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Yaseen Rashed

There is a case for Trump and Meloni

to challenge the status quo

Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced in January that the country will “soon” hold a public tender for exploring key gas and oil plots, the first such bid since 2007. The upcoming bidding round could allow Libya to stabilize and grow its oil output while attracting foreign direct investments into the country’s energy sector, a vital arm representing about 60 percent of the Libyan GDP, 94 percent of its exports, and 97 percent of the government revenues. Even still, there is room for growth—a majority of Libya’s territorial waters and 70 percent of its land area remain unexplored and are projected to hold vast basins of petroleum and gas reserves.  

But the round is set to occur against the backdrop of a decade-old stalemate between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR). Since 2014, the warring factions have failed to agree on a pathway for national elections and a political reconciliation process. 

The crisis is one that the US and Italy may be uniquely postured, and incentivized, to quell. 

Absent a thawing of that frozen stalemate, Tripoli is unlikely to attract an influx of energy investment. Even more, the stalemate risks plunging Libya into a deeper web of maligned foreign intervention. Both Washington and Rome could leverage their global positions to combat the country’s rabid kleptocracy and facilitate a Libyan-led technocratic political process. The carrot, of course, for this US-Italian stewardship is the opportunity for greater cooperation in countering Russia and China’s growing ambitions in Libya.  

Libya’s volatile energy output 

Libyan National Army (LNA) Commander Khalifa Haftar—who is also a US citizen—has held a monopoly over national energy resources for nearly a decade, bringing increased volatility to the country’s oil production. He has demonstrably leveraged his monopoly to negotiate arms deals and grow his access to a foreign support network. A recent Telegraph report uncovered a deal between Haftar and China where the latter reportedly shipped one billion dollars in Wing Loong military drones in exchange for crude oil. Haftar used the arms shipment to further project his power, by using United Nations-affiliated officials to facilitate it, in direct violation of the 2011 UN arms embargo. The move further signaled his rejection of any UN-facilitated process that could threaten his access to power.

As the stalemate stands, there is no guarantee for potential investors that Haftar or his affiliated militias will not force a shutdown of exploration or production. The bidding on the country’s largest petroleum reserves, the Sirte Basin, is largely under the control of Haftar’s LNA. It’s hard to imagine any company winning the exploration rights without buy-in from Haftar’s camp in exchange for security guarantees. Haftar could then leverage the exploration findings—if proven to be promising—to negotiate more favorable drilling approval and production plan contracts, growing his consolidation of the country’s shared institutions as defined by the 2020 ceasefire agreement. This could further open the door for increased foreign intervention in the country as both the GNU and Haftar have continued to leverage existing international partnerships to bolster their grip on the country’s wealthy energy resources.  

That includes an increasing closeness with Russia as Moscow pivots from Syria in the aftermath of the ousting of Bashar al-Assad. Such coziness portends that Haftar is likely to seek Russian and Chinese investment in the Libyan energy sector over Europe or the US. Already, in July 2024, Haftar signed a deal with Russian Railways Company to develop a railway connecting Sirte to Benghazi, a route critical to resupplying LNA weapons as well as shipping oil for export. Coupled with his smuggling of Russian oil into Europe, Haftar and Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrate a keenness to collaborate and circumnavigate existing sanctions on Russian energy resources.  

Russia could ensure that its oil continues to be sold while Haftar would bank on Russia’s security backing to negotiate a more favorable role in the country’s future. By working with Russia and China, Haftar is more poised to use the contracts to retain his access to illegal arms shipments in exchange for oil. With little international oversight, he may seek to use the upcoming public tender as an opportunity to gain influence with maligned foreign actors and solidify his grip on power. 

Investment opportunities amid growing

foreign ambitions 

At the end of 2024, the NOC defied global expectations and increased its production to an eleven-year high of 1.422 million barrels per day (BPD). By attracting investment, Libya hopes to repair existing refineries and work with international companies to re-establish its pre-war production output. Libya’s oil minister, Khalifa Abdulsadek, told Reuters in January that the country needs three to four billion dollars in foreign investment to reach a 1.6 million BPD output.

This has already raised some eyebrows among energy investors, and Libya is increasingly considered a hub of investment opportunity with promises of reforms and greater transparency. As Haftar continues to cozy up to China and Russia in search of weapon sales, the GNU has grown closer to Turkey. In 2019, they established an exclusive economic zone between the two countries. The GNU also signed a deal in January with Turkey to grow its cooperation in the renewable energy sector, and has attracted investment interest from Ankara’s state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). 

At the 2025 Libya Energy & Economic Summit held in Tripoli, General Manager of TPAO Ahmet Turkoglu indicated Turkey’s readiness to invest in the country’s energy sector, telling reporters “We are here because we see great potential. I am sure Libya will achieve much more,” specifically referring to offshore fields as part of a 2019 Memorandum of Understanding. 

Turkey’s ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean are neither secret nor uncontroversial. Similar to signing its fate with Syria’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Turkey placed its bets on Tripoli’s GNU in hopes of solidifying its ambitions to become a regional hegemon. Paired with Ankara’s growing involvement in facilitating Israel-Hamas negotiations, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is playing a regional chess game, one that has already proved successful in Syria and in its initial 2020 intervention in Libya. By growing investments in energy projects in Libya, Turkey seeks to gain influence in the country’s economic and political recovery. 

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Yaseen Rashed is the assistant director of media and communications at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center & Middle East Programs and a Libya researcher.  

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Stephanie T. Williams

Geography as destiny

The second factor that contributed to the Derna tragedy was the city’s geographic location, on Libya’s periphery, at a considerable distance from the capital and even far removed from the eastern region’s largest and most important city, Benghazi. So, it is the case that state-building, and the promotion of good governance, must also take into account Libya’s geography.

Many of Libya’s cities and municipalities are located far away from Tripoli, the country’s capital, which is located some 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) to the west of Benghazi. In addition, a good number of Libya’s far-flung municipalities are inaccessible due to inadequate road maintenance and persistent insecurity. Given the limited writ of the successive U.N.-recognized governments, even towns closer to Tripoli complained about not receiving adequate resources.

The resentment of the Tripoli armed groups’ monopoly over vital institutions stoked the mini-war on Tripoli that took place in August 2018 when forces from Misrata and Tarhouna attacked. The consistent marginalization of these non-Tripoli communities is a conflict driver and has produced calls for secession or a return to the federalist model that characterized the state in its first 12 years before the 1951 constitution was amended toward a centralized model in 1963.

Gadhafi’s frequent bureaucratic eruptions and his internal security forces’ brutality further frayed ties within and among communities near and far, sowing a great deal of mistrust, the resonances of which are still felt today. Marginalization, corruption, misgovernance, and repression have fed extremism in Libya. When a faraway city like Derna was identified as an extremist hotbed, it became the target of further repression, its citizens punished and neglected during the Gadhafi era and in recent years following the outbreak of violence in eastern Libya in 2012.

When I visited the city in the summer of 2019, after Haftar’s forces had “cleansed” it of extremists, its downtown area was totally demolished, reminding me of what was left of Mosul, Iraq, in the summer of 2017 after the Islamic State group was defeated. Due to conflict, distance, and neglect, the Derna dams and other critical infrastructure had not been tended to in decades, rendering the citizens of the coastal town entirely vulnerable in the event of serious flooding. Indeed, other communities are equally vulnerable to catastrophic weather events; last year’s heavy rains produced historically devastating floods in the southern Libyan towns of Ghat and Al-Kufra.

A quarrelsome ruling class that sometimes takes its quarrels to the streets

The third factor that contributed to the Derna catastrophe was the incessant quarreling among members of Libya’s ruling class, which has produced nothing beyond 10 years of divided government, persistent dysfunction, and occasional bouts of violence.

This broken political model has hampered the executive’s ability to respond to fast-breaking events and has stifled the fostering and development of experts and technocrats whose skills are desperately needed to address the country’s many challenges, including the effects of climate change and Libya’s overreliance on fossil fuels. Instead, the ruling class has prioritized patronage politics, battles over the shallow legitimacy of the remaining institutions, and the nepotistic appointing of relatives to important positions.

For instance, Derna’s mayor at the time of the epic 2023 storm just happened to be the nephew of parliamentary head Aguila Saleh, which seems to have been his only qualification for the job. It, therefore, comes as little surprise that responsibility for Derna’s reconstruction was handed to one of Haftar’s sons.

Meanwhile, across the country in Tripoli, the head of the U.N.-recognized government, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, has granted extraordinary access and power to his cousin Ibrahim. While they disagree on almost everything and went to war in 2014 over the results of parliamentary elections, Libya’s political class is in absolute alignment on one matter: to maintain the status quo which enables it to continue to access the state coffers.

A recent manifestation of ruling class quarreling was last year’s food fight over the management of Libya’s most prized sovereign institution, the Central Bank of Libya, which fully erupted in August 2024. The internationally-recognized governor, Sadiq al-Kabir, had held the position for 13 years, during which time the board of governors rarely met, if at all, with the governor monopolizing all fiscal and monetary decisionmaking.

When his relations with the Tripoli authorities soured, Kabir turned his sights east, funding the rival government operating under Haftar’s thumb. This spurred the Tripoli-based presidential council (PC) to summarily dismiss the governor, plunging Libya into a full-fledged and dire economic and financial crisis.

The PC pushed the country ever closer to the abyss by not adhering to the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement’s strictures on the selection of sovereign positions (a decision that is monopolized by the country’s two dysfunctional and usually dueling legislative bodies), and by not respecting the narrow authorities granted to them by the 2021 Libyan Political Dialogue Forum. Thanks to adept U.N. mediation, the central bank crisis was resolved, but the underlying causes of the rivalry over control of vital institutions remain untreated.

The post-Gadhafi ruling class has consistently preferred to continue cutting the cake, playing musical chairs, and engaging in endless “muhassasa,” or power-sharing arrangements.

Effective state-building and good governance require a degree of national consensus on what kind of state citizens desire and their relationship to those who govern them. This is not helped by the fact that almost 14 years after Gadhafi’s demise, Libya still lacks a constitution that determines the nature of the state—whether it is a centralized or decentralized model, whether it is a presidential system or a mixed presidential-parliamentary one—the relationship between the citizen and the state, and importantly, how the country’s resources are apportioned and managed. Rather, the post-Gadhafi ruling class has consistently preferred to continue cutting the cake, playing musical chairs, and engaging in endless “muhassasa,” or power-sharing arrangements.

A gaping lack of accountability

A related fourth factor that caused that huge loss in Derna is Libya’s gaping absence of accountability. Good governance requires accountability. Accountability is also needed to check the endemic corruption, abuses of power, and flagrant violations of basic human rights that have plagued Libya for the last 50-plus years. The rule of law rather than the rule of the gun must prevail.

Too often, it is the small fry, the minor officials, who are arrested and held for abuses of power or stealing from the public treasury. Meanwhile, the real predators, those who engage in patronage politics, wholesale plundering, organized crime, and crony capitalism, remain at large, free to continue forging their dirty deals. In the case of Derna, in a decision shrouded in mystery, 12 unnamed civil servants were reportedly given prison sentences for their role in the dams’ collapse.

One form of accountability should normally come through the ballot box. However, as I can attest, it is much easier to talk about elections in Libya than it is to produce them. The members of the ruling class, desperate to hold on to power, have buried the elections project by refusing to allow advancement on the constitutional process and the required (and consensually agreed to) electoral laws, and they and their institutions are now entirely bereft of popular legitimacy.

Elections are surely not a panacea, and if the conditions are not ripe, they can lead to further conflict, as was the case 10 years ago. However, it is also clear that the pursuit of an electoral process in Libya is absolutely key in order to remind the current legislators, who have been in power for more than 12 and 10 years respectively, that over 3 million of their compatriots have consistently demanded the right to democratically and regularly elect their representatives.

An inclusive political process that goes beyond the same old faces and that incorporates the full panoply, richness, and diversity of the Libyan body politic is being relaunched by the United Nations and deserves the full support of Libyans and international actors. We came rather close to such a formula first in 2018 and 2019 with the building of the National Conference, the holding of which was aborted by Haftar’s attack on Tripoli.

Then, in 2020, after the guns were silenced and we in the U.N. facilitated the signing of the nationwide ceasefire agreement, we convened the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), an inclusive gathering, to produce a detailed and time-bound roadmap that resulted in the formation of an interim government and a call for elections.

The nationwide ceasefire continues to hold but the LPDF’s lofty goals have yet to be achieved. Unfortunately, many in the international community mistook the congeniality that accompanied that political agreement in early 2021 for a true desire to push forward the electoral project. Using the pretext of “respecting” Libyan sovereignty, the international community allowed the LPDF roadmap to be cynically abandoned, and decision-making was returned to the hands of the very architects of the political stalemate.

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Jonathan M. Winer

Endemic corruption in Libya continues to deter foreign investment, cripple public services, and erode trust in government. In the past year, Libya fell to its lowest-ever ranking in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, tying for 173rd place with Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, and Eritrea — just four spots from the bottom. Similarly, the US Department of State’s 2024 foreign investment evaluation found that business licenses in Libya are typically granted through corruption and exploitation rather than objective criteria. The World Bank’s Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance has consistently given Libya a score of zero out of five, reflecting a system entirely bereft of transparency or accountability.

These dismal rankings mirror the ongoing power struggles among Libya’s political and military elite, who have not permitted parliamentary elections since June 2014. The country’s internationally recognized governing bodies still derive their authority from the 2015 Libyan Political Accord, and to maintain power, they rely on extensive patronage networks. These networks, in turn, depend on corruption to siphon off Libya’s oil revenues, distribute lucrative government contracts to loyalists, facilitate oil smuggling, abuse letters of credit, and traffic Syrian-produced Captagon. Corruption also extends to the judicial system, where courts are manipulated to conduct sham trials for political and financial gain — an issue comprehensively documented in The Sentry’s November 2023 report, Libya’s Kleptocratic Boom.

Over the past decade, local kleptocratic militias have provided muscle to both the Tripoli-based (and internationally recognized) “Government of National Unity,” headed by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, and its rival, the provisional “Government of National Stability” in Benghazi, backed by warlord Khalifa Hifter, his sons, and House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh Issa.

The military stalemate that has remained since Hifter’s failed 2019-20 effort to seize Tripoli by force has been maintained in part through an array of illicit revenue-sharing arrangements involving Libyan oil exports. But as the rivals do business, they are intensifying efforts to weaken other potential threats. Instead of attacking one another, bad actors in both Libya’s east and west have undertaken a spree of arbitrary arrests and detentions that the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has now warned are not only illegal, but creating “a climate of fear.”

Politically motivated arrests

In its March 22 public statement, UNSMIL found that hundreds of Libyans had been illegally arrested and detained by a range of Libyan security forces, including prosecutors, lawyers, and even officials appointed by the government whose bodies arrested them. Significantly, this last category includes Mohammed Mensli, head of the Libyan Asset Recovery and Management Office (LARMO), just as he was on the verge of making potentially significant recoveries of stolen Libyan assets.

In late December, officials at the Tripoli-based Administrative Control Authority (ACA), a post-Gadhafi anti-corruption investigative body, accused Mensli of unauthorized asset recovery efforts and holding dual nationality — charges he has denied. Notably, the decision was made immediately after a Libyan Supreme Court ruling had affirmed LARMO’s exclusive authority over such recoveries.

Mensli voluntarily returned to Tripoli to confront these allegations, only to be arrested on Jan. 7 and placed in pre-trial detention. Since then, his captors have continued to hold him without trial, in direct violation of Libyan law, which mandates that detentions cannot exceed 30 days without referral to public prosecution. More than 75 days have passed, yet no such referral has been made, leaving Mensli in legal limbo without any hearing or presentation of evidence against him. As UNSMIL found, those holding Mensli have largely denied him access to legal representation and medical care amid concerning reports of his deteriorating health.

On March 3, the Social Council of the Warfalla Tribes, Mensli’s tribal group, demanded his immediate and unconditional release, condemning his detention as “a blatant violation of all local laws and international conventions.” The council also warned that his imprisonment was part of an orchestrated effort by “corruption networks … to loot the Libyan state.”

LARMO’s mission and the threat to

Libya’s stolen wealth

Since his appointment as director-general of LARMO in 2021 by Prime Minister Dbeibeh, Mensli has led efforts to trace, recover, and manage stolen Libyan assets worldwide. Under his leadership, LARMO has reportedly identified tens — possibly hundreds — of billions of dollars in stolen assets, including stocks, bonds, real estate, jewelry, gold, aircraft, and yachts, held across Africa, Europe, and North America. Over a four-year period, Mensli had been consulting international bodies such as the United Nations and European Union, and national law enforcement agencies like the US Department of Justice and the UK National Crime Agency, with a program to ensure both that stolen Libyan assets would be recovered safely and then protected from raids by corrupt Libyan actors.

In pursuit of these twin objectives, LARMO has insisted on establishing internationally supervised financial controls to prevent recovered Libyan stolen assets from being looted again. Mensli has maintained that, with such safeguards in place, recovered funds should ultimately be used for Libyan hospitals, schools, infrastructure, sustainable energy, and food security — but only after national elections restore legitimacy to Libya’s government.

A power grab disguised as a

criminal investigation

Patience and safeguards are both critical to properly recovering and protecting stolen assets, as reflected in Mensli’s methodical effort to design a mechanism to ensure funds turned over to LARMO have sufficient controls to prevent them from being stolen again. Mensli’s continuing imprisonment suggests that those associated with his captivity are attempting to force him to disclose sensitive financial intelligence with the goal of enabling them to seize control of recovered assets for their own gain in the absence of any controls at all.

In the past weeks, Mensli’s unlawful detention has been escalated to senior officials in multiple countries, as UNSMIL worked behind the scenes to secure his release. Unable to make progress, UNSMIL then issued last weekend’s scathing statement, which warned that the wave of illegal arrests and detentions simultaneously threatened political dissent, judicial independence, and rule of law.

UNSMIL’s call for Mensli’s release and that of other Libyans unlawfully languishing in prison has yet to be echoed publicly by other major international actors with interests in Libya. Senior US and British officials responsible for Libyan policy were told about Mensli’s arrest within a few days of his arbitrary detention, and they have continued to meet with Dbeibeh and a wide range of other relevant Libyan actors, while Mensli has languished in prison. Now that UNSMIL has weighed in loudly to call for his release, it will be important for them to express their views publicly, too.

It is clear why corrupt Libyan officials might see an opportunity to profit from Mensli’s removal, but it is far less clear why the Dbeibeh government, which appointed him, has remained silent. By failing to intervene, Dbeibeh’s administration is not only jeopardizing Libya’s recovery of stolen wealth but also reinforcing the very corruption that has crippled the country for years. In the meantime, Mensli’s indefinite detention serves as yet another dark proof-point in Libya’s ever-deepening history of state-sanctioned corruption. Should he be released, Libya still has the opportunity to build out mechanisms for recovering its lost wealth to enable such funds to be used at some future point as a foundation to help the country rebuild.

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Jonathan M. Winer is a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at the Middle East Institute. He previously served as the United States special envoy for Libya and the deputy assistant secretary of state for international law enforcement. 

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Stephanie T. Williams

Some 17 months ago, in the early hours of September 11, 2023, thousands of residents of the quaint port city of Derna, nestled at the foot of the Jabal al-Akhdar (the Green Mountains) on Libya’s eastern coast, were washed out to sea by catastrophic flooding caused by Storm Daniel and the collapse of two dams that had been built in the 1970s during Moammar Gadhafi’s regime.

So great was the devastation and the loss of life that to date, thousands of bodies remain unrecovered and the death toll could well be close to 20,000; another 40,000 people were displaced (out of an overall city population of 90,000).

I can find no better words to describe the tragedy than those spoken by my former boss, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, when he mourned the loss of so many innocents: “They were victims many times over. Victims of years of conflict. Victims of climate chaos. Victims of leaders – near and far – who failed to find a way to peace. The people of Derna lived and died in the epicenter of that indifference – as the skies unleashed 100 times the monthly rainfall in 24 hours – as dams broke after years of war and neglect … as everything they knew was wiped off the map.”

This essay intends to use the Derna tragedy and its lessons to cast light on Libya’s long-running governance crisis and to propose a way forward. It is reasonable to ask whether Storm Daniel’s unusual magnitude would have caused death and destruction regardless of the state of Derna’s dams—that this was an act of nature, a freak storm of the kind we have increasingly witnessed as global warming wreaks havoc on the planet. Yet, this is at best a partial explanation, and it therefore cannot obscure the fact that there were other factors at play, explanations that are rooted in Libya’s history and its present.

I have identified five factors that led to the dreadful outcome in Derna: the legacy of statelessness left by Gadhafi; the historic marginalization of populations on Libya’s periphery; post-2011 conflicts and the irresponsibility of the current ruling class; the overall lack of political accountability; and the international community’s indifference.

From the onset, I wish to note that in my capacity as a U.N. mediator, I endeavored to avoid the inevitable reductionist narratives surrounding the Libyan conflict, such as the facile proposition that the 2011 revolution led to the division of the country into two parts. Rather than a split, what occurred in 2011 was a full-scale and deep societal implosion, resulting in the atomization in which Libya has languished.

Therefore, as a mediator, I believed that my primary task was to try to somehow reassemble all those fragments into a coherent whole. Indeed, some kind of societal cohesion is a vital ingredient for state-building. No less important is a common national identity. Both are absent in today’s Libya. Following Gadhafi’s demise, the grinding conflict in Libya has produced a bitter and unresolved contest over which Libyan figure has the capacity to assume the dictator’s two most salient qualities: his monopoly over the use of violence and his role as the (capricious) allocator-in-chief of the country’s vast riches.

Gadhafi’s legacy: An enduring

statelessness

In assessing the Libyan governance conundrum through the lens of the devastating Derna flood, the first factor to consider is the glaring absence of a strong, representative, and capable state, the achievement of which has eluded Libyans for many years. Indeed, a state (re)building project presumes the existence of a strong state prior to the upheaval in 2011.

In fact, as scholars such as Dirk Vandewalle in his book “A History of Modern Libya” have noted, what characterized both the Sanussi monarchy (1951-1969) and the Gadhafi (1969-2011) eras was something much closer to statelessness than a state in the modern sense of the word.

Following the nascent and unfinished institution-building efforts of the short-lived monarchy, Gadhafi—who disingenuously labeled himself as the “Brotherly Leader” or “Guide of the Revolution”—engaged in a 42-year experiment dedicated to the centralization of power and state deconstruction, epitomized by his frequent upendings of the status quo and declarations of one “revolution” after another, not to mention his swings from pan-Arabism to pan-Islamism and finally, pan-Africanism.

The net effect of these eccentric and theatrical perturbations was to keep Libyans off-balance, distrustful of each other, and perpetually in a state of flux and insecurity. To the extent that there were institutions during the tumultuous Gadhafi period, they were penetrated by a coterie of regime loyalists, fellow tribesmen, and their allies. Gadhafi also built a powerful internal security and intelligence system, ruthlessly punishing those who questioned his rule.

All of this turmoil had a direct impact on the building and maintenance of critical infrastructure, such as the dams in Derna, which were originally built in the 1970s but whose structural weaknesses were identified in the early 2000s. The regime waited for five years to address the maintenance issues and then got caught up in the maelstrom of the 2011 revolution.

In the euphoria that accompanied Gadhafi’s ouster in 2011, his Libyan successors and their foreign backers failed to adequately tackle the ‘day after’ challenge.

In the euphoria that accompanied the dictator’s ouster in 2011, his Libyan successors and their foreign backers failed to adequately tackle the “day after” challenge, which is not an easy task given authoritarian regimes’ tendency to capture institutions. The regime’s collapse rendered what was left of those institutions entirely brittle and vulnerable to predation by armed actors. This lack of institutional “puissance” (or power) continues to plague Libya today.

At the same time, the vengeful 2013 Political Isolation Law did not help in ensuring some continuity as it cast even minor “regime” officials (including those who had publicly and bravely joined the opposition) into purgatory and alienated many others who could have helped with the state-building task.

The absence of meaningful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and security sector reform efforts further contributed to the chaos that ensued, causing the ranks of the “revolutionaries” to swell from 30,000 to 300,000 personnel by the time I arrived in Libya in 2018.

In the years following Gadhafi’s downfall, the logic of perpetual conflict and the resort to arms soon overtook the pursuit of state and institution building. The state-building task, such as it existed, was assigned internationally to a United Nations political mission that often lacked the resources and personnel to tackle Libya’s unique set of issues.

Furthermore, for four and a half years, between mid-2014 and early 2019, due to ongoing conflict and instability in Libya, the U.N.’s international personnel were based in Tunisia. Places like Derna were entirely beyond our reach in this period, not to mention Libya’s south, which had fallen into the hands of extremist groups and thugs engaged in every type of illicit trade imaginable.

During my nearly four years working on Libya, from early 2018 through mid-2022, I would struggle to identify Libyan officials who were interested in any state-building exercise that would impede their ability to plunder and engage in patronage politics. The prime minister’s office was staffed by 900 people but only a few of these officials made any decisions.

On the other side of the country, former CIA asset Khalifa Haftar had launched his own project, building a military machine to seize control of the capital and render the “state” a mere appendage to his decidedly authoritarian project.

As for the rest of the international community, it did not appear to be prepared to invest much in what would be a painstaking, tedious, and long-term institution-building process. Instead, it seemed to have been converted to the paradigm of “stabilization” and the containment of issues such as terrorism and migration rather than the harder task of state-building.

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Tom Kington

Donald Trump turned geopolitics on its head this month with his determination to do business with Vladimir Putin while pouring scorn on America’s allies.

But there is one country in the world where tense competition between the United States and Russia continues apace, keeping the Cold War vibe alive with no nod to rapprochement.

Libya has just had a training visit from a USAF B-52 bomber as U.S. generals try to tempt local leaders to eject the ever increasing number of Russian troops stationed in desert bases in the country.

The U.S. visit last month was aimed at winning over Gen. Khalifa Haftar, the military commander who runs the eastern half of the North African country and is allowing Russia to use it as a bridgehead to back regimes further south which are hostile to Washington.

The February visit came after Haftar and his sons, Saddam and Khaled, paid a call to Russia’s close ally Belarus, a sign of ever closer ties with Moscow.

Jalel Harchaoui, an analyst at the RUSI think tank in London, said U.S. attempts to win over Haftar were being led by the Pentagon.

“The Biden administration had no real policy to peel him away from the Russians, and the Trump administration has had no time for Libya, so the Pentagon is conducting its own diplomacy here,” he said.

Visitors from U.S. Africa Command who held ground targeting exercises as two B-52H Stratofortress bombers flew overhead invited military personnel from Haftar’s forces as well as from Eastern Libya, which is run by a separate government in Tripoli.

The two sides of the country split in 2014, three years after the ousting of Ghadaffi.

“Haftar tells the U.S. he would work with them but says Russia gives him air defenses and military training. The U.S. tells him it would give him more if only he would distance himself from Russia,” said Harchaoui.

After the U.S. visit, Russia’s deputy defense minister, Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, was back in eastern Libya for another of his frequent visits.

“Meanwhile at Libya’s Brak al-Shati airbase, the number of Russians stationed there has risen from 300 to approximately 450 since November,” said Harchaoui.

Ben Fishman, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, said he was “very skeptical” about Haftar turning away from Russia.

“Those B-52s won’t change his mind, nor will attempts by the U.S. to unite the two militaries, since Haftar’s forces are a real mechanism while in the west local militias are more influential than the army,” he said.

Mohamed Eljarh at consultancy firm Libya Outlook was more optimistic, claiming Haftar’s son Saddam – who commands eastern Libya’s land forces – is seeking ties with the United States.

“There is a belief the Russians were playing a double game in Libya with both Haftar and Ghadaffi’s son, Saif Al-Islam. Saddam is leading efforts to be closer to the U.S. and visited the U.S. last year,” he said, adding, “The Russians are understandably concerned and want him to visit Moscow but that seems off the table for now.”

If Saddam engages with the U.S., it remains to be seen whether the Trump administration will reciprocate, said Umberto Profazio, an analyst at the IISS think tank.

“There is no sign of the Trump administration yet, and given its unorthodox view of Russia and wish to disengage with overseas theaters, we may see the U.S. providing leeway for the Russian presence in Libya,” he said.

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Tom Kington is the Italy correspondent for Defense News.

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Senussi Bsaikri

US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has deepened its interest in Libya following the developments in the country after the military attack launched by the House of Representatives-affiliated leadership on the capital, Tripoli, in 2019. One of the most dangerous consequences of this attack was the direct military presence of foreign forces, particularly the Russians and Turks.

Turkish forces are not a concern for the US, but Russian presence on Libyan soil has deepened the concerns of the Americans and their European allies, as evidenced by the statements issued by their officials and their movements on the ground. The repeated visits by senior USAFRICOM officers to Libya have been linked to these concerns.

US Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has deepened its interest in Libya following the developments in the country after the military attack launched by the House of Representatives-affiliated leadership on the capital, Tripoli, in 2019. One of the most dangerous consequences of this attack was the direct military presence of foreign forces, particularly the Russians and Turks.

Turkish forces are not a concern for the US, but Russian presence on Libyan soil has deepened the concerns of the Americans and their European allies, as evidenced by the statements issued by their officials and their movements on the ground. The repeated visits by senior USAFRICOM officers to Libya have been linked to these concerns.

USAFRICOM has played a prominent role in containing military and security tensions between the parties to the Libyan conflict.

The calm on the front lines and in the areas of contact cannot be separated or disconnected from US interventions, the ceasefire agreement and negotiations through the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC), as well as another official but unannounced path.

Germany-based USAFRICOM supported the main points of agreement reached by the 5+5 JMC: a ceasefire and stabilisation, the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces, and the unification of the army. These points were supposed to be implemented sequentially, meaning that the withdrawal of mercenaries would follow the ceasefire, followed by the unification of the army. However, matters did not progress well regarding the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces. While a number of foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan were withdrawn, this did not apply to the Russian and Turkish forces, for well-known reasons related to geopolitical developments across a larger area of North, Central and Southern Africa, and the subsequent military and security repercussions.

It appears that the Americans resorted to the plan of unifying the “army” as a key factor contributing to the withdrawal of foreign forces, especially since the reliance on political consensus and the settlement of disputes between Libyan factions regarding the constitution and elections is facing major challenges.

This is perhaps confirmed or hinted at by a report issued by African Defence Forum magazine, affiliated with USAFRICOM, which indicated the interest of American officials and their emphasis on the need to unify the divided military institutions in order to impose security stability and confront the risks posed by the presence of foreign mercenaries and illegal trafficking networks. The report did not reveal any progress on this path, other than praising the cooperation of the parties to the Libyan conflict and their agreement on mechanisms for US cooperation with the Libyan parties to overcome the obstacles preventing the unification of forces in the west and east.

What has hindered the rapid implementation of the military and security points agreed upon by the 5+5 JMC is the link between the interests and influence of the Libyan conflicting parties and the external support (Russia and Turkiye), and the insistence on all forces being subordinate to the General Command headed by Khalifa Haftar, whose position and powers are beyond dispute with regard to the eastern front.

It appears to be counting on making progress in unifying the General Staff Command. It may achieve positive results on this front, but efforts to meet the requirements for army unification require political stability and the resolution of outstanding issues causing the current state of institutional division.

America’s ongoing efforts to restructure the military institution to address security challenges within Libya and the region, and to protect Libyan sovereignty from any external interference, as stated in the report, require a restructuring of the military and security structure. This will clash with the interests and impact of influential forces in the west and east. The influential forces in the west, especially the capital, Tripoli, whose powers and authority are greater than that of the armed forces, will not accept a unified army that follows the model implemented in the east, where the army controls military, security and even political affairs.

The hammer of expelling the Russians and the anvil of the complex military, security and political situation could prompt USAFRICOM’s plan to produce a deformed embryo and an entity lacking in effectiveness and influence. This is in addition to the ambiguity surrounding the White House’s approaches and options under President Donald Trump, and its handling of Russian ambitions, which may go in a direction different to that planned by US Africa Command.

________________

Kaan Devecioglu

Concerns of Italy and Europe

Over Russia’s Presence in Libya

Russia’s withdrawal from Syria and focus on Libya stands out as a development that threatens Italy’s geopolitical interests in particular. Libya is a priority country for Italy in terms of energy security, migration management and regional stability.

Russia’s increasing influence in Libya by settling in strategic bases such as Tobruk and Maaten al-Sarra could weaken Italy’s control over energy infrastructures and deepen instability in Libya, while also increasing migration flows to Europe. Indeed, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has evaluated these moves by Russia as a threat and called on the European Union and NATO to be more active in this regard.

Russia’s activities in Libya directly affect not only Italy but also the energy security and migration policies of the European Union. While European countries are trying to turn to alternative energy suppliers to reduce their energy dependence on Russia after the Ukraine War, Russia’s access to energy infrastructure in Libya jeopardizes these efforts.

Although the European Union has made diplomatic and economic efforts to ensure stability in Libya, full coordination has not been achieved among member states on this issue. While France is focusing more on Libya with its decreasing influence in the Sahel region, Germany is adopting a more cautious policy and prioritizing economic aid. However, Russia’s increasing influence requires Europe to develop a more comprehensive strategy.

Italy is one of the European countries that has been following the developments in Libya most closely, and its geographical proximity to the country increases Italy’s sensitivity over Libya. The presence of major Italian energy companies such as ENI in Libya is an important factor shaping the efforts of the Roman government to maintain stability in the region. However, Russia’s increasing influence in Libya through its military and paramilitary forces threatens Italy’s interests in the region.

Italy is making great efforts to establish a more effective Libya policy within the European Union and to strengthen security on NATO’s southern flank. However, the success of these efforts depends on Europe’s capacity to develop a common strategy. If an effective response is not given to Russia’s presence in Libya, not only Italy but all of Europe will feel the negative consequences of this geopolitical competition.

As a result, Russia’s withdrawal from Syria and its focus on Libya is creating a new balance of power in both the Mediterranean and Sahel regions. Moscow’s focus on strategic bases such as Tobruk and Maaten al-Sarra are remarkable steps taken to consolidate its military presence in the Mediterranean and to create new spheres of influence deep in Africa.

This situation poses serious risks, especially for Italy and other European countries, in terms of energy security, migration management and regional stability. The European Union and NATO’s failure to develop a common strategy against these developments in Libya could pave the way for Russia to further increase its influence.

In this context, it is critical for Italy to take on a leadership role and strengthen Europe’s efforts to protect its interests in Libya. However, the success of these efforts depends on the capacity of European countries to act together and to develop a comprehensive political vision that supports peace and stability in Libya. Otherwise, the current power struggle in Libya could create greater problems for Europe’s security and economic interests.

__________________

Tarek Megerisi

In January, the Italian government helped a notorious Libyan torturer escape an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. Osama Njeem, a senior militia leader who commands Libya’s judicial police, was detained in Turin, in northern Italy, under an ICC warrant for suspected crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against detainees at Mitiga prison, which he oversaw in Libya’s capitol, Tripoli. But soon after his arrest, Njeem was unexpectedly freed by Italian authorities on what they claimed was “a legal technicality” and flown on an official Italian state aircraft back to Libya, where he received a hero’s welcome from his fellow militiamen.

The ICC made clear that Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s far-right government had not consulted the court before defying the warrant for Njeem’s arrest. Helping Njeem escape the docket in The Hague was an act of sabotage against the international order, universal justice and multilateralism itself—from a founding member of the ICC, no less. Under the Rome Statute that established the ICC, Italy is required to hand over wanted individuals to the court for trial in The Hague.

In the chaotic aftermath of outraged recriminations, Italian ministers claimed their hands were tied by improperly filed paperwork, before being trumped by their own prime minister in a fiery sermon on social media. Facing investigation from Italian prosecutors for her actions, Meloni claimed she had no regrets about doing what was necessary to protect her country from this supposed lone threat (in fact, an unarmed, overweight, already detained individual). “I can’t be blackmailed, I can’t be intimidated,” she declared, casting the investigation against her as desperation by political rivals who don’t want to see “Italy change, to become better.”

Meloni then doubled down on the subterfuge, dispatching Italy’s spy chief, Giovanni Caravelli, to Tripoli to brief Libya’s deeply unpopular, increasingly repressive government on who else was under sealed indictment from the ICC. According to Italian media, Caravelli assured Libyan leaders that none of the motley crew of 86 accused war criminals in Libya reportedly on the ICC’s list would be arrested on Italian soil, in order to avoid any embarrassing replays of the Njeem affair.

Meloni’s calculation is as simple as it is cynical. Since she came to power on an anti-immigrant platform, promising to close Italy’s borders to migrants and asylum-seekers, she depends on these torturers, criminals and militias in Libya to “manage” migration flows to Italy, which have already gone up 33 percent from this time last year. Meloni’s commitment is not to international law and the ICC, but instead to a shadowy agreement with Libya to prevent migrants from crossing the Mediterranean. Had she allowed international justice to take its course, with Njeem and other torturers under arrest in The Hague, Meloni probably feared that the migrant agreement with Libya would collapse. In a callous act of revenge, Libyan officials may even have emptied their infamous migrant dungeons, sponsored by the European Union, in Italy’s direction.

This entire episode exposes who European countries are partnering with to “curb” or “manage” migration from North Africa, undermining any stated commitment to human rights. But it is also perhaps the most glaring example yet of how international actors are sabotaging the prospects for change in Libya and the chance that Libyans might finally realize the hopes of their revolution in 2011. It is a tale of the myopia and short-term imperatives of outside powers that don’t have any strategic plan or policy in Libya, instead only what now amounts to extortion rackets. They are consumed by trying to contain what once may have been considered the revolution’s fallout, but is increasingly the fallout of their own failed policies since the end of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime. The result is that each year, the state that Libyans dreamed of gets farther away, and the Pandora’s box that Libya has become gets harder to keep shut. 

This time it was Italy, but they’re far from the only ones trading their values and their interests for ever-smaller and ever-shorter gains. Libya is where international law has risen and fallen, like a phoenix in reverse. In 2011, Libya’s revolution—and Gadhafi’s violent response, calling on his soldiers to “cleanse” Libya “house by house”—sparked fears of impending massacres that led to the one-and-only armed intervention on the grounds of the international humanitarian principle of “responsibility-to-protect,” or R2P. When the United Nations Security Council authorized NATO to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians from Gadhafi’s forces, it was seen by advocates of R2P as the crowning achievement of international law.

But Libya today is a wasteland of international law, the state effectively split into two rival territories. Whether in western Libya under its internationally recognized but failed and kleptocratic government, or in eastern Libya under the breakaway authoritarian regime of Gadhafi-era general Khalifa Haftar, there is no international law in action, only misguided games of realpolitik.

Just a week after the Njeem debacle, a U.S. diplomatic and military delegation posed smiling with Saddam Haftar, the filial heir apparent of eastern Libya’s dictator. It was a curiously timed display of legitimizing support, given that it coincided with the publication of a report by a U.N. panel of experts highlighting Saddam Haftar’s role as cocaine baron, smuggler-in-chief and prolific violator of the U.N. arms embargo on Libya. The U.S. goal in its dealings with Haftar is even more ethereal and quixotic than Meloni’s. Washington’s vain hope is drawing the Haftar family away from its ever-deepening relationship with Russia, their key financial and military patron, through shallow meet-and-greets and other empty gestures like participation in training exercises.

A few months earlier, Saddam Haftar had also been briefly detained in Italy, as part of a Spanish investigation into his attempts to illegally import military drones to Libya. The younger Haftar was predictably outraged. He is used to sharing in his father’s absolute impunity, which even involves visiting British and European ambassadors watching his forces parade their collection of weaponry obtained in violation of the U.N. arms embargo. Saddam Haftar’s response was to shut down Libya’s largest oil field, co-operated by a conglomerate of European oil companies, of which Spain’s Repsol is the most prominent.

Libya’s recent history has been an utterly predictable demonstration of cause and effect. Europe and the U.S. have not been the drivers of Libya’s decline, but they have been its sentinels, watching over, protecting and easing every deleterious step, believing it was in their interests to do so. But whether that interest lays in migration, geopolitics, energy or even some general but nebulous “stability,” those pillars have all degraded along with the position, power and influence of these Western sentinels.

Nothing symbolizes this decline better than Italy’s Meloni breaking the law to protect Libyan warlords and their people-smuggling gangs. This, almost ten years on from Italy’s first foray to co-opt Libya’s human-trafficking militias into becoming Europe’s counter-smuggling “partners.”

The same pattern applies to all these other Western interests in Libya. Desperation to stop Libya’s civil war spinning completely out of control in 2020 pushed Western states to collectively bless a deeply flawed cease-fire plan originating from Moscow. The same desperation led to hushing Libyan demands for accountability for Haftar’s numerous war crimes and for assurances that Libya’s key military bases and oil installations would be demilitarized under government control. Today, Libya is the linchpin of Russia’s Africa operations and, according to the U.N., “armed groups in Libya have achieved an unprecedented level of influence over state institutions,” including vital oil infrastructure.

Libyan oil, as Libyans had warned, was shut off in 2022 in another collaboration between Haftar and Vladimir Putin that had two aims: to politically strengthen Haftar and help Moscow torch international energy markets after invading Ukraine. President Joe Biden’s desperation to lower global oil prices enabled a shady deal brokered by the United Arab Emirates—Haftar’s other key patron—to restart Libyan oil production in exchange for effectively handing Libya’s oil governance over to armed groups. As a result, Libya’s vast oil wealth has been diverted to Haftar’s so-called Libyan National Army and mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group, helping Russia escape Western sanctions over Ukraine and fueling other African conflicts like the civil war in Sudan. Meanwhile, the Libyan state tumbles into ever deeper financial crisis.

As egregious as Meloni’s recent depredations are, they are merely symptomatic of a long trend of Western policymakers letting desperation lead when strategy should, trading their policy pillars for the equivalent of magic beans. The continuous result is watching the Western world, supposedly committed to the international rules-based order, dismantle the international laws, frameworks and mechanisms that not only uphold that order around the world, but protect their interests in Libya and represent their vehicle to finally stabilizing the country post-2011. With every piece of leverage the U.S. or Europe give up, with every tool of influence they destroy, they become more dependent on the arsonists who promised they would stop lighting fires once they were sure they wouldn’t be threatened with water.

Libyans, Libya’s neighbors and Europe have always been in this together, as they all suffer at the same hands. The only way out of this inferno is to shepherd Libya toward elections that replace the current crew of arsonists in power. That requires using what outside leverage remains to strengthen accountability that can restrain these arsonists and establish transparency over Libya’s oil industry and revenue, to help cut off their fuel. The fate of Libya, and of the international order itself, depends on it.

***

Tarek Megerisi – Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow with the North Africa and Middle East program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

_______________

Kaan Devecioglu

Russia’s reduction of its military presence in Syria and its focus on Libya points to a new power struggle in both the Middle East and North Africa. Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) advance in Syria and the fall of the Assad regime have caused Moscow to reassess its positions in Syria. Russia’s termination of its military presence in Tartus and its transfer of its naval elements to Libya can be interpreted as part of Moscow’s efforts to protect and expand its strategic interests in the Mediterranean and Sahel regions.

Russia’s Decision to Withdraw

from Syria and Its Geopolitical Agenda

The changes in the course of the civil war in Syria have been influential in Russia’s decision to reduce its military presence in the country. HTS’s successful operations have become a threat to Russia’s naval assets at its Tartus base. In addition, the Bashar Assad regime’s failure to re-establish control after the civil war has increased concerns that Russia will not be able to recoup its investments there. In this context, it is understood that Moscow has decided to move its military and logistical assets to a more secure and strategic location, considering the increasing costs of maintaining its presence in Syria.

Another important motivation for Russia in this process is to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean, which is critical for international maritime transportation and energy security. While the Tartus Base is an important center supporting Moscow’s logistics and military operations in the region, the fact that this base is at risk has led Russia to seek alternatives.

However, the recent statement by the Ahmed Sharaa administration stating that they do not want Russia to withdraw from Syria in a way that would negatively affect bilateral relations, and the Russian delegation’s visit to Damascus, as well as the Port Sudan administration’s visit to Moscow within the scope of the planned Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast of Sudan, reveal the Putin administration’s security-centered geopolitical agenda, which extends from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and from there to the Indo-Pacific region.

Another important motivation for Russia in this process is to maintain its influence in the Mediterranean, which is critical for international maritime transportation and energy security. While the Tartus Base is an important center supporting Moscow’s logistics and military operations in the region, the fact that this base is at risk has led Russia to seek alternatives.

However, the recent statement by the Ahmed Sharaa administration stating that they do not want Russia to withdraw from Syria in a way that would negatively affect bilateral relations, and the Russian delegation’s visit to Damascus, as well as the Port Sudan administration’s visit to Moscow within the scope of the planned Russian naval base on the Red Sea coast of Sudan, reveal the Putin administration’s security-centered geopolitical agenda, which extends from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and from there to the Indo-Pacific region.

Libya: The New Geopolitical Center

Russia’s move to Libya is an extension of Moscow’s strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Tobruk in eastern Libya (al-Qadim and al-Jufra – both former outposts of the Wagner Group) and Maaten al-Sarra Base in the south offer Russia an opportunity to make up for the strategic advantages it has lost in Syria. As a coastal region on the Mediterranean, Tobruk could allow Russia to control energy and shipping routes. Maaten al-Sarra, on the other hand, is strategically located on the border of Libya, Sudan and Chad and could serve as a logistics center for operations in the Sahel region. In fact, satellite images reflected in open sources also prove this development.

Russia’s deployment of paramilitary elements such as the Wagner Group (now known as the African Corps ) to Libya and the Sahel highlights Moscow’s efforts to consolidate its military presence there. The Wagner Group, in cooperation with Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), undertakes the task of protecting and expanding Russia’s interests, particularly in the Cyrenaica region. These steps reveal that Russia sees Libya as a base not only for military purposes but also for energy and geopolitical competition.

Russia’s efforts to reduce its presence in the Tartus Naval Base in Syria and establish a naval base in Tobruk, eastern Libya, are aimed at protecting and strengthening Moscow’s long-term strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Tartus was an important logistics and operational hub for Russia. However, the fall of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria, which Moscow supports, has jeopardized the security of Tartus.

Therefore, establishing a base in a more secure location such as Tobruk would strengthen the door for Russia to establish a stronger presence in a region close to NATO’s southern flank. The geopolitical importance of the Mediterranean is evident as it is the intersection of energy corridors and international trade routes. The planned naval base to be built in Tobruk would provide the Russian navy with operational flexibility in the Mediterranean while also allowing Moscow to increase its strategic pressure on NATO and Europe. This move could also be considered a step towards increasing Russia’s visibility as a global naval power.

Libya is also in a strategic position in the energy competition, as it has one of the largest oil reserves in Africa and plays a critical role in European energy security. By controlling energy resources in Libya, Russia aims to both expand its economic interests and create strategic pressure on European countries. While the European Union obtains a significant portion of its energy needs from Russia, it has developed policies aimed at reducing its dependence on Russia following the Ukraine War.

In this context, efforts to turn to alternative energy suppliers such as Libya have come to the fore. However, by controlling the energy infrastructure in Libya, Russia may have the opportunity to undermine Europe’s strategic diversification goals. Russia’s increasing interest in energy fields in the Cyrenaica region, which is controlled by Khalifa Haftar, is part of this strategy. Moscow’s use of paramilitary forces such as the Wagner Group to ensure the security of energy infrastructures supports Europe’s aim of taking control of the energy supply chain while strengthening its presence in Libya.

On the other hand, Russia’s goal of expanding its military presence in Libya to the Sahel region is part of a long-term strategy aimed at increasing Moscow’s influence on the African continent. The Maaten al-Sarra Air Base in southern Libya plays a key role in this context.

The base is strategically located on the border of Libya, Chad and Sudan and is considered an ideal center for providing logistical support to the Sahel region. Considering the Wagner Group’s activities in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan, it is clear that this base could make significant contributions to Russia’s military operations in the region.

Indeed, the power vacuum created by France’s reduction of its military presence in the Sahel creates new opportunities for Russia. The relations developed with the junta regimes in the region and the security support provided are important indicators of Moscow’s increasing influence in the Sahel.

In addition to supporting Russia’s operations in the Sahel, the Maaten al-Sarra base could provide direct military and logistical supplies to regional countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Sudan. The deployment of Syrian soldiers and Russian technicians to rebuild the base shows how much importance Moscow attaches to the project. The base is becoming a critical hub for expanding Russia’s presence in Africa and filling the gap left by France’s decline.

______________________

Sophie Kemkhadze

Over a decade after Libyan women led protests that set Libya on a path to peace in 2011, they were told their role was over—’We appreciate your contribution thus far, but perhaps it is time to step aside and go back to the safety of your homes.’ Today, newly elected women in municipal councils still face pressure to step aside, as if leadership is not theirs to hold.

Persistent imbalances

On 20 February 2025, Libya’s High National Election Commission concluded candidate nomination, with women accounting for 27 per cent of the candidates nominated to run for seats in 62 municipal councils across the country, later this year. With the adoption of Regulation 43/2023, there are now as many as three seats reserved for women in every council. Despite progress, women remain outnumbered and lack the support structures of their male counterparts.

A Global phenomenon

Exclusion of women from politics is not unique to Libya. In 2024, more than 3 billion people were poised to cast ballots in countries across the globe, marking “the biggest election year in human history.” Installing leaders in 72 countries, voters had an unprecedented opportunity to affect global change – to challenge imbalances, disparities, inequalities, and exclusions. Yet, turnout declined, protests grew, and there was no significant progress in ensuring equal participation for women in decision-making.

Uncertainty and resistance to change

Academics have observed that in “precarious transitions from war to peace,” women are prone to falling down on the list of priorities.

More generally, there is substantive evidence that people are both politically and psychologically resistant to change during times of uncertainty.

International commitment

In times of uncertainty, it is crucial to reaffirm a simple truth—equal participation in decision-making is not an act of charity; it is a necessity. 

International conventions from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women recognize human equality and acknowledging the rights of women to participate in elections and political life. Meanwhile, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) emphasizes the critical role of women in post-conflict decision making – specifically calling for their presence in establishing national Constitutions, electoral systems and institutions.

UNDP, together with international partners, has worked alongside local authorities and civil society to advance women’s representation in decision-making spaces—ensuring that their voices shape Libya’s future, rather than being sidelined.

And for those who remain unconvinced, I would further argue that Involving women in governance is just smart policy – and will accelerate the achievement of the most pressing issues we face today. Let’s consider some of the supporting evidence.

Peaceful transitions and long-term stability: 

Movements that include women are less prone to violence, they also gain greater legitimacy. Working across political divisions and with their male peers, women work in a less hierarchical way and are effective negotiators. In fact, peace agreements and post-conflict reconstruction are more likely to endure over the long-term when women have been involved.

Reduced corruption: 

Decades of research reveal a strong correlation between higher levels of women’s political participation and lower levels of corruption – from petty corruption during implementation to grand corruption, occurring at the highest level of political decision-making.

Economic growth: 

Studies have shown that diversity improves cooperation, innovation and performance. It also enhances creativity, expands access to information networks and strengthens collective resilience. Countries with more women in governance reduce legal discrimination and inequalities more effectively. Because this results in higher workforce participation and access to professional opportunities, the impact can be seen in national gross domestic product (GDP). According to the World Economic Forum, enabling women to participate fully in the labour force could increase global GDP by roughly 20 per cent.

Delivering on human rights: 

When women participate in politics, governments are more responsive to citizen needs. Women in political leadership prioritize issues that improve quality of life, such as health and education. And women lawmakers are not only more attentive to issues relating to women’s biological and societal needs; they are also more likely to serve the interests of under-represented and minority groups, respond to community level concerns and address the needs expressed by their own constituents.

Not going home

In December 2024, Zayra Al Maqtouf made history as the first woman Mayor in Libya — currently the only woman among 58 Mayors. Her presence may be considered an anomaly by some, but a significant one all would agree as she was elected by her fellow council members. For Mayor Maqtouf, there is no “going back to the comfort of home” – she is committed to serve to the fullest of her abilities.

Libya’s progress depends not on sidelining voices but on embracing them. The future will not be built by half of society alone—it requires the leadership, dedication, and vision of all those who are ready to serve.

________________

John Lechner

Turkey’s Syrian mercenaries found themselves under-equipped for the fight ahead. “We were given old machine guns from home,” one fighter recalled, “not due to lack of higher quality weapons, but because those weapons had been sold off on the black market.” On the enemy’s side, Haftar’s LNA employed sophisticated surveillance drones—likely provided by the UAE, but also Wagner—to map targets. Back in Syria, “neither the regime nor rebels had the ability to target precisely.”

Turkish officers told the Syrian recruits they were fighting not just Haftar, but Assad’s regime—there were Syrians on the other side loyal to the regime. They weren’t wrong.

In proxy warfare, outside powers are typically willing to invest enough resources to ensure their preferred proxies won’t lose, but not enough for them to win.

In September 2019, “Basil,” a twentysomething Syrian from Syria’s Latakia region, was in Deir ez-Zor with Wagner’s ISIS Hunters unit when an order came to head to their base in Homs. “The Russians told us about [another] mission, but no one knew where exactly. We thought we were maybe going to Raqqa.” The ISIS Hunters took a bus to Hmeimim Airport, then boarded a military plane packed with men and coffins. Three hours later, they landed. The Syrians were loaded in pickups and brought to Al-Karama base where they were finally told where they were: Libya. The starting salary was $500 per month. Twenty of the ISIS Hunters immediately refused to fight. “They said it was because of the low salary, but really they were afraid of the whole situation.” More ISIS Hunters joined them in a strike, forcing a Russian commander to raise salaries to $1,000 a month: low by international standards but good money in the overwhelming poverty of Assad’s Syria.

The same twenty fighters still refused to participate. They eventually flew back to Syria. The commander of the brigade collected the mobile phones of the others. Basil’s family had no idea where he was, but that was pretty normal given “all the secret work” he did. Still, he was terrified. The men were given weapons and piled into another plane, this one heading for al-Jufra. Everyone was given a fake name. From there, they hopped onto small buses and drove twelve hours to the front line in Tripoli. The trip shouldn’t have been that long, but various “clans” put up roadblocks on the way.

Like their fellow Syrians across the front line, Basil and the ISIS Hunters were put up in civilians’ houses. The next day, they visited one of the field hospitals that had an operations center. The first floor was for injured Russians and Syrians and food supplies, provided by the UAE. The floors above were for communications. There were Sudanese mercenaries, who, annoyingly for Basil, were earning $1,500 dollars, as well as Chadians. After a few days, it was time to fight. “The Russians were advancing during the day and withdrawing at night. I don’t know why,” Basil remembered. “The real war was in the air, and the Turks controlled it.”

In May 2020, the Turkish intervention had made a serious difference. Pro-Tripoli forces pushed Haftar’s LNA out of Tripoli’s southern suburbs. Milita commander Heithem thanked the Turkish drones more than the mercenaries. “They cut off the logistical supplies for the Russians and the LNA. They ran out of ammunition, even food.” At the end of the month, Wagner’s 1,500 mercenaries, a number that did not include Syrians under their employment, made a sudden and hasty retreat from Tripoli. From what Basil had heard, there had been a truce. “The Russians learned the GNA and Turks wanted to attack Sirte. Both had oil and were more important to Wagner than Tripoli, so they made a truce, and we were given seventy-two hours to withdraw.” For now, it seems unlikely that Wagner had a direct stake in those oil fields. The bulk of Wagner’s funding in Libya likely came from the Russian military, not Haftar. It is still unclear, too, whether Wagner brokered a deal with the Turks or simply made a hasty retreat. Soon, though, fires were lit at Russian headquarters. Smoke from laptops and documents filled the air. Haftar’s campaign against the capital collapsed a few days later.

Ahmed—who had fought for the Turks and the GNA—went back to Syria with a shattered pelvis. He was paid $2,500, a quarter of the $10,000 he was owed. “When I complained, they said this is what we have for you. If you don’t like it, file a complaint.” When the fighting in Libya was at its peak, a recruiter for one of the Turkish-backed militias reported he was told to “send as many fighters as we could recruit . . . so, we started sending kids with zero military experience.” But once the battle was won, “commanders confiscated salaries,” he confirmed.

After visiting the white house where Wagner forces had allegedly stayed, Heithem and I drove a few minutes to meet Abdul Rahman. Abdul lost two brothers to the mines Wagner left behind. He showed us the car, speckled with small holes where shrapnel sliced through. He pointed to the trip wires in his garden and the booby traps behind his doors.

“Was it possible this was the LNA?” I asked.

“We don’t know for sure,” he responded. But the sophistication hinted at the Russians. “Libyans themselves wouldn’t leave these mines behind; society is not structured that way.”

In the backyard we saw an unexploded shell. Abdul covered it with a rusty bucket and put a rock on top to keep it in place. His neighbor lost two children the year before when they picked up a mine. Frequent petitions to demine Ein Zara had gone unanswered by the government in Tripoli.

We then drove past several buildings destroyed by Emirati drones and fighter jets. On the street, groups of African migrants congregated, some on break from rebuilding Ein Zara, earning money to pay for boats to Europe. They bore the brunt of injuries from unexploded ordinances.

In October 2020, representatives from Libya’s two rival camps signed a United Nations-sponsored action plan committing to the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries. A Wagner force stuck around, however, keeping some of its Syrian fighters. Basil’s unit was transferred to Sirte, to wait for an attack from the Turks and GNA that never came. They were bored almost immediately, even more so after commanders cut everyone off from hashish. Most Syrians opted to go back, but a few signed new contracts to fight in Africa. They went south to the Central African Republic.

The offensive on Tripoli was a failure for Haftar, but not for Wagner. Prigozhin’s men were paid for their services—likely through the UAE and the Russian state. While the Kremlin and Prigozhin would be happy for Haftar to take Tripoli, there was no interest in throwing all the necessary resources behind him. Russian military planners knew Haftar’s chances of taking the city were limited. In the spring of 2019, Prigozhin received a report stating the LNA lacked the capacity and motivation to seize the capital. It was more important to maintain Haftar’s dependence on the Kremlin and, therefore, Russian influence in an important country on NATO’s southern flank. In proxy warfare, outside powers are typically willing to invest enough resources to ensure their preferred proxies won’t lose, but not enough for them to win. In this sense, Russia and Turkey have made the conflict in Libya more intractable. Ironically, it is also Russia and Turkey’s intervention that produced a military stalemate and prevented the eruption of another war after 2020.

Neither at war nor at peace, the real winners in Libya are those comfortably straddling the two, feeding belligerents’ demand for men and material.

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Amine Ghoulidi

If Russia entrenches itself in Libya unopposed, it will create problems for Europe in the Mediterranean and Africa. 

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime and the increase in Russian Libya involvement may seem like unrelated phenomena. However, Russia’s shift towards Libya is a direct reaction to Bashar al-Assad’s downfall. 

While this shift reflects constraints on Russian power, it may also increase risks to European and regional security by concentrating Russian power closer to NATO’s southern flank, potentially allowing Russia to exploit regional fractures in Libya and elsewhere.  

Currently, Libya remains divided between the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls the east. This division has allowed external powers to take advantage of Libya’s instability to advance their own regional agendas. 

Recent reports indicate a Russian cargo plane departing Khmeimim, Syria for Libya. This could have reinforced Moscow’s established Libyan presence via private military contractors tied to the LNA.  

Satellite imagery of dismantled Ka-52 helicopters and S-400 systems points to Russia’s planned redeployment of key military hardware. Italian defense minister Guido Crosetto warns that repositioning from Syria to Libya puts hostile naval capabilities “two steps away” from Italian maritime space. 

Whether a reflection of opportunism or a coherent plan, Moscow’s moves—driven by setbacks and resource constraints—could reshape regional security well beyond Libya’s fractured landscape. 

This realignment unfolds against a backdrop of unprecedented Western retrenchment across Africa. France’s forced withdrawals from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Senegal mark not merely the collapse of decades-old security arrangements. Still, the unraveling of an entire post-colonial order that had (however imperfectly) stabilized the region. The American departure from Niger has contributed to the strategic vacuum—and Moscow appears eager to exploit that. 

For Moscow, Libya provides an ideal platform to reassert the influence that had been contested in Syria. LikAmine Ghoulidie in Syria, where Moscow and Tehran used a conflict to entrench themselves, Libya’s fractious landscape now provides a playground for outside powers.  

Yet, while Syria granted access to the Levantine corridor and Israel’s doorstep, Libya offers strategic depth in Africa, allowing Russia to project power into the Sahel. In Syria, Russia’s aims centered on shoring up a beleaguered ally. Still, its objectives in Libya reflect broader ambitions—ambitions for which anti-Western sentiment and fragile states offer fertile ground.  

Moscow seeks a durable maritime presence in the Mediterranean, a longstanding aspiration that demands year-round port access and the ability to deploy naval assets. It also seeks control or influence over transit routes from Libya, which would position Russia to pressure Europe on energy routes and critical infrastructure.  

Russia views Libya as an anchor for further entrenchment in the Sahel, where Western disengagement and weakened governments create openings. From oil in Libya to gold in Sudan to uranium in Niger, control of North Africa’s resources would feed Russia’s broader power projection goals. 

Libya’s geographic centrality amplifies its strategic value. Libya offers multi-directional influence: north toward Europe, south into the Sahel, and west across the Maghreb. This geographic centrality presents operational complexities that temper Russia’s reach. The vast Saharan expanses pose logistical challenges. Still, even a limited Russian presence in the country’s east provides significant leverage over critical Mediterranean and trans-Saharan routes. These strategic considerations illustrate why Libya isn’t a mere substitute for fading influence in Syria—instead, it may be Moscow’s new proving ground.  

Russia’s constraints (including recruiting challenges and Ukraine force commitments) may make Libya’s fractured landscape appealing. Further, the loss of the Syrian air bridge makes securing and expanding Russia’s Libyan foothold even more crucial for maintaining Moscow’s broader African operations.  

Unlike Syria, where Russia maintained expensive military deployments, Libya allows Moscow to project influence through a combination of private military contractors, targeted arms supplies, and political leverage—a model better suited to Russia’s current constraints. 

Currently, Moscow and Ankara maintain a careful balance of rivalry and tactical cooperation in Libya. In contrast to the stark antagonism of the Syrian war, competition in Libya is more restrained and pragmatic, relying largely on proxies and military assets to sustain influence without risking open confrontation.  

Russia’s Wagner Group supports Khalifa Haftar’s LNA, while Turkey backs Tripoli’s GNA with drones and advisors. This dynamic fosters “managed instability”—a scenario where both sides prevent decisive victories, ensuring that neither can unilaterally dominate Libya’s strategic corridors.  

For Russia, however, this contest might serve more than mere strategic purposes—it could be an opportunity to settle scores with Turkey after being outmaneuvered in Syria. 

The Russian pivot to Libya also affects Libya’s North African neighbors like Algeria and Tunisia, which share borders with Libya and thus have an immediate stake in the outcome.  

Tunisia’s and Algeria’s positions on key regional issues seem almost completely aligned—largely because of Algeria’s strong backing of the Kais Saied administration. Algeria typifies the intricacy of the regional situation. While it has deep military ties and a vital alliance with Moscow, it’s also voiced concerns about the growing Russian military buildup in Libya.  

Yet, these tactical disagreements don’t undermine the broader Russian-Algerian strategic partnership, which remains anchored in extensive military-technical cooperation and Algeria’s position as one of Moscow’s largest arms customers. 

However, the implications of Russia’s Libyan presence aren’t limited to the region—implications for Europe are also severe. Russian forces operating from Libya could position advanced weaponry and sabotage capabilities within close range of critical European infrastructure. This would leave naval routes, undersea cables, and energy corridors vulnerable to disruption.  

These risks are amplified by Western military withdrawals from the Sahel, where Wagner-linked entities have already established footholds. There, these entities profit from Sudan’s gold reserves while embedding themselves in local power structures.  

As a result of deteriorating security, regional extremist operations have expanded, creating overlapping crises that Moscow can exploit for economic and diplomatic leverage. 

Yet flashpoints remain. If Russia were to deploy advanced air defense systems, or if Turkey were to deepen its military footprint substantially, the resulting shift in Libya’s power balance could provoke a more intense proxy conflict with broader regional implications.  

The ultimate impact of Russia’s realignment toward Libya hinges on its capacity to juggle competing interests. Libya’s environment is more fragmented than Syria’s, creating a precarious setting where subtle actions can have outsized repercussions. The region already bristles with external players, and a single misstep could pull it into an even deeper cycle of interventions. 

Russia’s pivot from Syria to Libya demonstrates how even a constrained power can pose significant regional challenges. Moscow’s more flexible engagement in Libya enhances its ability to exploit vulnerabilities amid a historic Western retreat from Africa. Libya has become Moscow’s launching pad to extend influence in the Sahel, hold Europe’s strategic infrastructure at risk, and elevate its global posture.  

The challenge for the United States and its allies is to contain Russian ambitions while averting further fragmentation in North Africa. If Russia entrenches itself in Libya unopposed, it will create problems for Europe in the Mediterranean and Africa.  

The stakes are high: missteps in managing Russia’s Libyan gambit may usher in a new era of rivalry in the Mediterranean—this time within striking distance of Europe’s vitals.

***

Amine Ghoulidi was a Visiting Fellow at Heritage’s Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and is currently pursuing a PhD in Geopolitics and Security at King’s College London’s School of Security Studies.

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Executive Summary

Russia is expanding its military footprint in Libya, focusing on the Maaten Al Sarra airbase near the Chadian and Sudanese borders. This action shows a strategic reorientation by Moscow toward the Sahel, resulting from challenges encountered in Syria.

Satellite imagery and international open sources indicated Russia is modernising the airbase and leveraging its alliances with key Libyan factions, particularly the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Khalifa Haftar. The base might serve as a logistical hub for operations in Mali, Burkina Faso, and potentially Sudan.

This report examines Russia’s activities near the Libyan airbase, analysing the significant geopolitical consequences, such as heightened regional conflict, increased Russian influence in Africa, and the weakening of Western security efforts.

Information Background

Libya has been a fragmented state since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, with competing factions vying for control. The country remains divided between the internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and the LNA, led by Khalifa Haftar, which controls eastern Libya.

Russia has fostered a strong relationship with Haftar, offering military aid for strategic advantages. Prior to its restructuring under the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Wagner Group, Moscow’s leading operative force in Africa, played a crucial role in advancing the Kremlin’s interests.

The Maaten Al Sarra base, originally used during the Libyan-Chadian war of the 1980s, has acquired renewed significance because of its proximity to the Sahel. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Russia has repositioned military assets from its Syrian bases to Libya, viewing the country as a gateway to Africa. Moscow’s increasing involvement with Libyan tribes in the south strengthens its regional power, improving logistical coordination across the Sahel.

Analysis of Key Developments

• Military Expansion at Maaten Al Sarra: Russia has transferred personnel, including Syrian military defectors, and equipment to restore and expand the Maaten Al Sarra airbase. Reconstruction efforts include runway repairs, the establishment of storage facilities, and enhanced logistical capabilities. The base might facilitate operations across the Sahel.
• Strategic Realignment in Sudan: Moscow has distanced itself from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and has instead aligned with Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. This shift suggests the Kremlin is reassessing its interests in Sudan, a move that could change the regional balance of power.
• Air Transport Operations: Reports from publicly available information (PAI) show an increase in cargo flights between Russian bases in Syria and Libya since December 2024. These flights probably carried military equipment and personnel, strengthening Moscow’s influence in North Africa.
• Russian Influence in the Sahel: Russia has developed deeper ties with military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso, positioning itself as a security partner amid the withdrawal of Western forces. Establishing Maaten Al-Sarra as a logistics hub will bolster military operations in these states.
• The Role of the “African Corps”: The Russian Armed Forces deployed the newly formed private military company (PMC) “African Corps” across key areas in Libya. Its presence extends from Tripoli’s outskirts to the Haruba military base in the east, providing operational flexibility across the region.
• Increasing Paramilitary Activities: Russia’s bolstered presence in Libya could facilitate an expansion of paramilitary activities across the Sahel, emboldening military-led governments in Mali and Burkina Faso while undermining Western-led counterterrorism efforts. A continuous supply route from Libya to sub-Saharan Africa strengthens Moscow’s ability to support allied governments militarily, solidifying its role as an alternative security partner.
• Increasing Challenge for Western actors: NATO and the European Union now face the challenge of countering the Kremlin’s growing influence in the region. As Western forces withdraw from the Sahel, Russia’s involvement may undermine diplomatic and military efforts to stabilise the region. There is also an increasing geopolitical risk of a direct clash between the Russian Federation and the West in North Africa, especially given the growing strain on European interests in the region, including energy supplies.
• Economic Implications: Control over critical supply routes and access to the Sahel’s resource wealth, including gold and uranium, could serve to bolster Moscow’s strategic and economic leverage. Stronger military and political ties with Sahel states could give Russia economic advantages, increasing its economic role in Africa and reducing Western influence.

Conclusion

Russia’s military expansion in Libya and the Sahel reflects a calculated strategy aimed at consolidating influence across North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Developing Maaten Al-Sarra as a logistics hub expands Moscow’s operational capabilities, enabling greater involvement with Sahel’s military governments.

The geopolitical implications of this shift are far-reaching, necessitating a reassessment of Western diplomatic and security strategies to mitigate the risks associated with Russia’s growing foothold in Africa.

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Geopolitical Report ISSN 2785-2598 Volume 51 Issue 2
SpecialEurasia OSINT Unit

John Lechner

The Austrian, an investigation by the Insider found, wanted his own mercenary company after the GRU arranged for him to LARP as a Russian soldier in Syria alongside Wagner’s head of intelligence, Anatoly Karazii. Marsalek envisioned his RSB not only demining the cement factory but training an army of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand Libyan mercenaries to guard “the country’s southern border and [restrict] migration flows at gunpoint . . . mercenaries could be outfitted with state-of-the-art body cams to record ‘awesome video material’ of them shooting people.”

Though it seems he wasn’t directly involved in the GRU’s deal, Prigozhin was well embedded within its network, which had now effectively monopolized the Libya portfolio. And in the end, Prigozhin’s capacity to move men and material, far larger than anything Krinitsyn or Jan Marsalek could muster, paved the way for Wagner to service Haftar’s need for mercenaries. It helped, too, that Prigozhin was already working with the UAE in Sudan, where Emirati officials allegedly connected Wagner’s boss with the head of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, Muhammad Dagalo “Hemedti.”

There are two pillars supporting the United Arab Emirates’ foreign policy. The first is security. Abu Dhabi seeks to counter Islamism and jihadism before it reaches its shores. The second, advanced by Dubai, is commerce: the desire to see the UAE as a twenty-first-century Venetian empire. Despite the population boom in places like Dubai, there are few UAE citizens.

With only one million nationals and incredible oil wealth, the country can outsource its foreign policy priorities. In Prigozhin, UAE officials found the perfect partner. As one Russian intelligence official put it: “When you have military equipment, military technologies and skills, trained and motivated personnel, and someone has money, then a form of cooperation is always found and easy . . . why not shake the hand with the money in it?” Abu Dhabi would provide the financing in Libya, and Prigozhin would supply the men.

In October 2018, those men were spotted at Al-Watiya Air Base, a slice of land the Haftar’s LNA controlled in western Libya. Months later, in early 2019, Haftar’s forces launched an offensive on Libya’s southern region, officially an effort to oust “Chadian gangs.” He took the main cities of Sabha and Ubari and captured the Sharara oil fields, bringing the majority of Libya’s oil production under his control. Haftar, though, wanted more than just the south: he wanted Libya’s capital.

On April 4, 2019, Haftar launched a surprise attack on Tripoli. The head of the Tripoli government (GNA), Fayez al-Sarraj, promised to resist and launched a counteroffensive, dubbed the “Volcano of Anger.” Seizing Tripoli, home to 1.2 million residents and a host of militias armed to the teeth, would prove no easy task.

But Haftar had sold outside powers, particularly the UAE—but also the Trump administration—on the notion he could unite Libya. The UAE poured weapons, cash, and drones into the conflict. In mid-April, Haftar left Saudi Arabia with more funding. And while the French denied any connection, the LNA general had met French diplomats just two weeks prior to the attack. Soon French weapons also appeared on the battlefield. Abu Dhabi would provide the financing in Libya, and Prigozhin would supply the men.

Everyone wanted a slice of the offensive. Security entrepreneurs flocked to Haftar. Christiaan Durrant—a former Australian fighter pilot, founder of security firm Lancaster 6, and a good friend of Blackwater founder Erik Prince—also had men in Benghazi.

According to a confidential UN report, a few days after he started his attack, Haftar met Prince in Cairo. Prince proposed an $80 million contract to the Libyan National Army, which would cover the provision of “assault aircraft, cyber capabilities and the ability to intercept ships at sea.” He outlined a program to kidnap and kill high-value targets in west Libya as well.

The plan, according to the UN, swiftly fell apart. The Jordanians cancelled a deal to sell Cobra helicopters, forcing Prince’s team to look for backups. They procured some utility helicopters from South Africa, then supplied crop dusters previously outfitted with weapons through Bulgarian and Serbian companies.

Durrant contends the UN investigation mixed up all sorts of timelines and geographies. “There’s nothing ‘united’ about the United Nations,” he later told me. “I’ve been in countries where the UN is feeding the rebels, criminals really, on the other side.”

It was Durrant, not Erik Prince, who rolled into Libya quickly, after a separate deal in Jordan fell through. “In our line of work, the first mover picks up most of the business,” he continued. “So, we were on the ground early talking not just with Haftar, but with the National Oil Corporation of Libya and U.S. government logistics.” As a former associate of Prince’s company, Frontier Services Group, Durrant had worked on crop dusters before and was well positioned to purchase planes and other assets for his own company.

After landing in Benghazi to assemble civilian helicopters, Durrant’s team were pulled in front of Haftar. “They were told to put a machine gun on the helicopter and fly it over Tripoli.” When the team refused—the mission was both “suicide and illegal”—Haftar’s men were furious and started waving guns around. The twenty unarmed men decided they needed to get out of dodge. In the dead of night, Durrant’s men escaped through Benghazi to reach two small inflatable boats, then crossed nearly two hundred miles of the Mediterranean to arrive safely in Malta.

With Trump in the White House, Durrant believes, there were those in the UN interested in using Erik Prince as a means to link the U.S. president to a “scandal.” “Everyone else, Britain, France, is sending in javelins, meanwhile we get reams of reports written up about a potentially armed crop duster.”

(An Austrian court later found that the crop dusters did not constitute war material.) With regards to the assassination program, Durrant notes there’s nothing illegal in proposing business. “I will do any work, as long as it’s legal,” he added, “and on the side of the right guys. If we are helping the U.S. stamp out terrorism, and we are able to make money doing it, then that’s great.”

“By August 2019, we knew Russian mercenaries were in the country,” Heithem, a militia commander, told me when I met him outside his former base a few years later. Rocket blasts had ripped the building half-open. Concrete, furniture, cooking utensils—the scaffolding of daily life—pooled onto the street below. It was early 2020, and the front line had settled where we now stood, in Ein Zara, a suburb south of Tripoli. In his late twenties, stocky, and shy, Heithem, at the time part of an anti-Haftar militia from Benghazi, stared down the enemy’s old position in a whitewashed house a few hundred yards away.

Walking softly across the rubble-strewn courtyard, Heithem waved me over. “Wagner played a logistical role in August, not an offensive one. Then in October, the guys in that white house started to look very different, like special forces. They had special vests, cameras on their helmets, different equipment.” The mercenaries started to make a difference. “The LNA usually takes four or five shells to hit a target,” Heithem added. “The Russians were hitting us immediately.”

Wagner’s intervention put Tripoli’s forces in a dangerous position. Growing desperate, the head of Tripoli’s GNA government, al-Sarraj, signed a memorandum of understanding with Turkey in November. The memorandum established maritime boundaries that effectively cut a direct line between Libya and Turkey and prompted immediate protests from Turkey’s rivals in the east Mediterranean—Greece, Egypt, and Cyprus—where Turks and Cypriots were competing for oil blocs.

Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in return, ramped up his support to the beleaguered Tripoli government, shipping in air defense systems, the Turkish military’s infamous Bayraktar drones, and mercenaries.

Turkish intelligence selected al-Hamzat, one of eight armed groups in Turkish-controlled Syria, to recruit mercenaries for Libya. Al-Hazmat emerged in 2013 as a division within the Free Syrian Army. The group received training and equipment directly from the United States and United Kingdom, first to fight Bashar al-Assad’s regime, then to fight ISIS. In 2016, under the leadership of Seif Abu Bakr, al-Hamzat joined Turkey’s Operation Euphrates Shield against the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces.

Turkish military officers put no restrictions on the number of recruits for the Libyan front. An influx of Syrians would provide more time to train Libyan fighters and free up GNA personnel for offensive operations. Syrian commanders quickly took advantage. The more men commanders sent to Libya, the more money they could skim off the top.

One recruit, “Ahmed,” had previously fought with al-Hamzat. In Syria, Ahmed recalled, fighters were rarely forced into battle. If conditions in a skirmish became unfavorable, many would simply fall back and fight later. In Libya, however, Ahmed discovered this was not the case. Seeing the front line in south Tripoli, the barrage of artillery and the drones hovering overhead, he asked to go home. His commanding officer told him: “Coming to Libya was your choice, going back is not.”

Together with fellow recruits, Ahmed reluctantly moved into an empty villa close to the front line. The first disbursement of his salary would be in three months, upon his return to Syria. Food became an issue, and it didn’t take long for Ahmed to understand how things worked. “A shopkeeper introduced us to the black market,” he said, “where we could sell our bullets and weapons to pay for groceries.”

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In Benghazi, General John Brennan met with “Field Marshal” Haftar, who stressed “the key role of the United States in contributing to the stability of Libya”

A high-level delegation from Africom, the US military command in charge of Africa, has completed a visit to Libya, stopping in the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi, the hubs of power in the country divided into rival political-military administrations.

In the west, there is the Government of National Unity (GUN) led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, recognized by the United Nations and supported mainly by Türkiye; in the east, the influence of the Libyan National Army (LNA) of the five-star general prevails Khalifa Haftar, a controversial figure with strong ties to Russia and a past in the United States as an opponent of Muammar Gaddafi. The mission, led by Africom’s deputy commander, three-star general John brennan, took place against a backdrop of growing rumours about the expansion of Russia’s military presence in Libya, a phenomenon observed with concern following the fall of the Syrian regime in Bashar al Assad.

In Tripoli, the general John brennan, accompanied by the chargé d’affaires of the US embassy, Jeremy Berndt, visited the Training Center of the 111th Border Guard Brigade. The visit included participation in a special forces military exercise, which showcased counter-terrorism techniques using real weapons, including rocket launchers.

During the visit, the delegation was briefed on the capabilities of the Center and the training programs implemented, aimed at strengthening the capabilities of the security forces in border control and combating security threats.

Interestingly, the 111th Brigade itself received training from Amentum Services Incorporated. This US company, founded in 2020, provides security services to both government and commercial clients and provides training in various military and security areas.

According to the latest report by UN experts, Amentum confirmed that it provided training to “potential Libyan security actors” outside of Libya, under two contracts with the US government: the Global Anti-Terrorism Assistance contract awarded by the US Department of State and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program contract awarded by the US Department of Justice.

Amentum also stated that it “has no record of working in Libya or involving Libyan security actors” outside of these contracts. However, contrary to Amentum’s claims, the Panel identified that the company provided training to Libyan armed actors at Mitiga Air Base in early 2024.

In Tripoli, Brennan also held talks with Prime Minister Dabaiba, the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army, General Mohamed al Haddad, and the Deputy Minister of Defense, Abdel Salam al-Zoubi. According to an official note released by the Tripoli government, the Libyan Prime Minister stressed “the importance of continuing the military partnership with the United States and of leveraging international experiences to improve the capabilities of the Libyan armed forces, ensuring security and stability”.

During the meeting, the US representative reiterated Washington’s support “for efforts to strengthen Libya’s security capabilities” and highlighted the “crucial role of military cooperation in the fight against terrorism and organized crime in the region”.

In Benghazi, Brennan met with “Field Marshal” Haftar, who stressed “the key role of the United States in contributing to the stability of Libya” and highlighted the progress in bilateral relations. According to the LNA press office, General Haftar praised “the joint efforts in the fight against terrorism and extremism” and reiterated the commitment to continue working with Washington.

During the meeting, Brennan expressed to Haftar his “appreciation for the efforts made by the LNA in consolidating security and stability, as well as in the fight against terrorism and extremism,” the Benghazi note reads. The Africom representative stressed that “the continuation of these efforts is essential to ensure the stability of the region,” the Libyan note continues.

General Brennan also met in Benghazi with Saddam Haftar, the Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army Ground Forces, commanded by his father Khalifa. The meeting focused on ways “to strengthen U.S.-Libyan security cooperation, as well as support for Libyan-led efforts to reunify military and security institutions,” the U.S. Embassy in Libya said.

The U.S. delegation also toured LNA military facilities during the visit. “We thank Lieutenant General Haftar for the excellent welcome and tour of the facilities,” the U.S. Embassy said in a statement on X.

The meetings come as a Russian naval group departed from the Tartus base in Syria and is returning to Russia after many observers and experts had identified Libya as a possible destination. Vesselfinder tracking systems confirm that the Russian-flagged roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) cargo ships Sparta and Sparta II, which were detected by Maxar Technologies satellite imagery on January 25 in the Syrian port of Tartus, were in the Sardinia Channel, heading west as of Wednesday, February 5.

Satellite imagery had revealed loading and transhipment activity at the port of Tartus, suggesting the ships were transferring equipment and personnel. Before entering the Syrian port, the two cargo ships had been at sea for several days, which analysts say points to a coordinated evacuation operation.

Earlier, military sources had reported to “Nova Agency” that the Russian naval convoy, apparently sailing aimlessly in the central Mediterranean, was off the coast of Malta and could have headed to Libya or crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to return home. Now, the Sparta and Sparta II appear to have St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad as destinations, respectively, but it is not certain that they actually reached Russian ports. A significant aspect concerns the escort of the two transport ships by Russian military units: open source images published online at the end of January showed the two ships together with the General Skobolev, Alexandr Otrakovsky, Admiral Grigorovitch and Ivan Gren.

The latter, of course, are not visible on open-source tracking systems. The movement of the Ro-Ro Sparta IV, which is currently crossing the Strait of Sicily and is en route to Port Said, Egypt, remains to be monitored. In the past, Russian ships of the same type have indicated Egypt as their destination, only to then continue on to the Syrian port of Tartus. The involvement of other ships of the same class suggests a broader redeployment of Russian naval assets in the Mediterranean, in a context that is rapidly evolving following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

Moscow has already transferred military equipment via dozens of flights between Benghazi and the Russian base in Latakia, Syria. Last June, two Russian warships, the Udaloy-class frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov and the Slava-class missile cruiser Varyag, escorted by two submarines, made an official stop at the Tobruk naval base in Cyrenaica.

According to the latest report of the UN Panel of Experts, in the weeks preceding the arrival of the Shaposhnikov frigate and the Varyag cruiser, the port of Tobruk had already received other Gren- and Ropucha-class landing ships, which had unloaded military vehicles and heavy equipment. In particular, on April 14, 2024, military trucks with small trailers were observed unloading, a clear indicator of large-scale and structured logistics activity between Moscow and Cyrenaica.

In recent months, the Russian Federation has intensified operations at its four main air bases: Al Khadim base, in the east of the country; Al Jufra base, in the center; Al Brak al Shati base, southwest of Sebha, the capital of the Fezzan region; and Al Qurdabiya base, in Sirte, in the north-central area. These bases host a variety of military equipment, including air defenses, MiG-29 fighters and drones, and are operated by a mixed contingent of Russian military personnel and mercenaries from the Wagner group, far from the supervision of the Libyan authorities.

According to Libyan sources consulted by “Nova”, Moscow has further expanded its presence with a new military base: Maaten al Sarra, on the border with Chad and Sudan. High-resolution satellite images taken by Maxar Technologies in December clearly show the extension of the runway and the construction of buildings that appear to be housing, confirming Nova’s information that Russian military, together with groups of Syrian fighters, are actively working to bring the base back into operation. The same Libyan sources report that Haftar’s forces maintain control of the area stretching from Kufra to the borders with Chad and Sudan, including the area around the Maaten al Sarra base.

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John Lechner

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s facial features rested in a natural scowl. He had, by all accounts, a penetrating gaze. “I felt,” said one woman who worked for him, “that he could see right through me.” His aura, she believed, was that of a living historical figure, someone who pulsated some grand, obscure fate. A polished dome complimented Yevgeny Viktorovich’s sharp visage, evoking a Bond villain. And like any good antihero, his origins, and his path to success and fame, were anything but ordinary.

In his youth, Prigozhin spent nine years in prison for robbery and fraud. After his release, he claimed he sold hot dogs until he had enough money and connections to enter the restaurant business. In 1997, he and a partner opened a restaurant in St. Petersburg that one client in particular, Vladimir Putin, came to enjoy. That special relationship launched the restaurateur into the lucrative world of government contracting. Prigozhin’s companies provided Russian schools and the army with meals, earning him the nickname “Putin’s Chef.”

In 2014, Prigozhin became a purveyor of both meals and men. On the heels of Moscow’s invasion of Crimea, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) was sponsoring small bands of mercenaries and volunteers to fight in eastern Ukraine on behalf of the Luhansk People’s Republic, which had declared itself independent. Prigozhin wanted in and linked up with Dmitry Utkin, a career soldier with the call sign “Wagner,” a name that would eventually become a catchall term for the companies and entities connected to both men. To insiders, Wagner Group was simply “the Company.”

“Like it or not, a twenty-first century ‘scramble for Africa’ is underway.”

Prigozhin’s men proved themselves an effective fighting force on the front, and brutal enforcers in the rear. The Company grew with Russia’s increasing assertiveness abroad. Starting in 2015, contractors worked closely with the Ministry of Defense in Syria. Wagner forces helped take Palmyra from the Islamic State, only for the generals in the MoD to claim credit for the victory and unceremoniously pull them out of the campaign. A year later, Wagner-affiliated mining companies and “security types” were arriving in Africa, a continent largely free from the bitter infighting and rivalry inherent to Russia’s competing security institutions.

It was only in 2018, however, that Prigozhin started making a name for himself. “Putin’s Chef” was known back home mostly for poisoning school children and soldiers with his food. His infamy went international when he took on the world’s sole superpower on multiple fronts. In February, Prigozhin ordered his mercenaries to attack the Conoco gas plant in Khasham, where U.S. special forces and their Syrian partners were embedded. A four-hour battle ensued between Russian and American citizens that, at its worst, could have “plunge[d] both countries into bloody conflict.” Only eight days later, a grand jury for the District of Columbia indicted Prigozhin’s Internet Research Agency for its role in interfering in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

After that, it seemed like Wagner was everywhere. Prigozhin’s political operatives were found funding candidates in Madagascar’s presidential election while Wagner soldiers were fighting a jihadist insurgency in northern Mozambique. U.S. and European governments took notice. A new Cold War was emerging, and it seemed Wagner was the tip of Russia’s spear. The U.S. Department of State called the mercenary group a state-backed organization that “exploits insecurity to expand its presence in Africa, threatening stability, good governance, and respect for human rights.” The former commander of U.S. Special Operations Command Africa, Major General Marcus Hicks declared, “Like it or not, a twenty-first century ‘scramble for Africa’ is underway.”

Back in Russia, however, who wielded the spear was never quite clear. In Putin’s system, Russian elites enjoy outsized freedom to lobby for and pursue lucrative policies they can frame within Russia’s “national interests.” Prigozhin had a unique talent for selling what Russia’s national interests were, and how Wagner fit in.

Yet he was only one of many to make riches in this second Cold War, a world where state and non-state actors position themselves to balance, and profit from, tensions among great powers. As colleagues would attest, Wagner’s boss was rarely the smartest guy in the room. What he was good at was recognizing opportunity in instability and bringing a team together to take advantage.

The siren song of war and reward echoes across Libya’s coast, luring states, jihadists, armed groups, and mercenaries of all stripes to its shores. It is hard to imagine Libya would not eventually pull in Prigozhin as well. Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and the civil wars that followed, Tripoli—the capital and center of the country’s public and private institutions and thus its oil wealth—has been the key prize for a shifting web of local warring parties and their foreign patrons interested in the country’s geostrategic location and its relevance to energy markets.

In General Khalifa Haftar, ruler of east Libya, Prigozhin found his opportunity. Haftar was part of the group of officers who brought Muammar Gaddafi to power in 1969. Nearly twenty years later, Chadian forces captured Haftar during the Great Toyota War. Gaddafi disavowed him, and Haftar turned on Gaddafi, going into opposition in Chad and eventually receiving asylum in the United States. Living in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C., he reportedly worked closely with the CIA on the Libya file.

In 2011, the general returned to lead forces against Gaddafi, but his clear ambition earned only distrust from other revolutionary forces. Haftar turned to building up his own military force, the Libyan National Army (LNA), in the east, establishing a base in Benghazi and framing his consolidation of power in anti-Islamist and anti-jihadist terms.

He could point to real threats. In 2014, Syrian returnees and foreign jihadists declared the eastern city of Derna a province of the Islamic State. Haftar rallied the United Arab Emirates and Egypt to his side, both of which sent funds and advisors. France deployed special forces. The United States, however, was less convinced the Islamic State represented a threat in Libya.

The Egyptians took the Islamic State on their border most seriously. And it was likely Egypt, political scientist Jalel Harchaoui notes, who first connected Haftar to Moscow. In the twilight of the Arab Spring, Egyptian military forces, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, overthrew the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi. The United States briefly suspended delivery of weapons in response, but it was a wide enough window for Russia to step in. In 2014, the UAE and Saudi Arabia funded a $3.5 billion weapons deal between Russia and Egypt.

A year later, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia were ramping up their lobbying efforts on behalf of Haftar. During Putin’s visit to Cairo in February 2015, President Sisi invited a Libyan officer close to Haftar to meet the Russians, and the provision of weapons and military equipment was discussed. The UAE then delivered Russian-made attack helicopters. The following year, Haftar’s force ordered another eleven.

Haftar needed more and more mercenaries. For his 2016 attack on the oil crescent, he hired thousands of men from the main Darfur rebel groups in Sudan, including factions of the Sudan Liberation Army, as well as Musa Hilal’s forces.

Later that same year, a private military company, or PMC, RSB Group, landed a demining contract for a cement factory in Benghazi, underbidding a British firm by the equivalent of $25,000,000. RSB Group, founded by Oleg Krinitsyn, a former officer in Russia’s border guards, is known to be “the first Russian PMC.” Krinitsyn’s company offered a wide variety of services: maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and Gulf of Guinea; consulting; demining; and convoy, site, and personal protection. In 2007, RSB worked with American security companies guarding convoys in Iraq. “Everyone has the same task—to make money,” Krinitsyn later told Russian state-affiliated media. “Where the U.S. Army appears, private military companies follow. If you imagine a war on foreign territory as a hunt by predators for herbivores, then the American army is a lion, and PMCs are jackals that eat up the carrion of the king of beasts.”

By 2017, it was clear to many in both Russia’s private and public sectors that there was money to be made in Libya, particularly in the region under Haftar’s control. After the factory deal was signed, the GRU—Russia’s military intelligence agency, which often competed with the FSB-friendly Krinitsyn—made RSB’s boss an offer he couldn’t refuse. “[The GRU] basically said to Oleg [Krinitsyn], ‘Look, let us buy your company, and we will work more in Libya,’” a person close to the matter told me.

Krinitsyn sold RSB, reportedly for a fair price, paid in cash, then registered a new company, “RSB Security Services.” The GRU then put their own man in Benghazi.

RSB’s new owner would be Jan Marsalek, an Austrian national and GRU asset. Marsalek was the chief operating officer of the German payment processing company Wirecard, whose collapse would become the largest fraud case in German history.

____________________

Tim Eaton

Phase 2: Europe intervenes: 2015-2017 

Criminalization in Niger

By 2015, migration through the central Mediterranean via Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean via Turkey led to growing hostility among European governments and populations.

Discussion of a ‘migration crisis’ emerged, and European policymakers targeted the movement of people in northern Niger and on the northwestern Libyan coastline. This succeeded in stemming the movement of people, but had significant second-order effects that further endangered those on the move, entrenching Libya’s conflict economy and criminalizing historic and long-standing cross-border movements via Niger.

A turning point for the migration economy in Agadez came in May 2015, when the government of Niger, in consultation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and with technical and financial support from the EU and EU member states, passed Law 2015-36. Often referred to as ‘Law 36’, the legislation outlined clear punishments for those engaged in migrant smuggling. In pressing for this, European policymakers were trying to sidestep the policy quagmire faced in Libya. The policy had deep consequences in Agadez.

One humanitarian cost was the increase in migrant deaths in the desert. As early as 2017, the International Organization for Migration and the Nigerien Red Cross reported increased fatalities as smugglers abandoned migrants in the desert when detected by Nigerien authorities and took more perilous routes to avoid detection.

Another was the development of protection markets and the growing presence of armed ‘bandits’ from southern Libya and Chad in northern Niger. These bandits, active along key transit corridors linking gold sites to trading and logistics hubs, have brought heavy weaponry from Chad and southern Libya.

The rise of heavily armed ‘Chadian’ bandits in northern Niger became a source of resentment among local communities, particularly ethnic Tuareg whose ability to move throughout the region and exert control over licit and illicit activities is constrained by their presence. In interviews with Chatham House, several Tuareg leaders stressed a need to ‘securitize’ or ‘militarize’ northern Niger to restore order.

At the time of criminalization, migration was estimated to have provided direct employment for more than 6,565 people and indirect incomes to more than half of all households in Agadez. However, the crackdown in Agadez coincided with a gold rush throughout much of northern Niger, offsetting the economic impact somewhat.

More widely, criminalizing migration eroded trust between local populations and their government, as well as between local officials and the national government. The crackdown disproportionately affected Agadez, home to communities that have traditionally felt marginalized by the government in Niamey.

This in turn reinforced narratives that the national government was willing to sacrifice the well-being of northern communities to ensure that international funds tied to cooperation continued to flow to central government.

Intervention in the Mediterranean and engagement with Libyan authorities 

Two further changes significantly shifted the status of migrant smuggling on the Libyan coastline. First, on 2 February 2017, Italy signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of National Accord in Tripoli, followed a day later by the Malta Declaration signed by EU leaders in Valletta.

Over 2017–2018, the Libyan Coast Guard became responsible for search and rescue missions near the Libyan coast. Over this period, European state rescue missions withdrew from Libyan waters, while NGO rescue missions were prevented from operating in Libyan waters.

The European naval mission Sophia, which had rescued about 48,000 migrants in the Mediterranean between 2015 and 2018, was replaced by a new mission, Irini, in 2020. Irini suspended deployment of naval forces and relied solely on unmanned aerial vehicles not equipped for sea rescues.

Second, a market for ‘anti-smuggling’ emerged on Libya’s northwest coastline over summer 2017. Armed groups that had facilitated migrant smuggling sought to evade UN sanctions. A conflict ensued in the Libyan coastal city of Sabratha lasting 19 days and armed groups complicit in smuggling posed as actors trying to prevent it.

Arrivals to Italy from Libya fell from 162,895 in 2016, to 108,409 in 2017 and 12,977 in 2018. But the numbers of migrants traversing Libya did not immediately fall. A large number of migrants were already present in Libya and other areas used by smuggling networks were not directly affected. This led to a spike in the numbers of migrants in Libya, and an increase in migrant detentions.

Phase 3: Regulation (2018-2024)

In the years since, numbers of migrants arriving in Italy have rebounded, reaching 49,740 in 2023, still well below the 2016 high. The EU has defended the partnerships developed with Libyan authorities as supporting the rule of law and compliant with EU laws. The reality has been murkier.

In particular, the penetration of Libyan state institutions by armed groups and the development of a conflict economy meant that the EU’s partners were themselves deeply involved in smuggling.

The Libyan Coast Guard and the Department for Countering Illegal Migration were accused of being complicit. A prominent Coast Guard commander was even sanctioned for his role in trafficking.
The changes provided financial support for migration management without removing financial incentives for migrant smuggling. Armed groups have profited from both prevention and facilitation of irregular migration at the same time.

The balance between the two created some regulation of migrant smuggling without stopping it. It also provided further resources for armed groups by financing detention centres, training and equipment. Arbitrary detentions increased, and a system of ‘abuse for profit’ whereby migrants were exploited, extorted and in many cases sexually abused grew dramatically.

Locally, where the presence of large migrant communities has caused tension, the armed groups presented themselves as guarantors that migrants do not remain in communities. All the while, they have cut deals with smugglers who bring migrants to the communities in the first place.

Where next? 

Smuggling delivers economic benefits to communities at departure points, transit hubs and populations in countries of origin.

Remittances have become a key source of income in Nigeria, while smuggling supports a wider economy in localities that are neglected by Libya’s central government.

Smuggling has stimulated the economies of these places. But the human cost of such activities is high for migrants who suffer systemic rights violations and abuse. A culture of impunity for such actions has prevailed. Policies focused solely on countering criminality miss such nuances that illustrate the need for broader solutions, including local development and peacebuilding.

The need for a true ‘whole-of-route’ approach 

The development of migrant smuggling shows how a conflict’s second-order effects can have impacts thousands of miles away. The rise of Mediterranean crossings stimulated European policy responses to target transit points in the Mediterranean Sea and in Northern Niger.

Framed as rule-of-law interventions, these approaches addressed the symptoms rather than causes. Flows have been reduced through a series of transnational bargains that entrench conflict and ultimately make it harder to resolve. The resulting de facto regulation of Mediterranean crossings is regarded as a relative success by EU policymakers, but has not prevented regular disasters at sea and avoidable loss of life.

To date, international approaches have sought to isolate choke points in the movement of people. A more effective policy approach would be to assess how smuggling and trafficking intersect with local dynamics in the places that the practices traverse.

In 2023, the EU laid out its intent to develop a ‘whole-of route’ approach to tackling irregular migration, but this does not extend beyond combatting trafficking and the rescue and return of migrants.

A truly ‘whole-of-route’ approach would need to be broader to be effective. It must contain a wider suite of policies beyond enforcement. That should include peacebuilding activities, local development and governance support so that it reduces demand and tackles the enabling environment within which criminal groups operate. As it stands, current policies run the risk of disrupting smuggling journeys only temporarily, with migrants bearing the worst impacts.

More directly, current policies have incentivized transactionalism in transit states. The huge funds that are being doled out to pay off states is no solution for irregular migration, and harms local populations in Libya. Those funds would be better invested elsewhere.

***

Tim Eaton – Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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How the Libyan conflict transformed human trafficking routes in West Africa, and why Europe’s response has so far failed.

Migrant smuggling and trafficking has flourished through Libya since its 2011 conflict. This article explains how this happened and why European policies aimed at addressing the issue are inadequate.

Migrant smuggling generally refers to the movement of people with their consent; while Trafficking in Persons (TIP) refers to the movement of people against their will – though the distinction is not clear cut and journeys often combine elements of the two. In particular, women have been disproportionately impacted by trafficking.

The three phases

In the first of three phases, the Libyan conflict led to the emergence of armed factions and an economy dominated by violence that has fostered migrant smuggling and trafficking. This led to a smuggling boom in Niger and Nigeria, supporting economic growth in Niger and worsening violence in Nigeria. Increased flows of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers through Libya further expanded the conflict economy.

In the second phase, European policymakers sought to reduce irregular arrivals from Libya. Rather than prioritizing efforts to rein in Libyan armed groups, policymakers forged partnerships with them out of perceived necessity. In neighbouring Niger, European leaders pressurized Nigerien authorities to criminalize the movement of people.

These shifts increased the perils faced by those on the move, as migrant exploitation grew in scale and severity. In this phase, the numbers reaching Europe fell, but large numbers of people continued to move. This expanded the level of violence and exploitation suffered by migrants.
In the third and current phase, the numbers of people reaching Europe have rebounded, though remaining below the highs of 2016. A transactional pattern has emerged in which Libyan groups seek political and financial support from European policymakers while allowing smuggling to continue, ushering in a degree of de facto regulation. But this has done nothing to tackle the factors that led to the rise of migrant smuggling in Libya or beyond.

Phase 1: 2011-2017-Expansion and boom

Libya’s agricultural sector had been in decline in the south since the 1990s due to international sanctions. Cross-border trade and smuggling increased dramatically. The conflict in 2011 led to further declines in state-run agricultural projects.

The collapse of the Gaddafi regime and ongoing governance crisis led to the rapid expansion of migrant smuggling networks based in Libya to facilitate maritime passage to Europe. The numbers of migrants entering Italy across the Mediterranean increased from around 28,500 in 2011 to nearly 163,000 in 2016.

Nationally, rival groups competing for the Libyan state sought to sustain local alliances through patron-client relationships rather than by supporting the wider population. These patronage networks inhibit the rebuilding of the state. At a local level, disputes over the right to govern led to a fragmentation of legitimate authority and a decline of law and order.

This encouraged local communities to develop their own armed factions that soon grew to dominate economic activity in these areas through the establishment of protection markets, and subsequently, their own business ventures.

These dynamics have inhibited a transition to coherent national government. Rival armed groups have fought over strategic transport routes, valuable infrastructure and for influence over state institutions. The illicit economy boomed, with migrant smuggling and trafficking growing rapidly.

Such practices had existed for decades, but not at such scale. The routes from Nigeria to Libya existed in the precolonial era, were entrenched by the transatlantic slave trade and used over the past 50 years by people seeking employment in North Africa or Europe, including low-skilled agricultural workers and later (forced) sex workers to Italy. The networks were scaled up significantly after the Libyan state collapsed post-2011.

The historic legacies, combined with local disputes over land ownership and governance, have created a hostile environment for foreign nationals in Libya. Many Sub-Saharan African people have experienced racist abuse and discrimination. Against this backdrop, the exploitation of and violence against people moving through the country became a defining feature of post-2011 Libya and an important source of illicit revenue.

A Chatham House study estimated that migrant smuggling and trafficking generated $978 million in revenues within Libya in 2016. Smuggling led to wider economic development around illicit markets. In the Libyan city of Kufra, smuggling revenues have in part been invested in local services. More widely, satellite analysis commissioned through the XCEPT programme indicates that artisanal agriculture expanded after 2015 following a period of continual contraction since the 1990s.

Agadez, Niger: the development

of a transit hub 

Developments in Libya reverberated across the southern border in Niger, where smuggling was socially accepted and akin to a semi-formal industry. Agadez has a long history of transnational trade, labour migration and housing transnational communities.

As barriers to travel through Libya eased, Agadez experienced increased demand for smuggling services and an expansion of smuggling networks. By 2013, an influx of people from throughout West Africa, most of whom wanted to travel to Europe, arrived in Agadez to reach Libya.

These were different cohorts from those who traditionally went to Libya for employment and who engaged in seasonal or circular migration, where they would work in Libya for a time before returning home. The trend towards seeking entry to Europe accelerated through 2014 and 2015.

Thousands of migrants left Agadez for Libya every week, a boon for the Agadez economy. In 2016, an estimated 333,000 migrants passed through the city. ECOWAS citizens were permitted visa-free travel to Libya, where costs for crossing the Mediterranean were falling dramatically, sparking a surge in irregular migration via Agadez to Sebha in Libya.

Government officials in Agadez openly celebrated the prosperity associated with migration, as drivers, fixers, landlords who ran migrant houses in neighbourhoods known as ghettos, shop owners, currency dealers, mechanics and restaurant owners benefited.

Edo State, Nigeria as a point of

origin for migrants 

Developments in Edo State, a region in southern Nigeria, illustrate the cascading impacts of Libya’s growing conflict economy. Smuggling networks in Nigeria, a point of origin for many of those on the move, expanded along with the shifts in Niger and Libya, further along the route. Incredibly, in 2017, one-in-four households in Benin City (the capital of Edo State) had at least one family member who had sought to travel to Libya.

Movement to the Libyan border was relatively affordable and prices paid to cross the Mediterranean fell dramatically – anecdotal evidence suggested a crossing may have fallen from $1,000 in 2013 to as little as $60–90 in June 2017 – as smugglers used ever-cheaper inflatable boats. The fallout of Libya’s civil war created an environment for a rapid increase in the movement of people from Edo State to Libya.

The prominence of out-migration and trafficking in and from Edo is underpinned by economic inequities. Edo’s agricultural sector – the traditional lifeblood of its economy – remains in need of investment and relies on manual labour.

Yet, such labour is increasingly insufficient for locals to make ends meet. As a result, fewer young people are entering the sector, which is contributing to its decline. Limited economic opportunities are reflected in the rates of un- and under-employment. This has led locals to seek alternative sources of income.

Interviewees in one village in Edo’s countryside said that people with the best housing often had financed it with remittances sent back from family members abroad. Seeking to access such remittances is seen as an economic lifeline.

But sending a young family member abroad to find work and send back remittances is not possible without the capital to fund travel. That leads to debt bondage, where those travelling agree to work to pay off the cost of their transportation, making those on the move more vulnerable to exploitation.

Family pressures may also play a role in encouraging travel. In some cases, where young people resist pressure to leave for Europe, families have used religious curses as a coercion tool. Traffickers have also used curses to intimidate those they traffic, preventing their escape from servitude.

Women are disproportionately impacted by trafficking dynamics. In some cases, women and girls are trafficked by their own families despite the knowledge they will be working as sex workers. Some see no alternative to make ends meet.

***

Tim Eaton – Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

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Repressive Laws, Harassment, Detentions Derail Organizations’ Work

Abusive Legal Framework

Civic groups in Libya contend with a range of abusive laws that make their work extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. The Gaddafi-era Law 19/2001 on the Reorganization of Nongovernmental Organizations greatly restricts civil society work in all of Libya, permitting registration only for groups working on social, cultural, sports-oriented, charitable, or humanitarian issues, but not other issues including human rights. The government has not clarified how organizations working on other issues can legally operate. Law 19/2001 also sets out overly burdensome registration requirements and empowers authorities to intervene in associations’ leadership and dissolve organizations without a court order. 

Some Libyan legal experts contend that Law 19/2001 was effectively suspended because the 2011 Libyan Constituent Covenant guarantees freedom of association, speech, and assembly, but that “the courts still use this law as if it’s active,” according to one expert. 

The head of a human rights group with multiple branches said the lack of a legal framework impeded the work of nongovernmental groups, forcing them to “operate in limbo,” and that it was important to ensure civil society participation in drafting a new law on associations. “People are afraid to travel as they are afraid of meeting with foreigners. Security agencies demand to give approval in advance of any meeting with foreigner groups. This is not suitable for civic work.” 

Discussions including Libyan civic groups around the adoption of a new draft law on associations are ongoing, including with officials from the civil society commission, members of the House of Representatives, and the UN special rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and association. Activists, civil society members, and UN officials confirmed that multiple drafts of a new law on civil society were in circulation and that consultations were taking place to expedite the process, but that members of the legislative authority, rival political bodies, and civil society members had not reached consensus around a unified draft. 

Between 2019 and 2022, the former Presidential Council of the Government of National Accord regulated the work of nongovernmental groups under Decree 286.

The decree included burdensome registration requirements and stringent regulations on funding, mandating onerous advance notification for attending conferences and other events. After nongovernmental groups appealed, a Benghazi court suspended Decree 286 in 2022 for violating the 2011 constitutional declaration. 

On March 8, 2023, the Law Department of the Supreme Judicial Council issued a legal opinion, following a request by the Commission for Civil Society, declaring all civil associations and civil society organizations not established under Law 19/2001 on Nongovernmental Organizations as illegal. The Office of the Tripoli Prime Minister on March 13 reaffirmed the legal opinion and revoked the licenses of nongovernmental organizations established in Libya since 2011. However on March 21, 2023, it gave nongovernmental organizations provisional legal standing until they “correct their legal status,” without providing a clear timeline.

Legislators have yet to revoke Gaddafi-era Penal Code provisions that provide severe punishments, including the death penalty, for the establishment of “unlawful” associations.

Registration and Administrative

Impediments

She said the process for foreign nongovernmental organizations was difficult and that she and other staff members had to use their personal accounts for financial transfers, as it was not possible for the organization to open an account. “Once, we had to wait for eight months for US$2,500,” she said. “In some cases, people were not paid their salaries for seven months.” She said the financial process and reporting requirements surpassed what could be reasonably expected from a small nongovernment group and that some “banks sometimes ask for a bribe.”

Civil Society Commission

The Commission for Civil Society, established in 2018, and that operates through branches around the country, has sweeping powers to inspect and demand documents, control funding, and cancel an organization’s registration and work permits of foreign organizations. According to the head of the Commission’s branch in Tripoli, in August 2023, the House of Representatives formally took authority over the Commission from the Council of Ministers, initiated a unification process, and assigned the Commission a budget and legal status. 

The various Commission branches have taken different approaches to resolving the impasse over organizations’ registration and renewal. The director of the Zawiyah branch said it provides an interim annual document renewing existing nongovernmental organizations’ registration, while other branches, such as in Tripoli, apply standards established by the Benghazi commission in the east to register organizations. The heads of two Commission branches said intelligence agencies on occasion requested information about certain civic groups, and that nongovernmental groups sometimes needed intelligence agencies’ approval to register. 

An activist in Tripoli, whose human rights group is active on press freedom in eastern Libya, said that security agencies in the east not only harass activists and try to control their activities, but held influence with authorities, including the Commission. “You will only get the Ishhar [notice of approval] if the agencies approve of you,” he said.

Another activist who heads a media freedom organization in Tripoli accused the Commission’s branches in east and west Libya of overreach: “Independent groups [based in Libya] are under a lot of pressure, as only those affiliated with the government are able to work. In the east, there is harassment by the armed groups and control over our activities.” He also said that the registration process had become more complicated: “We got our first notice of approval [Ishhar] in 2013, and only had to renew our registration in 2021. So, in January [2021] we first applied in Tripoli, but the Commission refused to give us our registration, so in March 2022, we applied in Benghazi. It took the commission there over a year to approve.”

Arrests and Detention

An Internal Security agency in eastern Libya accused him of “contacts with international organizations,” and “attempting to undermine state security” because of his activities with a youth forum around three sensitive issues: supporting the 2021 elections roadmap, transitional justice, and social responsibility of oil companies. He said, “I, for one, was detained without an arrest warrant and released without having to make any pledge. I was beaten in detention and even contracted a skin disease that I ended up treating in Tunis after leaving Libya.” He also said that he did not have access to a lawyer throughout his arrest and detention. 

Harassment, Threats, and Attacks

Another exiled activist, from eastern Libya, said that Internal Security officers called a relative to warn against the activist speaking publicly after he was released from detention in 2022. A member of an armed group in eastern Libya called the same relative in 2023, warning him over the activist’s public criticism of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces’ management of major flooding that killed thousands of people in the eastern region and left thousands more missing or homeless. 

Self-Censorship and Exile

Those who remained in Libya said that they had to self-censor their speech or activities to avoid being targeted by authorities and armed groups. One seasoned activist at a human rights organization based in western Libya said that security threats were increasing and that activists had resorted to working undercover. “Most work is done in secrecy.” He said that in 2022, local groups in Tarhouna with close ties to a militia threatened him over political disagreements.

Another activist from the south said he had to restrict his activities to remain in Libya, because of an “unsafe” environment for nongovernmental organizations. He said: “Although I might occasionally post something on my personal Facebook account, since 2020, I stopped publishing articles and no longer take media requests on general or human rights issues to avoid becoming a target for militias. I do not want to leave Libya and therefore have to maintain a low profile.”

“The south used to be safer for human rights activists, but since the military offensive in 2019, civic space shrunk just as much as anywhere else. Now, there’s nowhere safe in Libya, neither in the east nor in the west. Freedom of speech has become non-existent.” 

Six of the activists interviewed said that they had been compelled to leave Libya and settle in Tunisia or in another country due to the fear of being persecuted for their work, and one said he had to leave his region and settle in Tripoli.

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Repressive Laws, Harassment, Detentions Derail Organizations’ Work

• Libyan authorities have used a litany of overbroad and draconian legacy laws that violate international law to threaten, harass, arbitrarily detain, and attack civil society members and activists.
• Targeting nongovernmental organizations risks completely closing the space for free assembly and association in the country. Many activists are self-censoring or leaving the country.
• The authorities in both administrations vying for control of Libya should cease targeting civic groups and urgently adopt a civil society law consistent with international law. 

Libyan authorities’ accelerating targeting and harassment of activists and members of non-governmental organizations risks completely closing the space for free assembly and association in the country, Human Rights Watch said today. The authorities should cease targeting civic groups and urgently adopt a civil society law consistent with international law.

The authorities, backed by unaccountable militias and abusive internal security apparatuses, have used a litany of overbroad and draconian legacy laws that violate international law to frequently threaten, harass, arbitrarily detain, and attack civil society members and activists. One activist interviewed said he was tortured in detention. Since 2011, the authorities have passed decrees and regulations with onerous registration and administration requirements, preventing groups from establishing or maintaining a presence in the country. As a result, scores of activists have been driven out of the country, while those who remain have resorted to self-censorship and operating underground. 

“Libyan authorities need to urgently end their repressive policies, which are crushing civic space in the country and have made it near-impossible for organizations to carry out their vital work,” said Hanan Salah, associate Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Human rights groups and other civil society organizations should be able to operate without constantly having to look over their shoulder for fear of retaliation.”

Between April and October 2024, Human Rights Watch interviewed in-person and by phone 17 members of Libyan civil society organizations and activists in Libya and Tunisia, and met with student union representatives and members of the National Council on General Liberties and Human Rights (NCGLHR). Only five civil society members agreed to meet in person in Libya, the rest asked for telephone interviews or refused to respond altogether for fear of harassment by the Tripoli Internal Security Agency. Human Rights Watch has anonymized all interviews with activists to prevent retribution. 

Researchers also met with authorities in Tripoli, Zawiya, and Misrata, including with the justice minister, Commission for Civil Society, and with United Nations officials. Human Rights Watch did not obtain required permits to visit eastern Libya. 

Two rival authorities are vying for control in Libya: the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), appointed as an interim authority through a UN-led consensus process, and affiliated armed groups control western Libya. Their rivals, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and affiliated security apparatuses and militias, control eastern and southern Libya. A civilian LAAF-affiliated administration is known as the “Libyan Government.”

Human Rights Watch wrote to the Justice and Foreign Ministries in Tripoli on December 2, 2024, regarding its findings, but did not receive a response. 

The authorities in eastern and western Libya have used a slew of laws to repress civil society, including from the era of the former leader, Muammar Gaddafi. These include contested Law 19/2001 on the Reorganization of Nongovernmental Organizations, which greatly restricts civil society work and is considered as rescinded by some legal scholars because of the 2011 adoption of the Libyan Constituent Covenant by the National Transitional Council, as well as other laws governing expression and cybercrime and vaguely-worded laws on crimes against the state.

Libya’s Penal Code levies severe punishments, including the death penalty, for establishing “unlawful” associations, and stipulates prison terms for establishing or affiliating with international associations without prior “permission.” Regulations and decrees on organizing the work of nongovernmental organizations unjustifiably restrict and muzzle civic groups. 

Libyan legislative authorities should reform penal code articles that undermine freedom of expression, association, and assembly and should guarantee the peaceful exercise of those rights, Human Rights Watch said. The authorities should also promptly repeal the death penalty, including as a punishment for establishing or participating in unlawful organizations.

The authorities in both east and west of the country and armed groups have arrested and detained civil society members, often on bogus, politically-motivated charges. After the Tripoli Internal Security Agency – an armed group – arbitrarily arrested four members of the grass roots youth movement “Tanweer,” a court in Tripoli sentenced them in December 2022 to three-year prison sentences with hard labor for “atheism, agnosticism, being feminist and infidels.” Two activists, who did not wish to be named for fear of repercussions, said that these arrests and prosecutions sent a chilling message to civil society. One of them ended a movement on women’s issues they had started because of the incident.

Libyan authorities, particularly in the west, have imposed overbroad and often unworkable conditions and requirements on nongovernmental groups – domestic and international – who wish to register and obtain work permits, hindering their work. The authorities have imposed burdensome approval requirements on activities as simple as holding seminars and workshops, while onerous financial reporting requirements are often impossible for small organizations to meet. 

The establishment in 2018 of the Commission for Civil Society by the former Government of National Accord, tasked with registering and approving civic organizations and their activities, heralded further impediments to nongovernmental groups due to rivalries and inconsistencies between different branches. A process to unify the eastern and western branches started in 2023 and is still underway. Activists said the Commission had compelled some organizations to change their name or alter their objectives to obtain registration.

In the absence of a civil society organization law consistent with international law and best practices that guarantees the rights to freedom of association, assembly, and expression, Libyan authorities should scrap onerous restrictions on registration and allow for the free establishment of associations, Human Rights Watch said. 

Under international human rights law, freedom of expression, assembly, and association are recognized as fundamental human rights, often overlapping, and essential to the effective functioning of a democratic society and the enjoyment of other individual rights. 

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Libya ratified in 1970, states that no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of the rights to assembly and association “other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (“ordre public”), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

The UN Human Rights Committee, which authoritatively interprets the Covenant, has stressed that a government should be no more restrictive than is absolutely required for any limitation on freedom of association, the detriment suffered, and the duration of the limitation. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which Libya ratified in 1963, states that “every individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.” 

“Libyan authorities have used a slew of repressive laws to target civic groups while putting up obstacle after obstacle to prevent them from operating legally,” Salah said. “Civic groups cannot function effectively and safely as long as they remain in legal limbo, working in secrecy or constant fear of threat, attack, or arrest.”

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Igor Delanoë 

The trip to Moscow, planned for this February by Fayez Al-Sarraj, head of the Tripoli government recognised by the UN, as well as the two trips to the Russian capital by General Khalifa Haftar in 2016, illustrate Russia’s increasing involvement in the Libyan situation.

The Kremlin’s renewed interest in Libya must be seen in the light of two recent developments: the Russian return to the Near-East and the rise of a new strong man, General Haftar, who must now be reckoned with on the Libyan scene.

Although Russia had regained a foothold in Libya by the late 2000s, it was ousted again following the NATO operation and the overthrow of Qaddafi in 2011. The failure of all international attempts to unify the diverse Libyan factions, together with Russia’s increasing weight in Syria following its intervention there, have provided Moscow with an opportunity for a comeback in Libya.

Within the country proper, Russia is making a space for itself in the post-conflict efforts at political and economic reconstruction. Across the region, if the Russians manage to reconcile the groups competing for power in Libya, this will not be an end in itself but will have repercussions well beyond the local context, helping Moscow to further crystallise its influence in North Africa and the Middle East.

An Abortive Return

Colonel Qaddafi’s Libya became a client state of the USSR in the 1970s. The first major armament contract between the two countries was signed in 1974 and between 1973 and 1982 11,000 Soviet “advisers” were stationed there to train troops in the use of weaponry delivered by the USSR and which equip massively the Libyan armed forces. In 2008, Qaddafi went to Moscow—his first visit since 1985—and managed to negotiate the cancellation of his country’s debt, estimated at 4.5 billion dollars, in exchange for the resumption of trade between the two countries.

New contracts, worth somewhere between 5 and 10 billion dollars, were signed. Russian energy operators and arms manufacturers were not the only companies to regain footholds on the Libyan market: RZD (The Russian railways) landed a 2.2 billion dollar contract to build a 550 km high-speed line between Sirte and Benghazi. This was part of a regional project, a rail corridor through North Africa, but its construction was stopped by the events of 20111.

The overthrow of the Qaddafi regime put a damper on all those projects, but in April 2015, Abdullah Al-Thani, prime minister of the Tobruk government which was internationally recognised at the time, went to Moscow and already hinted that the Russo-Libyan contracts dating from the Qaddafi era might soon be on the table again. Besides its economic aspects, the Libyan question is also of political importance to the Kremlin.

Dmitri Medvedev, then president of the Federation of Russia, had refused to use the Russian veto to block resolution 1973 which laid the grounds for the NATO operation in Libya.

The Libyan question was one of the very few issues which gave rise to public disputes between President Medvedev and his prime minister, Vladimir Putin, who argued in favour of the veto.

Since then, Russia has been afflicted with the “1973 syndrome”, which goes a long way towards explaining its intransigence and constancy on the Syrian issue : Moscow has systematically used its veto over the last few years to block any resolution critical of the Damascus regime.

Libya is indeed a template for the Russian posture in Syria, and also seems to be an entry point for Russian influence in North Africa.

Khalifa Haftar, an “entrance ticket”?

Moscow leaders may well have found in General Khalifa Haftar the reliable partner they have been lacking in post-Qaddafi Libya. Commanding the National Libyan Army, Haftar is at war with groups he accuses of being “Islamists” currently holding sway in the Benghazi region.

Today, he appears to be the strong man in the Eastern part of the country. His two trips to the Russian capital in June and November 2016, and later his turning up on the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov which happened to be passing the Libyan coast in January 2017 – show the degree of Moscow’s interest in a man whose political and military mindset is keenly appreciated in the Kremlin.

For Haftar, the object of those meetings was probably to obtain the delivery of weapons which the Russians, assuming they would be willing to ship them, are for the moment unable to provide since Libya is under a UN arms embargo.

Since the end of 2015 Libyan affairs have been placed under the direct responsibility of Mikhaïl Bogdanov, Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Near-East, which attests to the importance the Kremlin attaches to the question.

The Russian objective was restated by foreign minister Serguei Lavrov on February 1, 2017, at the conclusion of the fourth session of the Forum on Russo-Arab Co-operation in Abu Dhabi. As he put it, the Russian objective is “to help the Libyans to restore their territorial integrity, their own State,” in other words to contribute to the reconciliation of the various players whose power struggles are a threat to the country’s territorial integrity.

In May 2016, the Kremlin began to take a more active role:

Russia printed four billion Libyan dinars (approximately 3 billion dollars) on behalf of the Tobruk government, eliciting protests from the Libyan Central Bank in Tripoli, seat of the government of national union recognised by the international community.

By helping him build his strong man image and consolidating the legitimacy of Khalifa Haftar, Moscow hopes to make him a central figure in Libyan politics so that Tripoli will have to accept him.

Here Russia has more latitude than France, Italy or the United States which can only support Tobruk covertly, for fear of finding themselves at odds with Tripoli authorities whom they are meant to be favouring.

Moscow’s is a long-term strategy, looking forward to the end of the embargo when the Russians will want a reliable partner in Libya to whom they can deliver weapons with a minimal risk of their falling into the hands of extremists.

However, Russian support for General Haftar is by no means unconditional, as indicated by the visit to Moscow which Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj is planning to make this month.

This journey demonstrates the influence the Kremlin has acquired in the inter-Libyan political process and illustrates the Russian refusal of a zero-sum game, which is one of the major principles of its diplomacy in the Near-East and North Africa.

Russia’s Return

Moscow’s renewed interest in Libyan affairs is not limited to the local context, it has a regional dimension. There are many other players active on the Libyan scene :

North-African (Algeria, Egypt), Near-Eastern (United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey) and Western (France, Italy, USA).

General Haftar is backed by some of these (Egypt and the UAE and more discreetly by Italy, France and the USA), and for this reason he provides a common ground between these countries and Russia.

Having gained the upper hand in Syria, both militarily and diplomatically, since its armed intervention in September 2015, the Kremlin cannot afford to consider a military option in Libya which could compromise its positions in Syria.

At the very most, Russia has offered to participate in a multinational naval operation designed to prevent the seaborne delivery of weapons and reinforcements to the jihadi. On the other hand, Moscow has displayed considerable diplomatic activity founded on its capacity to promote wider discussions and fuelled by a recently acquired influence due to its Syrian breakthrough.

Its action in Libya has allowed it to enhance its already fruitful relations with certain States (Egypt, UAE) while providing more latitude in its damaged relations with other players (Qatar, France, USA).

Moscow’s involvement also echoes that of Algiers—another important partner for Russia in North Africa—which has been acting as a mediator in the Libyan situation, without much success up to now.

And Russian initiatives could also build on the efforts of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi. For months now, Cairo has been urging the international community to openly support General Haftar, and according to certain sources he is shipping weapons to the Libyan National Army in spite of the UN embargo.

And yet Russia’s willingness to support General Haftar’s rise to power and at the same time maintain a dialogue with the weakened Tripoli government may be perceived as a form of duplicity.

While the Western powers find themselves increasingly marginalised in the settling of the Syrian crisis, its Libyan role also strengthens Russia’s hand in the tug of war with the Euro-Atlantic community over Ukraine and Syria, which has lasted for several years now.

The Libyan affair is a delicate one which, via the migration problem, is fuelling divisions within the European Union. And yet potentially Libya provides a space for dispassionate co-operation between Russia, the Western powers and the regional players in the struggle against Islamist terrorism.

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Igor Delanoë – Deputy Director of the Franco-Russian Observatory (Moscow), doctor in history, specialist in Russian foreign policy and defence issues.

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Amine Ayoub

Since Gaddafi’s 2011 assassination, warlords, extremists and foreign powers have exploited Libya’s instability, fueling terrorism, migration crises and Russian expansion; these threats endanger US allies and global stability, requiring urgent action.

Since the 2011 NATO-backed overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya has spiraled into chaos, becoming a playground for warlords, foreign powers and Islamist militants. What was once a nation of immense wealth and strategic importance is now drowning in corruption, economic ruin and endless conflict.

But why does this matter to the U.S., and why should the world be paying attention? The answer lies in a deadly mix of geopolitics, terrorism and a crisis that could explode at any moment.

The United States has a direct stake in Libya’s future, whether it likes it or not. With vast oil reserves, a strategic Mediterranean location and a crumbling security structure, Libya is both an opportunity and a ticking time bomb. Situated just across the Mediterranean Sea from Europe, Libya serves as a crucial geopolitical pivot point, with potential ramifications for global trade routes, security and regional stability.

The country’s vast natural resources, especially its oil, could hold the key to stabilizing the North African region, but its current instability threatens the region’s fragile peace.

Libya’s internal turmoil is having rippling effects far beyond its borders. The chaos has allowed foreign powers such as Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to project their influence into the region, vying for control over the country’s resources and strategic positioning.

With Russia reinforcing military bases in Libya’s eastern region, the situation is dangerously reminiscent of Syria, where a proxy conflict between global superpowers raged on. If left unchecked, Libya could become another battleground for Russian expansion, undermining U.S. influence in the region.

Moreover, the geopolitical importance of Libya extends beyond the Middle East. The instability in Libya has direct consequences for U.S. allies in Europe. The country’s geographical location has made it a critical point of migration, with thousands of migrants fleeing the violence and poverty in search of better opportunities in Europe. As these migration routes become increasingly uncontrolled, Europe faces rising tensions, further complicating relations within the European Union and with its neighbors. The potential for this crisis to worsen could provoke a larger regional or even global conflict, drawing the U.S. and its allies into more significant involvement.

Libya’s post-Gaddafi power vacuum has turned it into a haven for Islamist extremists. The Islamic State (IS) may have been driven out of Sirte in 2016, but various Islamist factions, including Al-Qaeda affiliates and Muslim Brotherhood elements, continue to wield influence. These groups exploit weak governance, using smuggling networks and corruption to fund their operations. The collapse of central authority has allowed these groups to thrive and recruit, turning Libya into a haven for jihadists.

The implications of this are profound. Terrorist organizations and violent extremist factions in Libya are increasingly using the country as a base for launching attacks across North Africa, the Middle East and even into Europe. They use Libya’s chaotic environment to smuggle weapons, transport fighters and carry out training. Libya has effectively become a hub for jihadists, posing a direct threat to U.S. interests and its allies. If left unchecked, these groups could use the country as a springboard to launch attacks far beyond the region, creating the perfect breeding ground for international terrorism.

The threat of extremism is not confined to the borders of Libya alone. The country’s lawlessness makes it an ideal location for the transfer of arms and other illicit goods, further fueling conflict across the African continent. The destabilization of Libya also encourages the rise of transnational criminal organizations that engage in human trafficking, drug smuggling and arms trading, further contributing to the degradation of security throughout the region. These illicit activities often align with terrorist objectives, forming an interconnected web of instability and violence that reaches far beyond Libya’s borders.

While Libya remains in the headlines for its security threats, the silent devastation of corruption and poverty often goes unnoticed. Transparency International ranked Libya as the 8th most corrupt country in the world in 2024, with billions siphoned off by elites while ordinary Libyans struggle to survive. The country’s immense natural wealth, particularly its oil reserves, has failed to benefit the population due to widespread corruption and mismanagement. Instead of being a resource for national development, Libya’s oil wealth is a tool used by various factions to fuel their power struggles.

Poverty levels are soaring despite Libya’s immense natural resources, pushing more citizens into the arms of extremist groups who promise stability and financial support. A significant portion of the population remains disenfranchised, with unemployment rates climbing and basic services either non-existent or in severe decline. The economic collapse has led to widespread hunger and displacement, as families are forced to flee the violence or face starvation. As poverty deepens, so too does the risk of radicalization, with extremist groups capitalizing on the desperation of Libya’s youth by offering them a sense of purpose and financial security in exchange for allegiance to their cause.

Meanwhile, human smuggling has become one of Libya’s most profitable industries. Militia groups control smuggling routes, profiting from the desperate migrants trying to reach Europe. These militias, which thrive in the absence of a functioning government, also profit from the trafficking of arms, drugs and human lives. This crisis not only fuels violence but also impacts global security, as these same smuggling networks are used for recruiting terrorists and funneling weapons into conflict zones.

To prevent Libya from becoming another failed state beyond repair, the U.S. must step up with a decisive strategy. Washington must push back against Russia’s military expansion in Libya, counter foreign interference and prevent the country from becoming another proxy battleground. This means supporting the United Nations’ efforts to broker peace among the warring factions, while applying diplomatic pressure on Russia and other foreign powers that seek to exploit Libya’s chaos for their own geopolitical gains.

At the same time, intelligence-sharing and counterterrorism operations should be ramped up to eliminate extremist factions before they grow stronger. The U.S. must cooperate with regional partners such as Morocco to help combat the flow of weapons and fighters into and out of Libya. This will require a sustained, long-term commitment to fighting terrorism, ensuring that extremist groups are rooted out before they can further destabilize the region.

Financial sanctions must target corrupt elites profiting from Libya’s chaos, ensuring that aid reaches the people who need it most. The U.S. should leverage its economic power to sanction those who benefit from the looting of the country’s resources, while encouraging reform efforts that promote transparency and governance. Additionally, the U.S. and its European allies must dismantle human trafficking networks that fund militias and criminals, addressing the migrant crisis before it spirals further out of control.

Libya is at a crossroads. It can either descend further into chaos or rise from the ashes with the right international support. The U.S. must recognize that inaction is not an option—because what happens in Libya won’t stay in Libya. The battle for Libya is a battle for regional stability, global security and the future of American influence in the world. If Washington fails to act, the consequences will be felt far beyond North Africa.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

The unraveling of Libya since 2011 has become a woeful parable of post-intervention state collapse. What began as a movement fueled by democratic aspirations has devolved into a fragmented contest for power, with rival governments propped up by foreign patrons and an array of militias, smugglers, and political elites.

A decade of failed peace talks, broken ceasefires, rampant corruption, and splintered institutions has left the plight of ordinary Libyans drowned out by competing authorities, each extracting loyalty through coercion or patronage. Exhausted by perpetual instability, some now whisper of partition — a formal division of the country into eastern and western zones, maybe even a southern region, too — as the only remedy for this crisis.

Yet, even when framed as pragmatism, such a “national divorce” risks cementing the dysfunction rather than resolving it.

The roots of the appeal of partition lie in the intense rivalry between the UN-recognized government in Tripoli, and Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the east of the country. Backed by an array of external powers, these factions have become less national entities and more proxies in a regional power struggle.
Meanwhile, hybrid networks — militias-turned-municipal authorities, smuggling rings-turned-economic pillars — exploit the vacuum to consolidate localized control and launder ill-gotten gains.

Given that national elections are often proposed but perpetually delayed, these new “elites” have entrenched themselves, rendering traditional disarmament and governance reforms highly implausible.

Partition advocates argue that accepting this reality could halt open conflict and allow parallel governance. But Libya’s history, social cohesion, and economic anatomy defy such simplistic perspectives.

Unlike, say, Sudan or Cyprus, Libya lacks the sort of deep-rooted ethnic or sectarian divisions that could justify a “neat” bifurcation. Tribal affiliations cross over geographic lines; economic life depends on interconnected networks, including oil flows from eastern fields to western ports; and financial institutions in Tripoli underpin national transactions.

Partition would rupture these ties, sparking heated disputes over citizenship and control of resources that could escalate into violence. It would empower warlords and external forces while alienating communities dependent on interconnected trade and kinship. Far from ending Libya’s crisis, partition would codify its divisions, trading a fragile status quo for a future of smaller, weaker, and more volatile statelets.

Furthermore, redrawing borders across Libya would do nothing to resolve the crisis and instead institutionalize the forces perpetuating it. Formalizing boundaries between eastern and western territories would grant highly sought-after legitimacy to warlords and militias, transforming them from rogue actors into de facto heads of state.

No longer confined to operating in the shadows or within exclusive family dynasties, these groups would gain sovereign authority to negotiate oil deals, sign military pacts, and suppress dissent within their domains. It would mirror the post-1991 fragmentation of Somalia, where clan leaders-turned-presidents exploited newly granted recognition to entrench networks of patronage, fueling cycles of corruption and insurgency.

In addition, the absence of unified governance would invite external actors motivated by self-interest to deepen their interference. Regional powers, no longer constrained by the pretense of backing a single Libyan state, would be further emboldened to carve out exclusive spheres of influence, endorsed by a new ruling elite that would seek to safeguard its own grip on newfound power.

Formalizing boundaries between eastern and western territories would grant highly sought-after legitimacy to warlords and militias.

Whether it was to secure a buffer zone against perceived threats, or to control Mediterranean energy routes and resources, renewed competition would mirror the proxy conflicts of the Cold War, with fractured states becoming battlegrounds for rival powers.

Meanwhile, Libya’s own main rival factions, relieved of the need to compromise for the sake of national cohesion, would abandon even rhetorical commitments to democracy. Elections, already delayed since 2021, would fade from the agenda as elites in both camps focused on consolidating their own power. The result? A rapid descent into authoritarianism, with militias morphing into formal security forces that would silence opposition voices under the guise of unchecked state authority.

Without credible pathways to inclusive governance, Libyans — like the Iraqis after the 2003 invasion — could face a future in which “stability” is synonymous with repression, and national identity fractures along the lines of foreign allegiances.

The most immediate appeal of partition — a quick end to fighting — also overlooks the tenacity of Libya’s hybrid actors. Militias in Misrata, Zintan and Benghazi have survived demobilization efforts not through brute force alone but by embedding themselves in local governance. Formal disarmament and security sector reform programs, which would already be challenging even in a unified Libya, would face near-impossible hurdles in partitioned territories where militias would function as de facto state agencies.

Meanwhile, the recycled efforts by the UN to broker elections reflect an institutional paralysis that only values national polls as the more, and perhaps only, viable path toward unification. However, repeated delays and derailments of similar previous initiatives have allowed parallel institutions to calcify, with the eastern-based House of Representatives and Tripoli’s High Council of State now operating as rival legislatures, each resistant to the idea of ceding power.

The latest UN-sponsored initiative echoes familiar patterns of diplomatic theater that will not compel rival powers to change course, nor does it possess the mechanisms to disarm militias and counter foreign interference.

Like previous talks, from those in Skhirat to Geneva, all that the UN-facilitated efforts have managed to achieve is eke out hollow, power-sharing frameworks that collapse when rival factions refuse to relinquish control. As a result, there is simply no trust in any “new” proposals that continue to advocate centralized governance, leading to calls for a kind of “loose federalism” — in other words, devolving authority to regional power centers and municipalities.

However, while a loose federation could accommodate Libya’s fractured sociopolitical reality, it risks formalizing the same divisions it seeks to mend. Regions such as Cyrenaica, with its historical autonomy claims, might exploit any autonomy to monopolize oil revenues or invite even deeper foreign meddling. Meanwhile, Tripoli’s militias could leverage this newfound “freedom” to rebrand as regional security forces under the guise of local governance mandates.

Federal systems also require functional institutions and mutual trust, both of which are absent in Libya. Resource competition and tribal rivalries would transform semi-autonomous zones into contested fiefdoms. Rather than fostering unity, loose federalism could Balkanize the state, allowing external powers to manipulate regional leaders and permanently derail national cohesion.

The allure of federalism lies in its flexibility. But in the Libyan context, flexibility might only deepen the fractures that sustain its crises.

Partition offers merely the illusion of resolution and would, in reality, only worsen Libya’s woes by legitimizing fragmentation. Any sustainable peace will require dismantling the warlord economy, curtailing foreign interference, and reviving civic engagement. This will be a monumental and complicated task that cannot be outsourced to hastily drawn lines on a map.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

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Frederic Wehrey and Mieczysław Boduszyński

Two fateful missteps after the fall of dictator Muammar Qadhafi offer important lessons on the impact of early policy choices.

Jubilant crowds tearing down statues and posters of a hated despot. Feared prisons emptying out their longtime occupants. City squares hosting raucous rallies and solemn Friday prayers, free from the prying gazes of the security services. 

These exultant scenes in Syria, where a rebel coalition toppled longtime president Bashar al-Assad in December, recall another Arab revolution whose euphoric aftermath and bitter unraveling we witnessed firsthand.

The 2011 fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi at the hands of a popular uprising backed by NATO intervention was initially greeted with hopes for democracy. Yet the country soon fell into lawlessness, militia infighting, and terrorism. Some observers have warned that Syria could follow the same path—or worse.

Such pessimism is not misplaced: a cursory glance at the differences between Syria and Libya suggests Syria faces far greater difficulties.

Syria is more heterogeneous and fragmented than Libya, at least in ethnolinguistic, denominational, and regional terms—though these affiliations were long exploited and militarized by Assad during his repressive rule and crackdown. Its economy and infrastructure were decimated during a ten-year conflict. It witnessed the largest displacement of people in the twenty-first century. And vast chunks of Syria’s territory fell into the hands of terrorist organizations and militias.

In contrast, Libya’s population is smaller and more homogenous, notwithstanding the divisions that emerged during and after the revolution, often based on ideology, patronage, and locale. Libya’s uprising lasted only eight months, leaving its oil-dependent economy largely intact—though Libyan factions have engaged in a zero-sum struggle over the control of oil resources.

While uprisings in both countries devolved into proxy wars involving external actors from within the Middle East and beyond, Syria experienced far worse devastation given Russia’s indiscriminate bombing campaign and the intervention of militias backed by Iran.  

Yet Syria need not suffer the same fate as Libya. Rather, Libya’s experience shows that early leadership and decisionmaking matter. During this crucial period, Libya’s leaders made two fateful mistakes that Syrians should avoid.

First, they became obsessed with punishing anyone associated with the Qadhafi regime. 

All transitional leaders grapple with how to hold officials from the ancien régime accountable, deciding who should be prosecuted and who should be vetted and allowed to participate in the building of the new order. But in Libya, this imperative quickly became an excuse for score-settling and personal vendettas. 

In 2013, the country’s interim parliament passed a sweeping “isolation law” that called for the political and economic disenfranchisement of broad categories of Libyans. Many had only the slimmest of connections to the toppled government. The result was predictable: The split between Libyans who benefited from the legislation and those who suffered from it helped precipitate a violent civil war.

Syria’s new leaders should ensure that efforts to deal with Assad regime officials center on conduct rather than affiliation or title. Only those found guilty of abuses in fair trials should be excluded from government service. Bureaucrats in sectors such as education and health should not be branded as irredeemable stalwarts of the old regime. Relatedly, revolutionary leaders who exclude their former partners from power-sharing arrangements are also inviting a return to conflict.

Second, Libya’s government made the early fatal error of bolstering the country’s predatory and unaccountable militias.   

Aiming to control and reward the revolutionary armed groups that fought against Qadhafi while appeasing key political factions, Libyan authorities placed the militias on state payroll and attached them to ministries. As a result, their strength skyrocketed.  Attracted by the promise of a salary, thousands of young Libyan men—many of whom had not participated in the revolution—rushed to join a militia. Their leaders emerged as a new class of warlords. Meanwhile, the regular army and police stayed weak and underfunded.

Today, these militia bosses and their allies are the effective masters of Libya, having captured key functions of the state and its oil wealth. Unwilling to part with their privileges, they have blocked any moves toward an inclusive democracy.

To avoid a similar scenario, Syria’s leaders need to avoid empowering the country’s militias, including those that fought Assad. Revolutionaries who want to join the army and police and should be encouraged to do so—but as individuals. Enrolling the militias en masse into the government and channeling money to their commanders will create a country ruled by warlords, like Libya. 

That said, pushing for the immediate disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups is unrealistic. Given the weakness of Syria’s army and police, doing so would create a security vacuum. Instead, Syria’s leaders could adopt a two-pronged approach:  rebuilding a formal security sector governed by the rule of law while gradually dismantling the militias and ensuring that their members are given alternative opportunities for work or training.   

Analogizing is always fraught with pitfalls, yet Libya’s journey after Qadhafi underscores the impact that early policy choices have on whether a revolution succeeds or fails. Unfairly targeting a broad swathe of citizens for retribution and enabling the growth of militia power were two key blunders that sabotaged Libya’s transition from autocracy to democracy.  

As they embark on their own uncertain transition, Syrians can learn from Libya’s experience, and they would be wise to do so.

***

Frederic Wehrey – Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

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