cover, regional and international transformations may prompt Moscow to reevaluate its position.

Among the reasons that may prompt Russia to abandon Khalifa Haftar are: (a) Changing international and regional balances and attempts to reach consensus with international powers: (b) Russia, which seeks to strengthen its influence in North Africa, may find its continuing support for Haftar puts it in confrontation with the United States, the European Union, and Britain, who support a comprehensive political process in Libya and reject the presence of Russian military bases under Europe’s feet.

Regional consensus with countries such as Qatar and Turkey, which support the Tripoli government, and are important economic and political partners for Russia.

Abandoning Haftar may be a way to avoid direct confrontation with these forces, which would harm Russian economic interests.

There is economic and military pressure in terms of the burden of support, as Russia supports Haftar through the Wagner Group and other forms of military support, which requires financial and military resources. With Moscow’s preoccupation with other conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, Libya may become a strategic burden.

This may expose Russia to more international sanctions, as Russia’s involvement in Libya may expose it to more Western sanctions, something Moscow seeks to avoid, especially in light of its worsening economic crisis.

Russia did not reap what it hoped for from supporting Haftar, as he is not internationally recognized and has not and will not achieve his goals of controlling all of Libya. Rather, his campaign on Tripoli faltered in 2019, which weakened his position as a strategic ally, capable of achieving Russian goals.

Russia is aware that internal opposition to Haftar is growing, especially in the areas he controls, which makes his support a political risk. That is why I believe that Russia will accept the search for political alternatives, and may see in abandoning Haftar an opportunity to open up to the internationally recognized Tripoli government or other Libyan figures that would guarantee it a foothold in the country without relying on Haftar alone.

Moscow may seek to adopt a position more compatible with the United Nations and major countries, especially with the push towards elections and a political solution that guarantees power-sharing and acceptance of a foothold for Russia.

There are understandings with Turkey that may encourage Russia to abandon Haftar, as Turkey and Russia have common interests in many files, from Syria to Ukraine. Abandoning Haftar may be part of a broader understanding with Turkey to ensure continued cooperation between the two parties. International pressure against the Wagner Group may force Russia to withdraw Wagner from Libya, and this is enough to bring down Haftar.

With the increasing international demands to withdraw these forces from Libya, Moscow may find itself forced to back down from supporting Haftar.

Is abandoning Haftar possible?

Personally, I think it is not unlikely, especially when his presence becomes an obstacle to achieving Russian interests in Libya and the emergence of alternatives capable of securing Russian influence in Libya, such as supporting a new figure or dealing with multiple parties.

Russia’s abandonment of Khalifa Haftar depends on developments in the Libyan and regional arena. Moscow is not committed to Haftar as a person, and its sudden abandonment of Bashar al-Assad confirms this. Rather, it is committed to what achieves its strategic interests. There is no permanent friend or enemy in politics, but rather permanent interests. When the cost of supporting him becomes higher than the benefits he brings, Russia may tend to change its alliances, just as what happen in other similar files such as Syria.

____________________

Emadeddin Badi and Abdullah al-Jabassini 

The Mediterranean has always been a theater of rivalries, shifting alliances, and calculated gambles, and Turkey has once again thrown its dice. Ankara’s announcement of a potential Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement with Syria’s new government mirrors Turkey’s 2019 maritime pact with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA).

That earlier agreement allowed Turkey to claim a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, reshaping regional dynamics to its advantage. Today, Ankara is pursuing a similar strategy in Syria, seeking to create facts on water as it did on land, using the promise of economic and political support to position itself as a dominant player in the country.

These parallel maneuvers underscore Ankara’s broader vision of Libya and Syria as interconnected pillars of its geopolitical strategy in the Mediterranean, where actions in one arena bolster influence in the other.

Central to this strategy is Turkey’s proclivity to leverage military interventions, political agreements, and economic tools to advance its objectives. In Libya, Turkey’s 2019 intervention secured it a critical foothold through the deployment of drones, Syrian mercenaries, and direct military support.

This allowed Ankara to negotiate an EEZ agreement that, from its vantage point, redefined maritime boundaries and challenged the claims of Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. The agreement was not merely an economic gambit; it was a strategic move to confront Mediterranean rivals over territorial waters and energy resources.

Five years later, Ankara is seeking to establish an EEZ agreement with Syria’s new government that would extend its maritime claims further into the Eastern Mediterranean. While Turkey frames these actions as legitimate assertions of its rights, regional powers are likely to view them as provocations that deepen tensions in an already volatile environment.

Balancing Russia in Libya 

Libya occupies a central role in Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy, serving as a gateway for Ankara’s regional ambitions and a platform for projecting influence. The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding with the GNA, which established a long-contested maritime boundary, has been criticized for raising unresolved sovereignty issues and its questionable legality under international law.

Beyond these legal challenges, Turkey’s position in Libya is further complicated by Russia’s entrenched involvement. Through the Wagner Group—recently rebranded as the Africa Corps—Moscow has bolstered Libyan National Army Commander Khalifa Haftar’s forces, securing itself its own foothold in Haftar’s areas of control.

Reports of Russian arms transfers over Turkish-controlled airspace from Syria’s Hmeimim airbase to eastern Libya after the fall of Damascus exemplify the paradoxical nature of the Turkey-Russia rivalry.

On the surface, such developments may appear transactional, but they reflect Ankara’s broader strategy: maintaining escalation dominance by setting boundaries on Russian operations while leveraging its role as a regional balancer to extract strategic advantages.

This balancing act underscores Turkey’s calculated pragmatism in Libya, where collaboration with Russia acts as both a counterweight to regional adversaries and a measured gamble.

By permitting Moscow’s logistical transfers, Ankara has transformed a potential liability into a tool of strategic leverage, subtly positioning itself to influence Russian ambitions in Africa while reaffirming its indispensability to NATO and fortifying its regional clout. However, this strategy is not without vulnerabilities.

The delicate balancing required to manage Moscow’s activities leaves Ankara exposed to the risks of miscalculation, overreach, and dependency. Disruptions in its arrangement with Russia—or fractures in its relationships with NATO allies, regional powers, or Libyan factions—could unravel Ankara’s hard-won gains, imperiling its broader Mediterranean ambitions and leaving its geopolitical foothold exposed.

Flexing muscle in Syria

In Syria, Turkey’s intervention was initially driven by the need to address immediate security threats, primarily removing the self-proclaimed Islamic State and containing Kurdish forces seeking to expand territorial control in northern Syria. However, with the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, Ankara recalibrated its approach, merging economic and geopolitical ambitions with its security objectives. The prospect of an EEZ agreement with Syria mirrors the dynamics of the 2019 Libya pact. While such a pact could offer maritime gains and deepen Turkey’s influence in the region, it is fraught with risks. 

Greece, Cyprus, and other European powers are likely to view such an agreement as an illegal and destabilizing move, further polarizing regional dynamics and intensifying disputes over energy and sovereignty.

Turkey’s approach in Syria also reflects its broader ambitions to integrate its strategies across theaters, enhancing its influence through interconnected policies. The country’s pursuit of maritime gains in Syria builds on the successes of its Libya agreement while highlighting the risks inherent in replicating this strategy in a different geopolitical context.

The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as Ankara navigates volatile rivalries and shifting alliances. The integration of its strategies underscores Turkey’s vision of the Mediterranean as a unified arena for projecting power.

However, significant challenges loom in Syria, the most salient of which stem from Israel. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli airstrikes have escalated, targeting countless military installations and destroying aircraft, radar systems, and missile sites.

Simultaneously, Israeli forces have conducted incursions and expanded their presence beyond the occupied Golan Heights, particularly in the Quneitra province of southern Syria.

These actions reflect dissatisfaction with Syria’s current trajectory. There is a widespread perception within Israel that Syria risks becoming a Turkish protectorate, a scenario that would severely constrain Israel’s military latitude in the region.

This concern is compounded by the belief that Iran will continue to maneuver for influence, viewing Syria’s strategic assets as too valuable to relinquish. In this context, a Syria rebuilt under the leadership of Arab states is seen as a far more desirable outcome, curbing the influence of both Turkey and Iran while pre-emptively neutralizing their resurgence.

Should this vision prove unattainable, Israel may resort to curbing Turkish influence by undermining Syria’s unity, channeling support to ethnic and religious minorities to fragment the country and weaken Ankara’s position. This could set the stage for a potential collision course between the two.

The interplay of this rivalry highlights the fragile nature of Ankara’s ambitions, with Israel emerging as perhaps its most formidable challenge. Tel Aviv’s ability to operate beyond traditional international norms, as starkly demonstrated in Gaza, and to secure the unwavering support of Ankara’s traditional Western allies—regardless of its methods—exposes the looming asymmetry Turkey faces in this geopolitical contest.

Strengthening influence in the

Mediterranean

Anticipating the challenges to its broader Mediterranean aspirations, Turkey is building synergies between its strategies in Libya and Syria to maximize its leverage, reflecting its broader ambition to reshape the Mediterranean’s geopolitical map and strengthen its negotiating position.

In Libya, Ankara has adapted to the shifting political landscape, engaging with Eastern Libyan factions and the Haftar family to expand its influence. This outreach signals a pragmatic shift from confrontation to cautious diplomacy, as Turkey seeks to transform former adversaries into cooperative stakeholders while navigating the crowded Libyan geopolitical arena.

In Syria, Turkey’s political influence has positioned it as a linchpin for regional engagement with the Syrian government, mediating between Damascus and key external actors, including Arab states, European Union countries, and potentially Russia. Ankara’s subtle gatekeeper role sharpens its leverage, turning regional rivalries into stepping stones for its own ascent.

By aligning its strategies in Libya and Syria, Turkey seeks to consolidate influence and amplify its leverage across both theaters. This calculated approach underscores Ankara’s effort to position itself as an indispensable actor in the Mediterranean, translating tactical maneuvers into broader geopolitical gains while pre-empting challenges that threaten its ambitions.

Yet, this high-stakes strategy leaves Turkey exposed. The overlapping tensions in Libya and Syria demand constant recalibration, as advances in one arena could rapidly unravel in another. 

The return of US President-elect Donald Trump to the White House this month looms as perhaps the most significant determinant shaping the region’s dynamics.

Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy could offer Ankara opportunities to assert itself more aggressively, particularly as it leverages its strategic position in the Mediterranean. However, this same approach raises the specter of greater US disengagement from regional conflicts, leaving Turkey to face escalating challenges from Moscow, Israel, and other regional powers without the backing of its traditional Western allies.

The uncertainty of this geopolitical environment underscores the precariousness of Turkey’s gains, where advances in one theater could rapidly unravel in another, placing its broader Mediterranean strategy on a knife’s edge.

Ultimately, Turkey’s Mediterranean strategy reflects both ambition and vulnerability, a delicate dance on shifting sands where every advance risks triggering a cascade of challenges.

Much like Ankara views Libya and Syria as interconnected theaters, Western actors should embrace this moment of change to recalibrate their bilateral relations with Turkey, recognizing shared interests in maritime stability and regional development. 

In Libya, this means supporting a political process that moderates a Turko-Russian oligopolistic arrangement while promoting stability and inclusivity to align with shared Turko-Western priorities. 

In Syria, targeted sanctions relief and reconstruction efforts tied to an inclusive political framework can support stabilization efforts and address immediate needs. By anchoring their engagement with Turkey in mutual interests and shared goals, Western actors can transform competition into cooperation.

This recalibration will be pivotal in shaping whether Turkey’s Mediterranean gambit becomes a cornerstone of regional stability or a foundation of enduring fragility.

***

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

Abdullah al-Jabassini is an adjunct professor at the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Europe.

_____________________

The Sentry

No Complacency Allowed

Between 2005 and 2010, Libya experienced extensive corruption in its infrastructure projects, and foreign firms were used as conduits to facilitate this wrongdoing. The absence of proper maintenance on Derna’s dams for many years before the September 2023 catastrophe is just one example of these practices.

A small group of high-level Libyan officials likely stole billions of dollars without leaving a clear paper trail, leading to years of impunity and even further entrenchment in the political ruling class, not to mention decrepit national infrastructure. This precedent of infrastructure-related irregularities from the mid-2000s calls for caution and vigilance regarding the ongoing reconstruction push in Libya.

Although the circumstances are different, present reconstruction contracting protocols, including in the city of Derna, should be closely scrutinized, as patterns of worrisome business practices may be repeating themselves. Many projects involve contract funds being split between foreign firms and Libyan private entities informally linked to the Haftar family, opening the door for the possible diversion of funds.

There is also a risk that some of the contracts involving Libyan companies may be used to facilitate fraudulent letters of credit, including for money laundering purposes. Such potential misuse and misappropriation of Libya’s public wealth would jeopardize the adequacy, sustainability, and feasibility of all new infrastructure projects announced by the Haftars.

It therefore is imperative to seek transparency on these publicly funded contracts, especially considering the secretive, unilateral approach imposed by the Haftar family. As for the Dabaiba family, presently in power in Tripoli, its members should also be held accountable for their suspected unlawful practices from the mid-2000s. Furthermore, Dabaiba’s government—as it has operated since 2021—bears at least some, and perhaps significant, responsibility for the Derna catastrophe.

The office of Prime Minister Dabaiba did not respond to a request for comment. The ever-deepening dysfunction in Libya’s economic governance calls for an international and domestic reevaluation of pressure and accountability mechanisms. If systemic gaps remain unaddressed, the ongoing surge in Libyan corruption will continue accelerating, with potential consequences including a relapse into economic turmoil or armed conflict.

Recommendations

The United States and other

like-minded countries

Resist any perpetuation of the current system of dual dynastic kleptocracy in Libya.

Instead, nations committed to reducing corruption in Libya should intensify pressure on both ruling families, as well as their closest business associates. This anti-corruption objective should be pursued even though US partners in the region such as Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE remain indulgent towards Libyan corruption.

Actively engage in discussions with the Central Bank of Libya’s leadership regarding Derna’s reconstruction.

Haftar-sponsored contracts should be appropriately vetted through all existing oversight mechanisms. There is a risk that the CBL may issue letters of credit for those contracts in an opaque manner. To prevent such a scenario, international stakeholders should urge the CBL leadership to increase transparency and accountability for reconstruction expenditures, which might otherwise bypass the ministries in Tripoli and all oversight bodies.

The CBL should refrain from exaggerating its enforcement role. Instead, it should focus on supporting the Audit Bureau, the Administrative Control Authority, and the Anti-Corruption Office in fulfilling their legal mandates. This is critical, given Belqacem Haftar’s relentless efforts to shield his Reconstruction Fund’s expenditures from any form of scrutiny.

Support the Audit Bureau, in exchange for their increased scrutiny of both past and present infrastructure-related corruption schemes.

The US should enhance USAID’s existing cooperation with the Audit Bureau, potentially including funding for its partnerships with international audit firms. US diplomats should advocate for the publication of the Audit Bureau’s annual reports and urge power brokers in both Tripoli and Benghazi to allow the Audit Bureau to operate without intimidation.

The Audit Bureau merits this focus by virtue of its competence and mandate to improve transparency in infrastructure spending.

Promote accountability and transparency in development spending beyond Derna.

For a better management of the so-called Chapter III section of Libya’s national budget, empower the Ministry of Planning and require the CBL to release detailed project lists, fund allocations, and progress reports, potentially through an accessible online portal.

Pair calls for increased transparency from Libyan leaders with targeted sanctions against those leaders’ closest associates and facilitators in the illicit realm.

Such an approach is needed because Derna’s reconstruction relies almost entirely upon Libyan resources, with foreign donations playing an insignificant role.307 Having made no substantial financial contributions, Western democracies lack leverage, making sanctions the primary tool with which they can influence Libyan behavior in the recovery process.

Support credible civil society organizations aspiring to mobilize the skills and efforts of Derna natives who live elsewhere in Libya and beyond.

Currently, the lack of interaction among members of the Derna diaspora results in a significant waste of potential, as many of them are adept at medical, administrative, and technocratic tasks. Initiatives aimed at fostering solidarity among people with roots in the bereaved city are worth backing, with one key goal being to elicit greater inclusiveness and transparency from the Haftar family

Investigate fraud, where possible. Given the Dabaiba family’s involvement in the Derna dam scandal

The United Kingdom should reinvigorate its decade-old investigation into ODAC-related fraud.

The UN Security Council

Maintain existing sanctions on Libyan Investment Authority assets until the sovereign wealth fund complies with the Santiago Principles by providing comprehensive accounts.

Even if Libyan officials cite Derna’s recovery in their request for an exception to the asset freezes imposed in resolutions 1970 and 1973 of 2011, the UN Security Council should remain steadfast.

International banks

Exercise increased vigilance. Given the risk that the Haftar camp may use reconstruction projects to launder proceeds from illicit activities, international financial institutions should exercise caution.

Under the guise of rebuilding Libya, the Haftar camp could use seemingly legitimate infrastructure projects as a means of integrating its illicit financial flows into the global banking system.

To avoid inadvertently facilitating Libyan corruption, foreign banks should scrutinize all transactions related to reconstruction, applying stringent anti-money laundering (AML) measures and focusing not only on members of the Haftar family but also on their enablers.

Libya’s ministries, agencies, and

other public institutions

Digitize the registry of private companies and make it publicly accessible.

This measure would facilitate the exposure of illegitimate firms linked to public officials and, in this way, help curb the misappropriation of government funds.

Launch a national taskforce dedicated to surveying existing infrastructure from a maintenance perspective.

Recent incidents—such as the August 2024 flood in Ghat, the February 2024 flood in Zliten, and the July 2023 collapse of the Great Man-Made River in Ajdabiya—show that the country’s vulnerability is not confined to Derna.

To prevent further instances of inadequate, underfunded, or mismanaged maintenance, the proposed taskforce should assess and publicly disclose the status of the nation’s infrastructure.

This initiative should involve existing bodies, including the National Planning Council, the Economic and Social Development Board, the Public Projects Authority, and the Ministry of Planning. Such a coordinated and comprehensive approach is imperative, given Libya’s heightened susceptibility to the adverse effects of climate change.

________________________

Hafed Al-Ghwell

The aftermath of Syria’s long civil war has sent shockwaves throughout global geopolitics that have seen Moscow redeploy key assets to Libya, signifying a deliberate recalibration of strategic priorities. With this move, Russia is not merely shifting military resources; it is shaping Libya into a central hub for long-term power projection. This development comes amid rising competition among great powers in the Middle East and North Africa region, where Russia seeks to forge new economic and security alliances.
Libya, with its geostrategic proximity to Europe and rich energy reserves, offers Russia the ability to enhance its geopolitical leverage in the Mediterranean. Moscow’s maneuver also reflects an intention to foster ties with key players, including Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army, positioning itself as a major actor in resolving or perpetuating conflicts depending on its interests.

The decision to refocus efforts on Libya teases Russia’s broader ambitions amid a global rebalancing of alliances in the ash and rubble of the Assad regime’s collapse. The Arab region’s rising geostrategic significance has drawn Russia back to assert influence that echoes Soviet-era ambitions. While Russian trade and arms exports in the region have traditionally lagged behind those of the US and China, its actions in Libya represent an effort to bolster its foothold beyond military priorities.

This repositioning takes place within a complicated mesh of regional politics, involving interplay with nations such as Egypt and Turkiye, impacts on global energy markets, and even disruptions to international commerce. By embedding itself even deeper in Libyan affairs, Moscow is not only addressing immediate strategic needs that were interrupted in Syria, but also seeking to craft a durable foundation for long-term influence in an evolving international order.

Libya, located just 400 miles from Europe’s southern shores, offers Russia a prime geographic position for asserting its influence over both the Mediterranean and the volatile regions of the Sahel. This strategic realignment is not merely about filling the void left by its withdrawal from Syria but also recalibrating its broader geopolitical strategy. Unlike in Syria, where Russia’s military presence was heavily invested in propping up a failing regime amid international isolation, Libya presents an opportunity to anchor its operations more effectively in the African theater.

The presence of the Africa Corps in Libya, formerly known as the Wagner Group, enables Russia to engage in security contracting, arms trades, and direct military interventions without the glaring spotlight of the international community. This approach contrasts with the high-profile, politically costly engagement in Syria.

The sheer scale of Russian military logistics moving to Libya, evidenced by the increasing number of military personnel — now numbering nearly 1,800 — and the delivery of about 6,000 tons of weapons, signifies a deliberate pivot. This investment places Russian forces in a pivotal role to influence conflicts in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, where control over resources and political allegiances are constantly in flux.

Thus, Libya is a launchpad for Russia’s renewed ambitions across Africa, backed by a robust military and economic strategy that ties its palpable Mediterranean influence with deeper incursions into the African continent.

Moreover, Moscow’s increased presence in Libya fundamentally redefines the strategic equation for NATO’s southern defenses. By cementing control over key installations, such as the Al-Jufra air base and the port of Sirte, Russia gains a formidable capability to monitor and potentially obstruct maritime traffic in the central Mediterranean. This development allows Russia to exert pressure on vital NATO supply chains and military routes, posing a direct challenge to the alliance’s operational security.

Furthermore, Libya’s instability provides a fertile ground for Russia to exploit local conflicts, potentially stoking regional tensions to undermine NATO’s cohesion. With European energy supplies still heavily reliant on Mediterranean channels, Russia’s position in Libya might also threaten critical oil and gas routes, adding an economic dimension to its military strategy.

As NATO contends with an increasingly assertive Russia in eastern Europe, the Mediterranean emerges as a sophisticated secondary theater where Moscow can dilute the alliance’s focus and resources, compelling NATO to adopt a more dispersed and defensive posture. Additionally, what makes Libya particularly fertile ground for Russian exploits is its fractured political environment, with power divided between the UN-recognized government in Tripoli and the eastern forces led by Haftar.

The Libyan National Army leader, benefiting from Russia’s substantial military support, including mercenary deployments and direct involvement from the Russian armed forces under the Africa Corps banner, has allowed Moscow to secure access to major oil fields, key air bases, and significant smuggling networks. This multifaceted involvement grants Russia enhanced influence over Libya’s resources, strategic locations, and vital resources, ensuring a continuous flow of influence and economic gains — at the expense of ordinary Libyans.

By enmeshing itself in the local economic and military infrastructure, Russia enhances its operational capacity and solidifies alliances that could prove indispensable in counterbalancing Western interests in North Africa, the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow’s entrenchment in Libya reflects broader ambitions to bolster its status as a consequential player on the African continent via the Mediterranean region.

In contrast to its earlier efforts in Syria, where the primary goal was to prop up the Assad regime, Russia’s engagement in Libya appears more multidimensional. It is not merely about sustaining a friendly government but about establishing a broad-based strategic presence. This involves integrating military diplomacy with economic initiatives, thereby embedding itself deeply within the Libyan infrastructure, broader regional politics, and the wider African continent’s evolving dynamics.

Thus, Libya emerges as more than just another arena for Moscow’s tactical maneuvers against Western influence; it is the linchpin of Russia’s renewed approach in a restless part of the world. Redeploying assets from Syria to Libya indicates a calculated bet on the long-term strategic dividends that Libya offers.

Such a bet is emblematic of Russia’s broader goal to establish itself as a counterweight to its geopolitical rivals. Furthermore, by maintaining a robust presence in Libya, Russia can pivot more dynamically between diverse theaters of operations, ensuring that its global role continues to adapt in an increasingly fragmented world.

Libya has now transformed from an oil-rich battleground for quarrelsome local factions to a cornerstone of Russia’s ambitions. As Moscow reconfigures its operational posture in this part of the world with Libya at its center, it is quickly redefining the North African country’s geostrategic importance even as its frustrating political gridlock persists.

***

Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington,DC.

____________________

AN

Omar Swehli

This will not happen while Haftar is among us. So why is it impossible to establish a successful state in Libya under Khalifa Haftar’s control?

***

Libya is now classified as a failed state, and the USA classifies Libya as a threat to its security, as do European countries, which place Libya in level 4 in terms of travel warnings.

Libya faces a state of division and political stalemate, with Khalifa Haftar representing the greatest obstacle to building a stable state, with his military and intelligence control over the eastern and southern regions, and his oppressive rule, Haftar rejects democracy and obstructs any efforts to establish a civil state.

His Control of the House

of Representatives

Haftar uses the House of Representatives to implement his agenda, with the help of its Speaker, Agila Saleh, who is subject to his influence. The repression and assassinations, such as the assassinations of MPs Siham Sergiwa and Ibrahim Al-Drisi, have spread terror among the members, which has thwarted any attempts at change within the House of Representatives.

Rejection of democracy and elections

Khalifa Haftar declares his explicit rejection of democracy and publicly mocks it, stressing his rejection of any laws regulating elections or referendums on the constitution. He seeks to establish a military family rule that keeps him and his sons in power, and he has even gone beyond rejecting democracy to banning it in the areas he controls, he has worked to abolish elected municipal councils, replacing them with people loyal to him. He also ordered his security services and militias to destroy polling stations in areas under his influence, with the aim of preventing any municipal elections from taking place.

In the latest example, the city of Derna witnessed direct security interventions, where independent candidates were threatened and forced to withdraw, confirming his repressive approach to preventing any manifestations of democracy or free local governance.

Tyranny in the Eastern Region

Haftar rules the areas under his control by force, with serious human rights violations and his prisons filled with opponents of opinion with the help of external intelligence support, he carries out a systematic repression against any opposition, with his bloody record extending from the Chad war to internal conflicts. In his attack on Tripoli, he caused the killing of ten thousand of his soldiers, defenders of Tripoli, and innocent civilians, and left behind after his departure mines that claim lives and do not distinguish between children, women, and innocents. Despite being over 85 years old, Haftar has a bloody past and present par excellence, and after this age, no change in his bloody criminal behavior can be expected from him.

His military ambition

Haftar seeks to impose his control over all of Libya, although he currently controls the eastern region and part of the south, while the western region, which includes the majority of the population (60%), remains outside his control. His military ambition and his criminal past undermine any efforts to establish a democratic and civil state.

The presence of Khalifa Haftar constitutes a major obstacle to the stability of Libya and the unification of its institutions, as his practices reflect an authoritarian tendency and an explicit rejection of democratic principles. His military and political control is hampering efforts to form a unified, internationally recognized government and preventing it from extending its sovereignty over the entire country.

Haftar has established a parallel government and almost placed a central bank outside the control of the state. He has also pressured the House of Representatives to enact a law establishing a constitutional court based in Benghazi, with the aim of circumventing the rulings of the High Court in Tripoli, in addition to printing Libyan currency without the approval of the legitimate central bank in Tripoli, which has further complicated the economic and institutional crisis. He is now stealing oil and exporting it through the Hariga port in the far east of Libya, which he exchanges for military purchases that fulfill his ambition to control Libya.

Salvaging Libya requires a new revolution that avoids the mistakes of the past, establishes a just rule that holds criminals against the people accountable, and builds a political system based on respect for human rights and justice, which ensures a unified and stable future for the country.

Perhaps relief will come from Allah prompting Haftar’s disappearance from political life, Allah’s willing, and perhaps the hope is that 2025 will bring us this good news.

____________________

What Benghazi’s reconstruction reveals

about Derna

The reconstruction process underway in Benghazi—also fully controlled by the Haftar family through the same institutional mechanisms as in Derna—provides a good indication of how Derna’s projects might unfold over the coming months.

Benghazi, a city of 800,000 residents, endured more than three years of intense urban warfare from 2014 to 2017, with reconstruction efforts finally commencing in 2022. Since then, the city has witnessed a surge in projects, and these construction initiatives have shaped the Haftars’ approach to infrastructure. Similar methods, including potential risks of abuse, are likely being applied in Derna.

In Benghazi, the Haftars’ infrastructure strategy often involves securing opaque deals with private companies, foreign and Libyan alike, via a process that lacks any public bidding.

The process typically begins with the allocation of an undisclosed amount of funds for a high-profile agreement with a foreign company that is chosen and publicly announced. Behind the scenes, however, the foreign company is often asked to partner with a private Libyan firm—one with informal ties to the Haftar family or their allies.

From there, roughly half the project’s nominal cost is reportedly paid out to the Libyan company, which contributes almost no value, while the remaining half goes to the foreign company, which performs the majority of the work.

This practice warrants concern: Officials who represent the Libyan state should not covertly control the Libyan contractors they hire for construction projects. Such conflicts of interest heighten the probability of financial misconduct and the likelihood that an enormous chunk of public wealth may be diverted.

When it comes to foreign partners, the Haftars have so far favored Egyptian and Emirati construction companies. Egyptian firms involved in Benghazi’s reconstruction thus far include Neom Real Estate Development, under the ownership of Ibrahim al-Arjani, a friend of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi; the Arab Contractors Company, linked to the Egyptian Council of Ministers; and the Wadi El Nile Company, known for its affiliation with Egypt’s General Intelligence Services.

In August 2024, Saddam Haftar’s National Development Apparatus awarded the major al-Marisa Free Trade Zone project to the UAE’s Global Contracting. Turkish companies, too, have secured contracts in Benghazi, suggesting they may find similar success in Derna.

Despite Ankara’s strong stance against Haftar during the 2019-2020 Tripoli war, Turkish diplomats—particularly since 2022—have made significant efforts to court the field marshal and his family, aiming to help Turkish firms win economic opportunities in eastern Libya.

Companies from China, France, South Korea, Canada, and other nations have also shown keen interest in contracts from the Haftar family, although their political connections likely rank lower than those of companies from Egypt, the UAE, and Turkey.

Moreover, some Western companies are wary of directly signing contracts with Belqacem Haftar’s Reconstruction Fund, owing to compliance concerns. Among the private Libyan firms most actively participating in construction projects in Benghazi are El Rayan Holding Company and Emaar Libya Holding Company. Both are linked to Haftar’s son Khaled, who serves as chief of staff of the Security Units, headquartered in Benghazi’s Qaryunis neighborhood.

In addition, Eabar al-Alam, with which the UAE’s Global Builders partnered to build a new Benghazi airport, is said to be tacitly controlled by Belqacem Haftar. A representative of Belqacem Haftar at the Libya Reconstruction Fund did not respond to requests for comment. El Rayan Holding Company, Emaar Libya Holding Company, and a spokesperson for the Haftar armed coalition did not respond to requests for comment.

The risks of a flawed recovery

Interviews with Derna natives and eyewitnesses have revealed that ongoing recovery efforts in the disaster-ravaged city appear to be more superficial than what was recommended by the World Bank.

Belqacem Haftar’s Reconstruction Fund never adequately communicated its plan for the city’s recovery, but its actions suggest that it may be prioritizing speed and cosmetics over safety. The World Bank’s “Libya Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment” report, which was issued following the 2023 floods, emphasizes the need for water, sanitation, and road infrastructure.

It also underscores the need to rebuild and upgrade electricity generators and water and sanitation systems, with an eye toward improved resilience against future extreme weather events; it urges the construction of flood-resistant bridges and roads using resilient materials and modern designs for durability and adaptation to climate change.

As for the dams, the World Bank recommends a comprehensive overhaul. After 12 months of outwardly impressive work in Derna, there is still no evidence that authorities have adhered to the World Bank’s recommendations. For instance, the plan for replacing the collapsed dams remains unclear, with no indication as to whether the new structures will meet recommended standards.

Rumors suggest that the Libya Reconstruction Fund may invest in an advanced overhaul that features the introduction of hydraulic systems, but local skepticism abounds. Some residents have also voiced concern over which companies ought to be given the task, highlighting a trust issue.

In the city itself, many Derna residents have welcomed the surface-level progress achieved so far, such as renovated schools, new children’s recreational facilities, and a new polyclinic. But more in-depth interviews with locals reveal that the recovery has been uneven.

Rehabilitation of al-Muzdawaj Darnes Club Street, for instance, has been thorough, covering sewage, drinking water, and electricity. But the effort in other parts of Derna is falling short of addressing issues that have been developing for decades in a city known for its lack of infrastructure.

For instance, two Derna residents told The Sentry that, despite announcements in March 2024 declaring a complete restoration of a key thoroughfare called al-Fanar Street, the actual work proved shallow, consisting of little more than cleaning and repainting.

A local source told The Sentry that the authorities had applied just a single layer of asphalt, and they expressed concerns that it would begin to crack in a few years. Another Derna resident, who lost two neighbors in September 2023, praised Belqacem Haftar’s repairs on a few of the main streets but pointed out that other vital arteries severely damaged by floods remained inhospitable as of October 2024.

Interviewees expressed their discontent with the condition of the alleys and smaller side streets, many of which are still cluttered with debris. Others also emphasized the ongoing lack of essential infrastructure such as electric and sewage systems in entire swathes of Derna.

The way the authorities have treated parts of Derna’s population shows signs of politically motivated neglect. Dozens of families from the flood-ravaged historical center—an area that previously took the brunt of Haftar’s 2018-2019 military campaign—seem to have been marginalized in the post-flood rehabilitation process.

As authorities carry out extensive demolitions in preparation for future reconstruction in those central neighborhoods, they have offered to buy some residents’ homes at prices significantly below fair market value.

In 2023, the Haftar family implemented a more aggressive version of similar policies in downtown Benghazi, and it led to the arbitrary and permanent displacement of numerous families. It is therefore possible that the Haftars are intentionally implementing an approach that would result in the forced dispersal of some families from downtown Derna, the tacit aim being to prevent the resurgence of political opposition there.

Moreover, compensatory money has not been evenly distributed thus far, adding to the risks of unfairness and lack of neutrality. Overall, the haste on display today in Derna’s reconstruction is typical of dysfunctional situations in which political leaders are driven by two misaligned incentives that detract from the population’s well-being.

First, the rulers exhibit a preference for bolstering their image through eye-catching announcements, rather than committing to the slow and meticulous implementation of projects.

Second, these leaders may give precedence to obtaining immediate financial gains via upfront payments, rather than dedicating resources to the high-quality realization of projects.

Such an approach runs counter to the recovery’s long-term success; it leads to the neglect of essential preparatory steps and the use of shortcuts that undermine the integrity of the eventual outcome.

______________________

The Sentry

Mustafa Fetouri

In his first comment on post-Assad Syria on 16 December, President Vladimir Putin said that Russia maintains relations with all groups in Syria and countries in the region and that most are interested in Russia’s military bases “remaining” in Syria. A week earlier, his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that he agreed with Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the new Syrian leader, that relations with Damascus were “long-term and strategic.”

At the same time, it is a fact that Russia is moving military hardware from its Tartous naval base in Syria to both Russia and eastern Libya, where Moscow maintains military ties to the region’s dominant strong man, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar.

Russian bases in Syria were meant to serve three long-term strategic objectives: to increase Moscow’s footprint in the region and thus challenge Western hegemony; to maintain its historical ties to the Middle East with a projection of power; and to be a springboard for Moscow’s Africa Corps, which is spearheading Russia’s return to old allies across the continent. Helping Bashar Al-Assad stay in power was a temporary tactical goal which, in part, explains giving up on him once it became unsustainable.

When Moscow increased its military presence in Syria in 2015 it did not show any immediate interest in Libya, which was already in chaos. The North African country was not part of any Russian plans in the region which is odd, geopolitically, given Libya’s strategic location and the fact that it is rich in natural resources. However, Moscow was watching developments in the country closely, while staying low key and preferring not to play any active role in the Libyan fiasco.

In late 2017 and early 2018 that position changed dramatically when mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group appeared in eastern and central Libya where most oil installation are. Wagner sent a couple of thousand fighters to help Haftar after he launched a military campaign in April 2019 to take the capital, Tripoli. Haftar was defeated and his troops retreated to Sirte, 500 km east of Tripoli, despite camping for months just outside the city.

In the following years, Moscow kept denying that it had any connection to Wagner and insisted that the mercenary entity was a private company with no links to the Russian state. By then Wagner was already present in the Central African Republic and Sudan, and testing the waters for a potential push towards the African Sahel while Moscow continued its denial of any ties to the group. Within the next couple of years Wagner expanded to four more African Sahel countries. It took another dramatic event for Moscow to acknowledge publicly otherwise.

The following month Putin revealed what was already known; that Wagner, despite being portrayed as a private company, was indeed funded by the Russian state. Wagner’s leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, was killed in a plane crash in August 2023. That led to the Russian ministry of defence taking over Wagner’s assets and its legacy across Africa, including Libya. From the beginning Wagner was clearly part of Russia’s long-term strategy in Africa, as the group led the earlier planning and establishment of what would become Russia’s Africa Corps.

Prior to setting foot on Libyan soil, Wagner was handling its African operations out of Syria, which served as a springboard and logistical hub for the mercenaries as they shuttled back and forth to different African countries. Even Wagner in Libya was, initially, supplied out of Russian bases in Syria regardless if such bases were controlled by Wagner or Russia’s ministry of defence.

However, the collapse of the Syrian regime is forcing Moscow to change its plans, not only for the Middle East, but also for its nascent Africa Corps. Libya has been the launching pad for Russian military activities in Africa beyond the Sahara since late 2020. The Russians now control a couple of military bases in eastern and southern Libya, and are expanding quickly. In western Libya, Turkiye — an ally of Moscow elsewhere but its rival in Libya — has established itself as the dominant military force.

However, there is a major difference between their respective presence in Libya: Turkiye sent troops there “legally” as it was invited to do so by the UN-recognised government in 2019 to fend off Haftar’s Wagner-supported offensive. Denying any connection to Wagner means that Moscow’s military presence in Libya today is neither “official” nor documented, and it is not clear for how long and for what purpose. Haftar never signed any “treaty” or deal with Wagner which, it could be argued, Moscow has inherited even if such a document is deemed illegal.

For Libya to become the focal point of Russian strategy in the southern Mediterranean and Africa is not only bad for the country, but also poses an existential threat. While both Russia and Turkiye endorsed and accepted UN Security Council Resolution 2617 (December, 2021) calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Libya, both countries still maintain a military presence there.

Nevertheless, they now find themselves in the crosshairs of NATO, whose presence in Italy is just an hour’s flight north, and Russia. There is now the potential for Libya to become a battlefield as the West seeks to limit or end Russia’s military expansion in Libya and beyond. It does not have to be Russian troops fighting NATO counterparts, but could be fought through local proxies.

The irony here could not be greater: under Gaddafi, Libyans used to celebrate, every year, three national occasions in which foreign troops and settlers were kicked out of the country. In March 1970, Gaddafi, who had come to power six months earlier, ordered British troops out of El-Adem Air Base in Tobruk; in June he kicked the Americans out of the huge Wheelus Air Bases just east of Tripoli; and in October of the same year he sent home some 20,000 Italian settlers, who had been transferred from Italy to Libya during the occupation and given the best land in the country. Many Libyans are sure that their former late leader is turning in his grave to see foreign troops back on Libyan soil again.

___________________

Emadeddin Badi

The West should beware falling

into a new trap.

The fall of Damascus last month marks a shift of historic proportions. Once a centerpiece of Russia’s reassertion on the global stage, Syria now starkly illustrates the fragility of alliances built on coercion and convenience. Bashar al-Assad, propped up for years by Russian airpower, mercenaries, and propaganda, could not withstand the combined weight of internal dissent and external recalibration.

For Moscow, this collapse is not merely a setback but an opportunity to adapt—an effort already underway as its forces and equipment pivot southward in the Mediterranean. Russia’s relocation of troops and hardware to eastern Libya signals a strategic recalibration, with Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar waiting in Cyrenaica, hedging his bets. All eyes are on him as Western states court his family members to deter them from enabling a Russian naval pivot in the Mediterranean.

This shifting terrain—from the ruins of Assad’s Damascus to Haftar’s contested Libya—reveals a deeper logic in Russian foreign policy. It is not about replacing one proxy with another but about continuity. Moscow’s operations in Syria were as much about resisting Western encroachment as securing tangible gains.

When Russian jets flew from Hmeimim airbase to Libya in 2019 to support Haftar’s Tripoli offensive, it was a quiet rehearsal for today’s broader strategic shift. This ambition in the Mediterranean is not new; it dates back to the eighteenth century, when Russia established its Mediterranean naval fleet to challenge Ottoman dominance and project power.

While Moscow’s role in Syria may be evolving rather than disappearing, the shifting dynamics surrounding its use as a launchpad to Africa only underscore Libya’s importance—not as a fallback, but as part of a long-standing strategy to expand Moscow’s strategic foothold in the region and project power beyond it.

Parallels between Assad and Haftar run deeper than their shared reliance on Russian patronage. Both are authoritarian figures willing to barter sovereignty for survival. Assad offered Moscow a foothold against NATO’s eastern flank and a stage to test military capabilities.

Haftar presents a similar opportunity—a means to disrupt Western interests, exploit Libya’s fractured politics, and extend Moscow’s influence into Africa. Yet both men embody the risks of Russia’s transactional approach. They are less allies than instruments, their perceived strength masking deep vulnerabilities. In Damascus, Assad’s forces crumbled as Moscow’s support wavered. Haftar’s story, though not yet written, carries ominous echoes of the same trajectory.

The West’s neglect during Libya’s transition—marked by US disengagement and conflicting European agendas—enabled Russia (and Turkey) to assert dominance. Despite this, Washington is now playing catch-up, attempting to disentangle Haftar from Moscow’s grip. This strategy betrays a misunderstanding of the dynamics at play, as well as a misconception about Western stakeholders’ ability to replace what Moscow provides to Haftar—military, logistical, and financial support that the West is neither prepared nor equipped to offer.

Haftar is no free agent capable of switching allegiances at will, least of all from Moscow, to which he is firmly tethered by his military and logistical dependence. From Wagner Group mercenaries acting as enforcers to counterfeit Libyan dinars printed in Russia financing his campaigns, Haftar’s power is not independent but borrowed, with terms dictated by the Kremlin.

Moscow’s tightening grip

The Kremlin’s view of Haftar as an unreliable paper tiger underscores the asymmetry in their relationship. While Haftar styles himself as Libya’s savior, Russia sees him as a tool for broader ambitions. During Haftar’s US-greenlit ill-fated assault on Tripoli launched in 2019, Wagner operatives eventually withdrew tactically, exposing his forces to chaotic retreats and humiliating losses. The mercenaries’ priority was not Haftar’s victory but securing strategic assets. By cementing a presence in key Libyan bases, Moscow deepened Haftar’s reliance on Russia while consolidating its long-term foothold.

Haftar’s dependence on Moscow reached new levels after his 2020 defeat in Tripoli. Cash-strapped and deprived of momentum, he turned to Wagner’s advanced military capabilities to maintain relevance. Wagner’s MiG fighter jets stationed in Jufra airbase and troops in Ghardabiyah airbase became lifelines for the LNA.

The perception of retaining the support of a global power enabled Haftar to reconsolidate his forces, suppressing dissent and enforcing loyalty within its fractious ranks through purges and restructuring. This consolidation paved the way for hereditary succession plans within the Haftar family. Nevertheless, the dependence on Russian support at a period of vulnerability highlights the precarious nature of Haftar’s power, with reliance on foreign support masking fragility.

Haftar’s sons have since cultivated ties with several foreign capitals, including Moscow, leveraging these connections to bolster the family’s standing. This approach mirrors Assad’s dynastic governance and highlights the critical role of external support in sustaining such systems. Centralizing authority within the family aims to solidify power but also disrupts the delicate balance among tribal coalitions and militia alliances underpinning Haftar’s rule.

While access to unfettered revenues has thus far preserved co-opted loyalty, the reliance on external backers mirrors the vulnerability that marked Assad’s later years, where growing insularity and dependence on Moscow eroded his broader alliances. The parallels extend to the late Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, whose inner-circle isolation and miscalculations led to mass defections at his regime’s peak. In both cases, perceptions of inevitability gave way to fragility—a cautionary tale for Libya’s current trajectory.

The Haftars’ strategy, while consolidating internal authority, has also deepened reliance on external backers such as Moscow. This dependency grew further in 2023 and 2024, as the Haftar family facilitated the evasion of Western sanctions on Russia by re-exporting Russian refined fuel products falsely labeled as Libyan.

This scheme hinged on Haftar’s influence over Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), a sovereign institution eroded by internal divisions and external interference. Working with the Tripoli-based government, the Haftars turned the NOC into a vehicle for factional control and illicit profit. 

A 2022 US-backed Emirati-mediated deal to replace the NOC’s chief reflected Washington’s flawed assumptions that sharing economic benefits between the Haftars and their counterparts in Tripoli could foster stability. Instead, the agreement enabled Haftar to exploit the NOC for Kremlin-aligned activities and private gain, deepening corruption and exacerbating Libya’s institutional fragility.

More broadly, Moscow’s rising influence over the Haftar family’s operations underscores its role as a key arbiter of its survival as a political dynasty. By controlling critical military assets and logistical networks, Russia wields significant leverage over the LNA’s future.

This dependency highlights the paradox of Haftar’s ambitions: consolidating power through familial ties renders him more beholden to Moscow, which can recalibrate its support based on broader strategic interests. In pursuing dynastic continuity, the Haftars have tightened Russia’s grip on Libya, transforming a bid for autonomy into another layer of dependence.

Lessons for the West

The folly of Western engagement with Haftar lies in overestimating his leverage. Washington’s assumption that Haftar can counter Moscow ignores his fundamental reliance on external backers. Even his allies, such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, now view him more pragmatically, supporting him only as long as he serves their interests.

For Russia, Haftar’s utility stems from dependence, not loyalty. His forces rely on Russian airlifts, the expertise of the rebranded Wagner Group (now operating as the Africa Corps), and Moscow’s soft power. Strip away Russia’s military support, and Haftar’s inflated power on the ground collapses—a mirage reminiscent of the misplaced certainty in Assad’s inevitability.

If the West is to counter Moscow effectively, it must abandon its reactive attempts to “peel away” influential figures from Russia and acknowledge the limits of its influence in a region where it has consistently been outmaneuvered. Instead of chasing fleeting alliances with figures like Haftar, the West should focus on addressing the structural weaknesses that make Libya susceptible to external exploitation.

Equally, unconditional support for a weak and corrupt government in Tripoli undermines the country’s sovereignty, creating further voids for actors like Russia to exploit. Strengthening governance, fostering economic resilience, and supporting inclusive political solutions are paramount. In particular, the United States should work with international partners to bolster Libya’s judicial and financial oversight institutions, creating accountability and reducing opportunities for exploitation by foreign actors.

Whether or not Russia succeeds in its Mediterranean pivot, the lesson for the West is clear: playing catch-up in a game already lost serves no one. The failures in both Syria and Libya underscore the dangers of neglecting early intervention and coherent strategy.

To avoid repeating these mistakes, the West must learn not only to act decisively but also to prioritize stability over opportunism. This is not merely a regional issue, but emblematic of a broader contest over the principles that will define the global order in the years to come.

***

Emadeddin Badi is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council.

___________________

The Sentry

From Qadhafi’s instruments to unruly

power brokers

The Dabaibas, rather than being mere pawns of Qadhafi and his children, formed a center of discretionary power in pre-2011 Libya. During the 1990s, Ali al-Dabaiba’s ODAC was known to have been exploited by the Qadhafi family as a tool for illicitly diverting wealth from Libya, including as a means of bypassing international sanctions.

By the mid-2000s, however, the Dabaiba family had gained significant influence of its own, becoming so emboldened that it sometimes operated beyond the regime’s control. In 2007, an anti-corruption inquiry led by a Libyan judge documented a set of severe corruption cases featuring ODAC and Ali al-Dabaiba.

They were prominently cited for their pivotal role in Tripoli-based real estate scams that centered around the unauthorized relocation of government offices and the provision of preferential housing for regime functionaries. The judge found that ODAC was paying exorbitant prices for property that was often not suitable for its declared purpose, and he recommended criminal charges against Ali al-Dabaiba and others.

Despite the report’s thoroughness, few actions were taken, likely because the individuals incriminated were deemed too crucial to the Qadhafi regime. The inquiry did, however, clearly document ODAC’s increasing independence and brazenness under the Dabaiba family’s leadership, marking these as clear trends as early as 2007.

Two years later, under separate circumstances, Seif al-Qadhafi, the dictator’s second son, had then-Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi informally encourage Libyan law enforcement authorities to investigate Ali al-Dabaiba’s conduct as head of ODAC.

In August 2010, they froze almost all ODAC outlays. The following month, under Mahmudi’s directive, Ali al-Dabaiba was replaced as the head of ODAC. Soon afterward, both Ali al-Dabaiba’s legal troubles and the decision to oust him were eclipsed by the widespread civil unrest that began in early 2011.

From the vantage point of foreign companies engaged in Libya, the uprisings of February 2011 caused a major rupture, compelling tens of thousands of foreign workers, including Arsel’s personnel, to flee the country.

The regime change also presented an opportunity for some companies to try to recover part of their operational losses—including those unrelated to the 2011 uprisings—by blaming the unrest. But those hopes would be largely disappointed.

A carefree trail of impunity

Post-Qadhafi, Libyan justice has been ineffective in scrutinizing the Dabaiba family’s track record from the 2000s. The international response, as well, has been insufficient, especially given the severity of the suspicions. This lack of accountability has contributed to the kleptocratic surge afflicting present-day Libya, with the Derna tragedy being just one of many consequences.

In February and March 2011, to curb the Qadhafi regime’s violent repression of popular uprisings, the United States and the United Nations imposed significant sanctions on Libyan economic institutions. However, the sanctions did not target ODAC, LIDCO, or other vehicles controlled by the Dabaiba family.

The European Union did freeze ODAC’s assets in August 2011, but it dropped those measures a year and a half later. The lack of international scrutiny into ODAC, combined with other factors, such as Ali al-Dabaiba’s concerted efforts in 2011 to fund preeminent anti-Qadhafi factions, helped ODAC survive as an institution.

In 2014, Libyan prosecutors determined that Ali al-Dabaiba had embezzled between $6 billion and $7 billion while he was the head of ODAC from 1989 to 2011.

The Libyan Attorney General’s Office asked Scottish authorities to initiate an investigation and even issued an Interpol red notice seeking him on that basis in 2014. Shortly thereafter, however, Abdelqader Radwan, the attorney general under whom most of these actions were taken, retired. His departure, coinciding with the outbreak of a new civil war in Libya, caused the investigation into the Dabaiba family to wane.

Meanwhile, ODAC carried on operating in post-2011 Libya under the leadership of Sharif Ibrahim Takita, a technocrat known to be aligned with the Dabaiba family. In 2016, a new UN-backed government in Tripoli, led by the moderate Fayez al-Serraj, ushered in a period when pragmatic Libyan factions sidelined hard-core revolutionaries, rendering the Libyan capital less hostile to former Qadhafi associates.

The following year, Abdelhamid al-Dabaiba, who had never relinquished his leadership of LIDCO, resurfaced in the political sphere. In October 2020, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) selected Ali al-Dabaiba to serve on a committee of 75 Libyan citizens that was asked to guide the preparations for Libya’s first nationwide elections in seven years.

The UN-backed committee ultimately selected Ali al-Dabaiba’s cousin Abdelhamid Dabaiba as the new prime minister amid credible vote-buying allegations. Mere months after taking office in 2021, Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dabaiba announced his intention to resuscitate “stalled projects in Libya” through ODAC.

While the body is notably less active than before 2011—many construction negotiations now circumvent it, particularly in the east—ODAC still possesses some relevance. The designs, blueprints, financing schedules, and administrative groundwork that ODAC prepared years ago for numerous unfinished projects still provide a foundation for several companies that hope to revive their contracts.

This is particularly true of the Turkish firms active in Libya before 2011. Since then, most input prices have risen substantially, necessitating a complete review and adjustment of original contracts.

But despite the changes in the economic environment, those Turkish firms that have managed to avoid bankruptcy since 2011 have demonstrated interest in reviving their old contracts with ODAC. A return to Libya would enable them to recover what they perceive as payments owed to them. The Libyan side, however, is not eager to accommodate them.

The Haftar Family’s Stranglehold

on Derna’s Reconstruction

Although the Dabaiba family holds power in present-day Tripoli, it wields no influence over Derna’s current reconstruction, which is tightly controlled by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his sons, mainly Saddam, Belqacem, and Khaled. Their style of authoritarian kleptocracy, although employing different tactics and unfolding in a drastically changed Libya, presents risks analogous to the Dabaibas’ own harmful practices.

Don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t know

An array of unilateral measures enacted after the Derna floods placed the Haftar family at the helm of recovery and reconstruction efforts, granting them power over almost every facet with minimal accountability. Their near total control significantly increases the risk that a large portion of the Libyan public wealth allocated for reconstruction will be misappropriated.

Shortly after the 2023 floods occurred, Khalifa Haftar appointed his son Saddam to spearhead post-disaster security and oversee the international rescue operations. As part of their bid to deepen their supremacy in eastern Libya, the Haftars prevented Tripoli-based Prime Minister Dabaiba from visiting Derna, while Benghazi-based Prime Minister Usama Hammad was asked by the Haftar family to stay out of any decision-making related to the reconstruction.

Quite significantly, in February 2024, the speaker of the House of Representatives issued a law appointing Belqacem Haftar, another son of Khalifa Haftar, as the head of the Libya Reconstruction Fund, which selects, negotiates, awards, finances, and manages many infrastructure projects in Haftar-held territories.

The official legislation bars the Audit Bureau, the Administrative Control Authority, and other Libyan regulatory bodies from examining Belqacem Haftar’s decisions or requiring transparency in his management of the reconstruction.

Other state entities, such as the Ministry of Planning in Tripoli, are also cut out. Even the House of Representatives itself lacks both oversight and knowledge regarding the specifics of most contracts signed by the Haftars. A spokesperson for the House of Representatives did not respond to a request for comment.

When it comes to Derna, Belqacem Haftar’s Reconstruction Fund has been signing contracts through an opaque, unilateral selection process that eschews competitive tendering. What’s more, the total sum of contracts signed by Belqacem Haftar for the reconstruction of Derna could soon reach approximately 12 billion dinars ($2.4 billion).

In July 2024, the House of Representatives passed a unified national budget law, which includes allocations for Libya’s reconstruction. Under this framework, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) will likely review each project proposed by Belqacem’s Reconstruction Fund, deciding case by case whether to issue the letter of credit essential for each project’s realization.

This leaves many vulnerabilities unaddressed, as the CBL is not intended to act as a law enforcement or supervisory body responsible for ensuring the integrity of infrastructure contracting. When asked by the press how his Reconstruction Fund will finance its work, Belqacem expressed his confidence in Libya’s official budget law, but remained vague about the details.

Belqacem Haftar’s Reconstruction Fund is not the only infrastructure vehicle fully controlled by the field marshal’s family. Even before the floods in Derna, reconstruction was already a top priority for eastern Libya’s rulers, an emphasis that had translated into a proliferation of committees and investment organs.

One consequential Haftar-linked player in the reconstruction space is the opaque National Development Apparatus, headed by Jibril al-Badri, who is known for his close ties to Saddam Haftar. All of this means almost complete opacity under the Haftar family’s rule: The Libyan public, Libya’s regulatory bodies, and international actors have little, if any, access to an overall reconstruction plan or to details about the contracts, the companies engaged, the composition of consortiums, the financial allocation for each project, the scope of work, or the origins of the funding.

Across Libya, illicit activities have been on the rise, including in territories under the Haftars’ rule. Amid this kleptocratic boom, the opacity of the publicly funded reconstruction process is especially concerning, as the Haftar family and its associates may exploit it for personal gain.

Possibilities in the context of infrastructure contracts include letter of credit fraud and money laundering. If a lot of construction business is processed through eastern Libya-based banks, the Haftars and their associates would find it easier to perpetrate such schemes under the guise of legitimate work by private contractors.

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Robert Edwards

• Fractured governance blamed for cycles of conflict and foreign meddling among other problems in 2024
• Local elections failed to provide a pathway to political reconciliation, stability and sovereignty

When the Arab uprisings swept through the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, many in the West hoped the fall of these entrenched regimes would herald a new era of development and good governance. Instead, it marked the beginning of a period of unprecedented suffering for millions.

Nearly 14 years later, in the wake of a grinding civil war, there are now renewed hopes that Syria, after its brutally suppressed uprising, might finally be stepping into the light following the toppling of the Bashar Assad regime.

However, as a diverse array of victorious armed opposition groups struggle to impose order and unity on a fractured nation, many observers share a common fear — that Syria could become another Libya.

Indeed, since the NATO-backed uprising that ousted Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has become a byword for state failure — divided between rival administrations, plagued by criminality, and used as a proxy battleground by foreign powers keen to exploit its oil and strategic location.

While 2024 offered glimpses of possible reconciliation between the North African nation’s competing factions, steps toward national elections, and perhaps even justice for its long-suffering citizens, the country remains deeply unstable as it enters the new year.

In April, Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN special envoy to Libya, resigned, citing the country’s entrenched political stalemate. His resignation followed 18 months of attempts to mediate between Libya’s divided factions, but a “lack of political will and good faith” thwarted progress.

“The selfish resolve of current leaders to maintain the status quo must stop,” Bathily told the Security Council. The delay of the national reconciliation conference, originally scheduled for April, highlighted the ongoing gridlock.

While Libya’s oil-rich economy offers immense potential, it remains plagued by a fractured political landscape — with the Tripoli-based UN-recognized Government of National Unity headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh opposing the eastern administration allied with General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army.

Bathily’s departure underscored the international community’s struggle to bring stability to a nation divided since the 2011 uprising. Despite his efforts, Libya’s entrenched rivalries and external meddling have kept progress elusive, prolonging the suffering of its population.

Libya’s fragile peace was repeatedly shattered in 2024, with violence escalating across major cities and border regions. In May, clashes in Zawiya between militias loyal to the GNU left one dead and six injured.

Violence escalated in Tripoli in July, where clashes between the Interior Ministry’s Special Deterrence Forces, also known as RADA, and Presidential Council units resulted in 13 fatalities, including civilians. August brought another tragedy in Tripoli, with nine killed in militia fighting.

Although political leaders have periodically called for ceasefires, the lack of cohesive state authority has allowed armed factions to exploit and perpetuate the chaos, leaving Libyans trapped in repeated cycles of violence.

Amid this summer of bloodshed, there was a glimmer of justice. In July, Libya’s Derna Criminal Court sentenced 12 officials to up to 27 years in prison for their roles in the catastrophic Sept. 10, 2023, dam collapse.

The disaster, triggered by Storm Daniel, unleashed torrents of water that obliterated entire neighborhoods in the coastal city of Derna, claiming thousands of lives.

Neglected infrastructure and corruption were deemed key factors in the disaster, as funds earmarked for dam maintenance were found to have been misappropriated. The court’s verdict represented a rare moment of accountability in a nation fraught with impunity.

While some saw this as a step toward justice, critics argue systemic reform is still absent.

Rebuilding efforts in Derna remain slow, hindered by political infighting. Meanwhile, the disaster’s survivors, grappling with trauma and displacement, want to see comprehensive infrastructure upgrades to prevent future tragedies.

September brought a breakthrough as Libya’s rival legislative bodies agreed to appoint Naji Mohamed Issa Belqasem as interim central bank governor, ending months of turmoil over financial leadership.

This crisis erupted when Tripoli’s Presidential Council moved to replace longstanding Governor Sadiq Al-Kabir, leading eastern factions to halt oil production in protest.

Libya’s oil-dependent economy suffered immensely, with crude exports plummeting from 1 million barrels per day in August to just 400,000 in September.

The UN facilitated the agreement, urging an end to unilateral decisions that deepen institutional divisions. While the resolution temporarily eased tensions, it highlighted the broader issue of competing power centers undermining Libya’s economic stability.

With the interim governor tasked to form a board of directors, the deal’s success hinges on sustained cooperation, a rare commodity in Libya’s fragmented political landscape.

The murder of Abdel-Rahman Milad, a notorious Libyan Coast Guard commander known as “Bija,” in September spotlighted Libya’s lawlessness and corruption.

Sanctioned by the UN in 2018 for human trafficking, Milad symbolized the overlap of state and criminal enterprise.

Speculation still abounds about the reason behind his killing — ranging from militia infighting to fears he might expose high-level corruption.

Milad’s killing also raised questions about the EU’s reliance on Libyan partners accused of human rights abuses to help control the flow of migration to Europe.

Observers see his death as a byproduct of power struggles between rival gangs and a reflection of Libya’s inability to reform its fractured governance and security apparatus.

While Milad’s death may serve as a test for Libya’s broken justice system, there has been some progress on addressing historic injustices.

October saw the International Criminal Court unseal arrest warrants for six Libyans implicated in war crimes during the Second Libyan Civil War of 2014-20. The suspects, linked to the Kaniyat militia, face charges including murder, torture and sexual violence.

These crimes occurred in Tarhuna, a town notorious for mass graves uncovered in 2020 after the militia’s retreat.

The ICC warrants mark a significant step toward accountability and highlight ongoing international scrutiny of Libya’s human rights record. However, Libya’s weak judicial system and fragmented governance pose challenges to enforcing these warrants.

As families of victims seek closure, the outcome may set a precedent for addressing atrocities committed during Libya’s protracted conflict.

In November, the GNU’s Interior Minister Emad Al-Trabelsi sparked widespread condemnation from human rights groups when he announced plans to establish a morality police force.

The new force would enforce conservative social norms, including mandatory veiling for girls over the age of nine and restrictions on women’s mobility without a male guardian.

Al-Trabelsi justified the move as preserving “Islamic social values,” dismissing personal freedom as incompatible with Libyan society.

However, the measures appear to have been slapped down by the GNU. There are also doubts that the government even has the means to enforce such rules.

“Al-Trabelsi’s sweeping moral measures were never likely to materialize,” Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya expert and senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told Arab News. “Enforcing such rules requires broad territorial control, religious credibility, and a clear moral gap to address.

“Much of Libya’s population is already conservative, the Interior Ministry lacks religious backing, and no armed actor — Al-Trabelsi included — can truly project power citywide, let alone nationwide.

“Unsurprisingly, nothing substantial has followed the initial announcement, which had drawn so much international attention.”

While national elections intended to reunify the country have been repeatedly postponed, November’s municipal polls marked a rare democratic exercise, with voting held simultaneously in Libya’s east and west for the first time since 2014.

Despite logistical challenges and political tensions, voter turnout hit 77 percent, signaling public demand for stability. The elections even included areas previously under military control, where mayors had been replaced with appointees.

International observers, including the G7, praised the process as a step toward national reconciliation. However, skepticism remains about whether these local elections can pave the way for overdue presidential and parliamentary votes.

Libya has become one of the busiest and most deadly routes used by migrants and refugees attempting to reach Europe — something that armed groups have long facilitated for a profit or have sought to curtail, often brutally, in exchange for EU funding.

Tragedy struck Libya’s migrant routes repeatedly in 2024, with multiple fatal incidents highlighting the perils faced by those seeking refuge.

In September, a boat capsized near Tobruk, leaving 22 missing. October brought another disaster, with only one survivor from a vessel carrying 13 passengers. Then in November, 28 people disappeared off Libya’s coast when their rubber boat got into difficulty.

Rights groups criticized both Libyan and European policies that push migrants into perilous crossings. The Mediterranean remains a graveyard for those fleeing violence and poverty, with international efforts to address the crisis falling short.

The Kremlin’s strategic ambitions in Libya are likely to keep growing in the new year as it seeks to offset losses in Syria following the overthrow earlier this month of Assad, a key ally who had permitted Russian use of air and naval bases.

Moscow has deepened ties with General Haftar’s Libyan National Army in recent years, using Libya as a launchpad for expanding its influence in North Africa and the Sahel.

The Wagner Group, a Russian private military contractor recently rebranded as the Africa Corps, has established bases in southern Libya, supporting resource extraction and military operations across the continent.

Russia’s efforts to consolidate its presence in Libya align with broader objectives to counter NATO and secure Mediterranean access for its ships.

As Libya’s rival factions vie for power, analysts believe this kind of foreign influence could further complicate efforts to achieve peace and sovereignty.

While Syria embarks on its own delicate transition out of war and dictatorship, Libya stands as a cautionary tale for what can happen when factionalism, greed, and foreign interests are allowed to trump the needs and aspirations of a long-suffering people.

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Samuel Ramani

Assad’s ouster has raised Libya’s importance for Russia’s foreign policy, with Moscow adapting to expand its strategic footprint.

On 18 December, US officials revealed that Russia was moving sophisticated weaponry from its military bases in Syria to facilities in eastern Libya.

Russia has reportedly transferred S-300 and S-400 air defence systems to Libya alongside approximately 1,000 military personnel.

These troops were drawn from the Fifth Corps and 25th Special Tanks Division, which supported Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, and were transferred via Ilyushin aircraft to avoid the Black Sea.

Russia’s transit of military assets from Syria to Libya reflects its commitment to creating an alternative logistical path for its African operations.

Moscow may not need to rely on this route, as its bases in Syria remain operational, but it serves as a valuable hedge against a breakdown in its relationship with the new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government.

Despite political risks associated with Libya’s still unsettled power balance, Russia is confident that a more robust military presence in the country will expand its long-term leverage.

A history of Russia’s military presence

in Libya

While the recent enlargement of Russia’s military foothold in Libya is linked to Assad’s fall, it is essential to place this development into its broader historical and geopolitical context.

Since Russia agreed to cancel Libya’s $4.5 billion Cold War-era debt to Russia in April 2008, the Kremlin has eyed its Mediterranean coast as a strategically valuable base location. During his October 2008 visit to Russia, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi expressed interest in the development of a Russian naval base in Benghazi.

As Libya descended into political chaos after Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, Russia established the al-Kadim base east of Benghazi and al-Jufra facility near Libya’s Mediterranean coast. These facilities supported its Wagner Group-led military intervention on Libya National Army (LNA) strongman Khalifa Haftar’s behalf and served as logistical hubs for Russian military operations in Sudan and Mali.

While Russia drew down personnel and air defence systems from Syria after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022, its military presence in Libya was largely unaffected by wartime constraints.

Since the Russian Defence Ministry dispatched its first delegation to eastern Libya in August 2023 and Haftar’s reciprocal visit to Moscow in September 2023, Russia has intensified its pursuit of a coastal military installation deal. Russia has also modernised the runways of its airbases and dispatched 1,800 new military personnel to Libya in the spring of this year.

During his June 2024 meeting with Haftar in Benghazi, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov vowed to enhance the LNA’s military capabilities.

Given these trends, the expansion of Russia’s military presence in Libya is not mere compensation for Syria. “Russia’s moves in Libya aren’t about replacing Syria – they’re about adapting and expanding their strategic footprint,” Anas El-Gomati, the director of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, told The New Arab.

The enduring lack of centralised authority and ongoing instability, which was evidenced by the recent escalation of hostilities in the northwestern Libyan city of Zawiya, is fuelling Russia’s growing presence in Libya.

How Assad’s fall impacted Russia’s

presence in Libya

Despite fears that Russia would immediately lose access to its Syrian bases after Assad’s fall, the worst-case scenario has not transpired. On 26 December, a Russian Air Force An-124 jet travelled to and from Syria’s Khmeimim Air Base to Al-Jufra. This flight was Russia’s first since Assad’s ouster and shortly preceded HTS’s reassurances of its commitment to maintaining cooperation with Russia.

Military analyst Yury Lyamin highlighted Libya’s strategic value, as it was already a refuelling hub for Russian forces in Mali and Burkina Faso and argued that the deployment of S-300s and S-400s would provide additional cover for Russian jets entering the Sahel.

“While Tobruk can’t match Tartous’s naval depth or Khmeimim’s air capabilities, it offers something potentially more valuable – shorter routes into the Sahel and closer proximity to NATO’s southern flank,” El-Gomati told The New Arab.

When asked about Russia’s tactical considerations, Tarek Megerisi, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told The New Arab that the distance between southern Russia to Libya was not much more than from Moscow to Khmeimim. Sochi also serves as a convenient resting spot for Russian military infrastructure transiting to Libya.

Despite these advantages, some Russian commentators have expressed concern about the costs associated with relying on Libyan facilities. Although Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations jets regularly fly over Libya to Mali, the path for military equipment is more arduous.

The Rybar Telegram channel contended that Russia would only be able to transit empty cargo planes without refuelling, and heavier weaponry would need to be transferred with the aid of ships. These logistical hurdles could cause the cost of Russia’s military operations in Africa to skyrocket and reduce their profitability for the Russian state.

Political risks are another factor that reduces Russia’s ability to rely on Libya as a logistical hub. Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in Global Affairs, warned that Libya lacks a figure that can wield the kind of power that Assad was able to do in Syria before his ouster. Lukyanov argued that this lack of centralised authority would prevent a stable network of bases from being constructed in Libya.

Due to the challenges associated with stable basing in Libya and the stagnant progress of Russia’s Red Sea basing aspirations in Sudan, the Kremlin is doing all it can to secure continued access to its Syrian facilities. Russia’s steps towards de-listing HTS as a terrorist group should be placed into this context.

The impact of Russia’s new military

deployments in Libya

Russia’s growing military presence in eastern Libya has provoked fierce backlash in Tripoli. Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah summoned the Russian Ambassador to Libya and castigated the Kremlin’s warnings against its citizens travelling to Libya.

In a thinly veiled shot at Russia, Dbeibah warned that “any party that enters Libya without permission or agreement will be fought” and insisted that Libya only allows foreign forces to enter on official training missions.

Dbeibah’s fiery rhetoric was largely dismissed in Moscow as bluster. The Rybar Telegram channel accused Dbeibeh of invoking the Russian threat to secure patronage from Western countries.

As Chechnya’s leader, Ramzan Kadyrov maintains a deep personal network in Libya and Dbeibah discussed economic cooperation with Russia after Haftar broached basing rights with Putin last year, the Kremlin is confident that its bridges in Tripoli are not burnt.

But even if Russia finds it can no longer strike a balance between Libya’s rival governments, it still has cards to play. Expanded Russian support for Haftar could convince him to escalate militarily against the western Libyan authorities, which almost transpired in September, or give him expanded bargaining power in future UN-backed negotiations on Libya’s political future.

Buoyed by large-scale Russian backing, Haftar’s leverage could even extend to the appointment of his preferred candidate as Libya’s new prime minister.

Russia can count on collaboration from regional powers in the Middle East. “Turkey plays a key role in shoring up Russia’s access to critical oil smuggling routes in Libya and has struck many deals of its own with Haftar and the eastern Libyan authorities,” Megerisi told The New Arab.

“The United Arab Emirates also has outsourced much of its role in Libya to Russia, as it transformed from relying on hard power since 2020 to a high-stakes diplomatic role.”

Russia’s understanding attitude towards Turkey’s military intervention against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and burgeoning strategic partnership with the UAE will only strengthen these partnerships.

The US’s disengagement from Libya, which could increase after President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration if history is any guide, will further work against any constraints on Russia’s collusion with regional powers.

Assad’s ouster has raised Libya’s importance for Russia’s foreign policy. This increased profile will likely be detrimental to Libya’s hopes to break out of its endless cycle of political turmoil.

***

Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. Samuel is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin’s War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International.

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The Sentry

Failures in project management

Beyond administrative irregularities, the Derna dam project was marked by an unusual and corruption-prone configuration of partners. In July 2009, the GWA contracted El Concorde, a Jordanian firm, to participate in the Derna dam project. The task for which El Concorde was recruited had in July 2007 been declared completed by an ODAC-affiliated enterprise called Benaa wa Tashyeed.

The hiring of another company for the same task two years later indicates that Libya’s Benaa wa Tashyeed had failed to do the work and that Arsel could not complete it.

El Concorde received its upfront payment but initiated no work, likely because Arsel did not complete its own earlier phases, preventing El Concorde’s work from commencing.

In response to The Sentry’s questions, a senior Benaa wa Tashyeed official declined to comment on the Derna dams but acknowledged the enterprise’s general lack of capabilities.

For large infrastructure projects, a consultancy is typically hired at the outset to validate contractors’ milestones throughout. For Derna’s dams, however, this crucial step was delayed until 2010, when the GWA hired Italian consultancy IRD. This delay suggests that the relevant Libyan decision-makers had been in a rush to funnel the upfront payment to Arsel before even making sure that all the necessary components for physical implementation were in place.

Such behavior often goes hand in hand with corruption.

Derna post-2011

Throughout the course of the Derna dam project, GWA officials demonstrated a notable lack of follow-through, as well as a remarkable leniency towards Arsel’s nonperformance. This behavior only continued in the years following 2011, adding to the likelihood that the initial assignment was tainted by corruption.

After Qadhafi’s fall, the newly established government in Tripoli introduced a policy meant to encourage foreign companies to return and resume their pre-2011 projects.

In response, Arsel personnel returned to al-Marj and Benghazi, likely motivated by the prospect of receiving at least half the payment from a round of invoices issued and approved just before the 2011 uprisings. But the Turkish company never returned to its Derna sites. Arsel did, however, voice grievances over not receiving the funds it was due at the start of 2011 for the Derna work scheduled to occur in 2010.

After years of bureaucratic back-and-forth, the GWA—now called the Water Resources Ministry—disbursed the payment, but it notably did not request that Arsel return to Derna and complete the job for which it was paid. Nor did the GWA attempt to get its money back when it became clear that almost no work had been carried out.64, 65 The GWA, now called the Ministry of Water Resources, did not respond to a request for comment.

During that same post-2011 period, ODAC directly contracted another Turkish company, Karan Grup, to perform excavation work as part of the rehabilitation of the Derna dams. Like Arsel before it, Karan did almost nothing.

The small Turkish company also had direct ties to its predecessor: Before 2011, Karan Grup’s leader, Sertac Karan, had held an executive role within Arsel, focusing on projects in the greater Benghazi area.

After 2011, he worked for various other Turkish companies in Libya, including his own. Karan Grup participated in several projects funded by ODAC, including the Derna assignment from 2012 to 2016. A former Karan Grup employee indicated to The Sentry that, during that period, Sertac Karan maintained connections with the Dabaibas, even though they were no longer officially at the helm of ODAC. Karan Grup did not respond to a request for comment.

In 2017, Arsel—whose fiscal health was weakened—filed for bankruptcy, leaving its creditors in pursuit of any remaining assets. Later, in the wake of the dams’ September 2023 collapse, information began to surface that Arsel’s failure to perform maintenance work on the dams had contributed to the tragedy.

In an attempt to change the narrative, the Dabaiba government helped promote the idea that proper and legitimate work by Arsel in Derna was interrupted by the February 2011 uprisings. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise.

ODAC Under the Dabaibas

Arsel’s compromised conduct in Derna was not isolated. It reflected a wider problem that was the hallmark of ODAC in the 2000s. With Ali al-Dabaiba at its helm from 1989 until 2011, ODAC employed questionable practices that subverted and impeded the completion of projects across Libya.

To put the situation with Arsel in Derna in perspective, it is essential to step back and examine ODAC’s broader operational context under the Dabaibas. As early as 1998, Ali al-Dabaiba implemented strategies that shielded his organization from the significant payment delays that characterized Qadhafi’s arcane bureaucracy.

By achieving greater financial independence from other parts of the state, Ali al-Dabaiba ensured that ODAC could issue payments fast, without interference from Qadhafi’s revolutionary committees and other cumbersome controls.

This differentiating trait contributed to rendering ODAC particularly attractive to foreign companies, especially from Turkey. Moreover, ODAC was notorious for its opacity.80 Ali al-Dabaiba’s power system rested on a foundation of familial ties, with his tightknit clan wielding influence across various parts of the Libyan state apparatus, beyond just ODAC.

In his capacity as ODAC chief, Ali was often assisted by his sons, Usama and Ibrahim, and his brother Youssef. Ibrahim became particularly assertive starting in 2006. That same year, Ali’s cousin Abdelhamid took the helm of the Libyan Investment and Development Holding Company (LIDCO), a real-estate vehicle through which billions of public dollars flowed.

LIDCO served three main state clients: ODAC, the Housing and Infrastructure Board, and the Civil Aviation Authority. Thus, during the regime’s last half-decade, the two cousins did business together, often without any oversight. LIDCO did not respond to a request for comment.

Also in 2006, Benaa wa Tashyeed, a state-owned construction enterprise established by Qadhafi’s regime the previous year, fell under ODAC’s control, becoming an extension of the Dabaiba family’s influence. For many of its projects, ODAC required that foreign firms—including Arsel, on several non-Derna projects contracted between 2007 and 2010—partner with Benaa wa Tashyeed in joint ventures.

From a governance perspective, the configuration posed a significant problem. Both the Libyan client (ODAC) and the Libyan contractor (Benaa wa Tashyeed) operated under the sway of the same family—a clear conflict of interest that undermined the principles of checks and balances, damaging project integrity and undercutting public interest. Suspicions of impropriety were further fueled by the absence of evidence that Benaa wa Tashyeed ever possessed the capabilities necessary to fulfill its high-profile mandates in these joint ventures. In response to The Sentry’s questions, a senior Benaa wa Tashyeed official indicated that from 2006 to 2010, projects were awarded to Benaa wa Tashyeed in a centralized manner based on favoritism, without regard for the company’s capabilities.

The official noted that this practice undermined project completion and added that Benaa wa Tashyeed’s weak finances prevented timely payments and limited its ability to attract qualified personnel. The period from 2005 to 2010, while all this was happening, was also one of the most financially prosperous in Libya’s history.

The December 2003 agreement between the US and the Qadhafi regime led to the removal of international sanctions, which—in conjunction with then-rising oil prices— brought about a surge in national prosperity.

Soon afterward, hundreds of foreign companies flocked to Libya. By the time of the February 2011 insurgency, the Qadhafi regime was overseeing more than $70 billion in ongoing projects, including more than $15 billion in contracts awarded to 200 Turkish firms active in 100 different locations across Libya.

In eastern Libya, in the cities of Tobruk, Benghazi, and Derna, 28 Turkish companies were said to be working on projects with a combined value of $3 billion. ODAC and LIDCO were the most prolific in handing out new contracts, with other active spenders including the Housing and Infrastructure Board and the Highways Authority. But despite these impressive figures, many of the projects did not actually proceed as planned once the paperwork was signed.

As the number of projects swelled, a change occurred: The pace of many Turkish construction projects in Libya became more laborious—if they got off the ground at all. The pronounced slowdown coincided with the rise in Dabaiba-linked corruption, which reached levels so severe that it hampered the implementation of construction projects.

Five former Libyan officials and a Turkish corruption expert told The Sentry that Ali al-Dabaiba and his relatives routinely demanded more than 15% in kickbacks as they negotiated infrastructure projects, especially during the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings.

The diversion of project funds into these bribes severely strained foreign contractors’ profit margins and operational budgets, often resulting in poor execution, delays, and long halts, despite timely payments from the Libyan state. Some companies responded by borrowing money, minimizing expenditures, progressing slowly on projects, and then, after years of delay, requesting additional funds from the Libyan state.

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The Sentry

On September 10, 2023, two dams near Derna, in eastern Libya, collapsed amid a strong rainstorm. The ensuing flood killed at least 4,352 people and displaced almost 45,000, while another 8,000 remain missing and should be presumed dead.

Since the disaster, journalists and nongovernmental organizations have highlighted several factors that contributed to the collapse, including suspected corruption that may have led to the dams’ extreme frailty.

In this report, The Sentry sheds additional light on these schemes, linking them to the Dabaiba family’s leadership of the Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers prior to 2011 and showing how new corruption risks under the Haftar family could lead to similar infrastructure failures in the future.

Among several factors contributing to the loss of life and material damage in Derna was the dams’ poor condition.

From 2007 to 2010, Libya’s General Water Authority (GWA) paid Arsel İnşaat Company Limited, a minor Turkish construction firm, and other companies for rehabilitation work that never happened.

Such inaction was indicative of a broader pattern of corruption that affected much of Libya’s non-oil-related construction and maintenance, especially in the years leading up to the 2011 uprisings. Schemes such as those affecting the maintenance of Derna’s dams were largely orchestrated through the Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers (ODAC), a state-owned body then controlled by relatives of Abdelhamid Dabaiba, the current prime minister in Tripoli, western Libya.

Today, post-disaster, the reconstruction of Derna is underway. In this ongoing process, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s family, which rules eastern and southern Libya, has complete control of new infrastructure contracts.

Early indications suggest that the Haftar clan may be resorting to corrupt practices similar to those of the Dabaibas, potentially using foreign companies as conduits to divert public funds.

Despite having occurred more than 15 years ago, the anomalies in ODAC’s interactions with Arsel remain acutely relevant in present-day Libya. They illustrate how officials may have exploited existing companies to steal billions from their own country’s public coffers.

This suspected transnational method of theft, or variations thereof, may be being employed in 2024—a time when large-scale infrastructure projects are used by Libyan leaders to justify spending significant public funds. By uncovering past fraud and scrutinizing contemporary contracting practices, this report seeks to contribute to the prevention of further corruption in Libyan infrastructure.

Dubious and Deliberate

In November 2007, the GWA awarded a $30 million contract to Arsel, a small Turkish firm, for the maintenance of the Derna dams—a decision that was heavily influenced by ODAC and its leadership. In the years that followed, until the 2011 uprisings, Arsel failed to carry out any tangible work on the Derna dams, despite receiving timely payments from the Libyan state.

This failure to perform can be traced to the corrupt practices of ODAC and its leaders, who benefited from the complicity of others involved in the project, including the GWA and Arsel’s management.

A thorough examination of the project’s negotiation, scope, payment history, and facilitation reveals a pattern of irregular behavior and red flags for corruption. Such unlawful practices and systemic failures not only contributed to the 2023 catastrophe in Derna but also mirrored issues affecting dozens of contracts across pre-2011 Libya involving foreign firms, many based in Turkey.

The common thread was the family then in control of ODAC—the Dabaibas.

ODAC’s influence

Ali al-Dabaiba, the current prime minister’s cousin and the head of ODAC from 1989 to 2011, exerted significant influence on the GWA’s November 2007 decision to sign a contract with Arsel for maintaining the Derna dams. Between 2007 and 2010, ODAC awarded Arsel a portfolio of about 15 projects, including parts of a university campus in Benghazi and housing units in al-Marj, the total value of which amounted to approximately $1 billion.

From hand-picking the Turkish company to managing its relationship with the Libyan state, Ali al-Dabaiba dominated the discussions and negotiations with Arsel. By so doing, he greatly influenced the GWA’s own decision to hire the Turkish firm.

Until ODAC awarded Arsel the $1 billion package of projects, the Ankara-based company was relatively unknown, with no experience abroad, having handled only modest domestic projects averaging about $20 million each.

Nevertheless, ODAC’s leader favored Arsel over other larger and more experienced Turkish firms,29 suggesting that Ali al-Dabaiba may have had an ulterior motive for the selection. Indeed, ODAC had a record of hiring unqualified contractors.31Arsel was no exception: it would go on to demonstrate significant shortcomings throughout its dealings in Libya. Neither Ali al-Daibaba nor ODAC responded to a request for comment.

Malfeasance, not negligence

After the GWA signed the contract with Arsel in November 2007, the project experienced almost 18 months of unexplained delays. From April 2009, when the project kicked off, to the onset of political unrest in February 2011, the Derna dam project was marked by a slew of administrative and operational irregularities, particularly in the interactions between Libyan officials and Arsel.

Administrative irregularities

Advance payments for the project circumvented standard procedures. Arsel received a direct advance payment of about 25% of the contract sum, even though it was common practice at the time for the advance payment to be set at 15% or less, with at least a third of that being placed into an escrow account.

In addition, Arsel paid neither the mandatory 2% tax nor the required 0.5% contribution to the Social Security Fund. These exceptions suggest a deliberate effort by high-ranking Libyan officials to ensure that Arsel enjoyed immediate access to the funds, raising the possibility of their diversion or misuse.

The scope of the project also raises questions. In 2003, a Swiss consultancy was commissioned to assess the situation in Derna. The resulting report concluded that the two existing dams needed bolstering, including through the addition of hydraulic devices, and that a third dam should be built to ensure the safety of Derna’s inhabitants downstream.

Yet when the Libyan state hired Arsel in 2007, it confined the project to modestly strengthening the two dam structures— even though funds were available for more substantive work.

More troublingly, after the Turkish company submitted its initial proposal for a light rehabilitation of the two existing dams, Libyan officials insisted on an even more rudimentary version, a move that suggests a potential plan to have Arsel spend less than it was to receive from GWA for the dam rehabilitation work.

What’s more, despite Arsel’s contract including no third dam and none having been built, the company falsely claimed on its website that its 2007-2012 Derna mission involved “constructing another third dam in between.”

A lawyer representing the owners of the now-defunct Arsel did not respond to a request for comment.

__________________

Joseph Gagliano

Monitoring of an air bridge between Russia and Libya by «Itamilradar» in recent days sheds new light on Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean and the evolution of its geopolitical strategy. According to reports, two Il-76TD aircraft belonging to the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations are alternating between Russia and the Al Khadim airbase, located in eastern Cyrenaica, east of Benghazi. This movement comes at a time of strategic change for Moscow, marked by the beginning of the withdrawal of its forces from the Hmeimim airbase in Syria and a renewed interest in Libya.

Cyrenaica:

New Hub of Russian Ambitions

The choice of Cyrenaica as the destination for this airlift is not accidental. Eastern Libya, under the control of General Khalifa Haftar’s forces, is a strategic region for Russia. In recent years, Moscow has sought to consolidate its influence in North Africa, a key area for controlling the Mediterranean and migratory flows to Europe. With Syria seemingly losing strategic relevance due to the unstable situation and the depletion of Russian resources in the conflict, Cyrenaica emerges as a promising alternative.

The possibility of Moscow establishing a permanent air and naval base in the region worries not only the European countries of the Mediterranean, but also NATO. A permanent Russian presence in Libya would pose a direct threat to maritime and air security in the central Mediterranean, as well as consolidating the Russian military projection capacity in North Africa and the Sahel.

The Role of the ‘New’ Wagner Group

According to «Itamilradar», Russia is deploying personnel and military equipment formerly associated with the Wagner Group, now reorganized under the so-called “Russian Afrika Korps”. Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Moscow has clearly decided to restructure its paramilitary operations in Africa, while maintaining a significant presence in key areas such as Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic. In Libya, this new military asset could serve as a tool to consolidate Russian control over the region, ensuring strategic access to the Mediterranean and local energy fields.

NATO and the Turkish Dilemma

One of the most significant aspects of this operation is the fact that the flights between Russia and Libya are made possible by Turkey, the only NATO member that has not closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. This detail highlights the contradictions within the Atlantic alliance. Turkey, despite being formally an ally, has often adopted autonomous positions, if not openly contrary, to the NATO line, as demonstrated by its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system.

Ankara also plays an ambiguous role in Libya, supporting the Tripoli government against Haftar’s forces, but at the same time maintaining open channels of communication with Moscow. This ambiguity complicates NATO’s ability to respond coherently to Russian moves in the region, fueling the risk of further internal divisions within the alliance.

An increasingly unstable

Mediterranean

The Russian airlift to Libya and the withdrawal from Hmeimim represent a paradigm shift in Moscow’s strategy . Russia is redeploying its resources to maximize its influence in areas where power vacuums and instability offer strategic opportunities. Libya, fragmented and politically unstable, is the ideal terrain for this strategy.

For Europe and NATO, Russia’s growing presence in the Mediterranean cannot be ignored. It is not just a military issue: Moscow’s control over Libya could affect migration flows, energy markets and regional political dynamics. In this context, the West’s failure to respond in a unified and coherent manner to the challenges posed by Russia and Turkey risks leaving the field open to both.

Conclusion:

The Future of a Geopolitical Game

Russian operations in Libya are yet another sign of an increasingly fragmented and multipolar world order. Russia, despite the economic and military difficulties caused by the war in Ukraine, demonstrates that it has the ability and the will to project its influence beyond its traditional borders. Libya, with its strategic position and energy resources, is destined to become a new epicenter of geopolitical tensions.

It remains to be seen whether NATO and Europe will be able to develop an effective strategy to counter this expansion. So far, the alliance’s internal divisions and lackluster rhetoric do not bode well. In the meantime, Moscow continues to move its pawns on the Mediterranean chessboard , demonstrating that, in international politics, opportunities often arise precisely in moments of crisis.

______________________

Mohamed Sharki

Fears of an arms race amid tensions in the region come alongside ambitious growth plans and hopes to boost living standards.

National economies in North Africa are heading into 2025 with bold economic ambitions. Across the region—made up of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia—the aim is for growth in gross domestic product (GDP) of over 4%, higher than the global economy’s projected 3.2% growth rate.

They will get help from generous budgets for development spending alongside reforms to increase revenues while cutting inflation and debt. Social programmes in health, education, direct subsidies, and wages will also play an important role.

But the best chance for success would be for the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to end, which would help the global economy return to growth. That would ease pressure on key markets, including those for raw materials and energy, alongside trade routes for goods. There will also be hopes for better conditions for agriculture, with regular rainfall helping to boost production and address challenges over food security.

But North Africa is not a homogenous economic entity due to the complex series of interlocking political disputes. And there is serious international concern about the tensions, especially over disagreements between Algeria and Morrocco, and the threat that could be posed to economic growth and broader regional security and stability.

Moves away from cohesion and the integration of trade and economic ties across the region—and any pivot toward nationalism—could hold back growth by 2 to 3 percentage points, according to analysts.

Al Majalla now looks ahead to what could be a pivotal year for North African countries. They have allocated substantial budgets for 2025, which total around $253bn—$126bn for Algeria, $73bn for Morocco, $26bn for Libya, around $25bn for Tunisia, and $3bn for Mauritania.

Oil-exporting countries have a good chance of achieving high growth rates thanks to energy exports. However, this advantage comes with a warning, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which says that “the absence of necessary reforms reduces the chances of transforming revenues into comprehensive development”. And that could have important implications for the labour market, debt levels and prices, the IMF added.

Algeria

Algeria is an oil exporter whose budget is the largest in terms of value, at $126bn. But there is a debt burden and a deficit estimated at $62bn. Finance Minister Laaziz Fayed said public debt will reach 17tn dinars (about $127bn) by 2025, equivalent to 50% of GDP. Although most of this debt is owed to local financial institutions or sovereign wealth funds, it is increasing strain on Algeria’s public finances, following a 16% drop in oil and gas revenues in 2023, totalling $50bn.

In the first nine months of 2024, oil and gas revenues were estimated at $34bn, according to Bloomberg, due to volatile prices on international markets caused by the series of wars and geopolitical crises.

Some 60% of Algeria’s budget depends on oil and gas revenues, but they are no longer enough to cover the public debt and the financial deficit, estimated at 21.7% of the GDP. The budget report says: “Expected revenues will be around $64bn with a 1.9 % increase in energy exports.”

Morocco and Tunisia

Meanwhile, net energy importers, such as Morocco and Tunisia, could benefit from lower prices on international markets. They could also diversify sources of income by relying on sectors that add significant value to what they produce. Investing in industries relatively sheltered from geopolitical turbulence—industry, renewable energy, and services, for instance—would also help.

Labour markets and the social implications of high employment depend on the volume of agricultural production. It will be critical to economic recovery and reducing unemployment, accounting for about 14% of GDP in both countries.

For Morocco, international institutions recommend continued diversification. Industry now makes up 28% of the national GDP, which has helped it mitigate the impact of climate change and other global crises while keeping growth rates relatively stable at around 3% to 4%, also thanks to the early implementation of political and economic reforms. The Moroccan budget forecasts growth of 4.6%, an inflation rate of 2%, and a deficit of 3.5% for the coming year. In 2024, growth was 3.4%.

Meanwhile, Tunisia expects growth to rise from 1.6% in 2024 to 3.2% in 2025, with revenues increasing by 5.7% based on an oil price of $77 per barrel. But it needs $8.83bn in financing, or 28bn dinars in local currency. Of that, 22bn dinars will come from the local financial market, although some observers warn that repeated government borrowing is putting strain on the banking sector. The cost of servicing public debt is estimated at around $6bn, or $3.2bn in domestic debt and $2.72 bn in foreign obligations.

Libya

The International Monetary Fund puts the conditions facing Libya’s budget in clear terms. Its report estimates that: “Algeria needs an oil price between $110 and $119 per barrel at a time when the price ranges between $70 and $80, depending on demand and international developments”.

Ibrahim Maamri, professor of economics at the University of Tizi Ouzou in eastern Algeria, believes that “dependence on energy sources threatens budget revenues in the medium term due to fluctuations in international markets.”

Libya is expected to lead the Arab and North African countries, helped by its oil industry coming back. The resumption of the production of crude oil in the east of the country could drive overall growth to 13.7%. The end of the crisis at the central bank in Tripoli will also help.

Libya’s oil production rose to 1.5 million barrels per day (bpd) in the fourth quarter of 2024, an increase of about 0.5 million bpd and production is expected to reach 2 million bpd in 2027.

But the authorities in both western and eastern Libya have been accused of weak governance, mismanagement, and inefficiency in public spending. The Libyan Audit Bureau previously revealed that: “Oil exports were sold in exchange for fuel and were not included in government revenues.”

Abdul Hamid Fadil, a professor of economics at Misrata University, told the newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat that: “Only $20 bn reached the state treasury instead of $28bn.”

For its part, the UN mission reiterated a: “Need to utilise oil resources to achieve development and prosperity for the Libyan people and ensure economic and financial stability for the country.”

Oil accounts for 97% of government revenues, 94% of exports, and 60% of GDP. Paradoxically, despite increased oil revenues, the per capita income of Libyans is 50% lower than it was ten years ago after conflict spread across the country. According to the World Bank, “Had it not been for the civil war, the Libyan economy would have grown by 68% over a decade.”

Mauritania

In the southernmost tip of North Africa, Mauritania is preparing to enter the club of gas exporters. Its Grand Tortue Amim (GTA) field and the offshore Birallah gas field in the Atlantic will increase hard currency revenues and help create fiscal space to meet medium-term development needs.

The IMF predicts growth of 4.2% for 2025, with inflation of 4% and a current account deficit of $960mn. For some time now, Mauritania has served as a bridge between North Africa and the Sahel countries in terms of trade through a corridor linking it with Mexico through the border region around Guerguerat.

The country’s geographical location has made it strategically important for security, illegal migration, crime prevention, and counter-terrorism, drawing attention and support from the US and Europe.

Militarisation and spending

Unlike regional economic blocs such as the Gulf Cooperation Council or the European Union, the Arab Maghreb Union is facing a growing crisis of confidence.

There are disagreements, conflicts, and disputes between the nations which make up the region, creating a political climate of instability. This has, in turn, led to increased defence spending, which is expected to reach over $50bn next year.

Algeria has allocated $25bn for military spending, representing one-fifth of the general budget, making it the largest military spender in North Africa, ahead of Morocco and Egypt. But in the face of its large budget deficit, the means of financing this spending is unclear, although the government has ruled out external borrowing. That has stoked speculation it may resort to using national foreign exchange reserves, estimated at $70bn.

Morocco has earmarked around $13.5bn, or 133.4 dirhams in local currency, to renew the army’s equipment and support the defence industry. Total military defence spending will be around £23bn. The kingdom plans to acquire what its budget bill referred to as “advanced aircraft and modern air defence systems.”

International concern

International institutions are concerned that what amounts to an arms race in the region will destabilise it, just as North Africa needs cooperation to take it toward comprehensive economic development.

A recent report by the international Brussels-based Crisis Group said: “Political and economic conflicts between the countries of the southern Mediterranean are hampering development across North Africa and threatening potential violent conflict.”

It called for restraint and the continued application of diplomatic pressure to contain tension, warning that: “Any escalation of the situation in North Africa and the Sahel could have a negative impact on security, stability, and supplies within the European Union. And any breakdown in security could have consequences in the areas of illegal migration, human trafficking, and the spread of cross-border crime.”

There are some hopes that the return of Donald Trump to the White House as president of the US in January could help ease tensions or at least prevent them from worsening.

Boosting living standards

Across North Africa, national budgets aim to improve individual income and purchasing power by funding schemes to subsidise prices and cut income tax while investing in development and infrastructure.

There is also a trend to exempt some food imports from customs and excise duties to curb inflation and protect prices. But the economic and social impact on citizens will vary from one country to another, depending on the nature of the political climate, local governance the level of integration into the global economy, and the contribution made to international trade.

_____________________

Cathrin Schaer

Russian military bases in Syria appear to be being packed up and evacuated. If Russia relocates to Libya, experts worry the shift could impact security in the Mediterranean and unbalance the frozen conflict there. Are they or are they not withdrawing from Syria? That is the question Middle East analysts have been asking about the Russian troops for the past several days.

Open source investigators, looking at satellite pictures and online air traffic tracking, have noted significant moves by Russia at its long-held Syrian bases since the regime of its ally, Syrian dictator Bashar Assad, was toppled nearly two weeks ago. They’ve seen attack helicopters and an S-400 long-range air defense system dismantled for travel, people with suitcases waiting to leave and large cargo planes being loaded.

Additionally, Russian navy vessels left their Syrian harbor on December 11, two days before the fall of the Assad regime. Russian officials have denied their troops are leaving Syria and reported they were negotiating with the rebel opposition group, which led the offensive that toppled the Assad regime and who are now setting up Syria’s transitional government.

Russia has two important military bases in Syria: The Tartus naval base, set up in 1971, and an air base at Hmeimim, established in 2015. Tartus is Russia’s only formal naval base outside former Soviet territory and a Russian presence there grew before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine in order “to counter, deter, and monitor any NATO operations in the Mediterranean,” the Institute for the Study of War recently noted.  

Hmeimim is used as a logistics and staging post for Russian activities in Africa and came under Russian control shortly after Russia entered the Syrian civil war. Russia helped Assad repress anti-government rebels, and Russian air power likely turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favor. But since mid-December, the people the Russians once bombed have been in charge of Syria.

So far, both HTS and Russia have been very pragmatic and have been in negotiations, Nanar Hawach, a senior analyst for Syria at the think tank Crisis Group, told DW. “Right now Russia is operating under HTS’ protection, with HTS forces protecting Russian convoys driving to the naval base and air base,” he explained. “But we should also keep in mind that Russia played a very prominent and important role in the fight against HTS.”

This makes Russia’s future military presence in Syria potentially problematic. Russia was relocating air-defense systems and other advanced weapons from Syria to bases it controls in Libya, the Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday, citing unnamed US and Libyan officials.

Moving to Libya?

Analysts point to signifiers like the removal of valuable military hardware from Syria, Russia’s suspension of wheat exports to Syria — over the past years, it has been Syria’s main supplier — and HTS’ refusal of Russian offers of humanitarian aid. They also say that wherever the Russian naval vessels from Tartus eventually end up will be an important indicator of where Russia is headed next — especially if the ships dock at the Libyan port of Tobruk.

Right now, it’s all just speculation, according to Jalel Harchaoui, a political scientist and expert on Libya at the Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, or RUSI, in the UK. Whether the Russians stay in Syria or go, there are certain incontrovertible facts that will change how they operate in Syria, he told DW.

“They’re never going to be able to stay with the same level of comfort, security and assurance as before,” Harchaoui said. “They’re going to have trouble guaranteeing their own logistics, electricity, water, food. They also know that when you run a [foreign] base you need a certain friendliness from the community around you and also the state, in terms of intelligence sharing. All of that is now lost.”

Nothing is clear yet, agreed Wolfram Lacher, a senior associate and expert on Libya at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. “As far as I can tell, what we are not seeing yet is any direct movement between the Syrian bases and Libya,” he said. “But, obviously, as the Syrian bases become more precarious, the importance of Libya increases.”

Libya was already becoming more important for Russia, Lacher and Harchaoui pointed out. In 2024, the British newspaper The Telegraph reported that Russia had reinforced runways and perimeter defenses at Libyan air bases, built new structures and delivered weaponry.

A threat to NATO

Since 2014, Libya has been split in two, with opposing governments located in the east and west of the country. An UN-backed administration known as the Government of National Unity, or GNU, is in the west, and its rival, known as the House of Representatives, is based in the east, in Tobruk. The latter is supported by former warlord-turned-politician Khalifa Haftar, who controls various armed groups in this area.

At various times over the last decade, each government has tried — and failed — to wrest control from the other, but the conflict is currently stalemated, resulting in shaky security. “Over the past few years, those Libyan factions have been locked in a stalemate that has kept their country largely free from major conflict, but that has depended largely on … two foreign powers with significant military forces on the ground, Russia and Turkey,” Frederic Wehrey, a senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wrote last week.

“Assad’s downfall … could affect this fragile equilibrium,” he suggested, arguing that Libya’s frozen conflict could potentially go the same way as Syria’s did and relapse into conflict. This may hinge on Russia’s next move. If Russia convinces Haftar to let it establish a more permanent base in Libya, this would present a major challenge to NATO.

“The Russians have wanted a naval base in Libya for several years now and the Americans’ main policy objective in Libya for the last two years is to prevent this,” Lacher explained. ” Up until now Haftar has always tried to balance different foreign supporters against each other to avoid becoming dependent on a single one.” So current events put Haftar in a very difficult position, Lacher said.

Harchaoui said he believes it’s too early to tell what will happen but presented two plausible scenarios. In one, the Russians remain in Syria but everything becomes more uncomfortable, expensive and laborious for them, he said. “They just absorb the cost, but it’s still roughly business as usual,” he told DW.

In the other scenario, Haftar’s permission for Russia to establish itself firmly in Libya would gradually become apparent. At that stage certain forces — for example, in NATO — who oppose Russian entrenchment in Libya might organize sabotage missions or even train fighters opposed to Haftar. 

“It will be gradual, a soft inflexion point. It won’t be fireworks,” Harchaoui concluded. “But it’s quite possible that then we might look back and go, yes, Haftar made a mistake by saying yes to the Russians and, yes, this all started with Assad’s fall.”

_____________________

Dr. Mohamed Berween

Conclusion

To conclude this article let me recap and re-emphasize some of the main points I have mentioned above, as follows:

First: The saddest thing is that the false hypothetical Intellectual Concept of the Arab World has made the vast majority of Arabs, especially the youth, during the past generations to live an unattainable dream, and it has finally turned into a tool to obstruct any serious attempt at rapprochement and cooperation between the different peoples of the region.

Second: The saddest thing is that the brutal and barbaric war on Gaza has shown, that there is no such thing call “the Arab World.” It has been approving that it is nothing but an empty slogan and a major obstacle to achieve a real unity among the states in the region. Therefore, it is time to get rid of it and work hard to replace it with another simple and practical concept for uniting all peoples in the region.

Third: The saddest thing is that the Palestinian people, unfortunately, found themselves facing a barbaric and brutal Israeli aggression by themselves, and the vast majority (except a tiny few) of the Arab people have failed miserably to support them.

Fourth: The saddest thing is that the brutal and barbaric war on Gaza has shown the hypocrisy of the Arab rulers and all what they care about is, shamelessly, to stay in power as long as they can at any cost, and to achieve their goals, and they are willing to ally themselves with anybody even the devil. More than that, they are secretly supporting and encouraging the Israelis to get rid of the freedom fighters in Gaza.

Fifth: The brutal and barbaric Israeli war on Gaza has shown plainly that an American, a European, and an Israeli human being, in the eyes of the American and European leaders, worthies more than an Arab or a Muslim human being.

Sixth: The saddest thing is that the brutal and barbaric Israeli war on Gaza has shown to all freedom loving people all over the Globe, that the Palestinian people, for more than seventy-five years, are being oppressed and evicted from their own land, by the Israelis and that is why they will not give up seeking their freedom and working toward their independence regardless of how long it takes or how much it cost.

Seventh: I believe, it is time for all patriot people in the region to cooperate to establish new political Umbrella, that might be called “the Confederate states in the Middle East.” This new political system would enable each state to be sovereign and govern itself independently, and at the same time, it would be abNinethle to work with other individual states on the issues that they could not be able to achieve individually.

Eighth: The war on Gaza has proven beyond doubt that there is no such thing as a “comprehensive Arab identity”! Thus, we can conclude that the activists of the “Arab homeland project” have failed miserably in their attempt, which lasted for more than one hundred and fifty (150) years, to achieve this goal. In other words, they have failed to define “who they are” and what are the most important commonalities and issues that unite them! Even the “Palestinian cause”, which was the main slogan (and one of the most important goals) of every political change in the Arab countries since 1948, has become an issue that does not concern them! In other words, one might say, the war on Gaza has dropped, what so called, the “fig leaf” that was covering their shame! Worst of all, with regard to the commonality that was supposed to define the meaning of the “comprehensive Arab identity”

The Arabic Language, we find that the Arab elites and rulers are the ones who have disregarded their language the most! Even after the United Nations recognized – in the seventies of the last century – that the Arabic language is the sixth official language on the international level (out of more than six thousand languages and dialects in the world), you find the Arab rulers and officials are ashamed to speak their own language, and they prefer to speak in other foreign languages, especially English, even when most of them do not speak it well!

Nineth and Finally, let me end this article by expressing my deepest condolences to all patriotic and sincere Arabists for this lost, and who fought so hard to achieve their national dream< which is “the Arab Unity”, during the previous decades, and I hope that they will not give up, and continue their struggle for achieving the unity of all peoples in region.

***

Dr. Mohamed Berween – Emeritus Professor of Politics and Administration, Texas A&M International University, Laredo, Texas, USA

____________________

Dr. Abdel Moneim El-Bouri

The independence of countries is the true and historical beginning of the liberation of peoples. There are many national and nationalist days in the life of many countries. But Independence Day remains that special memory and meanings, which makes it one of the most important days and holidays in the life of any people.

And since the majority of peoples did not gain their independence except after they fought a bitter and arduous struggle against foreign colonialism. A struggle in all its forms, military and political.

And fierce battles were fought by peoples against the colonizers, the results of which were millions of martyrs, wounded, disabled and refugees. Libya’s independence was not in vain nor a gift from anyone, but rather came as an embodiment of the free and comprehensive national will, emanating from the awareness of the various components of the Libyan people of their national character and crystallized through the factors of history, geography, heritage, values, customs and traditions.

In addition to the convergence of the goals of all these components and their common interests around the homeland. Libyans have embodied this will throughout history, through their constant endeavor to liberate their homeland from all the forces that have succeeded in occupying their land.

Since independence, Libya has been exposed to many dangers and crises that threatened its entity and destiny. However, the flame of unity in the consciences of its people has never extinguished.

Its people and the wisdom of its loyal men who managed the country’s affairs during the kingdom era were able to cross it to safety until the ominous September coup occurred and what it brought upon Libya of devastation and destruction of minds and souls, and distortion of history over the course of four decades, which was sufficient to bring about many changes that are difficult to limit on the human, moral and material levels.

Then, God soon enabled the Libyan people to carry out their revolution against all forms of injustice, oppression and tyranny and liberate themselves from the rule of the individual dictator. However, many factors combined to change the reality of the revolution, some of which we will mention, such as:

(1) the state of political vacuum that the country experienced,

(2) the absence of a comprehensive political vision for the transitional period and beyond,

(3) the failure of the Libyan political elites to find a minimum level of consensus on how to manage the affairs of government,

(4) the stumbling of efforts to rebuild the state,

(5) the absence of a national army,

(6) the emergence of tribal and regional calls. Ethnicity, class,

(7) the absence of central powers that control and dominate all parts of the country, and

(8) the failure of the executive bodies to perform their duties properly.

These factors and others have led to the transfer of political competition to the stage of military conflict.

In the midst of the major events we are witnessing today, and the fateful transformations at this particular stage of hardships, crises, and conflict between the sons of the nation, how much we need to remember that the most important pillars of our independence are based on:

First, the unity of the land and the people, this unity that was consecrated by the truth of history, the truth of customs and traditions and their nobility, and was established by the will to meet between all Libyans for a dignified and honorable common life, without which there is no independence but rather division and fragmentation that open the internal arena to the interventions and conflicts of others.

Libyans, the sons of this land, residents, refugees and expatriates, regardless of their affiliations, regions and backgrounds, are united by a single Libyan identity, a long history, future aspirations, and a firm belief in a shared life, stemming from their long interactions and experiences in living together, and their awareness of their vital interests.

Second, the painful events that have ravaged and continue to ravage the country have proven the extent of the dangers that surround us internally and externally, and that there is no way for all of us but to strive for a shared life by working together without excluding or marginalizing all components of the country, emphasizing the finality of the country and the unity of belonging to the various segments that make up Libyan society.

Third, it is necessary to establish a state of institutions that expresses the will and unity of the people, and that assumes its governance, care and management of its affairs, based on the principle of rights and duties, and also assumes the protection of the land and the regulation of the exploitation of its wealth, thus forming a fundamental pillar of the existence of the sovereign and independent country.

On the anniversary of independence, despite all the hardships and difficulties and despite the severe suffering that many Libyan cities are experiencing, this country will remain a towering, impregnable fortress, in light of the unbreakable will of a people, and a great faith in God, and in Libya, its land, people and destiny, and with it, God willing, security, safety, peace and stability will return, and the country will remain safe, healthy and victorious over the winds of sedition and conspiracies.

___________________

Frederic Wehrey

The hasty departure of Assad, who like the Libyan field marshal portrayed himself as a bulwark against Islamism and smeared his opponents as terrorists and jihadists, puts a dent in the narrative of strongman permanence—though Haftar’s other autocratic backers in the Arab world, Presidents Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo and Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi, remain solidly in place.

Still, the upset in Syria could spur Haftar to reconstitute the logistical underpinnings of his criminal network, possibly working with exiled remnants of the Assad regime and affiliated gangsters, or double down on other streams of funding. It could also prompt him to pursue political realignments at home and abroad, especially as the position of one of his main foreign backers is coming under strain as well. Indeed, a second major consequence that Assad’s ouster could have in Libya relates to that backer, Russia.

The Russians played a major role in abetting Haftar’s rise to power starting in early 2014, supporting his military campaign in eastern Libya with technicians, advisors, intelligence support, propaganda, and by printing currency for his unrecognized government—even as it engaged with other Libyan players. With Haftar’s attack against the Tripoli government in 2019, Russia increased its footprint in Libya with the deployment of thousands of mercenaries from the Wagner Group (which has since been reconfigured), regular military personnel, aircraft, and air defense systems.

While Haftar’s bid for power failed due to Türkiye’s military intervention, Moscow quickly adapted, keeping much of its personnel and weaponry at key airbases near oil installations. And in recent years, in addition to its continuing support for Haftar, Russia has used Libya as a vital waystation for the shipment of personnel and hardware into the African states of the Sahel and beyond.

The fall of the Assad regime could jeopardize, or at the very least complicate, this supply route into Africa and, critically for Haftar, into eastern Libya. That is because much of it passed through Syria, especially through the Russian naval facility at Tartous and the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia.

The Kremlin has already taken steps to engage Syria’s new leadership on continued access to these facilities, yet the outcome of these negotiations is uncertain. Without the centralized, authoritarian Assad regime in place, maintaining Tartous and Hmeimim could prove costlier and more cumbersome for Moscow, especially as it contends with local opposition or fragilized logistics—all which could be felt by Haftar.

Faced with such uncertainties, Russia could decide to pressure Haftar for more permanent naval access to the eastern Libyan port of Tobruq, which has already served as a maritime node for flowing Russian materiel and personnel into Africa. But that is likely to incur even more pushback from NATO and the United States, making Haftar’s dilemma of balancing the demands of his patrons even starker.

Alternately, Russia could route its aerial shipments into Libyan bases it already controls. However, this option, too, is costly and, more importantly, requires overflight permission from Türkiye. Given the tensions between the two countries on several issues and, especially, the current understanding that exists between them in Libya, such goodwill from Ankara will almost certainly come with strings attached.

Indeed, whether and how Türkiye’s behavior in Libya changes because of the shift in the regional balance of power in its favor occasioned by Assad’s downfall is a third potential effect, and one that carries even more ambiguity.

After consolidating its entrenchment in northwestern Libya in 2020, the Turkish government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan did not confine itself to maintaining the flawed peace in and around the capital. Instead, it pursued economic objectives increasingly linked to eastern Libya—territory controlled by the very Haftar faction Ankara once fought during the war for Tripoli.

Since 2021, however, Türkiye has gone to great lengths to woo the Haftar family and its allies, opening a consulate on Haftar’s territory and securing numerous contracts for Turkish companies in cities such as Benghazi and Derna, where reconstruction unfolds under the family’s opaque oversight.

This trajectory underscores Türkiye’s unwavering focus on expanding its influence in eastern Libya. As demonstrated in Syria earlier this month, when Türkiye perceives an opportunity to enlarge its footprint, it moves swiftly and decisively—even if it means turning against Russia.

 One possible scenario is that the erosion or obstruction of Russia’s once-smooth corridor of aid to Haftar could embolden Libyan factions in the west who are aligned with Türkiye to challenge the eastern warlord’s position, since his ability to impose oil blockades and dictate terms to Tripoli’s government has rested partly on the deterrent effect of the Russian military apparatus.

If that backing is perceived to have slackened because of Moscow’s post-Assad recalibrations or redeployments, anti-Haftar groups might contemplate reclaiming critical oil infrastructure, calculating that the cost of confrontation is now lower.

Alternately, and more realistically, Türkiye could be encouraged to intensify its political and economic outreach to Haftar, seizing on the window of opportunity afforded by Russia’s preoccupation with the aftermath of Assad’s exit.

In pursuing such a path, Erdoğan would likely endeavor to keep Russia on the Libyan playing field, albeit in a diminished state, which would increase the Turkish leader’s value to NATO as an interlocutor and counterweight. For his part, Haftar could prove receptive to such overtures from Ankara.

This is especially true if he feels vulnerable domestically from the attenuation of the Syrian-Russian channel, and as he comes under pressure from the United States and European states not to grant more permanent basing to a Russia that is trying to regroup after the Syria debacle.

It is crucial not to frame Libya as wholly beholden to external dynamics, or to the policies of intervening foreign states. These have long included not only Russia and Türkiye but also the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, the United States, and France. Still, the events unfolding this month in Syria, coming on top of the year-long war in Gaza, will likely resonate within Libyan society, where domestic political and armed group actors retain their own agency and matter significantly.

Although the revolutionary fervor that fueled the 2011 uprisings may appear dormant, it has not disappeared. Relatedly, the currents of political Islamism and jihadism, despite suffering a marked decline in recent years, still operate in the background—though political and armed mobilization in Libya has often occurred independently from these hazily-demarcated and often-misused categories.

It is important to recall the precedent of the hundreds of young Libyan men who went to Syria to fight at the height of the civil war, often mobilized by Islamist or jihadist networks, but inspired more deeply by sympathy for a revolutionary struggle against a brutal despot like the one they had overthrown at home. “We’d suffered, and we knew the Syrians were suffering too,” one of these militant volunteers told me.

It remains to be seen what sort of more substantial forms of solidarity or mobilization the remarkable victory of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and associated groups in Syria inspires in Libya, and how this will reverberate across Libya’s political landscape.

What is very possible is that Libya’s political standoff, which has prevented the country from moving beyond an unelected transitional executive and from bridging deep institutional divides, could in the not-to-distant future relapse into conflict.

This would happen not through sudden shifts in the regional balance of power alone, but through a confluence of these changes and a significant shock at home, such as a macroeconomic downturn, which could unravel the elite bargains that have ensured a tenuous stability over the past few years.

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Frederic Wehrey – Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

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Frederic Wehrey

In eastern Libya, Khalifa Haftar had close ties with the Syrian dictator, and has now lost a soulmate. 

In the wake of the momentous developments in Syria, Libya has inevitably been mentioned, though most often in the context of misinformed and inappropriate comparisons to its fracturing and descent into civil war following the 2011 overthrow of dictator Muammar Gadhafi.

What is missing in this commentary is an appreciation for how the fates of the two countries have been intertwined and shaped by similar forces in the decade since the Arab uprisings and, more importantly, how the recent, stunning collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime will affect the political, economic, and military standing of Libya’s factions.

Over the past few years, those Libyan factions have been locked in a stalemate that has kept their country largely free from major conflict, but that has depended largely on a modus vivendi between the two foreign powers with significant military forces on the ground—Russia and Türkiye.

Assad’s downfall, by changing the respective strategic positions of those powers in the region, and especially by complicating Moscow’s ability to channel fighters and weapons into Libya, could affect this fragile equilibrium.

Nowhere will the aftereffects be felt more acutely than in the eastern part of Libya. There, the largely autonomous and deeply repressive administration of militia commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his sons had long been bolstered, both directly and indirectly, by the Assad regime through a common ideology of authoritarian kleptocracy, networks of illicit businesses that enriched the two regimes, and mutual military aid from Russia.

Not long after he consolidated his rule in eastern Libya, following a bloody struggle for the city of Benghazi that lasted from 2014 to 2017, Haftar realized that Assad could provide both a template for political legitimacy and a source of military and economic support.

In 2020, Haftar’s eastern-based government reopened an embassy in Damascus with the encouragement and facilitation of his longtime political and military backer, the United Arab Emirates, which at the time was spearheading the Arab world’s rehabilitation of the Syrian dictator.

The symbolism of this move wasn’t lost on citizens in both countries. The post-2011 counterrevolutionary and anti-Islamist wave, led by Abu Dhabi and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, had prevailed and with it the narrative that only iron-fisted dictators such as Haftar and Assad could guarantee stability.

Concurrently, when Türkiye deployed thousands of Syrian mercenaries who had long fought the Assad regime to Tripoli and its environs—part of a broader military intervention to support the internationally recognized Libyan government which Haftar’s militia forces were trying to topple—Haftar turned to importing thousands of pro-Assad Syrian fighters, whose travel to Libya was facilitated and coordinated by Russia and authorized by the Syrian regime.

While the battlefield impact of these militants was ultimately minor, their arrival hastened a burgeoning logistical cooperation between Moscow and Damascus that manifested itself in more substantial military and economic support for Haftar’s regime, which persisted until the recent dramatic events in Syria.

Beyond politics and arms flows, eastern Libya has been tied to Syria through robust and intersecting networks of illicit trade, reflecting two extensive organized crime ecosystems whose connection benefited both sides.

For years, aircraft operated by Cham Wings Airline, a private Syrian carrier that has long supported the Assad regime by transporting cash, narcotics, materiel, and fighters, including Russian mercenaries, ferried irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and India into eastern Libya.

Here, their perilous journey onward across the Mediterranean toward Europe was facilitated and overseen by Haftar-linked militias, led by his most ambitious son Saddam, who reaped exorbitant profits from the business.

Despite various European Union deals with Haftar intended to curb human flows, the transfer of migrants courtesy of Cham Wings from Damascus through northeastern Libya remained uninterrupted. These commercial flights become integral to the Mediterranean’s human-smuggling industry—at times accounting for nearly half of all arrivals into the EU via Libya. This generated millions of dollars in annual revenue, with a chunk of the income accruing to the Haftars’ armed coalition.

In addition to human smuggling, Haftar’s rule in eastern Libya has also benefited from narcotics cooperation with Syria. Under Assad, Syria evolved into a multi-billion-dollar hub to produce Captagon, a synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant, which flooded Libya’s market through the Damascus–Benghazi corridor, enriching Saddam Haftar and his associates.

From Libya, these addictive, dangerous tablets, which are banned by many countries, spread further south and west, reaching Sudan, the Sahel, Algeria, and beyond. In parallel, the same Cham Wings flights were regularly employed to transport weapons sourced from Syria’s black market into Libya’s thriving arms trade.

A maritime route between the two countries also emerged, enabling a range of illicit shipments, including fuel smuggling—an activity that expanded markedly in eastern Libya over the last two years under Saddam Haftar’s authority.

A large portion of the fuel imported by Libya’s National Oil Corporation was illegally reexported, and some of it ultimately made its way to Syria. According to experts at The Sentry, an international investigative organization, the overall volume of illicit trade between Libya and Syria amounted to about $300 million in annual revenue.

A key node in all of these elements of the Syrian-Libyan organized crime pipeline was Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s younger brother and commander of the Syrian Army’s elite Fourth Armored Division and Republican Guard, who oversaw production of Captagon and orchestrated money laundering operations that enriched core loyalists and helped the regime evade international sanctions. 

In March 2023, he flew to eastern Libya to meet with Saddam Haftar and discuss furthering their cooperation on illicit activities, highlighting the very personal and high-level ties that cemented Syrian regime support to Haftar’s rule.

The sudden disappearance of those linkages has thrust Haftar and his clan into new and uncomfortable territory. This is evidenced by the scant media coverage devoted to the events in Syria by Haftar-aligned media outlets and the absence of significant public reactions in eastern Libyan cities, which contrasted sharply with the noisy celebrations in the western cities of Misrata and Tripoli.

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Frederic Wehrey – Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

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Dr. Mohamed Berween

One might ask, what do we mean by the concept of the “Arab World?” How it came about, and what is its future? To answer these questions, let me look at it from three perspectives:

(1) Geographically

It straddles two continents, Asia and Africa. It consists of five distinct sub-regions:

(a) Al-Maghreb (or Northern Africa).

(b) Al-Neel (or the Nile River),

(c) Al-Mashreq (or the Levant),

(d) Al-Khaleej (or the Gulf), and

(e) Al-Janoob (or the Horn and East of Africa).

Within these five sub-regions there are twenty-two states as follows:

(1) Al-Maghreb states include Libya, Tunis, Alegria, Morocco, and Mauritania.

(2) Al-Neel states include Egypt and Sudan.

(3) Al-Mashreq states include Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.

(4) Al-Khaleej states include Suadi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahran.

(5)Al-Janoob states include Djibouti, Somalia, and Comoros.

This huge region stretches across more than 13,000,000 square kilometers (or 5,000,000 square miles), it contains numerous raw materials needed for economic growth and development, and has more than one-fourth of the gas and oil reserves in the World.

(2) Demographically

It is a region of many people with extraordinary histories and cultures. Most of its inhabitants are Muslims and Arabs. The word Arab, here, is applied to all people in the region – Muslims, Christians and Jews who speak the Arabic language and identify themselves with the ways of life in the region.

Some of the inhabitants are descendants of linguistic and ethnic groups that pre-date the arrival of the Arabs to the region.

The Amazigh in North Africa, for instance, constitute roughly speaking between 15 and 30 million of the population of the regioni . They represent a significant portion of the populations of Algeria and Morocco, the vast majority of them are Muslims who prefer to speak their own language, preserve their own culture, and do not want to be called Arabs.

The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Sudan is also represented by more than 40 non-Arab ethnic groups and only about 60 percent of the Sudan population consider the Arabic language as its native tongue.

The vast majority of Kurds, in Iraq and Syria, are Muslims but not Arabs: In Iraq, they represent about 15%-20% of the populationii , and in Syria, the population of the Kurds represents about 3 to 5%iii .

In addition, there are other non-Arab groups in the region, such as, Turkmen and Assyrians (in Iraq and Syria); Armenians and Greeks (in Lebanon); Egyptians and Nubians (in Egypt); Circassian (in Jordan); blacks and Beja (in Sudan); Maur/black and Maur (in Mauritania); and othersiv ; Sharks, Turks, Tawariq, Tabou, and Greeks (in Libya).

(3) Politically

The concept of the Arab World was the main slogan used by the Arab nationalist movements in the second half of the 19th century to liberate the Arab people from the Ottoman Empire which was ruling the region at that time.

One might argue that this concept is an idea that was “born dead”, and from the get go, it was not intended by those who introduced it to be successful. It was just a “strategic designation” developed during the heyday of the British empire, to be used to kick out the Ottoman rule from the region.

It was a “misconceived idea” that never existed historically in the context that we know it nowadays. In other words, I would say that it was introduced to the Arab people, as a “feel good politics”.

Yes, throughout the region history, there have been Arab People all over the region, but they never constituted one united nation — from the Gulf states in the east to Morocco’s Atlantic coast in the west.

For instance, during the Ottoman rule which last for centuries, roughly from the 13th century until the World War I and the end of the Ottoman empire in 1924, the Kurdish area enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy and the Kurdish princes had allied themselves with the Ottoman Sultan.

This political concept became popular during the heyday of the of the concept of the “Arab Nationalism”, which was a mere “Hypothetical intellectual concept”. It was a product of the colonization era and a resentment against Western occupation.

It went on to dominate the Arab politics from the First World War to the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in 1967.

As a result of this unexpected humiliating defeat, Arab Nationalism lost its attractiveness in the Arab streets and became a mere political tool for the Arab dictators to legitimize their regimes, especially, the soldiers who came to power through coup de ta.

Some Facts and Incidents One could argue that the war on Gaza has approved a numerous ugly and sad facts, and shown clear incidents that reinforce the real American and European intent toward the Arab people.

The following are some of these facts and incidents:

First: The Palestinian people are, unfortunately, facing a barbaric and brutal Israeli aggression by themselves, while the vast majority of the Arabs people have failed miserably to support them, and more sadly, they have found that the Arab regimes secretly supporting and encouraging the Israeli to get rid of the freedom fighters. The following are quotes are just some of the reactions of the Arab Rulers to October 7th, 2023, as they were recalled by Bob Woodwrd, an American investigative journalist, in his book “War”, he stated that:

(1) When Blinken, Secretary of State of America, visited Jordanian King Abdullah II in Amman, on October 13, 2023, the king told him: “We told Israel not to do this, we told them not to trust Hamas, Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood, Israel must defeat Hamas. We will not say this publicly, but we support the defeat of Hamas…”.

(2) When Blinken, visited Abu Dhabi and met with Mohammed bin Zayed, on October 14, 2023, he told him: “Hamas must be eliminated, we have repeatedly warned Israel that Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood, we can give Israel time to eliminate Hamas, but it must first help us calm our citizens from the images of violence and destruction in Gaza, by bringing in aid, establishing safe zones, and controlling the violence of the settlers in the West Bank. Let it help us with our citizens and we will give it space, to eliminate Hamas“.

(3) When Blinken visited Riyadh and met first with Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, on October 14, 2023, he told him: “Israel should not have trusted Hamas, and Netanyahu warned us repeatedly, Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood”. … Then he continued by saying: “Terrorist groups are not only trying to eliminate Israel, but they want to overthrow other Arab leaders. …, and what comes after Hamas may be worse, …, and we will not pay a single dollar to rebuild Gaza after the chaos that Netanyahu created.”

(4) When Blinken met the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, On October 15, 2023, he told him: “I want the problems caused by October 7th. to disappear. A Palestinian state must be established before normalization with Israel. I do not want that, but I need it to justify normalization …with Israel” (Woodward, 2024). So?!

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Dr. Mohamed Berween – Emeritus Professor of Politics and Administration, Texas A&M International University, Laredo, Texas, USA

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