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Ben Fishman

Libya’s warring factions are not fighting and oil is flowing, but this illusion of stability can disappear anytime. Steps need to be taken before it’s too late to bring about a legitimate government that can develop the country.

The latest political agreement among representatives of Libya’s eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) and Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) received praise across the region when Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita announced it on 6 June.

The deal among the so-called 6+6 reportedly addressed the outstanding issues responsible for delaying the presidential and parliamentary elections originally scheduled for December 2021, including candidate eligibility, and sequencing the voting.

Predictably, soon after the 6+6 published their agreement, those responsible for the ongoing delay initiated their typical opposition.

No incentive to step down

Libya’s perennial obstacle to holding elections is that the actors currently enjoying the wealth and prestige of their theoretically temporary positions have no incentive to negotiate their departures – or even to put their positions up for a vote.

In other words, the temporary and transitional risks become increasingly permanent unless the international community is willing to shake Libya out of its increasingly embedded status quo.

Take just the last few years, for example. After the 2019-2020 civil war concluded and the warlord Khalifa Haftar’s forces (supported by Wagner Group mercenaries) were pushed back from Tripoli with the support of Turkey, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) formed the Libya Political Dialogue Forum to set the terms for a long-overdue election.

The Forum of 75 selected 21 December 2021, as Election Day. However, when it came time to select a temporary government whose mandate would focus on governing until the elections, trouble immediately ensued.

In February 2021, the forum selected Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh as prime minister and Mohamed al-Menfi to head the more symbolic Presidency Council. They defeated the more prominent former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and long-time chairman of the HoR, Aguila Saleh Issa in an upset vote that was marred by accusations of vote-buying.

Even though Dbeibeh received a grand total of 39 votes in all of Libya, he remains the prime minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU) enjoying red-carpet treatment and private planes. He attended the 12 June Champions League final in Istanbul as a guest of Turkish President Erdogan along with another important ally, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed.

The powerful image of the Libyan prime minister with the two regional powers sustains his identity as the head of Libya’s government as much as the UN recognition of the GNU itself, if not more so because of Turkish deployed troops in western Libya and the influence of the UAE.

Further, Dbeibeh acts like a prime minister, signs orders, and most importantly distributes funds and pays salaries with some informal arrangement with the Central Bank that receives the country’s oil profits.

The US and its partners have helped improve financial management, but much remains opaque below the top-level spending lines. A recent IMF report indicated the ratio of foreign reserves to GDP is 200%, far greater than even Saudi Arabia. Where the money goes is less well known. Executing the budget transparently requires significant improvement as the IMF noted.

A cat with nine lives

On the other side of the coin is Aguila Saleh Issa who seems to be a cat with nine lives. He received fewer than 1,000 votes in his small town of Qubba in 2014 but has led the HoR, a body that has long exceeded its mandate.

Saleh has often made paralysis seem like his only goal. The Libya Political Agreement of December 2015 created another body, the High State Council, but was never fully implemented in large part due to Saleh’s obstructionism for which the Obama administration eventually sanctioned him.

Hanging over this motley band is the warlord Khalifa Haftar who maintains dominance in the East and the crucial oil region, which he shut in for weeks last summer until Dbeibeh agreed to change the head of the National Oil Corporation and pay more salaries to the region (read: Haftar’s army).

Since the 2015 LPA, Haftar has refused to be subordinate to civilian control. The current version of the debate surrounds whether a current military officer can run for president or must resign first.

Reportedly, Haftar and Saleh recently agreed that the act of a presidential run would symbolise taking off the uniform, which could be put back in the event of an electoral loss – a vague stipulation that opponents of Haftar will likely challenge.

Even if Haftar could run, his responsibility for the deaths of fighters and civilians in the West of the country makes his candidacy unviable. 

Reinventing the wheel

The new head of the UN Support Mission in Libya Abdoulaye Bathily told the security council in November that he would consult widely across Libya to develop a renewed path toward elections.

Instead, he turned again to Saleh and his HCS counterpart Khaled Mishri who have been engaged in an endless circular dance. The two agreed to form a committee of six representatives from each side, knowing full well they could block an agreement at any time.

Aside from the question of dual nationality and a military candidate, other parts of the 6+6 agreement have also been publicly rejected: Saleh says there is no need for a second round of the presidential election, as he can rarely convene a quorum in the existing chamber.

Meanwhile, Dbeibeh refuses to yield power to another interim government charged with running the election process, regardless if he decides to run for president and many political actors have come out against the 6+6 plan to expand the parliament from its current 200 seats to 297. There are also several other issues that have or will be made into excuses not to hold elections.

The bottom line is unless there is some shuffling of the deck prompted by the international community, the likelihood of elections in Libya will keep diminishing and the conflict will be further cemented in the imperfect oil-for-cash bargain that feeds the political and security elite.

Breaking the stalemate

Unfortunately, there has not been any evidence to suggest the current approach is shifting. Diplomats continue to flock to Haftar’s headquarters in the misplaced belief that he will suddenly change his mind, subordinate himself to civilian rule, and trade his authoritarian mentality for a democratic one.

No amount of counter-terrorism cooperation or anti-migration efforts is worth concessions to Haftar; his capabilities are not that great. Further, his continued refusal to remove his support for Wagner Group forces in the territory he controls is indicative of his ineffectiveness as a potential partner.

On his part, Special Representative Bathily has given one last chance to the HCS and HOR to resolve their conflicts. In his upcoming address to the Security Council, he should call for a vote on the 6+6 deal in both chambers and if it fails, he should pivot to a new approach.

There is always tension in UN missions between local ownership and hands-on directives. It may go against his instincts, but Bathily should make a good-faith effort to close the gaps between the 6+6 election laws and their detractors.

This can be achieved through a technical committee of international and Libyan constitutional actors with clear support from the most relevant international actors in Libya, the P3+2+2: the US, UK, France, Italy, Germany, the UAE Qatar, Egypt along with Turkey.

Ongoing reconciliation among the latter two, particularly after President Erdogan’s reelection, opens additional options for pressuring their respective Libyan partners.

All have the capability to disrupt Libya’s ongoing stalemate, impose consequences and sanctions if necessary, and even offer incentives to those willing to step aside from their current comfortable seats.

From the outside, Libya may not appear to deserve much attention since the warring factions are not fighting, oil is flowing, and the country is not the terrorist safe haven it once was. But the illusion of stability can disappear anytime.

Far better to take the steps now to facilitate a legitimate government that can develop the country and spend resources that will benefit its struggling neighbours, especially Egypt and Tunisia. Elections are not an answer on their own, but Libya requires a legitimately-elected government to realise its potential.

***

Ben Fishman is a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former National Security Council director for North Africa.

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Samira Elsaidi

Sources in southern Libya say the commander is helping the Sudanese paramilitary group – and that supply lines have changed.

International monitoring has pushed Khalifa Haftar into changing the routes his forces use to supply Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), local sources close to the eastern Libyan commander have told Middle East Eye. 

Politicians, analysts and intelligence sources from southern Libya confirmed to MEE that Haftar is involved in the supply of arms and fuel to the paramilitary group, which has been at war with the Sudanese army since 15 April. 

While pictures of shipments of weapons being transported from military bases in eastern Libya were published early in the conflict, the sources also revealed the names of airbases they said are now being used as launching points for cargo. 

In an exclusive interview, Saad Bou Shradah, a member of Libya’s state council from the country’s south, told MEE that Haftar’s Forces is flying military supplies from its territory to the Central African Republic, from where they are driven by car across the border into the Sudanese interior.

Sources inside Haftar’s operation, who spoke anonymously because they are not authorised to talk to the media, confirmed this. 

Opposition sources in CAR have previously told MEE that the government there is working with the Wagner Group to supply the RSF. The bases are protected by forces from Wagner, the Russian military group.

There are several air and ground bases in eastern and southern Libya being used for this purpose, according to military sources inside Haftar’s operation.

These include the airbases al-Jufra, Tamanhent, Brak al-Shati, al-Khadim, Gamal Abdel Nasser, al-Abraq, Benina, Maaten al-Sarra and finally al-Wigh, located in the southernmost part of the Sahara border region along the Libya-Chad border.

Major General Khaled al-Mahjoub, director of the moral guidance department in Haftar’s army, told MEE that the army was not supporting the RSF in Sudan. He said that Haftar’s force distanced itself from external conflicts and that its objective was to protect the unity and territorial integrity of Libya.

Russian and Emirati relations

The question of Haftar’s connection to the RSF, which is led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has been hotly debated since the war between the paramilitary group and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began on 15 April.

Both generals enjoy a close relationship with key figures in the United Arab Emirates and Russia. And both have a history of helping one another. 

Dagalo, who is commonly known as Hemeti, sent hundreds of fighters to support Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, Libya’s capital, in 2019. At the time, the Sudanese army denied the involvement, despite evidence contained in a confidential report produced by monitors.

The presence of the fighters made little difference, with Haftar’s men suffering a major defeat. 

Haftar and the RSF are also implicated in a network of illicit trade that spans the border regions of Libya, Chad and Sudan.

Much of this cooperation is connected to tribal affiliations. Hemeti’s family hails from Chad originally, and he is part of the Mahariya tribe of the Rizeigat community, which has longstanding roots in the triangle border region of Sudan, Chad and southern Libya.

“The Haftar family cares about the survival of illicit trade networks that exist between Sudan and eastern Libya,” Jalel Harchaoui, a political analyst and an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told MEE in April.

“The Haftar camp is now sending aid to the RSF. This sudden benevolence suggests that the Emiratis or the Russians or someone from outside has decided to use their leverage with Haftar for the benefit of Hemeti.”

Fuel, captagon, hashish, gold and stolen cars are among the illegal goods smuggled in and out of Sudan and Libya.

Haftar-controlled territory in Libya also lies along the migration route from Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia to the Mediterranean. People trafficking has, since 2014, become a lucrative trade in Libya. 

Moussa Tehoussay, a member of Libya’s Change Party and a researcher in African affairs, said Haftar might not benefit significantly from getting involved in Sudan’s war. Tehoussay told MEE that Haftar’s support was related to his allies outside of Libya, namely the UAE and Russia. 

These two, the politician and researcher said, had provided most of the support funneled to the RSF. This mostly goes through the Wagner Group, which has transported advanced weaponry and military equipment, such as SAM-7 missiles and anti-aircraft systems, via air cargo from the town of Kufra in southern Libya.

That supply route is currently on hold because of international monitoring – including from the United States Africa Command (Africom) – and because of its vulnerability to attack from Sudanese air force planes. Nonetheless, Tehoussay said, support continues to be provided from Libyan territories.

Border movements

According to military analyst Adel Abdel Kafi, the supply of fuel to the RSF is facilitated by the Sabil al-Salam units and 128th battalions in Haftar’s army, which are under the command of Hassan Maatuq al-Zadma.

Zadma’s battalion is responsible for the southeastern region of Libya and the commander has strong, longstanding relationships with Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries and militias dating back to the days of Gaddafi. 

The RSF’s power base is in Darfur, in the west of Sudan. This vast region shares a border with Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic, and there are Sudanese groups operating in the border regions that are helping supply the RSF because of tribal connections and comradeship from previous periods of fighting.

This includes the first decade of the 21st century, when the notorious Janjaweed militias deployed by former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir brutally crushed rebellions among black African groups in Darfur. 

Hemeti was a Janjaweed commander and elements of the militias morphed into the RSF, which was brought under the auspices of the Sudanese intelligence services in 2013. 

The support being provided by groups in the border regions of Sudan and Libya includes fuel, ammunition and some medical and logistical equipment, but not in quantities that would significantly impact the course of battles or bring about a major shift in the war.  

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Tarek Megerisi

Libyans feel abandoned as hopes for democracy have been diverted into a means of furthering the status quo, to the benefit of a few corrupt and factional leaders under poor UN oversight.

In June 2020 many Libyans felt a surge of hope, something long absent from a country that since 2014 had become best known for civil war.

Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar – the general who had spent the past six years trying to subdue the country militarily – was defeated and his forces were scattered.

At last, it seemed, the political process that had been contorted into appeasing him could return to completing the political transition Libyans wanted from Gaddafi’s Jamahirya to a government for the people.

Three years later, that hope has disappeared once more. Despite Libya’s brief-yet-golden opportunity for progress, the web of international interests and a rapacious political class stifled any hope for positive change.

Today’s Libya is a decaying state where government services have been replaced by a barely functioning anarchy fuelled by corruption and nepotism.

Myriad Salafist and criminal militias maintain a squalid peace between skirmishes. Libya’s political leaders have retreated behind foreign-provided defences, where they scheme to undermine their people’s desire for elections and entrench their own power.

Today’s Libya is a decaying state where government services have been replaced by a barely functioning anarchy fuelled by corruption and nepotism.

Libyans, like many other populations in the modern Arab world, feel abandoned in their struggle. After prolonged anarchy, their dysfunctional day-to-day existence has an air of resigned normality.

Across the country, the rubble and damage inflicted by civil war rot away. At the same time, glitzy malls, new coffee shops, and select, disconnected, stretches of road are built – advertised to the outside world as signs of Libya’s rebirth, but within the country recognised as monuments to money laundering and the new elite class.

Most Libyans receive irregular salaries which are difficult to liquidate. Meanwhile everyone – from professionals to public sector employees – has been hit by inflation, which is re-introducing many Libyans to the kind of poverty not seen since the 1950s and 60s.

The people left out by this trend are the ones who either caused it or perpetuated it – those who have adapted to an economy turned upside down. Some have worked out ways to exploit Libya’s deepening streams of corruption, via the banking system, import monopolies, or government procurement. They are amassing fortunes.

Alongside these activities are ever-present and parasitic militias who add criminality to corruption, generating further revenue from extortion, smuggling, fraud and embezzlement.

As society is undermined, most Libyans are now united by anxiety and stress. They look at the criminal nouveau riche with both contempt and envy but are afraid to express their anger. 

Some have worked out ways to exploit Libya’s deepening streams of corruption, via the banking system, import monopolies, or government procurement. They are amassing fortunes.

Politics for the few

Libya’s politics are trapping the state and society in this corrosive toxicity. While the end of the war was the natural moment for something new, those with power and the ability to drive change were not ready to move on.

Libya is a land of abundant resource wealth in a strategic position in the world, but with no one in complete control. It remains, in effect, the political equivalent of an unfinished construction site. The UN put up the scaffolding in 2015 with a political agreement, but it was never implemented. 

The political agreement was based on a flawed view of Libya, seeing it as a nation of two political poles, with two leaderships, which needed to be brought together for a national agreement to be reached.

It favours building a consensus among politicians, who lack proper, popular constituencies. The project does not prioritise Libyan desires for unity, representative politics, security, decentralisation and development.

And so, until a deal is reached between the politicians involved, they are left in control of the country and its wealth with no real mandate or restrictions. It shouldn’t be a surprise then that the only agreement this system produced was an unspoken pact to keep the lawless system going at all costs.

A perfect opportunity to restart Libya’s transition was repurposed by participants to protect their own profitable positions, despite the same approach having caused a catastrophic war that Libya had only just escaped.     

Libya is a land of abundant resource wealth in a strategic position in the world but with no one in complete control. It remains, in effect, the political equivalent of an unfinished construction site.

Foreign exploitation

There are other countries vying to exploit lawless Libya, as well as its domestic factions. As Khalifa Haftar’s political confederacy disintegrated along with his fortunes, Russia saw an opportunity and stepped in.

Sensing the impending collapse, Russia’s Wagner Group – the nominally private military contractor – abandoned the frontline to take up positions around Libya’s oil fields and key terminals.

Russian jets patrolled a new frontline in the sands west of Sirte, in central Libya, and brokered a new balance of power with Turkey – the power behind Libya’s government in Tripoli.

Egypt put a more respectable diplomatic veneer on a new version of the old order by presenting a ceasefire proposal to the Libyan parties. It was embraced by the broader international community because of what it represented – a return to familiarity – despite some ridiculous clauses, including one calling for Libya’s government to surrender its weapons to Haftar.

When Libyans nationwide protested this rehabilitation of the old order, the UN assuaged them, promising that they would manage the change Libyans wanted through elections.

These promised elections never happened. The UN was outplayed, undermined and ultimately co-opted by Libya’s seasoned politicians and their international backers until it was reshaped from a guarantor of change to another guarantor of the system.

Critics of the UN process and mediation believe that the world body has surrendered its electoral process to Egypt in early 2022. In doing so, Egypt has become more influential in Libya’s political scene.

The UN was outplayed, undermined and ultimately co-opted by Libya’s seasoned politicians and their international backers until it was reshaped from a guarantor of change to another guarantor of the system.

Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh – best known for being the relative of Gaddafi’s most successfully corrupt underling, Ali Dbeibeh – gamed the post-war UN process to become interim prime minister and then never left.

This process was intended to leverage the post-war opportunity and popular discontent to develop a credible roadmap toward elections that was sourced from different Libyan constituencies instead of relying on Libya’s dependably obstructionist politicians. 

However, the UN got stuck in a devil’s pact of trade-offs and, for expediency, ended up allowing the established politicians to dominate the process.

In the end, civilian participants were even intimidated and any sense of substance or accountability over the roadmap was discarded in favour of a quick deal. The vote for a new government was allowed to go ahead despite serious accusations of widespread corruption.

In desperation to keep moving forward, the UN transformed a plan to extract Libya from its 2015 political system into a process that replicated it.

Corruption and maintaining Libya’s division

Dbeibeh’s enemies used the allegations of corruption to ensure Libya remained politically divided, while Dbeibeh himself used the lack of accountability or control mechanisms in the UN roadmap to becoming the de-facto king of western Libya.

In a sign of things to come, he immediately briefed foreign diplomats on his two-year plan for Libya’s rejuvenation, despite the target for elections being set for 10 month’s time.

Since taking power in February 2021, Dbeibeh has been accused of mass corruption. He reshaped Libya’s civil service, state-owned companies and import channels to gain control of Libya’s shadow economy.

Dbeibeh has been accused of mass corruption. He reshaped Libya’s civil service, state-owned companies and import channels to gain control of Libya’s shadow economy.

The purpose of this — other than the obvious and crude financial gain — is to normalise himself as Libya’s indefinite prime minister in the eyes of the international community, ensuring he stays in power with no real challenge as decrepit moves toward an electoral process finally peters out.

But Dbeibeh is further accused of empowering particular militias to crack down on civil society, and any political or economic activity outside his control. Most recently, he even used Turkish drones to bomb political rivals.

But as he entrenches deeper into Tripoli, the fractures he is causing are widening. Militias and political actors who Dbeibeh marginalised are plotting to violently make space for themselves or upend his system altogether.

The wild, wild east

In eastern Libya, another dictatorship is in the making, who is just as likely to break everything as he is to rule. 

Countries like Russia, Egypt and even European powers like France and Greece have a need to maintain opposition to a Turkish-dominated Tripoli as a vehicle for securing their own interests. But they all took different routes.

Libya’s electoral process is under the control of different political proxies who lead Libya’s two parliaments, believing they could then dominate whatever the process produces. But in two years featuring three electoral processes and a rival government, they’ve only succeeded in causing further damage to Libyan politics and institutions.

Russia took a more sanguine role, eschewing politics and animating the corpse of Haftar’s army to give Wagner a Libyan face as they directly secured interests such as smuggling routes, oil installations, ports and air bases. But unlike Tripoli, eastern Libya has no clear leader.

As the octogenarian Haftar ages badly, his children all vie for succession with other political and military rivals. 

Given that none of Haftar’s potential successors have local bases of support, they all play off international intrigue to strengthen themselves. Saddam Haftar has seemingly picked the best, working with some allies like the Russians to great mutual benefit.

Countries like Russia, Egypt and even European powers like France and Greece have a need to maintain opposition to a Turkish-dominated Tripoli as a vehicle for securing their own interests. But they all took different routes.

Libya has become integral to Russia’s foreign policy network, which props up Bashar al-Assad in Syria and is deepening its presence across Africa.

As Saddam aids Wagner’s financial gains, he has gained influence over other major revenue streams and militias.

While Saddam has made friends internationally, his personality has won him enemies across Libya. Moreover, the tribes which now dominate eastern Libya have made it clear that when Haftar dies they will no longer pay even nominal fealty to his defunct military if his sons take over.

So Saddam is in a race against the clock to bully eastern Libya into submission whilst in the precarious position of being entirely reliant on foreign support amidst a sea of domestic enemies.

Libya’s groundhog day

To many outside the country, this new version of the old Libya looks like it has a sustainable political status quo.

Dbeibeh provides outsiders with economic opportunity in the West, whilst Haftar fights to subdue the East, and the UN works with members of parliament and well-meaning but powerless generals to refine ceasefire agreements and electoral laws. The old status quo was considered much the same way.

Unfortunately for the Libyan people, they are rarely considered, in this country of missed opportunity, recurring political dynamics, and a morbidly decaying environment.

Unfortunately for the Libyan people, they are rarely considered, in this country of missed opportunity, recurring political dynamics, and a morbidly decaying environment.

Beneath what is, depressingly, seen as a hopeful picture for Libya by those looking in from the outside are the swirling political currents that will create tomorrow’s crises. The past few years have only heightened Libya’s mineral wealth and strategic value, and still, no one is in complete control of the country.

In the coming months, Libya will only be featured on international news bulletins when military agreements or electoral pacts are reached. They will, almost certainly, lead nowhere.

The real stories – the ones that truly reveal what is going on in the country – are less likely to make headlines: proxy wars between Libyan interests fought in Sudan, migrants dying in the Mediterranean, and new energy plans for North Africa. 

There will be regular updates from the UN’s special representative, where he warns the Security Council about all of these dynamics before doing nothing about them.

As with Libya’s old status quo, it will either snap when one of Libya’s new dictators becomes bold enough to wage war with the other, or when the poor Libyan people can bear no more and once again try to take their country’s destiny into their own hands.

All we know for sure is that the next war will be worse than the last one. Everyone will act surprised when the same political conditions that stoked devastation last time cause it all over again.

***

Tarek Megerisi is a senior policy fellow in the North Africa and Middle East Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

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Vito Todeschini

Presidential and parliamentary elections have long been heralded as a solution for Libya’s political instability. This process, however, has so far been characterized by a weak electoral infrastructure and power struggles between Libyan political actors.

The international community has long invested in holding presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya as a solution to the political, economic, and security crises that have characterized the country since the fall of Muammar Gadhafi in 2011.

While a first attempt to hold elections on December 24, 2021 has failed, since the beginning of 2023 the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Abdoulaye Bathily, have doubled down on their efforts to have the elections take place at the end of this year.

One of the factors that has hindered the electoral process is the absence of a constitutional framework that clearly defines the form of government and division of powers in Libya. The Draft Constitution elaborated by the Constitutional Drafting Assembly between 2014 and 2017, and adopted in July 2017, has never been put to referendum, and the Constitutional Declaration, adopted by the National Transitional Council in August 2011, still functions as the interim constitutional text of the country.

With a view to adopting a constitutional basis for elections and electoral laws, since early 2022 UNSMIL has facilitated dialogues between the two main Libyan legislative bodies: the House of Representatives (HOR), elected in 2014 and whose mandate has now expired; and the High Council of State (HCS), an advisory body established under the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement.

However, the possibility of new elections unseating the heads of these bodies, Agilah Saleh (HOR) and the Khaled Al-Mishri (HCS), as well as the current Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, have led these political figures to repeatedly frustrate the process, a risk that continues to persist.

Until the end of her mandate in July 2022, former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, Stephanie Williams, convened a number of meetings between the HOR and HCS in order to achieve progress on the elections file, yet with no conclusive results. After his appointment in September 2022, the new SRSG Bathily continued the dialogue with the various political and institutional parties in Libya, in an attempt to overcome the ongoing impasse.

By the end of 2022, the HOR and HCS sorted out most issues surrounding the adoption of a constitutional framework for elections. Yet, they stalled on two specific issues pertaining to the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates, namely, whether dual nationals and military personnel can run for elections. These points directly concern the ability of General Khalifa Haftar to participate in the presidential run.

Intra-Libyan dialogues

On February 7, 2023, the HOR adopted Amendment No. 13 to the Constitutional Declaration, which aims to serve as a constitutional basis for election by laying down the future form of government for Libya.

In particular, Amendment No. 13 provides that the President would be the Head of Government and would be based in Tripoli, while the Parliament would be composed of two chambers: a House of Representatives based in Benghazi and a Senate based in Tripoli. The HCS approved Amendment No. 13 on March 2, 2023. However, 55 out of its 135 members contested the vote, alleging that the quorum necessary for a valid vote within the HOR had not been met.

Furthermore, they expressed concern with regard to the content of the Amendment, particularly its failure to clarify the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates, the broad powers granted to the President, and the clause connecting the holding of parliamentary elections to presidential elections. In addition, the SRSG criticized the Amendment because “[it] does not stipulate a clear road map and timelines to realize inclusive elections in 2023, and adds additional contentious issues such as the regional representation in the Senate.”

Meanwhile, on February 26, 2023, the HOR and HCS agreed to nominate their representatives for the so-called “6+6 Committee,” tasked with drafting the necessary electoral laws and working out the contentious issues surrounding Amendment No. 13. This mechanism was supported by UNSMIL, with the SRSG stating that the “6+6 Committee” needs to complete its work by early July 2023 for the elections to be held by the end of the year. The “6+6 Committee” met between May 22 and June 6, 2023 in Bouznika, Morocco, where it eventually reached an agreement on draft laws for presidential and parliamentary elections.

As pointed out by the SRSG and some commentators, however, the draft texts remain problematic in several respects, including in relation to the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates and the provision that makes the holding of parliamentary elections dependent on the successful holding of the first round of presidential elections. Further delay in sorting out the outstanding issues, in a way that is acceptable by all Libyan stakeholders and that allows for the practical implementation of the electoral laws, will inevitably impede having national elections take place by the end of 2023.

The SRSG’s renewed approach

The volatility of the intra-Libyan dialogues and the relentless political struggle between Saleh and Al-Mishri have constantly risked derailing the electoral process, and eventually hampering the holding of elections by the end of 2023. For this reason, the SRSG has decided to launch a parallel initiative to the HOR-HCS talks.

During his remarks to the UN Security Council on February 27, 2023, the SRSG, while pointing to the limited progress achieved until then on a constitutional basis for elections, announced his plan to establish a High-level Steering Panel for Libya. This mechanism aims to bring together multiple Libyan stakeholders such as “representatives of political institutions, major political figures, tribal leaders, civil society organizations, security actors, women, and youth representatives.”

The stated goal of the SRSG’s initiative is to enable “the organization and holding of presidential and legislative elections in 2023,” including by facilitating the adoption of the legal framework for elections and a Code of Conduct for candidates, outlining a clear and time-bound roadmap, and devising security arrangements to hold the elections in safety. The SRSG’s approach was subsequently endorsed by the UN Security Council through a presidential statement.

Beside attempting to pre-empt spoiler moves by Libyan political actors, the SRSG’s intention is to make the electoral process more inclusive. Whereas the HOR-HCS talks keep the process within a strictly institutional context, which allows the heads of the two bodies to maintain control over it, on paper the High-level Steering Panel for Libya would give other institutional and civil society actors a chance to have a say in the design of a framework and roadmap for elections.

In his remarks to the UN Security Council on April 18, 2023, the SRSG indeed stated that “[i]t is vital for the success of elections that all parts of Libyan society are involved and have their voices heard, and that the electoral campaign provides an opportunity for a peaceful competition of visions and programs and not an occasion that triggers hate speech and violence.”

Outlook

While the international community has bet on elections as the chief way to bring political stability in Libya, some experts have expressed strong criticism towards this approach, arguing that the SRSG’s plan replicates the model that led to the failed attempt to hold elections in December 2021, and that the looming risk is for Libya to relapse into conflict.

Moreover, even if elections were successfully held, there is a real danger that the process fails to be “free, fair, transparent and inclusive” of women, the youth, minorities and civil society as called for by the UN Security Council. Among the many factors that could taint the process are the widespread online and offline violence against women, including those running for office, as well as an ever-shrinking civic space, which hampers the Libyan civil society’s ability to exercise the necessary democratic control and monitoring.

***

Vito Todeschini is a legal expert in human rights law, international humanitarian law, and international accountability, focusing on Libya, Palestine/Israel, and the wider MENA region.

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Jamal Jowhar

From ‘Kidan’ to ‘Radwan and Murad’

Extensive local and international mafias are behind the human trafficking and the attempts made by Issa and those with him to go into the sea six times. The business was promoted openly on social networking sites, advertising flee trips and their prices. This comes in parallel with the dismantling of the “largest human smuggling network” in Sudan, an operation in which the UAE police cooperated with the Interpol earlier this year.

Sudanese police arrested Eritrean citizen Kidan Zacharias Habt Mariam, known as “Kidan”, 37, in coordination with the UAE authorities, according to Brigadier General Saeed Abdullah Al Suwaidi, Director General of the Federal Drug Control Department in the UAE.

Kidan was arrested in Ethiopia in 2020, but he fled after one year, and was subsequently sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment. According to Interpol, Kidan is wanted for leading a criminal organization that for years kidnapped, abused and extorted migrants from East Africa to smuggle them to Europe.

The Missing Migrants project has documented the deaths and disappearances of more than 5,600 people across the Sahara Desert since 2014, with 149 deaths recorded as of 2022.

On January 5, Al-Suwaidi announced: “We have now closed one of the most dangerous smuggling routes to Europe, through which thousands of migrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan were transported through Libya, and from there to Europe.

If this is the story of Kidan, then who are Radwan and Murad, whose names are preceded by the surname “Haj” among those wishing to emigrate, and whose names are repeatedly mentioned by some?

Some families revealed to us that brokers like A.F, S.A.M. and S.B. in Egypt are just contractors working to gather young people and hand them over to a second and larger ring, until they reach large agents, including Radwan and Murad or others in Libya.

Social media is full of “video propaganda campaigns” for many human traffickers, including Radwan and Murad. The origins and the whereabouts of the two men remains unknown. They use fake names, and deal through intermediaries. This is how many Egyptians dealt with them, including Ayman Tarek al-Barri, according to what his sister told us. However, some migrants and their families believe that Murad is a Syrian, while Riad is a Libyan.

Stacked boats

The propaganda surrounding Riad and Murad, which usually relies on the testimonies of those who are believed to be migrants, failed to hide how hundreds of people wishing to emigrate to Europe, young or old, are packed on overcrowded boats like cattle.

This was evident in a video Asharq Al-Awsat received from one of the migrants, who was returned by the coastguards in western Libya in late January.

A boat capsized off the city of Qasr Al-Akhyar (75 kilometers east of the capital Tripoli) in mid-February. At least 73 migrants drowned. A team from the Red Crescent society in the city of Khums managed to recover 11 bodies.

The increase in the number of children migrating to Libya, with the intention of fleeing to Europe, during 2022 only, affirms that the matter has turned into a phenomenon. This prompted us to seek an explanation with UNICEF, but we received no response. Doctors without Borders also regretted that it did not have information on the same subject, and asked us to navigate its website, searching for relevant information.

According to a report by the International Organization for Human Rights in mid-April 2023, about 695,000 irregular migrants are in 100 Libyan municipalities, and they belong to more than 42 nationalities.

According to the report, financial difficulties remain the most pressing issue for more than three out of five migrants (61%), followed by problems with identity documents (30%), lack of Information (22%), security concerns (20%) and food and water insecurity (18%) in Libya.

Escape from the corpses

Residents of coastal Libyan cities are used to seeing the waves of the sea tossing some bodies believed to be of migrants who drowned during their trips to Europe, so much so that residents of the Qasr Al-Akhyar town were forced last summer to flee their homes and farms, because of horrible odors coming from corpses lying on the beach.

Given the reoccurrence of this phenomenon, Brigadier General Miftah Mohammed Haidar, the Security Commander of Khums area, announced that the city is facing a problem of piling corpses of drowned migrants piled up in morgue, demanding the allocation of a plot of land to be used as a graveyard.

The teams of the Libyan Red Crescent society always rushes to recover the bodies of migrants after notifying local and judicial authorities. Tawfiq Al-Shukri, director of the Information and Communication Office in Red Crescent, briefed Ashaq Al-Awsat on the efforts of relief teams to solve the crisis.

At least 2,300 people have died or gone missing in the Mediterranean since the beginning of 2022, while trying to cross on rickety and overcrowded boats that sailed from North Africa, mainly from Libya and Tunisia, according to the International Organization for Migration.

Italian police said the largest rate of migration flow during 2022 arrived from Libya with more than 53,000 illegal migrants, followed by Tunisia with more than 32,000.

Missing on land and at sea

Statements by the coastguard and anti-illegal migration authorities in Libya speak to appalling conditions suffered by dozens of children rescued from time to time, either in “secret warehouses,” or huddled with other migrants on boats at sea. Still, some do not belong to either group, among them – for example – are Egyptians Bilal Mohamed El Gamal, Adham Abdel Tawab, Nader Mohamed El-bezzawi, as well as Sudanese Mubarak Haroun Moussa, in addition to some who came from Syria and Palestine.

Bilal al-Jamal, 17, came from the village of Nahtai, Gharbia governorate. His cousin Nahed told us that he went missing more than a year ago, after he told them by phone from Sirte that he was heading to Italy in a boat.

“We learned from those who accompanied him that the coastguard returned the boat after it had traveled hundreds of kilometers. We inquired about him in Libya. We were told by some he is in prison, and others are asking for money to tell us his whereabouts, but it turned out that they are all liars. His mother is suffering from poor health.”

Speaking of the broker S.A.M., Nahed said in a written statement: “We asked him about Bilal and he claimed he didn’t know where he was; we are waiting for any news from Libya about him.”

Sirte, overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, about 450 kilometers from Tripoli, is a starting point for irregular migrants to Europe, although this is not as high as the turnout in other cities such as Sabratha, Zawiya, Zuwara and Qara Bolli, east and west of the capital.

With each returning boat loaded with migrants from the open sea to Tripoli shore in the west or Tobruk in the east, families in the Egyptian countryside, and Arab and African countries scramble for information. They all hope that – despite the loss of their “lifetime savings” – their children have survived, while frustration appears on returnees because of their failure to reach European shores.

Over the past eight years, 51,000 irregular migrants have died and thousands have disappeared, according to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who said on the International Migrants Day on December 18 that “unregulated migration within the ruthless world of smugglers still has high costs.”

The dangers that Guterres warnings found an echo in the Gaza Strip, following the identification of eight dead young people whose families had reported them missing in Libya. Their relatives published photos of them while they were on a walk in the Martyrs’ Square in the center of Tripoli, before their bodies were found off the Tunisian coast. The young victims died after a boat carrying them among others, drowned.

Amid a large crowds and tributes of mourners, the coffins of the victims were lined up, and funeral prayers were held for them on December 18. Among the victims were the brothers Maher and Mohammed Talal Ramadan Al-Shaer, and their relative Sami Mansour Ajeya al-Shaer.

‘Return to life’

The lists of names of some migrants made it easier for us to track and find out their whereabouts, even though they could be deported at any time from one prison to another. This news was reassuring to some families, but left others dismayed and heartbroken.

Asharq Al-Awsat obtained photos and information confirming the presence of dozens of children of Arab and African nationalities in a shelter for “vulnerable groups – women and children” in Tripoli (Zawiya Street), including 72 Egyptian children. At that time, we learned that the center’s administration was in the process of deporting a number of them, including Ahmed Faiq, who came from the village of Qarmala in Asharqia, whose family had previously been informed of his disappearance.

‘Vulnerable groups’ are lucky

Meanwhile, the Egyptian embassy in Tripoli was rushing to prepare travel documents for about 105 people, and on November 17, 2022, I received a letter from Ahmed Fayek’s mother, confirming that he was transferred among other Egyptians to the Sikka shelter, completing the procedures for their return to Egypt.

Anyone who is admitted to the shelter for “vulnerable groups” must be lucky, because it has only been established recently, and its applicants receive special care from the Migration Agency, in contrast to widespread violations in many informal centers, up to rape, according to UN reports.

A few days later, the Migration Agency in Tripoli, led by Colonel Mohammed Al-Khoja, deported a large number of inmates. The detainee’s mother, Ahmed Fayek, told us that he had arrived at Cairo International Airport.

The coastguard forces in east Libya managed to return many boats loaded with migrants, including a large boat carrying nearly 500 migrants, including a large number of children, from Egypt and Syria. The boat was welcomed in Tobruk by the mayor of the municipality Farag Boualkhatabia, who appeared carrying an infant described as the “youngest migrant” found along with his family.

Mystery of the burnt boat

Anyone who has lost a child or relative in Libya and is waiting for his/her return must feel horrified by disasters hitting migrant communities there. One of these disasters occurred on the shore of Sabratha after a bloody dispute broke out between a group of human traffickers, which ended with the shooting of the fuel tank of the boat carrying dozens of migrants.

The horrific crime, which took place on October 10, claimed the lives of 15 migrants, 11 of whom turned into charred bodies. Osama Abdel Tawab believes that his brother Adham was among the victims. Adham had arrived in Libya in August 2022, seeking a way to emigrate to Europe, but there was no news of him since his last call with his brother in Italy.

Osama links the incident of the boat burning with a call he received from his brother, the same day the local authorities announced the incident. “Adham called me from Zuwara, the day of the incident, and told me that he and 150 people were going to board a boat from Sabratha, and since then we have no news of him.” Osama said.

In the city of Abnoub, Assiut Governorate (about 400 kilometers south of Cairo), 14-year-old Adham was living with his family. Before he and his peers enrolled in the third grade of middle school, he yearned to travel and emigrate to Europe.

The story of the Southern boy Adham has conflicting accounts. His brother said Adham spoke to him from Zuwara, and then indicated – according to latest news – that he moved to neighboring Sabratha. “The boat sailed for one and a half hours, then suddenly it turned out that the boat had a hole. They came back for the second time, and it drowned before the shore.”

Asharq Al-Awsat contacted Libyan public prosecution in Tripoli on the matter, Consultant Ali Zubaida, the Deputy Prosecutor in the Libyan Attorney General’s Office, informed us that there “were no Egyptians on the burnt Sabratha boat,” adding that “it was carrying only Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants.”

Sabratha is one of the most important departure points for irregular migrants to Europe, along with other cities on the west and east coasts, where the “smuggling mafia” is active, away from the eyes of the security authorities.

Osama’s heartbreak over his brother is pushing him to constantly search for him. He told us: “We contacted all sides, we contacted many officials, and still don’t know his whereabouts. Even the broker who facilitated his travel turned off his phone. What we want now is to match the DNA, to find out whether Adham’s body is among the charred bodies or not.”

Human traffickers in Libya usually charge large sums of money, not less than US$5,000, for moving their victims to secret hideouts, then pushing them to the sea. My main question to Adham’s brother was: “Where did he get all this money, especially that he is still young, and he could not even work in Libya?” I couldn’t get an answer.

Osama told us that the people from Abnub recently found the body of a man who was accompanying his brother on the boat, named Haitham. They are also waiting for the return of another body of the Egyptian Islam Diab Abdo from Libya, and are still waiting for the return of Adham.

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Jamal Jowhar

The Story of the Sudanese Mazen

Mazen Adam, whose name was mentioned by the human rights activist Zaidani, is a Sudanese child whose story was reported in Libya and cast horrible doubts on the fate of his unaccompanied minor migrant peers.

The motherless Mazen, 14, was living with his father after he was released from the Ain Zara detention center. At the end of August 2022, gunmen kidnapped him in the city of Warshfana, southwest of Tripoli. Having continued to abuse him, they demanded a ransom of 5,000 Libyan dinars. They leaked a video as they took turns torturing him cruelly, and someone shouted at him: ” I’m broke. Where is the money?”

Families search through Detention Centers and among the dead

Whenever news was announced about the drowning of a boat carrying irregular migrants in the Mediterranean, or sending it back to Libyan ports, it reverberates in several countries, including Egypt, Sudan and Syria, as much money was spent on this trip. Mothers sold their clothes, and fathers mortgaged what was left in the barn of cattle.

As the dreams of migrant families of “promised wealth” seemed similar, they now share same fears, and experience the pain of heartbreak for the loss of their children, either by drowning, or detention, and may not know a way to reach them.

Asharq Al-Awsat is investigating the fate of hundreds of missing and detained migrants in Libya, based on the testimonies of their families, lists obtained from inside prisons, detention centers and “secret detention centers”. Asharq Al-Awsat is also documenting the accounts of some of those who were released, and those who failed several times to escape to Europe by sea.

The lists leaked from Libyan prisons and shelter centers include the names of migrants and minors from Egypt and several African countries in official prisons, including “Melita Tawila” prison, and shelter centers supervised by the Migration Agency of the Government of National Unity in Tripoli, such as “Ain Zara” shelter center, “Gut Sha’al”, and “Treek Al-Sekka”, the latter for migrant minors.

In Libya, there are also shelter centers belonging to armed groups, including the “Maya” (27 kilometers west of Tripoli) and managed by the “Stability Support Force” – closed in mid-February 2023 – along with other detention centers, including the “Wadi al-Hay” known as “Bir al-Ghanam” (southwest of the capital), which until recently housed about a thousand migrants, mostly Egyptians.

Six months of torture

Local human traffickers control the fate of detainees in informal shelters, or secret headquarters. They belong to militias and organized crime gangs. The freedom of every prisoner depends on his/her family paying a “ransom,” so that he/she can regain his/her and escape torture that amounts to deprivation of food, burning with fire, and sale to others, according to a report by the National Human Rights Committee in Libya.

A Chadian immigrant, A. S., through mediation from the security commander of Rabiana (150 kilometers from the city of Kufra, southeast Libya) area, recounted that “a gang of human traffickers detained him among 40 migrants, mostly children and minors, for more than six months in a dark warehouse near Rabiana”. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that they were all “starved, sexually assaulted, burned with fire, and videotaped in order to bargain with their families to pay ransom.”

Notably, a Chadian migrant said that “the gang of three (two Libyans, and a third one of an African nationality unknown to him), released more than 20 detainees, after receiving US$5,000 from the family of each. But the rest of the abductees continued to be abused daily, until they managed to escape and inform a police patrol that was nearby. The money was transferred to phone numbers. There are also private money transfer offices in Libya that operate without licenses, and are not subject to state control.”

In June 2022, 20 bodies of Chadians and Libyans were found in the Libyan desert in the town of Kufra, along Chad-Libya border. The Missing Migrants Project has documented the deaths and disappearances of more than 5,600 people across the Sahara Desert since 2014.

Leaked lists

Circumstances within most shelter centers, especially those hidden from international organizations, seem the same. Generally, they are no different from what happened with the migrants in the “Rabiana storehouse,” in terms of physical and sexual violations. According to Tarek Lamloum, director of the “Baladi Foundation for Human Rights”, what is happening to the migrants detained throughout Libya, is a “kind of slavery”.

“The sexual violations committed against migrants, pushing them towards forced labor in exchange for food, drink and access to toilets, is criminal forced labor,” Lamloum said. He added that those who have entered institutions affiliated with the Migration Agency are still better off than others detained in secret premises or supervised by armed groups.

The search trip, according to the lists we received from Egyptian and African families, led us to discover that some of the children were detained by police, such as the Syrian Haroun Abdul Hadi, 17, whose mother told us that he was released after months of imprisonment. There is also the Egyptian Ahmed Fayek, whose mother provided us with his personal photo, and we spotted him days later in an identification parade in Sabratha Security Command before he was sent to Ain Zara prison. His mother was happy to see him again. “We feel alive again,” she cried.

The Illegal Migration Agency in Libya says that due to large number of migrants detained in prisons and shelters across the country, it intensified “voluntary return” trips to home countries, or third host countries; but the numbers infiltrating Libya and held in its prisons remain much more.

However, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in a report published on October 11, believes that migrants are “forced to (voluntarily return) to escape arbitrary conditions of detention and the threat of torture, ill-treatment and sexual violence, as well as enforced disappearance and extortion.”

One of those who escaped dark prisons, thanks to evacuation operations supervised by the International Organization for Migration and the Egyptian embassy in Tripoli, is Amr Atef Mohammed, 15, who we met in the Mashtoul Al-Souq town, Asharqia Governorate, Delta of Egypt, following his return in December 2022, after surviving long imprisonment.

Amr showed us the route of his smuggling trip from Matrouh, with the help of a Libyan broker referred to as F.M. He charged him 60,000 Egyptian pounds (nearly US$2000). The journey started from the Salloum plateau by walking at night in the desert for long periods. Amr added that the “Bedouin” assistant who accompanied them “kept moving them from one store to another along desert roads until they crossed the Libyan border.”

Like others, young Amr went to Libya to flee to Europe. He told us that “the Libyan coastguard forces arrested us, and returned us to the Ain Zara shelter center (Anbar Battalion 1).” he added that they were humiliated, before being transferred to the Tareek Al-Sekka Road.

There is a big difference between the Ain Zara center and Melita Tawila prison. The latter, although it belongs to the Ministry of Justice of the Government of National Unity, is widely known as “notorious”. Several Syrian and Egyptian families have appealed to the embassies of their countries to act quickly to get their children out of these two facilities.

Egyptian Abdel Fattah Khodri, 62, complained that his son, along with a number of his villagers, including Mohammed Gouda Mahdi and Sameh Obeid, are suffering from diseases and scabies in the Melita Al-Tawila prison. Each family paid 150,000 pounds for the trip, and said their children may have been sold.

Magdy Saad Mujahid, 63, originally from the village of Kafr Hilal, Menoufia Governorate (north of Cairo), recounted the story of his son Khaled, who traveled to Libya, due to harsh economic circumstances, by means of smuggling. After a failed journey across the sea, he was detained in Ain Zara prison, after the so-called “Libyan Haj Riad” received 85,000 Egyptian pounds to help him get to Europe.

This case is not much different from the case of Mustafa Attia Al-Halwani, 18, from the village of Shabramals, Ghaarbiya Governorate, whose brother told Asharq Al-Awsat that “one of the brokers lured him to travel to Italy, along with two others. When he arrived in Libya, he was detained, and his family negotiated to pay 95,000 Egyptian pounds for his release.”

Ambassador Tamer Mustafa, the Egyptian charge d’affaires in Tripoli, in a press statement, affirmed that the diplomatic mission there is making great efforts, and is returning hundreds of irregular migrants to the country as soon as it gets travel documents for them.

The tragedy of the missing migrants in Libya is not limited to one country. Although there are no official statistics on the number of the missing, it seems that apart from Egyptians and Syrians, there are quite a few citizens of African countries, including Sudan. Here Ibrahim Haroun Moussa recounts the story of his brother Mubarak, who disappeared in Libya five years ago.

Mubarak came from the city of El Fasher (western Sudan) and his family has been searching for him since late May 2018. “We received news that Mubarak was imprisoned in Tajoura, and shortly after his release he was detained in a prison near the Libyan-Tunisian border,” Ibrahim said.

Escape to the sea six times

Most of the boys and young people, who fled to Libya through its vast desert, are driven by the dream of migrating to the “European paradise” by sea, even if it costs them their lives. Among them was young Sudanese Abdul Mawla Issa who ventured to throw himself into the sea six times in three years.

The absence of Mubarak Haroun Moussa has buried the details of his journey, which even his family does not know. But Abdulmoula Issa told Asharq Al-Awsat the details of his great tragedy since he entered the country as a child through the Libya – Egypt – Chad triangle, until he left, after a journey of torment, at the age of 23.

Issa said he entered Libya before 2018, through the city of Kufra, and there he worked for a few months before moving west, arriving in Tripoli in early March 2020.

“I tried to escape from Tripoli to Europe by sea six times. But coastguards were returning us to Tripoli, but we were able to escape again,” he said. On the sixth attempt, Issa said: “We could not escape, and were locked up in the city of Zuwara for seven months, I paid bail and got out of prison.”

After four months, Issa told us that he had an interview with the UNHCR, and at the end of December 2021 they evacuated a group of migrants, including him, to Rwanda. Having arrived there, Issa informed us that he was heading to Norway to join some of his comrades who had escaped from torment in Libya. By the end of November 2022, Issa told us that he had started completing his education in Norway.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell

Libya remains roiled by instability after more than a decade of a murky “transition” that has side-tracked its political journey, as turmoil persists despite concerted efforts to course-correct.

One unfortunate casualty of this seemingly permanent mess is the role of political parties within the context of the country’s now deeply convoluted sociopolitical background — a prospect consistently inviting consternation among the country’s volatile factions that have come to depend on pervasive uncertainty to insulate themselves from the transparency and accountability in a stable democracy.

For decades, Libya was dominated by one-party rule, and this has created an aversion to the idea of political organization as part of a process to form a distinct polity around hard-fought-for civil liberties. This, coupled with a deeply rooted culture of tribalism and localism, represents a substantial barrier to the acceptance and growth of political parties, let alone the inclusive, collaborative culture they can inspire.

In spite of the hesitation among Libya’s self-serving, ruling elite, it is critical to recognize that a functional political party culture could be instrumental in efforts to consolidate the democratic transition and the unification of the state.

Political parties are absolutely essential, in any democratic system, to represent a variety of interests and provide policy alternatives, which is something that is urgently needed given the diversity of societal groups, interests and perspectives in post-Qaddafi Libya. They also serve as a mechanism through which citizens can voice discontent and wield their influence, from their decisions at the ballot box to active civic engagement, in a structured and effective manner.

After all, the Arab Spring that precipitated the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi was driven primarily by a quest for democracy, the pursuit of civil liberties, and the establishment of state structures that invite, rather than repudiate, civic participation. Regardless of the disarray in the country today, this demand still persists among the Libyan public.

A successful democracy mandates the presence of a diversified political party system that represents Libya’s diverse voices and concerns. The establishment of political parties could prove pivotal in achieving these aims, especially if any such aspirations dispense with idealism and learn from the failures and inadequacies that doomed Tunisia’s bid for democracy.

However, the prevailing power deficit in Libya has only splintered and caused more turmoil. The establishment of formal political parties could impose some much-needed structure and help regulate this chaos, thereby facilitating effective governance. Within such a framework, political parties can, and should, serve as platforms for policy discussions, decision-making and public opinion mobilization.

The international community’s zeal for that kind of structured governance, after Libya’s decade-long paralysis, is evident, and a democratic transition endorsed by the UN Support Mission in Libya and the EU might deliver the necessary platform for instituting an enduring political party culture.

However, the formation and implementation of this externally mandated, and curiously managed, agenda has left a lot to be desired in recent years, UN Special Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily’s plans notwithstanding.

The establishment of political parties is a necessary but not in itself sufficient condition for the emergence of an effective and responsible political system. Political parties cannot be created overnight; they need to be nurtured, groomed and developed over time.

To succeed, they need to be responsive to the needs and aspirations of broader society, remain open to learning from their mistakes and failures, as well as successes, and build credibility by delivering on their promises.

But they can also be a game-changer. A robust political party culture has the capacity to overcome identity politics and foster political dialogue that is inclusive, open and responsive to diverse, even competing, interests.

Political parties also have a key role to play in the development of an enabling environment for democratic governance, through active participation in public policy debate and electoral competition.

Clearly, there are numerous upsides to pursuing a distinct political party culture, even one that can function effectively despite the idiosyncrasies in Libya. However, aspirational endeavors such as this must also remain grounded in a rather disappointing, post-Arab Spring reality, as seen in other parts of the Maghreb and Sudan.

In Libya’s specific case, it is crucial to be aware of the country’s unique historical relationship with political parties. Past experiences have led to widespread mistrust in large-scale political organizations. Attempts to establish some kind of political party culture have met with resistance from various factions that view the parties as a threat to their autonomy.

Very often, these same groups end up co-opting those attempts into sophisticated tools for minimizing participation and engagement.

Moreover, deeply entrenched political and ideological divisions among the Libyan population, arising primarily from historical grievances and regional disparities, might lead to a profusion of parties with conflicting objectives, adding to the political instability rather than reducing it.

Libya’s societal fabric is also steeped in tribalism and regionalism, potentially exacerbating these disparities and instigating a polarized, irreparably chaotic landscape. In the relatively short period since 2011, Libyan political parties have mainly acted as conduits for regional or tribal biases, thereby adding to the political polarization.

Furthermore, Libya’s security landscape remains saturated with a variety of armed entities, which pose significant threats to the development of a comprehensive political party structure. These groups could either manipulate parties for personal gain or vehemently combat those that undermine their interests (or those of their foreign patrons). This precarious security dynamic will compromise the establishment and preservation of a vibrant party culture.

As Libya navigates these troubled waters, only time will tell whether it is ready to adopt a comprehensive political party culture. The current situation, however, is not promising. After all, Libya’s neighbor, Tunisia, had a fledgling political party culture that emerged after the downfall of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, yet that brief courtship — summarily ended by a hyper-presidential power grab — was not devoid of issues.

A persistent lack of public faith in political parties remains evident in both countries, suggesting that the mere establishment of a party system is not sufficient for a thriving democracy, or a panacea for the lack of one.

Historically, Libya’s single-party rule under Qaddafi’s regime inhibited the evolution of mature political discourse. The dearth of political experience and maturity among the populace could therefore impose constraints on the effective operation of political parties.

As such, the prospect of a political party culture in Libya represents a double-edged sword. It offers the promise of democracy, structured governance, and international support, yet it must also confront some difficult challenges, including robust tribalism, powerful armed factions and political immaturity. Striking an equilibrium in this scenario is the formidable, yet crucial, challenge facing the country.

Given these considerations, attempting to answer the question of whether Libya is ready for a political party culture is complicated. There appears to be the potential for its development but significant obstacles need to be addressed.

The immediate concern should not necessarily be whether to establish political parties, but rather how to institutionalize them in such a way that fosters national unity, encourages public trust, ensures representation of diverse interests across Libyan society, and contributes to a sustained democratic transition.

If Libya is to progress toward a functional and inclusive democracy, it needs to confront its historical aversion to organized politics, restore trust in state institutions, and foster a political culture that accommodates its multifaceted identity.

The true sign of readiness, therefore, lies not in the establishment of political parties in and of themselves, but in a willingness and capability to navigate the significant challenges in a collective and collaborative “bottom-up” context.

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Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the Ibn Khaldun Strategic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C., and former adviser to the dean of the board of executive directors of the World Bank Group.

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Jack Dutton

A brief mutiny in Russia last weekend by the Wagner Group has shifted the spotlight back to the on mercenary organization.

The latest US sanctions on Wagner Group-affiliated companies, including one based in the UAE, could impact the shadowy Russian mercenary group’s presence and operations in Libya, according to experts.

Last weekend, the Wagner Group, lead by founder Yevgeniy Prigozhin, rose in a mutiny that threatened to descend on Moscow and derail President Vladimir Putin’s leadership. In a last-minute deal brokered by Putin’s close ally, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Prigozhin agreed to stop the advance on the capital and travel to Belarus.

Putin said Monday that Wagner mutineers could join the Russian army or go to Belarus. Not many more details emerged of the agreement between the Wagner chief and the Kremlin, but the mutiny has drawn the shadowy mercenary group — which has been active in Ukraine as well in the Middle East and Africa — back into the spotlight.

On Wednesday, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four companies and one individual connected to the Wagner PMC and Prigozhin. One of the sanctioned companies was Dubai-based Industrial Resources General Trading, an industrial goods distributor. The US Treasury Department said in a statement that the company works with Diamville SAU, a sanctioned gold and diamond company controlled by Prigozhin, to allegedly ship the products from the Central African Republic to the UAE and Europe.

In January, Dubai-based aircraft company Kratol Aviation was also sanctioned by OFAC. Other UAE-based companies that are not Wagner associates have also been sanctioned due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In April, the United States sanctioned some UAE-based companies for allegedly shipping products to Russia.

Kimberley Donovan, director of the Economic Statecraft Initiative within the Atlantic Council’s Geoeconomics Center, believes the latest Wagner-related designation will not have a direct impact on business or foreign direct sentiment in the UAE.

“UAE was greylisted by [the Financial Action Task Force] earlier this year, which signals to the global financial system that risks exist within UAE’s financial sector and they need to improve their [anti-money laundering/counter-terrorist financing] regime and its implementation to comply with FATF standards. So this is not a big surprise,” Donovan told Al-Monitor.

Sanctions always have a chilling effect on business, but it is not always easy to predict the extent. Donovan said there have been issues “for years” with UAE exchanges and other types of businesses being used for terrorist financing.

“In some cases, the UAE has taken action to address the issues,” Donovan said. “They recently shut down Russian bank MTS’s operations in the country. We’ll see how the UAE responds to this designation.”

Time will tell whether other countries will sanction Industrial Resources General Trading, but Donovan said it probably would not make a significant difference.

“An OFAC designation carries significant weight and will restrict US persons from doing business with them and restrict IRGT’s access to the USD and US financial system,” she said. “It’s also a big signal that there is significant risk in working with this company. That may be enough to disrupt their activities and support to Wagner. Designations by other countries would not hurt.”

Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East policy, said it’s likely that more Emirati companies will be sanctioned soon due to links with Wagner. The main question is to what extent more sanctions will limit Wagner’s access to resources.

Other funding sources

The US Defense Intelligence Agency found in a 2020 assessment that the UAE may be serving as a funding source for Wagner PMC. Abu Dhabi denies the allegations. The Russian government has financed the mercenary group but over the years Wagner has found independent sources, for example in Central African Republic, by establishing control of gold and diamond mines.

“Wagner is not a pure mercenary group. It also has a business model, albeit a ruthless one. In fact there’s no equivalent to Wager (and Russian PMCs) overall in international law. It is a unique creation and as such has taken advantage of loopholes in the international legal system, simply because there is nothing like it and no precedent for it,” Borshchevskaya said.

“When it comes to the UAE, if Wagner loses funding there, it will have an impact perhaps more on Wagner activities specifically in Libya, where the UAE has reportedly funded Wagner deployment,” she added.

Andreas Kreig, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College, said logistics companies like Industrial Resources General Trading and Kratol Aviation are crucial for Wagner to keep its businesses running across Africa. Kreig said that Wagner’s network of overseas affiliates was built up after it started operations in Libya in 2018 “to make the expeditionary capability of Wagner in Africa and the Middle East a self-sufficient, self-funding network of companies that didn’t have to rely on the Russian state anymore.”

In Libya, Egypt and UAE are backing the Libyan National Army commander, Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter, looking to topple the UN-backed government supported by Turkey and Qatar. Hifter also has warm relations with Wagner and Russia.

Anton Mardasov, a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute, told Al-Monitor that the UAE and Russia share common interests outside of Wagner. “Prigozhin and his PMCs are only part of the story,” he said.

“The UAE and Prigozhin have actually had no contacts for a long time, and in Libya, payment for the services of the Wagner PMC has been going through Hifter for a long time. So these proxy companies may have another jurisdiction other than the UAE,” he added.

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Jamal Jowhar

Between Quneitra and Tripoli

Days pass by so slowly and heavily for the families of some migrant children in Libya, without any news to reassure them of their whereabouts. A Syrian mother from the southern Syrian province of Quneitra told us that the last contact with her son Haroun Abdul Hadi, 17, who went missing in Libya, was in October 2022.

“He last spoke to me from the city of Zuwara before the police took him to a shelter in Tripoli,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat through WhatsApp. “I want to check on him. He flew to Libya from Benina airport officially. We have had enough sufferings in our country.”

The tragedy of Haroun is similar to the stories of many Egyptian children and minors, but they are younger. Among them is Ayman Tarek al-Barri from the Asharqia governorate, 83 kilometers north of Cairo, who has not yet enrolled in third grade in middle school.

His sister told us that he went to Libya through the “mountain”, with the help of a Libyan smuggler named “Haj Riad,” who charged him 120,000 Egyptian pounds to transport him to Europe. “They brought him back from the sea together with others, and he is now locked up in Ain Zara prison in Tripoli,” she added.

A similar story can be found in the case of Marwan Abdel Salam, whose mother told Asharq Al-Awsat with a tone full of heartbreak and fear, that he was smuggled into Libya before security forces arrested him. Now, he is detained in the Reayat Al-Sekka prison in Tripoli. Having asked the Anti-Illegal Migration Agency in Tripoli about their whereabouts, we were told by a security official that they were about to be deported.

Panic among the migrants’ families couldn’t hide the sense of guilt among some of them. They felt they were the cause of the plight of their children. Some of these families have openly admitted to us that they sold most of their possessions to smuggle their children. Some of these children have not even completed their primary education, while others were being treated at the children Cancer Hospital in Egypt (57357 Hospital). Their pretext was the “temptations of brokers,” who told them that if their children traveled to Europe, they would go to school, work and send them a lot of money.

Other painful stories are told by Egyptian MP Dr. Sahar Etman, who said in a statement to Asharq Al-Awsat: “I have about 2,170 requests from Egyptian families complaining about the disappearance or imprisonment of their sons and daughters, including many children, in Libya.”

The MP, who confirmed to that a child who was being treated for cancer traveled to Libya, added: “This is a true; unfortunately, there are families who did everything to smuggle their children to Libya. What we care about now is the return of those imprisoned or missing to their families.”

The MP, who shows special concern over this issue, attributed the growth of this phenomenon to “what the fraudulent broker portrays to the families of these children. He deludes them into thinking that they will obtain citizenship, and appropriate work; and therefore, he could easily seize from them 120,000 or 150,000 Egyptian pounds for each to smuggling operation into Libya.”

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has already ratified the amendment of some provisions of the anti-illegal immigration law in April 2022. Anyone who commits, attempts or mediates the crime of smuggling of migrants would be punished with a maximum prison sentence and a fine of at least 200,000 Egyptian pounds.

There are Egyptian villages in various governotrates, including Assiut (Upper Egypt), Asharqia and Gharbia (Delta), where most of their young people fled to Italy through smuggling with the assistance of “brokers”. Others sought to catch up with them out of “social jealousy” and to improve the living conditions of their families, no matter the cost of the trip.

Father of the child, Osama Hamed Abdul-Ati, 16, from Damanhour al-Wahsh village in the Gharbia governorate, told Asharq Al-Awsat about how his son traveled to Libya by smuggling with the assistance of brokers. “We sent him 20,000 pounds, and now he is imprisoned; we don’t know his whereabouts.”

Running in the desert on tramadol

On the Egyptian-Libyan border, the first steps of the “crime of child trafficking” are taking place. An aspect of smuggling routes broker Abu Mazen kept secret will be revealed to us by Egyptian child Amr Atef Mohammed, 15, who returned to his family in Asharqia Governorate in December 2022. He will tell us about it later, and will reveal how a Libyan broker transported him with a group of young people from Matrouh by a “Bedouin” to an area inside Libya.

Part of the torment of the smuggling trip was revealed by the mother of one of the returnees from Libya, referred to as M.A. He is from a village in Bilbeis, Asharqia, and she said that “he has been suffering from disturbing nightmares that leave him terrified” since his return last December.

The mother, who is in her fifties, attributed this to what her son told her about his painful journey, which cost his poor family 120,000 Egyptian pounds, which they borrowed from relatives and acquaintances. She even had to sell her “tuk-tuk”, the family’s source of income.

She added: “The broker’s assistant who accompanied them in the desert trip was threatening to shoot them if they stopped running. He dissolved some tramadol tablets in a bottle of water to give those whose strength fails.”

According to the accounts we got from returnees and their families, migrants, no matter how young, are forced to run for about 10 hours continuously before they reach the town of Emsaed inside the Libyan border or the Siwa Oasis path in Egypt, facing the Al Jaghbub Oasis in Libya.

MP Dr. Sahar Etman, quoting an Egyptian family she met, said that one of its sons had to “abandon his 10-year-old brother in the border area at gunpoint by the smuggler, so that he can join the rest of the group.”

According to a Libyan security expert, who requested anonymity for security reasons, such a group of migrants “becomes hostage to the broker’s assistant, and he had to hand over the entire group to a bigger trader waiting for them in Libya.”

Flights from Syria to Benghazi and back

If the escape by land is covered by the brokers and their assistants, how can minors get around by air? Here, Tarek Lamloum, a Libyan human rights lawyer and director of the “Baladi foundation for Human Rights,” reveals how children pass through some airports. He spoke of increasing reports reaching them, and other human rights organizations, about the loss of contact with minors who arrived in Libya since early February 2022.

Lamloum links a new office for an airline in Benghazi, which he says organizes regular flights from Syria to Libya, to child smuggling operations. “Starting in 2019, we noticed minors entering the country. How can an airport allow unaccompanied children, for example, 14 or 15 years old, to enter planes?” he wondered.

Asharq Al-Awsat contacted Benina International Airport and the company concerned, and their officials confirmed that all their procedures are “in accordance with the law.”

However, Lamloum said: “The smugglers coordinate before the arrival of the flights. Once the passengers arrive in Benghazi, they are transferred to cities in western Libya, where the journey of their kidnapping and detention begins. Many times, minors are found in houses close to the sea, in preparation for their smuggling to European shores.”

The story about the airline, which Lamloum accuses of “taking part in smuggling of children from Syria to Libya,” was later confirmed by Byron Camilleri, the Maltese Interior Minister. On March 13, “The Times of Malta” newspaper quoted the minister as saying that his country asked the European Commission “to take action against human smugglers who send migrants from Bangladesh to Libya, with the intention of crossing to Europe.” He accused the airline, to which the Libyan human rights activist previously referred, of being among those involved.

It did not stop there, but almost ten days after the Maltese minister criticized the airliner, Algerian authorities announced the dismantling of an “international network” for smuggling migrants to Libya, and from there to Europe through Algerian territory.

According to the Algerian news website “An-Nahar online”, the relevant authorities opened an investigation that lasted five months. The investigation allowed the Algerian police to track down the network that transported migrants from Syria and Lebanon to Benghazi airport. Meanwhile, the Central Department for Combating Organized Crime in Algeria announced that it had arrested 15 members of this network; they were nine Syrians and six Algerians, all of whom were brought before the courts.

Prostitution, organ trafficking and militias

The situation in Libya seemed frightening for the families of irregular migrants. News coming to Egypt, or to any African capital, indicates unknown and similar fates that many children in Libya are exposed to, including moving between prisons and official detention facilities, or “secret warehouses” belonging to armed groups.

In parallel with the “dream of wealth” promised by the brokers, large numbers of migrants are now living a painful reality, according to the Human Rights Watch Annual Report for 2023. The report warned that they are subjected to” ill-treatment, sexual assault, forced labor and extortion by members of armed groups, smugglers, and human traffickers.”

“Various foreign gangs stand behind bringing them from several African countries to Libya, with the intention of exploiting them, either in prostitution and begging, or facilitating their smuggling to Italy, after exhausting them financially and physically,” a senior leader of the agency of Combating Illegal Migration in Tripoli said, while discussing the reasons why the migration of children to Libya has increased significantly, at least over the past year.

The security official, who sent us a statement and requested anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the media, revealed to Asharq Al-Awsat that there are “gangs that bring children to be used for forced labor, obliging them to work for free in remote farms or in scrap stores.”

Having asked the security official about the information we received about trafficking of human organs of the migrants, he vehemently denied it. But days later, the General Directorate of Criminal Research in Sabha arrested a gang that it said was “involved in trafficking in human organs and smuggling irregular migrants from Southern to central Libya.”

The General Directorate of Criminal Investigation explained on December 25, 2022, that the gang members arrested belong to three different African nationalities.

The exploitation of some of these children for begging by “Libyan and African networks”, or abusing them sexually, haunts many families who came to Libya, seeking asylum in Europe. A Syrian mother told us that her son, 14, “was detained by three people, who threatened to kill him, and took turns raping him.”

Ahmed Al-Morabet Al-Zaidani, head of the Legal Committee of the Victims Organization of Human Rights, informed us about what is happening behind the scenes with a larger group of migrant children, who are the “weakest point” both in detention centers and on the Libyan scene. “In addition to the physical violations previously suffered by the Sudanese child Mazen Adam, we have observed sexual abuse of four Syrian children in Tripoli who are asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR,” he said.

“Have you noticed the existence of gangs involved in the sale of children, as is the case with elderly migrants?” Asharq Al-Awsat asked Al-Zaidani. “These crimes may take place in the south-west and south-east of Libya,” he answered.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres submitted a report to the UN Security Council at the beginning of April 2023, in which he revealed that migrant children were subject to violations in Libya, “including forced labor in armed groups.”

According to the report, many children have been victims of “trafficking and abuse,” noting that the United Nations has verified 24 cases of children “abducted from Sudan, registered as asylum seekers, and later sent to Libya to be trafficked.”

‘Information for sale’

This crime goes beyond Egyptian nationals who went missing, to include other nationalities in Libya.

Human rights activist Zaidani informed us about what happened with a Moroccan mother who lost her son, and then unknown people alleged to her that they knew his whereabouts, while others claimed that he was in one of the shelters.

“This misinformation is a form of organized crime in itself, so that information is leaked about the name and family of the missing person, whether he is an immigrant or asylum seeker, and then his family is financially drained. There are several similar cases,” he said.

Apart from suffering, children may be separated from their migrant parents for various reasons, including death or kidnapping, to face an uncertain and dark future. One such incident is related to two children from Cameroon, whose mother was kidnapped a year ago in one of the regions of southern Libya while she was entering the country.

The two children told the “Baladi Foundation for Human Rights” that their mother was detained after she was unable to pay the rest of the agreed amount for the trip. The Foundation believes that the mother is more likely to be subjected to sexual exploitation at the hands of smugglers, after they allowed the children to continue along with the rest of the migrants.

_________________

Mary Fitzgerald

Libya’s political players have grappled with how to build a political party culture since the country held its first post-Gadhafi elections in 2012. Under Moammar Gadhafi, political organizing was banned. Decades of regime propaganda against outlawed opposition movements made Libyans suspicious of political groups and parties. 

When the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) drafted a constitutional declaration during the 2011 uprising against Gadhafi, it stipulated the establishment of a democratic system based on “political and party plurality” and guaranteed the freedom to form political parties. The NTC declaration was only ever meant to be temporary, but in the absence of a proper constitution, it remains the legal underpinning of Libya’s troubled transition. 

Libya’s first experience of political parties came with the vote for the General National Congress (GNC) in 2012. During the drafting of the electoral law that year, some argued that an individual-based system would exacerbate tribalism and regionalism while others claimed that a party-based system would favor already established groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The GNC was eventually elected under a hybrid system that included both individual and party lists, with non-Islamist parties ultimately faring better in the party list.

Two years later, the House of Representatives (HoR) was elected to replace the GNC. That ballot had one key difference: All candidates were required to run as independents. This was partly due to growing animosity toward political parties. Popular frustration with the GNC meant political parties were often blamed for its shortcomings. Party headquarters were frequently attacked during the GNC’s lifetime. Almost a decade on, however, many critics of the HoR — which remains in place as no elections have been held since 2014 — insist much of its dysfunction stems from the absence of political parties. 

Over the past nine years, Libya’s parties have operated as shadow players in the country’s fractious politics. During the 2014-20 civil conflict, there were frequent calls to ban political parties outright as polarization deepened and people sought scapegoats for the country’s derailed transition.

Libya’s political landscape now looks very different. Several of the main formations that emerged in 2012 have since either been riven by infighting or have faded away. Most notably, the two dominant groups in that year’s election — the Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and its main rival, the National Forces Alliance (NFA) — have experienced splits. Those new to the scene include parties associated with the so-called “Greens,” or former regime figures and sympathizers, plus more tribal or regionally oriented parties. 

As part of efforts to get Libya’s democratic transition back on track, a more stringent political party registration system was introduced in early 2021, ahead of elections that were due to take place that December but were postponed. Robust vetting is considered crucial to prevent electoral fraud. More than 70 parties have since been approved for licenses, according to the body overseeing the process.

The number of parties not yet registered is estimated at over 100. Some parties, particularly those that trace their roots to the 2012 elections, such as the JCP plus NFA offshoots, have started to organize together and form networks and umbrella groups over the past two years. This may result in parties merging ahead of a future national ballot.

Three main currents are emerging: the Greens, the Islamists, and the nationalists. Libya does not have a defined secular/Islamist political cleavage, so anti/non-Islamist groupings are often described or self-describe as nationalist, a catch-all term that can include more liberal-leaning elements as well as social conservatives who do not identify as Islamist. In the 2012 election, there was little difference between nationalist party platforms and those of mainstream Islamist parties. All the leading parties supported the idea of sharia law being a basis for legislation. This is unlikely to change as parties prepare for future parliamentary elections. Detailed party manifestos were rare in 2012 and few have issued any since.

The Green current is believed to already comprise more than a dozen parties, with the most prominent being the National Movement party, led by former Gadhafi government minister Mustafa al-Zaidi. “That’s ironic when you consider the Gadhafi regime’s ideological opposition to the very idea of political parties,” says one party leader from the nationalist camp. Some observers believe the nationalist current stands to lose most if Green political parties gain momentum.

Since 2020, the development of youth-driven protest movements against the status quo raises the question of whether new political parties might yet emerge from a younger generation shaped by very different experiences in post-Gadhafi Libya. While these youth movements have yet to coalesce into a unified force, what they share is a frustration with an older political elite considered corrupt and out of touch. In recent years, the more established parties have sought to engage more with youth and women. Given the broad social conservatism of Libyan society, few believe the country’s political scene might include an openly secular or avowedly liberal party anytime soon.

Party leaders from across Libya’s political spectrum lament that they have too often been overlooked in diplomatic efforts to resolve the current impasse and nudge the country toward fresh elections. Indeed, some diplomats have considered them largely irrelevant to the power struggles that drove the 2014-20 civil conflict and still linger today.

In early March, 52 political parties signed a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres complaining that U.N. Envoy Abdoulaye Bathily’s new roadmap did not include them. “By virtue of the constitutional and legal framework, [parties] are a cornerstone and have a vital role in the political process,” the letter stated. “Democratic systems are based on political and party plurality.” Later that month, Bathily met with representatives from 21 political parties and his team has continued to engage since. Unsurprisingly, political parties are pushing for future electoral laws to include a large party list. “Without parties, it’s like trying to have a Champions League without any [soccer] clubs,” one party leader told me. “You cannot stabilize Libya’s politics without parties.”

The 6+6 Joint Committee, comprised of six representatives from the HoR and six from the High State Council (which is itself composed of former GNC members), has been tasked with drafting laws to organize elections Bathily wants to see happen later this year. They have decided to allocate just over 50% of seats in the next parliament to a party list.

Libyans who believe parties are key to embedding a less dysfunctional and more sustainable political culture say internationals should do more to support the idea of party lists. But Libya’s political parties themselves need to mature and reflect on whether they represent the longer-term interests of broad swathes of the population or narrower interests. “There’s not much vision beyond the here and now,” says one international. 

Despite Bathily’s entreaties, few Libyans believe elections will take place this year, or even next year. In the meantime, Libya’s political parties will continue to press their case. There are indications, including observations from party activists as well as public polling, that attitudes toward parties are shifting and that most Libyans accept they have a role to play in the country’s political life. Which parties might be up to the challenge is another question. Libya’s still-young experiment with democracy remains fragile and its political parties have a long way to go.

***

Mary Fitzgerald is a researcher and consultant specializing in the Euro-Mediterranean region with a particular focus on Libya. She is a non-resident scholar with MEI’s North Africa and the Sahel Program.

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How do “international networks” bring African children to be trafficked and smuggled into Europe?

Jamal Jowhar

***

Big human traffickers hide behind “false names” to round up boys from Africa and Asia for gangs to use them in forced labor, prostitution, and armed groups. Asharq Al-Awsat is tracking cross-border smuggling routes.

He called me from Italy in a frightened, trembling voice. “My brother Adham traveled to Libya, and there was no news of him. We no longer know if he is alive or dead,” he told me. This was one of the calls between us, during which Egyptian Osama Abdel-Tawab Amin informed me in October 2022 about what happened to his brother Adham, 14, who had traveled from Egypt to Libya, heading towards the city of eastern Libyan city of Benghazi.

Adham, born and raised in the southern Egyptian Assiut Governorate, is one of thousands of minors from several Arab and African countries who long dreamed of emigrating to Europe. Adham is one of those who surrendered themselves to “brokers” to start a “journey of wandering” that may end in either prison, on Europe’s shores, or perhaps a return to their countries, but this time to their “last resting place”.

Asharq Al-Awsat investigated these incidents in the Nile Delta to Sidi Barrani near the Libyan border, reaching other countries, including Sudan and Chad. It sought to document extensive operations that smuggle minors, and explore how they infiltrate Libya, and what parties are involved and benefitting from the situation.

In early 2021, we have observed an increase in Egyptian, African and Syrian families reporting that their children had travelled to Libya and whose fate is unknown. Families were looking for whoever could help return their children. They spoke of how they were “being scammed by brokers.”

Part of this tragedy was unfolded in front of the back entrance of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, overlooking the Cairo Nile. Asharq Al-Awsat witnessed a large number of complaints they submitted there. Complaints were also sent to the Egyptian parliament.

The beginning of tragedy … a broker

In mid-March 2022, the coastguard in the eastern Libyan city of Tobruk announced that a migrant boat sank in the Mediterranean Sea, off the Wadi Umm Al-Shawsh area. It was carrying a number of migrants, including about 18 young Egyptians. After days of searching for the missing, the family of Egyptian child Amr Sayed Anwar, 15, that lives in one of the villages of Dakahlia Governorate, north of Cairo, was told that their son was among the drowned.

About a month after the incident, I contacted Amr’s father, who lives in a village near Sinbalawin in Dakahlia. The man, who is about 50 years old and works as a daily-paid farmer, said the authorities in Libya have not found the body of his son, tearfully adding: “I lost my son forever”.

The man’s breakdown prevented me from inquiring about how he traveled to Libya, but he exploded angrily when he mentioned the “broker”.

“I paid 30,000 pounds, (US$ 1,000) and Amr traveled with 22 others of his age and may be older. They traveled to Marsa Matrouh to meet the broker. After they arrived in Libya, the broker, again, asked for an additional 70,000 pounds for his travel to Italy.”

I left the Anwar family, consisting of four daughters, all under 20 years of age and a child younger than seven, to their grief and poverty. I went to see the broker after the father gave me his phone number. It was clear that the “brokerage market”, like any other, is subject to supply and demand, bargaining and negotiation and that each Libyan region has a price paid by those wishing to go to it. Prices are also decided based on proximity to the Egyptian border.

It turned out that the broker is widely popular among those wishing to emigrate clandestinely in a number of rural governorates in the Nile Delta, although he lives in Sidi Barrani, 570 kilometers northwest of Cairo. The broker did not respond to any requests for an interview concerning his activity in transporting those wishing to travel across the border. However, he responded to us when we introduced ourselves as parents wishing to send their children abroad.

During the first phone call, I asked him to help smuggle three boys to Libya. He didn’t mind and asked me about which region they wanted to go. Broker Abu Mazen (a pseudonym), whose accent is a mix of Egyptian and Libyan, did not give me time to answer. He went on to specify the required amount and said that he could transfer any number across the Egyptian border to the Libyan inland. He added, as if reassuring me: “I consider them my children, I swear.”

About ten days later, I called Abu Mazen, and it seemed that he forgot our conversation due to the high number of calls he receives, so he asked me to remind him of our past talk. Then, I asked to meet him, and, reluctantly, he asked that we meet a week later in Matrouh.

This call was at the end of May 2022, and before the agreed date, he felt that it would be more appropriate for both of us to meet in Alexandria, as he was going to visit one of his relatives.

In a café overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, in the Asafra area of Alexandria, 230 kilometers north of Cairo, we met as agreed. We talked about how to bring young people together, and how to smuggle them out of the country.

It struck me that the 60-year-old man was speaking comfortably, but when we get to the details, he became cautious. While boasting, Abu Mazen, whose phone did not stop ringing, began to show how he has a strong network of relations inside Libya. He suddenly said: “I do not exploit young people or deceive them. They just come to ask us to smuggle them to Libya, and we help them and leave them only within the area they specify.”

Abu Mazen referred to the many phone calls he received in less than an hour that we spent together at the café, as proof of the growing demand for his services. He was also keen to show that his services are not overpriced “like others.”

He added: “We take care of others’ children. I take 20,000 Egyptian pounds (about US$650) per person to move from the Hodoud Barani to Tripoli, and 15,000 pounds to Benghazi. Others would ask for 40,000 and 50,000 pounds, and then leave the young people on the road, or sell them”. He added: “The Libyan dinar now is equivalent to five Egyptian pounds, (US$1 is equivalent to 5.12 Libyan dinar).”

In response to persistent appeals to show me the smuggling routes, Abu Mazen said: “This has been my job for years, and I have my men in Libya, ten hours away from the Customs Office side. Young people arrive in Libya, and I only leave them when each arrives at the place he wants.” I asked him: “which customs?” He replied with a Libyan accent: ” Emsaed Customs”.

Very discreetly, he said he brings young people from different governorates to the city of Matrouh on a specific date, before transporting them to Salloum, and from there, “they walk in desert roads and routes, along the Emsaed crossing border between Egypt and Libya”.

Having asked him again about the age of young people he helps smuggle, he showed no interest. He only said: “We take the money. We don’t care about their ages.” Laughing, he added: “There is a lot of demand for transporting young people. But what can we do? This is what their families want.”

He explained that those he smuggles “are planning to migrate from Libya to Europe… a trip costs aroun 120,000 to 150,000 Egyptian pounds.” He said he does not receive the full agreed amount in advance so as to “reassure people” that he is not a swindler. He added: “They will not get away with the money. My men in Libya are there.”

International networks

Due to increasing smuggling of young people by Abu Mazen and other brokers in the Egyptian Delta, the current situation indicates that smuggling operations exceed the capabilities of the “local network”.

Considering that irregular migration operations are carried out clandestinely, there are no related official statistics. Yet, the International Organization for Migration revealed the presence of more than 117,000 Egyptian migrants in Libya between December 2021 and January 2022.

What we have from Libya inland, and the details the families of migrant children have shared with us reveal a ramified and extended international network linking Libya with several countries, including Egypt and Sudan. The most well-known of these is, perhaps, the “Kidan” network, led by an Eritrean wanted by the Interpol.

The Italian “Information Security Policy” annual report for 2022 refers to “organized criminal networks in Libya, in the cities of Zuwara, Zawiya and Sabratha (to the west). The report considers these networks among chief reasons for the remarkable increase in migration by sea noticed the same year. The report also reveals “criminal partnerships made up of Tunisian and Italian brokers involved in various illegal trafficking operations, including facilitating irregular migration.”

The report attributed the “high pressure of irregular migration flows in 2022, towards Italy and Europe, especially from Africa, the Middle East and Asia”, to factors such as “political instability, armed conflicts, severe climate change and a strong demographic push.”

In addition to the report, Greek authorities are investigating seven Egyptians who were arrested there, according to press reports. They are accused of smuggling 484 people from Syria, Sudan, Pakistan and Egypt, including 128 boys and nine girls, after a rickety boat carrying them from Libya lost its way, near the southern Mediterranean island of Crete.

From Adham, the Egyptian…. to Eissa, the Sudanese

The tragedy of the family of the drowned child Amr, is not much different from what many other families suffered. They all share the same motives and social reasons that prompted them to accept the departure of their children from Egypt by means of smuggling through “brokers”. “Many people have traveled to Italy, and God helped them. They built new houses, and their circumstances improved”, says the mother of child Mossad Mohammed Ismail, from Ezbet Akl, in Mansoura city.

What is remarkable here, as we moved from one governorate to another and listened to some families, is that large groups of those who have fled to Libya, at least over the past year, are children and minors between the ages of 12 and 17. One of them is Adham Abdel Tawab Amin, who left from Borg El Arab Airport in Alexandria, according to his brother Osama, before enrolling in the third grade of middle school.

With great sadness, Osama explained that “the broker got Adham into the plane from Borg El Arab in Alexandria, to Benina airport in Benghazi on August 22, 2022. From there he moved to western Libya. We do not know his whereabouts.”

There are many tragic stories that we have seen related to many children detained in Libya. Some of them are held at official detention facilities, others are believed to be in the grip of human trafficking gangs, while others may have been washed away by the sea.

Our list is long and has hundreds of children from Egypt and as well as other African countries. Apart from Adham, there are Ayman Tarek Al-Bari, 14, Marwan Abdul-Salam ,15, Osama Hamed Abdul-Ati, 17, Ahmed Mohammed Faiq, 17, and Bilal Mohammed al-Jamal, 17.

We met their families successively in Egyptian governorates. There are also the Sudanese Mubarak Harun Musa, who disappeared five years ago, and Abdul Mawla Issa, with whom we spoke by phone. It turned out that he entered Libya at a young age, and recently left it at the age of 23 on an evacuation trip to Rwanda.

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Elis Gjevori

A pivotal force in Russia’s war against Ukraine, Wagner Group’s capabilities have been honed in Syria, Libya and elsewhere in Africa.

***

The Wagner Group’s rebellion against the Russian state could have major repercussions not only for the group’s operations in the Middle East but also for Moscow’s ability to replace the financial and military networks fostered by the paramilitary outfit in the region. 

The mercenary group, which launched an armed mutiny overnight Saturday, has built a spider’s network of military, business and political relationships over the past decade that encompass Libya, Syria, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. 

Wagner forces fighting in Ukraine had also until recently been a crucial asset supporting the Russian military on the battlefield. The self-funded force recently provided Russia with its first recent discernible victory when it captured the strategic town of Bakhmut. 

But the group’s considerable capabilities might not have been so well-honed were it not for its experiences in the Middle East and Africa. Wagner mercenaries cut their teeth fighting side-by-side with Russian troops in the battlefields of Syria, as a stand-alone outfit in Libya, and are even involved in the current conflicts in Sudan, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). 

“Wagner really started its Africa operations in Libya and did so in a very effective manner. It was a bridgehead that the UAE facilitated at the time from which Wagner was able to really expand,” Andreas Krieg, associate professor of security studies at King’s College London, told Middle East Eye.

While Wagner is not an official company in Russia, since the existence of private military companies is not allowed, the group has nonetheless created shell companies outside the country that it used to self-finance its operations and propel itself to power. 

Its “strategically significant” bridgehead in Libya allowed the group to create links with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemeti, who heads the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Krieg added.

The RSF, a militia force like Wagner, is now embroiled in its own rebellion against the Sudanese state. 

Wagner and the UAE

Wagner, which is under the control of Yevgeny Prigozhin, until recently a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is sanctioned by the United States and other countries for a network of investments made in places like Sudan, Mali and the CAR. 

Billions of dollars worth of gold have allegedly made their way from Sudan to the UAE, much of which is widely thought to be facilitated by Wagner.

MEE reached out to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs for comment but did not receive a response by time of publication.

US officials have openly expressed that it believes some of the gold mining concessions operated by Wagner have been partly re-directed towards Moscow’s $130bn gold stash, helping Putin’s administration circumvent the effect of economic sanctions imposed over the Ukraine war.

“The Kremlin relied on the UAE to facilitate many of the Wagner operations across Africa in 2018 because at the time it was a tool of Russian partially soft power but also hard power,” said Krieg. 

Last year, the US accused Wagner mercenaries of exploiting natural resources in the CAR, Mali, Sudan and elsewhere in the continent, which it would not have been able to do without the UAE.

“Prigozhin in particular had good relationships with the UAE, which is an important partner for Russia because there are a lot of private personal networks between Abu Dhabi and Kremlin elites,” Krieg said.

The multibillion-dollar question now is the extent to which Putin will pressure UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to “clamp down” on these networks, Krieg said.

“Wagner would not be able to operate if they no longer had access to the infrastructure, financial logistics, gold trade infrastructure that the UAE has provided,” he added.

While the Wagner, Sudan and UAE nexus has been a key relationship that has made all sides significant amounts of money, the Russian paramilitary group’s military skills have been much sought after in other conflict areas.

Russia’s strategic interests in Libya

Since 2019, Wagner mercenaries have played a crucial role in helping Libya’s eastern renegade military commander turned warlord Khalifa Haftar to maintain control over the country’s southern and eastern regions. 

“Without an alternative foreign security umbrella, the withdrawal of Wagner would pose a threat to Haftar’s influence in eastern and southern Libya,” said Ferhat Polat, a researcher at the University of Exeter with a focus on Libyan affairs.

With Wagner’s help, the Libyan conflict has effectively become a cold war. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the internationally recognised Tripoli government are likely looking at events in Russia and what it might mean for the balance of power in the country.

“The Wagner mercenaries have provided the necessary military expertise and resources that are not available within the LNA,” Polat told MEE.

“The Kremlin’s increased presence has given them greater leverage over western powers. The withdrawal of Wagner fighters could impact Russia’s geostrategic interests. However, it remains unclear whether Russia will actually withdraw its mercenaries from Libya,” he said.

Wagner’s presence in Syria

Syria was one of Wagner’s first forays outside Europe. The group deployed mercenaries to fight alongside the forces of Bashar al-Assad in 2015, at the same time that Putin launched an air campaign in support of Damascus.

It’s difficult to draw “bold conclusions” at the moment and the unfolding situation has a “tremendous  amount of potential to impact  the Ukraine war as well as Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East at large,” Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Washington-based geopolitical risk consultancy Gulf State Analytics said.

“Clearly what is happening in Russia undermines Russian unity, and there is potential for actors in the Middle to look at Russia differently,” he said.

Syria is one of the few publicly documented conflict zones where US forces have directly engaged Wagner fighters. In 2018, the US military killed between 200 and 300 pro-Assad fighters, many of whom were assumed to be Wagner mercenaries, after they assaulted a US military outpost in eastern Syria.

Syria is a linchpin for Moscow’s projection of regional power. Russia has strategic access to the Eastern Mediterranean through its naval base in Tartus. Meanwhile, companies linked to Wagner have obtained lucrative stakes in oil and gas deposits in territory formerly controlled by the Islamic State group.

“No matter how the latest crisis unfolds, Russia’s power projection is bound to be diminished across the MENA region,” said Yonatan Touval, an analyst at the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies (Mitvim).

Post-Wagner power vacuum

While the war in Ukraine has meant that Russia has had to reduce its military presence in Syria, Wagner has also been impacted.

“Wagner Group has been struggling to keep its operations across multiple fronts too, with the additional challenge posed by strong pressure exerted by the US on its Middle East allies to expel its mercenaries from Sudan and Libya,” Touval told MEE.

“The key question is whether these developments will create a power vacuum that will allow other players to enter, with the downside being rapid destabilisation in such areas as Syria and Libya.”

The weakening Russian hand in the region is already being felt. MEE reported last year that Russia had to delay servicing Middle Eastern arms clients because of supply shortages as a result of the war in Ukraine.

While Russia’s military presence in Syria means that Wagner’s activities can be quickly stopped in Libya and other African countries, this is going to be “more difficult” if Moscow moves to liquidate the group, said Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council.

“There are no Russian troops in these other regions, and local regimes work directly with Wagner and not with official Russian structures,” said Semenov, speaking to MEE from Russia.

“It cannot be ruled out that if the rebellion is suppressed, and I hope this will happen soon, the Wagner branches in Africa may turn into completely uncontrollable mercenary structures that will themselves build ties with local governments without regard to Moscow,” Semenov said.

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Key issues remain strongly contested despite draft laws agreed in Morocco by Libya’s rival legislative bodies.

…

Libya’s feuding parties have reached an agreement on legal steps to hold long-delayed elections in the troubled North African nation, yet contentious issues blocking the democratic process remain unresolved, according to observers and a copy of the agreement seen by Al Jazeera.

A 6+6 committee drawn from Libya’s two rival legislative bodies – the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based High Council of State (HCS) – agreed on June 6 on draft laws for presidential and parliamentary elections, inching forward in the country’s current political crisis.

Libya has been fraught with conflict for more than a decade since the removal of former strongman Muammar Gaddafi during the Arab Spring in 2011 and rival factions began competing for power. By 2015, the two legislative bodies had formed and the struggle over Libya’s rule and wealth has continued since.

While welcoming progress, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily on Monday warned the Security Council that “key issues remain strongly contested,” blocking the road to “a final settlement” and harbouring the potential to spark a new crisis in the divided country.

He added that he intended to intensify negotiations to address “serious loopholes and technical shortcomings” in the draft laws and make them “implementable” and effective in regulating “successful elections”.

The current political crisis stems from the failure to hold elections on December 24, 2021, and the refusal of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah – who led the transitional Government of National Unity (GNU) in the capital Tripoli – to step down.

In response, the country’s east-based parliament appointed a rival prime minister, Fathi Bashagha, who has for months sought to install his government in Tripoli.

Observers told Al Jazeera that many of the contested issues that hijacked the democratic process in 2021 were still unresolved.

“Bathily is rightfully noticing the concerns around an elections programme that is not accepted across the political spectrum and that risks sowing further division,” Tim Eaton, senior research fellow at Chatham House, told Al Jazeera.

“Clearly his calculation is that he needs to get a much wider agreement on what happens next and the challenge is being able to do that [and] to move forward,” Eaton said.

Presidential candidate eligibility

One of the main roadblocks to the democratic process has been reaching an agreement on the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates.

Azzedine Guerbi, a member of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) who attended talks in Morocco’s Bouznika ahead of the deal, told Al Jazeera that the two sides had agreed that candidates with military affiliations must automatically resign from their posts.

A copy of the text obtained by Al Jazeera states that once a candidacy is accepted, the presidential runner is “considered disqualified from their occupation or position by force of law”.

However, no additional provisions are made to ensure that a candidate does not resume their post once the electoral process is concluded.

Jalel Harchaoui, an expert on Libya and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), told Al Jazeera the failure to address the issue presents clear dangers.

“If you lose, you can go back to being military and mobilise a force to go after the winner,” Harchaoui said. “This should not be possible.”

Similarly, the draft law requires dual nationals to provide a “statement certified by the granting country’s embassy that proves the submission of final waiver of the citizenship of [the second] country”, but does not specify mechanisms to verify compliance.

According to Eaton at Chatham House, the debate over the eligibility criteria for the presidential election has become shorthand for the engagement of Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA), who also holds US citizenship.

“The UN previously felt that agreement could be reached on this area, so I think it’s a question of whether that agreement is being held up to prevent a political process or whether it is a true point of contention that can’t be navigated,” Eaton said.

New interim government

Among the provisions that Bathily raised as a concern was the requirement to form a new government ahead of elections.

According to Harchaoui, Bathily “knows that if a brand-new government is installed, that government will do everything in its power to make the elections fail and to stay in power for as long as possible.”

Additionally, the definition of a “new” government was still up for debate. “If Abdul Hamid Dbeibah reshuffles his ministries and implements a big change, is it a new government even if he remains prime minister?” Harchaoui said.

Dbeibah’s rivals, including HoR speaker Aguila Saleh and the Egyptian government, maintain that he should leave the post.

Eaton said the insistence on formulating an interim government again begged the question of whether the issue hid the “unwillingness of the existing elites to create a new process that could lead to their replacement.”

“Some of their arguments for removing the [Government of National Unity (GNU)] from its privileged position are justified, but if they create an interim government what we’ll probably see is that the talk of elections will die down,” the analyst added.

Second-round voting

The “linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections” was flagged by the UN envoy as potentially problematic.

According to Harchaoui, the criteria determining whether to hold a second round of voting were very vague. “There are still mechanisms to force a second round even if a candidate wins with an absolute majority in the first round,” he said.

Additionally, the draft laws’ provision cancelling parliamentary elections if the first-round presidential vote is not held or completed was also fraught with risks.

Having a parliamentary vote at the same time as the second round of presidential elections exposes the legislative vote to the possibility of being hijacked by presidential candidates dissatisfied with their performance in the first round, the analyst said.

Bathily warned that those contested issues were likely to take the electoral process into a dead end as happened in 2021, “which will result in further polarisation and even the destabilisation of the country”.

Libya has “once again reached a critical stage”, he said.

“Successful elections require not just a legal framework, but also a political agreement that ensures buy-in and inclusion of all major stakeholders.”

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Khaled Mahmoud

Washington’s obsession with the Wagner Group is clouding its efforts to contain Russia’s growing influence in Libya and Sudan. 

***

In the 12 years since the killing of Muammar Gaddafi and the collapse of the state, Washington has stayed clear of direct engagement with the Libyan civil war.  CIA Director, William Burns’ 24-hour visit in January is an indication of the necessity – rather than the desire – to re-engage. The most immediate reason for this: to curb Moscow’s growing influence both among Libya’s warring factions, and in the wider region in which the crisis in Sudan has been sucked into the region’s larger vortex of violence and instability.

The foreign mercenary file

Although the 5 + 5 Joint Military Committee, which includes the two main protagonists of the military conflict in Libya, have met inside and outside Libya to settle the niggling issue of  removing mercenaries from Libyan territory, the response of their patrons is far from enthusiastic.

According to sources in the United Nations mission in Libya, its head, Abdoulaye Bathily, returned from his visit to Sudan, Chad and Niger, all of which border Libya, without obtaining a clear timetable for the start of the gradual withdrawal of an army of foreign mercenaries from Libyan territory.

Months after CIA Director William Burns visited Libya, the first high-ranking US official to do so since the end of 2011, . Burns contented himself with meeting representatives of the two military forces in the east, represented by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Commander-in-Chief of the National Army stationed in the eastern region, and Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba, head of the Interim Unity Government, ignoring the presidents of the presidential councils, parliament, and the state.

Hany Khallaf, the former Egyptian ambassador to Libya, believes that the Americans, who control Libyan affairs remotely, are seeking to replace any other international parties to determine the future of Libya.

He told African Arguments that the visit is an attempt to ensure the future of the US presence there and to compete with other countries such as Russia, France and Italy with their military and economic presence.

He pointed out that Burns’ meeting with Dabaiba means that the latter, from the US point of view, is the legitimate official responsible for the government. The legitimacy of Dabaiba’s government supported, on the other hand, the parallel government of stability headed by Fathi Bashagha, which was recognized by the Libyan parliament.

He believed that the US presence in Libya, although it mainly concerns the strategic interests of the United States, is threatened by more than one regional and international party.

New strategy

In confirmation of this trend, in March the Biden administration presented its strategy for the next ten years for Libya, which the active political parties have unsurprisingly received in complete silence.

The United States said in an official statement wntirely lacking in irony, that it is committed to assisting the Libyans in their ongoing struggle for a more peaceful, stable and united future, noting that Libya has faced, since the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, division and violent conflict.

Washington accused external actors, including Russia, of exploiting the unstable situation in Libya, posing a threat to NATO’s southern flank and further destabilizing the Sahel region.

The American plan is supposed to create the necessary conditions for holding democratic elections in the long term, which elections all the parties insist must be held this year, an increasingly unlikely possibility.

Recently, US special envoy to Libya, Robert Norland put forward the possibility of holding elections in the presence of foreign forces and without the withdrawal of mercenaries. Dabaiba, who appears to believe that staying on Washington’s good side bolsters his chances of consolidating power, immediately endorsed the proposal. Haftar, the strongman who militarily controls the south and east of the country, thwarted by the mercenaries, quite predictably, is opposed to it.

Although Norland ruled out the reopening of the US embassy in Tripoli, closed since 2014, it is becoming increasingly difficult for US Libya diplomats to justify working from neighbouring Tunisia while trying to limit Russia’s growing influence, and hoping that its coterie of corrupt proxies and ageing warlords will get the job done.

Further signs of Washington’s growing desperation could be detected, say our Egyptian sources, when Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi recently received an American request to help end the Russian presence through the Wagner Group in Libya and Sudan. The Americans, our Egyptian sources say, are now keen for the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries as soon as possible.

Regional players

The Biden administration has been pressing for months, in cooperation with some regional powers such as Egypt and the UAE, to put pressure on the military leaders in Sudan and Libya to end their relations with the Wagner group.

Washington called on the Sisi government to help persuade Field Marshal Haftar, the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, and his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, to end their dealings with Wagner, while a Libyan official said that US officials demanded the withdrawal of mercenaries from oil facilities.

However, sources close to Haftar said that the American official asked him to stop Wagner activity on Libyan soil, and warned him of sanctions and charges against of aiding and abetting the Russian mercenaries.

As part of his follow-up talks with Burns, Haftar met with American political and military envoys at his headquarters in Al-Rajma, outside Benghazi, in eastern Libya. Sources close to Haftar say he asked for Washington’s support in ending the confrontation the Turkish-financed Syrian mercenaries and Al-Dabaiba’s forces in western Libya, pointing out that he considered that the continuation of what he described as the Turkish occupation of the western region of the country was no longer acceptable.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, said that Haftar requested the repatriation of the mercenaries without delay, given that their presence was an insult to the Libyan people, and obstructs all efforts aimed at creating a security and military environment for holding the postponed elections. According to the information, Haftar asked for assurances that Turkey and the militias supporting the Dabaiba government would not attack his forces.

Oral guarantees

Haftar confirmed, according to the same sources, his response to international and regional efforts aimed at finding a political solution to the current situation, providing verbal guarantees that he does not intend to repeat the experience of his failed war against Tripoli in 2019, again.

These assurances contradict his controversial statements during successive visits to the various areas under his control, of adopting a military solution. Sources in Haftar’s forces said that instructions were issued to equip military forces to replace the Wagner elements and what they described as collaborating Chadian and Sudanese militias, without going into further details.

An announcement in April by Major General Tariq bin Ziyad, a Haftar ally, that he was stationing his forces at the Chad border after an armed Chadian faction, the “Union of Forces for Democracy and Development” led by Muhammad Nuri announced the start of the withdrawal of his forces present in Sabha city in the south of Libya towards the Chadian lands.

Haftar never acknowledged the presence of these mercenaries within the ranks of his fighting forces, but it is widely believed that they, along with the Wagner Group, supported him and helped secure the territories under its control.

Former Libyan Foreign Minister, Muhammad al-Dairi, considered that Burns’ visit indicates the growing interest of the United States in the Libyan crisis, especially in the wake of the presence of the Wagner Company, pointing to the concerns raised by US Forces Africa Command (AFRICOM) about Wagner’s activities in several statements since 2018.

Al-Dairi added: “We cannot ignore Wagner’s use of its presence in Libya in logistical support for its operations in Mali, and the recent extension of the presence of the Russian company’s forces to Burkina Faso. All of this takes place in the midst of the participation of Wagner’s forces in Russian operations in Ukraine, which increases the United States’ opposition to Wagner’s presence.”

Unofficial estimates

Starting in 2018, Haftar used Wagner mercenaries to help his forces fight against extremists in the eastern region, in addition to his failed attack on Tripoli in April 2019.

The AFRICOM leadership estimated that about 2,000 mercenaries, said to be financed by the UAE, were present in the second half of 2020 with Russian military equipment, including armored vehicles, air defense systems and combat aircraft.

The existence of Wagner has been linked to widespread human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and forced displacement of civilians.

AFRICOM presented, on more than one occasion, evidence of Russia’s involvement in the Libyan war, including its introduction of manned armed attack aircraft in an attempt to change the nature of the current conflict.

In the past, it broadcasted photographs of Russian planes taking off from bases under the control of Haftar’s forces in the cities of Al-Jufra and Sirte.

In addition to securing energy sources and checking US expansion in the Mediterranean basin, Russia seeks to restore the influence it had in the 1960s in the North African region, and its strategic interests in Libya. However, Moscow failed to convince Haftar to grant a military base on Libyan soil.

Many international human rights organizations believe that Wagner is involved in the Libyan conflict on behalf of Haftar, and is accused of war crimes, including extrajudicial killings, indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas, and the use of child soldiers.

According to a report issued in March 2021 by the United Nations Panel of Experts in Libya, between 800 and 1,200 Wagner members supported Haftar’s forces in various roles of monitoring, advising, protecting forces, and fighting.

Since the United Nations announced a ceasefire in Libya in 2020, a year after the failed war launched by Haftar’s forces to liberate Tripoli from the control of armed militias loyal to the Dabaiba government, Wagner’s efforts have been limited to training members of the National Army led by Haftar and protecting oil installations in the areas under his control. in the east and south of the country.

According to a high-ranking Egyptian official, American officials are obsessed with the Wagner file, pointing out that it tops every meeting they have, whether in Egypt or Libya.

Washington’s man on the inside 

General Mohamed Abdel Wahed, an Egyptian national security expert, believes that the Americans would like to re-establish stability in Libya, however temporarily, especially in light of the war in Ukraine between Russia and NATO, by urging all political forces to cooperate on a number of issues: the unification of military forces; holding elections in the country as soon as possible; in addition to emphasizing the importance of maintaining global energy supplies by securing oil facilities in Libya, a member of OPEC.

He added: “Washington wants to continue the American presence in the region and not leave the arena empty for greater Russian presence, whether directly or through Wagner, in light of an American strategy to expel the Russians from Syria, Libya and the Sahel region…especially after its battles and victories in Ukraine, and its heavy presence in the Sahel region and its contribution to the expulsion of the French forces there.”

What’s in it for the Libyans? General Abdel Wahed says that al-Dabaiba presented himself as a strategic partner and agent of Washington in the region, who demonstrated his willingness to advance American interests by handing over former Libyan intelligence officer Abu Ajila Lammari, accused of making the Lockerbie bomb in 1988. Flirting with Washington’s economic desires, Dababa has also pledged that his country will increase oil exports to three million barrels per day in the next three years.

Thus, the political division continues in Libya between Dabaiba’s government and the parallel government of stability mandated by the House of Representatives led by his rival, Fathi Bashagha, who insists on remaining in office without obtaining the recognition of the international community.

Unfinished mission

In any case, there is an incomplete mission for NATO, which under US and Turkish leadership,  removed the Gaddafi regime in 2011, without establishing an alternative and coherent power structure – the roots of the current instability that has left the Libyan people in the midst of chaos and ruin.

The latest proposal made by Abdoulaye Bathily, head of the United Nations mission to the UN Security Council, to resolve the political crisis there and pave the way for elections that have been postponed for two years, also lacks imagination and reveals the international community’s lack of an effective strategy.

It appears that the initial optimism in Bathily was misplaced. A lasting solution remains very distant, as Washington  continues its strategy of motion without movement.

***

Khaled Mahmoud is an Egyptian journalist covering political and Arab affairs. He has corresponded for several Arabic newspapers in the Middle East.

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Gregory Aftandilian

Recent meetings in Morocco between representatives of Libya’s two main factions, the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the West and the House of Representatives (HoR) in the East, have yielded a tentative agreement on election laws that may pave the way for holding nationwide presidential and legislative elections at some point in the near future. However, this agreement has yet to be signed by the leaders of the two factions.

The leadership’s reluctance to nail down such laws is indicative of the deep divisions that remain in Libya, which benefit the political class and the militias associated with it, but which keep the country in political chaos and fail to resolve its myriad problems, including corruption that is rampant on both sides. Although elections may not be a panacea for Libya’s ills, they would at least begin a process of national reconciliation, which the country desperately needs in order to move forward.

The Long and Divisive Road to Elections

Since 2014, Libya has been divided between two rival governments, the House of Representatives in the East, backed by the so-called Libyan National Army of self-proclaimed Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and the government in the West, based in the capital city of Tripoli. In its latest incarnation, the latter is called the Government of National Unity, and is internationally recognized. Each of these governments is supported by various militia groups, as well as outside players.

After Haftar failed to take Tripoli by force in 2019–2020, the United Nations put in place a process that led to the appointment of an interim government in February 2021 and the promise of holding presidential and legislative elections in December 2021. However, these elections failed to materialize because of sharp disagreements on their rules, as well as eligibility criteria for presidential candidates.

In the aftermath of this debacle, the interim prime minister of the GNU, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, declared that he would remain in office. The HoR charged that Dbeibah should no longer stay in this position because his tenure had expired at the end of 2021, and in February 2022, this faction appointed a rival prime minister, Fathi Bashagha. Ironically, Bashagha was interior minister in the Tripoli government when Haftar tried to take control of the city.

Bashagha thus became prime minister of the eastern faction, now called the Government of National Stability. Why Haftar and the HoR chose him as prime minister was the subject of considerable speculation, but it may have had to do with the fact that Bashagha was likely to have more legitimacy vis-à-vis Dbeibah because he once held a prominent position in the Tripoli government.

Backed by militias, Bashagha tried to enter Tripoli twice in the past year but was repelled by forces allied with Dbeibah, resulting in scores of civilian deaths. After these failures, Bashagha ensconced himself and his government in the central coastal city of Sirte.

The main reason that reconciliation has not taken place is that the opposing factions benefit from the status quo.

Then, in mid-May of this year, the HoR fired Bashagha, allegedly because of “poor performance and corruption,” but more likely because, in the words of one analyst, he had outlived his usefulness. Since he failed to take Tripoli, for the HoR faction Bashagha was no longer worth keeping on. Whether the corruption charges are true is anyone’s guess, but since most Libyan politicians are alleged to have their hands in the till, the corruption charges may have been raised simply to obfuscate other reasons for his dismissal.

One alternative theory is that Bashagha got into a dispute with members of the HoR over the budget, with him complaining that the money allocated by the Libyan Central Bank was insufficient to run his government. Another theory is that Haftar may have wanted to use Bashagha and his allied militias to try to take Tripoli without harming his own forces, and when that did not work, Bashagha was no longer needed. The HoR subsequently announced that Finance Minister Osama Hammad would temporarily take over Bashagha’s duties.

In the meantime, UN Special Envoy for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily has tried to get the election process back on track. In March 2023, he said that elections could be held by the end of the year if the two factions could iron out their differences by June. A steering committee was formed with equal representatives from the HoR and the High State Council, which is associated with the GNU. Negotiations began in Libya but were shifted to Morocco in the latter part of May.

Some Progress Announced on Elections, but Leadership Stays Aloof

On June 7, the steering committee announced from its meeting venue in Bouznika, Morocco that it had reached an agreement on presidential and parliamentary election laws. Although the details of this agreement were not revealed publicly, the announcement was the only positive news to have come out since the elections were postponed in late 2021.

A representative from the High State Council, Omar Aboulifa, claimed that, “All that is left is for parliament to ratify” the agreement. However, neither Aguila Saleh, speaker of the HoR, nor Khalid al-Mishri, leader of the High State Council, decided to sign it, thereby putting the agreement in doubt.

Indeed, according to Libyan press reporting, Saleh and al-Mishri were supposed to attend the press conference on the deal, but they chose not to because of disagreements over conditions for running for president. The two leaders had actually arrived in Morocco for the signing ceremony, but when al-Mishri reportedly left the meeting hall over the dispute the signing ceremony had to be cancelled.

It is possible that the eligibility criteria for presidential candidates may be at the root of the dispute. The GNU has maintained that dual citizens should not be allowed to run for president—a criterion that was clearly aimed at Haftar since, in addition to his Libyan nationality, he holds US citizenship based on his long residence in the United States prior to 2011.

Whether the representatives from the High State Council conceded on this point during the negotiations with the HoR representatives is hard to say; but if they did, that would account for al-Mishri leaving the meeting hall without putting his signature on the accord. For its part, the HoR is opposed to Dbeibah running for president, charging that he reneged on an earlier pledge that he would not do so when he threw his hat into the presidential ring in late 2021.

Behind-the-Scenes Talks and Entrenched Interests

Regardless of what happens with the election law agreement, it seems that Haftar and Dbeibah are exploring some type of power sharing arrangement on their own, outside of the UN process. Over the past year, Dbeibah’s nephew, Ibrahim Dbeibah and Haftar’s son, Saddam Haftar, have been engaged in an ongoing dialogue supposedly aimed at bringing about some form of reconciliation. But it is unknown whether these talks, some of which have reportedly been held in Egypt and the UAE, are serious or are just meant to buy time while each side tries to bolster its military and economic capabilities.

Dbeibah’s decision to replace the head of the Libyan National Oil Corporation in July 2022 with a Qaddafi-era official took place soon after Ibrahim Dbeibah and Saddam Haftar had a meeting in the UAE, suggesting some type of agreement on this issue. The reason behind this consensus may have had less to do with politics and more to do with illicit economic activity, according to one prominent analyst who noted that there has been an “uptick in corruption” involving the national oil corporation in recent months.

However, the main reason that reconciliation has not taken place is that the opposing factions benefit from the status quo. Neither side wants to give up power and the associated economic benefits that come along with it. Corruption is said to be widespread in both camps, to the point that the majority of Libyans see the political class as being only out for itself and not caring about the average citizen who is struggling financially.

Moreover, foreign patrons want the status quo to continue because it benefits them as well.  Despite the pledge by international actors at the Berlin Conference in January 2020 that foreign forces and foreign intervention in Libya should cease, this agreement has been widely flouted.

The Tripoli government is still supported by Turkey and its allied troops, while the eastern government has the support of Egypt, the UAE, and Russia’s notorious Wagner Group, made up of mercenaries who not only fight for a particular side in a given country but often engage in the economic exploitation of that country’s resources.

One report that circulated earlier this year among Libya observers said that the Libyan Central Bank sent the national oil corporation around $6 billion after the head of the corporation was replaced in 2022, but that this money was not used for any upgrades of Libyan oil facilities as one might expect. Instead, the money remains unaccounted for, and rumors have circulated that Haftar used part of these funds to pay the Wagner Group. These mercenaries, in addition to supporting Haftar’s 2019–2020 offensive against Tripoli, have reportedly been used to protect key military bases and major oil facilities in the eastern part of the country.

As for Turkey, it wants to stay in the good graces of the Tripoli government, in large part to maintain its support for gas exploration projects in the Mediterranean Sea that are being opposed by several neighboring governments that resent Ankara’s unilateral expansion of its maritime borders.

In addition, having friendly ties to Tripoli allows Ankara to project force in North Africa. The recent reelection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will likely mean that Turkey will not depart from this policy, nor from Libya anytime soon. As for Egypt and the UAE, while paying lip service to Libyan reconciliation and occasionally hosting meetings of the two factions, they still favor Haftar and the HoR because of their opposition to Islamists.

The Militia Problem

Since the ouster of Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, one of the main problems in Libya has been the proliferation of militias. These forces are usually allied with one political faction or the other and have been a major cause of violence and instability in the country. Efforts by the UN to undertake security sector reform through a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and integration process have largely gone nowhere, and as long as there is no unified national government, each side will see militias as useful allies in the power struggle.

Many of the militias have been involved in illicit activities, particularly in human trafficking and drug smuggling.

Many of the militias have also been involved in illicit activities, particularly in human trafficking and drug smuggling, and they sometimes turn on each other. In May 2023, the GNU’s military forces struck militias west of Tripoli in the town of Zawiya that it accused of trafficking in fuel, narcotics, and human beings. That same month, two militias, both loyal to Dbeibah, clashed in Tripoli after a member of one of the groups was arrested by GNU authorities. Although a cease-fire between the two main Libyan factions has generally held since October 2020, there have been occasional bouts of violence since then.

Unfortunately, the recent civil war in Sudan has the potential to make these matters worse.  Human trafficking, which was already a serious problem in Libya because destitute people from various African countries wanting to reach Europe often try to go through Libya, is likely to pick up as life becomes unbearable in neighboring Sudan. Some Libyan militias will undoubtedly see this development as an opportunity to exploit.

No Substitute for Elections

Although national elections may not end Libya’s myriad problems—and there is always the possibility that the losing side will not accept the results—it is hard to imagine that true national reconciliation can take place without them. Without a central national government brought about through free and fair elections, Libya will not be able to deal with its militia problem and create a true national army; nor will it be able address the corruption that is sapping the wealth of the country. But in order for these goals to be achieved, the international community must step up its efforts in Libya to persuade all foreign forces to leave and put pressure on the two main political factions to move ahead with elections.

Efforts by the steering committee in Morocco to agree on election rules seem to have been a good start, but pressure needs to be applied to both GNU and HoR leaders to accept the compromises reached in Morocco, to sign the agreement, and to set a new date for elections. After more than a decade of violence and instability, the Libyan people deserve a better future. The longer elections are postponed, the greater the chances that civil war will erupt again, with civilians continuing to suffer as they always do during conflicts.

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Gregory Aftandilian is a Nonresident Fellow at Arab Center Washington DC. He is a Senior Professorial Lecturer at American University where he teaches courses on US foreign policy. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Boston University and George Mason University, teaching courses on Middle East politics.

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