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Libya’s Nightmare Extends Far Beyond its Borders

By Tom Pollitt

Libya’s internal crisis continues to devastate the country and the wider region. The resulting “migrant crisis” is really a moral crisis, as European governments that have contributed massively to Libya’s destruction refuse to take responsibility for finding solutions. Read More

Libya: no end in sight

Summary: Libyan political activist Ashur Shamis writes that the renegade general Khalifa Haftar has no interest in peace and no strategy other than war as he bids to seize the country. Read More

Libya’s bloodshed will continue unless foreign powers stop backing Khalifa Haftar

By Frederic Wehrey

Support from the Emirates, Russia and the US is empowering the military strongman and worsening Libyans’ suffering.

In Abu Grein, on Libya’s frontline, the militiamen’s scars read like a rollcall of the wars that have roiled the country since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.

One of the fighters, a truck driver named Muhammad, removes his cap to reveal a balding pate etched with shrapnel gashes. “From Da’ish,” he says, referring to a 2016 battle he fought against Islamic State in the Libyan city of Sirte.

Now, he says, yet another foe has captured Sirte: rebel militias under the command of a 76-year-old aspiring strongman named Khalifa Haftar. Last Sunday, these militias attacked Muhammad and his men, killing 11 of them, ignoring a shaky truce in a long-running war that started last April with a blitz on the Libyan capital by Haftar’s forces.

A former army general under Gaddafi who defected in the 1980s and became a CIA asset, Haftar launched his invasion of Tripoli after years of war in eastern Libya, where he built up power. In attacking the weak, internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in the capital, he claimed he was going to unify the country and put an end to militias.

To be sure, the GNA has been unpopular due to its administrative ineptitude and deference to corrupt militias. But a promising UN-brokered process was underway to replace that government and address the militia menace before Haftar’s offensive scuttled it.

An abiding quest for power has fuelled Haftar’s rise. When I met him in 2014, he told me even then of his plans to invade Tripoli, promising to eliminate Islamists of all shades through imprisonment, exile or death.

In pursuing his ambitions, he has deployed brutal tactics. In 2015, his allied militias in Benghazi admitted to me that they had carried out summary executions and stoked tribal divisions. One of his lieutenants faces a standing arrest warrant for war crimes; Haftar responded to this by promoting him.

The war he launched in Tripoli has caused misgivings among his supporters. Far from the quick victory he promised, it has been a drawn-out slog that has left more than 2,000 dead, including hundreds of civilians, and displaced hundreds of thousands. Most alarmingly, the conflict has drawn in outside powers who have sustained it with hi-tech weaponry– all in contravention of a UN arms embargo.

On Haftar’s side is a bloc of authoritarian and anti-Islamist Arab states: the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Emirates’ role has been especially destructive – its drones and fixed-wing aircraft have conducted hundreds of strikes, according to the United Nations, causing scores of civilian deaths.

French support is also key. Driven by a misplaced zeal for Haftar’s virtues as a counterterrorist and stabiliser, Paris has been sending him clandestine military aid for several years.

Added to this are the hundreds of Russian mercenaries who arrived at the Tripoli front last September, helping Haftar break the stalemate. While Moscow is not firmly wedded to the general, its strategy seems to be to egg him on and then reel him in, in order to shape a settlement to its liking. But that has not gone entirely to plan; last month, he walked out of a ceasefire meeting convened by Moscow.

On the other side is Turkey, whose Islamist-led government has long been at odds with the Emirati-led bloc. Not long after Haftar’s attack, Turkey dispatched armed drones of its own to the GNA and in recent weeks it has sent thousands of Syrian mercenaries, along with Turkish intelligence personnel, air defence systems and artillery.

But this came at a cost: Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is providing this new round of aid only after signing an accord with the GNA that enables Turkey to extend its exclusive economic zone in the eastern Mediterranean.

A much-hyped international summit hosted by the German government took place earlier this month, but it failed to formalise a ceasefire – Haftar effectively spurned the talks. And indeed, in recent days, emboldened by the increased flow of Emirati arms, he has effectively restarted the war, bombing Tripoli’s airport and civilian areas and blockading oil ports, which has caused production to drop dramatically and worsened the misery of Libyans. It’s part of a creeping escalation that could embroil the capital in even more bloodshed.

Averting this catastrophe demands a greater role from the one power that might be able to rein in Haftar. “Haftar will not accept a ceasefire unless America twists his ear,” a GNA commander told me.

That may well be right. Washington needs to jettison its tacit and sometimes explicit support for Haftar, epitomised in a phone call in April 2019 by Donald Trump to the general endorsing his attack on Tripoli.

While that enthusiasm has somewhat cooled because of Haftar’s alliance with the Russians, there’s still more that the US can do, especially in areas where Washington has unique leverage.

These include halting Haftar’s illegal effort to unilaterally sell oil on the global market, getting the Emirates to stop arming his forces, and backing a UN security council ceasefire resolution that would include strong provisions against embargo violators and human rights abusers.

In the meantime, it’s Libyans who suffer: from the constant fear of shelling or air strikes, 16-hour blackouts and the sense that their fates are being decided from abroad. “Libya’s like a cake,” the mayor of Yefren, a town in Libya’s western mountains, told me last month. “Everybody wants a bite.”

***

Frederic Wehrey is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya.

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The Guardian

Libyan Oil Blockade Could Drag On For “Months”

By Scott Carpenter

In early July 2018, things were looking bleak for general Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA). A couple weeks earlier, the LNA had seized control of four key ports in the eastern half of Libya, an area already largely under its control. Read More

Hifter and the strategic goal to invade Tripoli

Will Hifter escape the trap he set himself since the early days

By Ashur Shamis

Since Hifter took upon himself the goal to invade and control the city of Tripoli as a strategic military objective, Hifter has taken the first steps on an irreversible path. Either invading the capital or death. Heftir fell into a dilemma, a trap, with no exit strategy. Read More

Libya in the African context

Libya is at war with itself, but how did we get to this point?

By Mucahid Durmaz

Not too long ago, the picture was completely different. In 2008, Libya was hosting an African Union (AU) summit, and its dictator, sporting a robe and wraparound sunglasses, was on stage to be declared “King of Kings” of Africa by more than 200 African chiefs.  Read More

Russia’s Growing Interests in Libya

By Anna Borshchevskaya

As in other conflict zones, Moscow cares little about reaching a peace deal so long as it can outmaneuver the West strategically while securing port and energy access—with private contractors playing an increasingly important role. Read More

Why peace initiatives in Libya are failing

And what can be done about it?

By Noha Aboueldahab
This month has seen several failed attempts by foreign powers to broker a ceasefire in Libya.

First, Fayez al-Sarraj, who heads Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), refused to travel to Rome when he learned that his adversary, renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar, would be present at a meeting convened by Italian Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte.

A week later in Moscow, al-Sarraj signed a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement, but Haftar walked out without signing.

And then, the leaders of Germany, France, Russia, Turkey, Egypt and several other countries gathered in Berlin to jumpstart a peace process on Libya.

The final communique of the conference called on all parties to respect the nearly decade-old UN arms embargo on Libya – an embargo many of those powers have repeatedly violated – and reaffirmed the need for a political, rather than a military, solution to the conflict.

The renewed call to respect the arms embargo is sensible but it lacks a plan for sanctioning those countries that continue to violate it.

Meanwhile, the complex situation on the ground in Libya has worsened. Even while the Berlin meeting was in session, pro-Haftar protesters and militias blocked four key oil terminals.

Recently, Turkey announced the deployment of its troops to Libya to back the GNA. The country has already seen the presence of mercenaries from a number of countries including Chad, Sudan, Syria and Russia.

This has exacerbated an already complex situation on the ground, making it difficult for the UN and other peace-brokers to navigate.

In this context, the failure of European and Middle Eastern actors to stabilise the situation in Libya comes as no surprise, particularly since many of the so-called peace-brokers have actually fed the violence through, for example, repeated violations of the arms embargo.

In their interventions in the Libyan conflict, some foreign actors have been pursuing opposing visions for the future of the region. Others, in particular the Europeans, have intervened, hoping to secure economic gains in Libya and its assistance in keeping migrants away from European borders.

None have had the best interest of the Libyans in mind. This is quite clear from the absence of representatives of Libyan civil society and grassroots organisations in many of these “peace” initiatives sponsored by foreign powers.

While the fate of Libya continues to be negotiated in various European and Arab cities, the aspirations of Libyans continue to be swept aside. But it does not have to be this way.

Libyans can still take the peace process into their own hands. An existing framework, known as the National Conference Process (NCP), is a good starting point. 

The NCP was a consultative process launched in 2018 and led by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue with the support of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

The consultations were informed by the participation of 7,000 Libyans across the country. They resulted in a final report that outlined Libyan consensus on various policy areas that must be addressed to build the country.

It might seem futile to return to a process of national reconciliation while fighting is ongoing, but the outcomes outlined in the NCP’s final report still provide a critical opportunity to build a Libya by Libyans for Libyans – even during protracted conflict.

Given the current fragmentation of Libya’s political leadership, domestic civil society and business actors should shepherd this process, even if on the sidelines of the brutal theatre of war.

These actors include local security and military figures, municipalities and community leaders – many of whom were involved in the NCP consultations themselves in 2018.

Much of the current fighting is over resource distribution and power – no doubt a central reason why several foreign governments in Europe and the Middle East are scrambling to retain influence and control in Libya.

Distribution of power and resources is one of the five policy areas identified in the NCP report, alongside national and government priorities, security and defence, constitutional and electoral processes, and national reconciliation.

Haftar’s offensive in April 2019 was an attempt to take control of Tripoli by force, and it put an abrupt stop to plans to hold the national conference that same month.  

The national reconciliation process was meant to pave the way for presidential and parliamentary elections in Libya, after which the priorities outlined in the report would be among the issues addressed to build the country. 

It is no wonder, then, that Haftar and his army timed their offensive to thwart any kind of meaningful dialogue, especially a Libyan-owned one, whereby his legitimacy would have certainly been undercut.

But the NCP is, as its name indicates, a process as opposed to a mere two-day conference. The work of Libyan community leaders, civil society and security sector figures that drove the national conference consultations need not stand still because of the persistent fighting.

It could, as Yemeni civil society leaders have done through initiatives such as the Yemen Peace Forum, be used to organise strategic workshops at the community level in more stable areas in Libya.

Of course, certain Libyan organisations have indeed been working together, but there needs to be a more coherent process that also aims to develop the policy areas identified in the NCP. If the military conflict makes this option difficult, there is a robust group of Libyan civil society leaders operating in the diaspora who could, together with local community leaders based in Libya, pursue such initiatives in other safe spaces.

It is difficult to envisage any follow-through on the implementation of the NCP policy areas in the absence of the participation of Libya’s rival governments, or at least that of the GNA. It is even more difficult to envisage this without elections. But it is not impossible.

Libya’s civil society both domestically and in the diaspora has been quietly, but actively, working to support the various policy areas outlined in the NCP.

Those efforts must be supported – and not meddled with – by the international community. They form a crucial part of the groundwork needed to re-build Libya once the violence subsides.

Without support for such efforts, foreign military and political interference – the very problem that the NCP explicitly warns against – will continue to be afforded more space as the demands of Libyans continue to be ignored.

As the political squabbling continues in European cities, and as the fighting rages on in Tripoli and other parts of the country, the vision that Libyans put forward in the NCP should no longer be deferred. 

It is time to revive the National Conference Process in Libya, with or without a ceasefire agreement.

***

Noha Aboueldahab is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Doha Centre.

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Libya was present in Berlin, but the Libyans weren’t

By Amira Abo el-Fetouh

Things went downhill after Turkey signed two agreements with Libya’s internationally-recognised Government of National Accord, one related to the delineation of the maritime borders between the two countries in the Mediterranean, and the other for military cooperation between Turkey and the GNA in Tripoli. Read More

Can Diplomacy Stop the War in Libya?

By group of authors (*)

In the conflict over Libya, a North African country of considerable strategic importance for Europe, three countries have been setting the agenda betting on a military solution: Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. Read More